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There is one area where China depends on U.S. imports: the building materials for plastics.

While much of the focus of President Donald Trump’s trade war has been on the United States’ yawning trade deficit with China, the U.S. does have considerable exports going the other way — agricultural products like soybeans, technology products like semiconductors, and fossil fuels and petroleum products.
Those exports are not just actual crude oil, but also petrochemical feedstocks, which are a key input for China’s industrial production and represent a rare area of Chinese dependence on the United States.
To the extent this trade is imperiled by 125% tariffs on U.S. imports to China, put in place after the U.S. applied 145% tariffs to Chinese imports, it will be yet another example of how Trump’s second term could prove ironically disastrous for the oil and gas industry — first by making its inputs more expensive, then by helping sink oil prices, and now by inducing large taxes on American exports.
One of those feedstocks is ethane, which is extracted from natural gas. The U.S.-China ethane trade is relatively new — the first U.S. ethane ship left Morgan’s Point, Texas in 2019. Since then, annual U.S. exports to China have increased from just under 4 million barrels to 83 million barrels in 2024, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. U.S. feedstock exports to China have grown up alongside China’s petrochemical industry, to the point where analysts at S&P Global have warned of “overcapacity.”
“The speed and scale of the expansion of China’s petrochemical sector dwarfs any historical precedent,” wrote the International Energy Agency in 2023, noting that planned production capacity increases in China since 2019 for ethylene and propylene were set to match all production capacity in Europe, Japan, and Korea combined.
The U.S.-China trade in petrochemical feedstocks had, until this year, represented the strengths of each respective economy working in sync to buoy global manufacturing. U.S. production of ethane and other liquids had soared thanks to the fracking boom. In turn, China invested heavily in its capacity to process these fuels and churn out plastics for use across its economy — and often in exports back to the United States.
I reached out to a number of companies involved in ethane and propane exports, as well as trade groups for the oil and gas industry to talk about how tariffs are affecting their business. None of them responded.
But it is safe to say that business could soon be starved of key inputs.
“U.S. energy flows to China are done unless Beijing and D.C. come to an agreement,” Gregory Brew, an analyst at the Eurasia Group, told me. “China is already looking to buy more crude from OPEC states to make up for losing U.S. [imports]. NGLs are sure to follow.”
Those “NGLs”, a.k.a.natural gas liquids, including ethane, propane, and butane, are produced as a byproduct of oil and gas drilling and processing and are often used as feedstocks for making plastics. Ethane is converted into ethylene by a high-heat process known as “cracking,” then converted into polyethylene pellets, which find their way into many of the plastic products we use every day. A similar process turns propane, which can be derived from natural gas or crude oil, into polypropylene.
This growing mutual dependence has involved enormous capital investments in both the United States and in China to develop pipeline, storage, cooling and shipping infrastructure. The Chinese ethane processing industry was set to receive some $16 billion in new investment to import and process the gas, Reuters reported in February, while U.S. energy companies were working to expand their export capacity.
When an analyst asked James Teague, the co-chief executive of major pipeline company Enterprise Product Partners, in February about the prospect of tariff retaliation affecting exports to China, Teague noted confidently “those crackers can only use ethane,” and so “from an NGL perspective, I’m not worried.”
The ethane trade is a kind of mirror image of how U.S.-China trade is often thought of. Instead of America depending on China for batteries or rare earths, when it comes to ethane, it’s China that depends on the United States.
Almost half of all United States ethane exports went to China in 2023, according to EIA data, while the analytics firm Kpler put the portion of ethane exports in 2024 to China at 57%, according to figures cited by Reuters. “The United States represented practically all of China’s imports of the feedstock over the past seven years,” the news service reported.
“Chinese petrochemical crackers that use ethane as a feedstock rely exclusively on U.S. volumes,” according to the trade publication RBN Energy. “The tariffs will make U.S. ethane uneconomical, and these facilities will face two choices: absorb the cost or shut down.”
That risk goes both ways: “We see an increasing risk to U.S. export volumes,” wrote Citi analyst Spiro Dounis in a note to clients last week. “Both countries are heavily dependent on each other when it comes to NGLs and tariffs throw a significant wrench into the relationship.” That leaves Chinese importers of ethane with the grim choice of “either shutting in capacity or running at a loss.”
There’s likely a similar story playing out with propane and propylene. Propane exports to China have grown to over 114 million barrels in 2024, compared to just over 6 million 10 years prior, according to EIA data.
The price of propane in the United States has “plummeted” since China imposed its retaliatory tariffs, according to Bloomberg, while Chinese importers of the fuel are “getting gouged by traders taking advantage of their distress.”
“China … will face higher costs and potential shutdowns of [propane dehydrogenation] plants due to increased procurement costs and reduced downstream demand,” Drewry analyst Nisha Manav told me in an email. “This could lead to demand destruction in the country due to reduced operating rates at PDH plants. Alternatively, the U.S. will struggle to find alternative markets, leading to inventory build-ups and lower export opportunities.”
The EIA called our propane specifically in its most recent short term energy outlook, released this month. “We expect that China’s retaliatory tariffs on U.S. goods will have the largest effect on propane,” the report’s authors said. That will likely lead to increased inventories of propane in the United States and lower prices domestically.
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According to a new analysis shared exclusively with Heatmap, coal’s equipment-related outage rate is about twice as high as wind’s.
The Trump administration wants “beautiful clean coal” to return to its place of pride on the electric grid because, it says, wind and solar are just too unreliable. “If we want to keep the lights on and prevent blackouts from happening, then we need to keep our coal plants running. Affordable, reliable and secure energy sources are common sense,” Chris Wright said on X in July, in what has become a steady drumbeat from the administration that has sought to subsidize coal and put a regulatory straitjacket around solar and (especially) wind.
This has meant real money spent in support of existing coal plants. The administration’s emergency order to keep Michigan’s J.H. Campbell coal plant open (“to secure grid reliability”), for example, has cost ratepayers served by Michigan utility Consumers Energy some $80 million all on its own.
But … how reliable is coal, actually? According to an analysis by the Environmental Defense Fund of data from the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, a nonprofit that oversees reliability standards for the grid, coal has the highest “equipment-related outage rate” — essentially, the percentage of time a generator isn’t working because of some kind of mechanical or other issue related to its physical structure — among coal, hydropower, natural gas, nuclear, and wind. Coal’s outage rate was over 12%. Wind’s was about 6.6%.
“When EDF’s team isolated just equipment-related outages, wind energy proved far more reliable than coal, which had the highest outage rate of any source NERC tracks,” EDF told me in an emailed statement.
Coal’s reliability has, in fact, been decreasing, Oliver Chapman, a research analyst at EDF, told me.
NERC has attributed this falling reliability to the changing role of coal in the energy system. Reliability “negatively correlates most strongly to capacity factor,” or how often the plant is running compared to its peak capacity. The data also “aligns with industry statements indicating that reduced investment in maintenance and abnormal cycling that are being adopted primarily in response to rapid changes in the resource mix are negatively impacting baseload coal unit performance.” In other words, coal is struggling to keep up with its changing role in the energy system. That’s due not just to the growth of solar and wind energy, which are inherently (but predictably) variable, but also to natural gas’s increasing prominence on the grid.
“When coal plants are having to be a bit more varied in their generation, we're seeing that wear and tear of those plants is increasing,” Chapman said. “The assumption is that that's only going to go up in future years.”
The issue for any plan to revitalize the coal industry, Chapman told me, is that the forces driving coal into this secondary role — namely the economics of running aging plants compared to natural gas and renewables — do not seem likely to reverse themselves any time soon.
Coal has been “sort of continuously pushed a bit more to the sidelines by renewables and natural gas being cheaper sources for utilities to generate their power. This increased marginalization is going to continue to lead to greater wear and tear on these plants,” Chapman said.
But with electricity demand increasing across the country, coal is being forced into a role that it might not be able to easily — or affordably — play, all while leading to more emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, particulate matter, mercury, and, of course, carbon dioxide.
The coal system has been beset by a number of high-profile outages recently, including at the largest new coal plant in the country, Sandy Creek in Texas, which could be offline until early 2027, according to the Texas energy market ERCOT and the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis.
In at least one case, coal’s reliability issues were cited as a reason to keep another coal generating unit open past its planned retirement date.
Last month, Colorado Representative Will Hurd wrote a letter to the Department of Energy asking for emergency action to keep Unit 2 of the Comanche coal plant in Pueblo, Colorado open past its scheduled retirement at the end of his year. Hurd cited “mechanical and regulatory constraints” for the larger Unit 3 as a justification for keeping Unit 2 open, to fill in the generation gap left by the larger unit. In a filing by Xcel and several Colorado state energy officials also requesting delaying the retirement of Unit 2, they disclosed that the larger Unit 3 “experienced an unplanned outage and is offline through at least June 2026.”
Reliability issues aside, high electricity demand may turn into short-term profits at all levels of the coal industry, from the miners to the power plants.
At the same time the Trump administration is pushing coal plants to stay open past their scheduled retirement, the Energy Information Administration is forecasting that natural gas prices will continue to rise, which could lead to increased use of coal for electricity generation. The EIA forecasts that the 2025 average price of natural gas for power plants will rise 37% from 2024 levels.
Analysts at S&P Global Commodity Insights project “a continued rebound in thermal coal consumption throughout 2026 as thermal coal prices remain competitive with short-term natural gas prices encouraging gas-to-coal switching,” S&P coal analyst Wendy Schallom told me in an email.
“Stronger power demand, rising natural gas prices, delayed coal retirements, stockpiles trending lower, and strong thermal coal exports are vital to U.S. coal revival in 2025 and 2026.”
And we’re all going to be paying the price.
Rural Marylanders have asked for the president’s help to oppose the data center-related development — but so far they haven’t gotten it.
A transmission line in Maryland is pitting rural conservatives against Big Tech in a way that highlights the growing political sensitivities of the data center backlash. Opponents of the project want President Trump to intervene, but they’re worried he’ll ignore them — or even side with the data center developers.
The Piedmont Reliability Project would connect the Peach Bottom nuclear plant in southern Pennsylvania to electricity customers in northern Virginia, i.e.data centers, most likely. To get from A to B, the power line would have to criss-cross agricultural lands between Baltimore, Maryland and the Washington D.C. area.
As we chronicle time and time again in The Fight, residents in farming communities are fighting back aggressively – protesting, petitioning, suing and yelling loudly. Things have gotten so tense that some are refusing to let representatives for Piedmont’s developer, PSEG, onto their properties, and a court battle is currently underway over giving the company federal marshal protection amid threats from landowners.
Exacerbating the situation is a quirk we don’t often deal with in The Fight. Unlike energy generation projects, which are usually subject to local review, transmission sits entirely under the purview of Maryland’s Public Service Commission, a five-member board consisting entirely of Democrats appointed by current Governor Wes Moore – a rumored candidate for the 2028 Democratic presidential nomination. It’s going to be months before the PSC formally considers the Piedmont project, and it likely won’t issue a decision until 2027 – a date convenient for Moore, as it’s right after he’s up for re-election. Moore last month expressed “concerns” about the project’s development process, but has brushed aside calls to take a personal position on whether it should ultimately be built.
Enter a potential Trump card that could force Moore’s hand. In early October, commissioners and state legislators representing Carroll County – one of the farm-heavy counties in Piedmont’s path – sent Trump a letter requesting that he intervene in the case before the commission. The letter followed previous examples of Trump coming in to kill planned projects, including the Grain Belt Express transmission line and a Tennessee Valley Authority gas plant in Tennessee that was relocated after lobbying from a country rock musician.
One of the letter’s lead signatories was Kenneth Kiler, president of the Carroll County Board of Commissioners, who told me this lobbying effort will soon expand beyond Trump to the Agriculture and Energy Departments. He’s hoping regulators weigh in before PJM, the regional grid operator overseeing Mid-Atlantic states. “We’re hoping they go to PJM and say, ‘You’re supposed to be managing the grid, and if you were properly managing the grid you wouldn’t need to build a transmission line through a state you’re not giving power to.’”
Part of the reason why these efforts are expanding, though, is that it’s been more than a month since they sent their letter, and they’ve heard nothing but radio silence from the White House.
“My worry is that I think President Trump likes and sees the need for data centers. They take a lot of water and a lot of electric [power],” Kiler, a Republican, told me in an interview. “He’s conservative, he values property rights, but I’m not sure that he’s not wanting data centers so badly that he feels this request is justified.”
Kiler told me the plan to kill the transmission line centers hinges on delaying development long enough that interest rates, inflation and rising demand for electricity make it too painful and inconvenient to build it through his resentful community. It’s easy to believe the federal government flexing its muscle here would help with that, either by drawing out the decision-making or employing some other as yet unforeseen stall tactic. “That’s why we’re doing this second letter to the Secretary of Agriculture and Secretary of Energy asking them for help. I think they may be more sympathetic than the president,” Kiler said.
At the moment, Kiler thinks the odds of Piedmont’s construction come down to a coin flip – 50-50. “They’re running straight through us for data centers. We want this project stopped, and we’ll fight as well as we can, but it just seems like ultimately they’re going to do it,” he confessed to me.
Thus is the predicament of the rural Marylander. On the one hand, Kiler’s situation represents a great opportunity for a GOP president to come in and stand with his base against a would-be presidential candidate. On the other, data center development and artificial intelligence represent one of the president’s few economic bright spots, and he has dedicated copious policy attention to expanding growth in this precise avenue of the tech sector. It’s hard to imagine something less “energy dominance” than killing a transmission line.
The White House did not respond to a request for comment.
Plus more of the week’s most important fights around renewable energy.
1. Wayne County, Nebraska – The Trump administration fined Orsted during the government shutdown for allegedly killing bald eagles at two of its wind projects, the first indications of financial penalties for energy companies under Trump’s wind industry crackdown.
2. Ocean County, New Jersey – Speaking of wind, I broke news earlier this week that one of the nation’s largest renewable energy projects is now deceased: the Leading Light offshore wind project.
3. Dane County, Wisconsin – The fight over a ginormous data center development out here is turning into perhaps one of the nation’s most important local conflicts over AI and land use.
4. Hardeman County, Texas – It’s not all bad news today for renewable energy – because it never really is.