You’re out of free articles.
Log in
To continue reading, log in to your account.
Create a Free Account
To unlock more free articles, please create a free account.
Sign In or Create an Account.
By continuing, you agree to the Terms of Service and acknowledge our Privacy Policy
Welcome to Heatmap
Thank you for registering with Heatmap. Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our lives, a force reshaping our economy, our politics, and our culture. We hope to be your trusted, friendly, and insightful guide to that transformation. Please enjoy your free articles. You can check your profile here .
subscribe to get Unlimited access
Offer for a Heatmap News Unlimited Access subscription; please note that your subscription will renew automatically unless you cancel prior to renewal. Cancellation takes effect at the end of your current billing period. We will let you know in advance of any price changes. Taxes may apply. Offer terms are subject to change.
Subscribe to get unlimited Access
Hey, you are out of free articles but you are only a few clicks away from full access. Subscribe below and take advantage of our introductory offer.
subscribe to get Unlimited access
Offer for a Heatmap News Unlimited Access subscription; please note that your subscription will renew automatically unless you cancel prior to renewal. Cancellation takes effect at the end of your current billing period. We will let you know in advance of any price changes. Taxes may apply. Offer terms are subject to change.
Create Your Account
Please Enter Your Password
Forgot your password?
Please enter the email address you use for your account so we can send you a link to reset your password:
The little-known subsidy is supercharging U.S. clean energy manufacturing.

This year may forever be remembered as the start of the American clean energy manufacturing boom.
Since the beginning of 2023, companies have announced more than 150 separate investments in new and expanded factories to manufacture solar panels, wind turbines, batteries, and other clean energy technologies in the U.S., for a total pledged outlay of nearly $60 billion, according to tracking by the nonpartisan group E2. And these factories won’t just be assembling the final products. Entire supply chains have arrived on shore.
This is all, of course, due to the Inflation Reduction Act, the historic climate legislation President Biden signed in 2022. The projects announced this year are on top of some 60 announcements made right after the law passed.
But more specifically, these factories are the result of one program in the law that has perhaps not been fully appreciated — the 45X tax credit. The IRA’s X-factor, if I may.
In ecology, scientists refer to animals that have a disproportionate effect on their ecosystem as “keystone species.” Beavers, for example, engineer the landscape around them, creating habitat that allows certain other plants and animals to thrive. If beavers suddenly disappeared, those habitats and the creatures they supported would vanish, too.
Similarly, 45X is the “keystone” of the IRA, according to Harry Godfrey, managing director at Advanced Energy United, an industry association that represents a variety of clean energy companies. This one provision engineers the ecosystems supporting three key technologies — wind, solar, and batteries — by offering tax relief to U.S. manufacturers producing components up and down their supply chains.
The goal is not just to lower the cost of these climate solutions, but also to level the global playing field for American-made goods. Before the end of the year the Treasury Department will propose new guidance on how the 45X tax credit will work — for example, how the government will prevent fraud and abuse of the program — but the basic mechanics established in the IRA have given companies enough confidence to get to work.
The size of the credit companies are eligible for is specific to each manufactured component. Let’s look at how solar panels are made, as an example:
1. At the top of the supply chain are the companies that make polysilicon, the key material that helps transform sunlight into electricity. Those producers will earn $3 per kilogram of polysilicon fabricated in the U.S.
2. Next are the companies that buy polysilicon and turn it into solar wafers, thin slices that are later stacked to produce solar cells. They will receive $12 per square meter of wafer they produce.
3. The solar cell fabricators will receive a refund based on how much electricity their cells are capable of producing, paid out at 4 cents per watt, or $40 per kilowatt.
4. Producers of “polymeric backsheets,” a protective layer applied to the back of the final solar panels, can earn 40 cents per square meter.
5. Finally, companies that assemble the cells into a solar panel and apply the backsheets will get $70 per kilowatt.
Advanced Energy United made a rough estimate of what those five incentives would mean for solar using 2018 manufacturing data. It found that 45X would reduce the cost of a domestically produced solar panel by 41%. “That’s huge to the global competitiveness of this industry,” said Godfrey.
There are additional incentives under 45X not even included in their analysis. The program pays back 10% of the cost of producing the aluminum that goes into the solar panel’s frame and into the inverter that enables it to send power onto the electric grid, for example. Producers of “torque tubes” and “fasteners,” the structural components used to mount solar panels to a field or roof, are also eligible. Inverter manufacturers qualify, as well.
There’s no per-company cap or annual funding limit on the tax credit, and it will be in effect until 2032. But if it succeeds, it could become self-sustaining, encouraging companies to come to the U.S. in the future because that’s where the supply chain and workforce is. “Suddenly you’re shifting the gravity back into the United States,” Godfrey told me.
Proponents of subsidizing a domestic clean energy manufacturing industry tout benefits like job creation, economic development, and improving U.S. energy security and independence. Renewable energy technologies like wind and solar already inherently do this, as they reduce our exposure to the price volatility of oil and gas, as when energy prices spiked around the world in 2022 due to Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Diversifying supply chains and bringing them to the U.S. further insulates the country from being overly dependent on China, which currently controls some 60% of the manufacturing capacity of clean energy technologies. Being so reliant on any one country is risky — and when that country is China, a country with which the U.S. has a longstanding rivalry, the risk is greater still. For instance, China recently restricted exports of graphite, a key mineral for electric vehicles, in retaliation to U.S. export limits on semiconductors.
45X is not the only program in the IRA that encourages domestic production. The consumer tax credit for electric vehicles, for example, which gives car buyers a $7,500 discount on a new EV, only applies to models that were assembled in the U.S., with at least 50% of their battery components made in the country, too. But the IRA creates a push and pull dynamic — 45X provides the push for that consumer-based pull to work.
“In order for these demand side credits to be effective, we need the manufacturing capacity,” Thomas Boylan, regulatory director at the Zero Emissions Transportation Association told me. “Broadly speaking, this is what will make or break the success of some of these other credits.”
Treasury’s upcoming guidance will help clarify exactly which processes and technologies qualify. But unlike some of the IRA’s other programs, where the department has had to contend with big, industry-shaping questions, like how a company can prove it is using clean electricity, the uncertainty around 45X is mostly around small details.
For example, Boylan told me there’s some confusion in the industry about who can claim which aspect of the credit. Can producers of critical minerals claim 45X, or is the credit just for companies who buy the minerals? And if one company is involved in multiple steps of the supply chain, can they claim 45X for each one? There’s also uncertainty about whether only producers of new materials are eligible, or whether, for example, an electric vehicle battery recycling company can claim the credit.
But as evidenced by the investment numbers, companies haven’t exactly been waiting for the guidance to make moves.
Log in
To continue reading, log in to your account.
Create a Free Account
To unlock more free articles, please create a free account.
The data center boom is everywhere you look in U.S. economic and emissions data.
This is an edition of Heatmap Daily, an evening review of the day’s news written by our executive editor. Sign up for it here.
It isn’t exactly a new thought, but I’ve been struck recently by how many trends in America’s economic and environmental data are fundamentally about the data center boom and the return of electricity demand:
First, the Energy Information Administration reported this week that U.S. emissions grew by more than 2% last year, driven by surging electricity demand and an increase in coal-fired generation. What caused that higher power demand? New factories and data centers — as well as record summertime cooling demand.
Second, many of the new factories driving that higher power demand are themselves producing goods that are … let’s say … data center-adjacent. There are the enormous new semiconductor fabs, of course. But Ford and General Motors have also set up new production lines (or repurposed old ones) to manufacture grid-scale batteries to meet power demand.
Third, take a look at the recent U.S. spending on private non-residential construction — in other words, everything American companies are building that is not houses, condos, or apartments.
The construction industry’s spent almost $60 billion on data centers over the past year, which is more than it spent on all other office buildings combined (and more than it spent building warehouses, too). Just a handful of categories — data centers, power plants, electricity infrastructure, and certain kinds of electronics manufacturing — now make up a third of all U.S. private non-residential construction investment. They’ve never made up such a large share of construction spending since data collection began in 2014.
As The New York Times recently noted, the American economy is unusually dependent on the American stock market right now — and the stock market is unusually dependent on artificial intelligence. This week, investors started to balk at the enormous spending hyperscalers are planning to keep building out the AI boom; Alphabet’s shares dropped 8% this week after it boosted its planned 2026 capital expenditure and signaled 2027 will be even bigger. If the data center boom started to slow down in earnest, then more than just that budget will change.
Speaking of which, my colleague Emily Pontecorvo wrote earlier this week about how many businesses are struggling to even estimate their carbon emissions from artificial intelligence. The carbon accounting startup Watershed recently unveiled a new formula to help companies get a sense of their AI-related emissions.
But even that formula is still limited by the amount of data hyperscalers publish — and they don’t publish that much. Google, for instance, is the only AI company that has (laudably) provided estimates of its emissions on a per-prompt basis. Yet no company has published its per-token emissions, or how emissions sync up with particular models or regions.
So Emily asked Google: Why aren’t you — or any other model provider — disclosing this kind of data yet?
The tech company didn’t get back to us until after we’d published Emily’s story. But its response was interesting enough that I wanted to quote some of it here.
The problem is “industry consensus,” Cooper Elsworth, a Google spokesperson, told us. “There is currently very little consensus on how to comprehensively and fairly measure the serving environmental impact of generative AI (such as text generation),” he wrote. “Without standardized, ‘apples-to-apples’ frameworks, it is difficult to compare different providers accurately.”
That’s partly because energy use — and emissions data — can vary from site to site and depend on “custom-built hardware, software compilers, and advanced inference techniques.” And he claimed Google doesn’t always have the measurement hardware in place to provide such specific estimates: “Providing precise, repeatable data requires highly advanced measurement infrastructure,” he said. “For example, software-based energy monitoring tools often suffer from sampling biases. For our study, we had to step away from top-down averages and directly measure actual energy at the physical power supply unit (PSU) level across our deployed fleet. Not all providers have the telemetry or data sets required to benchmark their operations at this level of granularity.”
Read Emily’s story to understand the other reasons why estimating — or even “guesstimating” — AI-related carbon emissions is so challenging.
A conversation with Emma Uridge of the Kansas Health Institute.
This week’s conversation is with Emma Uridge, analyst with the Kansas Health Institute. Uridge spent copious hours analyzing state and local laws on data center development to best understand how policymakers are responding to the potential environmental public health impacts of large AI infrastructure, including power and water. The report, which came out this week, also goes in depth into those health impacts. I reached out to her to discuss what she sees as must-watch territory for our readers on this emerging policy arena.
Our conversation was lightly edited for clarity.
What is actually being done on policy when it comes to data centers — beyond moratoria of course?
So first I’d like to just talk about the point of moratoria. It’s helpful to talk about how these policies emerge in the first place. One area where moratoria are helpful is when a data center is proposed but the county has no approach for how they’d like to potentially regulate them. That’s temporary, most of the time. It lets local governments conduct research on the various impacts and also negotiate community benefits, ones that can mitigate any potential negative impacts — like Lancaster Pennsylvania, which instituted a community benefit agreement that maximized the potential benefits of development while mitigating what large data centers can do. That agreement looked at capping municipal water use at 20,000 gallons per day and requiring 100% clean energy. It had financial penalties for non-compliance. The company also committed $20 million to their local economic development and clean energy fund. There are ways to negotiate with developers.
We also see amendments to existing zoning. Data center proposals are increasingly popping up in rural areas, many of which are unzoned, so there’s no way a county can negotiate unless there’s a moratorium in place.
Other policy solutions include different performance standards or requiring on-site renewable energy, like what Jefferson County, Missouri, looked at. Also setback requirements, mandatory noise buffers, ending by-right zoning.
Where are local governments getting ideas for regulating data centers?
A lot of the technical information comes from developers. That can in cases be seen as a biased source of information. I wouldn’t say there’s a dedicated group providing assistance to local governments when a project is proposed — which is a similar story to wind industry development, where we have only a handful of consultants who provide technical advice. It can be really helpful to get a multi-disciplinary approach to hearing information. It can be helpful to have the utility commission, public health folks, those in academia, as well as the developer.
As of right now, especially in rural areas, local governments have a hard task of balancing pushback while getting the most accurate, evidence-based, neutral information to make decisions. That balance can be contentious.
What is the federal government doing on data center policy? How is the Trump administration approaching it?
A few things there. In the early days, the drive was for AI expansion and to be competitive with foreign adversaries. Now due to the amount of public pushback in red and blue localities and a more cautious approach.
I’m not seeing a lot of actual policy movement at this time.
I know the EPA is looking at the chemicals used in cooling data centers because when that water is cycled through the system, some of it is discharged into the water system, so they’re looking at the Toxic Substances and Control Act for monitoring that.
How much of an impact does this minimal federal role have on industry behavior?
Y’know, this isn’t specific to data centers. This is true for all kinds of large-scale development: there’s a need to require some sort of federal monitoring and regulation.
That’s where I see an emerging role for public health. At the federal level, there could be policy movement towards requiring some sort of environmental monitoring at data centers to make sure they’re operating responsibility. Looking at specific water use relative to water availability and what happens when there’s a time of severe, persistent drought. With air quality too — we’ve seen areas where the grid isn’t as reliable so their diesel generators are kicking on more and affecting air quality for residents.
We’re just not seeing all of that right now. We need corporate disclosure.
What do you see as the most important public health impacts from data center development?
It varies by localities. The most discussed obviously is water usage. One thing I’d note about my conversations with folks enthusiastic around emerging tech is, there are still questions that need to be asked about the capacity of localities to support a data center. Like a small town in Kansas may only be using 40% of their water for their utility needs. If a data center came online, how much of that water goes to the data center?
One area underexplored within the public health discipline is energy poverty and energy security. The ability of a household to meet the needs of everything energy provides in our lives. It’s known we have an aging electric grid but we’re not talking enough about large-scale blackouts when the grid is not sufficient to support some of these new data centers.
Plus more of the week’s big development fights.
1. Laramie County, Wyoming — Meta is fighting the fine it received in the Cheyenne data center water pollution controversy, and the conflict between the tech giant and the city’s small board of public utilities is continuing to spill out into the public.
2. Niagara County, New York — This county just rejected a solar project’s highway work permits in a show of retaliation against the state’s Office of Renewable Energy Siting.
3. Barron County, Wisconsin — The anti-solar protest is the new campaign stop in deep red Wisconsin.
4. Chesapeake, Virginia — A large battery storage project on the Virginia coastline is on the rocks amidst rampant local opposition.
5. Lewis County, West Virginia — West Virginia is now a key battleground in the fight over transmission, as a line spanning all of West Virginia and Maryland — and cutting through Data Center Alley in Virginia — causes compounding consternation.