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The R2 reveals — in its smallest details — the automaker’s aggressive new focus on keeping costs low.

Let’s get the big news out of the way: The new Rivian cars are very cool. The airy R2 is a two-row SUV that, if released today, would rival anything else on the American electric vehicle market; Rivian claims that its entry level trim will cost $45,000 and that it will get more than 300 miles of range. After including the Inflation Reduction Act’s incentives, that means the starting price for this car — for many Americans — will be $37,500.
Even more exciting are the company’s R3 and performance-oriented R3X, a hot-hatchback-slash-crossover concept that will be even cheaper than the R2 and has “the soul of a rally car,” according to Rivian’s lead designer Jeff Hammoud. It looks at once like a Volkswagen Golf GTI, an AMC Gremlin, and — could it be? — a Yugo. I love it.
It was a good day for Rivian after a disappointing year. Many things about its business are still working well. The brand evokes a fusion of Apple’s and Patagonia’s sensibilities, although it’s historically been priced more like Porsche, and it has become a favorite of high-earning Millennial dads. I saw more Apple Watch Ultras on Thursday than I have ever seen in one place before. RJ Scaringe, Rivian’s chief executive officer, was wearing one of them.
But Thursday, more importantly, signaled a new phase in Rivian’s life. After years of aggressive spending, the Irvine, California-based company is cutting costs and trying to find a financially sustainable — and profitable — footing. It’s one more sign that in the global electric vehicle sector, an industry that will be central to the fight against climate change, the startup phase has definitively ended.
This shift to profitability can be seen in virtually every aspect of Rivian’s business right now — and even in the design of the R2 itself.

If Rivian can make it, its prospects are good. It is one of a handful of American electric-vehicle makers that has a shot at competing with Tesla and surviving for the long term. But that will require it to get through the next few years and cross the “EV valley of death.” This is the period after a company has fully ramped up production and has very high costs, but before its revenue has grown to compensate. Tesla made it across this valley in 2021 and 2022; now Rivian is making its own attempt. This was the deeper message of Thursday’s event: Now is Rivian’s make-or-break moment, and the company’s leadership knows it.
To get across the valley of death, Rivian must become obsessive to the point of maniacal about its costs. The company’s survival is going to be an exceptionally close thing, and every dollar will matter. That’s why possibly the event’s most important news came right at the end, when Scaringe disclosed, almost as an aside, that Rivian is indefinitely delaying work on its new Georgia factory. That will save it about $2.25 billion, a significant sum for a company that burned roughly twice that amount last year. Rivian’s shares leapt 13% on the news.
“Every single thing we do within the business is focused on driving costs on this,” Scaringe told CNBC on Thursday. Other Rivian executives kept the message going: Walking through the R2’s design with reporters, Jeff Hammoud, Rivian’s design chief, mentioned the company’s efforts to cut costs at least six times. (Form follows function, indeed.)
The team kept asking itself “how can we simplify things — and not only simplify things from a design perspective, but also from a cost perspective,” he said, adding that “we’re not trying to make this thing feel or look cheap — that’s not what we do.”
He’s right: The R2 does not look cheap (as for feel, I wasn’t allowed to touch it), but some of the R1 series’s more premium touches are gone. Rivian has moved the R2’s speakers out of the driver and passenger doors and put them in the center console, a cost-saving measure that Hammoud suggested would give people more space for their water bottles. One of the panels in the car’s rear is made of mold-injected plastic, not sheet metal, which Hammoud said will save money and make the car easier to repair after a fender bender.
Then there are changes most drivers will never notice. The R2’s dashboard panels have a wood-like finish, and Hammoud wanted us to know that they are made of actual wood. And unlike other cars, which use wood purely as a decorative element — I assumed he was talking about the BMW i3 here — the R2’s wood is structurally integral to the dashboard. In other words, they look good and save money on underlying structural material. “With our vehicles and the R2, [the wood] literally holds the screen, it creates the shape for the vents,” Hammoud said. “If you were to take it out, literally the panel would fall apart.”

You can see, too, how other business needs are shaping how the vehicle looks and works — and even what kind of vehicle it is in the first place. Rivian only sells vehicles in the United States and Canada now, but wants and needs to expand into global markets in the coming years. It might be most famous for its pickup trucks, and yet Rivian didn’t announce a next-generation pickup on Thursday. Hammoud told me that that’s partly because Rivian is thinking about what will work well abroad, and mass pickup truck ownership remains a profoundly American phenomenon.
The charging port on the new Rivian models is on the rear passenger side, a move that confused many Americans who have come to prefer the charging port on the drivers’ side. (That’s where Tesla and the Rivian R1 put it, and the location is seen as better for home charging.) But think about it, Hammoud said. Many people in left-hand-drive countries charge their vehicles on the street, and a passenger-side setup — which becomes a driver’s side setup — makes more sense for them. The new setup also puts the charger closer to the battery, reducing the amount of high-voltage wires needed in the car. That cuts the car’s weight and — ding ding ding — lowers its cost. (Tesla puts its charger in the car’s rear for the same reason.)
The company hasn’t always been like this. During the first decade of its existence, interest rates sat nearly at zero, and Rivian could spend with abandon. It planned for its sprawling Georgia factory and could plan to sell more expensive cars to consumers who had access to cheap credit to buy them. The R2 carries forward the R1 tradition of having a flashlight in the drivers’ side door, but it lacks the hidey holes and air suspension of its predecessor. “With the R1, it was our premium flagship. We got to say yes to a lot of things,” Hammoud said. With R2, the question was “what do we have to say no to.”

This spring, Rivian will close down its Normal, Illinois, factory for a series of process upgrades. These will speed up its assembly lines and allow it to make its existing vehicles, the R1T and R1S, faster, with fewer internal computers and less wasted material; Rivian expects these improvements to carry it most of the way to profitability.
Even if it achieves its goal of turning a technical profit by the fall, it will still have a long way to go to become an actually sustainable business — and it will have to survive another year with no new products. The R2 is not due to go on sale until the first half of 2026, and the R3, which is built on the same platform as the R2, won’t start deliveries until “after the R2.” (No price or firm release date for the R3 has been announced.) The American EV market will change significantly by then. By the end of this year, some 50 different EV models in the U.S. will get more than 300 miles of range. Hyundai, Kia, Ford, and GM are all capable of bringing new cars to market during that interval that could smoke the R2 or R3, in part because they will be benchmarked off of them. The R2 and especially R3 seem like perfect cars for today’s market — and perfect cars for Rivian’s cash-saving situation. Whether they’ll be as perfect two years from now is anyone’s guess.
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A new Brown University report argues powering down a misaligned artificial intelligence would be tougher — and take longer — than many experts assume.
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It’s one of the most popular what-ifs about rogue artificial intelligence: Suppose an AI agent really were to get out of control and start threatening hospitals, flights, critical infrastructure, or even humanity as a whole. Why wouldn’t we just pull the plug on it?
A new report argues: We might not be able to. And the reason has to do with the energy system.
A new white paper from the Climate Solutions Lab at Brown University finds that U.S. electricity law offers essentially no way to rapidly power down a data center where a rogue AI agent is operating.
The problem is primarily legal, although technical issues could interfere as well. The rules and laws governing the power grid simply don’t countenance a scenario whereby an industrial facility might need to be suddenly disconnected from the grid in an urgent way, the report says. They also aren’t built for a world where something happening autonomously in a computing facility could affect people thousands of miles away — and require an immediate emergency response.
“If the United States concluded tomorrow that an AI system had escaped its deployer’s control and had to be stopped by cutting electrical power, neither federal nor state officials could swiftly do so within the law,” the paper warns.
While authorities might eventually be able to get a court order to disconnect a data center under existing law, that disconnection process could take long enough that a rogue agent might still be able to copy itself to another computer. And it would likely require a technician to go into the facility itself and cut backup power generation — which could itself be controlled by the misaligned agent.
Jeff Colgan, a political science and international affairs professor at Brown University and the report’s author, told me that he was inspired to write the report after studying the Hugging Face hack over the summer, in which a swarm of rogue ChatGPT models escaped OpenAI’s systems and infiltrated a French technology platform.
Colgan normally studies oil and gas companies, the power grid, and international political systems. (He put together the Iran War cost tracker earlier this year.) But after looking at loss-of-control research, he realized AI scientists had not always thought about how state and federal power law might interfere with their disaster planning.
“The folks who are focused on artificial intelligence may not realize that how the grid is managed is a complicated story,” he told me on Wednesday.
The paper focuses on what it calls a “middle-range scenario” in which an AI agent goes rogue. It imagines not a case in which a super-intelligent agent is hellbent on human extinction or civilizational destruction — Colgan assumes the army wouldn’t stand on legal ceremony in that scenario — but one in which an AI system, running on identifiable hardware, hacks into companies and hospitals, steals information, and begins to tamper with key software or demand ransom payments.
In such a scenario, leaders would face three core risks, he said — presuming that they even figured out what was happening in the first place. First, it might not be clear what data center to shut down or even where the agent “lives” in a facility, or even if it resides on a single server at all. The data center operator may also not want to assist in an investigation during that phase for fear of incurring liability. Second, even if the data center could be identified and disconnected, then it might have access to on-site backup power, which would require some kind of in-person intervention. Finally, no command structure exists today through which a public official’s order to disconnect a data center would lead to a technician, either on-site or remotely, pulling the plug.
Existing laws are a poor fit for these problems, Colgan told me. During crisis situations today, the FBI can disconnect a building from the power grid in order to avoid immediate harm to life or property. But it can’t do anything about backup generation inside a property’s fence line.
Nor are today’s federal and state laws built for a situation in which a grid connection needs to be be severed because of what a third-party is computing inside a facility, the report finds. Instead, today’s laws “provide emergency authority over the electrical grid only to address a supply problem or a physical attack on the system itself,” the report says.
In fact, in virtually any scenario now imagined by the law, authorities would need to go to the courts to disconnect a data center from the power grid. That could potentially take “valuable time” because it could give a rogue agent time to distribute copies of itself to other servers, the report says. Existing laws would likely treat any urgent disconnection as the state’s prerogative — and not the federal government’s — because states wield most legal authority over the power grid.
Even if authorities could quickly sever a data center’s hookup, there’s also almost no way to do so without causing collateral damage to every other tenant inside a data center, Colgan said. That risk could further delay a utility shut-off or make leaders skittish about pulling the plug. And since some data center tenants keep backup power capacity in the same “cage” where they run their servers, a worker would likely need to go to the specific racks where an agent “resides” inside a facility to power it down.
The report doesn’t make policy recommendations, in part because frontier AI models are developing so rapidly — and the subject is so “deeply technical” — that it exceeds Colgan’s ability to advise legislative changes, he said. But he does recommend that AI experts and developers begin involving local grid authorities in their emergency scenario planning.
“You need someone from Anthropic to sit down with their utility, with someone from their [public utility commission], with someone from FERC,” he told me, referencing the federal agency that oversees the power grid. Those meetings should arguably happen in every state where an AI company is computing, and they should include discussion of how to locate an AI agent on a computing property and what to do if operators lose control.
Colgan offered another recommendation by phone on Wednesday. Given data centers’ deep unpopularity, many tech companies and data center developers are now willing to strike community benefits agreements with state or local governments in exchange for the right to build a new facility. Those contracts should recognize these AI alignment and electricity problems, he argued.
“There is this real political window to say, ‘If you want to build a data center, you must show that you could — if necessary — shut down specific server racks without doing massive collateral damage to everyone else,” he said. “This is the moment to do this, because there is some political leverage and because there is such demand for these data centers.”
‘When China wants to do something, boy, they move fast.’
The electrolyzer has come a long way in the nearly 250 years since a pair of Dutch scientists first used electricity to split water into hydrogen and oxygen. Over the decades, European and American scientists refined and commercialized this technology, yet it is China that now accounts for nearly 70% of global electrolyzer manufacturing capacity, churning out the machines that make clean hydrogen from water at a fraction of Western costs. Its factories are building far more equipment than its domestic hydrogen market can absorb, and exports are climbing. On paper, China looks poised to dominate the global electrolyzer and green hydrogen markets, much as it already has solar panels and batteries.
“It stands to reason that the Chinese would want to capture the market just like they did everything else,” Rinaldo Brutoco, a hydrogen investor and founder of the think tank World Business Academy, told me. Beijing’s latest Five-Year Plan certainly lends credence to that ambition, repeatedly calling for the development of green hydrogen, hydrogen-derived fuels, and electrolyzers, even as other nations lag behind their once-ambitious clean hydrogen targets.
But it’s not actually obvious that the technology will go the way of solar. For one, Western governments are increasingly wary of dependence on Chinese energy technologies and are trying to bolster domestic manufacturing and limit foreign competition through measures like tariffs, domestic-content bonuses, and subsidy eligibility restrictions. The West also specializes in its own electrolyzer tech, which relies on proton exchange membranes. Though more expensive than China’s typical alkaline electrolyzers, PEM systems pair better with intermittent renewable power.
China’s tech is improving, though, and its electrolyzer stacks — the pile of cells where water splits into hydrogen and oxygen — cost about 60% less than Western alternatives. But the stack only accounts for about 6% to 9% of the total levelised cost of clean hydrogen production; most of the expense comes from electrical and process equipment, labor, and, most importantly, clean electricity. That single-digit cost advantage may not be enough to sway foreign buyers, especially since some cheaper designs come with trade-offs in efficiency, lifecycle, and warranty coverage.
“When the project as a whole is considered, there’s a lot less deviation between the Chinese technology and the rest of the world’s,” Thomas Koller, regional hydrogen lead at the Norwegian energy and maritime consultancy DNV, told me. But China is working on that, he added. “They’re very competitive already on the stack. But now they know that they also want to be competitive on how that stack can integrate with the wider electrolyzer system.”
Cracking that system-level cost issue could bring China much closer to achieving global market dominance. DNV calculates that to meet the Paris Agreement’s targets, clean hydrogen would need to supply around 15% of global energy demand by 2050 — and the production equipment and resultant clean molecules would have to come from somewhere.
In the meantime, however, the analysts I spoke with agreed that China’s domestic green hydrogen market is positioned for a near-term boom, as the government pushes adoption across fertilizer, chemicals, oil refining, steel, and transportation. “Demand is really the key takeaway that I see from this new Five-Year Plan — shifting from production to thinking about demand,” Koller told me.
And while the plan was pretty much complete before the Iran war broke out, the ongoing disruption in the Strait of Hormuz has underscored the logic behind China’s hydrogen push, as the country previously relied on the Strait for up to half of its crude oil imports. “It’s placed them in a pretty good position — in respect of hydrogen at least — to try and strengthen one of these areas that can reduce dependence on imported oil,” Koller said of the Five-Year Plan.
China is already the world’s largest hydrogen producer and consumer by a wide margin, using the gas as a key industrial feedstock for its vast chemicals and heavy industry sectors. But today, the industry makes nearly all of that hydrogen with fossil fuels.
Beijing made clear in its latest Five-Year Plan, released in March, that it wants to change that. According to an unofficial translation, the state promised to “expand applications of hydrogen energy in transportation, electricity, industrial, and other domains,” while improving “renewable energy hydrogen production equipment” and advancing “the hydrogen energy industry chain toward green ammonia, methanol, and sustainable aviation fuels.” (China has not published an official English translation of the plan.)
The country certainly has the manufacturing capacity to support these ambitions. After hundreds of manufacturers poured into the electrolyzer industry earlier this decade, China now produces about 35 gigawatts worth of this equipment annually, compared with less than 2 gigawatts of domestic demand. The resulting glut has even led some producers to sell their equipment below cost, echoing the dynamics of the solar industry in the early 2010s. Now, Beijing is trying to build a green hydrogen market to soak up the surplus, elevating production of the fuel — and derivatives like ammonia, methanol, and SAF — to a national priority.
“They’re talking about nationwide pipelines for hydrogen. They’re talking about a regionalized cluster strategy; they have very hard targets for green hydrogen sales,” Brutoco told me.
China is targeting 2 million metric tons of renewable hydrogen production annually by 2030, an eightfold increase from roughly 0.25 million metric tons today. The government has also designated five city clusters as green hydrogen demonstration zones, each eligible for up to about $240 million over four years to scale up the fuel’s use across sectors including transportation, metallurgy, and green ammonia and methanol production — and to build the pipelines required to move it.
“Hydrogen has clearly moved up in political visibility,” Qi Qin, a China analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, told me back in March.
All of this stands in stark contrast to Western markets, where low-carbon hydrogen projects continue to be delayed or scrapped amid weak demand and waning political support. Clean hydrogen is still far more expensive than its fossil fuel-based counterpart; buyers remain reluctant to pay a green premium, and policy uncertainty over the past few years has clouded the industry outlook. In the U.S., the rollback of Inflation Reduction Act incentives has weakened the economic case for green hydrogen, while in Europe, delays to regulatory decisions and missed deadlines for implementing hydrogen mandates have added to the uncertainty.
“Many companies were really thinking that the hydrogen economy was going to take off, and in the end, this has not been the case,” Anne-Sophie Corbeau, a researcher at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, told me. “The cost of the whole electrolyzer system is actually much higher than what we thought at the beginning.” That, combined with advances in batteries and other electrification technologies like industrial heat pumps, has arguably narrowed the range of applications where green hydrogen makes sense.
But perhaps the problem is simply a failure of imagination. After all, no country has yet demonstrated what a scaled-up clean hydrogen industry could look like, either physically or economically. The next few years, however, could offer a decent preview.
“When China wants to do something, boy, they move fast,” Brutoco told me. And there’s no doubt Beijing wants to capitalize on its burgeoning hydrogen economy. “They need more export markets because their housing boom — which busted — ain’t coming back in the near future,” he argued, explaining that new export opportunities could help revive Beijing’s sluggish economy. He sees electrolyzers and hydrogen as “low-hanging fruit,” given the country’s existing domestic buildout.
As for the argument that cheap Chinese electrolyzer stacks do comparably little to reduce the overall installed cost of a clean hydrogen project, Brutoco doesn’t buy it. He doubts developers would forgo potential savings — and the additional revenue that could generate — simply to align themselves with their administration’s protectionist preferences. “Did you ever know a business person that would like to shave 5% to 10%?” he asked.
Then there’s the question of performance. China’s alkaline electrolyzers have historically been slower to ramp up and down in tandem with variable renewable power compared with PEM systems. But Brutoco argues that today’s improving alkaline tech is more than capable of serving utility-scale renewable projects in areas with relatively consistent sun or wind. Koller likewise sees Chinese alkaline manufacturers as credible contenders for a range of overseas projects.
“I would expect that all of the European projects that are electrolyzer-driven, they will be considering Chinese electrolyzers, among others,” he told me. The case could prove even stronger elsewhere in the APAC region, including India, Japan, South Korea, and Australia. “All of the projects that I can recall having seen for Asia Pacific [...] at least some Chinese technology has been considered.”
But since Amy Ouyang, a senior hydrogen associate at the Clean Air Task Force, has been tracking the industry, she told me that “the narrative has shifted.” Just three years ago, many analysts expected Chinese electrolyzers to follow the trajectory of solar panels, with rock-bottom prices eventually squeezing Western manufacturers out of the market. But today’s more protectionist trade environment has made her reconsider that assumption.
“Maybe in the 2010s, the European countries and the U.S. were not really prepared to say, ‘We’re going to turn away Chinese solar panels just because they’re made in China,’” she told me. But Washington in particular has soured on its earlier laissez-faire approach to trade, perhaps regretting that while the U.S. and allied nations pioneered technologies such as solar cells and lithium-ion batteries, China ultimately scaled them — capturing millions of manufacturing jobs in the process.
Energy shocks from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the Iran war have further pushed Western policymakers toward a focus on domestic manufacturing, energy security, and even food security, Corbeau, the Columbia researcher, told me, given that about a third of globally traded fertilizer passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Now, she said, more countries are likely thinking, “What if we use our hydro, geothermal, maybe cheap renewables, in order to produce hydrogen domestically and produce ammonia domestically and produce fertilizer domestically?”
It all adds up to an environment where Ouyang sees “a lot more willingness to protect their own domestic industries from the low price of the Chinese electrolyzers,” she said.
The problem is, there simply isn’t much of a Western clean hydrogen industry to actually protect right now. Spurring demand will require political will and economic incentives to persuade hydrogen end users to make deals and help the nascent industry move down the cost curve. But with wholesale electricity prices rising and the Trump administration dismantling renewable energy legislation, the U.S. in particular looks unlikely to invest in much manufacturing capacity anytime soon.
But if the West does decide to double down, it might be better off conceding the price war from the outset. “A Western electrolyzer stack would probably struggle to match China’s lowest bid on an electrolyzer stack,” Koller explained, advising against trying to replicate China’s commodity-scale manufacturing model. “I would see their stronger position being if they can demonstrate different performance, different integration, offer a different type of service, an improved lifecycle emissions statement.”
That is, the answer probably isn’t to beat China at its own game. The U.S. and Europe might never win on cost, but that doesn’t mean they can’t build and scale a superior technology before yet another industry slips out of their reach.
Only upgrades for pre-existing wind projects have been approved.
In September, the Trump administration told a reporter that the president directed the Pentagon to finally process wind projects through routine airspace approvals as required under a court order. By doing this, it created the appearance of real headway and good faith in talks with Democrats in Congress on energy permitting legislation before the November midterm elections.
But the White House’s assurances are not what they seem.
All of the projects the administration has reportedly advanced over the past week are repowerings, meaning they’re only upgrades of existing projects, and two of the “projects” they’ve advanced were just two individual turbines, the American Clean Power Association on Tuesday told members involved in litigation with the administration.
Over the course of his presidency, the president’s team has turned what was once a sleepy bureaucratic check for radar or flight interference into a weapon against wind energy in the United States. You need Federal Aviation Administration clearance for any structure above 200 feet in the air and that process includes a Pentagon review. By claiming wind projects suddenly needed new scrutiny for national security reasons, the Pentagon held up FAA airspace approvals for apparently hundreds of projects.
This has been a key part of bipartisan energy legislation talks back in D.C., as Democrats in Congress have demanded at least some semblance of regular order be returned to renewable energy in federal permitting. The permitting bill ostensibly has ways to strengthen wind companies’ hand in dealing with a hostile Trump administration but negotiators, including Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, have also previously called attacks on wind projects during negotiations harmful to a final deal becoming law.
In September, Politico reported Trump told his aides he would agree to direct the Defense Department to “start clearing its queue of long-delayed onshore wind projects to strike a deal” citing “two people familiar with the talks and granted anonymity.” Among the commitments Politico reported were made: to approve about 30 projects awaiting a countersignature from the Pentagon on a mitigation agreement related to airspace impacts.
In federal court, the renewable energy trade groups who brought the lawsuit clearly don’t think the Trump administration actually followed through with that promise.
On Oct. 20, after updates from the Justice Department showed little signs of progress (which I wrote about), the trade groups filed a motion to enforce the judge’s stay on their air clearance freeze, saying that very little had advanced since the ruling in early August, and that none of the 30 projects awaiting countersignature on their mitigation agreements actually had advanced from Pentagon review. In addition, they said the government was now asking project developers to sign onto a litany of new requirements in exchange for a sign-off on mitigation agreements. They submitted a joint declaration from subject matter experts, including from former military personnel, who described these requirements as a vast departure from precedent with little basis in security rationale that they said also had terms that could violate state or local laws, like a blanket prohibition on aircraft detection light systems. (You can read the declaration here.)
Two days later, on Oct. 22, it started to look like we were getting somewhere when news outlets reported the Trump administration was "advancing" two “wind projects” in South Dakota and Maine, citing statements from the White House and the Pentagon.
Bob Ditchey, a spokesperson for the Pentagon, told us in an email that the two “wind projects” were Crowned Ridge, which he said consisted of 87 turbines in “Grant, SD,” and “Blue Sky/Hill,” which he said was made up of 19 turbines in “Hancock, ME.” Ditchey described them both as “proposed” wind energy “developments.”
“Following rigorous evaluation of potential impacts on military readiness, radar installations, and airspace operations, the DoW has cleared both projects to proceed to the next phase of federal evaluation,” Ditchey said in an email. “The projects have been formally referred to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for final aeronautical study and determination.”
The South Dakota wind project Trump officials are referencing is likely NextEra’s Crowned Ridge wind farm, which has 87 turbines and has been operational since 2019. On Oct. 5 a NextEra project consultant submitted a litany of height clearance requests for a “repowering project” on behalf of Crowned Ridge Energy Center, LLC, according to the Federal Aviation Administration’s public database. The requests are for turbines in Grant County.
There is no Maine wind project with the name “Blue Sky/Hill,” as far as we can tell, but there is a project in Hancock County that was completed in 2012 called “Bull Hill” that consists of 19 turbines, and which also has pending applications for repowering in the FAA’s database.
Neither NextEra nor Bull Hill’s developer, TerraForm Power, responded to our requests for comment. The Pentagon also did not respond to questions about these projects or the additional ones it said it had advanced.
In addition, as of this story’s publication, all of the air clearance requests for these two projects are all listed as “pending” online.
If you’re wondering why operational wind farms might need air clearances for construction, all of the wind farms’ requests describe the projects as “repowering,” an industry term that applies to upgrading, modifying, altering or restarting pre-existing wind farms. A repowering can mean anything from fixing turbine blades to changing turbine height, or moving a turbine, or commissioning new turbines entirely. Crucially though it’s not really considered a “new wind farm” in the colloquial sense. As my colleague Matthew Zeitlin has explained, repowerings are seen by the energy sector as a simple pathway to the most juice for the squeeze from what has already been permitted and built.
On Tuesday, Punchbowl News reported that the White House was advancing three more wind projects in Illinois and Iowa. After this story ran, American Clean Power told members involved in the airspace litigation clarifying that all of the projects thus far are “repowerings” and that the two Illinois “projects” each were only individual wind turbines. None of the projects were new utility scale projects.
On Wednesday, just before this story went to press, Punchbowl News reported another two wind projects were advancing, calling it “more permitting goodwill from the White House.” We have not yet been able to confirm what these projects are or whether they are also repowering projects.
American Clean Power endorsed the bipartisan Senate permitting bill and called for its passage. The group provided a comment from Frank Macchiarola, their chief advocacy officer: “To date, the administration has moved forward only a handful of the total number of projects they agreed to approve. In order to pass BAAJA and bring down costs for Americans, the Administration needs to get serious about building clean power.”
The White House did not respond to a request for comment.