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Can solar plus storage fix one of the thorniest problems of the energy transition?

To talk about renewable energy these days is to talk about power lines. “No transition without transmission” has become something of a mantra among a legion of energy wonks. And following the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act, which contains a massive pot of subsidies for non-carbon-emitting power but little in the way of delivering it, legislative and regulatory attention has turned to getting that power from where it’s sunny and windy to where it’s needed.
Hardly a day goes by in which some industry group or environmental nonprofit isn’t assaulting the inboxes of climate journalists like myself with another study or white paper stressing the need for more transmission. But I’ve also recently noticed a newer group of advocates popping up: the battery stans.
Now, virtually everyone in the renewable energy space loves talking about the massive growth and potential of batteries to store power generated by renewables for when it’s needed most. Here the Inflation Reduction Act’s honeypot of subsidies and the long economic trends are working together. The price of batteries really is falling dramatically, and their deployment has been ramped up.
For most people, batteries are a complement to transmission upgrades. But to a much smaller group, the falling prices of solar and batteries may obviate the need for transmission expansion entirely.
Let’s start with the more mild case. As Duncan Campbell, Vice President at Scale Microgrids told me, “If you go deep on power grid expansion modeling studies, they all assume an enormous build-out of transmission well beyond what we’ve done in the past and I think demonstrated to be well beyond the current institutional capacity.” In other words, you can pencil in as much transmission build-out as you want, but the chances we’ll actually do it seem at least short of certain. “It’s quite reasonable to suggest when doing something super ambitious that it’s a good idea to have a diversified approach,” he said.
That diversified approach, for Campbell, includes storage and generation both on the transmission part of the grid — like utility-scale storage paired with solar arrays — and on the distribution side of the grid, like rooftop solar and garage batteries. The latter two examples can also work together as a “virtual power plant” to modulate consumption based on when power is most expensive or cheap and even sometimes send power back to the grid at times of stress.
“At the end of the day it seems undeniably prudent to think about what solutions are going to complement large-scale transmission build-out if we want to meet these goals. Otherwise it’s a concentrated approach that carries a lot of risks,” Campbell told me. “Technologically, VPPs and DER [distributed energy resources] can help. Especially in those worst situations.”
This balanced approach would not actually face much opposition from advocates for a substantial transmission build-out, even if sometimes this “debate” — especially on Twitter, I’m sorry, especially on X — can get polarized and contentious.
“They’re complementary, not competitive,” Ric O’Connell, the executive director of GridLab, told me. “Transmission moves energy around in space, storage moves around in time. You need both.”
O’Connell pointed out that storage in some cases could be thought of a transmission asset, something analogous to the wires and poles that move electricity, where power could be moved on very short time frames to help out with extremely high levels of demand, a lack of generation, or transmission congestion. We’ve seen this already in Texas, where storage has helped take the bite out of extremely high demand recently, and in California, where it has helped alleviate the rapid disappearance of solar power every evening.
“The shorter duration storage stuff is working to address congestion and streamline transmission operations. In that sense you can put it in the same category as a grid enhancing technology,” O’Connell said.
While nearly everyone I talked to was eager to say that storage and transmission could complement each other, even if some leaned on transmission more and others were more bullish on storage and distributed energy, there was one person who actually did represent a clear and polarizing view: Casey Handmer.
Handmer is a Cal Tech trained physicist who used to write software for the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and founded Terraform Industries, an early stage start up that’s looking to develop the “Terraformer,” a solar-powered factory that would create synthetic natural gas. Immodestly, he “aims to displace the majority of fossil hydrocarbon production by 2035.”
More modestly, he describes himself as “effectively a puffed up blogger who runs a pre-revenue (i.e. default dead) startup in an area peripheral (at best) to grid issues,” but is nonetheless, again, immodestly “pretty confident that my analysis is correct,” he told me in an email.
“My views on this matter are unconventional, even controversial. Arguably this is my spiciest hot take on the future of energy,” he wrote on his blog.
He thinks that the falling price of solar and batteries will make large-scale transmission investments unnecessary.
The price declines in battery and solar will continue, allowing people and businesses to throw up solar wherever, pair it with batteries, to the point where solar is “5-15x” overbuilt. That would mean that solar wouldn’t need to be backed up by any kind of “clean firm” power, i.e. a source that can produce carbon-free electricity at any time, like nuclear power, pumped-hydro, green hydrogen, or natural gas with carbon capture and storage.
While extreme, his views are not so, so, so far off from other renewables maximalists, who view solar and battery price declines as essentially inexorable. If they’re right, resource adequacy issues (i.e. that it’s much more sunny in some places than others) could be overcome by just building more cheap solar and installing more batteries.
“Adding 12 hours of storage to the entire U.S. grid would not happen overnight, but on current trends would cost around $500 billion and pay for itself within a few years. This is a shorter timescale than the required manufacturing ramp, meaning it could be entirely privately funded. By contrast, upgrading the U.S. transmission grid could cost $7 trillion over 20 years,” Handmer wrote in July.
As for the case that transmission is needed to get solar power from where it’s sunnier (like southern Europe or the American Southwest) to where it isn’t (Northern Europe, the rest of America), Handmer argues this isn’t really a problem.
“Solar resource quality doesn't matter that much. Solar resource is much more evenly distributed than, say, oil,” he told me. “Almost all humans live close to where their grandparents were able to grow food to live, and crops only grow in places that are roughly equally sunny.” He also argued that “solar is about 1000x more productive in terms of energy produced per unit land used than agriculture,” so building it will be economically compelling in huge swathes of the world.
As he acknowledges, his view is pretty lonely. He seems to yada-yada away what developments in battery technology would be needed to make this all work (although presumably ever-cheapening solar could just charge more lithium-ion batteries). One estimate suggests that to have “the greatest impact on electricity cost and firm generation,” battery storage would have to extend out to 100 hours — about 25X more than they do now.
This is where I say what you’re already thinking. This combination of technofuturism, contrarianism, work experience in the space industry and comfort with back-of-the-envelope math to make strong assertions makes Handmer sound like — and I mean this in the most value-neutral, descriptive way possible — another proponent of the rooftop solar, home battery, electric car future: Elon Musk. (Handmer used to work at the Musk-inspired Hyperloop One).
When I asked him why he’s an admitted outlier on this, he chalked it up to “anchoring bias in the climate space ... before solar and batteries got cheap, analyses showed that increasing the size of the grid was the best way to counter wind intermittency. But when the assumptions and data change, the results change too. The future of electricity is local. As a physicist, I was trained to take unusual observations to their utmost conclusion.”
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Big questions about naval strategy and the oil economy with Cornell University’s Nicolas Mulder.
After negotiations between the United States and Iran broke down Sunday without a deal, the United States Central Command said it would “begin implementing a blockade of all maritime traffic entering and exiting Iranian ports” Monday morning.
It’s hardly like traffic through the Strait of Hormuz had been unencumbered before that. The strait has been largely closed to through traffic since the beginning of March thanks to the threat of Iranian strikes on ships going in and out of the Persian Gulf. That has remained the case even after the ceasefire deal was supposed to have opened up the waterway last week. Only a few countries have been able to get their tankers out, mostly those with close trade relationships with Iran, including China.
President Trump has been seeking to reverse that state of play and open the strait to non-Iranian traffic (e.g. oil, liquified natural gas, and fertilizer coming in and out of the Gulf states), whether by badgering European allies to help clear the strait and by having U.S. Navy ships traverse the channel to clear mines and demonstrate it’s safe to navigate. He appears to have ultimately settled on blockading the blockaders.
The president said Monday on Truth Social that 34 ships had sailed through the strait on Sunday, a number that has not been confirmed by third party sources. In the run-up to the U.S. blockade, about 10 to 12 ships were sailing through the strait per day, according to marine data service Kpler and The New York Times.
So, is the blockade an escalation of U.S. pressure on Iran? A violation of the ceasefire? A “pacific blockade” designed to pressure Iran without resorting to direct strikes? And how would it work, anyway?
I spoke with Nicolas Mulder, an assistant professor of history at Cornell University and the author of The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War, to try and get some of my questions answered. This interview has been condensed and edited for clarity.
Let’s start from the beginning. What is a naval blockade? And how does it different from typical naval warfare?
A naval blockade is actually interesting because it is a form of warfare that has been quite regulated for quite a long time already under international law. A lot of our modern understanding of the laws of belligerence and neutrality actually comes from blockades because they impose an important stricture on international maritime traffic. As a result, they raise all sorts of questions about who wars are fought between, and what wars mean for the civilian economies of the countries involved, and what they mean for the relationship of the belligerent states and third countries.
For most of U.S. history, the U.S. was not the blockader, but the neutral wanting to bypass blockades. The reason that the United States concretely intervened in the First World War and began to really involve itself with the power politics of Eurasia in 1917 is because it insisted on its neutral rights to trade with Britain when Germany had declared an unrestricted submarine warfare campaign that was effectively a blockade of the British Isles.
Even before that, the Union used it against the Confederacy.
In the 18th century, all the big great power wars — the Seven Years War, the various succession wars, the Napoleonic Wars — all of those involved blockades.
What I find interesting is that we have this ceasefire. We have these negotiations, which are apparently still going on. But then we also have the blockade. You seem to be arguing that blockades are a part of warfare. So, is this implying that the U.S. Navy is still potentially going to be shooting at stuff, even if there’s a so-called ceasefire?
That’s the big uncertain aspect of the current situation. We are not back into the same war that we were in last week before the ceasefire took effect. The way I would interpret this is that it’s a kind of fudge. From the perception of the Trump administration, it needs to do something to not look weak, but at the same time wants to avoid the risks of a full resumption of kinetic warfare and a massive air campaign, which they had pursued for six weeks to very mixed and disappointing effects.
The one historical parallel that I think can help us make sense of what they may be attempting to do now is the practice in the 19th century of “pacific blockade.” There were several conflicts, beginning in the 1820s with the Greek War of Independence and then through a whole bunch of Latin American wars and Asian conflicts, where European great powers would blockade small countries — not to declare war on them, but to prevent any of their ships from entering or leaving to put serious pressure on them.
What they were doing in that situation was to use wartime levels of pressure without initiating the full war because they knew that the target states were basically too weak to retaliate and did not have the naval power to contest that blockade.
How can we see this operation in Iran as part of a continuum of using these strangulation-type strategies against much weaker opponents?
One way to interpret what they’re trying to do now is to apply that Venezuela-Cuba template to Iran, and to wager that if they play this carefully, they might be able to bring real economic pressure to bear without provoking Iran into as full-scale a retaliation as it was undertaking before.
But that Venezuela-Cuba template is difficult to implement in the case of Iran for two simple reasons. One is just that Iran has, of course, shown that it has quite a lot of military capacity to retaliate with drones and missiles, and also mines and small ships and submarines. It also has the ability to widen its own maritime disruption in the region, for example by working with the Houthis to really stem the flow of traffic through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait.
What works in the Western Hemisphere, where the United States has a really unrivaled military dominance, may not be reproducible in this strategic theater.
What does the geography tell you about the ability to impose or contest a blockade like this?
They may be doing it with multiple rings, or multiple screens — a light initial screen, and then bigger barriers of ships a bit further away, so as to not risk most of their force too close to the Iranian coastline. We saw in the early phase of the war that some carrier strike groups began to operate over time further and further away from the Iranian coast, presumably to avoid the risk of being hit with missiles and drones.
In this case, one of the questions is, what kind of resources are needed to keep that going? The U.S. did run a blockade against Iraq for most of the 1990s that was in the Persian Gulf itself, which is very narrow. Iraq’s ports are a tiny sliver of land that ends in the Persian Gulf. So that was a very small stretch of coastline.
Iran should still be manageable, but it will require a wider screen, and potentially one that really crosses the entire Arabian Sea somewhere from the southern coast of Oman, diagonally, northeastwards to Pakistan, or at least the Pakistan-Iranian border, and potentially a bit further out. And if there is also interference in the Red Sea, then the U.S. Navy is going to have to route most of disabled forces all the way around Cape of Good Hope to move that whole force into the Indian Ocean.
I think that the Red Sea contingency is quite important to how this shapes up.
CENTCOM said yesterday that this blockade is on ships going in and out of Iranian ports. I wonder if this is unique historically — both a blockade of Iran and trying to impose freedom of navigation elsewhere?
It’s interesting, right? Because indeed, there is the commitment to freedom of navigation. But then it also has been suggested that the U.S. Navy will stop all ships that have paid any toll or transit fee to the [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps], and that paying that toll ipso facto would make their passage illegal. For that I don’t know any good historical precedent.
The other historical precedent is probably actually the Ottoman Empire and Russia and World War I. The Ottoman Empire was bottling up Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in the Black Sea by its control over the Turkish straits, which actually imposed a really serious, long run cost on the Russian economy. It’s one of the things that really fed us in the Russian Revolution. But at the same time, the Ottoman Empire was itself being blockaded by British and French forces in the Mediterranean.
Iran is blockading [Gulf Cooperation Council] states selectively — though of course, it is allowing through some shipments. But those shipments are then going to be intercepted, presumably by the Americans. So the de facto result of it is that no one is really going to be able to leave the Gulf. And that’s kind of where I see this game theoretically ending up.
So it seems like the result of this won’t be hugely different than what things were a few weeks ago, just with fewer Iranian ships getting out.
Also ships of those countries that negotiated transit with Iran.
If you looked at the news coming out of Asia and the diplomatic communiques of a large number of Asian states that brokered bilateral arrangements with Iran — so Pakistan, India; Bangladesh had done so; China, of course — but also countries that have otherwise fairly good links with the United States — the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam — all of them had essentially accepted that some payment to the IRGC was now the new cost of doing business. They were so desperately in need of energy supplies for the population that they decided to enter negotiations, even if, in principle, they would prefer freedom of navigation.
The likely diplomatic contestation or diplomatic issues coming out of this blockade are also going to be related to Asia, and that’s where I would focus our attention.
On Hungary’s political earthquake, mining in Argentina, and the Sam Altman attack
Current conditions: A storm corridor is set to pummel a swath of the United States from the Plains to Great Lakes for the next days • Super Typhoon Sinlaku is barreling toward Guam, where it is poised to make landfall as the equivalent of a Category 5 hurricane, while to the south Cyclone Vaianu forces hundreds of evacuations on New Zealand’s North Island • Santo Domingo, the Dominican Republic’s sprawling capital, is facing days of intense thunderstorms as floods displace cars in the Caribbean’s largest city.
Contrary to popular parlance, the Strait of Hormuz hasn’t been closed these past few weeks. It’s just been closed to any cargo not approved by the Iranian government. As I told you last week, a Wall Street analyst who went on a Gonzo reporting mission armed with Cuban cigars and packets of Zyn nicotine pouches to the Persian Gulf chokepoint concluded that billions of dollars of goods were passing through the waterway, but only on Iranian-flagged ships or Chinese vessels enjoying the benefits of political alignment with the Islamic Republic. After talks this weekend failed to reach a deal to fully reopen the Strait of Hormuz, the United States is planning a naval blockade to prevent any ships from passing and subject Tehran to the same pressure Washington is facing from the closure. That’s what President Donald Trump announced Sunday in a series of posts on Truth Social. In a reversal of last week’s ceasefire deal, Trump said the U.S. would “interdict every vessel” in international waters that passed through the Strait of Hormuz after paying Iran a toll, calling such a levy “illegal” and “world extortion.”
Oil prices spiked again in response to the president’s announcement. Already, as Heatmap’s Robinson Meyer reported last week, the war has cost Americans $17 billion at the pump. And even with the ceasefire in place, the end of the energy shock looked hazy at best, analyst Rory Johnston said on the most recent episode of the Heatmap podcast Shift Key.

For nearly two decades, Viktor Orbán ruled over Hungary with an increasingly tight-gripped fist, maintaining the closest relationship between Russia and any NATO country and providing what’s widely considered a blueprint for the West’s illiberal right to reduce checks on the power of the ruling party in a democracy. In February, his government oversaw the official start of construction on Paks II, a major new nuclear project Hungary hired the Russian state-owned Rosatom to build. Now Orbán’s 16-year tenure is coming to an end after rival conservative Péter Magyar won Sunday’s election in a landslide. During the heated campaign, which saw Vice President JD Vance visit Hungary to campaign on Orbán’s behalf in the closing days, Magyar depicted the incumbent right-wing ruler as a corrupt authoritarian selling out the country to its former Soviet imperial rulers in Moscow and vowed to rebuild Budapest’s ties with the European Union and NATO. That could spell trouble for Paks II. The project has stood out as the Kremlin’s last new commercial foothold in the West’s nuclear industry. At the start of the Ukraine war in 2022, Finland canceled a domestic joint venture with Rosatom. The U.S. nuclear giant Westinghouse, meanwhile, has cut deal after deal to supply Russian-made VVER reactors in Slovakia and Bulgaria with America-made fuel assemblies. Last summer, the Orbán administration said it had, as a result of its chummy relationship with the Trump administration, persuaded Washington to exempt Paks II from U.S. sanctions. The project’s fate under a Magyar government is uncertain, though at least one expert I spoke to on Sunday afternoon suggested the new prime minister may seek to renegotiate the deal with Rosatom to provide for more EU oversight or better terms. Canceling Paks II, which would significantly bolster the grid in a country already reliant on nuclear power for nearly half its electricity, seems unlikely at this point.
Meanwhile, Russia is getting some new competition from a European rival. Until recently, Rosatom was the only foreign company willing to invest in nuclear reactors in India, where a civil liability law passed in 2010 threatened to bankrupt developers if any accident occurred. In December, as I reported to you at the time, India passed legislation reforming the statute in a bid to attract more overseas investments into its growing atomic power sector. It’s working. The U.S. nuclear heavyweight Holtec International, which is attempting to build its 300-megawatt small modular reactors in Michigan, has expressed interest. Now the French nuclear giant EDF is exploring potential projects in the world’s most populous nation, World Nuclear News reported last week. In another bullish sign, regulators in South Korea, the democratic world’s most competent reactor builder, just approved the country’s latest plant to start up.
Argentina’s right-wing President Javier Milei notched a major legislative win last week after lawmakers in the lower house of the country’s legislature approved an overhaul of a landmark glacier protection law in a 137-to-11 vote. The victory opens “the door to mining near some of South America’s most important freshwater reserves,” the Financial Times reported, by giving provincial authorities greater discretion to determine which glacial areas warrant protection. The bill already passed in the Argentinian Senate, meaning Milei only needs to sign the legislation. He’s expected to do so. Milei pitched the bill as a way to free up areas “incorrectly classified as glaciers” to mineral extraction as his government seeks to tap Argentina’s rich lithium resources. But critics aren’t so sure. “This will not give investors the legal certainty they are looking for,” Andrés Nápoli, executive director of the Environment and Natural Resources Foundation, told the newspaper.
Milei signed a critical minerals pact with the U.S. in February as the Trump administration looks to secure non-Chinese supplies of key metals.
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Maybe the attacker was angry about data centers. Maybe the assailant took issue with OpenAI itself, or the way Sam Altman — a lightning rod figure in the American tech industry and the subject of a recent investigation in The New Yorker that raised questions about a uniquely powerful executive’s judgment — operates. Maybe the man who threw a Molotov cocktail at Altman’s San Francisco home on Friday was just compelled by illness or altered brain chemistry to act out violently against a public figure who’s been unmissable in the media. But the fact that the incident occurred less than a week after a gunman fired bullets into the home of an Indianapolis city councilmember who spoke out in support of a data center project does appear to be part of a worrying trend of violence. As Heatmap’s Jael Holzman wrote last week, the Indianapolis shooting, in which (thankfully) the lawmaker and his young son were not hurt, was the third such incident this year, “indicating the bubbling angst against data centers really does have potential to turn violent.”
In a post on his personal blog, Altman shared a photo of his husband, Oliver Mulherin, and their 1-year-old son and said he had “underestimated the power of words and narratives” amid what he admitted was an “extremely intense, chaotic, and high-pressure few years in the artificial intelligence industry. “A lot of the criticism of our industry comes from sincere concern about the incredibly high stakes of this technology. This is quite valid, and we welcome good-faith criticism and debate,” Altman wrote. “I empathize with anti-technology sentiments and clearly technology isn’t always good for everyone. But overall, I believe technological progress can make the future unbelievably good, for your family and mine.”
Battery recycling startup Ascend Elements will file for bankruptcy this Thursday, according to Bloomberg. The Massachusetts-based company raised more than $1.1 billion in equity and grants over the past 11 years as it sought to build out production from its factory reprocessing old batteries into cathode material in Georgia. But “the financial difficulties were insurmountable,” the company said.
Last summer, I told you about an abandoned green hydrogen project in Australia amid a spate of cancellations worldwide. But now a new 1.5-gigawatt project, the Murchison Green Hydrogen facility in Western Australia, has been selected for a fast-track approval under the national government’s new pilot program to speed up permitting, according to Hydrogen Insight. The program is reserved for projects of “national significance.”
The tech giant had been by far the nascent industry’s biggest customer.
Microsoft has begun telling suppliers and partners that it is pausing future purchases of carbon removal, according to two people who have been informed of its plans.
The news deals a potentially major setback to the fledgling carbon removal industry, which has relied on Microsoft’s voluntary corporate buying as an anchor source of early demand. The technology giant has made the overwhelming majority of carbon removal purchases in recent years.
It’s not yet clear whether the company could still increase its investment in existing projects or when it might resume purchases in the future.
In a statement, a Microsoft spokesperson denied that the company was indefinitely pausing all of its purchases. “We continually review and assess our carbon removal portfolio along with market conditions for the optimal balance on our path to carbon negative,” she said.
Industry data suggests that Microsoft has done more than any other private company — and arguably any organization on Earth — to support early-stage technologies that could withdraw or eliminate carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.
It has purchased 45 million tons of carbon removal, according to its own releases. The next-largest buyer of carbon removal credits — Frontier, a coalition of large companies led by the payments processing firm Stripe — has bought 1.8 million tons of carbon removal.
Microsoft made 90% of all carbon removal purchases worldwide last year, according to data from the third-party industry monitor CDR.fyi. The company is generally cited as making somewhere between 79% to 90% of all historic carbon removal purchases.
Microsoft also published guidelines about what it considered “ideal” carbon removal projects, setting de facto early industry standards for technologies including direct air capture, soil carbon management, and enhanced rock weathering.
The tech company has backed carbon removal in large part to meet its aggressive internal climate goals. Microsoft has pledged to become “carbon negative” by 2030, meaning that it must remove more greenhouse gases from the atmosphere than it emits within four years. The company also aims to eliminate its half century of historic carbon emissions by 2050.
Like other major tech firms, including Google and Meta, Microsoft has struggled to square its years-old climate goals with the urgent need to power energy-hungry AI data centers. But it has generally been seen as more environmentally friendly than other tech firms.
When Heatmap polled climate insiders late last year, Microsoft and Google were seen as the two AI tech developers who were “best” on climate. (Meta and Amazon got failing marks.)
Microsoft was making carbon removal announcements as recently as this week. It announced its most recent purchase of CDR credits only three days ago, when it bought more than 620,000 tons of credits from an indigenous-owned bioenergy carbon capture and storage project in Saskatchewan, Canada.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change considers carbon removal — technologies and methods that can reduce the amount of heat-trapping pollution in the atmosphere on century-long time scales — to be essential to meet the Paris Agreement’s climate goals.
By 2050, the world will need to remove 7 to 9 billion tons of carbon dioxide each year in order to hold to its Paris targets, according to an independent 2024 report.
Microsoft’s apparent pause comes at a lean time for the carbon removal industry, because the Trump administration has declined to spend — and in some cases even reassigned — funds previously authorized to encourage the development of the technology. For instance, the Energy Department says it plans to use more than $500 million in carbon removal funding to prop up aging coal plants.
Congress has been more generous to carbon removal, which has historically drawn more bipartisan support than other clean energy technologies. The 2026 federal spending law included more than $116 million to support carbon removal research and set up a federal purchasing program. With Microsoft’s shift, that purchasing scheme will be more important than ever.