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A victory for activists also represents a political gamble for the president.

Perhaps the biggest political test of the climate movement has now arrived.
There are a few ways to think about this. But first, the facts: The Biden administration will temporarily stop approving new liquified natural gas export terminals, allowing the Energy Department to study the effect that they have on the climate, the White House announced on Friday.
The decision is a victory for climate activists, who had demanded President Joe Biden halt the growth of what may be the country’s most important fossil fuel industry. It also throws into question whether some of the biggest pending LNG projects — such as Calcasieu Pass 2, or CP2, a proposed Louisiana terminal that activists have dubbed a “carbon mega bomb” — will ultimately get built.
The pause could also complicate Biden’s foreign policy, which has used America’s status as a major energy supplier to pacify allies and wield economic might. Since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 and throttled gas supplies to Europe, the United States has used its vast stores of liquified natural gas to supply allied countries with energy that conventional estimates say is less climate-polluting than coal.
In a statement, Biden framed the pause as a crucial part of his administration’s ambitious climate policy.
“From Day One, my administration has set the United States on an unprecedented course to tackle the climate crisis at home and abroad,” Biden said. “This pause on new LNG approvals sees the climate crisis for what it is: the existential threat of our time.
While the approvals are paused, the Energy Department will study the effect liquified natural gas export terminals could have on domestic and global greenhouse gas emissions. That review will likely last more than a year, almost certainly pushing a final decision until after the presidential election.
Biden also said the pause could be suspended in the case “of unanticipated and immediate national security emergencies.”
Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm joined a call with reporters on Thursday. “As our exports increase,” she said, “we must review export applications using the most comprehensive up-to-date analysis of the economic, environmental and national security considerations.”
Although the United States only began exporting liquified natural gas in 2016, it is now the world’s top exporter of the fossil fuel. And the country’s dominance in the industry is growing. By 2027, a slate of new liquified natural gas facilities
are set to open in North America, including several in the U.S., doubling the continent’s export capacity.
I think it’s fair to say that the Biden administration took many climate experts — a different class than activists, to be clear — by surprise. Liam Denning, a Bloomberg columnist who is no enemy of the green transition, dubbed the pause “clever, clever politics and bad policy.”
The activist case against liquified natural gas turns on an incendiary new analysis by Robert Howarth, a Cornell professor of ecology and environmental biology, that claims exporting natural gas could be significantly worse than coal for the climate. Howarth’s analysis has not been published in a scientific journal, but it has been cited repeatedly by the climate journalist and activist Bill McKibben, who has emerged as perhaps the leading opponent of building the new terminals. Using Howarth’s math, CP2 and other export terminals start to look worse than the Willow pipeline in Alaska that the Biden administration approved last year.
It’s hard to imagine Biden making this decision if the campaign wasn’t freaking out about getting Gen Z and younger Millennials to vote. The president’s polling among young voters has been so abysmal lately that it defied belief at first, and young voters widely oppose how America is handling Israel’s war in the Gaza Strip. This is more than a messaging problem: Young voters have a substantive policy disagreement with the Biden administration about the most salient international issue of the last six months.
The administration seems to be hoping a pause on LNG approvals will help reverse that dismal momentum. Yet doing so will bring its own electoral risks. In November, Heatmap polled roughly 1,000 Americans about key climate issues. While we didn’t ask what Biden should do about natural gas pipelines specifically, we did ask a more wide-ranging question about the recent March to End Fossil Fuels, which drew tens of thousands of demonstrators to New York in September. Protesters demanded, among other things, that Biden suspend or revoke approvals for all new fossil-fuel infrastructure.
Here was our mouthful of a poll question:
In September, more than 50,000 people marched in New York City demanding that the Biden administration and Congress “end fossil fuels.” These activists want the Biden administration to stop all oil exports, block new oil and gas pipelines from being built, and ban any company from drilling on government-owned land. These policies would increase gasoline prices, but some scientists say they are essential to slowing down the dangerous increase in global temperatures. Do you support or oppose the Biden administration and Congress adopting policies aimed at permanently ending the oil, gas, and coal industries?
Respondents were split — and, frankly, confused. Forty-two percent of Americans opposed ending the fossil-fuel industry; 41% supported it. Nearly 20% of Americans said they were unsure what Biden and Congress should do. And while sunsetting the fossil fuel industry won majority support among Democrats and liberal independents, a plurality of moderate independents said they would oppose such a policy. Two-thirds of Republicans rejected it, too.
I will confess that I am not sure that the American public, in practice, is as split on taking aggressive steps to end the fossil-fuel industry as the poll finds. That’s because elsewhere in our poll, we found that 62% of Americans said they supported the federal government “making it easier to drill for fossil fuels and build new fossil fuel pipelines.” Some sizable percentage of voters seemingly want Biden both to support fossil fuels and kill fossil fuels — a logical impossibility.
But the results of the fossil fuel march question become more interesting — and more politically relevant, I think — when you break them out by age group. The young and the old, we found, were divided on the fossil fuel industry. Slightly more than half of adults aged 18 to 34 said Biden and Congress should work to shut it down. But most older adults, defined here as anyone 65 and older, opposed such a move.
When you look deeper beneath the hood, those results get even more complicated. Of the young adults who support ending the fossil-fuel industry, most said they were “somewhat” in support of the idea. But of the older adults who opposed it, a majority were “strongly” against the idea. In other words, the largest share of young people were weakly for ending the fossil-fuel industry, while the largest share of older people were strongly against it.
That poses a dilemma for Biden. While younger and middle-aged adults drive social media discourse and shape media coverage, it is the old who consistently show up to vote. In that way, the fossil-fuel industry is — like the Gaza war — a young/old scissor issue; it divides the electorate along age lines in a way guaranteed to alienate some part of the president’s coalition. (Of course, most older Americans won’t see much of the consequences of greenhouse gas pollution from fossil fuels in their lifetime — but that fact, while ethically relevant, does not have immediate electoral bearing.)
The one grace for the president is that the fossil-fuel issue doesn’t divide Democrats as much, per se; about two-thirds of older Democrats said that they would back a plan to shut down the oil and gas industry. Yet self-identified independents, whom the president must win in November, were more evenly split. There is no easy out.
McKibben has declared provisional victory over the issue. “Joe Biden has just done more than any president before him to check the expansion of dirty energy,” he wrote on X when the first unconfirmed reports broke. “This is the biggest check any president has ever applied to the fossil fuel industry, and the strongest move against dirty energy in American history,” he later elaborated. I will be curious if that message breaks through — it is an endorsement that I think many young voters would be surprised to hear.
Under Biden, Congress has passed the most aggressive climate legislation in U.S. history — not only in the form of the Inflation Reduction Act, with its tax incentives for clean energy, but also the bipartisan infrastructure law, which directed hundreds of billions to public transit and next-generation energy research. Yet instead of celebrating that victory, many climate-concerned young voters — or at least the environmentalist groups that purport to speak for them — spent much of 2023 fixated on the president’s approval of the Willow pipeline. While I’ve never seen a scientific sample, it’s pretty clear that the negative news about Willow broke through among young voters to a far greater extent than the positive news about the IRA, even though the IRA will reduce greenhouse gas emissions far more than the Willow pipeline will increase them.
With the LNG pause, the Biden administration has avoided another Willow “betrayal”-style story among the youngs. But it may also have invited negative coverage from other factions of the press — including business and energy analysts who doubt Howarth’s analyses and remain more equivocal about LNG. This is why this moment is such a test for climate activists: If they cannot generate a positive news cycle for the president at this moment — or rather, if they can’t convince young people that Biden has done something good on climate change — then their utility in the coalition will come into question.
Below all of this lurks a possibility that would be truly toxic for climate politics: that the social media-driven environment in which younger adults marinate can only direct attention to negative stories. What if X, Instagram, and TikTok generate outrage and nihilism far more easily than support and solidarity? That would be dangerous not only for climate politics, but also for the entire progressive agenda, which requires the public — perhaps above all — to believe in the possibility of mutual uplift and civic competency.
Biden is presiding over a country in profound transition, trying to manage and redirect subterranean rivers of history that — much to his campaign’s chagrin — remain well outside his control. The United States is stuck between two regimes, two economies: the fossil-fueled, Middle East-managing policy of old, and the clean, climate-friendlier, Asia-focused policy of the future. Voters are split, too. As much as Biden officials and young people might want to push the economy toward the latter, America keeps getting dragged back toward the former — by its economy, by its electorate, and by events themselves.
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The Treasury Department released partial guidance for the new “foreign entities of concern” restrictions on clean energy tax credits.
The Treasury Department published long-awaited guidance for claiming the clean energy tax credits on Thursday, ending the state of limbo in which project developers have languished since the One Big Beautiful Bill Act passed last summer. Well, sort of.
Trump’s tax law put new restrictions on many of the clean energy tax credits, limiting eligibility to projects that could prove they had minimal material inputs or oversight from a handful of countries labeled “foreign entities of concern,” i.e. Russia, North Korea, Iran, and, most problematically, China. The problem was that it was hard to suss out exactly how to follow these rules. The Treasury Department would have to provide clarification, or in the parlance of federal tax law, “guidance.” Without this, developers might unintentionally break the rules, get audited, and then owe the government a bunch of money — a risk that financiers are not keen to take.
Now, developers have, shall we say, partial guidance. The FEOC rules have two main components, and a notice published by the IRS Thursday covers one of them.
The guidance clarifies how to calculate the material assistance limits, which ask for proof that a certain percentage of the material inputs to the project did not come from a FEOC-owned or -influenced company. For a solar farm, for example, that includes the photovoltaic cells, the frame, the glass, the sealant, the circuit boards, etc. These limits apply to the clean electricity investment and production tax credits (48E and 45Y), as well as the clean manufacturing credit (45X), and went into effect on January 1 of this year.
The notice the Trump administration published this week demystifies the material assistance math for some project types, but not others. It says the Treasury will be publishing more on this by the end of the year.
Then there are foreign influence and “effective control” restrictions that have to do with the ownership structure of the project. Those apply to any project attempting to claim a tax credit, including carbon capture (45X), nuclear, (45X), and clean fuels (45Z), that started construction as of January 1, 2025. Even though these rules have been in effect for longer, the Treasury has yet to clarify how to follow them. The notice suggests the department will publish this along with the additional information on material assistance.
To be clear, development did not halt or even really slow as a result of this missing guidance, although that may have been starting to change. Many companies were able to avoid the arduous material assistance calculations by starting construction on their projects last year, before the new restrictions went into effect. They were also allowed to use past IRS guidance, including tables breaking out the various components of a project and their relative weights for determining the amount of domestic content in a project, which they could then apply to determine the amount of non-FEOC-produced materials as a temporary solution.
As for the ownership restrictions, “you just err on the side of caution,” David Burton, a partner at the law firm Norton Rose Fulbright, told me.
I spoke to Burton late last night right after he had gotten through reading the new 95-page IRS notice, and he walked me through some of his initial takeaways.
What are the questions that companies had about FEOC prior to this that this document clears up?
It’s pretty specific on how to calculate whether or not you meet the material assistance percentage restriction. So for instance, if you have a repowered project, there was a question of, do you have to apply material assistance to the new stuff you’re adding? Or do you also have to apply it to the old stuff? And the rules clarify, it’s just the new stuff. If you have a solar project that you’re repowering by replacing the modules but you keep the old inverters, the new modules are subject to material assistance, the old inverters are not. So it clarifies that type of thing.
I think there’s going to be a lot of accountants doing spreadsheet work based on these calculations in the notice and the various elections and choices, trying to find the most advantageous path. I think it’s too early to tell if there’s some opportunities that the industry might benefit from, or some landmines that we weren’t anticipating, because there’s just … the calculations, there’s too many of them, they kind of link together, and it’s very complicated. So we need a little more than a couple hours to go through all that.
What do you mean by elections and choices?
You can use the domestic content safe harbor tables, or you can get a certification from a supplier. The notice says that if a supplier gives you a certification that says it’s not a prohibited foreign entity, and it’s not aware of any prohibited foreign entities in its supply chain, you can rely upon that. Or if it gives you a certification that says, I’m not a prohibited foreign entity, but 20% of the supply chain that feeds into my product is, you can rely upon that.
You’re unlikely to get top-to-bottom certifications that totally answer the question, but it is helpful.
We’ve talked in the past about how far up their supply chain companies will need to look to calculate material assistance. Does it answer those questions?
It does provide guidance on those questions, but really only for the technologies that are covered in the domestic content notices. So for instance, fuel cells or combined heat and power: If you’re not wind, solar, storage or some other technology, it doesn’t provide that much help. But it does clarify for wind, solar, and storage how to do the calculation. It provides some guidance for technologies other than wind, solar, and storage, but it’s still going to be pretty hard, I think.
What is still missing from the guidance? What are the open questions that certain projects might still face?
Foreign influence and foreign control, the notice doesn’t cover. For instance, there’s a rule that if 15% of your debt is held by Chinese banks, you don’t get tax credits. The notice doesn’t tell us how to apply that rule — how that applies if one lender transfers to another lender and syndications of debt, all that kind of stuff. It doesn’t even tell us at what level to apply that test. Do you apply it at the project company? Or at the ultimate parent company at the top of the ownership chain? So it gives us none of that.
How often are you running into that with clients?
Every deal where the project began construction after 2024 has that question. Most of the time it really shouldn’t be an issue, but you have to ask, who owns this entity? Who’s on your board? Who has the right to appoint people to your board? We’re starting to write a lot of memos about this stuff, but there’s not a lot of guidance.
How do you deal with that without guidance?
We have a statutory language, so it’s not like no guidance at all. You just err on the side of caution, and you err on the side of it being overbroad, and then you end up asking the parties involved a lot of due diligence questions. And they’re like, really? We have to answer your 1,000 questions here?
Do you think that, based on this guidance, this is workable for companies? This doesn’t seem to be the sort of backdoor way to kill the tax credits that some people initially feared.
I think it’s workable. I think it’s relatively even-handed. I think they are trying to make them administrable. Not easy, not simple — again, full employment for accountants. But at least you can spreadsheet it. It’s better to have to build a complicated spreadsheet than just be like, well, we don’t really know what the rule is, we’re not sure what the path is here.
Representatives Jake Auchincloss and Mark Amodei want to boost “superhot” exploration.
Geothermal is about the only energy topic that Republicans and Democrats can agree on.
“Democrats like clean energy. Republicans like drilling. And everyone likes baseload power that is generated with less than 1% of the land and materials of other renewables,” Massachusetts Representative Jake Auchincloss, a Democrat, told me.
Along with Republican Representative Mark Amodei of Nevada, Auchincloss is introducing the Hot Rock Act on Friday, focusing specifically on “superhot” or “supercritical” geothermal resources, i.e. heat deposits 300 degrees Celsius or above. (Temperatures in large traditional geothermal resources are closer to 240 degrees.)
The bill — of which Heatmap got an exclusive early peek — takes a broad approach to supporting research in the sector, which is currently being explored by startups such as Quaise Energy and Mazama Energy, which in October announced a well at 331 degrees.
There’s superhot rock energy potential in around 13% of North America, modeling by the Clean Air Task Force has found — though that’s mostly around 8 miles below ground. The largest traditional geothermal facility in the U.S. is only about 2.5 miles at its deepest.
But the potential is enormous. “Just 1% of North America’s superhot rock resource has the potential to provide 7.5 terawatts of energy capacity,” CATF said. That’s compared to a little over a terawatt of current capacity.
Auchincloss and Amodei’s bill would direct the Department of Energy to establish “milestone-based research grant programs,” under which organizations that hit goals such as drilling to a specific depth, pressure, or temperature would then earn rewards. It would also instruct the DOE to create a facility “to test, experiment with, and demonstrate hot dry rock geothermal projects,” plus start a workforce training program for the geothermal industry.
Finally, it would grant a categorical exclusion from the National Environmental Policy Act for drilling to explore or confirm geothermal resources, which could turn a process that takes over a year into one that takes just a couple of months.
Geothermal policy is typically a bipartisan activity pursued by senators and House members from the Intermountain West. Auchincloss, however, is a New Englander. He told me that he was introduced to geothermal when he hosted an event in 2022 attended by executives from Quaise, which was born out of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
It turned out the company’s pilot project was in Nevada, and “I saw it was in Mark Amodei’s district. And I saw that Mark is on Natural Resources, which is the other committee of jurisdiction. And so I went up to him on the floor, and I was like, Hey there, you know, there's this company announcing this pilot,” Auchincloss told me.
In a statement, Amodei said that “Nevada has the potential to unlock this resource and lead the nation in reliable, clean energy. From powering rural communities and strengthening critical mineral production to meeting the growing demands of data centers, geothermal energy delivers dependable 24/7 power.”
Auchincloss told me that the bill “started from the simple premise of, How do we promote this technology?” They consulted climate and technology experts before reaching consensus on the milestone-based payments, workforce development, and regulatory relief components.
“I didn't have an ideological bent about the right way to do it,” Auchincloss said.
The bill has won plaudits from a range of industry groups, including the Clean Energy Buyers Association and Quaise itself, as well as environmental and policy organizations focused on technological development, like the Institute for Progress, Third Way, and the Breakthrough Institute.
“Our grassroots volunteers nationwide are eager to see more clean energy options in the United States, and many of them are excited by the promise of reliable, around-the-clock clean power from next-generation geothermal energy,” Jennifer Tyler, VP government affairs at the Citizens' Climate Lobby, said in a statement the lawmakers provided to Heatmap. “The Hot Rock Act takes a positive step toward realizing that promise by making critical investments in research, demonstration, and workforce development that can unlock superhot geothermal resources safely and responsibly.”
With even the Trump administration generally pro-geothermal, Auchincloss told me he’s optimistic about the bill’s prospects. “I expect this could command broad bipartisan support,” he said.
Plus a pre-seed round for a moon tech company from Latvia.
The nuclear headlines just keep stacking up. This week, Inertial Enterprises landed one of the largest Series A rounds I’ve ever seen, making it an instant contender in the race to commercialize fusion energy. Meanwhile, there was a smaller raise for a company aiming to squeeze more juice out of the reactors we already have.
Elsewhere over in Latvia, investors are backing an early stage bid to bring power infrastructure to the moon, while in France, yet another ultra-long-duration battery energy storage company has successfully piloted their tech.
Inertia Enterprises, yet another fusion energy startup, raised an eye-popping $450 million Series A round this week, led by Bessemer Venture Partners with participation from Alphabet’s venture arm GV, among others. Founded in 2024 and officially launched last summer, the company aims to develop a commercial fusion reactor based on the only experiment yet to achieve scientific breakeven, the point at which a fusion reaction generates more energy than it took to initiate it.
This milestone was first reached in 2022 at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s National Ignition Facility, using an approach known as inertial confinement fusion. In this method, powerful lasers fire at a small pellet of fusion fuel, compressing it until the extremely high temperature and pressure cause the atoms inside to fuse and release energy. Annie Kritcher, who leads LLNL’s inertial confinement fusion program, is one of the cofounders of Inertia, alongside Twilio co-founder Jeff Lawson and Stanford professor Mike Dunne, who formerly led a program at the lab to design a power plant based on its approach to fusion.
The Inertia team plans to commercialize LLNL’s breakthrough by developing a new fusion laser system it’s calling Thunderwall, which it says will be 50 times more powerful than any laser of its type to date. Inertia isn’t the only player trying to commercialize laser-driven fusion energy — Xcimer Energy, for example, raised a $100 million Series A in 2024 — but with its recent financing, it’s now by far the best capitalized of the bunch.
As Lawson, the CEO of the new endeavor said in the company’s press release, “Our plan is clear: build on proven science to develop the technology and supply chain required to deliver the world’s highest average power laser, the first fusion target assembly plant, and the first gigawatt, utility-scale fusion power plant to the grid.” Great, but how soon can they do it? The goal, he says, is to “make this real within the next decade.”
In more nuclear news, the startup Alva Energy launched from stealth on Thursday with $33 million in funding and a proposal to squeeze more capacity out of the existing nuclear fleet by retrofitting pressurized-water reactors. The round was led by the venture firm Playground Global.
The startup plans to boost capacity by building new steam turbines and electricity generators adjacent to existing facilities, such that plants can stay online during the upgrade. Then when a plant shuts down for scheduled maintenance, Alva will upgrade its steam generator within the nuclear containment dome. That will allow the system to make 20% to 30% more steam, to be handled by the newly built turbine-generator system.
The company estimates that these retrofits will boost each reactor’s output by 200 megawatts to 300 megawatts. Applied across the dozens of existing facilities that could be similarly upgraded, Alva says this strategy could yield roughly 10 new gigawatts of additional nuclear capacity through the 2030s — the equivalent of building about 10 new large reactors.
Biden’s Department of Energy identified this strategy, known as “uprating”, as capable of adding 2 gigawatts to 8 gigawatts of new capacity to the grid. Alva thinks it can go further. The company promises to manage the entire uprate process from ensuring regulatory compliance to the procurement and installation of new reactor components. The company says its upgrades could be deployed as quickly as gas turbines are today — a five- to six-year timeline — at a comparable cost of around $1 billion per gigawatt.
Deep Space Energy, a Latvian space tech startup, has closed a pre-seed funding round to advance its goal of becoming a commercial supplier of electricity for space missions on the moon, Mars, or even deeper into space where sunlight is scarce. The company is developing power systems that convert heat from the natural decay of radioisotopes — unstable atoms that emit radiation as they decay — into electricity.
While it’s still very early-stage, this tech’s first application will likely be backup power for defense satellites. Long term, Deep Space Energy says it “aims to focus on the moon economy” by powering rovers and other lunar installations, supporting Europe’s goal of increasing its space sovereignty by reducing its reliance on U.S. defense assets such as satellites. While radioisotope generators are already used in some space missions, the company says its system requires five times less fuel than existing designs.
Roughly $400,000 of the funding came from equity investments from the Baltic-focused VC Outlast Fund and a Lithuanian angel investor. The company also secured nearly $700,000 from public contracts and grants from the European Space Agency, the Latvian Government, and a NATO program to accelerate innovation with dual-use potential for both defense and commercial applications.
As I wrote a few weeks ago, Form Energy’s iron-air battery isn’t the only player targeting 100-plus hours of low-cost energy storage. In that piece, I highlighted Noon Energy, a startup that recently demoed its solid-oxide fuel cell system. But there’s another company aiming to compete even more directly with Form by bringing its own iron-air battery to the European market: Ore Energy. And it just completed a grid-connected pilot, something Form has yet to do.
Ore piloted its 100-hour battery at an R&D center in France run by EDF, the state-owned electric utility company. While the company didn’t disclose the battery’s size, it said the pilot demonstrated its ability to discharge energy continuously for about four days while integrating with real-world grid operations. The test was supported by the European Union’s Storage Research Infrastructure Eco-System, which aims to accelerate the development of innovative storage solutions, and builds on the startup’s earlier grid-connected installation at a climate tech testbed in the Netherlands last summer.
Founded in 2023, Ore plans to scale quickly. As Bas Kil, the company’s business development lead, told Latitude Media after its first pilot went live, “We’re not planning to do years and years of pilot-scale [projects]; we believe that our system is now ready for commercial deployment.” According to Latitude, Ore aims to reach 50 gigawatt-hours of storage per year by 2030, an ambitious goal considering its initial grid-connected battery had less than one megawatt-hour of capacity. So far, the company has raised just shy of $30 million to date, compared to Form’s $1.2 billion.
Battery storage manufacturer and virtual power plant operator Sonnen, together with the clean energy financing company Solrite, have launched a Texas-based VPP composed exclusively of home batteries. They’re offering customers a Solrite-owned 60-kilowatt-hour battery for a $20 monthly fee, in exchange for a fixed retail electricity rate of 12 cents per kilowatt-hour — a few cents lower than the market’s average — and the backup power capability inherent to the system. Over 3,000 customers have already enrolled, and the companies are expecting up to 10,000 customers to join by year’s end.
The program is targeting Texans with residential solar who previously sold their excess electricity back to the grid. But now that there’s so much cheap, utility-scale solar available in Texas, electricity retailers simply aren’t as incentivized to offer homeowners favorable rates. This has left many residents with “stranded” solar assets, turning them into what the companies call “solar orphans” in need of a new way to make money on their solar investment. Customers without rooftop solar can participate in the program as well, though they don’t get a catchy moniker.