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Twenty-five years ago, computers were on the verge of destroying America’s energy system.
Or, at least, that’s what lots of smart people seemed to think.
In a 1999 Forbes article, a pair of conservative lawyers, Peter Huber and Mark Mills, warned that personal computers and the internet were about to overwhelm the fragile U.S. grid.
Information technology already devoured 8% to 13% of total U.S. power demand, Huber and Mills claimed, and that share would only rise over time. “It’s now reasonable to project,” they wrote, “that half of the electric grid will be powering the digital-Internet economy within the next decade.” (Emphasis mine.)
Over the next 18 months, investment banks including JP Morgan and Credit Suisse repeated the Forbes estimate of internet-driven power demand, advising their customers to pile into utilities and other electricity-adjacent stocks. Although it was unrelated, California’s simultaneous blackout crisis deepened the sense of panic. For a moment, experts were convinced: Data centers and computers would drain the country’s energy resources.
They could not have been more wrong. In fact, Huber and Mills had drastically mismeasured the amount of electricity used by PCs and the internet. Computing ate up perhaps 3% of total U.S. electricity in 1999, not the roughly 10% they had claimed. And instead of staring down a period of explosive growth, the U.S. electric grid was in reality facing a long stagnation. Over the next two decades, America’s electricity demand did not grow rapidly — or even, really, at all. Instead, it flatlined for the first time since World War II. The 2000s and 2010s were the first decades without “load growth,” the utility industry’s jargon for rising power demand, since perhaps the discovery of electricity itself.
Now that lull is ending — and a new wave of tech-driven concerns has overtaken the electricity industry. According to its supporters and critics alike, generative artificial intelligence like ChatGPT is about to devour huge amounts of electricity, enough to threaten the grid itself. “We still don’t appreciate the energy needs of this technology,” Sam Altman, the CEO of OpenAI, has said, arguing that the world needs a clean energy breakthrough to meet AI’s voracious energy needs. (He is investing in nuclear fusion and fission companies to meet this demand.) The Washington Post captured the zeitgeist with a recent story: America, it said, “is running out of power.”
But … is it actually? There is no question that America’s electricity demand is rising once again and that load growth, long in abeyance, has finally returned to the grid: The boom in new factories and the ongoing adoption of electric vehicles will see to that. And you shouldn’t bet against the continued growth of data centers, which have increased in size and number since the 1990s. But there is surprisingly little evidence that AI, specifically, is driving surging electricity demand. And there are big risks — for utility customers and for the planet — by treating AI-driven electricity demand as an emergency.
There is, to be clear, no shortage of predictions that AI will cause electricity demand to rise. According to a recent Reuters report, nine of the country’s 10 largest utilities are now citing the “surge” in power demand from data centers when arguing to regulators that they should build more power. Morgan Stanley projects that power use from data centers “is expected to triple globally this year,” according to the same report. The International Energy Agency more modestly — but still shockingly — suggests that electricity use from data centers, AI, and cryptocurrency could double by 2026.
These concerns have also come from environmentalists. A recent report from the Climate Action Against Disinformation Commission, a left-wing alliance of groups including Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, warned that AI will require “massive amounts of energy and water” and called for aggressive regulation.
That report focused on the risks of an AI-addled social media public sphere, which progressives fear will be filled with climate-change-denying propaganda by AI-powered bots. But in an interview, Michael Khoo, an author of the report and a researcher at Friends of the Earth, told me that studying AI made him much more frightened about its energy use.
AI is such an power-suck that it “is causing America to run out of energy,” Khoo said. “I think that’s going to be much more disruptive than the disinformation conversation in the mid-term.” He sketched a scenario where Altman and Mark Zuckerberg can outbid ordinary households for electrons as AI proliferates across the economy. “I can see people going without power,” he said, “and there being massive social unrest.”
These predictions aren’t happening in a vacuum. At the same time that investment bankers and environmentalists have fretted over a potential electricity shortage, utilities across the South have proposed a de facto solution: a massive buildout of new natural-gas power plants.
Citing the return of load growth, utilities across the South are trying to go around normal regulatory channels and build a slew of new natural-gas-burning power plants. Across at least six states, utilities have already won — or are trying to win — permission from local governments to fast-track more than 10,000 megawatts of new gas-fired power plants so that they can meet the surge in demand.
These requests have popped up across the region, pushed by vertically integrated monopoly power companies. Georgia Power won a tentative agreement to build 1,400 new megawatts of gas capacity, Canary reported. In the Carolinas, Duke Energy has asked to build 9,000 megawatts of new gas capacity, triple what it previously requested. The Tennessee Valley Authority has plans to add 6,600 megawatts of new capacity to its grid.
This buildout is big enough to endanger the country’s climate targets. Although these utilities are also building new renewable and battery farms, and shutting down coal plants, the planned surge in carbon emissions from natural gas plants would erase the reductions from those changes, according to a Southern Environmental Law Center analysis. Duke Energy has already said that it will not meet its 2030 climate goal in order to conduct the gas expansion.
In the popular press, AI’s voracious energy demand is sometimes said to be a major driver of this planned gas boom. But evidence for that proposition is slim, and the utilities have said only that data center expansion is one of several reasons for the boom. The Southeast’s population is growing, and the region is experiencing a manufacturing renaissance, due in part to the new car, battery, and solar panel factories subsidized by Biden’s climate law. Utilities in the South also face a particular challenge coping with the coldest winter mornings because so many homes and offices use inefficient and power-hungry space heaters.
Indeed, it’s hard to talk about the drivers of load growth with any specificity — and it’s hard to know whether load growth will actually happen in all corners of the South.
Utilities compete against each other to secure big-name customers — much like local governments compete with sweetheart tax deals — so when a utility asks regulators to build more capacity, it doesn’t reveal where potential power demand is coming from. (In other words, it doesn’t reveal who it believes will eventually buy that power.) A company might float plans to build the same data center or factory in multiple states to shop around for the best rates, which means the same underlying gigawatts of demand may be appearing in several different utilities’ resource plans at the same time. In other words, utilities are unlikely to actually see all of the demand they’re now projecting.
Even if we did know exactly how many gigawatts of new demand each utility would see, it’s almost impossible to say how much of it is coming from AI. Utilities don’t say how much of their future projected power demand will come from planned factories versus data centers. Nor do they say what each data center does and whether it trains AI (or mines Bitcoin, which remains a far bigger energy suck).
The risk of focusing on AI, specifically, as a driver of load growth is that because it’s a hot new technology — one with national security implications, no less — it can rhetorically justify expensive emergency action that is actually not necessary at all. Utilities may very well need to build more power capacity in the years to come. But does that need constitute an emergency? Does it justify seeking special permission from their statehouses or regulators to build more gas, instead of going through the regular planning process? Is it worth accelerating approvals for new gas plants? Probably not. The real danger, in other words, is not that we’ll run out of power. It’s that we’ll build too much of the wrong kind.
At the same time, we might have been led astray by overly dire predictions of AI’s energy use. Jonathan Koomey, a researcher who studies how the internet and data centers use energy (and the namesake of Koomey’s Law) told me that many estimates of Nvidia’s most important AI chips assume that their energy use is the same as their advertised “rated” power. In reality, Nvidia chips probably use half of that amount, he said, because chipmakers engineer their chips to withstand more electricity than is necessary for safety reasons.
And this is just the current generation of chips: Nvidia’s next generation of AI-training chips, called “Blackwell,” use 25 times less energy to do the same amount of computation as the previous generation of chips.
Koomey helped defuse the last panic over energy use by showing that the estimates Huber and Mills relied on were wildly incorrect. Estimates now suggest that the internet used less than 1% of total U.S. electricity by the late 1990s, not 13% as they claimed. Those percentages stayed roughly the same through 2008, he later found, even as data centers grew and computers proliferated across the economy. That’s the same year, remember, that Huber and Mills predicted that the internet would consume half of American energy.
These bad predictions were extremely convenient. Mills was a scientific advisor to the Greening Earth Society, a fossil-fuel-industry-funded group that alleged carbon dioxide pollution would actually improve the global environment. He aimed to show that climate and environmental policy would conflict with the continued growth of the internet.
“Many electricity policy proposals are on a collision course with demand forces,” Mills said in a Greening Earth press release at the time. “While many environmentalists want to substantially reduce coal use in making electricity, there is no chance of meeting future economically-driven and Internet-accelerated electric demand without retaining and expanding the coal component.” Hence the headline of the Forbes piece: “The PCs are coming — Dig more coal.”
What makes today’s AI-induced fear frenzy different from 1999 is that the alarmed projections are not just coming from businesses and banks like Morgan Stanley, but from environmentalists like Friends of the Earth. Yet neither their estimates of near-term, AI-driven power shortages — nor the analysis from Morgan Stanley that U.S. data-center use could soon triple within a year — make sense given what we know about data centers, Koomey said. It is not logistically possible to triple data centers’ electricity use in one year. “There just aren’t enough people to build data centers, and it takes longer than a year to build a new data center anyway,” he said. “There aren’t enough generators, there aren’t enough transformers — the backlog for some equipment is 24 months. It’s a supply chain constraint.”
Look around and you might notice that we have many more servers and computers today than we did in 1999 — not to mention smartphones and tablets, which didn’t even exist then — and yet computing doesn’t devour half of American energy. It doesn’t even get close. Today, computers use 1% to 4% of total U.S. power demand, depending on which estimate you trust. That’s about the same share of total U.S. electricity demand that they used in the late 1990s and mid-2000s.
It may well be that AI devours more energy in years to come, but utilities probably do not need to deal with it by building more gas. They could install more batteries, build new power lines, or even pay some customers to reduce their electricity usage during certain peak events, such as cold winter storms.
There are some places where AI-driven energy demand could be a problem — Koomey cited Ireland and Loudon County, Virginia, as two epicenters. But even there, building more natural gas is not the sole way to cope with load growth.
“The problem with this debate is everybody is kind of right,” Daniel Tait, who researches Southern utilities for the Energy and Policy Institute, a consumer watchdog, told me. “Yes, AI will increase load a little bit, but probably not as much as you think. Yes, load is growing, but maybe not as much as you say. Yes, we do need to build stuff, but maybe not the stuff that you want.”
There are real risks if AI’s energy demands get overstated and utilities go on a gas-driven bender. The first is for the planet: Utilities might overbuild gas plants now, run them even though they’re non-economic, and blow through their climate goals.
“Utilities — especially the vertically integrated monopoles in the South — have every incentive to overstate load growth, and they have a pattern of having done that consistently,” Gudrun Thompson, a senior attorney at the Southern Environmental Law Center, told me. In 2017, the Rocky Mountain Institute, an energy think tank, found in 2017 that utilities systematically overestimated their peak demand when compiling forecasts. This makes sense: Utilities would rather build too much capacity than wind up with too little, especially when they can pass along the associated costs to rate-payers.
But the second risk is that utilities could burn through the public’s willingness to pay for grid upgrades. Over the next few years, utilities should make dozens of updates to their systems. They have to build new renewables, new batteries, and new clean 24/7 power, such as nuclear or geothermal. They will have to link their grids to their neighbors’ by building new transmission lines. All of that will be expensive, and it could require the kind of investment that raises electricity rates. But the public and politicians can accept only so many rate hikes before they rebel, and there’s a risk that utilities spend through that fuzzy budget on unnecessary and wasteful projects now, not on the projects that they’ll need in the future.
There is no question that AI will use more electricity in the years to come. But so will EVs, new factories, and other sources of demand. America is on track to use more electricity. If that becomes a crisis, it will be one of our own making.
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If it turns out to be a bubble, billions of dollars of energy assets will be on the line.
The data center investment boom has already transformed the American economy. It is now poised to transform the American energy system.
Hyperscalers — including tech giants such as Microsoft and Meta, as well as leaders in artificial intelligence like OpenAI and CoreWeave — are investing eyewatering amounts of capital into developing new energy resources to feed their power-hungry data infrastructure. Those data centers are already straining the existing energy grid, prompting widespread political anxiety over an energy supply crisis and a ratepayer affordability shock. Nothing in recent memory has thrown policymakers’ decades-long underinvestment in the health of our energy grid into such stark relief. The commercial potential of next-generation energy technologies such as advanced nuclear, batteries, and grid-enhancing applications now hinge on the speed and scale of the AI buildout.
But what happens if the AI boom buffers and data center investment collapses? It is not idle speculation to say that the AI boom rests on unstable financial foundations. Worse, however, is the fact that as of this year, the tech sector’s breakneck investment into data centers is the only tailwind to U.S. economic growth. If there is a market correction, there is no other growth sector that could pick up the slack.
Not only would a sudden reversal in investor sentiment make stranded assets of the data centers themselves, which will lose value as their lease revenue disappears, it also threatens to strand all the energy projects and efficiency innovations that data center demand might have called forth.
If the AI boom does not deliver, we need a backup plan for energy policy.
An analysis of the capital structure of the AI boom suggests that policymakers should be more concerned about the financial fundamentals of data centers and their tenants — the tech companies that are buoying the economy. My recent report for the Center for Public Enterprise, Bubble or Nothing, maps out how the various market actors in the AI sector interact, connecting the market structure of the AI inference sector to the economics of Nvidia’s graphics processing units, the chips known as GPUs that power AI software, to the data center real estate debt market. Spelling out the core financial relationships illuminates where the vulnerabilities lie.

First and foremost: The business model remains unprofitable. The leading AI companies ― mostly the leading tech companies, as well as some AI-specific firms such as OpenAI and Anthropic ― are all competing with each other to dominate the market for AI inference services such as large language models. None of them is returning a profit on its investments. Back-of-the-envelope math suggests that Meta, Google, Microsoft, and Amazon invested over $560 billion into AI technology and data centers through 2024 and 2025, and have reported revenues of just $35 billion.
To be sure, many new technology companies remain unprofitable for years ― including now-ubiquitous firms like Uber and Amazon. Profits are not the AI sector’s immediate goal; the sector’s high valuations reflect investors’ assumptions about future earnings potential. But while the losses pile up, the market leaders are all vying to maximize the market share of their virtually identical services ― a prisoner’s dilemma of sorts that forces down prices even as the cost of providing inference services continues to rise. Rising costs, suppressed revenues, and fuzzy measurements of real user demand are, when combined, a toxic cocktail and a reflection of the sector’s inherent uncertainty.
Second: AI companies have a capital investment problem. These are not pure software companies; to provide their inference services, AI companies must all invest in or find ways to access GPUs. In mature industries, capital assets have predictable valuations that their owners can borrow against and use as collateral to invest further in their businesses. Not here: The market value of a GPU is incredibly uncertain and, at least currently, remains suppressed due to the sector’s competitive market structure, the physical deterioration of GPUs at high utilization rates, the unclear trajectory of demand, and the value destruction that comes from Nvidia’s now-yearly release of new high-end GPU models.
The tech industry’s rush to invest in new GPUs means existing GPUs lose market value much faster. Some companies, particularly the vulnerable and debt-saddled “neocloud” companies that buy GPUs to rent their compute capacity to retail and hyperscaler consumers, are taking out tens of billions of dollars of loans to buy new GPUs backed by the value of their older GPU stock; the danger of this strategy is obvious. Others including OpenAI and xAI, having realized that GPUs are not safe to hold on one’s balance sheet, are instead renting them from Oracle and Nvidia, respectively.
To paper over the valuation uncertainty of the GPUs they do own, all the hyperscalers have changed their accounting standards for GPU valuations over the past few years to minimize their annual reported depreciation expenses. Some financial analysts don’t buy it: Last year, Barclays analysts judged GPU depreciation as risky enough to merit marking down the earnings estimates of Google (in this case its parent company, Alphabet), Microsoft, and Meta as much as 10%, arguing that consensus modeling was severely underestimating the earnings write-offs required.
Under these market dynamics, the booming demand for high-end chips looks less like a reflection of healthy growth for the tech sector and more like a scramble for high-value collateral to maintain market position among a set of firms with limited product differentiation. If high demand projections for AI technologies come true, collateral ostensibly depreciates at a manageable pace as older GPUs retain their marketable value over their useful life — but otherwise, this combination of structurally compressed profits and rapidly depreciating collateral is evidence of a snake eating its own tail.
All of these hyperscalers are tenants within data centers. Their lack of cash flow or good collateral should have their landlords worried about “tenant churn,” given the risk that many data center tenants will have to undertake multiple cycles of expensive capital expenditure on GPUs and network infrastructure within a single lease term. Data center developers take out construction (or “mini-perm”) loans of four to six years and refinance them into longer-term permanent loans, which can then be packaged into asset-backed and commercial mortgage-backed securities to sell to a wider pool of institutional investors and banks. The threat of broken leases and tenant vacancies threatens the long-term solvency of the leading data center developers ― companies like Equinix and Digital Realty ― as well as the livelihoods of the construction contractors and electricians they hire to build their facilities and manage their energy resources.
Much ink has already been spilled on how the hyperscalers are “roundabouting” each other, or engaging in circular financing: They are making billions of dollars of long-term purchase commitments, equity investments, and project co-development agreements with one another. OpenAI, Oracle, CoreWeave, and Nvidia are at the center of this web. Nvidia has invested $100 billion in OpenAI, to be repaid over time through OpenAI’s lease of Nvidia GPUs. Oracle is spending $40 billion on Nvidia GPUs to power a data center it has leased for 15 years to support OpenAI, for which OpenAI is paying Oracle $300 billion over the next five years. OpenAI is paying CoreWeave over the next five years to rent its Nvidia GPUs; the contract is valued at $11.9 billion, and OpenAI has committed to spending at least $4 billion through April 2029. OpenAI already has a $350 million equity stake in CoreWeave. Nvidia has committed to buying CoreWeave’s unsold cloud computing capacity by 2032 for $6.3 billion, after it already took a 7% stake in CoreWeave when the latter went public. If you’re feeling dizzy, count yourself lucky: These deals represent only a fraction of the available examples of circular financing.
These companies are all betting on each others’ growth; their growth projections and purchase commitments are all dependent on their peers’ growth projections and purchase commitments. Optimistically, this roundabouting represents a kind of “risk mutualism,” which, at least for now, ends up supporting greater capital expenditures. Pessimistically, roundabouting is a way for these companies to pay each other for goods and services in any way except cash — shares, warrants, purchase commitments, token reservations, backstop commitments, and accounts receivable, but not U.S. dollars. The second any one of these companies decides it wants cash rather than a commitment is when the music stops. Chances are, that company needs cash to pay a commitment of its own, likely involving a lender.
Lenders are the final piece of the puzzle. Contrary to the notion that cash-rich hyperscalers can finance their own data center buildout, there has been a record volume of debt issuance this year from companies such as Oracle and CoreWeave, as well as private credit giants like Blue Owl and Apollo, which are lending into the boom. The debt may not go directly onto hyperscalers’ balance sheets, but their purchase commitments are the collateral against which data center developers, neocloud companies like CoreWeave, and private credit firms raise capital. While debt is not inherently something to shy away from ― it’s how infrastructure gets built ― it’s worth raising eyebrows at the role private credit firms are playing at the center of this revenue-free investment boom. They are exposed to GPU financing and to data center financing, although not the GPU producers themselves. They have capped upside and unlimited downside. If they stop lending, the rest of the sector’s risks look a lot more risky.

A market correction starts when any one of the AI companies can’t scrounge up the cash to meet its liabilities and can no longer keep borrowing money to delay paying for its leases and its debts. A sudden stop in lending to any of these companies would be a big deal ― it would force AI companies to sell their assets, particularly GPUs, into a potentially adverse market in order to meet refinancing deadlines. A fire sale of GPUs hurts not just the long-term earnings potential of the AI companies themselves, but also producers such as Nvidia and AMD, since even they would be selling their GPUs into a soft market.
For the tech industry, the likely outcome of a market correction is consolidation. Any widespread defaults among AI-related businesses and special purpose vehicles will leave capital assets like GPUs and energy technologies like supercapacitors stranded, losing their market value in the absence of demand ― the perfect targets for a rollup. Indeed, it stands to reason that the tech giants’ dominance over the cloud and web services sectors, not to mention advertising, will allow them to continue leading the market. They can regain monopolistic control over the remaining consumer demand in the AI services sector; their access to more certain cash flows eases their leverage constraints over the longer term as the economy recovers.
A market correction, then, is hardly the end of the tech industry ― but it still leaves a lot of data center investments stranded. What does that mean for the energy buildout that data centers are directly and indirectly financing?
A market correction would likely compel vertically integrated utilities to cancel plans to develop new combined-cycle gas turbines and expensive clean firm resources such as nuclear energy. Developers on wholesale markets have it worse: It’s not clear how new and expensive firm resources compete if demand shrinks. Grid managers would have to call up more expensive units less frequently. Doing so would constrain the revenue-generating potential of those generators relative to the resources that can meet marginal load more cheaply — namely solar, storage, peaker gas, and demand-response systems. Combined-cycle gas turbines co-located with data centers might be stranded; at the very least, they wouldn’t be used very often. (Peaker gas plants, used to manage load fluctuation, might still get built over the medium term.) And the flight to quality and flexibility would consign coal power back to its own ash heaps. Ultimately, a market correction does not change the broader trend toward electrification.
A market correction that stabilizes the data center investment trajectory would make it easier for utilities to conduct integrated resource planning. But it would not necessarily simplify grid planners’ ability to plan their interconnection queues — phantom projects dropping out of the queue requires grid planners to redo all their studies. Regardless of the health of the investment boom, we still need to reform our grid interconnection processes.
The biggest risk is that ratepayers will be on the hook for assets that sit underutilized in the absence of tech companies’ large load requirements, especially those served by utilities that might be building power in advance of committed contracts with large load customers like data center developers. The energy assets they build might remain useful for grid stability and could still participate in capacity markets. But generation assets built close to data center sites to serve those sites cheaply might not be able to provision the broader energy grid cost-efficiently due to higher grid transport costs incurred when serving more distant sources of load.
These energy projects need not be albatrosses.
Many of these data centers being planned are in the process of securing permits and grid interconnection rights. Those interconnection rights are scarce and valuable; if a data center gets stranded, policymakers should consider purchasing those rights and incentivizing new businesses or manufacturing industries to build on that land and take advantage of those rights. Doing so would provide offtake for nearby energy assets and avoid displacing their costs onto other ratepayers. That being said, new users of that land may not be able to pay anywhere near as much as hyperscalers could for interconnection or for power. Policymakers seeking to capture value from stranded interconnection points must ensure that new projects pencil out at a lower price point.
Policymakers should also consider backstopping the development of critical and innovative energy projects and the firms contracted to build them. I mean this in the most expansive way possible: Policymakers should not just backstop the completion of the solar and storage assets built to serve new load, but also provide exigent purchase guarantees to the firms that are prototyping the flow batteries, supercapacitors, cooling systems, and uninterruptible power systems that data center developers are increasingly interested in. Without these interventions, a market correction would otherwise destroy the value of many of those projects and the earnings potential of their developers, to say nothing of arresting progress on incredibly promising and commercializable technologies.
Policymakers can capture long-term value for the taxpayer by making investments in these distressed projects and developers. This is already what the New York Power Authority has done by taking ownership and backstopping the development of over 7 gigawatts of energy projects ― most of which were at risk of being abandoned by a private sponsor.
The market might not immediately welcome risky bets like these. It is unclear, for instance, what industries could use the interconnection or energy provided to a stranded gigawatt-scale data center. Some of the more promising options ― take aluminum or green steel ― do not have a viable domestic market. Policy uncertainty, tariffs, and tax credit changes in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act have all suppressed the growth of clean manufacturing and metals refining industries like these. The rest of the economy is also deteriorating. The fact that the data center boom is threatened by, at its core, a lack of consumer demand and the resulting unstable investment pathways is itself an ironic miniature of the U.S. economy as a whole.
As analysts at Employ America put it, “The losses in a [tech sector] bust will simply be too large and swift to be neatly offset by an imminent and symmetric boom elsewhere. Even as housing and consumer durables ultimately did well following the bust of the 90s tech boom, there was a one- to two-year lag, as it took time for long-term rates to fall and investors to shift their focus.” This is the issue with having only one growth sector in the economy. And without a more holistic industrial policy, we cannot spur any others.
Questions like these ― questions about what comes next ― suggest that the messy details of data center project finance should not be the sole purview of investors. After all, our exposure to the sector only grows more concentrated by the day. More precisely mapping out how capital flows through the sector should help financial policymakers and industrial policy thinkers understand the risks of a market correction. Political leaders should be prepared to tackle the downside distributional challenges raised by the instability of this data center boom ― challenges to consumer wealth, public budgets, and our energy system.
This sparkling sector is no replacement for industrial policy and macroeconomic investment conditions that create broad-based sources of demand growth and prosperity. But in their absence, policymakers can still treat the challenge of a market correction as an opportunity to think ahead about the nation’s industrial future.
With more electric heating in the Northeast comes greater strains on the grid.
The electric grid is built for heat. The days when the system is under the most stress are typically humid summer evenings, when air conditioning is still going full blast, appliances are being turned on as commuters return home, and solar generation is fading, stretching the generation and distribution grid to its limits.
But as home heating and transportation goes increasingly electric, more of the country — even some of the chilliest areas — may start to struggle with demand that peaks in the winter.
While summer demand peaks are challenging, there’s at least a vision for how to deal with them without generating excessive greenhouse gas emissions — namely battery storage, which essentially holds excess solar power generated in the afternoon in reserve for the evening. In states with lots of renewables on the grid already, like California and Texas, storage has been helping smooth out and avoid reliability issues on peak demand days.
The winter challenge is that you can have long periods of cold weather and little sun, stressing every part of the grid. The natural gas production and distribution systems can struggle in the cold with wellheads freezing up and mechanical failure at processing facilities, just as demand for home heating soars, whether provided by piped gas or electricity generated from gas-fired power plants.
In its recent annual seasonal reliability assessment, the North American Reliability Corporation, a standard-setting body for grid operators, found that “much of North America is again at an elevated risk of having insufficient energy supplies” should it encounter “extreme operating conditions,” i.e. “any prolonged, wide-area cold snaps.”
NERC cited growing electricity demand and the difficulty operating generators in the winter, especially those relying on natural gas. In 2021, Winter Storm Uri effectively shut down Texas’ grid for several days as generation and distribution of natural gas literally froze up while demand for electric heating soared. Millions of Texans were left exposed to extreme low temperatures, and at least 246 died as a result.
Some parts of the country already experience winter peaks in energy demand, especially places like North Carolina and Oregon, which “have winters that are chilly enough to require some heating, but not so cold that electric heating is rare,” in the words of North Carolina State University professor Jeremiah Johnson. "Not too many Mainers or Michiganders heat their homes with electricity,” he said.
But that might not be true for long.
New England may be cold and dark in the winter, but it’s liberal all year round. That means the region’s constituent states have adopted aggressive climate change and decarbonization goals that will stretch their available renewable resources, especially during the coldest days, weeks, and months.
The region’s existing energy system already struggles with winter. New England’s natural gas system is limited by insufficient pipeline capacity, so during particularly cold days, power plants end up burning oil as natural gas is diverted from generating electricity to heating homes.
New England’s Independent System Operator projects that winter demand will peak at just above 21 gigawatts this year — its all-time winter peak is 22.8 gigawatts, summer is 28.1 — which ISO-NE says the region is well-prepared for, with 31 gigawatts of available capacity. That includes energy from the Vineyard Wind offshore wind project, which is still facing activist opposition, as well as imported hydropower from Quebec.
But going forward, with Massachusetts aiming to reduce emissions 50% by 2030 (though state lawmakers are trying to undo that goal) and reach net-zero emissions by 2050 — and nearly the entire region envisioning at least 80% emissions reductions by 2050 — that winter peak is expected to soar. The non-carbon-emitting energy generation necessary to meet that demand, meanwhile, is still largely unbuilt.
By the mid 2030s, ISO-NE expects its winter peak to surpass its summer peak, with peak demand perhaps reaching as high as 57 gigawatts, more than double the system’s all-time peak load. Those last few gigawatts of this load will be tricky — and expensive — to serve. ISO-NE estimates that each gigawatt from 51 to 57 would cost $1.5 billion for transmission expansion alone.
ISO-NE also found that “the battery fleet may be depleted quickly and then struggle to recharge during the winter months,” which is precisely when “batteries may be needed most to fill supply gaps during periods of high demand due to cold weather, as well as periods of low production from wind and solar resources.” Some 600 megawatts of battery storage capacity has come online in the last decade in ISO-NE, and there are state mandates for at least 7 more gigawatts between 2030 and 2033.
There will also be a “continued need for fuel-secure dispatchable resources” through 2050, ISO-NE has found — that is, something to fill the role that natural gas, oil, and even coal play on the coldest days and longest cold stretches of the year.
This could mean “vast quantities of seasonal storage,” like 100-hour batteries, or alternative fuels like synthetic natural gas (produced with a combination of direct air capture and electrolysis, all powered by carbon-free power), hydrogen, biodiesel, or renewable diesel. And this is all assuming a steady buildout of renewable power — including over a gigawatt per year of offshore wind capacity added through 2050 — that will be difficult if not impossible to accomplish given the current policy and administrative roadblocks.
While planning for the transmission and generation system of 2050 may be slightly fanciful, especially as the climate policy environment — and the literal environment — are changing rapidly, grid operators in cold regions are worried about the far nearer term.
From 2027 to 2032, ISO-NE analyses “indicate an increasing energy shortfall risk profile,” said ISO-NE planning official Stephen George in a 2024 presentation.
“What keeps me up at night is the winter of 2032,” Richard Dewey, chief executive of the neighboring New York Independent System Operator, said at a 2024 conference. “I don’t know what fills that gap in the year 2032.”
The future of the American electric grid is being determined in the docket of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
The Trump administration tasked federal energy regulators last month to come up with new rules that would allow large loads — i.e. data centers — to connect to the grid faster without ballooning electricity bills. The order has set off a flurry of reactions, as the major players in the electricity system — the data center developers, the power producers, the utilities — jockey to ensure that any new rules don’t impinge upon their business models. The initial public comment period closed last week, meaning now FERC will have to go through hundreds of comments from industry, government, and advocacy stakeholders, hoping to help shape the rule before it’s released at the end of April.
They’ll have a lot to sift through. Opinions ranged from skeptical to cautiously supportive to fully supportive, with imperfect alignment among trade groups and individual companies.
The Utilities
When the DOE first asked FERC to get to work on a rule, several experts identified a possible conflict with utilities, namely the idea that data centers “should be responsible for 100% of the network upgrades that they are assigned through the interconnection studies.” Utilities typically like to put new transmission into their rate base, where they can earn a regulated rate of return on their investments that’s recouped from payments from all their customers. And lo, utilities were largely skeptical of the exercise.
The Edison Electric Institute, which represents investor-owned utilities, wrote in its comments to FERC that the new rule should require large load customers to pay for their share of the transmission system costs, i.e. not the full cost of network upgrades.
EEI claimed that these network costs can add up to the “tens to hundreds of millions of dollars” that should be assigned in a way that allows utilities “to earn a return of and on the entirety of the transmission network.”
In short, the utilities are defending something like the traditional model, where utilities connect all customers and spread out the costs of doing so among the entire customer base. That model has come under increasing stress thanks to the flood of data center interconnection requests, however. The high costs in some markets, like PJM, have also led some scholars and elected officials to seriously reconsider the nature of utility regulation. Still, that model has been largely good for the utilities — and they show no sign of wanting to give it up.
The Hyperscalers
The biggest technology companies, like Google, Microsoft, and Meta, and their trade groups want to make sure their ability to connect to the grid will not be impeded by new rules.
Ari Peskoe, an energy law professor at Harvard Law School, told me that existing processes for interconnection are likely working out well for the biggest data center developers and they may not be eager to rock the boat with a federal overhaul. “Presumably utilities are lining up to do deals with them because they have so much money,” Peskoe said.
In its letter to FERC, the DOE suggested that the commission could expedite interconnection of large loads “that agree to be curtailable.” That would entail users of a lot of electricity ramping down use while the grid was under stress, as well as co-locating projects with new sources of energy generation that could serve the grid as a whole. This approach has picked up steam among researchers and some data center developers, although with some cautions and caveats.
The Clean Energy Buyers Association, which represents many large technology companies, wrote in its comment that such flexibility should be “structured to enable innovation and competition through voluntary pathways rather than mandates,” echoing criticism of a proposal by the electricity market PJM Interconnection that could have forced large loads to be eligible for curtailment.
The Data Center Coalition, another big tech trade group representing many key players in the data center industry, emphasized throughout their comment that any reform to interconnection should still allow data centers to simply connect to the grid, without requiring or unduly favoring “hybrid” or co-location approaches.
“Timely, predictable, and nondiscriminatory access to interconnection service for stand-alone load is… critical… to the continued functioning of the market itself,” the Data Center Coalition wrote.
The hyperscalers themselves largely echoed this message, albeit with some differences in emphasis. They did not want any of their existing arrangements — which have allowed breakneck data center development — to be disrupted or to be forced into operating their data centers in any particular fashion.
Microsoft wrote that it was in favor of “voluntarily curtailable loads,” but cautioned that “most data centers today have limited curtailment capability,” and worried about “operational reliability risks.” In short, don’t railroad us into something our data centers aren’t really set up to do.
OpenAI wrote a short comment, likely its first ever appearance in a FERC docket, where it argued for “an optional curtailable-load pathway” that would allow for faster interconnection, echoing comments it had made in a letter to the White House.
Meta, meanwhile, argued against any binding rule at all, saying instead that FERC “should consider adopting guidance, best practices, and, if appropriate, minimum standards for large load interconnection rather than promulgating a binding, detailed rule.” After all, its deploying data centers gigawatts at a time and has been able to reach deals with utilities to secure power.
The Generators
Perhaps the most fulsome support for the broadest version of the DOE’s proposal came from the generators. The Electrical Power Supply Association, an independent power producer trade group, wrote that more standardized, transparent “rules of the road” are needed to allow large loads like data centers “to interconnect to the transmission system efficiently and fairly, and to be able to do so quickly.” It also called on FERC to speed up its reviews of interconnection requests.
Constellation, which operates a 32-gigawatt generation fleet with a large nuclear business, said that it “agrees with the motivations and principles outlined in the [Department of Energy’s proposal] and the need for clear rules to allow the timely interconnection of large loads and their co-location with generators.” It also called for faster implementation of large load interconnection principles in PJM, the nation’s largest electricity market, “where data center development has been stymied by disagreements and uncertainty over who controls the timing and nature of large load interconnections, and over the terms of any ensuing transmission service.” Constellation specifically called out utilities for excessive influence over PJM rulemaking and procedures.
Constellation’s stance shouldn’t be surprising, Peskoe told me. From the perspective of independent power producers, enabling data centers to quickly and directly work with regional transmission organizations and generators to come online is “generally going to be better for the generators,” Peskoe said, while utilities “want to be the gatekeeper.”
In the end, the fight over data center interconnection may not have much to do with data centers — it’s just one battle after another between generators and utilities.