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It isn’t just bad vibes: Electric vehicle sales are slumping in the United States. Fewer than 300,000 EVs were sold nationwide during the first three months of 2024 — although it could be more than 350,000, depending on how you count and whose data you trust. That’s a slight decline from last quarter at a time when EV sales need to be accelerating.
What caused the slump, and what can be done about it? And could hybrids or plug-in hybrids help solve the problem? In this week’s episode, Rob and Jesse chat with Corey Cantor, an EV analyst at BloombergNEF. They talk about Tesla’s spiraling problems, whether Detroit can pull its EV strategy together, and whether plug-in hybrids can co-exist with a climate strategy. Shift Key is hosted by Robinson Meyer, executive editor of Heatmap, and Jesse Jenkins, a Princeton professor of energy systems engineering.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, or wherever you get your podcasts.
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Here is an excerpt from our conversation:
Robinson Meyer: The PHEV story is really interesting here, and the hybrid story is interesting here, because three years ago, four years ago, Toyota was talking about how hybrids and plug-in hybrids were going to be the bridge for consumers. And what we have seen is that plug-in hybrid and hybrid sales have increased.
Now, what’s funny is that Toyota has actually not really been selling those plug-in hybrids. It’s like a Stellantis story, right? It’s Jeep. Ford sells a very expensive plug-in hybrid. Toyota actually doesn’t sell plug-in hybrids. In fact, if Toyota made more plug-in hybrids, if they made more Prius Primes, this amazing-looking recent car for them — it’s a plug-in hybrid — then they would sell them. But they don’t make enough. So Toyota has kind of won this discursive cycle, but not actually made the plug-in hybrids that they were advocating for, you know, two or three years ago.
Jesse Jenkins: Yeah. I mean, if you look at the numbers, about half of all the plug-in hybrids sold are Stellantis vehicles, right? Across the Jeep, Chrysler, Dodge, and Alfa Romeo brands, they don’t sell hybrids. They only sell plug-in hybrids. And they also don’t sell any, BEVs yet, either. They’re coming, later than the end of this year, probably, their first U.S. battery electric vehicle.
So, you know, Stellantis’ only offerings right now are a set of plug-in hybrids, and they’ve been selling them very effectively, partly because I think the tax credits from the Inflation Reduction Act make them very competitively priced relative to the conventional Jeep or, Chrysler Pacifica minivan, or whatever else you’re looking at in the market. Why not get the plug-in hybrid, even if you don’t plug it in?
But if you look at it, so they’ve sold about 46,000 plug-in hybrids in the first quarter of the year. Toyota, who talks about it more than anybody, only sold 11,600. So they sold like a quarter as many as Stellantis did —
Meyer: Which is so crazy because also, the Toyota plug-in hybrids are great. They’re awesome cars. They should be making more of them!
Jenkins: Yes, they should be selling 50,000 of them a quarter.
Meyer: Yeah, exactly. But they treat them — it’s so funny. The Toyota plug-in hybrids are central to the Toyota argument, and then they treat them like compliance cars. They don't make enough, even though they’re like, this is what consumers want.
And it’s funny: They were right. That is seemingly what consumers want. And it does seem like the availability of BEVs has like defanged plug-in hybrids and hybrids for consumers in a way that maybe we didn’t expect. Toyota’s not making them. It’s like they won the discourse cycle, but they’re not actually selling vehicles.
Jenkins: Yeah. I mean, Toyota Group and Honda are really the undisputed kings or queens of hybrid electric vehicles. They sell far more than anybody else. But on the plug-in side, Stellantis is the No. 1 by far. They’re like half of the market, just themselves.
Corey Cantor: I was just going to say, to Rob’s point on just how much better the Toyota plug-in hybrids are, they’re getting 40-mile electric range between the Prius Prime and the RAV4 Prime — which by the way: RAV4, Model Y, you could have a RAV4 Prime-Model Y-off every quarter if Toyota was selling enough of those.
For those Stellantis PHEVs, the other one that’s big is the Chrysler Pacifica minivan, which, I know how much you guys love your minivans, here. Those are in the low 20-mileage. So what you’ve seen policymakers in California advocate for is really going towards a 50-mile minimum to begin to count PHEVs in what's called Advanced Clean Cars II. Which, in the kind of conventional popular media is often referred to as California’s ban of gas cars, which actually isn’t a ban of gas cars because even in 2035, you could sell 20% PHEVs if they meet a 50-mile electric range minimum.
My hope, from a climate standpoint, is if PHEVs are going to be a part of the story — and again, data-wise, they’re just not in the U.S. In some European countries ... or BYD, for example, you see 50-50 split between BEV and PHEV. Here, it’s remained 80-20.
Just better PHEVs — just automakers delivering better PHEVs with 40[-mile] all-electric range, or 50[-mile]. I do think Hyundai and Kia might move in that direction, where they’re delivering those better PHEVs over time. But not to just take the, kind of, spin on them, and just say, wow, because Toyota or whatever automaker says PHEVs are great, that consumers should buy them. The PHEVs now just aren’t as good as they should be, and they can be better, and automakers can still make a profit off of it.
It’s one of those big myths, where it’s like, you see so many people say, “Have you considered a PHEV?” And it’s like, which PHEV? Because it’s really just the Jeep Wrangler and the Pacifica.
This episode of Shift Key is sponsored by…
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Watershed’s climate data engine helps companies measure and reduce their emissions, turning the data they already have into an audit-ready carbon footprint backed by the latest climate science. Get the sustainability data you need in weeks, not months. Learn more at watershed.com.
Music for Shift Key is by Adam Kromelow.
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Chatting about win-win solutions with the Abundance Institute’s Ryan Norris.
This week’s conversation is with Ryan Norris, senior fellow for energy policy at the Abundance Institute. The libertarian-leaning institute — whose name cleverly shortens to AI — is a new-ish entity with increasing relevance in energy and tech spaces. As Norris and I discussed, it’s starting to help shape policy on data center development and the generation that’ll power it all, especially in Republican circles. Norris himself previously worked with Americans for Prosperity, a right-wing political organization. I reached out to him and asked if we could chat because I wanted to know more about the institute’s work within the energy space. He wound up saying a lot more than I expected. So let’s dive into it.
The following conversation was lightly edited and abridged for clarity.
So let’s start with what you’re working on. What’s on your desk these days?
Here at Abundance, we sit at the juncture of emerging technology and the energy they need to bring that new technology to bear to impact life positively. We are always in a constant state of learning and researching what the latest thoughts and feelings are around certain policies, particularly around AI and data centers, and then energy technology. How do they feel about nuclear? Geothermal? Solar and battery arrays?
A lot of what I’m working on is Project Gigawatt, a body of policy that fits into permitting, generation, the grid, transmission, and then market and demand. Policies that we believe will generate more, transmit more, and as much of a free market approach as possible. Knowing that a lot of states have regulated utilities, when the state utility can’t produce what the state can potentially actually generate or would need to in order to accommodate large loads, we think there needs to be other opportunities to either bring that power or purchase it in a different way.
When it comes to this policy set, how are you taking into account the intensifying backlash to data center and AI infrastructure, as well as the energy attached to it?
As everyone can sense, things are moving rapidly, and there is a natural inclination to question how fast we’re going. I think these concerns need to be addressed seriously and respectfully. You can’t just say negative things about people who care about water quality or impacts to their local economies. Those are valid. I’ve lived through those. I come from a rural place in Arkansas that had oil and gas plays. And I’ve seen there needs to be conversations with people living in those areas too.
We cannot discount the backlash. When you take the legitimate concerns and pair them with the opportunities coming, I think there’s actually a chance to set up win-win solutions. It shouldn’t be a win-lose scenario here. They have skepticism about AI in the short and long term — that’s a natural inclination and not a negative, per se. But educating people and policymakers about data centers, that’s important.
What is your approach to the rise in land use regulation around data centers and energy infrastructure, moratoria and restrictive ordinances?
As much as possible, you want the infrastructure and cost allocation to be borne by the business causing it. That’s the motivation behind a lot of colocation partnerships happening right now, like the Kilby project in Texas, with natural gas powering a Microsoft hyperscale.
To us, it’s about setting up the opportunity for private property owners to sell to those hyperscalers and those generating the energy. Setting up situations where you’re not stopping people from benefiting. A lot of the “bring your own power” concept, we really like that. Maybe having it where power purchase agreements are more in the mix, things along those lines. That’s where I see things.
The energy increases to our utility bills, people are concerned about it, and that’s a bread and butter issue. That’s the approach: We know we need grid upgrades and want to have the most cost effective versions of those as possible, but you want those needing the power paying for it and not putting it on the backs of residents.
I’m curious, what’s you and your organization’s approach to the rise of gas infrastructure built for AI and the potential impacts that could have on climate change?
I don’t discount the issue of climate change.
Let’s say we’re not able to decarbonize enough to reverse the effects of warmth. We know we’ll have to create energy. We know we have other options for energy that need to be in the mix — more nuclear, which now even some of those who are climate-minded understand is an abundant energy source. I’m also interested in new technologies in geothermal where it can be viable in more places than we thought. You can drill down and tap hot rocks, a basin of water, turn a turbine, and that’s more acceptable for those who care about the climate. And states are looking at it, including my state of Arkansas. I bring these up because I also care about sources that provide firm, consistently available power.
We attended the American Legislative Exchange Council, and one of the things we do, we’re voting members on the energy, environment, and agriculture task force. We’re pro letting the market decide what they need. So we took opposite stances from what people typically consider normal standards on the center-right about banning “net-zero” for local governments. It did pass as model legislation but if we believe “all of the above” is the approach, we also want to be principally correct to ourselves that it doesn’t mean banning wind or solar where it’s viable.
My last question: What’s your thought on the future of politics around AI infrastructure and energy generation for it?
There’s definitely headwinds to those in that industry. I think the sense is, they understood what they wanted and didn’t see any barriers to the way they’d go about it. That’s causing ripple effects in our politics at the local level, including here in Arkansas, where I live in Pulaski County. I think it’ll stay important particularly as it connects to affordability concerns around energy. We know we need more energy, but we want it at the lowest cost possible to the residential side. If people are feeling like data centers are driving the demand for the energy and aren’t on the hook for it, that’s going to position them to be more negative towards the technology.
But we have to expand the conversation. There are folks out there talking about 3D printing for homes, using proprietary cement mixes to build homes in a few weeks when they took months. Agriculture is using robotics in lieu of pesticides and herbicides. Advanced manufacturing is improving the quality of medical equipment. No one completely understands the end goal of new energy to fuel the data centers and AI to get us where there’s a net benefit to them.
Plus more of the week’s biggest development fights.
1. Shelby County, Alabama — The Trump administration’s widening effort to intervene in rural energy project fights is facing an early test: What happens if companies don’t take it seriously?
2. Ozaukee County, Wisconsin — Speaking of walls, we just saw the political power of the data center resistance hit one in the Badger State.
3. Everywhere in Texas — Texas Governor Greg Abbott is getting a lot of love for his data center standards, with major developers rolling out press statements claiming they’ll comply.
4. Herkimer County, New York — Something weird is going on in upstate New York with a monastery, a wind farm, and the Trump administration. I’m not sure what to make of it yet.
Renewable and pipeline companies alike have come out against the administration’s attempt to leverage an obscure Cold War-era law.
The Trump administration is considering changing its interpretation of an obscure law related to farmland ownership to transform it into a national security instrument with profound impacts for U.S. renewables projects — and fossil fuels. U.S. energy developers and their trade groups are ringing alarms about the plan, arguing that Trump may be about to undermine their relationships with international investors in allied nations.
For the past week, I’ve been hearing anxious rumbling from contacts in D.C. about a proposed regulation from the Agriculture Department published on June 26. The plan has gotten little attention so far outside of energy trade publications and wonk analysis. Pay no mind to the relative quiet — anyone working in energy development needs to know what’s at stake. Explaining why this is sending D.C. energy lobbyists into a tizzy gets complicated quickly, so bear with me. But the easiest way to sum it up is a fear of death by a thousand cuts.
The administration’s proposal would morph USDA’s approach to the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978, often referred to in legal circles by the acronym AFIDA. This Cold War-era statute created a system for collecting information on farmland owned by people or entities born, headquartered, or otherwise governed by laws outside of the United States, requiring people or companies labeled “foreign persons” to disclose land holdings and transactions to the federal government.
As I reported Monday, Senate Democrats claim the department is proposing to expand the definition of “agricultural land” to include all solar and wind projects, as well as pipelines. I’ve since confirmed this is true, as stated in a supplemental document released by USDA. But there’s a lot more causing companies headaches. The plan would drastically expand the pool of entities and people required to report to USDA by lowering the minimum foreign investment threshold for reporting, compel information on rights of ways when it wasn’t asked for before, and force companies to do detailed geospatial mapping of farmland.
You may not have heard of AFIDA, but security hawks in D.C. and the most affected multi-national companies have been agitating to reform the law for years. Their concerns have focused primarily on Chinese firms and the agriculture sector. In 2022, Republicans in Congress anxious about Chinese companies purchasing farmland near military bases requested an independent Government Accountability Office audit of AFIDA compliance. Two years later, the watchdog office found the law was falling significantly short of its stated objective to track relevant land transactions.
Representatives from the energy sector tell me the actual proposed changes would create a severe red tape headache for developers of all stripes.
Over the past week, almost every major industry trade group in renewables and fossil fuels has filed a comment excoriating the plan, with even some oil and gas allies such as the Western Energy Alliance calling for it to be thrown onto the trash heap. The American Petroleum Institute and Interstate Natural Gas Association of America told the USDA that the plan would “chill foreign investment in U.S. energy infrastructure and increase the cost of capital for pipeline projects with no benefit to national security.”
Meanwhile, renewable energy industry representatives seemed particularly frightened by the proposal given existing financial relationships with investors, parent companies, and business partners in U.S.-aligned nations. American Clean Power said it would burden “good faith, low-risk filers from allied countries,” while the Solar Energy Industries Association said the proposal warranted “a full withdrawal” as it had “unintended national security consequences and [would] unnecessarily expose business sensitive information.”
So far, only one large publicly-traded renewables company has commented with criticisms of the proposal: EDP Renewables North America, a subsidiary of a Portuguese company. “We respectfully urge USDA to carefully weigh the compliance burdens imposed by each proposed change against the incremental national security benefit it provides,” wrote Tom LoTurco, an executive vice president for EDP Renewables North America.
Those calling for reform have wanted to streamline the filing process, not add even more bureaucracy. “Solar and wind, they’ve long been considered agricultural land users. But under this rule, costs are going to go way up,” Jeff Hunter, an attorney with Kelley Drye and Warren LLP, told me. “It’s going from a manageable material cost to something that’s going to have a meaningful effect on the bottom line.” Hunter represents the AFIDA Modernization Coalition, an ad hoc coalition of companies that routinely file under the law. Hunter said the coalition includes founders Invenergy and Doral Renewables, both of which have substantial renewables investments in the U.S. as well as investment originating from other countries.
“It’s going from a manageable material cost to something that’s going to have a meaningful effect on the bottom line.”
Many large renewable energy companies have substantial foreign investment because of the European trend towards ESG-minded financing practices, Hunter added. The law was already on developers’ radars, but this proposal presents a wholly different regime.
As Trump re-entered office, it was reasonable to expect his administration would attempt to “protect farmland” from renewable energy development given the issue’s salience in deep red rural pockets of his supporter base. Still, when the Agriculture Department last May released a “National Farm Security Action Plan” stating that it would change AFIDA regulations, I didn’t think much of it. The plan didn’t mention the energy sector at all.
In December USDA solicited public comments on ways to change the rules, but it was a sleepy affair with little conflict involving renewables or anything else. Even the Center for Regulatory Freedom, a conservative policy shop created by the political organization CPAC, sought changes while emphasizing the “United States benefits from foreign capital in agriculture, renewable energy, and rural development, and AFIDA should not become a blunt instrument that discourages lawful and economically beneficial transactions.”
All this is to say, nobody seemed to anticipate the bomb USDA suddenly dropped on the energy industry.
The plan may change between proposal and implementation. But so far only one organization I know of is focused on ensuring that solar and wind are targeted under the new rulemaking: the America First Policy Institute, a Trump-aligned think tank co-founded by Brooke Rollins, the current Secretary of Agriculture. In comments filed by AFPI’s Adam Savit, the conservative think tank recommended the government preserve “the inclusion of solar and wind generation on agricultural land” because it “prevents the conversion of reportable land into unreportable land through a change in use.” The group’s comments did not address the rule’s references to pipelines.
I asked AFPI to ask if it had any additional comment on the rulemaking, and specifically if it had any view on the new definition for agricultural land. In a statement provided by the think tank, its senior director for China policy Piero Tozzi told me that “the proposed change is necessary to address who owns the land and what control it gives the owner.”
“The current reporting framework for foreign acquisition of American farmland before land was understood as a potential strategic perch for foreign adversaries,” Tozzi said.
The Agriculture Department rarely comments on public input received on proposed rulemakings and did not respond to a request for comment for this story. On Monday, the agency sent me the following statement in response to the Senate Democrats’ claims: “As Secretary Rollins has noted before, the regulations governing the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978 are extremely outdated and need to be updated to better reflect today’s conditions. USDA looks forward to considering all public comments before finalizing the rule.”