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On solar PPAs, German EVs, and copper prices

Current conditions: Tropical Depression Two strengthened into Tropical Storm Bertha yesterday, recycling the name of the 1996 Atlantic hurricane season’s first major storm • Floods from the monsoon season killed at least four people in Vietnam and left as many missing • Lightning in Utah sparked the state’s latest wildfire, the Meeks Fire, near the Strawberry Reservoir.
President Donald Trump’s on-again, off-again feud with America’s northern neighbor is, as of Monday, back on again. The White House imposed 50% tariffs on most Canadian goods, accusing the nation’s geographically nearest ally and closest cultural bedfellow of unfairly discriminating against American automotives, alcohol, and dairy products. The move threatens to unleash what the Associated Press called “a new wave of economic chaos, with risks of higher inflation and further fraying of relations between two nations that had been closely woven together before Trump’s return” to office.
In its announcement, the Trump administration said the new tariffs would “apply to all covered goods regardless of whether a good originates under the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement,” referring to the Trump-negotiated North American free trade agreement, which the U.S. opted this month not to renew. This struck my colleague Robinson Meyer as ominous. “If the White House now thinks it can levy taxes despite that pact,” he wrote in yesterday’s Heatmap Daily newsletter, “then the risks for Ford, General Motors, and their suppliers have increased.”
Perhaps the only thing growing faster than voters’ antipathy toward data centers is the market’s desire for more of them. Demand for data centers is ballooning at such a rapid clip that BloombergNEF just raised its total forecast for 2035 by a jaw-dropping 83%. The latest data outlining the best-case scenario from the energy consultancy, released Tuesday morning, shows the total installed capacity of U.S. data centers reaching 194 gigawatts in the next nine years. The surge reflects how quickly new server farms are flowing into the project pipeline. In a bid to hedge against the continued expansion, BNEF created a new scenario based on the implied power demand of forecast shipments of microchips for AI computers up to 2033. This scenario implies an even greater need for power: 229 gigawatts of demand from data centers in just the next seven years. And that doesn’t count the continued growth of demand from data centers carrying out non-AI functions, such as traditional cloud computing workloads. This comes as the latest Heatmap Pro polling shows that seven in 10 Americans now oppose data centers in their backyard, a marked shift from last September, when the same survey showed voters evenly split in support and opposition.
That ballooning demand is already showing up in power markets. Of the $16.4 billion in charges from PJM Interconnection’s most recent capacity auction, $6.3 billion — some 38% — stems from data centers. That’s what Joseph Bowring, president of PJM’s independent market monitor Monitoring Analytics, told Utility Dive last week. In the last four base capacity auctions the nation’s largest grid operator held, 46% of capacity charges were driven by data centers. “PJM is continuing to act like it’s business as usual,” Bowring told the trade publication Friday. “You have to open your eyes and recognize that it is really a paradigm shift, and failing to do that imposes costs on other customers.”

On a logical level, it’s a simple supply and demand problem. The supply of electricity is not growing as quickly as demand, all while the Trump administration eliminates subsidies that once buoyed investments in new supply. As a result, corporate electricity deals look poised to increase in price. But not for every generating source. New estimates from LevelTen, a marketplace for power purchase agreements, found that solar PPAs were 5% cheaper in the second quarter of this year compared to the first quarter. In a piece by my colleague Matthew Zeitlin, LevelTen attributed the decline to an especially steep drop in prices in California’s electricity market. Excluding CAISO, solar PPA prices nationwide dropped slightly less than 2%. While hyperscalers are still buying solar, LevelTen found that commercial and industrial buyers are pulling back, creating a “continued softening in the market’s buy-side.” “We saw a lot less corporate energy buyers in the space in 2025 — 40% less — and that is just due to the increase of hyperscalers and data centers getting projects and snapping them up quickly,” Sarah Wolf, LevelTen’s director of North American transactions, told Matthew.
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Ah, Germany. The land of the Autobahn. Diesel-powered industry. The purring engines of BMWs, Porsches, and Mercedes-Benzes. The nation’s automotive might makes its latest milestone particularly important: Electric vehicles just outsold gas and diesel cars for the first time. New data from the Federal Motor Transport Authority shows that Germans registered 84,057 new electric vehicles in June, a more than 78% year-over-year increase. Traditional hybrids, meanwhile, saw 83,315 registrations, followed by gasoline-powered cars with 60,796, diesel with 33,862, and plug-in hybrids with 32,212. “The automotive history books will need a new page sooner rather than later, after electric cars outsold every other fuel type in Germany for the first time,” InsideEVs reporter Iulian Dnistran wrote. “It’s a huge shift in Europe’s biggest car market, which has traditionally been associated with diesel-powered cars that could travel hundreds of miles at highway speeds without breaking a sweat.” The Tesla Model Y was by far the best-selling EV in Germany, with nearly twice as many registrations as the No. 2 vehicle, the Volkswagen ID.3.
Putting on my Mesopotamian metal merchant hat again: Copper prices are back up. The price of the metal needed for virtually all electrical infrastructure rose 1.3% to just under $14,000 per metric ton, according to Mining.com. The price ultimately hovered at the red metal’s record set in early June. The spike stems from data showing rising tightness in the Chinese market, namely a hike in the premium buyers will pay in Shanghai for shipments of the metal. The price hiked further after a series of storms halted production in Chile for a few days.
While the West dithers on hydrogen, China is making huge strides. It already may be too late to catch up to Beijing on manufacturing the key machinery needed to produce the zero-carbon fuel. The latest data point, via Hydrogen Insight: China just shipped its largest electrolyzer order yet to Europe, via Romania.
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Current conditions: After forming into Tropical Storm Bertha late Monday, the system is barreling toward the Florida Panhandle as it makes landfall as far west as Texas • In the Pacific, Hurricane Fausto has strength as it heads toward Hawaii but remains a Category 1 storm • Temperatures in Ouargla, Algeria’s southern city in the Sahara desert, are soaring to nearly 120 degrees Fahrenheit this week.
Emissions from the United States’ electrical sector spiked 4% last year as demand for power drove up generation from coal. That’s according to the latest annual assessment published Tuesday morning by the U.S. Energy Information Administration. The report, which has tracked annual emissions data from all power sources since 2010, found that U.S. energy-related carbon dioxide emissions increased by 2%, or about 115 million metric tons, in 2025. But the power sector specifically saw a surge of 4%, or 58 million metric tons, due to a spike in fossil fuel use. Coal-fired generation rose by 13%, even as natural gas-fired power fell 4%. Renewables helped avoid more coal use. While wind generation increased 3%, solar skyrocketed by 34%. Generation from all other sources — including nuclear and the category of “other renewables” that includes hydropower and geothermal — were essentially flat last year.
The coal surge isn’t unique to the U.S., as my colleague Matthew Zeitlin wrote last year. Worldwide, rising demand for electricity and shrinking supply of natural gas coming through the Strait of Hormuz made for a good year for coal.
Watershed, the software platform focused on corporate sustainability, just published what it called its first comprehensive open framework for estimating the greenhouse gas emissions from companies’ use of AI programs. The framework has three elements: A comprehensive system that includes all phases of a data center’s use, from model training to inference to hardware production; a function unit of kilograms of carbon dioxide equivalent per million tokens; and a three-tier calculation approach “that aligns with companies’ data quality.”
In a statement to my colleague Emily Pontecorvo, Watershed’s science chief John Bistline said he had “heard from companies that they’re already being asked about AI emissions from investors, from auditors, from regulators, and right now most of them are guessing. We wanted to give them something that was more defensible.”
Oil prices spiked again Tuesday after President Donald Trump publicly weighed taking “a nice big fat shot” at Iran’s Pickaxe Mountain, where Israeli intelligence suggests the Islamic Republic moved its uranium-enriching centrifuges last fall. Brent crude, the main European benchmark for the price per barrel of oil, rose nearly 3% to over $91. West Texas Intermediate, the U.S. price signal, saw a 3% hike to just nearly $85. Murban crude — out of the United Arab Emirates, therefore the most sensitive to Persian Gulf disruptions — soared nearly 5% to just under $86 per barrel.
Shakeups among smaller producers, meanwhile, appeared to cancel out each other’s effects on the market. The shot: Kazakhstan, which falls just outside the top 10 oil-producing nations, is halting crude shipments to the Russia ports it relied on to get its hydrocarbons to market now that Ukraine is consistently attacking the Kremlin’s energy infrastructure, according to the Financial Times. The chaser: Norway’s oil output just beat forecasts, per Oil Price.
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Unlike the last man Trump put in charge of the Environmental Protection Agency during his first term in office, Lee Zeldin hadn’t formally worked for the coal industry before serving in government. But the EPA administrator sure made it sound like the industry’s executives are high-priority constituents. At a National Coal Council event in Washington, D.C.’s Willard Hotel that E&E News covered, Zeldin said “many of the items that were on your wish list are now done.” In the coming months, he added, the agency would get to “the remainder of those items,” but said he wouldn’t “prejudge” any rulemaking outcomes. “Between now and your next meeting, I’m excited to be able to share with great optimism, hope, and enthusiasm that you all, again, not prejudging the outcome of any rulemaking, we’ll have a lot to celebrate the next time you all get together again in January,” Zeldin said. One thing the EPA can’t do: Keep the coal plants the Trump administration wants open actually running. As Matthew wrote last year, the big problem with aging coal stations is that they keep breaking down.
Mergers and acquisitions within the global nuclear industry totaled more than $7 billion in value in the first half of 2026, doubling that same figure from a year earlier. That’s according to new data the law firm White & Case LLP shared Tuesday with World Nuclear News. The number of individual deals increased 10%, from 40 to 44. “At the current pace of dealmaking activity, 2026 is set to surpass all years aside from 2024 when a record $29 billion of M&A activity was registered,” the law firm said. More proof that the nuclear dealmaking boom, as Heatmap’s Katie Brigham wrote last year, “is real.”
It’s not just automobiles going hybrid-electric. The startup Electra, which has promised to build a nine-passenger hybrid-electric plane that can take off in as little as 150 feet, is now pumping $850 million into its first aircraft factory in Ohio. The plant, announced Tuesday, will build up to 800 aircraft per year at full capacity. But as Electrek put it, “that’s a big commitment for a plane that hasn’t flown yet.”
Frontier model developers still keep their energy use largely a secret, but Watershed is proposing a new formula that will at least get you close.
With companies now rapidly adding artificial intelligence into their products and using it across their workstreams, it stands to reason that all that extra energy use might show up in their climate accounting. But to any business that wants to get a sense of how big its AI-related emissions footprint is becoming — and, god forbid, maybe even try to reduce it — I say well, good luck. AI providers mostly keep the data required to make such calculations a secret.
Now Watershed, a startup that helps companies track and estimate their carbon emissions, is proposing a workaround. The firm published a white paper on Wednesday laying out a method for companies to produce rough estimates of their carbon impact from AI, while also encouraging them to demand better data from AI developers.
“We’ve heard from companies that they’re already being asked about AI emissions from investors, from auditors, from regulators, and right now most of them are guessing,” John Bistline, Watershed’s head of science, told me. “We wanted to give them something that was more defensible.”
For most frontier AI models, including those developed by OpenAI and Anthropic, there’s very little information to work with. Google is the only proprietary AI developer that has published a transparent estimate of its model’s operational energy use and related emissions. In a paper last August, researchers at the company found that “the median Gemini apps text prompt consumes 0.24 watts,” which is “less energy than watching nine seconds of television,” and released 0.03 grams of CO2-equivalent. These numbers may be out of date by now, however. In the paper, the authors note that this already represented a 33-fold reduction in energy consumption compared to the previous year.
That’s one challenge with estimating AI-related emissions — tech companies are both growing and innovating rapidly, expanding their energy footprints while also finding greater efficiencies, which may be one reason they don’t disclose this information yet.
Another obstacle is that the exercise involves making a number of carbon accounting decisions, and there’s no consensus yet on best practices. For instance, where do you draw the line on which emissions to include? You could just look at the energy required to operate the model, or you could include the energy used to train the model, or even the emissions related to fabricating and manufacturing the hardware it’s running on. Training a model tends to be more energy-intensive than running it to respond to queries, but it only happens once. If you’re going to include training emissions, the next question is, how should responsibility for those be allotted across the lifetime of the model and its use by hundreds of thousands of customers?
Another decision is how to account for differences in user behavior. A model’s energy intensity can vary widely depending on whether the user is asking a simple question, requesting complex research, generating images, or dispatching agents to conduct multiple tasks simultaneously. Models capable of “reasoning” use an estimated 30 times more electricity than those without that ability, according to research by HuggingFace, a company that creates tools for AI developers. A per-prompt emissions average would not capture these differences, and therefore would not give companies actionable information to help them reduce their emissions.
A “per token” average might be more useful in that sense. When AI models process queries, they break the sentence or code down into smaller components called tokens. One token might be just the first few letters of a word. When the model generates a response, it also processes it in terms of tokens. Estimating emissions per token is not a perfect system either, however, since a token’s value can vary across AI providers. Input tokens, i.e. user questions, also tend to be less energy-intensive than output tokens, or user responses, and a single per-token average will conceal that difference.
Then there’s the question of how to get from a model’s energy intensity to an emissions estimate. Should you use the real-world average carbon intensity of the electric grid? What about any clean energy agreements the AI company may have signed? And how should you factor in companies that decide to bypass the grid entirely and build their own on-site generation, which tends to use natural gas?
The Watershed paper proposes some answers to these questions, and also offers guidance for how companies can develop emissions estimates based on the data available to them.
While most of the published research on AI emissions to date has calculated energy intensity on a per-query basis, Watershed advocates for a per-token approach. — i.e. “kilowatt-hours per thousand tokens.” The authors reason that electricity use scales more directly with the number of tokens used than the number of queries submitted. AI application customers are also often billed based on their token usage, so there’s a business case for tracking tokens and trying to use them more efficiently.
For those companies working with essentially zero data — not even the number of tokens they’re using per year — Watershed recommends they approximate their AI emissions using a “spend-based” method. This means simply multiplying the amount they spend per year on AI services by an emissions factor of 0.134 kilograms of carbon dioxide equivalent per U.S. dollar, which is based on U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis numbers for the data processing sector of the economy.
The Watershed paper concedes that whatever number this method spits out will be wrong, noting that it “can misestimate true AI emissions by several times in either direction,” and advising companies to treat this as a “provisional placeholder.” But publishing these numbers, even though they are wrong, could help push AI companies toward more transparency if they want to correct the record.
For companies that do track their token volumes, Watershed has a more rigorous solution. The paper proposes a formula companies can use to calculate their AI emissions, accounting not just for inference energy use, but also training emissions, embodied emissions of the data processing equipment, and a figure known as “power usage effectiveness.” This captures the energy consumed by cooling systems, power conversion, and other data center infrastructure that’s not directly serving AI processing. Since model-specific values for the various inputs to the formula are mostly not available today, Watershed has provided default values gathered from previous studies, including papers by Microsoft and Google. Companies can substitute the actual numbers disclosed by AI providers into the formula as that information becomes available.
I reached out to Google, Microsoft, Anthropic, and OpenAI to ask why they didn’t share token carbon intensity, and whether they planned to in the future. Only Microsoft responded to my inquiry, pointing me to its blog post and peer-reviewed paper estimating general AI energy use across frontier models.
To get the most accurate estimate, companies would also need to know where, geographically, their AI queries are being serviced, since emissions from the electric grid varies by region. In some cases, companies may be able to actually choose where their queries are being processed, offering another lever by which they could potentially reduce their emissions.
The right data, disclosed in sufficient detail, will unlock companies’ ability to reduce their AI-related emissions, Watershed argues. Employees would have more reason to choose the most appropriate model for a given task, for example, like avoiding using energy-intensive reasoning models for basic questions.
“I think about a John von Neumann test here,” Bistline said, referring to the mathematician and proto-computer scientist. “You wouldn’t ask an advanced model like Fable anything that you would be embarrassed to ask John von Neumann, or Marie Curie, right? You wouldn’t want to ask ‘how many R’s are there in Strawberry?’ or ‘which restaurants would you recommend I go to in Miami?’”
Of course, companies can already implement this recommendation today, but there will be no way to account for and prove that they are reducing their emissions as a result until AI providers disclose distinct model-based energy estimates.
As Bistline mentioned, this information isn’t just nice-to know — companies are already being asked for it. Upcoming regulations in California and the European Union will require large companies to disclose their total direct emissions, and will eventually require them to disclose indirect emissions like AI energy use. The EU’s AI Act will also require AI companies to disclose a breakdown of the energy consumption of its general purpose AI models.
“There are customer-side disclosure rules and provider-side ones developing in parallel,” Bistline said, “and right now there’s no agreed methodology connecting the two, which is the gap we’re trying to address with our AI emissions framework.”
Average U.S. gasoline prices have slipped back above $4 a gallon.
A decade ago, the Princeton economists Alan Blinder and Mark Watson published a paper about a fact that they called “not nearly as widely known as it should be”: The U.S. economy has done better under Democratic presidents than Republican presidents.
Blinder was not a completely impartial observer — he served on President Bill Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers, and Clinton later appointed him vice chair of the Federal Reserve — but he and Watson compiled a lengthy list of statistics to back up their claim. The U.S. economy has grown faster, produced more jobs, had a lower unemployment rate, seen higher corporate profits and investment, and experienced better stock market performance under Democrats than Republicans. While the original paper described this divergence from 1947 to 2013, recent research has shown that it held through the subsequent Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations.
The only metric where the two parties come close is inflation, but Democrats still seem to have a tiny edge there, even after the Biden-era inflation.
Why? Blinder and Watson found that it didn’t entirely come down to timing. (Other observers have disputed this, arguing that Republicans tend to get elected at the peak of economic booms, while Democrats win during or just after recessions.) Instead, Blinder and Watson found that a few factors — oil shocks, productivity growth, a more favorable international growth environment, and perhaps better consumer confidence — could explain much of the divergence.
Of course, these factors can’t be entirely separated from a president’s record in office. Oil shocks, for example, tend to drag down global growth, which in turn slows the U.S. economy. And as Watson and Blinder write, some of those oil shocks “may have been induced by [American] foreign policy.” By that mechanism, presidential bellicosity in the Middle East can translate into poorer economic outcomes. This belligerence may even be, as the writer Matt Yglesias contended earlier this year, Republican presidents’ “worst economic policy.”
Why am I recounting all this? Because average U.S. gasoline prices have slipped back above $4 a gallon, according to AAA. (As I write, they stand at $4.01.) The collapse of the ceasefire with Iran — and President Trump’s inability to figure out how to end a war he started — are once again driving up fossil fuel prices.
The numbers add up. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told Congress today that the Iran War has cost $37.5 billion so far, but according to a tracker from Brown University researchers, Americans have already paid nearly double that — $71 billion! — on more expensive gasoline and diesel fuel. A billion here, a billion there, and pretty soon you’re talking about real economic underperformance. That estimate suggests the burden of higher energy prices from the Iran War has wiped out the expected $65 billion consumer boost from the One Big Beautiful Bill Act’s expanded tax refunds.
Of course, from a decarbonization perspective, higher gas prices are good, in theory. They encourage people to drive less and to switch to more fuel-efficient — or even fully electrified — vehicles, reducing carbon emissions. (This is part of why I joke about Degrowth Donald, raising fuel prices as he goes.) But short-term oil shocks are the second worst kind of emissions reductions after recessions: They are unlikely to last; they will probably not lead to real decarbonization; and they produce a lot of human misery along the way.
Perhaps this oil spike won’t persist. Perhaps Trump will find a way out of the quagmiring conflict in the Persian Gulf. Perhaps Republican presidential underperformance really does all come down to luck, too. (Or maybe, as a 2020 paper argued, Democratic presidents benefit from a “pre-election growth surge” just before a Republican wins.) But I think it’s worth noting that the recent trickle of news — and the recent and less noticed surge in gas prices — is how an oil interruption results in slower growth overall. If oil shocks really are responsible for GOP presidential underperformance, this is what it would look like.
The irony is that technology finally exists to make the American transportation sector — and the overall economy — less dependent on oil. This technology was developed at the American public’s expense to help manage a scenario much like this one. And the administration has undermined it at almost every opportunity.