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If there’s one climate policy you’re likely to hear about in the debt ceiling deal, it’s the Mountain Valley Pipeline.
The 304-mile pipeline, which will link West Virginia’s booming gas fields to the East Coast and Texas, essentially received automatic approval under the bipartisan deal. The bill compels federal agencies to approve the pipeline and then shields those permits from judicial review, all but guaranteeing the project’s eventual completion.
If nothing else, the deal brings the saga over the Mountain Valley Pipeline to a close almost a year after it began: The White House initially agreed to support the project last year in exchange for Senator Joe Manchin of West Virginia’s support for Biden’s climate law. But neither Manchin nor Biden could get a bill containing the pipeline through Congress last year as part of a larger package of permitting reforms. Manchin persevered, and the pipeline wriggled into the deal over the weekend thanks to House Republicans and oil-and-gas lobbyists. Manchin, it seems, finally has his pipeline.
The project isn’t the most important climate item in the deal. That distinction has to go to the deal’s preservation of the Inflation Reduction Act, which will ensure hundreds of billions of dollars go to clean energy and infrastructure over the next decade. Nor is it the deal’s worst blow to the climate: As I wrote yesterday, Democrats’ failure to secure any power-grid reform takes that title.
Yet the Mountain Valley Pipeline, or MVP, is the item that environmental groups have focused on the most. “Allowing this deal to advance sets a dangerous precedent,” Ben Jealous, the Sierra Club’s executive director, said in a statement. “We can pay America’s bills without undermining bedrock environmental protections or fast tracking the fracked gas Mountain Valley Pipeline.”
So I was curious: How big a deal is the MVP? When completed, it will transmit 2 billion cubic feet of natural gas a day: What does that actually mean for the country’s natural gas transmission?
Well, here’s a potentially helpful chart:

This is the Energy Information Administration’s chart of new natural-gas pipeline capacity from 1995 to 2022 with my addition. I’ve added the MVP’s capacity at the right. As you can see, the MVP alone will add more pipeline capacity than the entire U.S. added last year — but that’s partially because the country added much less capacity in 2022 than it has in any year since records began in 1995.
I’ll be honest that the chart helps me think more clearly about the project, but not in a way that’s easy to describe. The Mountain Valley Pipeline is a medium-largeish pipeline — big enough to single-handedly expand the country’s ability to move natural gas, but not so big that it will change the fundamental trend that fewer new pipelines are getting built every year.
The MVP’s most important effect may not be its size, but its strategic location: By connecting the productive Utica and Marcellus shale fields in Appalachia to the Transcontinental pipeline, a massive backbone conduit that links New Jersey to the Rio Grande Valley, it will make it easier for cheap natural gas to reach the population centers — and export terminals — of the Eastern Seaboard and Gulf Coast. That will, in turn, spur a modest increase in natural-gas drilling, which could increase American emissions by roughly 6 to 16 million metric tons a year, according to an estimate from The Washington Post.
The Inflation Reduction Act, by comparison, will eliminate roughly 660 million tons a year by 2030. So preserving the IRA is worth the carbon cost of this pipeline — but it would be better, of course, not to have to make such a choice at all.
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And not for the first time.
The Department of Energy proposed sweeping changes to its rules for updating efficiency standards for household appliances on Thursday. If finalized, they would hamstring future administrations from issuing tighter standards that would save consumers money as higher-performing air conditioners, stoves, washing machines, refrigerators, and the like hit the market.
While the agency portrayed the move as bringing an end to appliance standards writ large, that is not, in fact, what it is doing. The proposal would update the DOE’s so-called “Process Rule,” which governs how the agency develops standards, adding onerous requirements that will make it much more difficult to make any changes at all.
Under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, the DOE is generally required to review existing standards every six years and assess whether recent technological advances warrant raising the bar for efficiency for any given product category. Updating the standards involves extensive technological and economic analysis, including looking at the cost to manufacturers and payback periods for consumers, as well as several rounds of public comment. After a new standard is issued, products that fail to meet that level of efficiency have to be taken off the market.
The new proposal delivers on the appliance industry’s request that President Trump restore the process he finalized during his first term, which Biden swiftly reversed. The changes include raising the minimum energy savings required to issue a new standard, adding several more steps and requirements to the rulemaking process for new standards, and using industry-developed test procedures to measure the efficiency of new products.
“This obstacle course of restrictions would hinder the department from carrying out its congressional mandate to protect consumers,” Andrew deLaski, executive director of the Appliance Standards Awareness Project, said in a statement. “We have products that keep getting more efficient and we need to embrace these technological advances, not reject them, especially as data centers strain our electric grid.”
Manufacturers welcomed the announcement. “AHAM applauds the Department of Energy for acting swiftly and delivering a proposed Process Rule that reflects years of constructive engagement with manufacturers, consumers, and other stakeholders,” Kelly Mariotti, the Association of Home Appliance Manufacturers’ president and CEO, said in a statement. The Air-Conditioning, Heating, and Refrigeration Institute also told me it “strongly supports DOE’s review” of the rules, although both groups said they were still working through the proposal.
The Energy Department issued a request for information last April seeking comments on potential changes to its procedures for revising energy conservation standards. At the time, the industry’s biggest trade groups urged the agency to “return to the 2020 version of the Process Rule.”
Trump has long been sympathetic to the industry’s ire over ever-tightening standards. He’s complained about dishwashers and heating systems that no longer work and showers that slow to a trickle. Now, Energy Secretary Chris Wright has joined in, grumbling about clothes dryers that run for multiple cycles.
The Process Rule changes threaten the potential to create significant consumer savings, however, according to the Appliance Standards Awareness Project. The group estimates that based on recent technological advances, the DOE’s next round of standard updates could save the average U.S. household $160 per year on their utility bills, and businesses a collective $15 billion in annual operating costs over 20 years. The group also projects that updated standards have the potential to reduce summer peak electricity demand 34 gigawatts by 2040, which would be like taking New York City off the grid. There are climate benefits, too, of course — an estimated reduction of 800 million metric tons of carbon emissions through 2050.
Even if finalized, Trump’s changes to the Process Rule will not be irreversible, and could continue to ping pong back and forth between administrations, “creating the kind of uncertainty and instability that makes it difficult for manufacturers to plan, invest, and innovate with confidence to the benefit of American consumers,” according to Mariotti of AHAM. The industry’s hope is for Congress to amend the underlying Energy Policy and Conservation act to “lock these reforms into statute,” she said. One such effort, the Don’t Mess With My Home Appliances Act introduced by Republican Representative Rick Allen of Georgia, passed the House in February.
The DOE’s proposal follows a memorandum of agreement the agency reached with the Environmental Protection Agency in March to take over as the lead agency running the EnergyStar labeling program, which identifies the most efficient appliances in a given category. The Process Rule changes will not affect EnergyStar, however.
The DOE is accepting public comments on its proposal for 30 days and will hold a public meeting on July 15.
Cities like New York, Philadelphia, and Toronto will see more days like this — but the effects of chronic not-so-extreme heat also build up.
The map of the Eastern United States has turned purple.
That’s the color used by the National Weather Service to distinguish the most severe category of extreme heat — a “rare and long-duration” event “with no overnight relief” — which spread like a bruise on Thursday morning from Chicago to Detroit and across the entire state of Ohio. From there, the purple splits north toward Toronto — where Portugal and Croatia will face each other tonight in a Round of 32 match — and down across the 13 original colonies, from Boston to New York City to Washington, D.C., Richmond, Charlotte, and Atlanta. An estimated 83 million Americans, or about a quarter of the population, are under the most extreme heat warning, with local temperatures cresting 100 degrees Fahrenheit; in many places, humidity will push the heat index up to 15 degrees higher.
That’s killer heat. Although the United States has a higher deployment of air conditioning than Europe, early tallies from the heat wave on the continent in late June found that some 20,000 people died from “heat-exacerbated causes” like heart attacks. In general, in New York City, an estimated 3% of deaths between May and September are due to the heat, a recent city report found — that’s about 500 deaths a year, close to the number of homicides during the city’s year of peak violence in 1990.
“Extreme heat is a chronic stressor that leads to hundreds of deaths in New York City,” Jeff Schlegelmilch, the director of the National Center for Disaster Preparedness at the Columbia Climate School, told me. “I’ve seen models showing the cumulative number of excess deaths over the next several decades could be in the tens of thousands.”
But while heat waves like the one this week bring much-needed attention to the public health crisis, it’s not actually extreme events that are driving those mortality figures. According to the city, about 80% of heat-related deaths in New York occur when temperatures are below 95 degrees Fahrenheit — that is, on hot, but not extremely hot, days. While risk increases with temperature in the way you’d expect, jumping sharply after 90 degrees Fahrenheit is crossed, there are more days in the still-dangerous 82- to 94-degree range on average each summer in New York (74, up from 52 in the 1970s) than extreme heat days like the ones occurring this week (of which there are about 11 per summer).
Schlegelmilch likened the moderate-temperature heat deaths to those during COVID, when it was the frontline workers who were paid hourly, couldn’t take days off, and who lived in more crowded homes who were the hardest hit. “We see those same patterns increasing exposure to heat,” he told me, noting that Latino and Black New Yorkers die from heat stress at rates two to three times higher, respectively, than white New Yorkers.
That said, the majority of people who die from heat-exacerbated causes do so in their homes, which “isn’t necessarily where the totality of the exposure to the heat is,” Schlegelmilch said. In fact, the number of people who die of direct heat stress in New York averages in the single digits per year, by comparison. “If you have to work outdoors, or you have to go back and forth to work and be exposed to the heat, and you go back into a home that is hot, and your body isn’t cooling off at night — this is actually something we’re very worried about tonight and tomorrow night — then the body doesn’t get that break.”
Part of the reason direct heat stress deaths are lower than those caused by chronic exposure is thanks to the agility, urgency, and attention of local governments, which issue heat warnings, promote cooling centers, and take preemptive measures during the worst heat waves — such as Toronto canceling its downtown World Cup watch party this afternoon. In New York this week, kiosks will help direct people to their nearest cooling centers, and local pools will stay open later. Meanwhile, to address more systemic heat impacts on the vulnerable, Mayor Zohran Mamdani has signed an executive order calling for the development and issuance of guidance for protecting outdoor workers and vendors during future heat events.
Because heat-related deaths often take the form of heart attacks, kidney disease, and diabetes, and therefore “don’t fit within the disaster declaration mechanisms” the same way floods or hurricanes do, “we don’t really have good policy to take care of this,” Schlegelmilch added. Particularly in cities with historically colder climates, such as Boston and New York, executive orders like Mamdani’s can be quick fixes, especially when followed by “lengthier and more thoughtful legislation and regulation.” But because the housing stock in such cities is older and, in some cases, even designed to retain heat, saving lives in the long term will require major infrastructure investments, ranging from tree planting to combat the urban heat island effect to expensive retrofitting.
“In the arc of history with disasters, we generally don’t do the things we need to do until it hurts too much,” Schlegelmilch said when I suggested that such a level of investment seems daunting, if not impossible, when spread out over the whole of New York, not to mention the Northeast. “It’s an open question how many people need to die, how many hours of productivity need to be lost, how much strain there is on infrastructure before everybody realizes this is not an abstract problem, that this is happening right now, and that it’s a hell of a lot more expensive to clean up after than to make these investments over the long run.”
An extreme heat wave might not be the primary driver of heat-related mortality in the United States, in other words, but it is certainly an opportunity to push for climate adaptation funding. “It’s not cheap at all,” Schlegelmilch agreed. “But it has to be part of the thinking, because there just isn’t another solution.”
Democrats in Congress are determined to restore them. That isn’t necessarily what the industry wants.
As many Americans celebrate the country’s 250th birthday this weekend, the clean energy industry will be mourning a death. Independence Day marks the expiration of federal tax credits for wind farms and solar arrays, subsidies that have been in effect in some form or another since 1978.
They may not be dead forever. Leading Democrats in Congress are preparing to reinstate the tax credits the next chance they get — whether or not the clean energy industry is asking for it.
“Republicans letting these clean energy credits expire is bad for families, bad for workers, and a gift to China,” Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer told me in an email. “Democrats will fight to bring these incentives back and keep pushing every policy that lowers energy costs, strengthens American manufacturing, and protects America’s clean energy future.”
While the tax credits were not initially created to tackle climate change, they became the backbone of American climate policy as fossil fuel companies mired federal attempts to regulate carbon pollution in court challenges.
The original credits, passed as part of the 1978 Energy Tax Act, were intended to reduce the country’s reliance on oil and natural gas during the oil crisis. They included a 30% tax credit for homeowners and a 10% tax credit for businesses on the cost of wind or solar, among other “alternative energy” technologies. Congress passed extensions of the credits numerous times in the decades that followed, making tweaks along the way: Lawmakers took away the credit for wind farms in the mid-1980s; then, in 1992, they created a new production tax credit for wind based on the amount of energy a given project generated.
Throughout the history of the tax credits, there was often a will-they-won’t-they precarity to their reauthorization. And yet in the end Congress always extended the credits on bipartisan votes. It wasn’t until the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act, which wrapped up tax credit reauthorization in a larger, highly partisan package, that even Republicans who supported the credits withdrew their votes in protest.
The IRA dramatically extended and expanded the subsidies, opening up both the investment and production tax credits to any carbon-free electricity source — not just wind and solar — and authorized them for as many years as it would take to cut emissions from the electric grid by 75%. It also offered developers increased tax relief, covering up to 70% of their costs if they used equipment from U.S. factories and built in designated low-income “energy communities.”
This combination of tweaks — the seemingly infinite timeline, the generous boost for domestic content — contributed to a boom in investment in new wind and solar projects in the U.S. and onshore manufacturing of the equipment to build them. But unbounded optimism gave way to uncertainty when Trump took office in early 2025 and pushed through the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, which cut short subsidies for wind and solar. Projects that begin construction on or after July 4 of this year are no longer eligible for the tax credits, though other carbon-free energy sources such as new nuclear reactors, geothermal plants, and energy storage systems remain eligible until 2033.
The effects of the tax credit cliff for wind and solar will not be noticeable right away. Developers have stockpiled solar modules and turbine parts and ordered custom transformers, strategies that will enable them to claim they have “begun construction” on projects before July 4, even if they haven’t broken ground yet. Wood Mackenzie analysts estimate that companies have safe harbored between 216 gigawatts and 240 gigawatts of solar capacity, and nearly 30 gigawatts of onshore and offshore wind capacity. It will take four to five years for the industry to work through this pipeline. Any slowdown during that time is more likely to be a result of Trump’s gauntlet of permitting challenges for renewables or community opposition than it is to come back to the lack of tax credits.
Post-2030, however, the picture is murkier. No one I spoke to for this story expects clean energy development to come to a halt. Solar is the fastest growing energy source in the United States, and with demand for electricity surging, that’s unlikely to change. Without the tax credits, however, solar projects may become more difficult to finance, and the energy they generate will cost more. According to market research by LevelTen Energy, a company that connects corporate clean energy buyers and sellers, developers expect average prices for power purchase agreements, or PPAs, to rise by 40% to 120%.
That’s a wide range, and these numbers are still hypothetical, as developers aren’t yet selling power from non-tax credit-eligible projects, Connor Valaik, a senior manager for energy marketplace transactions at LevelTen, told me. When I asked him whether corporate buyers will still be interested at those rates, he noted that PPA prices have already increased year over year due to tariffs and inflation, “and we still see really strong demand for PPAs.” What matters most is the price of a solar or wind PPA relative to the market price of power. If electricity demand continues to explode in the 2030s, as it is expected to, “that will push energy market prices up, which could buoy that value to buyers.”
When I started asking whether the clean energy industry itself would fight to bring the tax credits back, the responses I got were mixed. The developers I reached out to declined to comment. The American Clean Power Association sent an ambiguous quote from JC Sandberg, its chief policy officer, stating that it was “focused on delivering durable policies to support American-made clean energy.” The Solar Energy Industries Association repeated an earlier quote from its president and CEO, Tim Pawlenty, stating that “SEIA will of course consider any policy, including tax credits, that accelerates solar and storage growth.”
One staffer in the House told me there’s a split between bigger developers that don’t need the tax credits for their projects to be viable and smaller companies that do, which is making it difficult for the trade associations to take a position. Another staffer told me that while they’ve heard some in the industry argue that it would be better not to put a target on their backs by reinstating the credits, that is not the majority view.
Maya Gibbs, a senior policy advisor for clean energy deployment at the center-left D.C. think tank Third Way, said the industry has bigger fish to fry right now. “There’s better bang for our buck, so to speak, in reducing the structural and non-cost barriers that are getting in the way of projects,” she told me. That includes speeding up permitting and building more transmission. Even if Democrats win a trifecta in 2028, she said, she’d caution against trying to reinstate the credits on another party-line vote.
The biggest lesson from the IRA was that “for legislation to be durable, it needs to be bipartisan,” she said, “and I don’t anticipate enough Republican support for wind and solar tax credits to get that across the finish line.”
There is one corner of the clean energy industry that’s been vocal about its concerns: solar manufacturers. The tax credits — and specifically the bonus they offered for using domestic content — generated demand for U.S.-produced technology to an extent that reshaped the American solar manufacturing landscape. The United States now has enough solar manufacturing capacity to meet domestic demand two times over, much of which was built in the past four years.
The caveat to that statistic: Those new factories mostly assemble the final solar modules. The parts still come from elsewhere, primarily China. Manufacturers have only just started to onshore the rest of the solar supply chain, with just a small handful of factories currently operating or in development to produce cells, ingots, wafers, polysilicon, and other subcomponents. Manufacturers like Qcells, which is building some of that upstream capacity at its factories in Georgia, argue that it’s crucial to national security to diversify the supply chain away from China.
“We see domestic content as probably the most critical tool to supporting the factories that we’re investing in,” Marta Stoepker, the head of corporate communications for Qcells, told me. “Not having direct access at home to that technology opens a myriad of vulnerabilities from an energy standpoint. Until we can actually catch up, we need policies that are really, really proactive and aggressive to onshore.”
Tax credits aren’t the only option. Protective trade policies like tariffs on imported modules and anti-dumping duties have also helped. And Stoepker and Martin Pochtaruk, the CEO of solar manufacturer Heliene, both suggested that permitting reform could be another potential vehicle to support domestic manufacturing, for example by offering faster approvals to projects that use U.S.-made equipment.
The problem with that idea, Gibbs told me, is that it means adding additional administrative complexity to a policy that’s supposed to remove red tape.
Everyone I spoke to agreed that in the near term, the most important thing Congress could do to help clean energy is break down some of the non-cost barriers to development through permitting reform. Some, like Gibbs, were optimistic that a package could come together by the end of the year. She argued that both parties have learned they can’t afford to wait for the perfect deal. “Every single year of inaction on permitting reform means that less new energy gets built, and that’s higher cost for consumers,” she said.
Representative Jared Huffman, the ranking member on the House Natural Resources Committee, was less sure. He told me that as long as the Trump administration continues to shut down clean energy projects, “I don’t think Democrats can engage in a serious way with Republicans on permitting reform.”
When I reached out to Democrats in Congress, I asked them whether they still saw a need for solar and wind incentives, whether tax credits were still their favored mechanism, or if there were other ideas being tossed around. The response was nearly unanimous — they told me they were determined to restore the tax credits. “Bottom line, the tax credits worked and the U.S. saw a clean energy boom like never before,” Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon, who serves as the ranking member of the Senate Finance Committee, told me in an email. “So we need to put that framework back in place.” The only departure from that narrative came from a Hill staffer who told me there was a general lack of imagination in the Democratic caucus about where energy policy and climate policy should go next, hence the focus on the tax credits.
While nobody thinks restoration will be possible under Trump, some in Congress are already preparing for the next opening. Two Democrats in the House, Sean Casten from Illinois and Mike Levin from California, introduced the Energy Bills Relief Act in March, which would reinstate the credits, among other policies to support energy affordability. In an interview, Representative Levin told me he thinks it’s become “one of the consensus House Democratic blueprints for energy affordability.” The tax credits are “a tried and true way to incentivize people to build clean energy, for consumers to invest in clean energy,” he said.
For Huffman, who supports Levin and Casten’s bill, the tax credits aren’t necessarily about helping wind and solar compete. The point is to get off of fossil fuels faster. “If you believe the science that we are in a race against time to avoid tipping points that could make this planet unlivable,” he told me, “then I think you lean towards a more aggressive policy of speeding up this transition, and that’s where I fall.”