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Robinson Meyer:
Hello, it is Tuesday, June 30, and the funding environment for climate tech might be getting better. Gigascale Capital announced earlier this month that it had raised $250 million to invest in climate tech startups. That would be interesting by itself, but even more interesting is the face, the name, and the leader behind Gigascale Capital is Mike Schroepfer, the former Chief Technology Officer of Meta. Mike Shroepfer, or Schrep as he is called, spent 13 years at Meta and nine years as its CTO. He remains a senior fellow there, working on artificial intelligence. He left in 2022 and since then he’s been investing in climate tech startups. What’s fascinating, I think, is that this is the first time he’s taken serious outside money. He spent the past four years investing in form and all these other interesting climate tech startups, but this is the first time he’s taken outside investors’ capital to actually build a real fund. I wanted to have him on the show to discuss that fundraise and how he sees the climate tech landscape at the moment. He helped build data centers back at Meta in the cloud era, when they were much smaller, less power-hungry affairs. Now he’s involved in Meta’s AI work, still knows a bit about data centers, so we chat about that too. Where he thinks it’s going and what it all means for energy and electricity. Gigascale is investing in a number of manufacturing companies here in the United States, and so we talk about what America’s advantages are, if any, in a world where China dominates basically all high-tech manufacturing processes, and we also talk about greenwashing. So we get to a lot in this conversation. Stick around, it’s coming right up. I’m Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News, and it’s all coming up on Shift Key. Mike Schroepfer, welcome to Shift Key.
Mike Schroepfer:
So excited to be here.
Robinson Meyer:
So, you lead Gigacale Capital, it invests in hard tech with, I would say, a climate tech focus, but you’re feel free to kind of edit that description. You left Meta a few years ago. Can you just start by kind of catching us up on Gigascale Capital’s thesis, what you’ve been up to, and what this new two $50 million rate is all about?
Mike Schroepfer:
Yeah, when I started many years ago, the thesis was simple. The trends were clear in two directions: one is power use, electrical use was going to grow quite a bit from onshoring, from EVs, from data centers, and at the same time, a bunch of new technologies were hitting cost curves, in particular that time, solar and batteries, but electrolyzers, and a bunch of other things, you know, on the horizon, that meant that they could now compete at cost or speed with traditional sort of, I would say more polluting technologies, and so the basic thesis was, huh, there’s a couple of, you know, areas of technology that are T minus two years, zero to two years from commercial competitiveness, meaning they win on features and economics, not on vibes and hope, and I wanted to go help build the next, you know, 10, 20, 30 companies that were going to be multi-$100 billion companies by building out the technology set. That was the basic thesis of Gigascale.
Robinson Meyer:
You have a new raise. Is this new raise kind of advancing that thesis? Is it a now more than ever situation? Yeah, for the Gigascale,
Mike Schroepfer:
You know, in such a short number of years, the sort of public opinion or investing vibes have changed dramatically. So, three or four years ago, when I started this, most people told me this is a terrible idea, you couldn’t make money in hardware, you know, energy was really tough, etc. etc. Now we’ve got, you know, Vervoe Next Energy to in $10 billion IPOs, we’ve got Cerebros, a $60 billion dollar IPO got SpaceX, of course, multi trillion dollar hard tech company, of course. All along, I’m saying, well, Nvidia is one of the best examples here of, again, a hard tech company over multiple decades. So it flipped, like in the beginning, people were like, this doesn’t make any sense, and I, you know, I’m a pretty humble guy, so I was like, maybe they’re right. So let me start by investing my own money and saying, like, let’s run the thesis and learn by doing, and start investing in companies on our own, and if I’m wrong, it’s on me before I take on any external capital. And basically, what happened over the last 12 months is not the vibe shift, actually, but it was prior to that, it was like, huh, our companies are working, we have a bunch of companies that are scaling, growing, selling products people want, I think they have like very large. Markets ahead of them, and so I just, my own sort of confidence in our own vision and ability to go and, you know, say with confidence to others, like I’m going to go take your money, and I think we’re going to return your money, and then some, to be a great investment. And the only caveat is, like, we’re just screening for companies that also part of the reason they’re so successful is their products are simpler, and because they’re simpler, they also happen to be cleaner too, and I can give you lots of specific examples of that, but those two things tended to cohabitate more places than were obvious. A simpler, cleaner machine ends up being cheaper too.
Robinson Meyer:
I want to dive into a few things, but can you actually give me an example of what you have in mind?
Mike Schroepfer:
Sure, I’ll give you two or three examples, just to sort of spread the spectrum of these different things. The most obvious one is solar, you know. If you had two choices, a solar plant or a gas power plant in your backyard, there’s an obvious choice as a human, which is like the gas power plant is going to, however clean it is, it’s like nitrous oxide emissions and others, is bad for me, bad for my health. Whatever you think about global warming, a solar power plant, I don’t care, no emissions, you know, not a lot of maintenance, and all the rest of it. So, I think that’s the easiest one, is solar. I think anytime you replace a combustion engine with batteries, you know, you’re better off. There’s been multiple studies now in the U.S. and in China that, as EV adoptions increase, like health impacts from air pollution are measurable, and so, like, we’re measurably saving human lives by replacing polluting things with non-polluting things, but the reason why people are doing is because they’re faster, they’re convenient. With today’s gas prices, they’re cheaper to operate, and so that’s example number two within our portfolio. For example, if we talk about one company, Solcoa, which is in Alameda, California, they make neodymium, it’s a rare earth, this is a material that’s used to make magnets, what do we need magnets for? Anything with a spinning motor, you know, anything electric, wind turbine, etc. So it’s used, you know, iPhone has them, like we need it all over the place. Most of that, like 99 plus percent, is made in China in a terribly polluting process using fluorinated gasses. You know, we’re talking like facilities don’t have a roof because they would just want to air everything out. It’s bad. If you want to do that process in the United States, you’d have to do it cleanly, which requires a whole ton of safety gear. You’re like double sealed things, you have to have venting, all of the rest of it. So it’s extraordinarily expensive, which is why we have outsourced it. So, if you say, "Wait a second, the U.S. ought to be able to make this stuff. How do we do it? Well, we do it the traditional way. It’s non-competitive. Salco is doing it a very different way. They’re recycling and using mine tailings. They’ve got a permit in Alameda, California. You can walk around the facility. It’s an incredibly simple two-reactor process because it’s such a simple process. It’s both clean and they are cost-competitive with China. So, the TL;DR for customers, I have the thing you want at the price you want, and, oh, by the way, I can do it in the U.S., because it’s clean, so that to me is the like the co-location of simplicity and cleanliness, and simplicity breeds typically cost advantages, you know, there’s an old saying for SpaceX, the best part is no part, is that when you simplify a machine, it’s the best way to make it cheaper, and so I’m just obsessed with simplifying processes with modern technology, and thus making them both cleaner and cheaper.
Robinson Meyer:
It seems to me, when you look at hard tech, and when you look at manufacturing, or any kind of like physical process, that that a that a VC-backed startup is going to do, it’s really hard to compete with China. Right? This is the story we had John Arnold on recently. He was like, I wouldn’t invest in any U.S. manufacturing, and when we talk about China. Like, what sets China apart is a very deep talent pool, lots of implicit knowledge, access to cheap energy, this huge domestic market that I think plays a big role in their local production, even though they export a lot. And famously, like this hardware manufacturing ecosystem based around Shenzhen, that’s able to get prototypes to commercial scale really quickly. Any kind of plan to invest in hard tech, right, has to have a thesis of, like, well, what is America’s advantages here, or what are we, what should we piggyback off China to learn or do, or kind of outsource there, and then enjoy here. How does your thinking about giga scale fit into what has been over the past 20 years this vast and world-beating Chinese manufacturing apparatus, and given that those are all the advantages of the Chinese system, like what sets America apart in hard tech.
Mike Schroepfer:
Yeah, so first of all, you have to go in with a deep humility and respect for the capabilities of China and the manufacturing sector, and you have to get into the details to like think about this product by product and area by area. I built millions of headsets via Oculus in China. We built millions or tens of millions of servers with quantum and others for Meta in China. So I have sort of firsthand knowledge of their ability to scale, and I think if you’re trying to go head on with China and a thing they have already scaled. It’s tough, and, like, probably a mission you don’t want to undertake. So, if you’re talking about existing solar panels, I think it’s really tough. They are there, so I think you have to look at things in a couple dimensions, which is where are they not there? So, where do they not have the leading? That’s something entirely different, and that they can’t sort of bridge easily for. Their manufacturing, so let’s take solar, for example. So, I think manufacturing traditional solar cells is tough to compete, but if you look at utility-grade solar in the United States, most of the cost is not the panel anymore, it’s the racking, it’s the EPC, it’s site preparation, it’s all the rest of it. So, you say, "Wait a second, are there ways I could go attack those problems? Because they’re local problems, and if I can do that and be the cheapest way to deliver utility-grade solar, and just buy the panels from either China or the U.S., depending on customers and incentives. It doesn’t matter, that’s their commodity parts, they look the same, they’re a rectangle. I buy them, then I install them. Then, that now we’re talking, that’s an interesting business. So, so I think there on batteries, for example, like innovating on battery chemistry, I think is really, really, really, really challenging, because so much of the value of the little cylindrical cell is sort of the scale up, and so we, you know, it’s tough to do. We haven’t invested in that. However, if you say we’re going to take an entirely different approach, something that lithium ion can’t touch on grid storage, four hours is about what you get with lithium ion, you’re now starting to see eight hours cost scaled linearly with duration, so an eight hour battery is twice as expensive as a four hour lithium ion battery. So you say, well, wait a second, I want to get through like a three or four day lull in the winds or cloudy day, I want 100-hour battery that is 25 times as expensive as that four hour lithium ion battery. Instead, let’s build it entirely different out of iron air and build a battery that’s from the ground up designed for cheap long duration storage. This is Form Energy, for example. Who you know has multiple deals out. That’s an interesting thing, because it’s an entirely different process. Building that is not the same as building a lithium ion battery, and so I think you have a shot to compete because you’re selling a very different product using a very different process, and getting there. The key is, what is America great at? Is innovation, and like, can you get the innovation, and it’s just a trick. Can we start scaling up that innovation fast enough, you know, before it gets copied and replicated? And that, that is a key question.
Robinson Meyer:
Where do you see that innovation happening in the hardware cycle? I mean, we’ve named SpaceX, obviously, but aerospace is, I think, kind of famously one of the last remaining sectors where China is still trying to catch up to Western firms in terms of cost competitiveness, in terms of sophistication, and then when we talk about, like, solar, it sounds like there’s a lot of cost to lose its solar, but it’s still kind of piggybacking on the back of a fundamentally Chinese-dominated process, and obviously the form energy story is awesome. They have a great product, but also it’s - I’m not going to say it’s a one-off, but like it does seem that they have this battery chemistry that is not related to the lithium-ion chemistry that nobody else has, and they’ve been able to get there first. America is great at innovation, but we’ve struggled to convert that innovation over the past 10 years in the world of hardware into actually great products. And so, do you have a thesis about how that is going to change going forward, or where in the in the cycle we need to intervene, or where Gigascale can intervene to make sure that that innovation actually gets carried through into real products that that change the marketplace at climate level scales.
Mike Schroepfer:
I mean, I guess I just fundamentally disagree with that statement. Let’s talk about some of the most valuable companies in the world, Nvidia and SpaceX. You know, Nvidia is still one of the world’s best, and I mean, you could say it’s manufactured at TSMC, but it’s fundamentally they’re designing a chip, you know. SpaceX is the only company that’s landing rockets every other week, and they’ve been doing it for a decade. Tesla really pioneered the electric vehicle, and I can go on and on and on. In terms of, you know, I built 10s of millions of square feet of data center space. AI, the U.S. is still ahead, and AI probably one of the most consequential technologies. Yes, the AI itself is software, but it’s like on the back of massive infrastructure build. Where are all these data centers? They’re in the United States, like that’s where all the training is happening, and that involves a bunch of infrastructure build. Part of why I got into this was, I, you know, it’s reading all this stuff about how the U.S. and the West doesn’t know how to build anything anymore, and everything’s late and expensive, and like, we were out there building data centers, and I was like, these things are like plus or minus 3% on time, on budget, every single time, like, what the heck. And, and when I like looked at it, the thing everyone is missing is like, yes, when you make every project a special snowflake project, it’s a disaster. Every custom home, even like electrical projects, right now, you know, if you go spec a transformer. It’s like you hire an engineer and they like write the specs, and they do a design doc, and they send it over, and like, why does this take forever? It’s because it’s like a custom bespoke wedding cake, basically every single time. It’s like, no, no, no, no. What’s the Costco sheet cake equivalent for transformers? I just roll in, and I’m buying them, you know, by the palette, and that’s what parent power is doing, is saying, like, no, no, we have a five megawatt transformer, it’s software controlled, so your voltages can be determined like at runtime. Cool, cool, you don’t need to custom design this thing, and that’s an entirely different process. And that’s the way we build data centers, is like every single building looked the same from the sky. It was an L-shaped building, then we made an H-shaped building, it’s four data halls, and we would just like roll through and build the same. Thing over and over again, but Nvidia, part of the reason so valuable is like the, you know, same chip, basically with a couple small variants in my gaming PC is the thing that’s in my data center, but the core R and D was the same, and when we do that and we concentrate R and D and technical innovation, and then replicate the thing out, the U.S. is like sort of unmatched in that, and so I think there’s example after example of this, and I think we got to be more bullish about it. Not to mention every day I’m going off and meeting entrepreneurs who are ex-SpaceX, ex-Tesla, who like had been doing this for the last 10 years, like, oh, hey, we looked at this bold, boring, dumb industry that’s been doing the same thing for 100 years, they haven’t seen robotics and printing and computer design and AI, for that matter. Like, we can do this five times better. I don’t have enough time in the day to meet all these entrepreneurs, so like I think we have a ability to approach problems if it is doing the same thing the same way we’re doing it. You’re tips, but if there’s a new twist on it, and the only thing you say is like form is a one off. Well, like I’m not trying to reform the industry, I’m trying to find the one-offs, and then make them scale. That’s what actually changes the world, is singular companies with singular founders who like push the whole world forward, and everyone runs after them.
Mike Schroepfer:
That is part of why, when you ask, why did I do this, is like that’s the way to change the world. And so I don’t need everyone to succeed, I just need one form to succeed, and I need one Sock Poet to succeed, and one Heron Power to succeed, and then we have completely transformed storage minerals and the electrical grid for each of those companies, so it’s like I need like 20 companies, not like 4000
Robinson Meyer:
It does sound like, though, that you do have a little bit of a thesis, which is like if you can figure out a way to funnel the man that’s coming from the American economy, whether it’s needs data centers, whether it needs rockets and access to low earth orbit, whether it needs transformers in a modular and replicable way, you can actually make a lot of progress. I mean, that’s what I’m hearing as commonalities. Yeah, companies are talking about
Mike Schroepfer:
it’s what I learned in tech, which is, and I’ll give you some specific examples, but like everything in your life that has gotten cheaper, think TVs, think cars, or capacity of what you get for in a car, they’re mass manufactured. Everything that has gotten more expensive, things like healthcare, any sort of government projects, public works projects, housing, like these, are all much more custom built things. And so when you can take that R and D and then concentrate it in something that I can make a lot of and sell a lot of, that’s when you get this economic flywheel going that allows America, like we’re going to compete at higher margins. That’s the fundamentals of it. It’s like if we’re trying to scrape together a 3% margin, it’s going to be tough. If I can do billions of dollars with R&D, and then sell the chip at 40% margins, I can hire all the world’s best talent to build the next chip and build an advantage that gets me continuing to go, and that that is our fundamental thesis. It’s just sort of like we’re talking about 30%, 40%, 50% margin companies, not 3% margin or 5% margin companies, and that means a lot of R&D into a product that I can sell a lot of, and then it brings costs down for consumers too. So that is probably the core thesis of how we look at things. And I’ll just tell one story, which is, you know, I worked for a long time on heads up displays and other sorts of custom virtual reality headsets, and the first sets of ones we did, we used like off-the-shelf mobile LCD panels, so displays to the same panel that was shipping at 10s of millions of volumes and phones, and then we’re like, oh, we want to start customizing this thing, we need a slightly different size or different refresh rate, and man, the cost just like 10x on us there, and then when we’re like, oh, we need an entirely novel display architecture, it’s not even OLED or LCD anymore. We’re like, well, now it’s like 10, it’s like 100x off of buying the consumer thing. So you can do that, but it’s just rough. So whenever you can be in a like, I can ship this thing, I can leverage a supply chain. So like in Herron Powers, for example, they’re building solid state power transformers. The chips that are in those transformers are also in your electric vehicle, because it turns out these high, high power solid state chips are already shipping at 10s of millions of scale. They’re packaging it into a different format for the grid, but they’re not inventing the chips in the first place, and they’re putting it all together, and they’re making sure it works and warrantied, and so they’re leveraging the supply chain. So that lesson of, like, wait a second, we’re going to borrow a part from someone else that’s already shipping at scale, like repackage it in a different form, and then build a brand new product that’s a great sort of American innovation,
Robinson Meyer:
That’s kind of the Tesla story too. So, let’s talk about AI, though, because we’ve already brought it up. So, one of the big changes over the past few years has been tech companies, I think, becoming light industrial companies. We talked about how energy is now a constraint to some of the biggest companies in the economy, I think that’s changed maybe a little bit in the time since you left Meta, but also you still are watching it happen, and you also, as you were saying, watch data centers get printed out in a very regular, modular way while you were at Meta. Can you just describe, like, what has the shift from, let’s say, a cloud orientation world for tech companies or hyperscalers been as they move to a AI orientation or AI data center centric world.
Mike Schroepfer:
So, there’s two big parts of this. We can talk about how the architecture of the data center. So, I built traditional cloud data centers, and then AI cloud engineers, no consultant. So familiar with what they’re doing there, and there’s a pretty big set of technical shifts that have happened in terms of the power density of the data center, cooling, networking, how those things work, that’s like one thing we can go on, but I think the more interesting question is the transformation that’s happened in the industry writ large, as you alluded to, which is people have realized that if you just like step back for a second, where is AI working the most? Where has it received most product market fit? It’s programming, right. For most of my 25 year career in Silicon Valley, like most of my time was like getting and keeping the best engineers in the world, right, software engineers generally speaking. And you’re like, wait a second, I’m like dramatically reducing the cost of producing software, I’m dramatically reducing the barriers of entry to a new company to produce the same software. It’s not zero, but it’s closer to zero than it ever was before. And so you say, well, if my competitive isn’t now my computer science pedigree, what is it? And people are realizing it’s a much deeper vertical integration. So if I think about the AI world, and I say, like, if I’m just sort of a candy-coated wrapper on top of someone else’s AI, running on top of someone else’s infrastructure. What is my right to exist five or 10 years from now? It’s, it’s tenuous, right? And if you say, well, let me do it the other way, and say, like, actually, I have a product that directly touches the end user, powered by model that I wrote, or trained, or customized, running on infrastructure that I specified that I built and own and operate. Now I have the deep vertical integration. This is the thing that SpaceX and Tesla both got right. If you remember during Covid, there was a period of time where Tesla was the only company who could make cars, because, like, the supply chains got all blown up because they controlled the supply chain. They’re like, "Oh no, we can do this, we got this. You know, SpaceX, out of necessity, built most of the stuff in their supply chain, and so when you do that, you have the ability to optimize the entire stack, and you say, like, well, wait, is it the power system, is it the data center design, is the chips, is it the model? Can I co-design everything, so the model and the chips and the network architecture, the power infrastructure, and everything is designed such that I can get a system-wide optimization, and that you know, 10s of percent optimization. If I can do that, I’m going to beat you. If you’re buying this giant seven layer cake, where everyone’s making money on that, versus me, I just, I bake the whole cake myself, like I’m going to win. And so people kind of just figured this out. It’s like, oh crap, we got to own everything. And so that means that they start to care about the infrastructure and care about not only like the building and the land, but like where am I going to get my power transformers from, where am I getting my chips from, all of this stuff. Because if you can do that, that gives you the control and competitiveness in a way that wasn’t important five or 10 years ago.
Robinson Meyer:
Can you give an example of how companies like Meta or another similar company has approached the process of infrastructure building five or 10 years ago versus how it would approach it today. You just gave a little bit of a hint, but what has that meant in terms of approaching the projects?
Mike Schroepfer:
Yeah, I think the simplest thing is, is, you know, let’s just talk about electrons and power. Five or 10 years ago, it was like power was like this thing you had to get, it wasn’t a huge part of the cost. We built solar, we built wind, and we built other things, but it was like not a driving factor in the data center. Now, access to power is often the limiting constraint, power or power infrastructure, things like power transformers, generators, you know, turbines is often the like getting constraint from getting compute capacity up, and so if I’m just like on the market buying these things with everyone else, I’m in line with everyone else. If I have my own land and I’m putting up my own solar arrays and I have bought my own generation and I’ve got my own interconnects happening, like I can operate at a speed and a cost that other people can’t. So I think that that is like a big thing that, like, by owning it you can sort of really control your destiny in a way that wasn’t important five or 10 years ago. I just like, sign up, get an interconnect, buy power from someone else, they build it, who cares? And you’re seeing companies like Mez is public now, and companies like Meta and others like invest and do pre-purchases of new technology, next generation fission reactors, you know, long duration storage, because they’re saying, wait a second, for any of these companies that build these things, they eventually run out of capacity, and they’re like booking slots in like 2030, 2031 so if I don’t do a partnership with them and I just wait and show up in 2030 like, can I have some of these things, or like, sorry, we’re booking in 2035 at this point, you gotta wait, and so getting early access to this stuff ends up being a competitive advantage, and my experience again, building hardware is like, you can’t solve it on a spreadsheet, you have to be in the supply chain yourself, because if you’re solving it on a spreadsheet, I’m on the internet, just like everyone else, I have no proprietary information, when I control my entire supply chain, I’m like flying to the factory, visiting people, and be like, wait a second, why are we delayed? Huh, it’s like wiring harnesses, that’s the problem. Okay. Well, let’s like go start buying some machines and figure that out. Oh, it’s copper now. Oh, it’s this other thing, and like I’m figuring this out three or six months before everyone else. So, when the Wall Street Journal article gets written about how like copper shortages is things slowing everyone down, I’ve already secured my supply, I’m ahead, and that is the. Thing people miss about the vertical integration is that, like, it gives you competitive intelligence in the supply chain that you cannot get by being a couple levels removed from it, and this is why the vertical integration is so important.
Robinson Meyer:
Well, it’s funny just to talk about SpaceX in this context, because SpaceX, I think, has one of the only factories in the country, maybe the new Arizona TSMC tech chip fab is going to be like this, but right now SpaceX and Brownsville is the only factory I think where engineers are living so close to the factory that they can actually check in on the production process fairly regularly, which is actually a fairly Chinese style of production. They’re just one of the few American firms that does it here too, knowing what you know about the AI build out and the shift to infrastructure that’s happening at tech companies. When you look at demand forecasts and what people are saying about electricity prices going forward and electricity demand going forward, what do you think folks are missing? Are the demand forecasts too high or too low?
Mike Schroepfer:
It is very hard to predict what’s going to happen here, and I’ve had lots of conversations with lots of smart people, and lots of smart people disagree about all of these things, but I think a couple things are definitely true. One is the difference between what people want to build and what people will actually build is quite stark, you know. So, I think what we’ll see is over the next couple of years, people will figure out that it’s like really hard to build stuff, and it’s a million annoying things that some permitting snafu, it’s a supplier screwed up, and like you’re just going to see this over and over and over again, that people are going to be late and over budget with what they’re building, and so less is going to get built than people want, and so I think demand will continue to increase for a while in this. I also think that people will be surprised at how fast certain things start to ramp, and so, like, I think the next few years will be sort of messy, and then I think we’re going to have a lot of options, because we’ve had a power sector that has been operating in kind of like stasis for two, three decades, like relatively flat power demand, very regulated entities, not a lot of places to make money, so you get what you get, which is like everyone’s trying to make sure the lights stay on and everything’s pretty hunky dory, and that’s fine. We’re now in a world where people are showing up with wearables full of cash. I mean, like, can I, can I get in front? You’re like, don’t you think it’s going to change behavior a little bit? It takes time for that to trickle through the system, and we’ve been operating in that way for, I don’t know, a year or two years, and like, most of these things take three to five years to really get going. So, I think you’ll simultaneously see a really messy year over the next couple of years, where you see a lot of articles about this shortage or that shortage, or this funny thing happening, or that funny thing happening, and overbuild, or project failed, like just it’s going to be like chaos, but I think under the covers what you’re going to see is a lot of capacity starting to get built, and these exponential curves that feel like nothing at the bottom, and then they start to bend, and you’re like, "Holy crap, we just like deployed I don’t know how many hundreds of gigawatts of solar, and I mean the number of battery factors coming online in the U.S., I don’t think people totally understand the good news, bad news about the whole EV thing is that Ford GM, all the rest was like, All right, stationary storage, instead we just had, you know, I don’t know how many gigawatt hours of battery capacity showing up in the United States for stationary storage, and so I think we’re going to see just like this exponential ramp of batteries. I think the other thing about the power system is, you know, for the power nerds listening to this, this may not resonate, but for the IT nerds it will, which is just like the thing that is so confusing to me, and I say this, and everyone looks at me a little, little puzzled, is like I built networks for years and years and years, and whenever you build a computer network, I spent all this money trenching a fiber line between two things. You like calculate what do I think the average utilization of this is going to be, not the peak utilization. And then what I do is like, hey, if I ever need more bandwidth than this cable has, I like store and forward. I have a little memory buffer in the switch, and I store packets and I send them out at line rate and then eventually I catch up, so they don’t have to build towards the peak capacity. We built from a power plant to the data center. Generally speaking, until recently we built the peak capacity because you said, well, what if everything goes on at once? I gotta like get the electrons straight from the power source over to here, because we didn’t have memory buffers equivalent, but we have them now.
Mike Schroepfer:
They’re called batteries, and so you can drop a battery at the front, the back, on both sides, and say, like, wait a second, I’m doing this training run for the next two hours, I’m going to spike 35% drain those batteries, you know, go pull 150 megawatts equivalent power off 100-megawatt line, okay, training runs done, go down to 50 megawatts recharge batteries, so we’ve been building our power infrastructure to its peak, and we started building towards averages, and start using batteries in a lot of places, which is what’s happening - a whole crap ton of capacity gets unlocked, like two weeks, so I think that is going to happen when you look at battery capacity and the economics of that, it’s happening at the home, it’s happening at the data center, it’s going to happen at utility scale, and then you layer in intermittent renewables and deregulated markets, you’re just like a ton of disruption that’s happening, and I think we got a shot at the other end of all of this chaos to basically say, like, wait a second, solar is the cheapest electrons in batteries is the cheapest way to shave off peak, those two things together are going to end up being the dominant sort of way where. Adding capacity to the grid for the foreseeable future,
Robinson Meyer:
Does that whole transition basically depend on sustained high power prices in Climate Tech 1.0 The huge driver was that electricity prices were really high, and there were a lot of technological bets made, including on nuclear, back in the aughts, because people were worried about natural gas supply. Basically, they were looking forward, they were saying natural gas prices are going to go up, of course. Then fracking happened, power prices went down in a long-term secular way, and also demand flattened out in the power sector for about two decades. As you were saying, is the next transition, and to some degree, is like the current set of bets being made in the world of climate tech, do they rely on high power prices, and therefore AI, like, is that the kind of primary secular driver of the transition going forward as you see it, or would this happen anyway? Because you can do a lot of stuff for cheap.
Mike Schroepfer:
I think what AI and high power price has done is pulled demand several years forward, so I think it’s like a massive accelerant, but not a requirement, is the short version, and the difference between now and the aughts. I mean, Victoria, from our team, lived the solar aughts herself, is, you know, 98% cheaper now. The solar cells are just like, so cheap, again, like I said, they’re the cheapest part of the solar plan, is the panels themselves. Batteries, like, literally didn’t exist back then. I mean, you had them in your phone, but utility grade storage as batteries was not a thing, so like these two things, prices are continuing to decline, and I think we can get installed utility grade solar prices down even further, and if you plot fossil fuel generation costs over like a 50 year time horizon, it’s relatively flat, so like it’s going up and down, it’s volatile, but it is not on a declining cost curve, and solar is absolutely on a declining cost curve. You know, I didn’t go to business school, but my, like, simple math is my product keeps getting cheaper and yours doesn’t. At some point when I cross, I think I win, and like, I think we’ve crossed, or about to, or can, so, depending on how you model capacity, but again, with batteries as a capacity thing on top of solar, I think it is like it’s inevitable, it’s a question of when, not if, and I think the difference is it might have taken a lot longer, but I think we’re pulling so much demand in because of price and sensitivity that it’s going to pull a lot of technologies in that will then allow us to build out over the next decade.
Robinson Meyer:
One distinction I want to pull out of your thinking here is that I think there’s a lot of people in tech, or in kind of tech-adjacent circles, who are very excited about new forms of generation, whether it’s advanced fission or fusion. We can talk about those, but it sounds like your view here is that the base load, so to speak, or the primary generating source of a future power system is solar, just because the economics are are so powerful.
Mike Schroepfer:
I think it’ll be one of the largest, but I’m like, we have one fission investment, two fusion investments. We have a next generation, you know, carbon sequestering gas turbine and Arbor Energy. So I’m like an all of the above person. I don’t want to pretend like solar solves everything, because, like, you know, if you’re at high latitudes, it sort of sucks. It sucks in the winter. There’s a bunch of reasons why it doesn’t work, and so I think we need a little bit of everything. I do think fusion is the ultimate unlock. I think it shows up in the mid, mid 2030s and allows you to site power very large power sources, very large heat sources anywhere you want with no no fueling, no inputs, or you know, pickup truck and fuel a gigawatt power plant for the year, pretty awesome, no safety concerns. So, I think that’s like I’m long fusion, you know. Radiant nuclear is a micro reactor, you know, it’s a 1.2-megawatt, five-year running micro reactor. This is a perfect replacement for a diesel generator, so anytime I’m shipping diesel fuel somewhere, which is really expensive and sometimes very dangerous, like I’d rather have a little container that’s just making me power for five years, and I ship that once, and I’m good again for the humans all living around that container. You much rather have the Radiant system than a diesel generator, whatever you care about climate change, like better for your health. So I’m like super bullish on that company, and then I’m super bullish on more radical things, like we invest in a company called Panthalassa that said, Wait a second, we’ve got 10 terawatts of unused wave power in the Southern Ocean, like the southern band of the planet. If we bring the compute to the power by little floating buoys that bob up and down and harvest wave power, use the ocean for cooling, we can run AI inference compute and beam it over Starlink again. Couldn’t do that a decade ago, because you didn’t have Starlink. Now you do, and I think that may be the cheapest form of AI inference in the coming years, because you just co-locate cooling cheap power, and that if I just said, hey, I’m going to take most of the AI inference demand and move it off the grid, because it’s going to use wave power, that is a huge sort of relief in demand from there. So, I, I don’t want to, like, overstate solar is one example, and I think I’m really bullish on it, but I think the challenge, and this is why it’s like, why did I start a fund, is like, well, it’s not one thing, it’s like 20 things, you know? I think we need neodymium, and I think we need fusion, and I think we need fission, I think we need to go faster with solar, I think we need grid storage, like, I, we’ve got an AI inference chip company that’s got a next generation. Memory architecture that’ll be much more power efficient. Chips are the easiest place to optimize your power load in a data center. I’m not a one trick sort of solves it all. I think we need all of these things to make it work.
Robinson Meyer:
It’s funny being a Panthalassa. I think sometimes when there are these, let’s say, like very charismatic engineering projects, or these companies that seem to solve a lot of problems at once. They use wave power. They’re going to use the ocean for cooling at a hyperscaler. A big tech company has a demonstration project with them. I sometimes see people say, sure, this looks cool, but actually most AI is still running off natural gas. This very charismatic demonstration project is just a form of greenwashing, you know, it’s just a form of kind of papering over the actual emissions from this activity. How should people tell the difference between a real engineering development that could actually cut emissions or use the technological pressure and price pressure from AI to drive actual innovation versus just greenwashing that a company is investing in, because it’s a cool project, but it’s never going to scale in the way that it would need to scale to cut down on emissions.
Mike Schroepfer:
Well, the ultimate test is in a few years when we could talk about it at scale. So, I think the ultimate test is like, is this thing being deployed at scale, or is it a little demonstration prototype project in some corner somewhere, you know, it’s literally embedded in our name, gig of scale. It’s like fundamentally I’m only interested in things that have almost no upper limit in their scalability. So we talked about solar, we talked about batteries, talked about fusion, we talked about, you know, fusion has no scale limit, basically. And way power, I think it’s like a 10 terawatt scale limit. So I think we’re pretty good there. So I think the proof will be on the pudding when we build it, you know. In Panthelas’ example, again, this is why I got in this business. It’s not like the hyperscalers had started doing this. It’s a company privately funded with venture capitalists and a bunch of great ex SpaceX engineers showing up, and they’re going to demonstrate the capability to hyperscalers who are then going to do offtakes. So there’s no greenwashing here. It takes a lot of belief, and trust me, I’ve had these conversations with people, and I mean it’s the funniest company to talk about, because it’s like, what do you want to talk? It’s like, what about pirates, you know? How about algae growth?
Robinson Meyer:
Yeah,
Mike Schroepfer:
There’s answers to all these questions. The difference for me is like, we go into the details, we look at each of the things, and try to understand from first principles, what does this look like? Now, I can’t guarantee, because it hasn’t been done before, but you can, like, for hard tech on paper, you can be like, okay, there’s an answer to that. There’s no violation of physics. We can do the eight data index and weigh the thing. Okay, that’s how much this deal cost. So we should be able to get to, you know, plus or minus x on top of that. So it takes a lot of work, but I think you got to do the work. You can’t just say, like, that sounds cool. You got to meet all the people, meet the experts, review it, and then you got to have some belief. Well, it’s not working. Everything I built, you know, when I joined Facebook in 2008 the word on the street was like, social networks don’t know how to make money. There’s like, you got email and you got AOL Instant Messenger products, everyone uses, no one knows how to make money on them, right? And so that was the first thing went to prove. And then we did it on the web, and then we switched to mobile, and we, this IPO, and everyone’s like, "Oh, wait a second, you can’t do ads on mobile, nobody wants to type in their credit card on a mobile phone, nobody makes money on mobile ad, no one’s going to prove them wrong then too. And so, even the most successful companies that I’ve been directly, like, there have been moments along the way where it’s like, "You guys are dead, and, like, I don’t have many counter examples where there is, I mean, SpaceX had this, Tesla had this, you know, if you talk to, you know, Tim over at Fervo, is like a whole bunch of people for a long time, so this geothermal thing’s not going to work, and so it takes someone to be like, all right, we’re in it with you for the next 10 years, and we’re going to be rationalists, but even when the prototype blows up or doesn’t work, we’re going to like go again until we get there, and that’s kind of the way we’ve built our firm, is like we’re going to do all the work up front, and I tell founders when I meet them, I’m going to ask a lot of annoying questions up front, you got to get me to like deep belief, because then once I get to deep belief, I’m like ride or die with dude, let’s go, and I think that’s what’s needed to get some of these hard things through the hardest parts, and then we’ll see at the end, we won’t be right every time, but we’ll be right enough times to make a dent in the planet and the way people live on this planet, and that’s that’s what I’m here to do.
Robinson Meyer:
A few years ago, not Gigascale, but Additional Ventures Foundation, your philanthropy was doing a lot in ocean carbon removal. Can you update us where that stands?
Mike Schroepfer:
So, we’ve moved that into a separate organization called Outlier Projects, now that’s looking at what I’d say is like frontier climate science, and out of that we spun a different organization called Cargan to see, which is looking at a particular form of carbon removal called ocean alkalinity enhancement. Again, fits this category of like in the two by two chart is like highly scalable, likely really cheap in terms of like gigaton carbon removal, you know, they have moved the field from something people were talking about to something people have done field trials. So we’ve done field trials in U.S. federal waters under an EPA permit in cooperation with Woods Hole. We’ve done a field trial in Halifax and Canada. There are field trials underway in the EU, or under planning in the EU, so we’re trying to, like, again move this from. Um, here’s a lab thing, to like, here’s what happens when you do this in the real world, in terms of cost, in terms of, you know, safety and efficacy. So, it’s, it’s, it’s, I would say a couple clicks from the commercialization, you know, bent, but it’s like a very promising thing. And this is on the philanthropic side, what I’m doing is trying to advance the science side to get a couple more tools in the toolbox for us to be able to deal with some of these challenging problems. Carbon removal, sea level rise is another really challenging one. You know, the earth decreased reflectivity, absorbing more solar radiation is sort of a problem. So, like, there’s a bunch of other things there that are not commercial endeavors but are scientific ones, but I think our promise for other possible solutions.
Robinson Meyer:
Can you give us a vibe check for climate tech at the moment, because I think in 2025 was a rough year between IRA repeal, between I think a realization about maybe some of the exuberance that existed in the earlier 2020s coming out of the pandemic, but you just raised $250 million fund, Oba is on the books, what do you see as the future of climate tech, are we entering a new, you know, is the wave beginning to build for climate tech. Three,
Mike Schroepfer:
So I think it’s a really funny world, because, like, don’t say the word climate, because, like, in certain audiences it’s a huge negative. Well, I was surprised, because
Robinson Meyer:
I went to Gigascale Capital’s website expecting to not see the word climate, and in fact, the word climate is quite clearly on a number of places in the, in the, on the site.
Mike Schroepfer:
Yep, and this is like, I got a ton of feedback in the fundraise process, like this is great. Can you just talk about, like, data centers and not say the word climate? And I was like, no, because, like, that’s not what we’re doing. I’m gonna make a ton of money from our investors, because I think hardware, to our prior conversation, like hardware, is where all the competition is going, and I think cheaper is going to win, but, like, I also am going to screen for companies that are trying to, like, the cheaper thing also happens to be cleaner, and that, that is my thing, and I’m not going to run away from it, because that’s what we’re doing now. I think the challenge is, like, short words have a lot of meaning to a lot of people, and climate has gotten attached to a lot of people to higher cost foisted on consumers, and that’s bad. And my whole thing is, average people do not have time, energy to deal with these problems. So I’m going to go make these things easy buttons for them, so it’s cheaper, better, cleaner, faster, and like that’s why you’re going to love it. And you don’t have to make any choice, in fact, just make your life better. So, like, that, that is the difference, I think, is just like economics, economics, economics is just I want to build products that are cheaper, better, faster, happen also to be cleaner, and I think when you talk in that language, and by the way, U.S. American jobs form, we talk about foreign energy, like go to work in West Virginia, drive past a bunch of shuttered steel mills, beautiful new factory, union workers proud of what they’re doing. What is not to love about this? We’re going to build great U.S. jobs to make great products that make humans’ lives better, and it’s going to be cheaper because of technology. Again, what’s cheaper in your life? Technological innovation, phones, TVs, these things are cheaper, and that’s what we’re going to apply here. I have yet to encounter someone on any political spectrum who, like, has an argument with any of this? Right, the argument is only like, wait a second, are you going to like tax me? Are you going to charge me more? Are you going to tell me I can’t do a thing? They’re going to outlaw my gas car. These.. it’s like, nope, I won’t do any of that. I’m gonna let the markets win. And I think we’ve conflated these two things together, and when we conflate them, you frustrate a large part of the populace and the political apparatus, and when you say, like, nobody’s forward pollution, nobody’s for air pollution in their neighborhood, for solution,
Robinson Meyer:
I should say, some, there are definitely some pro-pollution forces out there,
Mike Schroepfer:
Not in their neighborhood,
Robinson Meyer:
Yes, not in their neighborhood, that’s right,
Mike Schroepfer:
So it’s complicated, because, like, the word climate triggers some people, and I get why, but I also can’t. I don’t want to, like, like whisper it. It’s like, yeah, look, I care about pollution, I care about human health, I do care about the long-term impact it has on humans living on this planet. And to me, that is what climate is. It’s like, what we got is pretty great. It’s like, not screw it up, like it’s not that complicated. Maybe it’s a problem, maybe it’s not. Let’s not figure it out. That’s people we got. When I have those kind of conversations, I have trouble upsetting people, but I think that’s the key.
Robinson Meyer:
You mentioned that climate kind of makes people think of higher consumer costs or taxes or some kind of higher costs. The main way that climate policy is proceeded in the U.S. for the past at the federal level, for the past five to 35 years, has been subsidies and tax credits. Right? Is there a policy intervention that you think that you’d like to see on climate? Is there a policy change that you think would be important, either for climate or for your portfolio companies?
Mike Schroepfer:
I don’t spend a lot of time on the policy side, because I’m a technologist, so I don’t have a ready answer for here’s what government should do. I do think investing in U.S. economic competitiveness is critical, so regulatory sort of smoothing, so like in terms of the fission industry, the best thing that’s happened is like as. Between the NRC and others getting faster with approvals and getting more certainty, I think government loans and support 45 export of Q, again things that build jobs and factories in the United States. There is a bootstrapping period where we got to invest a lot of capital, so anything the U.S. government can do to speed innovation, invest capital in U.S. jobs, U.S. competitiveness, I think it’s great, pre-buying, sort of. I want to buy supplies of things to guarantee the U.S. has domestic production. I think these are smart, smart industrial policy. I’m much more like create demand than I am like tax people, sort of, in what I would do. But I think there’s lots of things the U.S. government could do to spur innovation. I do think our universities, I know they have under our attack too, but that is the source of a lot of, like, how many things I’m right next door to Stanford, you know, MIT, like these are like amazing places where we collect the greatest minds of the world, and then they stay here, and so I do think that just thinking about it in that regard, and like us is unmatched when it comes to innovation, and how do we keep that engine going is something that the U.S. government can play a dramatic role in, and has, you know, Silicon Valley has a long history in defense and in other things. There has been an interplay of the government and the private sector in a way that, you know, people don’t often want to acknowledge, but I think it’s really critical.
Robinson Meyer:
I remember back in the 20 teens, late 20 teens, you worked at Meta, you were CTO at Meta at the time, working on a number of things, including AI, and one thing I heard in the late 20 teens from friends who were much closer to general computing than I was was that AI was beginning to toss off these huge technological advances. Now we know it was the time of the transformer, it’s the time of the attention is all you need paper, but they were like, oh, there’s huge advances happening in AI, of course. Now we’re, I don’t know, eight years later, and we live in a world of LLMs and deep learning, and obviously AI is the primary driver of the American economic dynamism at the moment. Was that your experience at the time, or did you see it as more of a long-term linear change? Number one, number two. If it was like, what’s doing that today? What is tossing off those same basic kind of rote technological improvements today? Where you think in 2034 or 2035 this is going to be a huge force within the economy, and specialists know it, but we as generalists don’t know it yet.
Mike Schroepfer:
So we started the Facebook AI Research Lab in 2013 Yan Lecun, who now runs his own company, but it’s like Turing Award-winning inventor of some of the early concepts in neural networks, and you know, at the time, in 2013 it was really bad, didn’t do a lot of work, but the trends.. this is back to our entire conversation, is like to me, the question is, what are the underlying trends driving progress or not? And in that case, it was like, oh, these neural nets are really small on relatively small data sets using relatively meager compute. We can scale all three of those - the neural net side, the data side, and the compute side - quite a bit from where we were in 2013. That on its own will be a lot of improvement. This predates this is convolutional neural net, so it predates the transformer architecture, and then there’s always this fourth, like, well, wait a second, if we can innovate on the network architecture, that’s like a fourth dimension of possible goose, and so that was like awesome, and so my experience of most of these technologies is they are like compounding interest over time, and it just doesn’t feel that way, because they haven’t hit, there’s like this magic threshold where it crosses, where it becomes perceptible to humans as a zero to one jump, and really this was the ChatGPT moment in 2022 which was like almost a decade later. We’ve been training chat bots all the time, and they were terrible. You talk with them, they’d lose their context in a little bit, and like this thing happened where it’s just like it went from this thing can’t talk to me at all to like wait a second, this is actually really useful, and it wasn’t a single giant leap. It was compounding over a long time. We switched architectures, we scaled up the data, we scaled up the compute, we did all of this stuff, and then we sort of got this again with post training and reinforcement learning and reasoning, or just sort of loops over the outputs over a long period of time. And so there’s often one underlying thing, but that thing doesn’t show up right away. It’s more of this compounding interest over time, and AI, right now, again, is mostly applied to coding. This is the place where it’s gotten most product market fit. Starting to see it in legal and doctors and medical and other things, but it’s just getting there. I think application to the physical world is the place where I think we’re going to see tremendous change, which is just like having run hardware projects, it takes a really long time to design a new piece of silicon or new hardware part, and then you’ve got to prototype it and get the CNC machines and all the rest of it. Then I get a little factory line, and I think in five or 10 years you’re going to be like basically vibe coding hardware that kind of get spit out of an automated factory in production capability mid like that afternoon, and I think it’s going to be mind-bending in terms of what the impact that has on the world, because the latency from four years or two years from design to scaled manufacturing going to like days, weeks, months is just going to mean there’s a bunch of problems we didn’t think we. Solve that we now can, so that’s a huge, I think, huge area of like AI in the physical world. I’ve been very bearish on robotics, because building stuff in the physical world is so hard, and there’s a never-ending long tail of weird things to deal with, but I have seen multiple things, and it caused me to flip my opinion and invest in a company called Rota AI, because they’re doing a bunch of interesting sim to real understanding internet scale videos and applying it in real time to robotics to like allow them to adapt to different environments, that was really compelling. And so I think we’re going to start not in the home but in an industry and factories, start to see more general purpose robotics that solves problems without having to have a lot of exquisite training.
Mike Schroepfer:
So I think we’re going to see that I think the compute architectures we’re talking about, you know, we’ve been sort of scaling up GPUs, we’ve got this whole network stack, there’s a whole switch to photonic computing, which will be much faster and much more energy efficient, that I think there’s a whole bunch of computing architecture changes, photonics is one of them that I’m really excited about, and then again, we talked about the power system, we talked about solar batteries, fusion, fission. I think fusion will be one of these things that works. Now, once it works, and you could show up at Commonwealth Fusion and look at the tokamak, and like, here it’s running, it’s going to blow people’s minds. It’s the most energy-dense reaction, maybe minus anti-matter matter interaction that you can make, and so it’s like a super unlock in the tech tree, you know. This is why I’m excited, is because I think we got a shot over the next five or 10 years to have at our disposal the ability to craft the life for everyone in terms of comfort and safety and productivity in a way that is durable for centuries to come, so that my children and their children can have a great existence on this awesome planet, and I think we’re going to see a lot of it. It’s going to happen faster than people realized.
Robinson Meyer:
And do you see fusion as at that key? Where are we in the pre zero to one? Are we in the where we are, we in the interest compounding stage of fusion?
Mike Schroepfer:
Fusion is my favorite, because the joke is, you know, it’s next 10 years, next 10 years, but if you actually, if you look at it on that, there’s a triple product chart on sort of the key components to fusion, it’s been making progress at about faster than Moore’s Law, and so it’s one of these things that’s like, oh, that doesn’t work, that doesn’t work, but the actual progress under the covers has been really dramatic, and there’s a crossover point where it crosses that binary. Like, wait a second, it’s not only doable, it’s economic. And again, you look at input, so Commonwealth Fusion is building a tokamak. It’s this magnetic confinement, it squishes the plasma to keep it in there. Their observation is very simple: is that, like, the strength of the magnetic field is a nonlinear benefit to the sort of stability of the reaction. So let’s just build the world’s most powerful magnet, and so they have the world record. The Commonwealth fusion magnet could levitate an aircraft carrier. It’s the most powerful magnet we’ve ever made. We’re just like, we’re just doing the same thing, just like super powerful magnets. And by the way, we have really great simulations now of the plasma interaction, so we know how to keep the thing stable, and we’re going to fire the sucker up, and that it’s like the inputs into that just look really good, and so I think we’re gonna see it’s like incremental, incremental, incremental, and then like, whoa, the thing’s running, so I think that’s gonna surprise people.
Robinson Meyer:
Well, as that comes along, we should have another conversation. Until then, Mike Schroepfer, thanks so much for joining us on Shift Key.
Mike Schroepfer:
It’s great to be here, you
Robinson Meyer:
and that will do it for us today. Thanks so much for listening. I’m gonna put in the briefest of plugs here. If you do not subscribe to Heatmap Daily, which is our afternoon newsletter, it goes out every weekday, and I write it. It is a great day to do so. Go to Heatmap dot news, go to that newsletter tab up top, sign up for Heatmap Daily. I’m just saying, if you like this podcast, you like the newsletter. Shifty is a production of Heatmap News. Our editors are Jillian Goodman and Nico Lauricella. Multimedia editing and audio engineering is by Jacob Lambert and by Nick Woodbury. Our music is by Adam Kromelow. Thanks so much for listening. Happy almost July, and see you next week.
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Current conditions: Tropical Storm Edouard is making landfall over Texas and Louisiana, bringing flooding as it moves inland • Already facing a southwest monsoon, or habagat, the Philippines is now staring down Tropical Storm Pilandok • Intensifying flooding in South Sudan’s Sudd, the largest wetlands in Africa, is displacing families by the droves.
Oil prices surged north of $90 per barrel Tuesday as the United States exchanged fire with Iran amid the ongoing fight to control the Strait of Hormuz. West Texas Intermediate, the U.S. benchmark, rose nearly 2% to $91.74 per barrel. Europe’s Brent crude measure closed less than 2% higher at just below $97. Murban crude, the yardstick for oil out of Abu Dhabi, soared nearly 8% to over $106 per barrel. In a post on Truth Social, President Donald Trump said he was “not trying to force Iran to the bargaining table.” Rather, “I couldn’t care less if they sign a worthless, to them, agreement,” he continued. “I like our position now much better, with almost total control of the Hormuz Strait, and their economy totally collapsing.” Referring to the U.S. military as the “American terrorists,” the Tasnim News Agency, a semi-official outlet associated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, reported that Tehran “had previously warned and promised” that “the Iranian armed forces will respond decisively and extensively to any aggression against our country’s territory and interests.”
Meanwhile, the Group of 20 — the club of 18 rich economies, plus the European Union and African Union — concluded its latest meeting with a joint statement that affirmed the necessity of central bank independence, called out energy affordability in the age of AI, and admonished “non-market economies” with “excessive and persistent external surpluses” that distort the global market. China didn't like that, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told CNBC, issuing a dissent.
If the sun were blasting onto all the solar panels in China all at once, the overall electricity output would top that of every one of the country’s coal plants firing at the same time. It’s a major milestone, Bloomberg reported, highlighting just how extensively Beijing has glazed its fields, foothills, and urban rooftops with photovoltaic panels in recent years. But the achievement comes with an asterisk. “No matter how you feel about solar or coal as an energy source, CAPACITY is not ENERGY,” energy analyst Nicholas Birkhead wrote in a post on X. “These solar capacity numbers way overstate the energy mix, which is what matters! I really wish we’d all just publish capacity numbers after they’re adjusted for capacity factor.” In other words: As significant as this seems, China is still burning a whole lot of coal more frequently than the midday sun is shining.
Last year, upward of $440 billion flowed into solar worldwide, while $540 billion went to upstream oil drilling. It’s a sign, according to a new report from McKinsey, that “markets are financing both fossil fuels and low-carbon energy simultaneously” and that “the system is not replacing one fuel type with another but rather building them in parallel.” Moving forward, the consultancy cautioned, policymakers and planners need to assess not just the cheapest available options for new generation but what best supports the performance of the entire energy system. Just look at what Ontario did when deciding to move forward with what’s expected to be North America’s first small modular reactors. Instead of looking at the upfront cost of the generating assets alone, the province-owned Ontario Power Generation considered the whole cost of transmission and backup generation that would have come in the fine print of choosing wind turbines over nuclear reactors. The example, as my colleague Matthew Zeitlin wrote, highlights the problems with levelized cost of energy, the widely used measure of the overnight costs of building new generation assets: “Everyone’s favorite energy metric is wrong.”
A long-awaited California bill covering state policy on wildfires, insurance, and utilities collapsed in the state legislature Tuesday. The proposal, called Senate Bill 492, had been the product of intense negotiations between legislative leaders and Governor Gavin Newsom. The deal was released on Saturday and included provisions to speed up payouts to victims of fires and nibbled around the edges of the vast payouts California utilities are forced to make to insurers when their equipment sparks a blaze. The legislators fractured because it failed to address the core issue of California’s strict rules around wildfire liability and insurance, where insurers can sue utilities to recover damages when, for example, a transformer or power line ignites dried brush. Instead, the deal would have tweaked the system, making it harder for insurers to sell claims to investors, pushing out payouts to victims faster, and limiting utility executive bonuses when their companies’ equipment causes a fire. These payouts can drag utilities into bankruptcy, as happened with Pacific Gas & Electric in 2019 following a series of wildfires, and end up elevating electricity rates. “The only solution is to return to fix the entire problem, not part of it,” Newsom said in a statement to Politico.
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Fervo Energy’s stock soared nearly 30% on Tuesday after the next-generation geothermal giant announced its biggest deal yet, to sell nearly 400 megawatts of electricity to Google. When Fervo starts up its Cape Station project in southwestern Utah sometime in 2028, the facility will become the world’s largest enhanced geothermal plant. In enhanced geothermal plants, the underground heat harnessed for power production comes from artificial wells drilled with fracking technology rather than naturally forming subterranean reservoirs of hot water. If Houston-based Fervo can bring down the cost of its drilling, the technology could enable construction of geothermal power stations in vastly more locations than the industry previously believed possible. “Even though right now we don’t have clarity yet on how this will serve a data center … we know that it will be a foundational building block of power generation for a data center presence in Utah,” Lucia Tian, Google’s director of advanced energy technologies, told The Wall Street Journal, which broke news of the deal.
Next-generation nuclear startups, meanwhile, are facing a looming challenge over plutonium. The material, which doesn’t occur naturally, was largely produced in the 20th century for weapons production. Now, however, developers of novel kinds of reactors are angling to use some of the world’s 571 metric tons of stockpiled plutonium for energy production. In a feature on the topic published this week, the Financial Times outlined the split between countries such as the U.S., which I told you in May was giving out plutonium to startups, and the United Kingdom, which opted to bury its material. “It’s like a car that runs on diamonds. Plutonium reserves are about the same size as diamonds around the world, which gives you an idea of how rare this precious element is,” a French official told the newspaper.

The Department of Energy is pumping $12 million into developing and manufacturing technology for solar panels that can be used in space. In keeping with the Trump administration’s skeptical position on the weather limits of wind and solar, the agency pointed out that, “unlike terrestrial solar energy systems, which are subject to regulate interruption by weather and the Earth’s rotation, space PV can deliver near-constant power.” The funding is aimed at projects that will enhance the durability and cost of solar cells for space and develop manufacturing methods that can provide “innovative, high-volume” processes for mass production. “The next frontier for solar PV power generation is in space,” Audrey Robertson, the assistant secretary of energy, said in a statement. “As demand for space-grade PV skyrockets, this investment will establish American leadership in next-generation, space-based PV, bolster our national security, and enhance our economic competitiveness.”
Investors are putting big G’s behind VPPs. Virtual power plants promise to ease stress on grids and direct power that might otherwise have been wasted toward all the new demand coming online. Amid the scramble to supply power to data centers, money is flowing into companies that can harness those distributed assets. On Tuesday, the VPP software maker Light announced a $46 million Series A. That same day, the British distributed energy giant Octopus Energy closed its deal to buy a majority stake in the VPP provider Uplight.
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Robinson Meyer:
Hello, it’s Wednesday, September 2. I cannot believe it is already September. Last month, it became clear we’re witnessing a new kind of natural gas build out in the United States. Just think of the announcements we got in a few days in the middle of August. First, around August 11, the market intelligence service Cleanview identified that Amazon was behind a 7.6-gigawatt natural gas plant in Texas called Gigawatt Ranch. So just for comparison, that is huge. That would be the country’s biggest natural gas power plant. In fact, it would be the country’s biggest power plant, period. It’s about half a gigawatt bigger than the Grand Coulee Dam in Washington State, the largest power plant in America for like half a century. Then, just a week later, we learned that OpenAI and Nvidia are working together on a 9.2-gigawatt gas plant in Ohio.
Robinson Meyer:
That plant would obviously dwarf the Grand Coulee Dam. It would be the biggest power plant in America by far. But it would also even rival the Jebel Ali Power and Desalination Facility in Dubai as the world’s largest natural gas power plant of any kind. It would be a truly gargantuan facility. My colleague Emily Pontecorvo recently tried to identify the scale of the ongoing gas buildout. And she found a number of power plants, of projects that I think weren’t on my radar, weren’t generally on people’s radar. It’s been interesting because we’ve been getting a sense of the scale of this buildout at the same time that it’s become clear that the data center buildout is enormously unpopular in itself. If you’ve been reading Heatmap News, you know that according to a Heatmap Pro and Embold research poll conducted also in early August, 75% of Americans are now opposed to a data center being built near where they live, including a majority of Democrats, Republicans, independents, rural voters, urban voters, suburban voters, basically any demographic you can think of. They don’t seem to want a data center near them right now.
Robinson Meyer:
I recently sat down with Emily, a Heatmap founding staff writer, to talk about her reporting on the gas buildout, how she identified the 10 largest gas power projects now under construction or being permitted or being proposed in the United States, and how to think about this messy period. Also, how to think about the fact that it’s tech companies, who often have some of the most ambitious climate policies in America, who are now behind, a natural gas buildout on the scale that could actually increase the country’s, greenhouse gas emissions from the power sector, or at least increase them compared to the baseline. How should we think about these net zero commitments from companies like Amazon, Microsoft, Google, when often it’s those same companies that are now building some of the biggest fossil fuel projects ever proposed in the United States? And what would a good net zero commitment or climate commitment look like from those companies? We get into all of it in this conversation. It was a really generative, really interesting conversation for me. I’m Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News, and it’s all coming up on this episode of Shift Key. Emily Pontecorvo is here. Welcome to Shift Key.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Thanks, Rob. Glad to be here.
Robinson Meyer:
So you recently wrote a piece for us about the scale of the natural gas buildout in the United States that’s happening to service data centers and to service AI. And I think it’s quite interesting because we will talk about this, but I don’t know if we understood just how large this buildout was going to be as recently as the beginning of this year.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah, I think that’s right.
Robinson Meyer:
What I think back to is, we did our poll, our annual poll of climate insiders, which are kind of sources and experts and former officials and chief sustainability officers. And we asked them at the end of last year, do you think the AI build out is going to significantly slow down decarbonization? And most people said no. And at the time, I don’t know how I would have answered, but ... I feel like we’re much closer to a place where the AI buildout is slowing down decarbonization now than we were even eight months ago. And so just to start off, can you put the scale of this gas buildout in context for us? So how many plants have been proposed? How many of these plants are going to happen? What do we understand about the scale of this next generation of gas that is being planned across the United States right now?
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah, so I will say to start that a lot of this information is very slippery because there’s been so many announcements. The announcements are constantly kind of changing. And so we have some numbers, but they’re definitely estimates. So last week, the Global Energy Monitor, which is this group that tracks oil and gas projects all over the world, they put out a report saying that they counted 189 gigawatts of natural gas plants in the U.S. that have either been announced, that are in a pre-construction phase, like they have some permits, or that are under construction. And that is nearly double the amount that they found at the end of last year, which was about 97 gigawatts.
Robinson Meyer:
And is that entirely behind the meter plants, or are those any kind of natural gas plant being planned across the United States, kind of for any purpose on the grid or off the grid?
Emily Pontecorvo:
So these numbers, 189 gigawatts up from 97 six months ago, those are projects that are specifically being motivated by data centers. So some of them are being built on the grid that utilities are building to kind of meet new demand room data centers. And a lot of them are off-grid projects that are being directly tied to data centers.
Robinson Meyer:
And I guess you’ve kind of alluded to this already, but like, So it’s almost 200 gigawatts of gas plants coming online. Do we know, like, how large is the existing U.S. gas fleet?
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah, so I, you know, had to look this up for this story. But as of last year, the existing natural gas generation capacity in the U.S. was 512 gigawatts.
Robinson Meyer:
Wow. It’s like 40% of the gas fleet we’re going to add to our existing fleet. Like, this is not a small change to the size of the gas fleet. This is like a major expansion of U.S. generation capacity.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah. And the thing is, the numbers I gave earlier, those are just projects that have some relationship to the data center build out. The report also gave an estimate of just total natural gas generation that’s being planned across the country. And that number is 378 gigawatts. So it’s almost, you know, nearly doubling what we have today. And what was really interesting was I went back and looked at when was a lot of the existing natural gas generation built? Was there a time in the past where we ... Natural gas plants this quickly. And there’s like a pretty clear kind of analogous time period in the early 2000s where we built, what was it, like nearly, it was like more than 150 gigawatts in just four years. I saw different estimates. It was like maybe closer to 200. But that was a very different build out where this time the plants are much, much bigger. And so many of them are being built off-grid.
Robinson Meyer:
It is actually crazy to me the scale of the build-out that is not being built to service AI, first of all, because I would have assumed that basically the number, that upfront number, was basically all the gas because all of it would be going to AI. So the fact that there’s another, what, 150, 140 gigawatts going to just general generation is pretty crazy.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah, I will say it is possible that some of that is duplicative. Like I was talking to Brendan Pierpont from Energy Innovation. He is on their electricity team, and he was pointing out that they’re seeing that in a lot of cases, the developers will go to the utilities first and ask for a certain amount of capacity. And then when they see how long that’s going to take, then they’ll kind of turn to an off-grid project. And so it’s possible that both of those are getting included in this data, but it’s so hard to really pinpoint what the numbers are.
Robinson Meyer:
So how should we think about these 189 gigawatts? Because as you said at the top of this episode, like there’s a haziness to all of this because sometimes the same gigawatt, so to speak, of demand gets requested in multiple different venues, either in different grids or at different locations, or they ask for it on grid and then they try to build it off grid. At the same time, One through line of this AI story since the beginning has been the difficulty of getting any kind of bead on demand and on the scale of demand. And it seems entirely possible to me that these 189 gigawatts are not going to all get built, but that we are going to add 189 gigawatts because maybe there’s another 100 gigawatts of demand that’s waiting to be requested. And, you know, if we build 70% of these requested gigawatts and 30% of those requested gigawatts, we’re still hitting 190 gigawatts, we’re still hitting 200 gigawatts. And so how do you think about the likelihood that this demand becomes like real capacity in the economy?
Emily Pontecorvo:
I think that the demand is real. I don’t know that 189 gigawatts of natural gas fired power plants, and especially the particular list that this report comes up with, I don’t know that those are real. But I think between data centers and a lot of other kinds of demand that we’re putting on the grid, air conditioning, electric vehicles, manufacturing, like absolutely 189 gigawatts is real. I think that the really big question is how real are these natural gas projects and how quickly will they get built? What kinds of equipment, what kinds of technology they’ll use? So
Emily Pontecorvo:
I basically went through this exercise of trying to identify the 10 biggest projects. And my initial list and my final list are not the same because as I was like researching each individual one, everything felt like sand slipping through my fingers. Like I would see one press release and then one, you know, news article with rumors about XYZ. And then the company’s website said one thing and the permit said another thing. And it was really hard to get a good grasp of, here’s a developer with a project that they say can meet five gigawatts of demand someday. And yet, in the near term, they’re actually just going to build 150 megawatts.
Emily Pontecorvo:
And so, like, should we think about that? Right, exactly.
Robinson Meyer:
This is the case for the OpenAI facility. I wrote about this for Heatmap Daily, our daily afternoon newsletter that everyone should hopefully be subscribed to. But there is this big OpenAI Department of Energy data center that is being planned in Ohio. It’s being built on a kind of ex-nuclear site that the DOE owns. And I think one of the interesting things, I mean, there’s a lot of interesting things about this project. But first of all, it’s massive. It’s nearly 10 gigawatts. It would rival the largest natural gas power plants in the world. I think it’s going to be right now.
Robinson Meyer:
Neck and neck. If the whole thing gets built, it would be right around the same size as the Jabal Ali power and desalination gas plant in Dubai. And it’s all going to go to an open AI data center. It’s backstopped by Nvidia. We learned that last month, it’s really going to increase the likelihood that this facility gets built out. But what’s interesting is that the natural gas plant is going to be built on federal land, on Department of Energy land. It’s going to be owned by the DOE and financed by Japan as part of this Trump-Japan trade deal. Now, I think there’s still a lot of questions about how much this gets built. But to your point, what’s difficult about thinking about this plant is that they want to eventually build more than nine gigawatts of power. They plan to initially build 800 megawatts of gas, which is a lot of gas, but not like a Grand Coulee Dam’s worth of gas. That is a very large gas plant, but it is not a unprecedentedly large gas plant. And how do you assess the scale of that demand, right? Do you think of it as an 800 megawatt gas plant that could literally grow 10x over the next few years? Or do you think of it as a nine and a half gigawatt gas plant, and therefore the largest power generation project in American history?
Emily Pontecorvo:
Right. I mean, so there’s like so many projects that are in this data, that are in that 189 gigawatts, like Fermi America, the big project in Texas.
Robinson Meyer:
The Rick Perry associated project, yes.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yes. And so they’re also aspiring to even bigger than the OpenAI project. I believe their stated total power generation for the site is like 17 gigawatts, 11 gigawatts of natural gas, plus a bunch of nuclear and some other stuff. Just completely pie in the sky numbers. they already have a permit for the 11 gigawatts of natural gas though or actually no i’m sorry they have a permit for the first six and submitted a permit for the next five but
Robinson Meyer:
Big plant that’s still a really big.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Plant it’s a really big plant and yeah there’s all these projects in the list that have these huge numbers but then what’s actually happening is they’re being built in phases and the first phase might just be a couple hundred megawatts or one gigawatt or between one and two is what I’ve mostly seen. And so whether that first phase is successfully built will determine whether the additional phases are built will determine how much of that 189 gigawatts.
Robinson Meyer:
Right. Well, and also like if the AI boom is still going strong in 2028 and 2029 and 2030, then they can keep building gas to service it. Who knows what the economy will be like by then? You and I will work for AI map or something.
Robinson Meyer:
Can we talk a little bit about like, why are companies building gas? Clean energy advocates talk a lot about how wind and solar, especially solar and batteries are the cheapest source of electricity. I would say when you talk to electricity traders, too, like when you talk to people in the market every day, they also talk about how cheap solar is. So why are companies building gas and not solar to service these facilities?
Emily Pontecorvo:
So there’s like, a lot of different reasons that are all kind of coming together. Maybe the biggest one of all are the bottlenecks to connecting to the grid, the transmission bottlenecks. And that’s really pushing a lot of these companies to look for off-grid solutions.
Robinson Meyer:
And specifically just to like play that out, because they cannot site enough acreage of solar on the site where they would put a data center to generate the power they need, which means they need a grid hookup. But if they need to generate their own power on their own acreage, then you need an extremely energy-dense form of generation, and that means you go to gas. Right, right.
Emily Pontecorvo:
And then I think that’s coming together with a bunch of political factors, like the Trump administration has a strong interest in pushing natural gas. They have gotten rid of the tax credits for clean energy. They’ve made renewable energy, wind and solar, really hard to build with all of these permitting freezes and permitting obstacles for renewables. I think another element is just like the extreme speed and kind of urgency that AI companies are expanding at and demanding power at, which I guess kind of circles back to the interconnection issue and just not wanting to wait to be connected to the grid. And then the last one that I think is important is this issue with affordability in data centers where people are really worried about the build out, increasing their energy bills. And a lot of data center developers are pushing this idea that by bringing their own generation, by building these gas power plants on site, not connecting to the grid, they’re kind of putting their project in a box and ensuring that it doesn’t have any impact on regular rate payers.
Robinson Meyer:
It’s interesting to me, the ratepayer protection pledge from Trump pledges that, data centers won’t make electricity rates go up. And the solution to this for a lot of these companies, as you were saying, when they look at the set of constraints that they’re working within that include acreage, cost, regulation, local grid interconnection capacity, speed to power, they solve this set of constraints by going with gas. And I mean, I think there’s a few interesting aspects about it. First of all, it’s not clear to me that it makes data centers any more popular. He recently did polling that made a lot of news that found that 75% of Americans at this point would oppose the data center being built near where they live. I’m not convinced that adding a fossil fuel power plant to a proposed data center project makes it any more popular because it’s taking a quasi-industrial site and turning it into a full-on industrial site. But that being said, one of the promises made by adding gas generation at the data center is that by generating your own electricity, you’re not increasing local demand for electricity and therefore not increasing anyone’s rates. Now...
Robinson Meyer:
There’s a whole separate conversation to have here about whether adding marginal large-scale loads to electricity grids outside of markets like the Mid-Atlantic, which are structured in a particular way where that jacks up everyone’s rates. There’s a whole separate question and discussion to have here about basically, if you add large customers to an electricity grid because of how electricity rates are designed, that may actually bring down everyone’s bills. But I don’t want to have that conversation now. But like, it’s not clear to me that they are actually like, companies build gas to protect everyone’s electricity rates from going up nearby. And whether or not that is a good idea, and whether or not that is true, what gets left out of that conversation is whether they’re protecting everyone else’s gas rates. And the natural gas system is also a fixed system. And unlike the electricity system where you’re moving electrons around, so to speak, and you can re-rate lines, you can up-rate existing transmission lines, like you are moving molecules around with natural gas. And one thing I have wondered is like, if we’re adding gigawatts and gigawatts of gas generation to an existing gas grid.
Robinson Meyer:
Are we about to see natural gas prices go up around the country, especially when you take into effect that LNG demand is also about to double over the next few years? And so there’s like we were already worried about LNG export driving up natural gas rates. Now we’re adding LNG and a nine gigawatt scale natural gas power plant is basically like a medium sized LNG plant’s worth of demand. You’re just exporting carbon dioxide into the sky and producing electricity right so like hyperscalers can protect electricity rates by building local gas generation it’s not clear to me they can protect gas rates.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah I, I mean we’ve talked about this. I, I think it’s a ... I did talk a little bit about this with folks when i was reporting on this gas build out, and I think the natural gas international natural gas market is complicated, and it’s not like there’s like a one-to-one, you know, increased demand here prices go up here…
Robinson Meyer:
It’s also like when you talk about natural gas pricing like what drives natural gas pricing in the united states is like number one weather and then like ... dot dot dot ... like a gap as big as the grand canyon and then number two like, local supply constraints and then number three is like local demand you know like there’s the number one thing driving natural gas rates remains weather but I don’t know whether these.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Things wonder yeah like if any of these mega projects get built to this the scale that they are trying to and like will they be fighting with lng exports for capacity it’s hard to it’s hard to imagine
Robinson Meyer:
Of these 10 projects, like what surprised you most? Or what project kind of wound up on the list that you did not expect to see on the list at the beginning?
Emily Pontecorvo:
So, you know, going back to a few things that we’ve talked about, like, why is this happening? Why are why gas plants? There were two projects on the list that I was surprised to learn about that were, I think, have been sort of overshadowed by the OpenAI project. But there are two additional natural gas mega projects that are coming out of this U.S.-Japan trade deal that are going to be financed by Japan and owned by the U.S.
Robinson Meyer:
I think they’re financed by Japan, owned by SoftBank’s new energy subsidiary.
Emily Pontecorvo:
In this case, SoftBank is not involved. So NextEra is building a big project in Pennsylvania. They haven’t said where yet. And a big project in Texas, neither is like has a data center attached to it. It’s a little bit unclear whether there will be a data center attached to it. The Pennsylvania one might connect to the grid. But nonetheless, these deals have been advertised as being sort of motivated by increased data center demand. And so just going back to what we were talking about before, like, I do think that a significant amount of this buildup is the Trump administration wanting to build gas plants. Like, that’s nearly 20 between these three projects, the OpenAI one and the two NextEra projects. That’s nearly 20 gigawatts of natural gas fired capacity that the Trump administration is behind through this trade deal.
Robinson Meyer:
That’s crazy. Do we know for the 180 gigawatts built-to-service AI, for the hundreds of gigawatts that we think might be coming online for these 20 gigawatts, do we know what ... Kind of power plant they’re going to build. Because as we’ve discussed on previous episodes of Shift Key, there’s several different kinds of gas plants that are being built. The most efficient tend to be these combined cycle plants, which use the exhaust from generating electricity to then generate more electricity. And then that can kind of scale up through a peaker plant all the way to just basically now people are running jet engines to generate electricity. That matters a lot to the emissions profile of these plants because it matters a lot to their energy efficiency in just a very kind of classical sense. Do we have any sense of how efficient this nearly 190 gigawatts could be?
Emily Pontecorvo:
No, we don’t. In the case of these three projects that came out of the U.S.-Japan trade deal, it’s a little bit fuzzy still what technologies they’ll be using. I think in the case of the OpenAI plant, they said that they have the initial generation equipment secured, which maybe that just leads me to think that it’s combined cycle turbines since those are in shorter supply.
Robinson Meyer:
The hardest to get. Or maybe it means that they absolutely don’t have combined cycle turbines. Maybe, maybe.
Emily Pontecorvo:
But in going through this list, what I learned is that like, yeah, a lot of these projects are the ones that are permitted where, you know, you get really specific information about exactly what technology they’re using. A lot of them are using these combustion engines, just putting like dozens of them on site and,
Robinson Meyer:
Let’s ask the question that I think is nearest and dearest to both of our hearts. Like, what does this mean for U.S. emissions? Do we have any ability to estimate what a gas build out of the scale, what does this mean for U.S. emissions?
Emily Pontecorvo:
I tried to answer that question for this story, and I think it’s one that I’m going to continue to look into. It’s really hard to say at this point because so much of it is speculative. We don’t know, you know, is a third of this real? Is half of it real? Will it all eventually be real? What technologies will they end up using? How much of it will be on-grid versus off-grid? Like all of those questions will impact what it means in the long run. I think the best kind of estimate that I found was to look at the Rhodium Group’s taking stock report. They just put out their latest version of this last month. And this report they put out annually, it basically looks at, you know, if we take current policy, energy, technology trends, and we project them out into the future, what happens to emissions. So they found power sector emissions could decline 24 to 48% by 2040.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Compared to today, yeah. So, you know, that maybe it’s hard to tell, like, is that good? Is that bad? That is a significantly worse outcome than what they found two years ago when they did the same exercise and the Inflation Reduction Act was kind of in full swing. At that point, their estimate was power sector emissions would decline by at least 42%, so near the high end of the current estimate, by 2035, so five years earlier. Both of those reports did take into account lots of data center demand growth, but they did not, neither of them took into account the potential for a lot of that demand growth to be met with off-grid natural gas combustion engines. And so, you know, those are much worse from a mission standpoint. And the other thing, when I spoke to Ben King, one of the authors, and he was saying, you know, not only are these less efficient systems, these combustion engines and simple cycle turbines, but putting them off-grid also, they’ll be running around the clock. Whereas like if they were on the grid, you have this amazingly efficient system that’s, they’re being called upon when they’re needed, but they’re not necessarily...
Robinson Meyer:
Right, you have price-based dispatch.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah, yeah.
Robinson Meyer:
What does this mean for corporate net zero goals? And to what extent is the AI high boom kind of turning corporate net zero goals into a dead letter?
Emily Pontecorvo:
So, you know, all of these companies, the biggest AI hyperscalers, Microsoft, Google, Meta, Amazon, those four specifically, they are still the biggest clean energy buyers in the world. Like Amazon has funded, you know, has more clean energy PPAs than any other company in the world. At the same time, Amazon is behind this natural gas power plant in Texas that’s going to be 7.65 gigawatts, depending on what else gets built, could be the biggest natural gas plant in the U.S. So it’s really hard.
Robinson Meyer:
For about a week, we thought it was the biggest natural gas plant in the U.S. And then this OpenAI project got announced.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Right, right. So yeah, it’s very hard to square these two sides of the coin where like these companies, on the one hand, seem to be totally throwing out their net zero goals and just trying to build as quickly as possible with whatever they can get. And on the other hand, they are still publicly stating their commitment to the net zero goal and still publicly signing power purchase agreements with clean energy. I don’t know that we have a good accounting yet of how much gas are they helping get built versus how much renewables. And I don’t know if that exercise is possible, but if you know, reach out to me. But there is something sort of absurd or like it just feels so implausible that these companies could still say we’re committed to go net zero and meanwhile be supporting these natural gas mega projects.
Robinson Meyer:
How many of these companies are still pledging to hit net zero by 2030?
Emily Pontecorvo:
Those four, the big, like Amazon, Microsoft, Meta, Google, the thing is
Robinson Meyer:
They all still have 2030 net zero goals.
Emily Pontecorvo:
They’re either 2030 or 2035. But I mean, on one hand, Google calls it a moonshot. And they have language like that, where they’re like, this is our guiding principle. This is our aspiration. But even that if this is your guiding principle how is it guiding you to support it
Robinson Meyer:
We did get to the moon, do you know what i mean a lot companies the government does this now too like public sector organizations they use moonshot to refer to something they want to do but are not probably going to do but in fact the whole thing about the moonshot was we did in fact get to the moon.
Emily Pontecorvo:
The thing is, like, is it still possible for a company like Microsoft or Google to hit net zero emissions by whatever date they choose on paper? Probably. That will maybe depend on the corporate standards that rise up in the next couple of years that determine what they are allowed to say on paper and how we account for certain things like carbon removal and clean energy purchases, those accounting rules can really change what these companies say they’ve accomplished. Will they have achieved net zero in the true spirit of trying to get the whole world to go net zero? I think that seems a lot less likely.
Robinson Meyer:
Well, this is, I mean, you’ve written about this too, but I guess what all this suggests to me is that corporate net zero goals and arguably even national net zero goals are not even the right thing to be training on because, and I’m not trying to make excuses for the tech companies here, because I completely agree with you that this gas build-out is not at all in line with their climate commitments. However if they were to basically give up on their climate commitments, and pull out their investments in all these other technologies that are crucial for global decarbonization and those technologies never got developed that would be a tragedy, like that would be really bad and to some degree if google, or microsoft with their investments that they’re making to meet their net zero goal, were to seed, a technology that is crucial to overall global decarbonization. To some degree, that is more important than whether Google is able to make a zero appear on its books in 2035 or 2040.
Robinson Meyer:
And I don’t mean to be too glib about this, but I do think we actually accept this logic in the case of other industries. I would argue, I think climate advocates would argue pretty forcefully that like the coal that was an input into the Chinese solar industry ultimately at this point has been overwhelmed by the emissions reductions from the Chinese solar industry, number one. But it was number two, it was like important because now we have the Chinese solar industry, which is able to produce solar panels at this unprecedented scale for global decarbonization. And setting aside the particular kind of security implications of that, it just seems to me that like, It is bad that these companies are doing this, but it would in some ways be worse for them to kind of stop.
Emily Pontecorvo:
I don’t know why one precludes the other.
Robinson Meyer:
I mean, well, just because I think that the charge here is not hypocrisy. I would rather they remain hypocritical, but doing something for net zero. I would like them to stop emitting. But if they are going to emit, I don’t mind that they’re hypocrites, I guess is maybe what I’m saying.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Sure. I mean, I do think that there is a potential problem with using net zero as the kind of defining goal.
Robinson Meyer:
Yes, yes. Right. In fact, the goal is a bad one.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah, I mean, I would love for these companies to come up with a new set of commitments that continue to motivate them to make the kind of transformative investments that they’re making, but that don’t lead people to believe that achieving this balance of inputs and outputs is not only feasible, but is like for one company by itself to do that is important.
Emily Pontecorvo:
And it’s much more important to look at the kind of global picture.
Robinson Meyer:
How do you think about this whole build out in context of climate? I mean, at this point, Heatmap has written extensively about the unpopularity of data centers. It’s clear that some people hate data centers because of their emissions impact, but it doesn’t seem to be driving that trend. Though in some ways that trend is so big, so generalized, and so amorphous in some ways that like everything is kind of driving it. How has your recent reporting made you think about the AI build out broadly?
Emily Pontecorvo:
I mean, I’d come back to the fact that we really don’t know the scale of it yet, because there are so many unknowns. So much of this development is speculative. How much natural gas will actually get built? We don’t know. I think there are some other kind of exciting unknowns, like will we be able to speed up the development of geothermal and some nuclear and some other cleaner sources that could maybe displace some of this gas? And then I also started to think about some other questions, which are like, in a future administration that wanted to do something about climate or a future Congress that had more capacity to do something about emissions, what kind of new constituencies does this build? Like, I wonder if, you know, in the past, companies like Microsoft and Google have been supporters of emissions regulation and clean energy policy. But if they suddenly have all this natural gas on their books, are they going to still support regulating emissions? Like, they might have a vested interest in fighting natural gas power plant controls.
Robinson Meyer:
It’s been so fascinating watching the political backlash to data centers. And I think especially because data centers threaten to be this massive emissions bomb, right? But also because that doesn’t really seem to be what the backlash is about. And I am filled with a little bit of a sense of foreboding watching this because I know the scale of infrastructure change that is going to have to happen to decarbonize. And it is smaller than the data center build out. Now, I think we have a lot more to offer people in some ways than AI does. But I don’t know that, for instance, the faces of that decarbonization infrastructure change will be any more trusted than the faces of this infrastructure build out. And so, you know, Tom Perriello, former congressman, actually was in climate philanthropy for a long time.
Robinson Meyer:
Was a fairly important figure in climate philanthropy, is now running for Congress again. His odds aren’t great, but he’s running in this Republican district near Charlottesville, Virginia. And he just came out with an ad that was against transmission lines. It was against a transmission line. And it was also kind of against data centers because there’s an unpopular transmission line in his district. And listen, he’s a politician, right? He’s going to do what he needs to do to win that election. But like, if Tom Perriello, of all people, is willing to nod along to the threats of transmission lines, which are non-existent and, in fact, essential to the energy transition. I can’t look at the data center backlash and be entirely like, yes, only good can happen, to paraphrase our president.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah. I mean, the one thing that I, when I think about comparing, if we didn’t have this crazy data center build out, and instead what we had was a huge surge of electric vehicles and heat pumps that created this energy crisis that, you know, where we needed to build a lot of power plants. I think the main difference in those two scenarios is the speed of it. Like, less the scale. I think the scale is somewhat equivalent, but it would at least have happened or it can still happen in the it might have been, people wouldn’t have been bombarded with a project in their backyard in every county in the country.
Robinson Meyer:
That’s not happening. And there’s an interesting angle here. We’ve talked about it on previous shows, but we always expected load growth to come back in the 2030s. In fact, we kind of need it to come back in the 2030s if we’re anywhere close to hitting climate goals. And if the economy not only decarbonizes, but modernizes in the way that we would like it to modernize, it will require load growth to go up. But I wonder if climate advocates are a little lucky that the people eating, the initial wave of load growth, the people who are kind of the clarions of load growth, as it were, are not decarbonization industries, but the big tech companies, which already had their own PR issues.
Emily Pontecorvo:
I don’t know. Well, a second ago, you were wondering if this doesn’t bode poorly for...
Robinson Meyer:
I think it ... I don’t know. I don’t know. I managed to feel bad about it either way. We’re going to have to leave it there. Emily Panacorvo, thanks so much for joining us on Shift Key.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Thanks, Rob.
Robinson Meyer:
And that will do it for us today. I hope you enjoy the dwindling days of your summer. Remember to stick around after the show for a conversation between Heatmap Labs and the sponsor of this episode, Verse. It should be really, really interesting. Until then, Shift Key is a production of Heatmap News. Our editors are Jillian Gibbon and Nico Loricello. Multimedia editing and audio production is by Jacob Lambert and by Nick Woodbury. Our music’s by Adam Cromelow. Thanks so much for listening. See you next time.
Mike Munsell:
My name is Mike Munsell, and I’m the Vice President of Partnerships with Heatmap News. In my last conversation with Seyed Madaeni, we talked about Versus’ business model helping data centers and large energy consumers connect to power. In today’s conversation, we chat about Versus’ recent Series B, and we go deep on speed to power. Let’s talk about speed to power. Why is everyone talking about this concept today, and how is Versus helping to accelerate that deployment? Very good question. And I think this is the billion dollar question, if not a trillion dollar question. So as we know, AI is compute, and compute needs power. So the first order of business, if you’re, I’m just going to use an example, if you’re developing 100-megawatt data center, the size of these data centers are measured in units of power. Let’s say for the sake of the argument when we talk about 100 megawatt data center if you apply for interconnection meaning that you want to power your facility so your chips start running and your AI models start training that takes a long time the reason that it takes a long time is utilities need to do planning studies they’re basically answering two questions one is there enough energy at the grid level to serve your consumption and your demand? Second, if there is, is there enough transmission and distribution wires to get the power to your location?
Seyed Madaeni:
Given this enormous amount of growth, the answer usually fails on both fronts. And as days go by and our grid becomes more and more saturated, the wait times are going to be even longer and longer because the world of power and energy doesn’t move at the speed of AI. It takes years to build transmission lines. It takes years to build power facilities. So how do we solve this problem? Is there a magic wand that we can use to accelerate the time for in a connection of these large loads the answer is yes in a nutshell is to bring your own generation to the mix and that is by deploying behind the meter assets behind the meter assets that are capable of
Seyed Madaeni:
Charging up energy giving it back to the grid like energy storage or solar or nimble gas plants. So really the solution is to pair your data center with these large physical assets such that when you are being studied by the local utility, you’re not no longer seen as a 100 megawatt fixed load that consumes electricity around the clock. You have the capability to shape and form your energy profile. But those physical assets, they’re not just going to drive themselves. They need software. Ironically, they need AI to solve the AI compute problem. And that’s where we come in. We control these assets on a second by second basis to, again, make sure the needs of the utilities are met, the needs of the data center is met. And then plus, we can give back to the grid and be grid grid citizens by participating electricity markets and really trying to offer that capacity to suppress electricity prices. That’s the solution that’s really being adopted. And we play a role in kind of controlling those assets on a 10, 15 year basis.
Mike Munsell:
And I saw you recently completed a Series B of which Nvidia and Google Ventures were big backers. Can you talk more about that and why Nvidia and Google are invested in versus success? And is it related to that speed to power equation?
Seyed Madaeni:
We just closed the Series B round. It was led by Bessemer Venture Partners. They’re an amazing group of folks, have more than a century of experience in investing. You’re absolutely right. Nvidia backed us. Also, Google Ventures, which led our Series A round. They also took part in our Series B round. Essentially, the value prop that we have in the investment thesis that these investors try to pursue is, can Verse be the entity to solve the grid problem so we can be good grid citizens and also simultaneously win the AI race? That was the fundamental investment thesis. and we managed to prove that we are the team, we are the platform. And as a result, they did participate. Now we’re working alongside Nvidia to integrate with their DSX platform and kind of be that part of the standard reference design, which we are working towards. Obviously, Google has a big need of data centers. Plus, we’re also serving a lot of hyperscalers and we have a deep backlog in the queue to kind of help contribute to bring these CapEx online.
Seyed Madaeni:
But we also have a very good angle that we can look back and not only we solve the problem, but we also help towards sustainability because believe it or not, solar and storage is the quickest and cheapest solution that you can deploy. We’re at the moment of time that CFOs like clean energy because it’s economic and clean, which gives us momentum to try to solve this problem.
Mike Munsell:
Let’s get into that. What is VERS deploying today? And what does the system look like when you integrate it with a data center?
Seyed Madaeni:
We as a company, we are AI software driven. So we are not really developing the physical projects. That requires financing, that requires a balance sheet, that requires expertise in EPC and construction. That’s why we have partners like Calibrand and And they’re top notch, not from the kind of physical development, but understanding how the systems work, holding the hands of these customers to understand what the value proposition is. Our work is mostly on the software side. Just think about it when you build an amazing car. That car needs a driver. And in this case, these assets need a driver, but it can’t be a human driver because you’re making decisions every millisecond, whether to fire up the battery, curtail the solar. Draw from the grid so we’re you need a autonomous self-driving car and this is like self-driving assets so ironically we’re using ai to train our models to control these assets but that’s the role that we play and in terms of the underlying assets that we’re seeing a lot of lithium-ion batteries systems from tesla influence and etc.
Seyed Madaeni:
A lot of solar and some nimble gas generators that can and be part of the mix and the solution. But we have integrations with a lot of these OEMs, SCADA systems, meters to be able to effectively control.
Mike Munsell:
And you mentioned Calibrand. Can you talk more about your partnership with them and how they’re helping you deploy today?
Seyed Madaeni:
Yeah. So basically, as we announced in our Series B, I would look at them, the OG of energy infrastructure development, and they’ve made significant progress in this field. So they’re deploying assets, they’re financing assets, they’re their owner and operator. And our partnership, our involvement is on the software side because this is not a software and AI problem. You can’t build amazing software like the one that we have and just use it up in the air. You need to deploy it on physical assets. And it takes a whole team to do that from people that understand hardware, understand financing, understanding project development, and people who understand AI models and software platforms, we fit in more of the latter camp.
Mike Munsell:
Can you talk more about your project pipeline right now and maybe how your Series B is helping to deploy technology faster, perhaps?
Seyed Madaeni:
Yeah, so basically our backlog is pretty deep. We are in the business of managing assets at the end of the day. So we have gigawatts on the management. We’ll soon come out with some press releases in terms of showcasing what those numbers are. And then our backlog, it’s on the kind of plain vanilla contract management, utility bill management, a lot of enterprises ranging from retail to hyperscalers to manufacturing, steel companies. But on the dispatch intelligence, which is part of ARIA, we have a deep backlog and commitment from a lot of blue chip hyperscalers that need speed to power tomorrow. So really, our mix of customer base is, I would say, enterprises that spend $100 million and above on electricity, which by frame of reference, some of them spend billions of dollars. So that’s really our target ICP. And so far, the traction has been amazing.
Mike Munsell:
That wraps up today’s conversation with Sayed Medini, CEO of Verse. Stay tuned after the next episode of Shift Key to learn more about Verse’s next five years and what Sayed believes is needed for U.S. energy policy.
Rob talks with Heatmap’s Emily Pontecorvo about how the data center boom is changing our emissions trajectory.
The United States is staring down a natural gas buildout of gigantic proportions.
Amazon wants to build what would be the country’s largest power plant in Texas — and run it entirely on natural gas. Not to be outdone, OpenAI is plotting an even larger power plant in Ohio that, if built, would become the world’s largest gas power facility. How should we think about this boom — and about the AI and technology companies behind it, who remain some of the world’s biggest buyers of clean energy?
On this episode of Shift Key, Rob is joined by Emily Pontecorvo, a Heatmap founding staff writer. They discuss what Emily learned identifying the country’s 10 biggest gas projects, what surprised her most, and what this means for the country’s climate trajectory — and Big Tech’s corporate net-zero goals.
Shift Key is hosted by Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, or wherever you get your podcasts.
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Here is an excerpt from their conversation:
Robinson Meyer: Can we talk a little bit about , why are companies building gas? Clean energy advocates talk a lot about how wind and solar — especially solar and batteries — are the cheapest source of electricity. I would say, when you talk to electricity traders, too, like when you talk to people in the market every day, they also talk about how cheap solar is. So why are companies building gas and not solar to service these facilities?
Emily Pontecorvo: So there’s a lot of different reasons that are all kind of coming together. Maybe the biggest one of all are the bottlenecks to connecting to the grid, the transmission bottlenecks. And that’s really pushing a lot of these companies to look for off-grid solutions.
Meyer: And specifically, just to play that out, because they cannot site enough acreage of solar on the site where they would put a data center to generate the power they need, which means they need a grid hookup. But if they need to generate their own power on their own acreage, then you need an extremely energy-dense form of generation, and that means you go to gas.
Pontecorvo: Right, right. And then I think that’s coming together with a bunch of political factors, like the Trump administration has a strong interest in pushing natural gas. They have gotten rid of the tax credits for clean energy. They’ve made renewable energy, wind and solar, really hard to build with all of these permitting freezes and permitting obstacles for renewables.
I think another element is just the extreme speed and urgency that AI companies are expanding at and demanding power at, which I guess kind of circles back to the interconnection issue and just not wanting to wait to be connected to the grid. And then the last one that I think is important is this issue with affordability in data centers, where people are really worried about the buildout increasing their energy bills. And a lot of data center developers are pushing this idea that by bringing their own generation, by building these gas power plants onsite, not connecting to the grid, they’re kind of putting their project in a box and ensuring that it doesn’t have any impact on regular ratepayers.
Meyer: It’s interesting to me — the Ratepayer Protection Pledge from Trump pledges that data centers won’t make electricity rates go up. And the solution to this for a lot of these companies, as you were saying, when they look at the set of constraints that they’re working within that include acreage, cost, regulation, local grid interconnection capacity, speed to power — they solve this set of constraints by going with gas. And I mean, I think there’s a few interesting aspects about it.
First of all, it’s not clear to me that it makes data centers any more popular. We recently did polling that made a lot of news that found that 75% of Americans, at this point, would oppose the data center being built near where they live. I’m not convinced that adding a fossil fuel power plant to a proposed data center project makes it any more popular because it’s taking a quasi-industrial site and turning it into a full-on industrial site. But that being said, one of the promises made by adding gas generation at the data center is that by generating your own electricity, you’re not increasing local demand for electricity and therefore not increasing anyone’s rates.
You can find a full transcript of the episode here.
Mentioned:
The U.S. Is Building Natural Gas Power Twice as Fast as China
Emily on Amazon’s Gigawatt Ranch
Rob on OpenAI and the PORTS-Pike Technology Campus
This episode of Shift Key is sponsored by ...
Verse's software platform Aria helps data centers connect to the grid faster and optimize power operations in real time. Learn more at verse.inc.
RE+ 26 is the largest clean energy event in North America, happening November 16th through 19th at the Las Vegas Convention Center. Register at re-plus.com and use code SHIFTKEY20 to save 20% off a Full Conference pass.
Music for Shift Key is by Adam Kromelow.