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Why permitting reform could break the political alliance that produced America’s most significant climate law

The U.S. climate coalition is under serious strain.
The tension has been brought to a head by last month’s debt-ceiling compromise, which enacted a variety of reforms to the National Environmental Policy Act and exempted the long-debated Mountain Valley Pipeline from federal environmental review. While environmental groups have decried the concessions as “a colossal error … that sacrifices the climate,” clean-energy trade groups are praising them “an important down payment on much-needed reforms.” This gulf now threatens to disintegrate the political alliance that, less than a year ago, won the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), its most tangible accomplishment and by far the country’s most significant climate law.
The differences over permitting reform aren’t just a disagreement about tactics. Rather, they reflect fundamental changes within three of the most important factions within the climate coalition — the environmental movement, the clean energy industry, and the Washington-centric group I’ve termed the green growthers. Facing these changes and their implications is critical to preserving the political foundations of federal climate action.
Ever since passage of the IRA unlocked massive fiscal resources for decarbonization, the climate coalition has been split on how best to put that money to work. While nearly everyone recognizes the need to substantially increase the pace at which clean energy infrastructure gets deployed, division centers on the question of permitting reform. To even name the debate is to invoke a factional diagnosis: the view that environmental laws are hobbling decarbonization by preventing clean energy infrastructure from getting built quickly enough — or even at all. This perspective has rapidly gained momentum across a bipartisan community that includes self-styled centrists within the climate coalition.
Permitting reform is unraveling the climate coalition because it reawakens a fundamental, unresolved disagreement over how to decarbonize. Its timing adds to these tensions: bipartisan legislation to curtail national environmental law has arrived, not accidentally, just as the clean energy industry has become most capable of splitting from the broader climate coalition that helped create it.
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The oldest faction in today’s climate coalition, and the most diffuse, is the environmental movement. Its mainstream wing has roots in the principles of preservation, and its largest organizations have spent multiple generations fighting for clean air and water, and ecologically healthy lands and species.
Its environmental justice wing, by contrast, emerged as racial justice activists combined civil-rights and environmental-protection principles to address historically unequal pollution burdens that have concentrated health risks and environmental damages in disempowered communities of color. Only in the last few years, after decades of discoordination, disinterest, and exclusion, have preservationist institutions become more attentive to the legacy of environmental racism. The movement has now coalesced, however incompletely, around a broader and more inclusive environmental vision.
Though preservationist and environmental-justice approaches can still lead to different priorities, the new environmental movement is at its most unified when it opposes fossil fuel production. The movement’s history of civil disobedience and legal combat have taught it to keep fossil fuels in its crosshairs — not only because of the social and environmental harm fossil fuel projects cause, but also because fights against fossil fuels mobilize the public, clarify the stakes, and yield tangible improvements for local communities and environments.
Though both wings of the environmental movement fought hard for the IRA, the law does almost nothing to directly constrain fossil fuel production. Instead, the IRA largely aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions not by preventing those emissions, but rather by boosting the production and use of low-carbon energy — along with generous subsidies for storing carbon dioxide, often in conjunction with oil production or fossil fuel combustion. Accordingly, the environmental movement has redoubled its efforts to pair the law’s clean energy subsidies with new fossil fuel restrictions.
The environmental movement’s discomfort with a subsidies-only approach to decarbonization is probably better known than the shifting politics of the clean energy industry. As the new environmental movement has coalesced, clean energy has matured into a fully-fledged industry, both in the U.S. and around the world. Until the past few years, the nascent clean energy industry wielded little political muscle, depending instead on the political support and lobbying assistance of environmental groups. Not that long ago, renewable energy was more expensive, less familiar to regulators, and supported by fewer subsidies than fossil energy systems. As a result, clean energy companies depended heavily on the environmental movement’s political support to survive and grow.
Over the past half a decade, technological progress and policy victories achieved in coalition with the environmental movement have vaulted key technologies like wind, solar, and batteries into commercial maturity. Those gains are now locked in. The IRA provides at least 10 years of new federal clean energy tax credits, ending the boom-and-bust cycle of short-term extensions that held the clean energy industry together for most of the previous two decades. With falling costs and fiscal tailwinds, the clean energy industry no longer relies on the environmental movement’s lobbying muscle for commercial success.
The clean energy industry’s maturation has led to more profound differences with the environmental movement that eclipse a simple re-alignment in relative power. As the clean energy industry has grown, it has come to share the fossil energy industry’s preference for more permissive regulatory regimes and fewer environmental protections. In the pre-commercial era, climate-conscious jurisdictions like California drove clean energy development through supportive environmental policy. In recent years, though, the clean energy industry has grown faster and profited more in places like Texas, and for the same reason the fossil fuel industry has: because Texas offers open markets and few restrictions on energy development. As the clean energy industry’s policy priorities have shifted, its growing lobbying apparatus has followed suit, leading groups like the American Clean Power Association to collaborate with fossil fuel companies in pursuit of environmental deregulation.
Activists and policymakers focused on rapid, massive clean energy development make up a third critical faction of the national climate movement. Many in this group work in and around the Biden administration and have come to the climate fight not from the environmental movement, but from other areas such as industrial policy, national defense, some strands of organized labor, and electoral politics. They have brought their prior priorities — job creation, domestic manufacturing, and stable energy prices — to their climate politics. In the wake of the IRA, they remain focused on lowering the remaining barriers to rapid clean energy development.
These often center-left climate actors have only cohered into a distinct faction in the past five years, as enthusiasm for so-called “supply-side progressivism” has given them a common language with which to articulate a set of climate solutions founded on proactive government support for private reindustrialization. For some green growthers, deregulation is a necessary precondition to decarbonization, and since many also believe that clean energy will — with the IRA’s help — outcompete fossil fuels, they see fewer risks to reforming environmental law than the environmental movement does.
In part, the conflict over permitting reform has grown bitter because the term gets used to refer to many different policy proposals. Depending on the speaker and the audience, it can mean sweeping changes to how environmental laws govern new infrastructure projects; tailored tweaks to environmental review; more resources to strengthen administrative capacity and expedite permitting reviews; or changes to the process for building transmission lines and connecting power plants to the grid. This tangle of meanings has undermined the climate coalition’s ability to negotiate its internal differences and prioritize consensus solutions to the challenge of rapid clean-energy development.
More fundamentally, though, the environmental movement, the clean energy industry, and the green growthers are clashing over permitting reform because it has forced them to confront their ongoing disagreement about how to achieve decarbonization.
To many in the environmental movement, and especially on the climate left, most permitting reform proposals double down on what they see as a worrying tenet of the IRA: its dependence on competition and market dynamics to slash fossil fuel production. The environmental movement is familiar from long experience with this kind of market thinking, which promises that present development and the damage it entails will eventually unlock future benefits. As the environmental movement as a whole has become more concerned with historical pollution burdens, that bargain looks worse, and less trustworthy, than ever.
Many permitting reform proposals, including the newly-enacted language of the debt-ceiling deal, exacerbate these concerns by targeting the environmental movement’s oldest and most effective legal tools for defeating fossil fuel projects. At the same time, these proposals still omit any of the constraints on fossil fuels that the environmental movement believes necessary for decarbonization.
The environmental movement has responded with deployment-focused proposals of its own that aim to speed clean energy development without weakening environmental law. However, even the most straightforward of these proposals — such as appointing a fifth commissioner to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission — have repeatedly been deprioritized by clean-energy groups and green growthers. In the wake of the debt ceiling deal, which included none of the environmental movement’s reform priorities but substantially weakened environmental review, the movement is mobilized and angry.
To the green growthers, by contrast, rapid decarbonization cannot happen without permitting reform. According to the IRA’s market-decarbonization logic, the best and most politically plausible way to drive fossil fuels out of American energy markets is to displace them with cheaper and more abundant clean energy. At the same time, events such as the gas-price shock of 2021 — and its damage to Biden’s popularity — has reinforced their existing belief that suppressing fossil fuel extraction without first creating massive new clean energy production will risk serious political backlash. This theory of change has led green growthers to be simultaneously sympathetic to the clean energy industry’s deregulatory wishlist, and skeptical of the environmental movement’s focus on constraining fossil fuel production.
These factions’ divergent theories of decarbonization have offered a wedge to those within the climate coalition who believe rapid, effective clean energy development has become incompatible with rigorous environmental and social protections. Anti-coalitional voices, especially within portions of the clean energy industry, increasingly see permitting reform as an opportunity to split the climate coalition, excising the environmental movement from the climate coalition and creating a new, climate-inflected industrial alliance.
Most green growthers understand that such a split would deprive the existing coalition of its popular wing at a critical moment, threatening the political viability of climate progress. Though the growthers believe that the IRA’s clean-energy manufacturing boom will build a powerful new political coalition in favor of decarbonization, that coalition does not yet exist.
Environmental protection, by contrast, is extremely popular across America today, and the environmental movement has repeatedly proven its ability to mobilize public support. Though the clean energy industry no longer needs the environmental movement’s political muscle to turn a profit, the climate coalition as a whole may struggle to maintain political support for decarbonization without it, especially as climate change destabilizes the country’s energy systems and the right continues to oppose rapid decarbonization.
To understand why, you don’t need to look farther than Texas, which is something of a proving ground for the three factions’ competing beliefs about how deregulation may shape decarbonization.
In recent years, Texas provided strong evidence for the clean energy industry’s assertions that, whatever the environmental and social costs, less regulation can speed the deployment of renewable energy. It likewise bolstered green growthers’ claims that cheap, plentiful renewables can displace fossil energy.
But suddenly, Texas is also proving the environmental movement’s counter-argument. The state’s legislature has just created a new set of generous rules and tax subsidies that support new gas-fired power plants while hampering clean energy development. Though state lawmakers are transparently motivated by gas-industry lobbying and culture-war fixations, they have justified the legislation by arguing that Texas’ increasingly unreliable grid needs more gas plants to keep the lights on.
Such claims, however dishonest, will only grow more plausible to many voters as climate-exacerbated disasters and the energy transition itself strain infrastructural systems in the years to come. Without permitting structures or robust state environmental laws, Texan climate activists are ill-equipped to fight a possible new wave of gas plants, and Texas’ future decarbonization is now in peril.
Whereas last year, Texas’ clean energy boom seemed likely to continue driving fossil fuels out of the market and emissions down, now Texas’ new IRA-style subsidies and weak environmental protections look more likely to leave the state with more energy production of all kinds. Though Texas will continue to add clean energy, its decarbonization remains in doubt.
Permitting reform is threatening the national climate coalition because it cuts to the heart of a longstanding philosophical disagreement about what it will take to actually achieve decarbonization. It has arrived as the climate coalition’s major factions are transforming in ways that themselves sharpen the conflict. Good-faith advocates of decarbonization in all camps should be concerned that, in the wake of the debt-ceiling deal, a new round of fractious permitting-reform fights will split the climate coalition into separate camps with irreconcilable theories of climate action.
The result, though ideologically purifying, would be politically disastrous.
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The fundraise comes on the heels of a $50 million grant from the Department of Energy.
Almost all lithium-ion batteries on the market rely on graphite for their anodes, more than 90% of which is processed in China. That concentration has created a chokepoint in the Pentagon’s supply chain as the military increasingly turns to batteries to help its transportation network operate more quietly and reduce reliance on complex refueling logistics.
So when Congress passed the latest National Defense Authorization Act at the end of 2025, barring Chinese-linked battery materials from military use starting in 2028, Coreshell saw an opening. While the California-based silicon-anode battery startup had previously focused on automakers as its beachhead customers, it’s now shipping its first battery cells to the military for use on Navy ships and Army ground vehicles. On Wednesday, Coreshell announced a $30 million Series B to scale up manufacturing operations to meet the needs of this growing customer base.
“We’re entering a new stage where we’re no longer, I would say, demand limited,” Coreshell’s CEO Jonathan Tan told me. “This year we’ve had to put on second and third shifts, work nights and weekends, just to get the product out the door.”
Coreshell sets itself apart by going a step further than the NDAA requires. The law doesn’t make suppliers trace battery materials all the way back to the mine, which would be exceedingly difficult given China’s dominance across the battery supply chain. But Coreshell has nevertheless eliminated Chinese sourcing from its anodes by replacing graphite with silicon mined and refined in the U.S. by Ferroglobe, one of its Series A investors.
Ferroglobe and global investment firm Access Industries led the latest round, with defense contractor ADS also joining as a new strategic investor. The financing comes on the heels of a $50 million Department of Energy grant that Coreshell secured in August as part of a program to strengthen the domestic battery supply chain. That funding will support the company’s first commercial-scale facility, a 2-gigawatt-hour factory.
That’s about 20 times the size of the 100-ish-megawatt-hour plant the startup had originally envisioned, as the DOE grant has allowed Coreshell to “expand much further than we were originally expecting,” according to Tan. The company is now evaluating several potential U.S. sites and expects to announce its selection early next year. For now, it relies on unnamed contract manufactures, along with its small pilot line in San Leandro, to produce its cells. But once the gigafactory gets up and running, the startup plans to bring electrode production in house by 2028, followed by full cell assembly in 2029.
Building this plant will ultimately require significant additional capital. But Tan believes this latest vote of confidence from the federal government will help Coreshell to diversify its capital stack as it continues to fundraise. “That’s one of the great things about having such a notable DOE award is that it also allows us to attract multiple forms of capital,” he told me.
Silicon has long been recognized as a promising alternative material for battery anodes, as it can store far more energy than graphite. The catch is that it tends to swell during charging, causing it to break down quickly and ultimately leading to a much shorter cycle life. Coreshell says it’s extended its anode’s lifespan by giving it a proprietary coating, which Tan told me back in April essentially means “painting the inside of your battery” with an ultra-thin protective layer.
Other companies, such as Sila Nanotechnologies and Group14 Technologies, are also working to commercialize silicon anodes. But Coreshell says many of its competitors rely on more highly engineered, expensive forms of silicon, such as silane gas. By contrast, Coreshell uses metallurgical silicon, a cheap, raw commodity already widely used in aluminum alloys. That, Tan argues, gives the company a cost advantage not only over its competitors, but potentially Chinese graphite too.
Coreshell hasn’t yet demonstrated that its cells can meet the performance demands of the automotive industry, however. When the company raised its Series A in early 2025, it said it expected its automotive cells to exceed 1,000 charge cycles while retaining 80% of their original capacity. But Tan told me many defense applications don’t require such demanding performance targets, as Navy ships and ground vehicles are “not intending to have as many miles or missions or use cases on that same battery” as a consumer EV would.
That doesn’t mean the company is abandoning its automotive ambitions. As Tan pointed out, electric vehicles remain by far the largest source of global and domestic battery demand. “It’s natural for us to obviously utilize the security supply chain first,” he told me. “That allowed us to really get to commercialization, revenue, and production faster, because automotive qualification is this longer journey. But ultimately, we want to do both of those and more.”
Current conditions: A large storm is roaring across the Northeast that will shower Michigan and Upstate New York with rain and snow by tomorrow • AccuWeather declared an early end to the 2026 Atlantic hurricane season, which saw 10 named storms and only one hurricane in October, breaking a 121-year record for the latest first hurricane • It’s a mild, cloudy day at the Rethondes Clearing in France’s Forest of Compiègne, where the armistice that ended World War I was signed 108 years ago today.
Inflation is ticking up again, and faster than expected. That’s my colleague Matthew Zeitlin’s read on the latest numbers from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Preliminary data from Heatmap and MIT’s Electricity Price Hub shows that electricity prices in particular spiked nearly 8% to 19.9 cents per kilowatt-hour in October from 18.5 cents in the same month last year. But that’s largely due to a change in the timing of a bill credit in California. Without that, the year over year price jump was just under 4%.

Ontario Power Generation, the state-owned utility in Canada’s most populous province, admitted in a public filing Wednesday that its megaproject to build the first small modular reactor in the rich world is costing a lot more than planned. The company is constructing the world’s first BWRX-300, the flagship reactor from GE Vernova Hitachi Nuclear Energy, at its Darlington plant. The project is an attempt to revive construction of atomic power stations in North America, Europe, and Japan by building the inevitably costly first-of-a-kind unit that can then be replicated at what the developers say will be a decreasing price. Using billions in Canadian ratepayers’ money to essentially de-risk an American-Japanese technology ruffled some feathers among the country’s nuclear boosters, who told me last month they want to see Ottawa approve construction of more of the Canucks’ homegrown reactor. In its latest earnings report, OPG said the BWRX-300, known as DNNP Unit 1, “is no longer expected to achieve the previously disclosed commercial operation date target of October 2030 or be completed with the previously disclosed estimated cost of $7.7 billion.”
Amid a flurry of funding cuts in the early days of the current Trump administration, the Department of Energy canceled an $87 million grant to the green cement startup Sublime Systems. In response, the company sued for damages. This week, the Somerville, Massachusetts-based firm filed legal documents accusing the agency of “refusing to comply with its basic discovery obligations and the schedule” for the case.
“The government has repeatedly delayed responding to Sublime’s discovery requests, and now the government is refusing to even meet and confer with Sublime until some indefinite date in the future,” read the joint status report filed with the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. “The upshot is that, as of today, the government has not produced a single document in response to Sublime’s requests for production (served nearly two months ago), it has provided no timeline by which productions will be completed, and it is refusing to search for core documents related to the May 2025 mass termination at the heart of this case.”
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The Energy Department’s Office of Energy Dominance Financing, formerly the Loan Programs Office, closed a $480 million loan for a Texas-based company’s effort to modernize and boost production from 22 offshore oil and gas platforms in the Gulf of Mexico. Arena Energy, the Woodlands, Texas-based company behind the initiative dubbed Project Elkhorn, said that the initiative will add 38,600 barrels of oil per day and up to 77 million cubic feet of natural gas per day to U.S. energy output.
“The United States is the world’s largest producer and exporter of oil and natural gas, and thanks to President Trump, American energy production will continue to grow,” Secretary of Energy Chris Wright said in a statement. “By providing financing for projects like Project Elkhorn, the Energy Department is expanding domestic production and strengthening our energy security to power American prosperity for decades to come.”
QuantumScape emerged years ago as the frontrunner in the race to commercialize solid-state batteries that last longer, charge more quickly, and function better under harsh conditions than liquid-based lithium-ion packs. On Wednesday, the San Jose, California-based startup unveiled what it called in a press release its “next-generation open platform for all-solid-state batteries.” Dubbed Osprey, the cells “deliver the world’s first public data demonstrating a sulfide-based cathode cycling 1,000 times under just one atmosphere of pressure.” In other words: “an unmatched capability that is necessary for automotive solid-state batteries.”
“Osprey is a next-generation platform that is built on our same core technology, the ceramic separator and anode-free design,” Siva Sivaram, QuantumScape’s chief executive, told me in an email last night. “It will allow us to provide the unique benefits of our ceramic separator to developers of all-solid-state batteries using sulfide-based cathodes.” The company plans to start mass producing its cells in 2028, he said.
Bill Gates boasts that he has committed more of his fortune to fighting climate change than virtually any other rich man in the world. But a new investigation by ProPublica found that he’s ramped up his investments in a landfill company, Republic Services, that spews millions of tons of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. “It seems very likely that Bill Gates has the power to influence Republic’s behavior to make it more climate-friendly, even if that costs the company profits,” Ann Lipton, a legal scholar who studies corporate governance at the University of Colorado, Boulder, told the outlet.
One of the bill’s Democratic co-authors speaks about the bill’s outlook in Congress, what it means for clean energy and data centers, and why the president it helps most won’t take office until 2029.
The bipartisan permitting reform bill took a big step toward becoming law last night, when more than 70 senators voted to advance it past a key procedural hurdle.
About 12 hours later, I sat down at a Heatmap breakfast event in Washington, D.C. with one of its Democratic coauthors: Senator Martin Heinrich of New Mexico.
Heinrich and I have spoken about permitting and power lines repeatedly over the past year, but what were once niche issues in the space — such as when and whether a president can revoke an energy project’s permits — have turned into major disagreements within and between environmental groups, the clean energy industry, and liberal lawmakers.
At the same time, Heinrich is on the verge of a major climate policy victory with the bill, which would finally create a one-stop shop for large-scale power line approvals in the federal government. The bill would put transmission lines, which can carry zero-carbon electricity, on a more equal footing with natural gas pipelines, which already enjoy fast-track federal approval.
“My goal here is to take the politics out of permitting,” Heinrich told me at the event. “If you’ve done everything right — and you get your final permit to actually construct — you should be able to take that to the bank.”
We discussed the bill path to passage and his replies to some of critics’ biggest arguments against the bill, including whether it will push data centers to build more behind-the-meter natural gas power plants. We also discussed whether Congress should restore the wind and solar tax credits, how this bill was informed by the Biden administration’s struggles, and why Heinrich believes lawmakers should take this deal, now, even though some of his colleagues have urged waiting until the new Congress starts in January.
This conversation has been edited for readability and concision.
How are you feeling? And how are you feeling about the number last night?
Seventy-three is a great number. It suggests we’re on track to get this done. And I think we just need to be patient and let the process play out.
We were talking in the green room a little bit. I think one of the things that worries me about today’s politics is that we’re having this really substantive discussion here, and with members, with the House and Senate back and forth, which is super healthy, and that hasn’t really happened often enough in recent years. And then there’s the algorithmic, online, like, light-everyone’s-hair-on-fire [conversation]. Those two things are completely divergent streams, and they make me worry about democracy as a whole.
Not to mention the fact that we need to be able to build big things in this country, and that’s what this legislation represents. How do you actually deliver on the affordability question that was central to the election we just had? How do we make sure that our country competes in the world? All of those things. But the gap between those two conversations is something that we have to solve for in the politics of today. And there were people who should have been with us [last night] who weren’t, and I think it’s indicative of that gap.
As someone who’s been reporting on the bill, and knows the policy, and knows, for instance, where the fault lines in the policy are, it has been striking how much the social media discussion of the bill has been focused on creating sufficiently plausible lies that go just viral enough to poison the politics. And make it so you can’t even talk about the bill, because, why would you ever even consider such a horrible thing?
It’s been interesting — I’ve got a 23-year-old who’s in graduate school in New Mexico, and he has a really good sense of who I am and what I care about. For him to see protests on his campus, or protests on the overpass in Albuquerque — and how divergent that is from the goals of this legislation — those conversations have been really interesting. I think if I wasn’t so comfortable in what I actually care about, and what I want to get done in my time in Washington, D.C. — which like, this is not my identity, it’s a path to making a change. I think it would be really hard to do this if I weren’t so comfortable in what we need to do on this issue.
In the run-up to last night’s vote, there were a number of endorsements of the bill or the motion to proceed. What was the biggest whip victory for you or Senator Whitehouse?
When you hit above 70, your caucus is taking your work very seriously, and given the attempts to poison the well early on, I was just very encouraged by the fact that in our caucus — we had a caucus meeting over the weekend on this, and then we obviously had the vote last night — there’s a certain implicit trust in a number over 70.
People want to get to yes. They understand that at the end of the day, the American people really do want us to make life cheaper. Like, this election is not a mandate, it’s a job interview, right? And if we can’t deliver on it, and we can’t do the things that make people’s lives better, we’re gonna — it’s going to be very fleeting.
The outside assessments of the bill report numbers anywhere from power grid cost savings in the hundreds of billions to single-digit percentage reductions of power bills in a decade or so. Do you feel like those estimates capture the benefits of the bill, or are the benefits largely unquantifiable?
No, I think they’re quantifiable. I think the emissions reductions are quantifiable.
I think if all we did in this bill was the data center provision, that says you can’t keep exporting your costs onto customers, you actually have to pay your own freight — and that’s not something that the data center developers are all aghast at, I blame some of the utilities for passing those costs along to customers. That’s outrageous. Just because you can ratebase things doesn’t mean you should ratebase things, and the public is fucking pissed off, and they should be — but if all we did is transfer that $35 billion from data center developers into the pockets of consumers, I would be enthusiastic about this bill.
But we do a whole lot more than that, right? There’s almost no conversation right now about the value of virtual power plants and distributed energy resources, and all the changes in leasing for geothermal. There are things that I’ve been working on my entire career that we couldn’t get — well, we still, I guess, haven’t gotten — the public to focus on. But if we can get them done, it really opens up a future for the power grid that looks so different from the power grid I grew up with. I grew up around the kitchen table with an IBEW dad, and we would talk about the power grid all the time. And it was a one-way deal. You had a dam or a coal-fired power plant, and then [electricity] would go out across the big wires, and then it would get into the little wires, and then people in homes and businesses would consume that power. We’re now talking about a two-way power grid that is so much more complicated and efficient than that, and that’s what’s getting lost in this conversation. But it’s also what I’m really excited about.
Let’s talk about the criticism of the bill. You mentioned the data center ratepayer protection policies, which we’ve covered at Heatmap. They are quite substantive. I have begun to hear a concern that they are so substantive that they’ll push data centers even further away from using the grid — that they’ll push data center developers to be like, Oh, this is raising the cost of power, I’m going to build more offsite gas than I would.
I don’t know a single hyperscaler who’s saying that, and we’ve had all these conversations about off-grid behind-the-meter generation. It is so much more expensive. It is so much more difficult to operate and maintain. It’s insane to build a data center that is not connected to the grid. Like, these people now talking about repurposing airplane engines to run data centers — that’s nuts. If you want to put the cost of maintaining that kind of operation, go for it, because it’s going to fail.
It makes sense to have stuff connected to the grid because you don’t have to pay the full freight of the worst day of the entire year, and spread that over the rest of the year. That’s why we have a grid. I just don’t see that as a viable business plan for anyone.
This bill makes it easier to build federal infrastructure projects. I’ve seen people say, ‘Look, if we do this now, then the president gets two years to build whatever he wants, and that includes ICE detention centers.’
No. We have walked through the legal cases in places like New Jersey to make sure that we’re not facilitating that.
I don’t think this bill will measurably change what this president can accomplish because it’s going to take multiple years … Like right now, it takes two decades to build a really important interregional transmission line. It’s still going to take five years after this bill. This is not some magic wand. It’s way better. It makes us much more competitive against China and our near-peer competitors around the globe. But you’re still going to take multiple years to do an [Environmental Impact Statement]. So this is not going to impact this president measurably one way or the other.
But it is going to measurably impact the next president. And I can tell you, as someone who was around for the Biden administration, we passed incredible legislation. The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and the [Inflation Reduction Act] were huge lifts in terms of legislation. But the president of the United States could not deliver on those promises because the permitting regime was a 10-year-plus regime. So even though he had all the funding you could imagine, and you had [the Department of Energy] and the Department of Interior all lined up, President Biden could not deliver on those promises in a time frame that the American people could appreciate.
Is that because of procedure or because of staffing? Because some people have responded to this bill by saying, ‘Well, we know we have to staff up these agencies, and this bill doesn’t do that.’ If Biden had been able to staff those agencies, would they have been able to move a lot faster?
They would have been able to move measurably faster, yeah, but it would not be sufficient. I’m all for restaffing those agencies. We authorize a lot more funding for things like Tribal and state historic preservation officers in this legislation, but it wouldn’t have been sufficient. It just wouldn’t have.
And you look at — I mean, the fact on SunZia, which, you’re as educated on that transmission line as anybody I’ve met in the press. It took, what, 17 years [to permit]? That’s one of the best projects that I’ve ever interacted with. It was 3.6 gigawatts of clean power. They did a great job of doing mitigation. They bought property that had enormous environmental value in my state. They engaged with stakeholders as well as any developer I’ve ever seen, like 17 to 18 years [to permit it]? That’s nuts. We can’t iterate on that kind of a timescale. I mean, John Podesta came back into the White House under the Biden administration and was like, ‘Didn’t we do this? I thought we already did this.’ It took two records of decision. That’s just not a recipe for success.
You mentioned [Biden’s former climate adviser] John Podesta. We reported on comments he made saying this bill would not allow a president to reverse a permit that had been granted illegally.
No, that’s not true. If you don’t follow the law, the permit can be overturned. So first and foremost, you have to have fidelity to the actual underlying statute. So if you violate the Mineral Leasing Act, or you violate some other statute that determines how you get that permit, you’re done. That’s real jeopardy.
Second, you can overturn anything up to the final permit. So if there’s a lease along the way, the next administration can overturn that.
But if you’ve done everything right — and you get your final permit to actually construct — you should be able to take that to the bank. In what world can you do everything right and then you get a legal right to proceed, and anybody, for politics, can pull that out? I know that some in the environmental space think that it should be that way, and we should be able to ping-pong back and forth between Trump and Biden. My goal here is to take the politics out of permitting. So if you do everything right — by the book and by the law — at the end of the day, if you get your permit, you can actually take that to the bank.
One of the big arguments for this bill was this permitting certainty provision. Ending the back-and-forth, and making it so a future president couldn’t do what Trump has done to wind energy. It’s been interesting watching the politics of this bill develop, though, because what’s become clear is — as you just hinted — not everyone actually wants permitting certainty.
No, and it cuts both ways. That is both a positive, depending on your perspective … and if your business model is litigating projects, it’s going to be harder. You can still litigate, but you can’t wait six years to do it.
I have heard folks say, ‘Look, it’s a big bill. It’s 400-something pages. It makes changes to NEPA and the National Historic Preservation Act. It makes changes to the Clean Water Act. The Supreme Court is controlled by conservatives at the moment, and they have been willing to improvise with big new doctrines such as the major questions doctrine. How can we be sure — and how can you be sure — that you’re not writing traps into these laws that courts will come along and use in the future?’ Republican judges may not agree with your aims, but they’ll be able to say, ‘Look at this recent and specific law, it lets presidents do X.’
We need to be able to legislate. I think the more we actually assert our political potential and mandate in legislation, the more we take power from the Supreme Court and from the judiciary in general. I think we need to be very careful and specific about our language. But the more you can’t get things done in Congress, the more power just sort of shifts over to the judiciary and to the administration. We need to claw that back, and we need to show that America can do stuff, that we can build big things again.
And to the extent that we’re not willing to do that, that power is going to shift to other places, and I’m not comfortable with that. I don’t think that’s good for democracy. I don’t think it’s good for our country. I don’t think it’s good for building things. We need to get [a project] to yes, or if it’s going to fail, if it’s a bad project, fail fast. Move on and to the right. This is not about greenlighting bad projects. It’s honestly about getting the projects into the right places.
What’s something you’re excited about in the bill that you feel like hasn’t been discovered yet?
Virtual power plants. I mean, I hate the term “virtual power plants” because they’re not virtual; they’re real. If you’ve got a gigawatt that you can you can contract with someone to say, ‘Hey, when I need this power, it’s there,’ and they can produce on that based on whether they like turn off half the lights in in a Walmart, or tap into the batteries in a bunch of electric vehicles, that is real power, and it has enormous value to the grid.
I know how conservative utility culture is, because I grew up in utility culture. I saw it every day in those conversations with my dad around the dinner table — but that is real demonstrable technology that we all know works at this point, and yet most of the utilities in the country have not embraced it. So if we get this done, we’ll be able to respond to the wholesale markets and [they] can’t be blocked, that’s a huge change.
One of the interesting things about this midterm is that almost all the incoming Democrats, I think certainly in the Senate, have pledged to restore the solar and wind tax credits. Have you done any work on what this bill would mean if those tax credits were back on the books?
I think we need to have a really robust discussion around that. I say that from the point of view that, we don’t have the [tax credits] right now, and yet we have tons of viable projects in wind and solar. So what that says to me is, maybe that money is more valuable someplace else.
We’re doing a really good job in this country of decarbonizing the electric generation sector with wind, solar, and batteries. I think we’ve won that battle, and if we have a level playing field, which is what this bill is all about, we’re going to decarbonize the power sector. We have not decarbonized the transportation sector. We have not decarbonized the industrial sector, which is dependent on, in many cases, chemical processes.
The question for me is not, do I want the wind sector, or the solar sector to move faster? I think if we get out of the way, they’ll move faster. The question is, would those dollars be more valuable in another sector of the economy?
Because when I look around back home, we are in the new normal. We’re in the part of climate change that I didn’t think would happen in my lifetime. In New Mexico, we’ve been the driest we’ve ever been in 1,200 years. And then once El Niño kicks in, we’ve had two of the word floods in recorded history in the last month. That’s where we are today. That’s what our grandkids are going to know for their entire lives. We’ve got to solve for that, and limit the worst cases of that, and we’re not going to do it by doing the least effective, least efficient thing. We have to invest in the places that make the biggest differences.
Senator Merkley voted no yesterday, as you know, and in his statement he said that the bill is very interesting, we should pick it up next year in the new Congress.
How many times has that worked?
I think one argument has been —
I’ve seen that over and over again. I’ve been here since 2008. How many years is that? Almost 20 years. When is that a real thing?
We should do a lot more in the next Congress. Let’s do that. Let’s get this as the floor, and then let’s raise the floor everywhere we possibly can.
And you don’t think passing this now will exhaust the president’s willingness to work on permitting reform?
I will take a win with the president wherever I can get one because it is fleeting, and he is what he is. He did not help last night. My phone blew up. The White House was like, you know, ‘Sorry, he just says stuff.’
[laughter in the room]
We have an alignment right now — the House, the Senate, and the White House — that has real value to making energy cheaper and putting more clean energy online. We should just take that because it also creates uncertainty for other folks. When we have that opportunity, don’t kick it to the curb. It is what it is.
Do you think the president needs to approve these projects for the bill to make sense?
No, because I think the greatest value is for the next president. But we are seeing real progress on real projects right now. We have seen dozens of projects approved that were stalled out. We’re having constructive conversations about many additional projects. That has its own value, but the value of this bill, in my view, is for the next president of the United States — whoever they are — and I will do everything in my power to make sure that that’s a Democrat — but if it’s not, they still need to be able to govern and compete with the rest of the world, and so the value is really for the country and the next president.
Give us a sense of what the amendment process will look like.
I don’t know what the amendment process is going to look like because that typically gets negotiated between the majority and the minority leaders. My view is that amendments are helpful. I think we’ve gotten away from amendment processes in the Senate, and that has not served legislation well. So I’m perfectly comfortable. I’ve told a number of members who want amendments that I’m supportive of them getting those amendments, because I think it lets people make their case about what they care about, and that creates buy-in for eventual legislation. And whether we win over those members or not, I think it has value.
The downside is we let things hang out there at a time when much of the conversation is still governed by these social media algorithms. But I still think it’s the right thing to do.
What does the path in the House look like, as you’re thinking about it today?
In the House, it’s the coalition of, one, the White House actually wants this, and they’re communicating with Republicans in the House, many of which won’t be there next year. So, like, go out on a win. Then on the Democratic side, you have the New Dems and the Problem Solvers Caucus and the Blue Dogs, and like, We’re not going to get all of the Democrats, but we’re going to get enough of the Democrats who believe in governing and who want the lessons of this election cycle to actually be manifest in law. I think we very much have a viable path in the House of Representatives.