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Robinson Meyer:
Hello, it is Thursday, November 19, and we start today with some exciting news. You know, when we started Heatmap a few years ago, I did not expect to spend so much time thinking and talking about data centers. They were then, and still mostly are, a small share of overall U.S. energy use. And obviously, I knew they existed. I lived near Northern Virginia at the time. I knew they were out there. But even when we launched the show, which was about a year later, experts still had questions about whether they would explode in quite the way that they actually have. Well, since then, obviously, they’ve become the biggest story in the American economy, the biggest driver of near-term electricity demand, and they helped define the 2026 midterm elections. We have a new podcast from Heatmap that is all about the fallout from this data center moment and whether it is possible to develop and make data centers in a responsible way. It is called, appropriately enough, Load Bearing, and it is hosted by former Federal Energy Regulatory Commissioner Allison Clements. It’s out now. You know, in the course of doing this show, Allison talked to a lot of different folks who have faced this trend head on. Local officials, regulators, developers, utility executives, entrepreneurs, technologists, activists, everyone who has had to scale the coalface of data center demand and data center development. And she’s asked them, you know, what would it look like to do this in a responsible way? And is it even possible to do it in a responsible way? It’s a really interesting show. And you can find it now on Heatmap News or wherever you get your podcasts. I recommend it. That’s Load Bearing by Allison Clements.
Robinson Meyer:
Well, now on to our show. A few weeks ago, some colleagues and I had the chance to go to New Haven, Connecticut for what’s become an annual live Shift Key taping, a live roundtable at the Yale Clean Energy Conference. It’s hosted by the Yale Center for Business and the Environment. And this year, we did it right after the midterms, literally the Friday after the 2026 midterms. And so we were able to have a very live, we were able to have a very lively conversation on stage about what had just happened, trying to digest all the changes that just occurred in American politics and what they might mean for the future of climate politics and broadly where we are in this moment in the U.S. On climate change, on energy, and on just the future of fossil fuels and all the issues, decarbonization that we follow at Heatmap. I was joined in this conversation by Heatmap founding staff writer Emily Pontecorvo and Heatmap’s newest correspondent, Alexander C. Kaufman. Obviously, this was a live show and we recorded it before a number of things had happened, including the recent revisions and, by the time you read this, potential passage of. Obviously, this was a live show and we recorded it before a number of news events, including the recent revisions to the bipartisan permitting reform bill and potentially, by the time you listen to it, the passage in the Senate. But there’s a lot in this conversation that we haven’t. But we’ve edited out a lot of the parts that became irrelevant. And we’ve kept the conversation that I think hasn’t aged and still remains really interesting and was really fun to have at the time. I’m Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News, and all that and more. It’s all coming up on this episode of Shift Key.
Robinson Meyer:
I’m Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News. And for those of you who don’t know, roughly every week or so, sometimes twice a week, we at Heatmap publish a podcast called Shift Key, where we have conversations, roundtables with some of the most interesting and important voices in our space. We recently welcomed Secretary of Energy Chris Wright and former Vice President Al Gore, both to Shift Key and to our live Heatmap House event in New York City. Today, though, we want to bring you a roundtable with Heatmap reporters and journalists. So I’m joined here on stage by Alex Kaufman and Emily Pontecorvo.
Alexander C. Kaufman and Emily Pontecorvo:
Glad to be here.
Robinson Meyer:
Let’s start with what is obviously the biggest event in American politics in the past two years, if not since 2016, which is the midterm elections that just happened earlier this week. In some ways, I feel like we are... Starting, we are having this conversation almost too soon. Like, I don’t feel like I fully have wrapped my head around everything that this election might mean for the future. But let me just start here. What surprised you most about this election? And what have you found yourself thinking about?
Alexander C. Kaufman:
Look, it’s an extremely cliche thing to point out about this election, even this early after it happened. But the extent of the blue wave and the states where it hit, the importance of those states in overall energy production? I mean, did anybody expect for Texas to not only flip on the federal level, but flip on the state level, something that has enormous implications for a lot of industries, both clean and fossil? Yeah, I think I’d start there.
Robinson Meyer:
Did you see the video yesterday of Ted Cruz? He was doing an interview, but it had the energy of someone broadcasting from a bunker. He was like, as of right now, I am the last remaining Republican and statewide official in the state of Texas, which is actually not quite true. I think there’s still two Texas State Railroad commissioners. However, in this cycle, it is true. Emily, what surprised you most or what do you find yourself thinking about?
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah, it’s hard to say something not cliche. I think just the breadth of it, like the fact that it wasn’t just Congress, it was governor’s offices, it was public utility commissions, it was all across the board, the shift that we saw.
Robinson Meyer:
Alex, you wrote a piece for us on Heatmap that was basically like, Democrats are about to control Congress. Here is what they plan to do with it. So what do they plan to do with it? What should we expect to see from this Congress for the next two years?
Alexander C. Kaufman:
Well, I think first, it’s important to begin with the caveat that after listening to interviews this morning with both future majority leader Chuck Schumer and future House Speaker Hakeem Jeffries, it seems like they’re still sorting out exactly what they want to do with it. I don’t think that they anticipated anything close to the margins that they’re going to be operating with. And I believe that that changes the calculus fundamentally. I mean, with a much thinner margin, they would be at the behest of a lot more of the ideological lawmakers that were elected this cycle. And I don’t think that’s the case. And so we may, in fact, see things that they are able to do. Among the top priorities and things that they want to do are the restoration of the renewable energy tax credits, the ITC and the PTC. Or the creation of some kind of a tax credit for batteries. I think there’s pretty widespread recognition that there were issues with the electric vehicle tax credit, difficult to defend against populist arguments that it accrued too many benefits to wealthy Americans, which, you know, is true, and a desire to support battery deployments in these other areas of grid ancillary services and the like. And so I think they want to do something with that. And then on the flip side, I think there’s a real strong desire to see oversight over key issues like, you know, something that came up repeatedly was the Department of Energy’s elimination of the industrial demonstrations program. This, I think, in particular, offended a lot of people who worked on it because it had operated with a degree of financial discipline that wasn’t always the norm with a program like that. And because China’s equivalent of that is already like three times the size of this program that didn’t even reach completion. And so going after that, going after these offshore wind deals that the Trump administration has been brokering, I think, are going to be at least top priorities that were obvious to them now. They have a lot more creative minds from a lot more regions of the country that are energy producing regions that I’m sure are going to be influential in deciding what they actually ultimately propose.
Robinson Meyer:
I think it’s worth kind of spelling out exactly the caucus dynamics that you just hinted at, which are, of course, this is a big election for the DSA or the left wing of the Democratic Party. Nithya Raman won in Los Angeles. Of course, Zohran Mamdani is mayor of New York. And there were a number of DSA victories, especially in New York City, in the primary, which kind of made it seem like going into this election, the DSA would have a or at least, like left wing lawmakers would have the kind of key margin that would matter in the House specifically. And so if the size of the Democratic majority was like 220 members, then the key majority making margin there would be the eight or 10 left wing or DSA aligned lawmakers. And because the wave was so big, it’s kind of a counterintuitive dynamic in some ways, but because the wave was so big and therefore so many moderates want, in some ways, like Jeffries and Schumer are now operating with a degree of maneuvering room, that it doesn’t seem like they were planning for even on, I mean, maybe they knew by Monday, but they weren’t planning for like in the middle of last month.
Alexander C. Kaufman:
I think that’s right. And not just that, I don’t think that they were planning for having a caucus that was going to be so heavily indexed on more rural Democrats coming from blue-collar districts, districts that have a much more pragmatic view of energy policy, and which are going to have the expectation of that pragmatic view being more widely reflected if they want to keep that majority, right? There’s been a lot of focus in the Senate, for example, on candidates who have been very aggressive in pushing stronger renewables policy. But one of the breakout stars of this, I think, is Talarico in Texas. And he’s someone who very explicitly has not missed an opportunity to say how much he loves and supports the oil and gas industry and how willing he is to challenge his own colleagues in the party to maintain that. I think also one of the key tensions that we might see going forward, at least at the federal level, is, I mean, Alex mentioned we’re going to see a lot more oversight. We’re also going to see Democrats trying to bring back some of these policies like clean energy tax credits.
Emily Pontecorvo:
I think there is probably a tension there where if you’re asking Trump to reinstate and Republicans to reinstate these policies that they just overturned and while at the same time going after him, going after the deals that he’s made with critical minerals companies and wind companies and. I don’t really see how you can do both. So I think there’s going to be some strategy there that they’re going to have to work out.
Robinson Meyer:
Do they expect to, I mean, do Democrats expect to bring back the ITC and PTC before 2029?
Alexander C. Kaufman:
That’s a great question. From the sources that I’ve talked to, it’s mixed. You know, there are kind of two different strategies for pursuing. One is in the nearer term, there are elements of the bipartisan infrastructure law and the Energy Act of 2020 that are expiring either this year or next year. And the reauthorization of those policies is clearly an avenue through which you can do policymaking like around these things. Another theory that I’ve heard is that Democrats may have to ultimately wait until, you know, 2028 to and 2029 to push some of these things under the auspice that President Trump’s many of his tax policies are going to be expiring if he wants to cement his legacy as the guy who ended tax on tips, that that is something that they can horse trade on potentially to get the ITC and the PTC back.
Robinson Meyer:
I feel like we might all know this, but just to spell it out, for a long time, the U.S. government had incentivized energy production by just like enumerating different forms of energy technology in law. And so some forms of energy technology got an investment tax credit where you could get 30 to 50% of your investment back by the time your project was up and running. Some got a production tax credit where you could get a certain kind of tax credit back, I think three, basically three tenths of every cent back or so. In 2023, Democrats said we’re tired of enumerating energy technologies. They made it tech neutral. They wrote that into the Inflation Production Act. Ron Wyden led that effort. It was very exciting. Republicans in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act just carve that back only for solar and wind. And so all you would have to do is end that carve out and the law would be right back where it was at the end of the Inflation Reduction Act.
Robinson Meyer:
One dynamic that I feel like I still don’t understand here is that like for the past 15 years, really since the Great Recession, And for the time that I think all three of us have been journalists, there has basically been no constraints on what the U.S. government could spend in any meaningful way. It didn’t seem like when the U.S. government spent more money, interest rates went up very much. We are now in a famously inflationary environment. Democrats basically won campaigning on affordability and lower gas prices, which has its own implications for climate policy. But like, I just wonder if there’s going to be the same appetite for spending money in this upcoming Congress as there has been historically. I mean, the last time we had like deficit politics in this country was like the late 80s and early 90s. And the U.S. government did indeed reduce its spending and increase its revenue. And then there was a surplus and then we stopped talking about it. And so what does any of the deficit politics here mean for the ITC or BTC? I feel like I have no idea about any of that.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah, it’s a good question. This doesn’t answer that question. But I will just say also that while the politics around the ITC and PTC are like pretty unclear, I think there could be a slightly better chance for things like energy efficiency tax credits or things like that, where we’re in this moment where all anyone cares about is energy affordability. That is an easy win for both sides to bring some of those kinds of policies back. So yeah.
Alexander C. Kaufman:
I mean, a sign of where these things might go. You know, one of the other priorities I failed to mention before is that there seems to be a consensus about putting more money into LIHEAP, the main program through which the federal government helps to subsidize utility bills, heating bills for millions of Americans, and also through that fund energy efficiency renovations in people’s homes that make their homes less drafty and then bring their bills down, especially in the winter. And the Trump administration has proposed in the past two years all but eliminating the program. In the most recent budget, there was actually an increase from above the roughly $4 billion budget. I think they added another $20 million to that. So there is already a clear bipartisan consensus on the need to spend more money on a program like that. And when you look at the range of existing programs that can, in the near term, actually help to reduce people’s bills, you know, short of building a lot of new electricity infrastructure, this is actually a way that you can target some of those things and perhaps broaden them. So I would expect that to be an area where we see more spending.
Robinson Meyer:
I have one more wonky question, then we’re going to talk about a big picture, then we’re going to move on. But one of the big issues in this election, and actually it was like previewed starting last year in the New Jersey, I think particularly the New Jersey governor’s race, was the role of high power prices. And one dynamic that we saw was not only did Democrats at the national level run on the Iran war and Trump making gas prices higher, but a lot of state level races were really rotated around utility policy. I wrote a piece yesterday. Arguing, essentially, that Wall Street hasn’t quite realized the scale of anti-utility politics that happened in this election and what it could mean. And so not only did like governors talk about getting power bills down, but, a number of governors who won, as well as their Republican opponents, all talked about replacing or changing how, who sat on their public utility commission, like who regulated the local utilities. And like all of them are saying they want to look harder at doing something on rates and at changing the utility profit model or the amount of money that utilities can make on their investments. Emily, you’ve done reporting on some ideas for utility reforms and particularly this idea about changing utility return on equity. What would that look like? I realize every state, it’s like electricity law is such a nightmare because every state is different. And then on top of every state’s different structure, we have layered the world’s most boring regulator, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. However, what would this look like at a high level for the U.S. To change and for these states to change how local utilities make money?
Emily Pontecorvo:
So we’re talking about something called return on equity, ROE, and it’s kind of a rough proxy for the amount of profit utilities make off of the investments that they make in infrastructure, in transmission lines, pipelines, any kind of capital improvements to the system. And there’s been this kind of debate among utility regulators and watchdogs and utilities about whether the ROE that a lot of states have set, the rate that utilities can make back, is too high. There’s various arguments for why that is, but there seems to be kind of this growing consensus that it could come down a little bit, save consumers some money, and utilities would be nowhere soft. The counter argument there is that when you lower utilities, are we, they start to look less attractive to investors and the utilities argue you’re risking us not being able to get cheap financing for all the building that we need to do. All of the hardening against climate impacts and expanding the grid, et cetera, et cetera. And so that’s also a pretty compelling argument. And regulators are put in this tough spot where they say, on the one hand, we could have this easy win, tell consumers we’re going to lower the profits of utilities. On the other hand, are we risking our utilities becoming more expensive for them to build things and not being able to get the capital they need? It reminds me of that meme with all the Spider Mans like pointing at each other. Like if one state moves and lowers their utilities, ROE, capital might flow to another state, to a rival state. And so there is this question of, does there have to be this sort of like consensus action among governors or among multiple states to take action on this? And I’m curious how we’ll see that play out.
Robinson Meyer:
I feel like one dynamic in the past year that’s emerged is every governor, so the country’s largest power market is PJM. And it’s all in the Mid-Atlantic. It goes from New Jersey down to Northern Virginia, out to Ohio. And this power market is let’s say it’s the way it’s governed is heavily pointed in favor of utilities. And it has certain market structures that have been performing very poorly. And because utilities are this funny sector, which is sort of interstate, but also sort of under the control of states, but also in the market, in the electricity market era, any one state has far less authority over its power, over power prices than it did in a kind of previous vertically integrated era, like a lot of states getting on the same letter and being like, listen, here is how we’re all going to change this together. And it wouldn’t necessarily be like a federal path, but it would be a multi-state coalition almost to change this.
Robinson Meyer:
Alex, I feel like we’re engaging in an elision that I want to be careful about because, for the past, let’s say, since at least the 2008 or 2010 election, there’s been a sense of like, We are interested in decarbonization, we’re interested in climate policy, Democrats are interested in climate policy, and so therefore it’s probably good for climate policy when Democrats win. You’re one of the best, if not the best, reporter on nuclear energy in the country. And you pointed to an interesting consequence of the Georgia PUC flipping. I wonder if you could just describe it for us and maybe why I want to say it’s the opposite of a silver lining for Democrats, or at least for kind of decarbonization advocates here.
Alexander C. Kaufman:
Well, you know, the Georgia PUC was responsible for overseeing the construction of the only two newly built nuclear reactors in this country in almost our entire lifetimes. The Southern Company’s pair of Westinghouse AP1000s at Plant Vogtle were supposed to be two of over a dozen in the country. Those after Fukushima, and really, more importantly, after the fracking boom made gas so cheap, really progressively shrunk down. You know, infamously, there’s the case of VC Summer in South Carolina, where the utilities actually lied to regulators and people, executives went to jail for it. So quite controversial. Georgia Power under Southern Company stayed the course. And with the Georgia PUC strongly in support of that, you know, recognizing the kind of long term benefit of this build out that was taking place. I guess critics of it might say that part of that recognition was coming from the lavish donations that would come from Georgia Power to some of those Republican commissioners. But I think it’s a little unfair to claim that that’s the only thing. And now looking back, people in the nuclear industry and beyond are immensely grateful to the Georgia PUC for allowing that to happen.
Robinson Meyer:
Including Biden administration officials.
Alexander C. Kaufman:
Very much so.
Robinson Meyer:
We’re quite like, thank goodness we finally got one of these done because now we have the workforce. Now we have, yeah.
Alexander C. Kaufman:
Yes. And ultimately, very grateful to the Georgia ratepayer for the financial sacrifice that they made. Are they grateful to the Georgia ratepayers? Well, they’re grateful for their money. I don’t know if the Georgia rate payers are themselves grateful, but that allowed those projects to move forward. And obviously, there’s a very keen focus by this administration on building more of those AP1000s. Would that have happened under Democratic leadership? It’s difficult to say. Democrats have shifted a lot on nuclear energy since those projects were initially planned. So had Democrats been in control of the PUC at that time, would those projects have been built? Probably not. And a lot of Democrats have been sort of polarized against that because of that cost and the anger over it from Georgia ratepayers.
Emily Pontecorvo:
I think the other thing to note about the win in Georgia, the kind of flipping of the Georgia PUC, I think what the Democrats, the New Democrats on that commission want to do is more closely scrutinize the proposals that Southern Company is coming to them with. And, you know, what’s looming over this whole conversation that we actually, I can’t believe we haven’t said the words yet, data centers, Southern companies proposing tons and tons of natural gas power to power data centers. And so those Democrats ran on really scrutinizing those decisions, trying to push for renewable energy as a cheaper solution, et cetera. And just zooming out on the data center of it all really quick, we haven’t noted that between Texas, Ohio, Georgia, these three states that have a huge amount of the data center capacity that’s on the way coming to them. The three governors who won in those states all campaigned on data center moratorium. Yeah.
Robinson Meyer:
Well, and there’s a funny mix. I mean, I am obliged to say that when you ask the advocates in Georgia who supported the Democratic PUC candidates, they go, this actually isn’t about the AP1000s. This isn’t about Plant Vogtle. This is about all the other Southern company spending that the PUC kind of authorized and didn’t look at closely. I am not sure Georgia voters were as discerning when they looked at their power bills and said, oh man, if it wasn’t for all that extra spending that the utility did. It is interesting because I feel like one, we’re gonna get to permitting reform in a second, but I wanna actually, this is a good zoom out. One interesting thing about this whole election is Democrats, number one, basically campaigned on lower gas prices. I think they did so quite fairly. And I think the Trump administration completely ceded that ground to them. It turned out that starting a war of choice in the Middle East really destroys your ability to promise voters that you are singularly focused on low gas prices. And I think it also singularly like President Trump ran on a really clear energy compact with voters in 2024 that I do think invoked climate policy maybe more than we were willing to credit it until after the election, which is that basically like, look, Democrats, Democrats care about all these things that are not lower prices. I only care about lower prices. He said, I’m going to cut your energy bills in half. That was among the dumbest campaign promises any politician has ever made, and he’s been appropriately punished for it. But he said, I’m going to cut your, we’re going to drill baby drill, and I’m going to cut your power bills in half. And in his way, he basically said, the only way to cut your power bill, the only way to make energy prices lower is to give the fossil fuel industry everything they want. And what the Trump administration did was that they gave the fossil fuel industry everything they wanted. And they also started this war. And it hasn’t brought bills down. It hasn’t made gas cheaper. And I think voters punished the port. So I think Democrats were very fair to run on that. But among Democrats who won, I think we see a interesting mix of pragmatism on how we would have defined the energy issue space like five or six years ago, which are promising. Annie Andrews won to cut the gas tax. James Talarico, I think on Good Morning America, said, I think we should get rid of the gas tax. I don’t think the votes are there necessarily for that, but that’s what they’re talking about. They’re talking about lowering taxes on fossil fuels. At the same time, they’ve taken a really, really hard line on data centers and basically campaigned against data centers anywhere and campaigned. Annie Andrews in South Carolina, I keep going back, but campaigned on a moratorium on data centers and basically every winning Democratic Senate candidate campaigned on making data centers pay not only for their own energy, but for the full cost of burying them on the grid. How are either of you thinking about the much larger consequences of this election? What it means for the kind of national political regime that we’re in?
Emily Pontecorvo:
We started this conversation saying it’s a little soon to have big takeaways about this election. We’re still processing it. I’m wondering how climate politics are going to evolve. I think, you know, you were just sort of alluding to this. But one thing that we’ve been discussing internally at Heatmap is like, for so long, fossil fuel companies have been like the big bad guys of climate change and tech companies have sort of been saviors. And we are starting to see that shift a little bit. I mean, I don’t think fossil fuel executives are being absolved, but we are seeing the climate movement really shift toward data center activism and anti-AI activism. And so I wonder how that is going to manifest in the presidential election. What will climate activism and climate politics look like? That’s what I’m curious about.
Alexander C. Kaufman:
So, obviously, everything kind of hinges on what happens with the permitting reform bill. So I don’t want to get out ahead of that portion of the conversation. But frankly, I feel a little bit cynical. I think that there is going to be a lot of pressure for the new Democratic majorities to focus heavily on oversight. And rightly, in many cases, there are cases that courts have already ruled that the Trump administration seemingly violated the letter of the law that was passed, certainly in terms of money coming out of the Inflation Reduction Act that was redirected, for example, to relining a blast furnace at a Cleveland Cliffs steel mill rather than building a new, you know, cleaner, lower carbon source of iron. And so I think there will be a lot of pressure to hold the administration accountable for those things. I think it’s also worth noting that there are a lot of hungry mouths to feed that have nothing to do with energy.
Robinson Meyer:
Yes, right. Exactly.
Alexander C. Kaufman:
There’s a lot of care economy,
Robinson Meyer:
Health care. Yes. Energy kind of won the last reconciliation bill. We’re not talking about a number of other issues that have historically defined the Democratic Party. I am so curious, Emily, to your point about what a blue Texas means for any of this. Yeah. One thing that happened instantly upon Mamdani, I mean, we all live in New York, so we’re like very Gotham-centric. But like one thing that clearly happened instantly with Mamdani winning in New York is that he had to like get religion on Wall Street. And more broadly, financial services jobs being extremely important to the city of New York’s economy, and that he wanted to grow these jobs, whatever he could do, because suddenly he was in an executive position and needed the economy of the region to do well to accomplish his broader goals. And I think if Talarico alone had won Texas, he would have been able to walk a kind of careful all of the above policy. And I think, you know, Hinojosa is going to do all of the above too. But I think having a Democratic governor of Texas, who the Democratic Party is going to be looking to defend, for the next four years, really changes what the politics of oil and gas are for the Democratic Party, and is a much, much bigger change from, I think, where the Biden administration wound up at the end of its term, which is we support the workers in oil and gas, but we don’t necessarily support the companies. I think we just don’t know yet what a Democrat sitting in the Texas governor’s mansion means for the way the whole party thinks about these issues. Let’s talk about permitting because we’ve burned through far more of this conversation over the election than I thought. This bill’s fate is like totally unclear to me. And I can see ways that this election, you know, the bill basically has a few different corners. It will make it much easier to build transmission lines in this country. It will make it easier to build natural gas pipelines in some parts of the country. It eases some natural gas permitting. It does not ease natural gas permitting. On a national scale in quite the same way I think it does for transmission lines, but all linear infrastructure will benefit from the bill. It weakens the role of tribes in certain kinds of oversight they can do on federal land and private land, which matters primarily out West. And it adds all these permitting certainty provisions, which are meant to help renewable developers under the Trump administration fight back against the Trump administration’s effort to revoke their permits. Emily, you were doing some reporting on what could happen next on this bill. Just download to us what could happen next year and what maybe you learned or what surprised you most from that reporting about just like, where we should all be thinking.
Emily Pontecorvo:
I think a big wild card is we don’t really know Republicans in the House. We don’t really know how many of them are for the bill. This bill would chip away at the business model of a lot of utilities in the South, and especially the transmission provisions. And so there’s some Southern House Republicans in leadership positions that could be swayed by the harm to the utilities in their states.
Robinson Meyer:
I mean, to some degree, I have to say, seeing this whole package move has made me resent the filibuster in the Senate in a new way because it’s so cool to see actual legislating happen and therefore like actual divides among legislators, emerge in surprising ways. And so if you imagine what the path for this bill looks like, it is Republicans in the Senate basically will all vote for the bill. That gets you into the 50s. You have to clear 60 to get, you have to clear 60 to pass the filibuster and the sponsors would like to get as high as possible to create an aura of inevitability around the bill. So it will be some of the Democrats in the Senate, plus all of the Republicans. That seems like what the math would be in the Senate if you imagine this thing passing. Then it goes to the House. The House, the most powerful Republicans in the House are all like Southeastern Republicans with very close ties to Southern Company and Duke, which are these vertically integrated monopoly utilities that are going to lose special rights under their monopoly under the bill. And so there you potentially need moderate Democrats to ride in and save the day in the House because you get a lot of defections among House Republicans.
Robinson Meyer:
Potentially, none of this matters if the bill either dies in the Senate or if the bill is attached to one of the two or three must-pass pieces of legislation that the House has to move before the end of the year. but like, It’s this interesting mix of regional and ideological caucus immersion that you don’t normally see because Congress normally doesn’t legislate. Like, how does Tuesday seem to be affecting how Democrats are thinking through this legislation? Because it seems like it could go either way. Emily first, and then Alex.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah, I mean, what you keep hearing is that a lot of more progressive Democrats feel emboldened by the results. They think, OK, we are going to have these massive, unheard of majorities in the next Congress. Why are we going to make a compromise deal right now that has all of these what they see as poison pills? Why not just wait and wait till they have more leverage and pass something in the next Congress? Then, of course, there’s all of these questions about how that would actually work. They either need to get Trump on board or they need to get the numbers for veto-proof legislation. And I think other Democrats are saying that’s not happening.
Robinson Meyer:
So, yeah. Well, it’s also funny to imagine the politics of, like, you are going to do the most ruthless oversight operation you’ve ever done, precisely on some energy issues. Like, we know, for instance, Senator Ossoff, who has sworn off running for president in 2028, something we all believe. We all know, for instance, that Senator Ossoff is very, very interested in oversight of Trump family kind of infiltration of various critical mineral firms and the ways that the Trump family members have profited from critical minerals. Well, this bill, in the form that it exists right now, is quite good for hard rock mining. And so you’re going to make it easier to do hard rock mining at the same time. I mean, maybe these things go hand in hand. It’s just hard to imagine exactly what this operation looks like. And I think tricky too, necessarily to believe some members because, A lot of Democrats who are quite close to legacy environmental groups have seemingly gotten religion on the importance of transmission. I’m not sure that if this bill were to move through, they would be as eager to pass transmission legislation as they are claiming to be right now. Alex, you were going to say something.
Alexander C. Kaufman:
I share Emily’s view that this has really emboldened a lot of the critics of the bill who believe that they could get a different kind of legislation in the next Congress. I’ve also heard the flip side of that from people who agree that the prospects of passing this have dimmed as a result of Tuesday, and who are very cynical about the possibility of any kind of dealmaking on this scale, and any kind of dealmaking that’s this broad actually happening in the next Congress, even with those majorities, because they’ve been very, there’s been a lot of bipartisan comity on things like incremental updates on nuclear energy. Transmission, a much more challenging issue.
Robinson Meyer:
It’s interesting because the bill, like with the initial kind of modeling efforts, and I think there’s a lot about this bill that is completely unquantifiable. It comes down to individuals making risk assessments of whether they think the underlying policy changes are good or not. But there has been an effort to quantify some of the bill’s impact. And it has found basically the Rhodium Group, which is an independent research firm published an estimate that found the bill would be, in the worst-case scenario, basically neutral for the climate, and in the best-case scenario, cut emissions by 4% by 2040, which is like not a lot, but like not nothing, and kind of helps you maybe draw some error bars around how bad or good the bill could be. In a world where the ITC or PAC are restored very soon. No one’s published this modeling. It strikes me that the bill is much better for emissions. And if your base case now is that the Democrats are going to, have a strong enough majority in the House and Senate through at least 28, if not through 2030, to do some real negotiating with this president and whoever the next president is, then it does seem to, like, the case for the bill does seem to me to be stronger now. And it seems to me to be stronger now in part because you want to start all these regulatory processes that the bill would inaugurate, like having FERC oversee, basically FERC kind of beginning to force electricity regions to move through transmission planning so that they are ready to go by 29 and you can actually start putting steel in the ground.
Emily Pontecorvo:
I had this in an earlier story I wrote about the bill, but after the Inflation Reduction Act passed in 2022, the Princeton Zero Lab did this modeling where they found that the vast majority of the emission reduction potential of this bill was bottlenecked by the fact that we didn’t have the transmission to get all the potential renewable energy it could bring onto the grid. And just it could be so supercharged by having a reformed transmission system. And so, yeah, there’s this argument that if Democrats want to do something big on climate, the next opportunity that they have, this is a prerequisite. Like, if they don’t have transmission reforms in place, it’ll be a missed opportunity. You know, everyone complained about the IRA moving too slow. This was one of the reasons.
Robinson Meyer:
One of the arguments that I’ve seen against this bill on the climate front is basically by making it easier to build renewables, it will push any U.S. Oil and gas production into being exported. And therefore kind of just like create more spillover. Does that seem like, what do you think of that?
Emily Pontecorvo:
I don’t think you can, oil and gas exports are totally dependent on global factors. And so, you know, maybe more gas, they’ll try to export more gas, but it just depends if there’s a market for it.
Robinson Meyer:
One of the interesting dynamics here is that a lot of what you think about this bill does actually come down to like, do you think solar and wind, solar and batteries really are the cheapest form of electricity, not only in the U.S., but around the world. What is your model for what the market, quote unquote, does to U.S. and global, the global energy system over the next five years to 10 years? And there was a lot of initial concern about kind of this initial shock from data centers and what that could mean in relation to the bill. I wonder if Tuesday’s results kind of muted that or changed that because there’s going to be a lot of state level pressure and oversight of data centers that you wouldn’t have assumed was there. But it also is kind of like, do you think that as renewable advocates and climate advocates would tell us in other settings that solar and wind and batteries are winning? Or do you think that fossil fuels will always win for reasons beyond just cost? I want to ask one last question. This has been such a huge week. There must be some question that’s like burning in both of your heads. I know there’s one in mind that is like, how are things going to turn out? What is your biggest question looking forward for the next two years in the full cosmos of issues that we cover? What is the thing you’re like, man, I am so curious how this is going to turn out? Alex, then Emily, then I’ll go.
Alexander C. Kaufman:
You know, there are some things that are rather positive and clean energy that the Trump administration has done. Namely, I think the amount of money and resources that have been put into nuclear projects has been very significant. It has gone beyond in many ways what the Biden administration was able to do through legislation to bolster that industry. Many of those nuclear plants are located in blue states. A big question is, how will that money keep flowing? Will the oversight coming from Democrats start to limit the money in that deal-making that happens? And how willing are they going to be to open up the purse strings for various types of projects, like, for example, some of these nuclear projects in upstate New York? Will negotiating with the energy department become a lot more difficult on either side as a result of this, I think, is a big question, especially for things that take so long and are so capital-intensive, And therefore, any kind of these near-term political disruptions can be disastrous to the total cost and actual ability to reach final investment decision.
Robinson Meyer:
Emily?
Emily Pontecorvo:
It has to be permitting reform. That has been the theme, I think, over the past two years of reporting and just seeing how the climate and clean energy industry and community has evolved under the second Trump administration. And it is something that, you know, there’s interest on both sides of the aisle to do this. And while getting a perfect deal for Democrats is not possible, getting something that will enable Democrats to do what they want to do down the line is, it seems like it is so essential to what happens next in climate. And I’m just dying to find out whether it’s going to pass or not.
Robinson Meyer:
I think these are two great questions. And it’s reminded me what a great team we have here at Heatmap. I think there’s a number of things that I have been thinking about around this election that have been really quite striking. The first one is the Trump era since 2016 has been defined by massive turnout from both parties. The first time we realized this was 2016, of course, but then in 2018, it became clear that this was not going to be a regular midterm, that Republicans were showing up in droves to vote for Republican candidates in the midterm elections and Democrats were also showing up in droves to beat back Donald Trump. And this has continued through every election since 2016. This is the first election where one party showed up in droves and the other one didn’t. And what happened is that the one that didn’t got wiped out. And that has been really striking. I think the second thing is that that front, if you had told Democrats back in 2013, I’m stealing this point from another political writer, but I think it’s a great point. If you told Democrats in 2013 that they would eventually win the state of Texas or the state of Georgia. Or just put back together a Senate majority by putting together a coalition of holding on to upper Midwest working class whites while putting together in the South a coalition of Latinos, Black voters, voters below the age of, let’s say, 44 and college educated professionals, they’d be like, yeah, of course, like that’s the play. Like that’s what we assume is going to happen in the future of the American political system. What they wouldn’t have predicted was that in the middle of that, Donald Trump would become president. He’d be impeached all these times. We’d have a big pandemic. I think 10 years ago, Democrats thought they had to have a lot of different policies to appeal to those different groups. And it turned out that you actually don’t, that the same policy mix appeals to all those groups. And back when Democrats were kind of putting together the coalitional policy plan, they thought about liberalizing immigration. They thought they wanted climate to attract young people to the party. And it turned out that actually, they didn’t need those things, that voters responded to more moderate approaches to immigration, approaches that characterized the early Obama administration, and that voters seemed to respond to a more affordability-focused energy frame and climate frame. It’s been so striking with the permitting bill because after two years of Democrats swearing that they care about affordability and campaigning on affordability. So much of the conversation about the permitting bill has been about emissions. And I’m so curious to see now. Where climate winds up in the democratic firmament. I think that democratic politicians do care about climate change, but I think how they balance climate against other policy objectives and how they frame that to voters remains totally unclear. I really have no idea where this winds up. And I think that what a democratic Texas means for all of this remains totally uncertain. And we’ve seen, by the way, in North America, the two most successful politicians in recent history in North America, Mark Carney and Claudia Scheinbaum, the two most popular executive politicians have taken a much different approach to the fossil fuel industry while still saying all these nice things about climate change. We don’t really know what a Scheinbaum-Carneyism would look like in the U.S. I don’t know that it would be better for decarbonization than the Biden administration, but we saw how the Biden administration wound up. And so that’s what I’m really curious to see.
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Rob digests the election results with Heatmap’s Emily Pontecorvo and Alexander C. Kaufman during a live Shift Key taping at Yale.
A few weeks ago, some colleagues and I had the chance to go to New Haven, Connecticut, for what’s become an annual live Shift Key taping at the Yale Clean Energy Conference, hosted by the Yale Center for Business and the Environment. This year, we did it three days after the midterm elections.
I was joined in this conversation by Heatmap founding staff writer Emily Pontecorvo and Heatmap’s newest correspondent, Alexander C. Kaufman. Obviously, this was a live show, and we recorded it before a number of things had happened, including the recent revisions to — or maybe even, by the time you read this, the potential passage of — the bipartisan permitting reform bill and potentially, by the time you listen to it, the passage in the Senate. But there are still plenty of questions that remain for the next Congress.
Shift Key is hosted by Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, YouTube, or wherever you get your podcasts.
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Here is an excerpt from their conversation:
Robinson Meyer: How are either of you thinking about the much larger consequences of this election? What it means for the kind of national political regime that we’re in?
Emily Pontecorvo: We started this conversation saying it’s a little soon to have big takeaways about this election. We’re still processing it. I’m wondering how climate politics are going to evolve. I think, you know, you were just sort of alluding to this. But one thing that we’ve been discussing internally at Heatmap is like, for so long, fossil fuel companies have been like the big bad guys of climate change and tech companies have sort of been saviors. And we are starting to see that shift a little bit. I mean, I don’t think fossil fuel executives are being absolved, but we are seeing the climate movement really shift toward data center activism and anti-AI activism. And so I wonder how that is going to manifest in the presidential election. What will climate activism and climate politics look like? That’s what I’m curious about.
Alexander C. Kaufman: So, obviously, everything kind of hinges on what happens with the permitting reform bill. So I don’t want to get out ahead of that portion of the conversation. But frankly, I feel a little bit cynical. I think that there is going to be a lot of pressure for the new Democratic majorities to focus heavily on oversight. And rightly, in many cases, there are cases that courts have already ruled that the Trump administration seemingly violated the letter of the law that was passed, certainly in terms of money coming out of the Inflation Reduction Act that was redirected, for example, to relining a blast furnace at a Cleveland Cliffs steel mill rather than building a new, you know, cleaner, lower carbon source of iron. And so I think there will be a lot of pressure to hold the administration accountable for those things. I think it’s also worth noting that there are a lot of hungry mouths to feed that have nothing to do with energy.
Meyer: Yes, right. Exactly.
Kaufman: There’s a lot of care economy ...
Meyer: Healthcare — yes. Energy kind of won the last reconciliation bill. We’re not talking about a number of other issues that have historically defined the Democratic Party. I am so curious, Emily, to your point about what a blue Texas means for any of this, one thing that happened instantly upon Mamdani — I mean, we all live in New York, so we’re like very Gotham-centric. But one thing that clearly happened instantly with Mamdani winning in New York is that he had to get religion on Wall Street, and more broadly, financial services jobs being extremely important to the city of New York’s economy, and that he wanted to grow these jobs, whatever he could do, because suddenly he was in an executive position and needed the economy of the region to do well to accomplish his broader goals.
And I think if Talarico alone had won Texas, he would have been able to walk a kind of careful all of the above policy. And I think, you know, Hinojosa is going to do all of the above too. But I think having a Democratic governor of Texas, who the Democratic Party is going to be looking to defend for the next four years, really changes what the politics of oil and gas are for the Democratic Party, and is a much, much bigger change from, I think, where the Biden administration wound up at the end of its term, which is we support the workers in oil and gas, but we don’t necessarily support the companies. I think we just don’t know yet what a Democrat sitting in the Texas governor’s mansion means for the way the whole party thinks about these issues.
You can find a full transcript of the episode here.
Mentioned:
Alex’s election-night story: Democrats Took Control of Congress. Here’s What They Plan to Do With It.
Emily’s transmission story: Exclusive: New Modeling Finds Permitting Bill Would Likely Cut Emissions
Rob’s Wall Street story: The Anti-Utility Election
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Music for Shift Key is by Adam Kromelow.
How senators voted didn’t just come down to party, ideology, or geography.
This is Heatmap Daily, a weekday digest written by our executive editor. Subscribe here.
The Senate will vote tonight on amendments to the permitting reform bill, officially known as the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act.
It will then vote on the bill itself — which only needs a bare majority to pass. The House of Representatives will then take up the bill.
The permitting bill, in other words, appears to have survived that peculiar phase of Senate process where legislation requires 60 votes to pass. (That magic number isn’t due to anything in the Constitution, but because Senate procedure technically allows unlimited and silent “debate” on a measure, and it takes a three-fifths majority to end that “debate.” Changing this is what people mean when they talk about “ending the filibuster.”)
All of this is to say that the bill’s Senate coalition might be as large now as it has ever been. Senators have now taken a handful of these 60-vote-threshold cloture votes on BAAJA, and we can see who voted for the measure last week at the beginning of the debate and who had peeled off by the end.
As we await final votes on the amendments and the bill itself, here’s some brief game-time analysis:
Almost every Republican voted yes. Since the first cloture vote on November 9, almost everyone in the Senate GOP caucus has voted in favor of the bill. Mike Rounds, the junior senator from South Dakota, is the only Republican to vote no in every roll call. Missouri’s Josh Hawley, who opposes the bill’s transmission provisions, started out voting yes but voted no today.
Democratic support has eroded somewhat. Fourteen Democrats (or those who caucus with them) never voted against the bill, while 25 have voted against it at every opportunity. The latter group includes Senators Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, Ed Markey, and Ron Wyden.
But some Democrats who started off supporting cloture on the bill peeled off as the politics have developed — or as they jockey to add amendments or shape the bill during its final passage. Senators Jon Ossoff of Georgia, Gary Peters of Michigan, and Jeanne Shaheen of New Hampshire voted yes on the initial cloture vote last week, but no on the final vote today about moving to passage. The bill contains Cathy Cortez Masto’s mining measure, and she voted yes on it for its first cloture vote, but no today. Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut and Andy Kim of New Jersey also voted no today.
There’s a surprising amount of same-state splits. BAAJA’s politics have been quite geographic at times — as Julian NoiseCat observed on Shift Key, Western senators with close tribal ties have clearly approached the law differently than those from the East Coast or Midwest — but it’s also revealed surprising splits in the Democratic caucus that don’t necessarily come down to ideology or location. Senator Raphael Warnock of Georgia voted yes on every cloture vote, for instance, but Senator Jon Ossoff started out yes and then switched to no. Senator Martin Heinrich of New Mexico helped write the bill, but his same-state colleague Senator Ben Ray Lujan voted against cloture. Arizona’s Mark Kelly is a no, but Ruben Gallego is a yes. Cory Booker in New Jersey is a yes, but his colleague Andy Kim started out yes … and then became a no.
Among Democrats, there’s something of a “new school” vs “old school” divide on how to fight climate change. I thought it was notable that Senator Brian Schatz of Hawaii, a self-described climate hawk, has evidently signaled he will vote yes on final passage, according to Josh Siegel of Punchbowl. Schatz is part of the group that once called themselves “the three climateers,” a troika of Democratic senators who worked on climate change and decarbonization through the bad old days of the 2010s. The other two members of that group? Senators Martin Heinrich and Sheldon Whitehouse, who led the Democratic side of the negotiations over this bill.
Whitehouse and Heinrich argue that this bill — because it will speed up permitting, especially for transmission lines, and put clean energy to something closer to an even footing with fossil fuels — is good for the climate. They also argue that it will allow future climate policy to go even faster. But BAAJA is also opposed by a handful of senators who have defined themselves by their support for aggressive climate policy, including Senators Ed Markey of Massachusetts and Bernie Sanders of Vermont. You could see this as a new-school climate hawk vs. old-school environmentalist fight, but the divide isn’t total. I find it interesting that Senator Tina Smith of Minnesota — an aggressive climate and clean energy advocate — says she’s “firmly opposed” to the bill because of what she worries it could mean for mining projects near the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness.
Lots more to say but we’ll leave it there for now.
The company is attempting to commercialize a novel processing method, with the help of a former NRC commissioner.
If you were born the year the United States gave up on finding a place to store its spent nuclear fuel, you’d almost be eligible to vote. Since 2009, when the Obama administration halted work on Yucca Mountain, the Nevada site designated under federal law as the nation’s first nuclear waste repository, the country has had no formal plan in place.
Russia, France, China, and Japan all reprocess highly radioactive spent fuel that comes out of reactors to extract usable materials and recycle them into more fuel. The process still leaves behind some nasty, dangerous radioisotopes that form during fission, but there remains a lot less that needs to be stored for centuries. The U.S. attempted to set up a commercial nuclear recycling industry in the 1970s, before President Jimmy Carter pulled the plug as a sop to the nonproliferation movement. No one has really attempted to invest in the industry since.
Over the past decade, a new slate of startups has promised to revive the dream — or, to some, nightmare — of recycling spent fuel. The Biden administration put up funding. The Trump administration proposed “nuclear lifecycle campuses” where recycling would be just one part of future complexes that process, enrich, and reprocess reactor fuel, and dozens of states stepped up to serve as hosts. In a sign of growing momentum, one such company formed last year in Washington, D.C., with former Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman Chris Hanson as its head of implementation.
Now that company, Project Omega, has taken a big step toward actually commercializing its technology, Heatmap can exclusively report. The company submitted its “letter of intent” to the NRC, giving the agency a formal heads up that it plans to submit a full application within the next few years.
“Waste is the biggest challenge in the nuclear industry,” Staff Sheehan, Project Omega’s chief executive, told me. “We exist to take the amount of nuclear waste and the hazard of that nuclear waste and drastically decrease it.”
The NRC has, over the past year, ramped up efforts to streamline and modernize its regulatory process, and has greenlit permits for new reactors in record time. But the most successful applications have largely come from companies that carried out a lot of legwork with the NRC before submitting paperwork, so that the formal documents provide answers to questions the regulators expect to ask.
Since the NRC has never permitted or licensed a commercial nuclear reprocessing facility, companies are lining up to engage with the agency early. Oklo, the Silicon Valley startup seeking to deploy its own small modular reactors and reprocess the fuel its future power stations will run on, held a “pre-application meeting” with the NRC just last month. Curio, another Washington-based company specializing in nuclear waste reprocessing, submitted its letter of intent to the NRC in May.
Reprocessing, as a concept, draws fierce opposition from nonproliferation advocates who say the technology lays the groundwork for greater production of materials for bombs. Plutonium, which is used in some of the most powerful nuclear weapons, does not occur in nature, but forms during fission. The world’s only commercial nuclear recycling facilities, such as La Hague in France or the Mayak Production Association in Russia’s Ural Mountains, rely on a technology called aqueous reprocessing, which involves dissolving spent nuclear fuel in acid, then using a solvent to separate reusable uranium and plutonium from the other waste products. What little remains is then typically put into glass through a process called vitrification, which keeps the radiation from emanating, and stored long term. But the issue for policymakers and advocates seeking to thwart the growth of the world’s nuclear arsenal is that plutonium is among the key extracted materials.
Project Omega, by contrast, is pursuing an approach called pyroprocessing. Under that technology, developed in U.S. national laboratories and pursued by Oklo as well, spent fuel is chopped up and dunked in a bath of molten salt, often heated to temperatures around 930 degrees Fahrenheit. An electrical current then separates out useful materials, such as uranium and various isotopes that can be used for medical purposes.
“You can’t separate out pure plutonium, so you don’t get any streams that are usable for weapons,” Sheehan said. “That’s a big regulatory advantage, I would say.”
The biggest disadvantage, he admitted, is that nobody has tried to do pyroprocessing at scale. La Hague in France “has been operational for 50 years or something like that.”
“The disadvantage going in with a new technology is you have to educate regulators, and you have to get them comfortable with some of the novelties about it. It hasn’t been done before,” Sheehan said. “But the advantage of using a new technology is you can do things way more efficiently, way more safely, and way more economically.
Project Omega emerged from stealth back in February. Sheehan founded the company after leaving his previous startup, Air Company, where he had invented a novel process to convert carbon dioxide into hydrocarbons and alcohols that could be used for sustainable aviation fuel. Among the early hires to the new company was Hanson, whom President Donald Trump fired from the NRC last year in a dramatic show of control over an independent federal agency.
That doesn’t mean the company has faced the Trump administration’s wrath. Since then, Project Omega has won funding from the Department of Energy to carry out work at the Idaho National Laboratory and the U.S. military to conduct research with the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. Last week, Project Omega raised $80 million in a Series A, pitching its reprocessing facilities as “nuclear refineries for the next industrial revolution.”
“I believe Project Omega is addressing one of the most critical gaps in our nuclear industrial base,” Tommy Hendrix, general partner at the venture firm Decisive Point, which invested in the Series A, told me over email. “Omega is taking a fundamentally different approach by transforming used nuclear fuel into valuable resources for advanced reactors and long-duration power systems.”
Asked whether he would pitch his company differently to Democrats, who traditionally opposed nuclear reprocessing and will command sizable majorities in Congress next year, Sheehan swiftly answered, “Not at all.”
“They call me the climate guy in all the circles I have walked in. Whether it was the White House under the Trump administration or D or R offices in Congress,” Sheehan said. “And I have a reputation for sticking to my guns.”