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You probably know your car’s fuel economy. But do you know its emissions per mile?

If you drive a gas-powered car, you almost certainly know its fuel economy. But do you know how much carbon your car emits?
Probably not. Here in America, at least, it’s not something we think about in concrete terms, like miles per gallon or the money we save at the pump by buying a more efficient car — but it probably should be.
In general, there’s a direct correlation between fuel consumption and CO2 emissions: the more gas you use, the more CO2 your car produces. That means we often use miles per gallon as a shorthand for pollution. But if you’re concerned about your carbon footprint, there’s clarity in knowing the actual emissions produced by your car.
In other parts of the world, governments make sure people can turn knowledge of CO2 consumption into power. If you’ve ever been to Europe and seen a car ad anywhere, you’ve probably seen a “Closed course, professional driver”-style line of text detailing that vehicle’s CO2 emissions. That’s because they have to do this. The European Union has for years required automakers to disclose their cars’ emissions in ads across multiple platforms.
In America, these carbon-related metrics aren’t nearly as publicized. The closest equivalents we have are the metrics on a new car’s window sticker, which are required for consumer transparency purposes. Here you’ll find an important figure: CO2 emissions per mile. It’s tiny, like fine print, but it’s there. It’s essentially the same thing you see in those European ads, just not using the Metric system, obviously, and they go out of their way to drive this point home; us, not so much.
These ratings come from the EPA. The last major revision to how these labels look came about a decade back. But it’s also part of a bigger, more confusing package on the sticker. On one graph, you see a rating of fuel economy and CO2 emissions combined together, while the “smog rating” measures pollutants like nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide and particulate matter. These are rated on a not-very-helpful scale of 1 through 10.
But unlike in Europe, our CO2 emissions figures aren’t really something we see or consider when buying a car; they don’t even appear in car reviews, generally. I’ve probably written thousands of those and I’ve never once included it.
Now, here’s what the label doesn’t say, but the EPA does: the average passenger vehicle in America emits about 400 grams of CO2 per mile. If you have the free time to go to FuelEconomy.gov, you can find out how your car ranks there and it could — should, I’d argue — help inform your next car purchase.
Take my car, a Mazda 3 hatchback with the model’s larger 2.5-liter engine. The EPA says it produces 301 grams of CO2 per mile, so better than average and way better than, say, a 2023 Bronco Raptor example, a high-performance off-road SUV that’s fun but emits 577 grams of CO2 per mile.
Let’s say I decide I can go a little greener than my car, but I’m not ready to completely break up with gasoline just yet; a new 2023 Toyota Prius hybrid puts out just 155 grams of CO2 per mile in its base trim. What a champion, and further proof that hybrids are a great tool for bringing down emissions right now.
Now, if I need more room for my 12-pound dog (he can take up a surprising amount of space when he wants to) I could get a Honda CR-V Hybrid, which puts out 237 grams of CO2 per mile. Not as good as the smaller Prius, but still better than average.
Internal combustion engines have gotten much cleaner over the years and smaller engines obviously emit less. A Chevrolet Equinox with a small, turbocharged four-cylinder engine puts out 310 grams of CO2 per mile, while a V8-powered Chevrolet Tahoe emits 527 grams of CO2 over a mile.
But car size matters here too. If I had purchased a bigger 2018 Mazda CX-5 crossover instead of my hatchback, I’d be putting out an extra 21 grams of CO2 per mile even though the cars have the same engine. Plenty of people might make the size tradeoff even if it meant a hit to fuel economy, but how might they feel if they knew the difference in CO2 as well?
Now let’s put all of those numbers into context. The EPA says the average American vehicle — something it claims does about 22.2 miles per gallon and drives 11,500 miles per year, which all tracks with my experience — emits about 4.6 metric tons of CO2 per year. That’s one vehicle, and just an average one to boot. In the grand scheme of things, that one vehicle contributed to what the U.S. Energy Information Administration claims was 1.476 billion metric tons of CO2 in 2022 from the entire transportation sector — or about 30% of total U.S. energy-related CO2 emissions that year. Granted, you can’t put that whole number on cars, but it’d be great if consumers knew more about what parts their purchases play in all of it.
Of course, there’s a clear winner here: electric vehicles. They all emit 0 grams of CO2 per mile, underscoring how important EVs are to decarbonization.
Still, that figure — while vital — elides a lot of differences. A Tesla Model 3 and a GMC Hummer EV both have no tailpipe emissions, which is true. But one is a compact sedan and the other is a 9,600-pound behemoth of an SUV; in fact, it’s so heavy it’s not even required to list such figures on its window sticker, so good luck finding it on the EPA’s website. The Hummer will clearly need much more energy to fully charge than a small Tesla. The two may be EVs but they are not created equal. It would be nice to see some kind of data tied to charging, despite the many variables involved there, particularly since 60% of our electricity is still generated by fossil fuels.
The only thing we have to easily compare them is MPGe, the deeply flawed, barely understood metric for ranking the energy consumption of hybrid and electric cars. That would be miles per gallon equivalent, an EPA-created metric that measures energy consumption in comparison to a gasoline vehicle. But how useful is that, really? Besides telling you the obvious, that EVs are more efficient at how they use energy overall than ICE vehicles, it doesn’t help you know anything about emissions or even energy costs. It’s also a terrible way to explain to someone what really matters, as The Drive pointed out last year: lower efficiency means charging more frequently.
Even better would be a rating that lets you compare life-cycle emissions — i.e. not just the emissions from tailpipes, but the emissions generated by the construction of a vehicle. Here, you’ll find some surprising data: while EVs overall have much lower life cycle emissions than gas cars, the biggest EVs end up just as polluting as small gasoline cars by that metric because they are so resource-intensive to make.
Yet most automakers don’t publish that data, even if they know it themselves. What we have are a handful of estimates cobbled together by enterprising researchers and journalists. There’s definitely no comprehensive database. And the EPA’s way of speaking to consumers still feels focused on what they’ll spend at the pump.
The point is, it would be amazing if customers were made more aware of the CO2 impact from their cars — from tailpipe emissions or from charging, although it’s been proven time and time again the latter is less harmful than the former long-term. I would love to see American buyers start to consider emissions the same way we have thought about fuel economy for decades. Perhaps this would entice people to make better purchasing decisions, even if they come down to slight differences between two competing vehicles.
I don’t love putting environmentalism solely on ordinary, individual people; our decisions matter, but arguably less so than major corporations. We purchase the cars we’re given, and thanks in part to our absurd regulations, small cars are dying and the market has shifted to SUVs and trucks. What’s worse, EVs are still mostly very expensive and not nearly enough places offer choices like safe bike lanes or widely available public transit.
But I think putting CO2 emissions, and their effects, more in front of drivers’ minds is a good start. It’s time for all of us to try and think beyond just saving on gas.
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On another offshore wind kill, inverter bans, and NYC’s new power line
Current conditions: The wildfires in Spokane, Washington, have burned nearly 11,000 acres and destroyed close to 900 structures in the past week • Tropical Depression Maymay is veering away from the Philippines after battering northern Luzon with 45-mile-per-hour winds • Temperatures in Seoul are surpassing 103 degrees Fahrenheit today as South Korea’s heat wave caps off before dropping about 10 degrees over the weekend.

The Trump administration taketh away, and the Trump administration giveth. A month after President Donald Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act effectively eliminated a key incentive for solar developers to buy domestically-made panels, the White House has announced new tariffs on polysilicon and virtually every component in each step of the photovoltaic supply chain. The trade case originally came before the Department of Commerce when polysilicon makers complained that they couldn’t compete with Chinese manufacturers on semiconductor-grade material without also having a market for the solar-grade stuff. As my colleague Emily Pontecorvo and I reported last night, the administration will impose a 15% tariff on all imports and set baseline prices at which the levies would kick in for each part of the solar supply chain, ranging from $0.22 per watt for solar cells, the actual devices that convert sunlight into electricity, to $0.38 per watt for completed panels. Raw polysilicon, meanwhile, will start at $20 per kilogram. Tariffs have been tried before in the U.S. and Europe to keep out the onslaught of cheap Chinese products and protect domestic manufacturers in the name of national security, but those had only mixed success due to a lack of supply chain visibility. The Trump administration has vowed to try something novel, providing strict oversight over which companies qualify for offsets from the program to prevent Chinese manufacturers from gaming the market.
Still, just a small fraction of the nearly 300,000 Americans who work in the solar industry are in manufacturing. The Solar Energy Industries Association, the solar sector’s largest trade group and a longstanding advocate of importing cheap panels, said the tariffs would only worsen electricity inflation. “America has made terrific progress rebuilding its solar manufacturing base,” Tim Pawlenty, SEIA’s chief executive, said in a statement, “but imposing tariffs and prices floors on solar materials will create new challenges for American manufacturers and raise energy costs for families and businesses.”
Speaking of renewables the Trump administration taketh away: Yet another offshore wind developer has reached a deal with the White House to take a payment in exchange for abandoning a project. On Thursday, the German giant RWE entered into a settlement with the Department of the Interior for $1.2 billion to surrender federal leases for offshore wind projects in New York Bight and off the coasts of California and Louisiana. “After careful consideration, it was determined there is no path forward to permit these projects in the U.S. for the foreseeable future,” RWE said in a press release. “The company determined that this resolution best serves the interests of its stakeholders and allows it to direct resources toward energy projects that can be advanced with certainty.” Noting that this deal is the largest payout yet of any of the agreements the Trump administration has made to kill offshore wind projects, my colleague Robinson Meyer wrote that the price tag is “fittingly” high “because it is among the most damaging” yet. While RWE has pledged to invest in gas projects elsewhere, such as a liquified natural gas export terminal in Louisiana, RWE “well knows” that “these projects won’t help solve a coming energy shortage in New York or New England,” Rob wrote.
Dominion Energy has long dominated Virginia’s politics as the state’s utility giant and one-time political kingmaker. Now Virginia Governor Abigail Spanberger, a moderate Democrat who soared to victory last year promising to rein in runaway electricity prices, is getting involved in the utility megamerger that could see Dominion join forces with Florida-based NextEra Energy in what my colleague Matthew Zeitlin called a “juggernaut.” In an op-ed in The Washington Post, Spanberger said she had “serious questions about what this deal would mean” and vowed to intervene by formally submitting to become a party in the case to decide whether the deal, which would create a $420 billion behemoth, violates consumer-protection rules. “I know this action is unprecedented by a Virginia governor — but so, too, is the size of this proposed merger and its potential impact on the commonwealth,” Spanberger wrote. “Virginians deserve to know that their leaders are laser-focused on ensuring that their needs are part of” the review by the State Corporation Commission, the regulator that determines whether a utility deal harms ratepayers. The move comes as state regulators order Dominion to create a process for making data centers pay more of the direct costs for their electricity use, such as sponsoring construction of substations to meet new demand, E&E News reported.
On Capitol Hill, meanwhile, Democrats are eyeing new ways to crack down on data centers beyond backing the national moratorium progressive lawmakers proposed. Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon, the highest-ranking Democrat on the Senate’s tax-writing committee, pitched a new excise tax and the elimination of tax breaks for data center construction, NOTUS reported.
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By the end of next year, American factories will have enough capacity to produce all the solar inverters the country needs. The U.S. once imported 90% of its large-scale inverters, including more than 30% from Chinese-headquartered vendors. But domestic manufacturers are on track to open more than 100 gigawatts of inverter-making plants by December 2027, according to a new analysis from Wood Mackenzie. The consultancy cautioned that the devices, which patch panels onto the grid, will come at a high premium than today. As I reported last week, the Federal Communications Commission banned new types of foreign inverters on the grounds that they pose a threat to the U.S. grid and the artificial intelligence buildout. “The FCC’s intent here is clear. The US government determined that the U.S.’s reliance on foreign inverters poses a national security risk, citing both cybersecurity and economic concerns,” Joe Shangraw, research analyst at Wood Mackenzie, said in a statement. “Leading manufacturers are notifying clients that they believe their products will not fall under the scope of this ban, while project owners are concerned that their existing inverters could be blocked from receiving critical firmware updates.”
The Pentagon, meanwhile, is canceling plans to award a contract worth up to $300 million for lithium carbonate after twice delaying the deadline for bids, Inside Defense reported. The Defense Logistics Agency gave no explanation for rescinding the solicitation for a five-year, indefinite-delivery deal.
Last month, New York City’s newly minted clean energy megaproject, a 339-mile transmission line plugging the five boroughs into Quebec’s famously cheap and clean hydroelectric system, went down unexpectedly for maintenance. Just in time for the city’s temperature to go back up, Hydro Quebec’s Champlain Hudson Power Express line completed repairs two weeks ago and started delivering electricity at full capacity again on Thursday, the province’s state-owned utility told me. “We are seeing full capacity flows now on CHPE as we’ve entered a heatwave,” Pete Rose, Hydro Quebec’s senior director of stakeholder relations in New York, told me via text yesterday. “This large volume of clean energy helps suppress wholesale electricity prices while displacing large quantities of CO2.”
Like Germany itself, BMW’s Munich factory has, uh, seen a lot of changes since its opening in the early 1920s. At each step of the way, however, the vehicles coming off the assembly line ran on petroleum products. Not for long. The company’s oldest manufacturing facility will begin exclusively building electric vehicles starting next year. “This marks a huge turning point for the brand, as it phases out internal combustion models for its Neue Klasse EVs. It isn’t only a production milestone for the brand but a symbolic one,” reporter Nico DeMattia wrote for InsideEVs. “Munich is the site of BMW's HQ and its Bavarian home, and it's about to be fully electric.”
New tariffs and price floors for imported polysilicon aim to protect U.S. producers from Chinese competition.
Almost exactly a month after President Donald Trump’s landmark tax law effectively eliminated a key incentive for solar developers to buy panels made in America, his administration is throwing a lifeline to manufacturers behind the nation’s fastest-growing and quickest-to-deploy source of electricity.
On Thursday afternoon, after the markets closed, the White House announced new tariffs and minimum import prices for imported polysilicon as part of an effort to prop up the domestic supply chain for the primary ingredient in semiconductors and solar panels.
The levies come in response to complaints from polysilicon makers that the dearth of U.S. factories demanding solar-grade polysilicon made it difficult to compete with Chinese giants who benefit from selling both the solar- and microchip-grade versions of the ultra-pure industrial material derived from quartz and sand. The companies made the petition under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which gives the White House the power to restrict imports and charge tariffs on imports that demonstrably impair national security.
The Trump administration will impose a 15% tariff on all imports and set baseline prices at which the levies would apply for each component in the solar supply chain. Polysilicon will have a minimum import price of $20 per kilogram. Wafers, the ultra-thin slice of crystalline silicon that acts as the foundation of a photovoltaic cell, and ingots, the silicon material before it’s sliced, will start at $100 per kilogram. Cells, the tiny silicon-based devices that absorb photons from sunlight and break away electrons that generate electrical currents, will have a minimum price of $0.22 per watt. Modules, the completed panels, are $0.38 a watt.
The majority of U.S. solar factories simply assemble wafers and cells into modules, leaving them reliant on imports. But the policy won’t hit all at once. The Commerce Department is giving companies 120 days before the restrictions kick in.
The agency will also set up an incentive program that allows manufacturers that make large capital investments in the U.S. to avoid the worst of the levies. Jeffrey Kessler, the Under Secretary of Commerce in charge of executing on 232 cases, pushed for the provision as a bid to avoid what happened when Europe attempted to protect its own solar manufacturers by setting a minimum import price meant to keep Chinese companies from flooding the market. That policy ended up subsidizing the very Chinese parent companies putting market domination ahead of profits back home.
Avoiding that outcome is tricky under any circumstances. China and the U.S. don’t have a tax treaty, which makes it difficult for American authorities to confirm a company’s ownership structure. The surest way to seal off the U.S. market is with 100% tariffs such as those imposed on Chinese electric vehicles.
In this case, the Commerce Department decided to allow companies with active plans to onshore the solar supply chain to apply for an exemption from the new trade rules. Ahead of the announcement, sources familiar with the talks listed South Korean giant Qcells, which just opened the nation’s largest integrated solar factory in Georgia, as one obvious example of a company that would pass muster.
Solar manufacturers applauded the move. “Today’s decision from the White House balances the reality of where America’'s solar energy manufacturing is today while advancing our collective ambition to onshore the entire supply chain from polysilicon to finished panels in the U.S.,” Andy Park, the global CEO of Qcells, said in an emailed statement. “American solar manufacturers are ready to rise to the occasion.”
The trade action “creates a market where wafer and cell manufacturing can happen in the United States, and companies can go fully vertically integrated,” Nick Iacovella, the executive vice president of the Coalition for a Prosperous America, a bipartisan trade association that represents manufacturing companies at every stage of the polysilicon supply chain, told Heatmap.
“What this does is cement a key input in the supply chain that’s critical not just for chips, but for the most efficient, best-performing solar modules,” he said. “We shore up our chip supply chain at a time when there is a greater urgency to derisk from China invading Taiwan — and also during a time when the AI data center boom is driving massive demand for new energy generation, with solar driving a lot of the new capacity coming onto the grid.”
The levies come a week after the Federal Communications Commission banned the use of new types of foreign-made inverters, the equipment needed to patch solar panels onto the grid. Analysts said the ban would have a limited effect on the solar industry, since it allows for the current models on the market to be sold. The purpose of that policy is to prop up domestic factories at a moment when Europe, despite its struggle to reindustrialize, is experiencing an inverter manufacturing boom.
Despite those intentions, multiple industry sources who spoke on condition of anonymity told Heatmap that trade restrictions alone would likely prove insufficient to prop up a domestic solar supply chain at the scale needed to minimize imports.
The latest data from the Rhodium Group found that new U.S. investments in solar factories peaked from the second half of 2022 through the first quarter of 2025. During that time, as Emily reported in May, the announced projects averaged more than $2 billion per quarter. At least 30 new utility-scale solar factories opened across the U.S. just last year.
Since then, development has plummeted. Investment in new solar factories announced fell to about $350 million in the first quarter of 2026, a drop of more than 80%.
By raising the price of panels overall, the Commerce Department is providing a particular boon to America’s leading solar manufacturer, First Solar. While the Phoenix-based panel-maker’s thin-film cell technology doesn’t use polysilicon, the price hike from the tariffs will give the company an edge by allowing the company to either raise its prices to match new industry-wide benefits or undercut its competitors. Investors in the company told Heatmap its recent bookings average sales of about $0.36 per watt.
Another clear winner is T1 Energy, which Roth analysts say “would eventually be a beneficiary once it ramps up its U.S. cell manufacturing, which is now expected to come online” next year. The company’s share price spiked more than 10% in after-hours trading, while First Solar was up more than 8%.
“There are a lot of people in the administration who support solar,” Iacovella said. “They just don’t want a bunch of Chinese solar panels.”
Still, he added, “this is all about the chip supply chain.” While the benefits to solar are welcome, “this is a two-for-one.”
The Trump administration has signed a deal with RWE, a German developer, to cancel more than 3 gigawatts of offshore wind near New York and New Jersey.
This is an edition of Heatmap Daily, an evening review of the day’s news written by our executive editor. Sign up for it here.
There goes another one. The German energy developer RWE has signed a $1.2 billion deal with the Trump administration to give up its claims to develop offshore wind farms in New York, California, and Louisiana. The Trump administration has now bought out 12 offshore wind leases, paying energy developers $3.93 billion for the privilege of not developing renewable energy along the American coastline.
Today’s is the largest payout yet — and fittingly so, I suppose, because it is among the most damaging. As part of the deal, RWE abandoned its plans to build a more than 3-gigawatt offshore wind farm in the New York Bight. When RWE first leased that site in 2022, it paid $1.1 billion for it — the biggest offshore wind lease auction ever held in the United States.
RWE promised that the resulting facility, dubbed Community Offshore Wind, would generate 700 jobs and $3 billion in local economic activity. It would have been close enough to New Jersey and New York that its power could have flowed to either state, although no final power contract was ever signed. Now all of that is kaput.
In the eyes of some critics, RWE had overpaid for that lease — and in that context, the Trump administration has I suppose done the German developer a favor, bailing them out from a bad investment in a legally dubious manner. (New York’s attorney general is suing to block a similar payout to Total Energies.)
But even beyond that context, there remains one big problem with these deals — an issue even more glaring now than when Trump started targeting wind projects last year. It is that the United States — and especially the Northeast, and especially New York — needs as much electricity as it can get right now. The Trump administration is striving to bring new power demand online in the form of data centers, but cutting off new sources of generation if they fail to meet its aesthetic standards.
Anticipating this sensitivity, RWE’s press statement announcing the deal goes on to list major energy projects that it’s committed to in the United States. These projects all involve, coincidentally (or not), fossil fuels: They include a $900 million stake in a Louisiana liquified natural gas export terminal and a $300 million reservation for new natural gas turbines. (RWE implies, but doesn’t say outright, that it will build 15 natural gas peaker plants with these turbines.) When we asked for more details about these projects, and whether we should anticipate anything new, RWE immediately got back to us: “We are unable to discuss further details on the investments.”
Yet as RWE well knows, these projects won’t help solve a coming energy shortage in New York or New England. For one, the Louisiana LNG export terminal is, well, an export terminal: It will help move energy out of the country, not generate more of it at home. Those exports might boost Americans’ fortunes in a vague, long-term, balance-of-payments way, but they won’t keep a lid on anyone’s power bills (which, by the way, just hit an all-time high). More importantly, the 15 peaker plants that RWE cites are largely going to be built … in other regions of the country. If the lights go out on Houston Street, a new gas plant in Houston can’t help.