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Large electricity users that employ few workers are not what America’s reindustrialization dreams are made on.

A group of local activists recently rallied against a major new industrial site in their area.
They worried the new facility was going to suck up water and electricity. They fretted about the chemicals and risky materials it might store on site. And they argued that the land’s “light industrial” zoning designation is not appropriate for the incoming tenant.
All in all, it sounded like a typical neighborhood protest against an incoming data center. As we’ve covered here at Heatmap News, local opposition to data centers has surged over the past year, ultimately playing a role in the demise of about 25 proposed projects nationwide in 2025.
But the new facility wasn’t a data center at all. It was a factory set to produce solar panel components. The proposed Silfab Solar factory in Fort Mill, South Carolina, has fought legal efforts to change local zoning rules since May 2024 as residents have fought it in a spiraling series of cases. As of January, the battle was still ongoing.
The case serves as a reminder: While the ongoing exurban land-use backlash is notionally about data centers, it will not necessarily stop there. Many of the issues that concern residents about data centers — their power use, water use, and lack of jobs — are not unique to these vast computing facilities. Data centers more closely resemble modern factories and other industrial facilities than they do the vast, job-intensive projects of last century.
One thread unites many opponents’ stated concerns: AI data centers, which consume prodigious amounts of electricity, aren’t the kind of industrial development Americans are used to. The Bethlehem Steel site or the Ford River Rouge factory used huge amounts of energy at their peak — but also employed more than 100,000 people. Although a single data center can boast dozens of megawatts of backup diesel generation — potentially turning it into an industrial-scale polluter — it is also unlikely to create few if any permanent jobs.
This isn’t to say that AI data centers create no benefits for their communities: If their community benefits or tax packages are structured well, AI data centers can lower energy costs, help local nonprofits, or generate staggering amounts of public revenue. AI data center projects also, of course, employ construction and electrical workers (and enrich local landowners). They can also generate several dozen permanent jobs, according to Matt Dunne, the founder and executive director of the Center for Rural Innovation.
“In the places where data centers are showing up, the jobs are really quite good. These are 50 really good, high-paying jobs — and in a community of 10,000 people, that’s not nothing,” Dunne told me.
With limited land at their disposal to allocate for new developments, local officials typically prefer to see hundreds or even thousands of new jobs created by a new project. They imagine creating facilities like the BMW plant in Greer, South Carolina, or the Volkswagen facility in Chattanooga, Tennessee, both of which transformed their respective regions after they opened.
But AI data centers are more like wind and solar farms — or even oil or gas pipelines — than the factories or refineries of yore. They are a particularly “jobless” form of industrial development, and they seem to compare poorly with the more labor-intensive forms of economic activity that many exurban or rural communities say they crave.
The researcher Advait Arun at the Center for Public Enterprise also points out that some AI data centers take advantage of longstanding local tax incentive packages designed to help more traditional “cloud” data centers, which use less power and are less risky investments than the “neoclouds” and other more speculative proposals popping up across the U.S. No jobs and no tax revenue don’t add up to a particularly appealing package for local governments.
The challenge is that in the next few years, more forms of economic development will come to resemble AI data centers than factories or refineries. The country’s steel plants and shipyards used to employ tens of thousands of people. But SpaceX’s rocket factory near Brownsville, Texas, now employs closer to 4,000 people. Taiwanese chipmaker TSMC’s plant in Arizona — probably the country’s most advanced manufacturing facility — employs only 3,000. That number might eventually double, but it still pales in comparison to the heavy industrial sites of old.
The post-war factories of old were detrimental to their communities in any number of other ways — sending deadly particulate matter into the air, releasing chemicals into the water, and leaching contaminants into the soil — and drew their fair share of protesters as a result. These next-generation facilities share few if any of their forebears’ foibles, but that might not help them with the public, Jonas Nahm, a Johns Hopkins University professor who studies industrial policy, told me.
“The factories now being built are not the smokestack industries of the past. They are cleaner, and often among the least locally polluting facilities in the economy,” Nahm said.
“But political opposition no longer tracks pollution alone,” he added. “It increasingly tracks who bears the costs of scarce resources—electricity, water, land—and who captures the benefits. On that dimension, advanced factories can start to resemble data centers: clean in emissions, heavy in infrastructure, and relatively light on jobs.”
Silfab is not alone among manufacturers in facing local opposition — factories across the country have pushback on par with the budding data center rebellion. Rivian’s proposed 1,800-acre manufacturing facility in Stanton Springs, Georgia, has dealt with a “No2Rivian” campaign focused on “land and water preservation.” The Chinese company Gotion faced years of local opposition when it tried to build a plant in Big Rapids, Michigan, before it eventually killed the project.
Economic and national security imperatives will not ease these challenges in the near term. If America wants to compete with China’s dominant electronics or batteries industries, then its manufacturing industry must become even more capital-light. Some Chinese firms, such as the EV maker Zeeker, have begun experimenting with “lights-out factories,” where robots alone can build a product without much human involvement. Despite China’s much larger population, the country now uses more industrial robots per 10,000 workers than the United States does. (South Korea and Japan still lead in robot density.)
This isn’t the first time automation and technological change have transformed the labor market in exurban and rural communities, Dunne said.
“The great automation of agriculture is what drove a lot of people to cities in the Twenties, Thirties, and Forties — about half of Americans were employed in agriculture at that moment in time, and then these things called tractors came along,” he said. “Manufacturing today is going through the same thing.”
Manufacturing has become progressively less job-intensive over the past few decades, he added. Many companies invested in manufacturing “competitiveness” programs, he said, which “sounded great until folks realized the ‘competitiveness’ of a certain plant meant shedding 60% to 70% of its jobs.”
Nahm, the Johns Hopkins professor, agreed. “The tension is that competitiveness now requires more automation, not less,” he said. “We can’t rely indefinitely on tariffs or subsidies to make domestic production viable, and China is showing what large-scale industrial automation and AI deployment can achieve. The factories that actually make reshoring work, however, are unlikely to recreate the mass employment that once tied industrial facilities tightly to local communities.
“That gap — between national economic goals and local political buy-in — is where the next set of conflicts is likely to emerge,” he added.
Of course, AI data centers differ from factories in key ways. New data centers suck up huge amounts of electricity despite taking up a small plot of land, a concentration of power use rivaled only by a few industries, such as aluminum smelters. Factories also tend to support a network of local high-end employment — engineers, machinists, robotics specialists — even if robots themselves do much of the assembling work.
But if a future policymaker wants to revive U.S. manufacturing — as every president in recent decades has vowed to do — then they will discover a new raft of obstacles. And the employment juice of a manufacturing-focused economy might no longer deliver the benefit that it once did.
In one big way, factories and data centers present similar risks for local communities. Often a town or county will only have a few high-quality sites for economic development, Dunne, the Center for Rural Innovation director, said. Once a facility uses that land, then the community’s economic fate is tied up with that industry.
“I think we’ve all seen the story where over-dependence on a single industry — not to mention a single company — does not go well,” Dunne said. “If a data center is coming in and going to take over a huge amount of your potential developable property, you still need to be thinking about how to diversify your economy effectively.”
“The only way to do that,” he continued, “is to continue to create wealth in the community and invest in local entrepreneurship, to invest in quality-of-life amenities, in quality K-12 schools — all the things that make a place exciting for folks to want to live in.”
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‘Our entire company was built for this purpose.’
After decades of stagnation, the nuclear industry has drummed up all kinds of ideas meant to revive the prospects for building reactors in the United States. Make the reactors smaller. Micro, even! Cool them with helium or molten salt instead of water. Invite the Koreans or Canadians to come teach us how to construct atomic power stations again.
Yet the startup bold enough to name itself The Nuclear Company launched in 2024 on a simpler thesis: Just go with the large-scale reactors we have built before, and construct them in bulk to bring down costs.
Essentially, do what the Chinese did.
While the U.S. struggled for 15 years to complete its first two Westinghouse AP1000s, the 1.1-gigawatt units designed at the dawn of this century to be America’s flagship nuclear technology, China built four in the same time period. Beijing then reverse-engineered the technology to make its own version with an entirely domestic supply chain. China now has 10 operating Hualong One reactors and at least 37 more on the way. The U.S. ultimately completed its first two AP1000s at Southern Company’s Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant in eastern Georgia right around the same time.
The Nuclear Company was formed by hiring former managers who oversaw the Georgia project. Despite the Trump administration’s pledge to finance construction of at least 10 more large nuclear reactors, the only projects that have broken ground are new, first-of-a-kind small modular reactors that skeptics fear will face the same billion-dollar cost overruns that the AP1000s faced at Plant Vogtle — but without the same output of electricity to balance out the expenses.
On Wednesday morning, The Nuclear Company announced its most significant attempt at a Chinese-scale buildout yet. The firm unveiled plans to build 6.6 gigawatts of new, large-scale reactors at a greenfield site in Kentucky, along the Ohio River. Dubbed Prosperity One, the project would be located in Lewis County, on property once assembled for a coal-fired station that was later abandoned. The site sits half a mile from a 765-kilovolt transmission line that connects to PJM Interconnection, the nation’s second-largest and arguably most stressed grid system.
“Our entire company was built for this purpose,” Joe Klecha, The Nuclear Company’s chief nuclear officer and a former manager on the Plant Vogtle buildout, told me. “We recognize that this is different and unique in our country. We believe it’s very much needed.”
The project will begin with two reactors at a time; the Kentucky site has room for up to six. The Nuclear Company is already negotiating potential offtake agreements with electricity buyers to help finance construction, and it expects deals by next year. The company told me it has not yet decided whether it will run the Prosperity One as an independent power provider or sell the facility to a utility or another plant operator. “We are preserving all options and will make that decision as we pull the other partners onboard formally,” Klecha said.
Since its inception, The Nuclear Company has focused on the AP1000 as the most promising design in the U.S. That’s particularly true after the Nuclear Regulatory Commission certified the Vogtle Unit 4 design last week as the permanent, settled schematic for future AP1000s.
But Klecha left open the possibility of another technology. “The AP1000 is our basis for the site at this point, but we’ll continue to evaluate other options as we get through the site characterization,” he said. He expects that process to wrap up in “the first half of next year.”
The company’s options are limited, though. Last month, as I reported, South Korea agreed to help the U.S. build up to six new AP1000s at an as-yet-unspecified site in addition to constructing at least two APR1400s — that is, essentially the Korean version of the American technology. In theory, The Nuclear Company could build APR1400s, too. But it’s highly unlikely, since Westinghouse accused the state-owned Korea Electric Power Corporation of ripping off its technology for the APR1400 in 2022. That led to a yearslong lawsuit and settlement that gave the American company the right to demand royalties and keep Seoul out of markets where Westinghouse aims to compete.
The only other viable option is the ABWR. The world’s first so-called advanced reactor, the ABWR was built with General Electric’s boiling water reactor technology, which is used across about a third of the U.S. fleet. It serves as the second-most popular design after Westinghouse’s pressurized water reactor model. Japan successfully built four ABWRs over a decade from 1996 to 2006, and Taiwan nearly completed two before killing the project in a bid to phase out nuclear power altogether. The NRC certified the ABWR for construction in the U.S., but a project in southern Texas that aimed to build the first in the U.S. was scrapped about a decade ago.
“The ABWR has an impressive pedigree of construction success as well as experience being built to U.S. standards that is hard to find outside of the Vogtle project,” Brett Rampal, a veteran nuclear consultant who advises Deloitte and Veriten, told me. Still, he said, the AP1000 is the leading contender for the Kentucky site.
Rampal said Prosperity One represents a welcome break from how large-scale reactors have been planned in recent years. While most of the industry remains focused on small modular reactors, research I covered last month indicates the technologies could face worse cost problems than large-scale units, and the emerging consensus on building AP1000s focuses on expanding existing nuclear plants.
Indeed, The Nuclear Company’s first major deal was to help Brookfield Asset Management, which owns 51% of Westinghouse, complete a thwarted AP1000 project at the V.C. Summer plant in South Carolina. But other potential sites considered for new AP1000s included expansions of Florida Power & Light’s Turkey Point nuclear plant in Florida, the Tennessee Valley Authority’s Bellefonte nuclear station in Alabama, or even adding another two units to Plant Vogtle.
“A lot of the thoughts around AP1000s and large reactors have always been around existing or already-licensed sites,” Rampal said. “It’s very interesting to see TNC’s first project buck the trend of what folks have been talking about around the large reactor story in this country."
At least one thing is certain about The Nuclear Company’s approach: It will settle on one design. The company is animated by the need to avoid one of the U.S. nuclear industry’s biggest financial mistakes, known simply and derisively as “Whoops.” In 1983, the Washington Public Power Supply System — WPPSS — triggered what was then the largest municipal bond default in U.S. history after its buildout of several different reactor designs at once fell apart in a major boondoggle.
Building different reactors at Prosperity One “really goes against our mission, our vision, and our thesis as a company,” Klecha confirmed.
The key is repeating the same design over and over again so the project managers sort out the fastest, most efficient ways to build and workers hone skills in actually constructing the design. “Six AP1000 units on one site creates the scale and repetition needed to drive down costs and sends a strong signal to the supply chain,” Lin Yuan, the senior advisor at the Nuclear Scaling Initiative, a non-profit collaboration working to create the enabling commercial and policy conditions for safe and secure nuclear energy scaling, told me in an email. “Manufacturers and craft labor need to see a sustained order pipeline to invest in capacity, factory expansion, and training.”
Vogtle Unit 4 came online in 2024 roughly 30% cheaper and faster than Vogtle Unit 3, completed a year earlier. Klecha said that’s the minimum cost reduction The Nuclear Company expects for the first two reactors built at Prosperity One.
“The 30%, I would say, is the floor on the savings from the first unit to the second unit,” he said. “How do we capture those lessons? Obviously, our team’s experience. We have a pretty rigorous ‘lessons learned’ document.”
Soon, he hopes, there will be even more lessons learned — in concrete, rather than on paper.