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It took the market about a week to catch up to the fact that the Chinese artificial intelligence firm DeepSeek had released an open-source AI model that rivaled those from prominent U.S. companies such as OpenAI and Anthropic — and that, most importantly, it had managed to do so much more cheaply and efficiently than its domestic competitors. The news cratered not only tech stocks such as Nvidia, but energy stocks, as well, leading to assumptions that investors thought more-energy efficient AI would reduce energy demand in the sector overall.
But will it really? While some in climate world assumed the same and celebrated the seemingly good news, many venture capitalists, AI proponents, and analysts quickly arrived at essentially the opposite conclusion — that cheaper AI will only lead to greater demand for AI. The resulting unfettered proliferation of the technology across a wide array of industries could thus negate the energy efficiency gains, ultimately leading to a substantial net increase in data center power demand overall.
“With cost destruction comes proliferation,” Susan Su, a climate investor at the venture capital firm Toba Capital, told me. “Plus the fact that it’s open source, I think, is a really, really big deal. It puts the power to expand and to deploy and to proliferate into billions of hands.”
If you’ve seen lots of chitchat about Jevons paradox of late, that’s basically what this line of thinking boils down to. After Microsoft’s CEO Satya Nadella responded to DeepSeek mania by posting the Wikipedia page for this 19th century economic theory on X, many (myself included) got a quick crash course on its origins. The idea is that as technical efficiencies of the Victorian era made burning coal cheaper, demand for — and thus consumption of — coal actually increased.
While this is a distinct possibility in the AI space, it’s by no means a guarantee. “This is very much, I think, an open question,“ energy expert Nat Bullard told me, with regards to whether DeepSeek-type models will spur a reduction or increase in energy demand. “I sort of lean in both directions at once.” Formerly the chief content officer at BloombergNEF and current co-founder of the AI startup Halcyon, a search and information platform for energy professionals, Bullard is personally excited for the greater efficiencies and optionality that new AI models can bring to his business.
But he warns that just because DeepSeek was cheap to train — the company claims it cost about $5.5 million, while domestic models cost hundreds of millions or even billions — doesn’t mean that it’s cheap or energy-efficient to operate. “Training more efficiently does not necessarily mean that you can run it that much more efficiently,” Bullard told me. When a large language model answers a question or provides any type of output, it’s said to be making an “inference.” And as Bullard explains, “That may mean, as we move into an era of more and more inference and not just training, then the [energy] impacts could be rather muted.”
DeepSeek-R1, the name for the model that caused the investor freakout, is also a newer type of LLM that uses more energy in general. Up until literally a few days ago, when OpenAI released o3-mini for free, most casual users were probably interacting with so-called “pretrained” AI models. Fed on gobs of internet text, these LLMs spit out answers based primarily on prediction and pattern recognition. DeepSeek released a model like this, called V3, in September. But last year, more advanced “reasoning” models, which can “think,” in some sense, started blowing up. These models — which include o3-mini, the latest version of Anthropic’s Claude, and the now infamous DeepSeek-R1 — have the ability to try out different strategies to arrive at the correct answer, recognize their mistakes, and improve their outputs, allowing for significant advancements in areas such as math and coding.
But all that artificial reasoning eats up a lot of energy. As Sasha Luccioni, the AI and climate lead at Hugging Face, which makes an open-source platform for AI projects, wrote on LinkedIn, “To set things clear about DeepSeek + sustainability: (it seems that) training is much shorter/cheaper/more efficient than traditional LLMs, *but* inference is longer/more expensive/less efficient because of the chain of thought aspect.” Chain of thought refers to the reasoning process these newer models undertake. Luccioni wrote that she’s currently working to evaluate the energy efficiency of both the DeepSeek V3 and R1 models.
Another factor that could influence energy demand is how fast domestic companies respond to the DeepSeek breakthrough with their own new and improved models. Amy Francetic, co-founder at Buoyant Ventures, doesn’t think we’ll have to wait long. “One effect of DeepSeek is that it will highly motivate all of the large LLMs in the U.S. to go faster,” she told me. And because a lot of the big players are fundamentally constrained by energy availability, she’s crossing her fingers that this means they’ll work smarter, not harder. “Hopefully it causes them to find these similar efficiencies rather than just, you know, pouring more gasoline into a less fuel-efficient vehicle.”
In her recent Substack post, Su described three possible futures when it comes to AI’s role in the clean energy transition. The ideal is that AI demand scales slowly enough that nuclear and renewables scale with it. The least hopeful is that immediate, exponential growth in AI demand leads to a similar expansion of fossil fuels, locking in new dirty infrastructure for decades. “I think that's already been happening,” Su told me. And then there’s the techno-optimist scenario, linked to figures like Sam Altman, which Su doesn’t put much stock in — that AI “drives the energy revolution” by helping to create new energy technologies and efficiencies that more than offset the attendant increase in energy demand.
Which scenario predominates could also depend upon whether greater efficiencies, combined with the adoption of AI by smaller, more shallow-pocketed companies, leads to a change in the scale of data centers. “There’s going to be a lot more people using AI. So maybe that means we don’t need these huge, gigawatt data centers. Maybe we need a lot more smaller, megawatt-size data centers,” Laura Katzman, a principal at Buoyant Ventures, told me. Katzman has conducted research for the firm on data center decarbonization.
Smaller data centers with a subsequently smaller energy footprint could pair well with renewable-powered microgrids, which are less practical and economically feasible for hyperscalers. That could be a big win for solar and wind plus battery storage, Katzman explained, but a boondoggle for companies such as Microsoft, which has famously committed to re-opening Pennsylvania’s Three Mile Island nuclear plant to power its data centers. “Because of DeepSeek, the expected price of compute probably doesn’t justify now turning back on some of these nuclear plants, or these other high-cost energy sources,” Katzman told me.
Lastly, it remains to be seen what nascent applications cheaper models will open up. “If somebody, say, in the Philippines or Vietnam has an interest in applying this to their own decarbonization challenge, what would they come up with?” Bullard pondered. “I don’t yet know what people would do with greater capability and lower costs and a different set of problems to solve for. And that’s really exciting to me.”
But even if the AI pessimists are right, and these newer models don’t make AI ubiquitously useful for applications from new drug discovery to easier regulatory filing, Su told me that in a certain sense, it doesn't matter much. “If there was a possibility that somebody had this type of power, and you could have it too, would you sit on the couch? Or would you arms race them? I think that is going to drive energy demand, irrespective of end utility.”
As Su told me, “I do not think there’s actually a saturation point for this.”
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At this point, I think it’s clear that AI data centers are unpopular.
You probably know it, at least. I was preparing talk about data center opposition on a podcast today and I took the opportunity to dive back into our data, so I certainly know it. At this point, we’ve written about results from our polling that show Americans overwhelmingly oppose local data center construction, that majorities of Americans now support a national data center moratorium, and that the only group of Americans who feels more optimistic than pessimistic about artificial intelligence is … men older than 65 years old.
So I got curious: Given all that, who actually supports AI data centers?
One question from our recent Heatmap Pro poll, conducted by Embold Research, helps give us a sense. This is the profile of someone our data says would support a data center built in their local area:
A few facets stand out. These data center YIMBYs are more likely to be men, and more likely to be 2024 Trump voters, but they’re not locked into one age demographic or voting cohort. A third are Harris supporters, and roughly a third are women. Data center YIMBYs are more likely to be older than 50, but the majority isn’t overwhelming.
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Perhaps more surprising: The group has many more people who voted third-party in the 2024 election (8%) than the general population (just under 2%), although that response could also include people who didn’t vote. (Alas, the data can’t quite confirm how many in this group are libertarian.)
What’s perhaps most interesting: This group overwhelmingly believes that artificial intelligence will make their lives better. And in heartening news for climate advocates, they are even more likely to support a given data center project if it is powered by renewables.
I was going to joke that the profile is essentially a newly retired engineering dad — except that, to my surprise, these data center YIMBYs are far less gender imbalanced than the American engineering profession. (They’re also less gender-imbalanced than American Tesla owners.) So I’ll leave it at that.
Five takeaways from the latest Lazard Levelized Cost of Energy report.
It’s all getting more expensive.
That’s the conclusion of the investment bank Lazard’s latest report on the levelized cost of energy, one of the most closely watched and cited energy reports of the year.
Levelized cost of energy measures the dollars per megawatt-hour a power plant needs to earn in revenue to break even over the course of its lifetime in present-value terms.
What makes LCOE so alluring is that it’s a way to compare any type of generator, whether it requires a large upfront investment but has few operating costs, like a utility-scale solar project, or whether its expenses are largely fuel costs incurred in the future, like a combined cycle natural gas plant. This is also why LCOE has its critics, who point out that a solar panel that only runs during certain times of day has a different value to the electricity system than a natural gas plant that can ramp up and down quickly or a nuclear plant that provides steady baseload power.
Anyway, here’s what we can learn from this year’s Lazard report.
Curves that were once gently sloping downward are starting to look like incipient U’s. While longterm LCOE falls are still dramatic and impressive for some technologies — utility solar has fallen from $359 per megawatt-hour in 2009 to $69 in 2026 — the short term rises are worrisome. That $69 per megawatt hour represents a nearly 10% increase from 2025, when utility-scale solar had a LCOE of $58. And it’s not just renewables — the LCOE for a combined cycle natural gas plant rose from $78 per megawatt-hour to $90 in the past year. Gas plant LCOE got as low as $60 in 2021. That’s a 50% price hike in just five years.
Lazard attributed the increase in solar and wind LCOE to “higher capital costs, sustained interest rates, tariff pass-through and supply chain repricing.” These technologies are also the most “sensitive” to subsidies by way of the tax code, with federal tax tax credits taking the low end cost of utility solar to as low as $16 per megawatt hour. To the extent those tax credits are no longer available or weren’t accessible due to strict eligibility rules, that could be a source of future upward pressure on costs.
That being said, renewables “maintain their relative cost advantage despite facing the same cost pressures affecting the rest of the generation stack,” the Lazard analysts concluded.
Natural gas, meanwhile, is seeing prices spiral upward on huge and growing customer demand.
“Continuous upward revisions to demand projections have driven a sharp increase in announced new-build gas generation despite a 15-year high LCOE and historically long development lead times,” according to Lazard.
The report hints at what LCOE is not always able to capture, namely that generators like gas have attributes besides low cost that make them attractive. “New gas combined cycle plants offer the lowest-cost dispatchable power in high-demand and low-cost-gas environments,” the analysts point out.
Anyone building a new combined cycle gas plant, however, will have to deal with the high cost and low availability for turbines, which is “extending development timelines well beyond historical norms.” That provides an opening for renewables that can be deployed quickly and cheaply, like solar and accompanied by battery storage.
In 2019, the low end of LCOE for onshore end was $28 per megawatt-hour, according to Lazard’s figures, and the high end was $54. In 2026, however, the low end costs sits a bit higher at $37 per megawatt-hour, but the high end cost rose to $99. There’s a similar story for utility solar: in 2019, the spread between low and high was a snug $8 per megawatt-hour, while this year it’s ballooned to $58.
The broadening range is “likely reflecting that some project developers have been better able to mitigate broader cost pressures across supply chain and project-level economics than others,” the Lazard analysts wrote.
The Lazard report doesn’t just look at the discounted cost of individual generators over their lifetimes. It also tries to figure how much they cost on certain grids. One way of doing this is to look at what Lazard calls the “cost of firming intermittency” or “levelized firming costs.” This is essentially looking at what it costs to bring solar, solar and storage, and wind and storage onto actual grids considering their ability to perform when the grid is most stressed.
This measure tries to refine LCOE to give a sense of how various forms of energy generation compare to gas plants in real world circumstances, not just as a financial construct. This is not a perfect, real-world comparison — gas capacity needs to be “firmed” as well, as it’s not always entirely available at times of peak need — but at least it gives an idea of how these resources actually function in a real-world grid.
Even with firming costs, “renewables remain broadly cost-competitive,” the report concludes.
Not surprisingly, some of the most dramatic costs are in America’s most troubled electricity market, PJM Interconnection. The unsubsidized cost of firming intermittency for solar and storage is $167 per megawatt-hour, compared to $150 in Texas or $115 in California. That’s also compared to a $129 per megawatt-hour at the high end for conventional combined cycle gas plants in PJM.
PJM is notorious for its inability to bring on new resources quickly and its strict standards for accrediting the contribution of storage and renewables to grid stability.
While the Lazard authors explicitly caution that it doesn’t measure what the“total system costs are for 1 MWh of incremental electricity” and can’t say “the optimal mix of renewables, conventional generation and storage,” it does conclude that “firming costs and dispatchability are increasingly critical for comparing resources on a more complex grid.”
In short, no matter what ends up on the grid, grid planners will have to think carefully about how to make sure it’s reliable and works in concert with what’s already there.
Timber companies think of them as pests, but new research indicates that stands of the slender tree can act as barriers against raging flames.
Colorado’s Aspen Acres Fire is named after a quiet RV campground located high in the San Isabel Mountains, about a five-hour drive due southeast of the state’s better-known Aspen. Both places, however, are named after the iconic deciduous tree known for its golden leaves in the fall. While the start of monsoon season may yet prevent the Aspen Acres Fire — the seventh-largest in Colorado’s history — from joining Utah’s Babylon Fire as the second 100,000-acre “megafire” of the season, the conflagration has been aided in its rampage not by aspens, but rather by dead, downed, and blighted ponderosa pines, spruce, and Douglas firs. The wildfire has now burned over 98,000 acres and nearly 300 homes, and is only 36% contained due to steep terrain that has hampered firefighting efforts, along with extreme drought conditions and beetle infestations that have greatly degraded the forest health of the region.
But what about its aspens? Though the extent of the damage at the campground remains unknown, according to a recent study of Populus tremuloides, Colorado’s iconic golden trees could be one of the keys to more wildfire-resistant forests in the future.
Flavie Pelletier, a recent PhD graduate of McGill University’s Natural Resource Sciences program, told me she first became interested in aspens while working as a tree planter in British Columbia. “The historical assumption on aspen is that stands are very good at stopping fire progression. But the paradox is that if you take an aspen by itself, it’s going to burn at high severity,” Pelletier, who published her findings in Forest Ecology and Management, told me.
By creating near-real-time maps of fires using satellites and comparing them against the Canadian Forest Service’s newly available maps of dominant tree species in the boreal, Pelletier and her colleagues discovered that aspen were almost two and a half times more common at the perimeter of a burned area than inside it. The finding suggests that despite the flammability of a single aspen with its thin bark, stands of aspen act as a kind of barrier when wildfire ran up against them, likely because they lack the flammable resins of conifers and their high foliage helps force running crown fires back toward the ground. Pine and spruce, by contrast, showed a near-zero or even negative effect.
When aspen stands did burn, Pelletier found they did so more slowly: A tree cover of 50% aspen burned at about 224 hectares per day, compared to 717 hectares per day in areas where aspen made up less than 10% of the cover. That’s the equivalent of about 1,000 FIFA-regulation soccer pitches per day in places where aspen are sparser — like Aspen Acres.
Even more surprising, though, was that the pattern held true in the early season, when the trees are still twiggy and have yet to grow their moisture-filled leaves, and despite the severity of fire weather. “Aspen still showed resilience even when the fire weather was very intense, [like in 2023, when] we had all the fires,” Pelletier said.
But she was also the first to admit that seasons are getting more extreme, and that there’s no guarantee the pattern will hold for the next 10 or 20 years.
Pelletier was reluctant to make a policy recommendation based on her research, noting that she’s not a forest manager. But in Alberta and British Columbia, timber companies spray hundreds of thousands of acres of timber with glyphosate, an herbicide, to kill off aspens because the trees outcompete the more commercially valuable conifers. Her findings are “a big argument to stop the spreading of herbicides because you’re increasing the risk of fire in your forest by removing aspen,” Pelletier said.
Despite her hesitation, Pelletier is explicit in her paper about one thing: that aspens “should be encouraged — specifically around key landscape positions, such as population centers” — given that they are a proven means of hardening the wildland-urban interface against wildfires. It might be too late for the idyllically named Aspen Acres, of course; any of the aspens that once drew tourists to the area are likely now ash.
But this not be Colorado’s last fire, either.