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“It’s got nothing to do with technology. It’s nothing to do with execution capability. It’s purely due to access to capital.”

Ever since Trump reentered the White House, Europe has been a safe haven for U.S. climate tech companies fleeing an increasingly hostile policy environment. Through strong carbon pricing and stable regulations, the bloc has created demand for still-experimental technologies such as green hydrogen, thermal energy storage, low-carbon building materials, and sustainable fuels.
And yet at the same time, Europe has struggled to finance many of its own climate tech startups as they enter the capital-intensive scale-up phase. What gives?
The problem is not a lack of startups or capital. European firms raised $61 billion for climate-focused funds last year, far outpacing those in the U.S., which brought in $37 billion, according to Sightline Climate. The problem is that almost all of that European money flows to infrastructure and private equity investors backing more mature technologies. Early-stage startups also enjoy relatively strong backing, but the market starves the growth-stage middle.
The issue is both cultural and structural: Most of the bloc’s investors are unaccustomed to making the high-risk, high-reward bets required to scale climate tech. They also often can’t access tools like loan and equity guarantees, which remain limited in Europe, nor are there the institutional limited partners and growth-stage co-investors that could help de-risk those investments.
“It’s got nothing to do with technology. It’s nothing to do with execution capability. It’s purely due to access to capital,” Craig Douglas, a founding partner at the Berlin-based multi-stage venture firm World Fund, told me. That means companies that have outgrown early-stage financing but are still considered too small or too risky for larger institutional investors often either shutter or seek capital abroad. Logically, if given the chance, most startups choose the latter.
“You’re allowing U.S. investors to cherry pick European assets,” Douglas told me. The result? “European technologies and European companies that are successful end up enriching American pension funds rather than European pension funds.”
Ioannis Ioannou, an associate professor of strategy and entrepreneurship at the London Business School, told me that the consequences extend beyond the purely financial, emphasizing that Europe runs a strategic risk by relying on foreign capital for its climate tech scale-up. “It means you lose the supply chains. You lose the skills. You lose the fine manufacturing capabilities. You lose the so-called green jobs.”
Douglas and the other specialists in European climate finance I spoke with emphasized that the ever-ominous “missing middle” funding gap is particularly pronounced in Europe. A report Douglas co-authored earlier this year, aptly titled “The Series B Funding Gap In European Climate Tech,” quantifies the problem. While 25% of U.S. climate tech companies that raised a seed round from 2010 to 2020 had moved on to secure a Series B by the first half of last year — regardless of what country the capital came from — only 15% of European companies were able to do the same. That has created a growing backlog of startups stuck in a financing limbo: The lineup of European companies looking to raise a Series B grew from 220 in 2020 to 533 in the first half of last year.
While smaller climate tech funds in Europe and the U.S. have raised similar amounts of funding for early-stage startups — $18.5 billion in Europe versus $20.2 billion in the U.S. from 2020 through the first half of 2025 — the gap at the larger end of the market is stark. The U.S closed 29 funds of at least $500 million or more, compared with just 11 in Europe. These larger funds are the ones capable of writing the $25 million to $100 million checks companies desperately need to commercialize and scale. As Douglas’ report notes, fewer than 20% of European climate funds are pursuing a growth strategy, with over 70% making early-stage investments only.
“When we raised World Fund One, we were the largest [debut] climate fund in Europe, and we’re a €300 million fund. That’s nuts,” Douglas told me. World Fund aims to help companies “reach growth-investor readiness” by supporting startups from their seed through Series B, a model Douglas would like to see replicated throughout the region. “We need another 20 World Funds out there in the market to start filling this capital shortfall,” he told me. The firm announced last February that it’s raising a second, €500 million fund, but that’s yet to close.
One of the primary reasons European growth-stage investors have less capital to deploy comes down to the structure of European financial markets, which remain heavily reliant on bank lending rather than higher-risk equity investments. As a result, institutional investors like pension funds, insurers, and endowments never built the habit of investing in venture capital, which shows up when comparing the LP bases across the two regions: In the U.S., about 72% of VC funding comes from private institutional investors, compared with just 30% in Europe. Public money, much of it from the European Investment Fund, helps bridge the gap, but it simply cannot match the scale of private institutions.
Pension funds are a telling case. They’re among the largest sources of venture capital in the U.S., allocating nearly 2% of their assets to VC. But in the EU, they allot just 0.018% — roughly 100 times less. And because the U.S. also has far more money sitting in pension funds than Europe does, this makes the gap in actual dollars reaching startups wider still. Without that deep pool of institutional funding, Europe struggles to support the $500 million- to $1 billion-plus funds that would have the wherewithal to lead growth-stage rounds.
The result is a self-reinforcing cycle. Large growth funds require large institutional backers, but precisely because European pension funds and other institutional investors haven’t stepped up, the venture market remains too small to absorb the kinds of $100 million-plus commitments pension investors managing billions of dollars typically want to make. “They don’t see [venture] as an asset class that they can invest in,” Douglas told me. “But the reason that it doesn’t exist is because they’re not investing themselves in that asset class.”
If there’s one thing I learned from my reporting, it’s that white these problems run deep, Europe is hardly standing still. Policymakers and investors are well aware of the disconnect and are now experimenting with strategies to close the scale-up gap and affirm the region’s position as a leader in climate innovation.
To attract more institutional investment, for example, a growing number of initiatives aim to create “funds of funds” and other government-backed structures that pool money from pension funds, insurers, banks, foundations, and other large investors. The fund-of-funds structure lets an institution make a single, large commitment; then, intermediary asset managers break that capital into smaller chunks and invest it across multiple venture funds. This gives large-ticket investors the scale and diversification they want without requiring them to conduct due diligence on dozens of small venture funds; venture managers, in turn, gain access to much larger pools of capital.
Germany’s Wachstumsfonds Deutschland, for example, is a €1 billion fund-of-funds backed by more than 20 investors — including insurers, pension funds, and large family offices — that invests across the German and broader European VC ecosystem, with a focus on growth-stage capital. The EU’s European Tech Champions Initiative follows a similar model. The European Investment Bank and six member-states launched the initiative in 2023 with €3.9 billion to back regional growth-stage VC funds. Now it’s raising a second tranche of money — targeting €15 billion — and is bringing in private institutional capital for the first time.
Europe’s member states have also pushed institutional investors toward coordinated capital commitments in recent years, with France’s Tibi initiative serving as the model. Launched in 2019, it tasks the French government with vetting venture and growth funds, with those that qualify becoming eligible for backing from initiative’s signatories, primarily insurers and some pension funds. The program has attracted about €31 billion in commitments to date. Germany adopted a similar approach with its WIN initiative, which has now secured €12 billion in pledges from more than 30 major corporations — including Deutsche Bank, BlackRock, and Henkel — to invest in the country’s venture ecosystem by 2030.
The Irish Venture Capital Association has proposed a similar model, while Tibi’s founder — the economist Philippe Tibi himself — has been on a tour essentially pitching the idea across the bloc. But Ioannou isn’t convinced that creating country-specific Tibi-style commitments is the most efficient way for the region to scale climate tech.
“I’m not sure that fragmentation will actually solve the problem,” he told me. “Maybe it will be better if all that capital came into one larger fund, whereby the scale-ups wouldn’t have to deal with country level fragmentation, regulations, jurisdictions, legal, and all that kind of stuff.”
That’s the idea behind the new €5 billion pan-EU Scaleup Europe Fund, which is designed to invest directly in European deep-tech startups — climate tech very much included — rather than through venture funds. Announced last year, the fund has already secured roughly €2.5 billion in capital commitments from both the European Commission and private institutional investors, with a second fundraising round planned for the second half of this year. EQT, Europe’s largest private-markets investor, will manage the funds, ultimately deciding which growth-stage companies to back.
“Everything happened so quickly, from agreeing to it to executing on it to allocating it,” Douglas told me. “In effect, it happened in less than a year, which in the European context is crazy.”
The idea is to replicate what the combination of U.S. federal support and deep private capital markets has accomplished, Dimitri Colin, a policy officer at the cleantech policy and advocacy group Cleantech for Europe, told me. “The whole idea is to bring what worked in the U.S. into European public financing policies,” he said. Colin extolled the virtues of the Biden-era Loan Programs Office, as well as the efficacy of other Inflation Reduction Act-fueled efforts such as generous production tax credits when it comes to derisking investment in first-of-a-kind tech.
In our interview as well as in a recent report, Colin argued that EU funding should move from prioritizing grants to loan and equity guarantees in its forthcoming budget for the years 2028 through 2034. That’s because guarantees have proven far more effective than government grants at bringing private investors into climate tech, Colin told me. According to his report, every euro of grants or equity capital channeled through the VC arm of the European Innovation Council yields about €3 in additional investment. That’s nothing to scoff at, but it pales in comparison with InvestEU, the bloc’s €26.2 billion investment guarantee program. Every euro of guarantees from the latter attracts nearly €14.80 in private follow-on capital.
“The main idea behind the whole budget should be to focus on the leverage effect,” Colin told me, referring to how much additional private funding government backing generates. “How can the little public money that we have in Europe — because the fiscal environment is, of course, very constrained — more easily mobilize private money? That’s what the LPO did well.”
Colin also wants to change the EU’s public funding rules to make it easier to subsidize ongoing operational expenses for early-stage cleantech facilities, similar in effect to U.S. production tax credits. Currently, European policymakers often structure public support for these projects as capex grants paid out after construction is complete. This type of support is more difficult for private investors to underwrite since it doesn’t directly improve the plant’s ongoing operating economics, one of the risks investors care about most.
Getting these financing structures right is a matter of life or death for many of Europe’s most promising climate tech industries. Douglas points to batteries, critical minerals, semiconductors, and green molecules as sectors with the technological readiness to scale domestically — but not yet the capital. “One of the major risks in every sector we know is who’s going to be there, who’s going to be able to go with us on that journey to make sure the company has the capital to be successful,” he told me. Still, he sees reason for optimism. Because if there’s one thing that can be said about the E.U. at this moment, it’s that “they’re definitely taking it seriously.”
“The perfect solution doesn’t exist,” Colin told me. “We need to align the funding models, we need public de-risking tools, but we need also a true industrial strategy, China has done that, the US has done that with the IRA,” he explained. Now it’s Europe’s turn.
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What would happen to Project Jupiter if the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act is passed?
One of the nation’s largest data centers is struggling under permitting woes. So let’s play a game: would the bipartisan permitting bill in Congress make the path easier, or might the federal legislation be irrelevant to large hyperscalers under development today?
Meet Project Jupiter, a mega project in southern New Mexico in Dona Ana County under development by Oracle and OpenAI, with financial backing from SoftBank and political support from the Trump administration for being a part of Stargate, a major Trump administration public-private initiative boosting AI development. Project Jupiter would be one of the largest data centers in the country if completed and currently is expected to run on a microgrid powered by fuel cells converting gas to electricity, which the developers claim will burn much cleaner than a typical off-grid gas turbine power plant.
Solving the energy side of the equation is a major hurdle for Jupiter, largely because of permitting delays and legal challenges.
In mid-September, the New Mexico Supreme Court lifted a stay it placed on consideration of the project’s state air permitting application. But on Wednesday, the Santa Fe New Mexican published emails between the New Mexico Environment Department and Project Jupiter staff detailing that independent emissions modeling showed pollution would be greater than predicted by the developers, after they had already requested permission to emit more CO2 than the state’s three largest cities combined. A final decision on the air permit was expected in November; the emails suggest the deadline may slip further. After the emails were reported, Oracle declared it would try to reduce emissions from the site by more than 30%.
At the same time, the New Mexico Justice Department is opposing the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s environmental assessment under the National Environmental Policy Act for a gas pipeline key to powering the project. The state’s attorneys assert the agency improperly failed to examine how the data center’s use of the pipeline would affect the environment. This week, a dozen GOP attorneys general representing states with large gas industries wrote FERC insisting they ignore the state’s protests, arguing that a recent Supreme Court ruling – known colloquially as Seven County – meant the federal government doesn’t need to look at the data centers gas pipelines are feeding when the lines are reviewed. Oracle has declared a “force majeure” over the pipeline delay. Rumors have circulated that trucks may just bring gas in for operations; company representatives told the Dona Ana County Commission this week those claims were “misinformation.”
Amidst these delays and potential legal conflicts, I’ve sought to understand whether projects like these – large data centers racing to operate within the next year or two – would be affected by enactment of the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act of 2026, a major permitting reform deal negotiated in part by New Mexico’s senior senator, Energy and Natural Resources chairman Martin Heinrich.
In Washington D.C., this legislation is exciting many constituencies, including energy industry types, policy wonks, business-friendly climate advocates. At the same time, more conservation-minded environmental groups opposed to provisions benefiting the fossil fuel industry are leaning into an argument that the legislation would accelerate a new era of gas-dominant data center construction.
Last week, I wrote about the environmentalists’ argument. I also examined the parts of the bill unlocking a new transmission build-out and requiring data center ratepayer protection. If enacted, FERC would have to require utilities to charge data centers not only for the costs of new grid upgrades but the charges incurred for using the grid, too. As my colleague Robinson Meyer has written, by forcing AI infrastructure operators to pay for both embedded and incremental energy costs, the legislation would essentially mean data centers paying both to reduce rates and build new energy generation. We’re seeing in real time what happens when you don’t deal with the transmission connection system while building new grid upgrades: companies will often opt to just build their own private off-grid fossil fuel islands. In Texas, for example, we’re seeing transmission hook-up delays lead to companies just building their own gas plants instead. This is not to say companies won’t still go off the grid if this bill passes, but it’s a serious consequence of our dilapidated energy system worth considering.
So I decided to evaluate Project Jupiter as a test case. How might the permitting bill affect this project and other big data centers at a stage like it?
For starters, let's say what the permitting bill does not do. It wouldn’t change the Clean Air Act. Project Jupiter would be one of the largest data centers in the country if completed, as well as potentially one of the nation’s biggest CO2 emitters if permitted as proposed. Nothing in the bill would affect requirements that the project adhere to national air emissions standards, so it wouldn’t affect the New Mexico Environment Department’s pending decision around the project’s air permits.
Enacting BAAJA could potentially affect this sprawling data center project in extremely hypothetical ways. It would reduce legal risks associated with future interstate gas pipelines under development expected to potentially branch out to Project Jupiter, including the Desert Southwest Expansion pipeline. It’s easy to understand in the words of Robert Pattinson in Primetime how this looks: like an easier path to expanding gas generation in this area.
On renewables, the bipartisan permitting deal would codify new permitting certainty and timeline provisions that claim to make it easier for companies to pursue solar development on federal acreage managed by the Bureau of Land Management. Project Jupiter just concluded a request for proposals to procure two gigawatts of renewable energy including solar power to meet the developers’ pledge to achieve 100% carbon matching by 2031 and Thiagarajan previously told the commission they’ve examined potentially getting energy from solar projects nearby on BLM lands.
But all of this is too theoretical and the case for any individual early-stage energy project too. Not to mention that we have no idea how the Trump administration would implement this certainty language, even for Project Jupiter.
To me, if people want to earnestly understand how the bipartisan permitting bill might actually affect data centers, they need to fully consider how making it easier and more transparent to hook up to the existing electric grid could reduce how much on-site gas generation is used at AI data center operations.
Delays in state permitting for the off-grid fuel cell plant have led Project Jupiter’s developers to consider what turning to the power grid would look like. In early September during a Dona Ana County commission meeting, Oracle executive vice president Mahest Thiagarajan told the panel, “If we end up in a situation where the air permit is not actually approved, I do have to work with a grid provider. Whether it is actually part of the grid or they built the grid for me could be TBD.”
“It doesn’t need to be on the grid, but I need [a] source of power to help power the data center,” Thiagarajan said.
Commission chair Manuel Sanchez replied that the microgrid plans were established in their community benefit agreement but he supported proposals requiring data center developers paying for upgrades and directly paying to reduce electricity rates for nearby residents. “It’s actually provided a downward pressure on rates,” Sanchez said, referring directly to such a policy created by the Georgia Public Service Commission.
Thiagarajan agreed. “My current plan is to continue to work with NMED [the New Mexico Environment Division] and get the off-grid site. If for any reason we have to, because I don’t have the air permit and I have to build the site, I strongly believe it has to come with me bringing down pressure to the rates. Period. I don’t think that’s a question of, I’m not increasing the rates. I actually have to come in and say, I am lowering the rates here.”
If Congress enacted this permitting bill in the lame duck, would Project Jupiter ditch plans to be off grid? It’s challenging to prove or disprove such a hypothetical. Representatives for the project did not respond to requests for comment. But we know any attempts at grid hookups without greater ratepayer protections are only leading to more conflict locally; this week, when Project Jupiter tried proposing a hook up to the grid for emergency power, the county commission fumed. Right now, the plan is still to power Project Jupiter with the gas fuel cell generation on site.
As I concluded this research, I noticed Heinrich’s office has actually promoted news coverage about what his efforts to enact data center ratepayer protections would do to Project Jupiter.
In early August, as the Senate was leaving for a summer recess, his office republished a Santa Fe New Mexican article about legislation the senator authored – the GRID Savings Act – and its potential impact on Project Jupiter. The article claimed that if Project Jupiter was unable to get its air permit, they’d be able to get power a different way under his proposal. The local news outlet also quoted an email from Sanchez, the county commission chair, stating that Heinrich’s bill “could be an avenue for Project Jupiter to fulfill their requirements if the air permit is denied.” Sanchez did not respond to requests for comment.
So I asked Senator Heinrich’s office for comment about this republished article, as well as if his permitting deal would indeed help ensure Project Jupiter was completed and came online. To conclude this story, here is their full statement:
The Senator has been clear that building big things responsibly means putting communities first. As he stated in his interview with the Albuquerque Journal, Project Jupiter botched community engagement from the start.
BAAJA is about making sure we build the energy infrastructure we need while keeping costs down for families and small businesses in New Mexico and across the country. The legislation would help get new energy generation, primarily clean energy, on the grid. By getting the energy onto the grid, states like New Mexico, which has enacted the Energy Transition Act, can continue working to ensure the energy powering our grid is increasingly clean.
The Senator has fought to ensure that growing energy demand doesn’t come at the expense of New Mexicans’ electricity bills by requiring data centers to pay for all of their associated transmission costs, rather than those costs shifting onto ratepayers. Ultimately, the Senator strongly believes that any major development, including data centers, should come as a benefit to the communities that host them, not a burden — and that starts with meaningful community engagement and real benefits for New Mexicans.
To be clear, BAAJA is federal legislation focused on energy infrastructure and grid connectivity. It does not ‘permit’ data centers. State and local government approval is still required. The Senator's legislation addresses the federal energy infrastructure challenges associated with a grid that cannot keep up with demand; it does not circumvent the state and local processes that determine whether Project Jupiter moves forward.
Media representatives for Project Jupiter did not respond to requests for comment.
And more of the week’s top news around project fights.
1. New England (and Maryland) – The Trump administration is still messing with offshore wind farms, even while trying to pass a permitting reform deal. Examining the court filings reveals why they may feel empowered to do it — and I’m not sure how this ends.
2. Columbia County, N.Y. – New York’s renewable energy permitting office has rejected an upstate solar farm on farmland as a House Democrat representing the area joined hands with the Trump administration in publicly railing against the project.
3. Cumberland County, N.J. – The Vineland data center project is impacting the sector’s reputation in the Garden State.
4. Hood County, Texas – It looks like this corner of Hill Country is going back to court over a data center.
These seven elections could change state energy policy.
No matter how well Democrats do in the House and Senate in November, it’s unlikely to mean anything new on climate policy in Washington, D.C., for as long as Donald Trump remains in the White House.
That is not true when it comes to the other elections this year.
Several states are on the verge of a possible Democratic trifecta, meaning unified control of both chambers of the state legislature and the governor’s mansion. It’s a position that could enable such states to either top off existing climate and energy policies passed in the last decade or to make the first real run at climate legislation in recent history.
There are also several races for control of public utilities commissions — and, in turn, for influence over rates and the potential adoption or expansion of clean energy — that are being closely watched.
Here are some of the biggest climate races beyond the House and Senate.
Minnesota passed its comprehensive climate legislation in 2023 after Governor Tim Walz won reelection in 2022 and the state Senate flipped to Democratic control. The bill included a 100% clean energy goal for 2040. Almost a year after Walz signed his bill, Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer signed her own, with a 100% clean energy target for 2040, along with energy efficiency and permitting streamlining. Walz would also sign a follow-on permitting bill in 2024. That November, however, Democrats lost control of both state houses (sort of — you’ll see).
Now many climate advocates and strategists look forward to possibly regaining trifectas in the two upper Midwestern states. “They’re in a spot where they haven’t been able to pass anything for two years,” Caroline Spears, the executive director of Climate Cabinet, a nonprofit advocacy group, told me. She said a priority for both states would be writing laws specific to data centers to make sure the energy they use is clean and they don’t increase costs for residential ratepayers.
“What you’re able to do when you have multiple bites at the apple is change your existing energy policy to match the current market and match the current needs, and that’s what Minnesota and Michigan have to do now,” Spears said.
In the case of Michigan, the House of Representatives stands at 58 Republicans to 52 Democrats, while the Senate is 20 Democrats to 18 Republicans. In Minnesota, Democrats have a one-seat edge in the House of Representatives, with 67 seats, compared to the Republicans’ 66 thanks to a Republican resignation (68 are required to reach a majority). But the House is still under a power-sharing agreement with a Republican speaker. Ballotpedia currently rates the possibility of a Democratic trifecta in either state as a “toss-up,” although Minnesota has a slightly easier path.
In both Michigan and Minnesota, a trifecta could deliver “policies that are focused on reigning in utilities’ profits to bolster affordability,” Courtney Brady, Evergreen Action’s senior Midwest director, told me.
“Really strong guardrails are needed in Michigan to ensure that data centers and utilities that are providing them energy have to continue to abide by the state’s clean energy laws,” Brady added.
Michigan Democratic gubernatorial candidate and Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson said she would “ban rate increases that are only being used to pad profits” and implement performance-based standards for utility payouts. She also said she would “conduct a comprehensive audit of our power grid and address the vulnerabilities and outdated infrastructure of our aging energy infrastructure.” Benson’s energy platform “heavily focuses on affordability,” Charlotte Jameson of the Michigan Environmental Council, a clean air and water nonprofit, told me.
Amy Klobuchar, the Democratic candidate for governor in Minnesota, has been less specific, typically including utility costs in a laundry list of affordability items including health care, housing, and child care.
And while Michigan does have a clean power standard, “We’ve not in Michigan really tackled transportation sector emissions, or frankly, housing and buildings,” Jameson said. A Democratic trifecta could shift transportation spending toward mass transit and away from lane widening, Jameson added, and could devote resources to electric-vehicle charging. Benson has also supported bringing high-speed rail to Michigan.
While Michigan and Minnesota have passed climate legislation that could be revisited for the age of load growth, several states may elect Democratic trifectas for the first time in decades, giving them a first shot at climate policymaking. Strategists and activists are targeting Wisconsin, Arizona, and Pennsylvania.
In Wisconsin, Republicans have an 18-15 majority in the state Senate, with half the seats up for reelection; Democrats only need to flip two. To gain control of the state Assembly, Democrats would need to flip five seats in the 99-member chamber.
Any energy legislation in the next session would likely address data center construction and ratepayer protection, including empowering utility regulators to better scrutinize requests for new gas plants and demand projections, Brady told me. Wisconsin Democratic gubernatorial candidate David Crowley has also proposed bolstering the state’s existing weatherization and efficiency programs.
In Arizona, where Republicans have a four-seat majority in the state Senate and a 33-27 majority in the House of Representatives, the oncoming Democratic trifecta is always an election away. While Arizonans have elected Democrats to both U.S. Senate seats — and to governor, with Katie Hobbs running for reelection — the party hasn’t controlled any house of the Arizona state legislature since the early 1990s. This has meant that progress on energy legislation has so far largely consisted of Hobbs vetoing anti-renewables legislation passed by Republican majorities.
A Democratic majority could do more to encourage solar development in the sunny state. “The thing we’ve always been pushing for with the Arizona state legislature in getting to a trifecta is any kind of clean energy incentive bill,” John Qua, campaign director at Lead Locally, a group that works to elect progressive candidates, told me. He also said a Democratic majority in the statehouse could implement “guardrails” on energy and water use by data centers in the state.
In Pennsylvania, Republicans hold a four-seat majority in the state Senate while Democrats have a three-seat majority in the House of Representatives. With Democratic Governor Josh Shapiro likely cruising to reelection, climate advocates are looking at maybe finally having an opportunity to pass legislation in a major energy-producing and exporting state with relatively little renewable generation. This could include beefing up standards for clean energy generation for the state’s utilities and getting the Senate to agree to a community solar bill.
Qua said that majority makers in the state legislature support “strong regulations of data centers somewhere between very tough guardrails and moratoriums,” and would likely push Shapiro to continue his turn against rampant data center development.
The 2025 Georgia Public Service Commission elections revolved almost entirely around data centers and electricity costs and resulted in two massive Democratic wins for the utility regulator. Now one of those commissioners, Peter Hubbard, is running for reelection following his special election victory, and another Democrat, Shelia Edwards, could flip partisan control of the PSC if she and Hubbard both win. A super PAC connected to the solar industry is spending $250,000 in the race to support the two Democrats.
“The solar and storage industry is building political power by investing in high-impact local elections like the Georgia PSC races, where policymakers have significant influence over permitting, utility policy, regulation, and energy markets,” Steph Bosh, board chair of the Community Clean Energy Coalition, said in a statement. “Building a durable network of solar and storage champions across the country is a long-term strategy, not a one-year effort, and we’re focused on scaling that work with industry buy-in.”
A Democratic PSC would likely look more skeptically on deals between data center developers and Georgia’s dominant utility, Georgia Power, and would be more friendly to deployment of solar and storage to meet the state’s growing electricity needs.
The other utility regulator race getting national attention is the Arizona Corporation Commission, which has two seats up for election this year. Arizona’s Democratic Attorney General Kris Mayes has tangled with the Republican-controlled board over data centers and the possibility of shifting costs towards ratepayers. The Commission currently has five Republicans, but both Qua and Spears told me part of the challenge is getting voters — who may be voting for Hobbs and other Democratic candidates — to realize the Corporation Commission is a partisan race at all. “It’s standard for most people to say, ‘I think I know what the Arizona Corporation Commission is, but I'm just not sure,’” Spears told me.
“In terms of our get-out-the-vote work, we are mostly focused on hiring organizers for the state legislature,” Qua said. “And then as a second ask: ‘Also, have you heard of the corporation commission?’”