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A victory for activists also represents a political gamble for the president.
Perhaps the biggest political test of the climate movement has now arrived.
There are a few ways to think about this. But first, the facts: The Biden administration will temporarily stop approving new liquified natural gas export terminals, allowing the Energy Department to study the effect that they have on the climate, the White House announced on Friday.
The decision is a victory for climate activists, who had demanded President Joe Biden halt the growth of what may be the country’s most important fossil fuel industry. It also throws into question whether some of the biggest pending LNG projects — such as Calcasieu Pass 2, or CP2, a proposed Louisiana terminal that activists have dubbed a “carbon mega bomb” — will ultimately get built.
The pause could also complicate Biden’s foreign policy, which has used America’s status as a major energy supplier to pacify allies and wield economic might. Since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 and throttled gas supplies to Europe, the United States has used its vast stores of liquified natural gas to supply allied countries with energy that conventional estimates say is less climate-polluting than coal.
In a statement, Biden framed the pause as a crucial part of his administration’s ambitious climate policy.
“From Day One, my administration has set the United States on an unprecedented course to tackle the climate crisis at home and abroad,” Biden said. “This pause on new LNG approvals sees the climate crisis for what it is: the existential threat of our time.
While the approvals are paused, the Energy Department will study the effect liquified natural gas export terminals could have on domestic and global greenhouse gas emissions. That review will likely last more than a year, almost certainly pushing a final decision until after the presidential election.
Biden also said the pause could be suspended in the case “of unanticipated and immediate national security emergencies.”
Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm joined a call with reporters on Thursday. “As our exports increase,” she said, “we must review export applications using the most comprehensive up-to-date analysis of the economic, environmental and national security considerations.”
Although the United States only began exporting liquified natural gas in 2016, it is now the world’s top exporter of the fossil fuel. And the country’s dominance in the industry is growing. By 2027, a slate of new liquified natural gas facilities
are set to open in North America, including several in the U.S., doubling the continent’s export capacity.
I think it’s fair to say that the Biden administration took many climate experts — a different class than activists, to be clear — by surprise. Liam Denning, a Bloomberg columnist who is no enemy of the green transition, dubbed the pause “clever, clever politics and bad policy.”
The activist case against liquified natural gas turns on an incendiary new analysis by Robert Howarth, a Cornell professor of ecology and environmental biology, that claims exporting natural gas could be significantly worse than coal for the climate. Howarth’s analysis has not been published in a scientific journal, but it has been cited repeatedly by the climate journalist and activist Bill McKibben, who has emerged as perhaps the leading opponent of building the new terminals. Using Howarth’s math, CP2 and other export terminals start to look worse than the Willow pipeline in Alaska that the Biden administration approved last year.
It’s hard to imagine Biden making this decision if the campaign wasn’t freaking out about getting Gen Z and younger Millennials to vote. The president’s polling among young voters has been so abysmal lately that it defied belief at first, and young voters widely oppose how America is handling Israel’s war in the Gaza Strip. This is more than a messaging problem: Young voters have a substantive policy disagreement with the Biden administration about the most salient international issue of the last six months.
The administration seems to be hoping a pause on LNG approvals will help reverse that dismal momentum. Yet doing so will bring its own electoral risks. In November, Heatmap polled roughly 1,000 Americans about key climate issues. While we didn’t ask what Biden should do about natural gas pipelines specifically, we did ask a more wide-ranging question about the recent March to End Fossil Fuels, which drew tens of thousands of demonstrators to New York in September. Protesters demanded, among other things, that Biden suspend or revoke approvals for all new fossil-fuel infrastructure.
Here was our mouthful of a poll question:
In September, more than 50,000 people marched in New York City demanding that the Biden administration and Congress “end fossil fuels.” These activists want the Biden administration to stop all oil exports, block new oil and gas pipelines from being built, and ban any company from drilling on government-owned land. These policies would increase gasoline prices, but some scientists say they are essential to slowing down the dangerous increase in global temperatures. Do you support or oppose the Biden administration and Congress adopting policies aimed at permanently ending the oil, gas, and coal industries?
Respondents were split — and, frankly, confused. Forty-two percent of Americans opposed ending the fossil-fuel industry; 41% supported it. Nearly 20% of Americans said they were unsure what Biden and Congress should do. And while sunsetting the fossil fuel industry won majority support among Democrats and liberal independents, a plurality of moderate independents said they would oppose such a policy. Two-thirds of Republicans rejected it, too.
I will confess that I am not sure that the American public, in practice, is as split on taking aggressive steps to end the fossil-fuel industry as the poll finds. That’s because elsewhere in our poll, we found that 62% of Americans said they supported the federal government “making it easier to drill for fossil fuels and build new fossil fuel pipelines.” Some sizable percentage of voters seemingly want Biden both to support fossil fuels and kill fossil fuels — a logical impossibility.
But the results of the fossil fuel march question become more interesting — and more politically relevant, I think — when you break them out by age group. The young and the old, we found, were divided on the fossil fuel industry. Slightly more than half of adults aged 18 to 34 said Biden and Congress should work to shut it down. But most older adults, defined here as anyone 65 and older, opposed such a move.
When you look deeper beneath the hood, those results get even more complicated. Of the young adults who support ending the fossil-fuel industry, most said they were “somewhat” in support of the idea. But of the older adults who opposed it, a majority were “strongly” against the idea. In other words, the largest share of young people were weakly for ending the fossil-fuel industry, while the largest share of older people were strongly against it.
That poses a dilemma for Biden. While younger and middle-aged adults drive social media discourse and shape media coverage, it is the old who consistently show up to vote. In that way, the fossil-fuel industry is — like the Gaza war — a young/old scissor issue; it divides the electorate along age lines in a way guaranteed to alienate some part of the president’s coalition. (Of course, most older Americans won’t see much of the consequences of greenhouse gas pollution from fossil fuels in their lifetime — but that fact, while ethically relevant, does not have immediate electoral bearing.)
The one grace for the president is that the fossil-fuel issue doesn’t divide Democrats as much, per se; about two-thirds of older Democrats said that they would back a plan to shut down the oil and gas industry. Yet self-identified independents, whom the president must win in November, were more evenly split. There is no easy out.
McKibben has declared provisional victory over the issue. “Joe Biden has just done more than any president before him to check the expansion of dirty energy,” he wrote on X when the first unconfirmed reports broke. “This is the biggest check any president has ever applied to the fossil fuel industry, and the strongest move against dirty energy in American history,” he later elaborated. I will be curious if that message breaks through — it is an endorsement that I think many young voters would be surprised to hear.
Under Biden, Congress has passed the most aggressive climate legislation in U.S. history — not only in the form of the Inflation Reduction Act, with its tax incentives for clean energy, but also the bipartisan infrastructure law, which directed hundreds of billions to public transit and next-generation energy research. Yet instead of celebrating that victory, many climate-concerned young voters — or at least the environmentalist groups that purport to speak for them — spent much of 2023 fixated on the president’s approval of the Willow pipeline. While I’ve never seen a scientific sample, it’s pretty clear that the negative news about Willow broke through among young voters to a far greater extent than the positive news about the IRA, even though the IRA will reduce greenhouse gas emissions far more than the Willow pipeline will increase them.
With the LNG pause, the Biden administration has avoided another Willow “betrayal”-style story among the youngs. But it may also have invited negative coverage from other factions of the press — including business and energy analysts who doubt Howarth’s analyses and remain more equivocal about LNG. This is why this moment is such a test for climate activists: If they cannot generate a positive news cycle for the president at this moment — or rather, if they can’t convince young people that Biden has done something good on climate change — then their utility in the coalition will come into question.
Below all of this lurks a possibility that would be truly toxic for climate politics: that the social media-driven environment in which younger adults marinate can only direct attention to negative stories. What if X, Instagram, and TikTok generate outrage and nihilism far more easily than support and solidarity? That would be dangerous not only for climate politics, but also for the entire progressive agenda, which requires the public — perhaps above all — to believe in the possibility of mutual uplift and civic competency.
Biden is presiding over a country in profound transition, trying to manage and redirect subterranean rivers of history that — much to his campaign’s chagrin — remain well outside his control. The United States is stuck between two regimes, two economies: the fossil-fueled, Middle East-managing policy of old, and the clean, climate-friendlier, Asia-focused policy of the future. Voters are split, too. As much as Biden officials and young people might want to push the economy toward the latter, America keeps getting dragged back toward the former — by its economy, by its electorate, and by events themselves.
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House Republicans have bet that nothing bad will happen to America’s economic position or energy supply. The evidence suggests that’s a big risk.
When President Barack Obama signed the Budget Control Act in August of 2011, he did not do so happily. The bill averted the debt ceiling crisis that had threatened to derail his presidency, but it did so at a high cost: It forced Congress either to agree to big near-term deficit cuts, or to accept strict spending limits over the years to come.
It was, as Bloomberg commentator Conor Sen put it this week, the wrong bill for the wrong moment. It suppressed federal spending as America climbed out of the Great Recession, making the early 2010s economic recovery longer than it would have been otherwise. When Trump came into office, he ended the automatic spending limits — and helped to usher in the best labor market that America has seen since the 1990s.
On Thursday, the Republican majority in the House of Representatives passed their megabill — which is dubbed, for now, the “One Big, Beautiful Bill Act” — through the reconciliation process. They did so happily. But much like Obama’s sequestration, this bill is the wrong one for the wrong moment. It would add $3.3 trillion to the federal deficit over the next 10 years. The bill’s next stop is the Senate, where it could change significantly. But if this bill is enacted, it will jack up America’s energy and environmental risks — for relatively little benefit.
It has become somewhat passé for advocates to talk about climate change, as The New York Times observed this week. “We’re no longer talking about the environment,” Chad Farrell, the founder of Encore Renewable Energy, told the paper. “We’re talking dollars and cents.”
Maybe that’s because saying that something “is bad for the climate” only makes it a more appealing target for national Republicans at the moment, who are still reveling in the frisson of their post-Trump victory. But one day the environment will matter again to Americans — and this bill would, in fact, hurt the environment. It will mark a new chapter in American politics: Once, this country had a comprehensive climate law on the books. Then Trump and Republicans junked it.
The Republican megabill will make climate change worse. Within a year or two, the U.S. will be pumping out half a megaton more carbon pollution per year than it would in a world where the IRA remains on the books, according to energy modelers at Princeton University. Within a decade, it will raise American carbon pollution by a megaton each year. That is a significant increase. For comparison, the United States is responsible for about 5.2 megatons of greenhouse gas pollution each year. No matter what happens, American emissions are likely to fall somewhat between now and 2035 — but, still, we are talking about adding at least an extra year’s worth of emissions over the next decade. (Full disclosure: I co-host a podcast, Shift Key, with Jesse Jenkins, the lead author of that Princeton study.)
What does America get for this increase in air pollution? After all, it’s possible to imagine situations where such a surge could bring economic benefits. In this case, though, we don’t get very much at all. Repealing the tax credits will slash $1 trillion from GDP over the next decade, according to the nonpartisan group Energy Innovation. Texas will be particularly hard hit — it could lose up to $100 billion in energy investment. Across the country, household energy costs will rise 2% to 7% by 2035, on top of any normal market-driven volatility, according to the energy research firm the Rhodium Group. The country will become more reliant on foreign oil imports, yet domestic oil production will budge up by less than 1%.
In other words, in exchange for more pollution, Americans will get less economic growth but higher energy costs. The country’s capital stock will be smaller than it would be otherwise, and Americans will work longer hours, according to the Tax Foundation.
But this numbers-driven approach actually understates the risk of repealing the IRA’s tax credits. The House megabill raises two big risks to the economy, as I see it — risks that are moresignificant than the result of any one energy or economic model.
The first is that this bill — its policy changes and its fiscal impact — will represent a double hit to the capacity of America’s energy system. The Inflation Reduction Act’s energy tax credits were designed to lower pollution and reduce energy costs by bringing more zero-carbon electricity supply onto the U.S. power grid. The law didn’t discriminate about what kind of energy it encouraged — it could be solar, geothermal, or nuclear — as long as it met certain emissions thresholds.
This turned out to be an accidentally well-timed intervention in the U.S. energy supply. The advent of artificial intelligence and a spurt of factory building has meant that, in the past few years, U.S. electricity demand has begun to rise for the first time since the 1990s. At the same time, the country’s ability to build new natural gas plants has come under increasing strain. The IRA’s energy tax credits have helped make this situation slightly less harrowing by providing more incentives to boost electricity supply.
Republicans are now trying to remove these tax bonuses in order to finance tax cuts for high-earning households. But removing the IRA alone won’t pay for the tax credits, so they will also have to borrow trillions of dollars. This is already straining bond markets, driving up interest rates for Americans. Indeed, a U.S. Treasury auction earlier this week saw weak demand for $16 billion in bonds, driving stocks and the dollar down while spiking treasury yields.
Higher interest rates will make it more expensive to build any kind of new power plant. At a moment of maximum stress on the grid, the U.S. is going to pull away tax bonuses for new electricity supply and make it more expensive to do any kind of investment in the power system. This will hit wind, solar, and batteries hard; because renewables don’t have to pay for fuel, their cost variability is largely driven by financing. But higher interest rates will also make it harder to build new natural gas plants. Trump’s trade barriers and tariff chaos will further drive up the cost of new energy investment.
Republicans aren’t totally oblivious to this hazard. The House Natural Resource Committee’s permitting reform proposal could reduce some costs of new energy development and encourage greater power capacity — assuming, that is, that the proposal survives the Senate’s byzantine reconciliation rules. But even then, significant risk exists for runaway energy cost chaos. Over the next three years, America’s liquified natural gas export capacity is set to more than double. Trump officials have assumed that America will simply be able to drill for more natural gas to offset a rise in exports, but what if higher interest rates and tariff charges forbid a rise in capacity? A power price shock is not off the table.
So that’s risk No. 1. The second risk is arguably of greater strategic import. As part of their megabill, House Republicans have stripped virtually every demand-side subsidy for electric vehicles from the bill, including a $7,500 tax credit for personal EV purchases. At the same time, Senate Republicans and the Trump administration have gutted state and federal rules meant to encourage electric vehicle sales.
Republicans have kept, for now, some of the supply-side subsidies for manufacturing EVs and batteries. But without the paired demand-side incentives, American EV sales will fall. (The Princeton energy team projects an up to 40% decline in EV sales nationwide.) This will reduce the economic rationale for much of the current buildout in electric vehicle manufacturing and capacity happening across the country — it could potentially put every new EV and battery factory meant to come online after this year out of the money.
This will weaken the country’s economic competitiveness. Batteries are a strategic energy technology, and they will undergird many of the most important general and military technologies of the next several decades. (If you can make an EV, you can make an autonomous drone.) The Trump administration has realized that the United States and its allies need a durable mineral supply chain that can at least parallel China’s. But they seem unwilling to help any of the industries that will actually usethose minerals.
Does this mean that Republicans will kill America’s electric vehicle industry? Not necessarily. But they will dent its growth, strength, and expansion. They will make it weaker and more vulnerable to external interference. And they will increase the risks that the United States simply gives up on ever understanding battery technology and doubles down on internal combustion vehicles — a technology that, like coal-powered naval ships, is destined to lose.
It is, in other words, risky. But that is par for the course for this bill. It is risky to make the power grid so exposed to natural gas price volatility. It is risky to jack up the federal deficit during peacetime for so little gain. It is risky to cede so much demand for U.S.-sourced critical minerals. It is risky to raise interest rates in an era of higher trade barriers, uncertain supply shocks, and geopolitical instability.
This is what worries me most about the Republican megabill: It takes America’s flawed but fixable energy policy and replaces it with, well, a longshot parlay bet that nothing particularly bad will happen anytime soon. Will the Senate take such a bet? Now we find out.
And more of the week’s top conflicts around renewable energy
1. Worcester County, Massachusetts – The town of Oakham is piping mad about battery energy storage.
2. Worcester County, Maryland – A different drama is going down in a different Worcester County on Maryland’s eastern shore, where fishing communities are rejecting financial compensation from U.S. Wind tied to MarWin, its offshore project.
3. Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania – A Pivot Energy solar project is moving ahead with getting its conditional use permit in the small town of Ransom, but is dealing with considerable consternation from residents next door.
4. Cumberland County, North Carolina – It’s hard out here for a 5-megawatt solar project, apparently.
5. Barren County, Kentucky – Remember the Geenex solar project getting in the fight with a National Park? The county now formally has a restrictive ordinance on solar… that will allow projects to move through permitting.
6. Stark County, Ohio – Stark Solar is no more, thanks to the Ohio Public Siting Board.
7. Cheboygan County, Michigan – A large EDP Renewables solar project called the Northern Waters Solar Park is entering the community relations phase and – stop me if you’ve heard this before – it’s getting grumbles from locals.
8. Adams County, Illinois – A Summit Ridge Energy solar project located near the proposal in the town of Ursa we’ve been covering is moving forward without needing to pay the city taxes, due to the project being just outside city limits.
9. Cottonwood County, Minnesota – National Grid Renewables has paused work on the Plum Creek wind farm despite having received key permits to build, a sign that economic headwinds may be more powerful than your average NIMBY these days.
10. Oklahoma County, Oklahoma – Turns out you can’t kill wind in Oklahoma that easily.
11. Washoe County, Nevada – Trump’s Bureau of Land Management has opened another solar project in the desert up for public comment.
12. Shasta County, California – The California Energy Commission this week held a public hearing on the ConnectGen Fountain Wind project, which we previously told you already has gotten a negative reaction from the panel’s staff.
A conversation with Heather Cooper, a tax attorney at McDermott Will & Emery, about the construction rules in the tax bill.
This week I had the privilege of speaking with Heather Cooper, a tax attorney at McDermott Will & Emery who is consulting with renewables developers on how to handle the likelihood of an Inflation Reduction Act repeal in Congress. As you are probably well aware, the legislation that passed the House earlier this week would all but demolish the IRA’s electricity investment and production tax credits that have supercharged solar and wind development in the U.S., including a sharp cut-off for qualifying that requires beginning construction by a date shortly after the bill’s enactment.
I wanted to talk to Heather about whether there was any way for developers to creatively move forward and qualify for the construction aspect of the credits’ design. Here’s an abridged version of our conversation, which happened shortly after the legislation passed the House Thursday morning.
How would this repeal affect projects that are already in the pipeline?
Projects in the pipeline are likely going to be safe harbored or grandfathered from these repeals, assuming they’ve gone far enough into their development to meet certain tax rules.
For projects that are less far along in the pipeline and haven’t had any outlays or expenditures yet, those developers right now are scrambling and I’ve gotten probably about 100 emails from my clients today asking me questions about what they can do to establish construction has begun on their project.
If they don’t satisfy those construction rules under the tax bill, they will be completely ineligible for the energy generating credits — the investment tax credit and production tax credit. A pretty significant impact.
What are the questions your clients are asking you?
I’m being asked how these credits are being repealed, if there’s any grandfathering, and how it’s impacting transferability. Also, they’re asking if these rules are tied to construction or placing in service or tax years generally. But also, it seems like people are asking what folks need to do to technically begin construction.
How much will this repeal affect fights between developers and opposition? I spoke to an attorney who told me this repeal could empower NIMBYs, for example.
I don’t know if it empowers them as much as NIMBYs will have less to worry about. If these projects are no longer economical, if these are no longer efficient to build, then the projects just won’t get built. NIMBYs and opponents will be happy.
I don’t think anything about the particular structure of the repeal, though, is empowering opponents. It is what it is.
Like, you can begin construction by entering into procurement contracts for equipment to build your facility so if you’re building a project you can enter into a contract today to get modules, warehouse those modules, and then use those modules to cause one or more projects as having begun construction based on when they were purchased.
If a developer today is able to enter into those contracts, that’ll be outside the scope of anything an opponent would have anything to do with.
Are we expecting people to make decisions before the Senate has acted on this bill or are people in a holding pattern?
When the election happened in November I had increased interest in clients who were concerned about a worst-case scenario like this, that credits would be repealed at or around the time of enactment. We had clients betting not that this would happen but [there was still] a 1% chance or a 5% chance. And folks asked then, how do we re-up thinking about how to begin construction on projects as a precautionary measure.
A lot of my clients were thinking about the worst case scenario beforehand. This is probably just escalating their thinking.
I don’t think people have a lot of time to think about what to do, though, given the 60-day cut off after enactment.
What is the silver lining here? Is there any? If I were to talk to a developer right now, is there an on the bright side here?
The short answer is no. Maybe it makes power projects a lot more expensive and American energy a lot more expensive and therefore those building power projects can make more money from their existing projects? That’s whether they’re renewable or otherwise. Other than higher power costs – for consumers, regular old taxpayers – there’s not really a bright side.
So, what you’re saying is, you don’t have any good news?
The good news is the Senate is still out there and needs to review this. There are a few senators who’ve expressed strong support of these credits – I’m not super optimistic, but four senators tend to have a bit more sway than congresspeople do.