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A smooth transition to clean energy will require coordinating on oil prices — just not the way Scott Sheffield was doing it.

The Federal Trade Commission earlier this month threw sand in the gears of one of several big oil company deals currently in the works, the $60 billion acquisition of shale oil company Pioneer by Exxon. While the FTC didn’t block the sale, it said that Pioneer’s chief executive, Scott Sheffield, could not join Exxon’s board, as proposed in the merger agreement, because of his role in seeking to coordinate oil production and push up prices.
It was yet another Rorschach test of the mid-transition — oil folk saw regulator overreach or pettiness under a Democratic administration, while climate campaigners saw shameless profiteering by the oil industry. What it really reveals is more complex: The illusion of laissez-faire oil markets; the disingenuousness (if not hypocrisy) of the U.S. oil industry; and the need for U.S. policymakers to take a much more interventionist stance in oil markets.
First, the FTC complaint. Sheffield, fêted in the oil world as one of the key instigators of the U.S. shale oil boom, has called on peers in the sector to refrain from drilling when prices were low. The commission also quoted public remarks by Sheffield referring to U.S. oil companies “staying in line,” being disciplined in their production, and being punished by shareholders if they sought to grow production.
He went further than that, though, according to the FTC. In a heavily redacted section of the complaint, the Commission describes Sheffield meeting with OPEC officials and communicating with them by WhatsApp. “If Texas leads the way, maybe we can get OPEC to cut production. Maybe Saudi and Russia will follow. That was our plan,” he said in one text message cited by the Commission. He added: “I was using the tactics of OPEC+ to get a bigger OPEC+ done.” Pioneer issued a statement saying that circumventing competition rules was “neither the intent nor the effect” of Sheffield’s comments and pointing to Pioneer’s role in increasing U.S. production.
Coordinating on prices, however, is the norm in the history of oil markets — even in the U.S. It shouldn’t be so shocking that the purportedly free market-loving oil industry would engage in this kind of behavior.
A lot of Sheffield’s activity mentioned by the FTC took place from around 2020 to 2023, when oil demand was still uncertain thanks to Covid. Even before then, the U.S. shale industry, which had boomed through the late 2010s, was under pressure from institutional investors, frustrated as all the new supply undermined their profits. Exxon, whose antecedent Rockefeller famously took control of transport to manage the oil market, is so big and cash-rich that it can largely ride out market fluctuations; the smaller and newer shale oil producers, reliant on increasingly impatient investors, could not.
No wonder Sheffield was vocal about restricting supply: He had a large company and a high profile among a sea of smaller players that were fracking madly even as prices fell.
Oil prices are notoriously volatile, which serves neither producers nor consumers. If prices are too low, the industry logic goes, no-one invests. Too high, and there’s a risk that demand for the stuff falls — especially if it prompts a recession. To keep prices in a sweet spot, a good chunk of the market has to be prepared to refrain from pumping. Turning the taps on and off is a role that Saudi Arabia and fellow OPEC petrostates have taken for decades. The nature of shale oil means it is a “swing producer” that can switch up and down its output with relative ease compared to other producers.
The market dynamics changed quickly when Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2022. Since then, U.S. oil producers have been pumping more than ever, to the point where the country is now the world’s biggest producer. None of this has stopped the industry from continuing to loathe the Biden administration, of course. (Sheffield himself said in 2021 that the administration was trying “to slow down U.S. drilling in any way they can.”)
The U.S. government is the one actor with enough power to influence global oil demand that has largely sat on its hands. The oil industry often engages in a kind of collective delayed gratification to keep oil prices in a sweet spot: high enough to maximize profits, but not so high that households and businesses start cutting back on their fuel use. Far less effort has gone into a kind of reverse strategy. There have been few attempts to reduce supply without disruptive price volatility — the kind of government inaction that pits voters against lawmakers and hurts households that really feel the pinch from higher gasoline prices.
Having intervened extensively in the preceding decades, during the 1980s, the U.S. government backed away from the complex price controls of the Nixon presidency and the demand-curtailing measures of Carter’s. With OPEC’s strategy being fairly straightforward, a couple of decades of relative stability followed, along with the assumption that the market would self-correct whenever prices went too high for consumers or too low for producers. Bassam Fattouh of Oxford Institute for Energy Studies argued that it was the perception of a self-correcting supply-demand dynamic that “stabilized long term expectations about oil prices” in that period.
The “mid-transition” idea, developed by academics Emily Grubert and Sara Hastings-Simon in a 2022 paper, asserts that the process of decarbonization involves a drawn-out, messy, liminal phase, during which changes to energy costs and supply will shape a society’s perception of clean energy so much that negative experiences like price spikes or supply interruptions will undermine political support for the transition.
In 2023, the Biden administration broke the U.S. government’s longstanding precedent and began intervening in oil prices with an eye beyond manipulating the immediate consumer price. It announced a target price for buying several hundred million barrels of oil to restock the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which had been depleted after the invasion of Ukraine sent prices spiking. By pledging to buy crude whenever the price was between $67 and $72 a barrel, it would do what Employ America, a think tank, had proposed: Set a floor under prices that would help U.S. producers, as well as a ceiling that would avoid pain at the pump.
“Mid-transition” is a relatively new concept, but it harks back to a more established phrase in climate policy: “smooth transition,” which describes a pathway to decarbonization that is steady but not disruptive. Stimulating or restraining oil production in a way that stabilizes oil investment and prices — if done effectively and with the right intentions — is a necessary condition for such smoothness. Sheffield and other producers, including OPEC+ members, have for decades sought to manage oil supply to ensure that price spikes don’t disrupt oil’s future. For all that the U.S. oil industry castigates the Biden administration, they are actually pursuing the same goal, just with a different view of the end game.
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America runs on natural gas.
That’s not an exaggeration. Almost half of home heating is done with natural gas, and around 40% — the plurality — of our electricity is generated with natural gas. Data center developers are pouring billions into natural gas power plants built on-site to feed their need for computational power. In its -260 degree Fahrenheit liquid form, the gas has attracted tens of billions of dollars in investments to export it abroad.
The energy and climate landscape in the United States going into 2026 — and for a long time afterward — will be largely determined by the forces pushing and pulling on natural gas. Those could lead to higher or more volatile prices for electricity and home heating, and even possibly to structural changes in the electricity market.
But first, the weather.
“Heating demand is still the main way gas is used in the U.S.,” longtime natural gas analyst Amber McCullagh explained to me. That makes cold weather — experienced and expected — the main driver of natural gas prices, even with new price pressures from electricity demand.
New sources of demand don’t help, however. While estimates for data center construction are highly speculative, East Daily Analytics figures cited by trade publication Natural Gas Intel puts a ballpark figure of new data center gas demand at 2.5 billion cubic feet per day by the end of next year, compared to 0.8 billion cubic feet per day for the end of this year. By 2030, new demand from data centers could add up to over 6 billion cubic feet per day of natural gas demand, East Daley Analytics projects. That’s roughly in line with the total annual gas production of the Eagle Ford Shale in southwest Texas.
Then there are exports. The U.S. Energy Information Administration expects outbound liquified natural gas shipments to rise to 14.9 billion cubic feet per day this year, and to 16.3 billion cubic feet in 2026. In 2024, by contrast, exports were just under 12 billion cubic feet per day.
“Even as we’ve added demand for data centers, we’re getting close to 20 billion per day of LNG exports,” McCullagh said, putting more pressure on natural gas prices.
That’s had a predictable effect on domestic gas prices. Already, the Henry Hub natural gas benchmark price has risen to above $5 per million British thermal units earlier this month before falling to $3.90, compared to under $3.50 at the end of last year. By contrast, LNG export prices, according to the most recent EIA data, are at around $7 per million BTUs.
This yawning gap between benchmark domestic prices and export prices is precisely why so many billions of dollars are being poured into LNG export capacity — and why some have long been wary of it, including Democratic politicians in the Northeast, which is chronically short of natural gas due to insufficient pipeline infrastructure. A group of progressive Democrats in Congress wrote a letter to Secretary of Energy Chris Wright earlier this year opposing additional licenses for LNG exports, arguing that “LNG exports lead to higher energy prices for both American families and businesses.”
Industry observers agree — or at least agree that LNG exports are likely to pull up domestic prices. “Henry Hub is clearly bullish right now until U.S. gas production catches up,” Ira Joseph, a senior research associate at the Center for Global Energy Policy at Columbia University, told me. “We’re definitely heading towards convergence” between domestic and global natural gas prices.
But while higher natural gas prices may seem like an obvious boon to renewables, the actual effect may be more ambiguous. The EIA expects the Henry Hub benchmark to average $4 per million BTUs for 2026. That’s nothing like the $9 the benchmark hit in August 2022, the result of post-COVID economic restart, supply tightness, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Still, a tighter natural gas market could mean a more volatile electricity and energy sector in 2026. The United States is basically unique globally in having both large-scale domestic production of coal and natural gas that allows its electricity generation to switch between them. When natural gas prices go up, coal burning becomes more economically attractive.
Add to that, the EIA forecasts that electricity generation will have grown 2.4% by the end of 2025, and will grow another 1.7% in 2026, “in contrast to relatively flat generation from 2010 to 2020. That is “primarily driven by increasing demand from large customers, including data centers,” the agency says.
This is the load growth story. With the help of the Trump administration, it’s turning into a coal growth story, too.
Already several coal plants have extended out their retirement dates, either to maintain reliability on local grids or because the Trump administration ordered them to. In America’s largest electricity market, PJM Interconnection, where about a fifth of the installed capacity is coal, diversified energy company Alliance Resource Partners expects 4% to 6% demand growth, meaning it might even be able to increase coal production. Coal consumption has jumped 16% in PJM in the first nine months of 2025, the company’s Chairman Joseph Kraft told analysts.
“The domestic thermal coal market is continuing to experience strong fundamentals, supported by an unprecedented combination of federal energy and environmental policy support plus rapid demand growth,” Kraft said in a statement accompanying the company’s October third quarter earnings report. He pointed specifically to “natural gas pricing dynamics” and “the dramatic load growth required by artificial intelligence.”
Observers are also taking notice. “The key driver for coal prices remains strong natural gas prices,” industry newsletter The Coal Trader wrote.
In its December short term outlook, the EIA said that it expects “coal consumption to increase by 9% in 2025, driven by an 11% increase in coal consumption in the electric power sector this year as both natural gas costs and electricity demand increased,” while falling slightly in 2026 (compared to 2025), leaving coal consumption sill above 2024 levels.
“2025 coal generation will have increased for the first time since the last time gas prices spiked,” McCullagh told me.
Assuming all this comes to pass, the U.S.’s total carbon dioxide emissions will have essentially flattened out at around 4.8 million metric tons. The ultimate cost of higher natural gas prices will likely be felt far beyond the borders of the United States and far past 2026.
Lawmakers today should study the Energy Security Act of 1980.
The past few years have seen wild, rapid swings in energy policy in the United States, from President Biden’s enthusiastic embrace of clean energy to President Trump’s equally enthusiastic re-embrace of fossil fuels.
Where energy industrial policy goes next is less certain than any other moment in recent memory. Regardless of the direction, however, we will need creative and effective policy tools to secure our energy future — especially for those of us who wish to see a cleaner, greener energy system. To meet the moment, we can draw inspiration from a largely forgotten piece of energy industrial policy history: the Energy Security Act of 1980.
After a decade of oil shocks and energy crises spanning three presidencies, President Carter called for — and Congress passed — a new law that would “mobilize American determination and ability to win the energy war.” To meet that challenge, lawmakers declared their intent “to utilize to the fullest extent the constitutional powers of the Congress” to reduce the nation’s dependence on imported oil and shield the economy from future supply shocks. Forty-five years later, that brief moment of determined national mobilization may hold valuable lessons for the next stage of our energy industrial policy.
The 1970s were a decade of energy volatility for Americans, with spiking prices and gasoline shortages, as Middle Eastern fossil fuel-producing countries wielded the “oil weapon” to throttle supply. In his 1979 “Crisis of Confidence” address to the nation, Carter warned that America faced a “clear and present danger” from its reliance on foreign oil and urged domestic producers to mobilize new energy sources, akin to the way industry responded to World War II by building up a domestic synthetic rubber industry.
To develop energy alternatives, Congress passed the Energy Security Act, which created a new government-run corporation dedicated to investing in alternative fuels projects, a solar bank, and programs to promote geothermal, biomass, and renewable energy sources. The law also authorized the president to create a system of five-year national energy targets and ordered one of the federal government’s first studies on the impacts of greenhouse gases from fossil fuels.
Carter saw the ESA as the beginning of an historic national mission. “[T]he Energy Security Act will launch this decade with the greatest outpouring of capital investment, technology, manpower, and resources since the space program,” he said at the signing. “Its scope, in fact, is so great that it will dwarf the combined efforts expended to put Americans on the Moon and to build the entire Interstate Highway System of our country.” The ESA was a recognition that, in a moment of crisis, the federal government could revive the tools it once used in wartime to meet an urgent civilian challenge.
In its pursuit of energy security, the Act deployed several remarkable industrial policy tools, with the Synthetic Fuels Corporation as the centerpiece. The corporation was a government-run investment bank chartered to finance — and in some cases, directly undertake — alternative fuels projects, including those derived from coal, shale, and oil.. Regardless of the desirability or feasibility of synthetic fuels, the SFC as an institution illustrates the type of extraordinary authority Congress was once willing to deploy to address energy security and stand up an entirely new industry. It operated outside of federal agencies, unencumbered by the normal bureaucracy and restrictions that apply to government.
Along with everything else created by the ESA, the Sustainable Fuels Corporation was also financed by a windfall profits tax assessed on oil companies, essentially redistributing income from big oil toward its nascent competition. Both the law and the corporation had huge bipartisan support, to the tune of 317 votes for the ESA in the House compared to 93 against, and 78 to 12 in the Senate.
The Synthetic Fuels Corporation was meant to be a public catalyst where private investment was unlikely to materialize on its own. Investors feared that oil prices could fall, or that OPEC might deliberately flood the market to undercut synthetic fuels before they ever reached scale. Synthetic fuel projects were also technically complex, capital-intensive undertakings, with each plant costing several billion dollars, requiring up to a decade to plan and build.
To address this, Congress equipped the corporation with an unusually broad set of tools. The corporation could offer loans, loan guarantees, price guarantees, purchase agreements, and even enter joint ventures — forms of support meant to make first-of-a-kind projects bankable. It could assemble financing packages that traditional lenders viewed as too risky. And while the corporation was being stood up, the president was temporarily authorized to use Defense Production Act powers to initiate early synthetic fuel projects. Taken together, these authorities amounted to a federal attempt to build an entirely new energy industry.
While the ESA gave the private sector the first shot at creating a synthetic fuels industry, it also created opportunities for the federal government to invest. The law authorized the Synthetic Fuels Corporation to undertake and retain ownership over synthetic fuels construction projects if private investment was insufficient to meet production targets. The SFC was also allowed to impose conditions on loans and financial assistance to private developers that gave it a share of project profits and intellectual property rights arising out of federally-funded projects. Congress was not willing to let the national imperative of energy security rise or fall on the whims of the market, nor to let the private sector reap publicly-funded windfalls.
Employing logic that will be familiar to many today, Carter was particularly concerned that alternative fuel sources would be unduly delayed by permitting rules and proposed an Energy Mobilization Board to streamline the review process for energy projects. Congress ultimately refused to create it, worried it would trample state authority and environmental protections. But the impulse survived elsewhere. At a time when the National Environmental Policy Act was barely 10 years old and had become the central mechanism for scrutinizing major federal actions, Congress provided an exemption for all projects financed by the Synthetic Fuels Corporation, although other technologies supported in the law — like geothermal energy — were still required to go through NEPA review. The contrast is revealing — a reminder that when lawmakers see an energy technology as strategically essential, they have been willing not only to fund it but also to redesign the permitting system around it.
Another forgotten feature of the corporation is how far Congress went to ensure it could actually hire top tier talent. Lawmakers concluded that the federal government’s standard pay scales were too low and too rigid for the kind of financial, engineering, and project development expertise the Synthetic Fuels Corporation needed. So it gave the corporation unusual salary flexibility, allowing it to pay above normal civil service rates to attract people with the skills to evaluate multibillion dollar industrial projects. In today’s debates about whether federal agencies have the capacity to manage complex clean energy investments, this detail is striking. Congress once knew that ambitious industrial policy requires not just money, but people who understand how deals get done.
But the Energy Security Act never had the chance to mature. The corporation was still getting off the ground when Carter lost the 1980 election to Ronald Reagan. Reagan’s advisers viewed the project as a distortion of free enterprise — precisely the kind of government intervention they believed had fueled the broader malaise of the 1970s. While Reagan had campaigned on abolishing the Department of Energy, the corporation proved an easier and more symbolic target. His administration hollowed it out, leaving it an empty shell until Congress defunded it entirely in 1986.
At the same time, the crisis atmosphere that had justified the Energy Security Act began to wane. Oil prices fell nearly 60% during Reagan’s first five years, and with them the political urgency behind alternative fuels. Drained of its economic rationale, the synthetic fuels industry collapsed before it ever had a chance to prove whether it could succeed under more favorable conditions. What had looked like a wartime mobilization suddenly appeared to many lawmakers to be an expensive overreaction to a crisis that had passed.
Yet the ESA’s legacy is more than an artifact of a bygone moment. It offers at least three lessons that remain strikingly relevant today:
As we now scramble to make up for lost time, today’s clean energy push requires institutions that can survive electoral swings. Nearly half a century after the ESA, we must find our way back to that type of institutional imagination to meet the energy challenges we still face.
On Google’s energy glow up, transmission progress, and South American oil
Current conditions: Nearly two dozen states from the Rockies through the Midwest and Appalachians are forecast to experience temperatures up to 30 degrees above historical averages on Christmas Day • Parts of northern New York and New England could get up to a foot of snow in the coming days • Bethlehem, the West Bank city south of Jerusalem in which Christians believe Jesus was born, is preparing for a sunny, cloudless Christmas Day, with temperatures around 60 degrees Fahrenheit.
This is our last Heatmap AM of 2025, but we’ll see you all again in 2026!
Just two weeks after a federal court overturned President Donald Trump’s Day One executive order banning new offshore wind permits, the administration announced a halt to all construction on seaward turbines. Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum announced the move Monday morning on X: “Due to national security concerns identified by @DeptofWar, @Interior is PAUSING leases for 5 expensive, unreliable, heavily subsidized offshore wind farms!” As Heatmap’s Jael Holzman explained in her writeup, there are only five offshore wind projects currently under construction in U.S. waters: Vineyard Wind, Revolution Wind, Coastal Virginia Offshore Wind, Sunrise Wind, and Empire Wind. “The Department of War has come back conclusively that the issues related to these large offshore wind programs create radar interference, create genuine risk for the U.S., particularly related to where they are in proximity to our East Coast population centers,” Burgum told Fox Business host Maria Bartiromo.
The new blanket policy is likely to slow progress on passing the big bipartisan federal permitting reform bill. The SPEED Act (if you need an explainer, read this one from Heatmap’s Emily Pontecorvo) passed in the House last week. But key Senate Democrats said they would not champion a bill with provisions they might otherwise support unless the legislation curbed federal agencies’ power to yank already-granted permits, a move clearly meant to thwart Trump’s “total war on wind.” Republican leaders in the House stripped the measure out at the last moment. On Monday afternoon, the senators called the SPEED Act “dead in the water.”
The Department of the Interior and the Forest Service greenlit the 500-kilovolt Cross-Tie transmission project to carry electricity 217 miles between substations in Utah and Nevada. Dubbed the “missing pathway” between two states with fast-growing solar and geothermal industries, the power line had previously won support from a Biden-era program at the Department of Energy’s Grid Deployment Office. Last week, the federal agencies approved a right-of-way for a route that crosses the Humboldt-Toiyabe National Forest and public land controlled by the Interior Department’s Bureau of Land Management. In a press release directing the public to official documents, the bureau said the project “supports the administration’s priority to strengthen the reliability and security of the United States electric grid.”
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Google parent Alphabet bought the data center and energy infrastructure developer Intersect for nearly $5 billion in cash. Google had already held a minority stake in the company. But the deal, which also includes assuming debt, allows the tech behemoth to “expand capacity, operate more nimbly in building new power generation in lockstep with new data center load, and reimagine energy solutions to drive U.S. innovation and leadership,” Sundair Pichai, the chief executive of Alphabet and Google, said in a statement.
The acquisition comes as Google steps up its energy development, with deals to commercialize all kinds of nascent energy technologies, including next-generation nuclear reactors, fusion, and geothermal. The company, as Heatmap's Matthew Zeitlin noted this morning, has also hired a team of widely respected experts to advance its energy work, including the researcher Tyler Norris and and the Texas grid analyst Doug Lewin. But Monday’s deal wowed industry watchers. “Damn, big tech is now just straight up acquiring power developers to scale up data centers faster,” Aniruddh Mohan, an electricity analyst at The Brattle Group consultancy, remarked on X. In response, the researcher Isaac Orr joked: “Next they buy out the utilities themselves.”
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The long duration energy storage developer Hydrostor has won final approval from California regulators for a 500-megawatt advanced compressed air energy storage project capable of pumping out eight hours of continuous discharge to the grid. With the thumbs up from the California Energy Commission, the Willow Rock Energy Storage Center will be “shovel ready” next year. The technology works by using electricity from wind and solar to power a compressor that pushes air into an underground cavern, displacing water, then capturing the heat generated during the compression and storing the energy in the pressurized chamber. When the energy is discharged, the water pressure forces the air up, and the excess heat warms the expanding air, driving a turbine to generate electricity. The plant would be Hydrostor’s first facility in the U.S. The company has another “late-stage” development underway in Australia, and 7 gigawatts of projects in the pipeline worldwide.

The world is awash in oil and prices are on track to keep falling as rising supply outstrips demand. At just 0.8 million barrels per day, predictions for growth in 2026 are the lowest in the last four years. But Brazil, Guyana, and Argentina will account for at least half of the expected global increase in production of crude. In its latest forecast, the U.S. Energy Information Administration said the three South American nations will account for 0.4 million barrels per day of the 0.8 million spike projected for 2026. The three countries — oddly enough one of the only potential trios on the mostly Spanish-speaking continent with three distinct languages, given Brazil’s Portuguese and Guyana’s English — comprised 28% of all global growth in 2025.
A fungal blight that gets worse as temperatures rise is killing conifers, including Christmas trees. But scientists at Mississippi State University have discovered a unique Leyland cypress tree at a Louisiana farm with a resistance to Passalora sequoia, the fast-spreading disease that attacks the needles of evergreens. In a statement, Jeff Wilson, an associate professor of ornamental horticulture at Mississippi State University, said that, prior to the study, “there had not been any research on Christmas trees in Mississippi since the late ‘70s or early ‘80s, but there is a real need for the research today.” May all your endeavors in the new year be as curious, civic-minded, and fruitful as that. Wishing you all a merry Christmas, happy New Year, and what I hope is a restful time off until we return to your inbox in January.