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Research from the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis calls blue hydrogen’s carbon math into question.

The largest hydrogen producer in the world, Air Products, stands to earn up to $440 million per year in clean energy tax credits once it opens its massive, $7 billion complex in Louisiana in 2028. But a recent report argues that while the hydrogen produced there will be highly profitable for Air Products, it’s a “lose-lose proposition” for the environment — and for taxpayers.
The research adds to the long-running debate around the climate benefits of “blue hydrogen,” which is produced via the separation of hydrogen molecules from carbon molecules in natural gas, with systems that capture the resulting carbon emissions and store them underground. Advocates of the technology say it’s a critical bridge to a renewables-powered hydrogen economy, as it allows for cleaner hydrogen production now by relying on existing infrastructure. Critics, however, say that blue hydrogen’s emissions benefits are minimal if any, and that a focus on this technology diverts money from more meaningful climate solutions.
The blue hydrogen produced at Air Products’ Louisiana facility will be eligible for the lucrative 45Q carbon sequestration tax credit, which was expanded by the Inflation Reduction Act in 2022 and provides up to $85 per metric ton of carbon that’s permanently locked away.
The March report from the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, however, argues that Air Products makes overly optimistic assumptions about both methane leakage rates and the effectiveness of carbon capture equipment, while underestimating the potency of methane in the short term. The company’s estimates are largely based on a Department of Energy life cycle analysis tool, which the report's authors also believe is flawed. The result, the authors write, is that the Louisiana plant would “cost billions of dollars in subsidies for essentially zero environmental benefit.”
With lawmakers in Congress considering which IRA tax credits to preserve and which ones to cut to make way for Trump’s spending priorities, now is a critical moment for climate-focused policymakers to have their priorities in order. It’s worth asking which provisions from Biden’s signature climate law are actually delivering a climate bang for their buck.
Air Products says that its Louisiana facility will sequester 5 million metric tons of CO2 annually over the 12 years that it’s eligible for the tax credit, which equates to $6.3 billion in total tax savings. To state the obvious, that’s a lot of taxpayer money for a project that a leading research group asserts will likely be a net negative for the environment.
“As you start expanding the envelope to take into account the full footprint and the full impact of this project and its product, there’s just not much of a benefit there, if any. It may be making things worse.” Anika Juhn, an energy data analyst at IEEFA and one of the report’s authors, told me. These findings are not specific just to Air Products’ upcoming facility — they’re “broadly applicable to other blue hydrogen projects,” Juhn said. (My colleague Emily Pontecorvo, for instance, wrote about a similar finding regarding methane leakage from the Permian Basin.) At least four of the DOE’s seven hydrogen hubs rely on natural gas with carbon capture and storage to some degree. Meanwhile, the Trump administration is looking to cut funding for the hubs that primarily produce hydrogen via renewable energy.
The DOE’s life cycle analysis tool uses an industrial methane leakage rate of 0.9% and a carbon capture rate of 94.5% for the specific method the Air Products facility will use, called autothermal reforming. (Or at least that’s what the IEEFA report said — I couldn’t find evidence of this carbon capture number in the government’s model itself.)
When Juhn and her co-author David Schlissel adjusted the analysis of Air Products’ Louisiana project using more typical industrial methane leakage rates of 1% to 4% and carbon capture rates ranging from 60% to 94.5%, they found that only under the most optimistic scenario would the project yield any carbon reductions at all. Even then, avoided emissions would only be about 200,000 metric tons per year of CO2 equivalent, whereas at the high end of the report’s “realistic scenario,” the project could result in an additional 7.5 million metric tons of CO2 equivalent annually.

To calculate the net life cycle emissions of a hydrogen project, the authors had to take the estimated benefits of hydrogen production into account, a task complicated by the fact that Air Products hasn’t announced any offtakers, making it impossible to know what dirtier (or cleaner) options customers might turn to if they didn’t have access to blue hydrogen. So instead, IEEFA relied on the White House’s general estimate that the 3 million metric tons of blue and green hydrogen (i.e. hydrogen released from water molecules using carbon-free electricity) produced by the hydrogen hubs would displace 25 million metric tons of CO2. But because the White House didn’t release its formula for determining avoided emissions, take their numbers with a grain of salt.
All of Air Products’ calculations thus come with the usual caveat, which is that they’re measured against an unknowable counterfactual — essentially a best guess at what would happen if plans for the Air Products facility went poof. Would the end users opt for hydrogen alternatives or would they rely on a standard natural gas-powered hydrogen facility with no carbon capture? Is it possible that a green hydrogen plant using renewables-powered electrolysis would be built instead?
All we know is that a portion of the hydrogen will be turned into ammonia and exported abroad, where Juhn told me it’s likely to be burned as fuel. Another portion will be injected into an existing 700-mile hydrogen pipeline on the Gulf Coast for use by existing customers in industries such as energy, transportation and chemicals.
While Air Products did not respond to my request for comment on the report, I was able to discuss the results with John Thompson, a director at the climate nonprofit Clean Air Task Force, which advocates for a wide array of climate-focused technologies, including hydrogen with carbon capture and storage. He took issue with the IEEFA study’s methodology, and told me that blue hydrogen projects have the potential to be a big win for the climate, so long as they’re replacing “gray” hydrogen projects — that is, those powered by natural gas with no carbon capture.
“When you do displace gray hydrogen, you get huge, huge benefits,” Thompson told me. Despite all the unknowns involved, he’s confident the Louisiana project will do just that, primarily due to the existing network of hydrogen pipelines at the site. “Those pipelines are there because they’re serving existing customers — refineries, ammonia plants, chemical manufacturing,” he said, meaning that “the likelihood that you’re displacing existing sources is pretty great.”
Thompson also took issue with the notion that a 95% capture rate is overly optimistic, telling me that there’s no technical barriers to achieving industrial capture rates in the 90s. “The 95% capture rate that they’re proposing to build towards is what is commercially guaranteed by many vendors,” Thompson said. “It hasn’t been widely used, not because it’s not commercially available, but because it’s costly, and there hasn’t been much demand for it until we got into climate considerations.”
To Thompson, the IEEFA report looked more like an “advocacy piece.” To IEEFA, the Louisiana project still appears to be a government subsidized money-making scheme. Notably, the Air Products facility probably will not qualify for the much debated 45V clean hydrogen production tax credit, the most generous subsidy of all in the IRA. That credit provides up to $3 per kilogram of clean hydrogen produced — a whopping $3,000 per metric ton — for projects with the lowest emissions intensity. It’s also tech-neutral, meaning that so long as blue hydrogen projects have life cycle emissions under 4 kilograms of carbon dioxide equivalent per kilogram of hydrogen produced, they will be eligible for at least a $0.60 credit per kilogram of clean hydrogen.
Air Products said last May that it would not even attempt to claim this credit for the Louisiana facility, even as the company asserts that the complex will produce “near-zero carbon emissions.” A 2023 DOE report indicated few blue hydrogen projects will be eligible, period, given “the added [natural gas] and electricity needed to run the [carbon capture and storage] facility.”
So at least by the DOE’s own standards, the hydrogen produced by Air Products will not be “clean.” That’s not a precondition for the carbon sequestration tax credit, though, which doesn’t demand life cycle analysis, just proof that you’re putting a certain amount of CO2 in the ground. Juhn thinks that’s a big mistake. These analyses are “the only way that you can know whether or not investing in CCS projects makes sense, either in a climate sense or in a financial sense,” she told me.
But as fossil fuel interests including Occidental and ExxonMobil have advocated for preserving and even increasing the 45Q tax credit, Juhn doesn’t expect to see any changes to the rule that would mandate more stringent requirements.
“I do hear the fossil fuel industry saying, Oh, we need blue hydrogen first because we can get things moving. We can get this online and we can start creating this product to stimulate demand,” she told me, citing a common argument that blue hydrogen is a necessary stepping stone to creating a robust, economical green hydrogen economy. “But the problem is that these facilities, they’re not going to go away when green hydrogen projects come online, and these projects are being built with a 25-, 30-year lifespan.”
At the very least, what everyone can agree on is the need to address upstream methane leakage. “It’s not enough to do carbon capture, I can’t emphasize that enough,” Thompson told me, pointing out that methane emissions are “not a law of thermodynamics” but rather “a variable that we can control if we choose to.” Unfortunately, it looks like the Trump administration won’t be choosing to, as the president recently signed legislation scrapping a Biden-era rule that imposed fees on oil and gas producers who emit excess methane.
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Two international law experts on whether the president can really just yank the U.S. from the United Nations’ overarching climate treaty.
When the Trump administration moved on Wednesday to withdraw the U.S. from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, we were left to wonder — not for the first time — can he really do that?
The UNFCCC is the umbrella organization governing UN-organized climate diplomacy, including the annual climate summit known as the Conference of the Parties and the 2015 Paris Agreement. The U.S. has been in and out and back into the Paris Agreement over the years, and was most recently taken out again by a January 2025 executive order from President Trump. The U.S. has never before attempted to exit the UNFCCC — which, unlike the Paris Agreement, it joined with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Whether or not a president can unilaterally remove the U.S. from a Senate-approved treaty is somewhat uncharted legal territory. As University of Pennsylvania constitutional law professor Jean Galbraith told me, “This is an issue on which the text of the constitution is silent — it tells you how to make a treaty, but it doesn’t tell you anything about how to unmake a treaty.” Even if a president can simply withdraw from a treaty, there’s still the question of what happens next. Could a future president simply rejoin the UFCCC? Or would they again need to seek the advice and consent of the Senate, which would require getting 67 senators to agree that international climate diplomacy is a worthy enterprise? And what does all of this mean for the future of the Paris Agreement? Is the U.S. locked out for good?
In an attempt to wrap my head around these questions, I spoke to both Galbraith and Sue Biniaz, a lecturer at Yale School of the Environment and a former lead climate lawyer at the State Department who worked on both the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC. Biniaz and Galbraith were part of a 2018 symposium on the question of treaty withdrawal that was prompted, in part, by Trump’s first attempt to remove the U.S. from the Paris Agreement, during his first term in the White House. Those conversations led Galbraith to consider the question of rejoining treaties in a 2020 Virginia Law Review article. Suffice it for now to say that both questions are complicated, but we dig into the answers to both and more in our conversation below.
Interviews have been edited for length and clarity.
At the most basic level, what are the constitutional questions at play in an executive withdrawal from the UNFCCC?
Galbraith: Typically, the U.S. president needs to think about both international law and domestic law. And as a matter of international law, there is a withdrawal provision in the UNFCCC that says you can withdraw after you’ve been in it for a few years, after one year of notice. Assuming they give their notice of withdrawal and wait a year, this is an issue on which the text of the constitution is silent — it tells you how to make a treaty, but it doesn’t tell you anything about how to unmake a treaty.
And we have no definitive answer from the courts. The closest they got to deciding that was in a case called Goldwater v. Carter, which was when President Carter terminated the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. That was litigated, and the Supreme Court ducked — four justices said this is a political question that we’re not going to resolve, and one justice said this case is not ripe for resolution because I don’t know whether or not Congress likes the withdrawal. There was no majority opinion, and there was no ruling on the merit for the constitutional question.
Presidents have exercised the authority to withdraw the United States from various international agreements. So in practice, it happens. The constitutionality has not been finally settled.
Both Trump administrations have removed the U.S. from the Paris Agreement, but the Paris Agreement was not a Senate-ratified treaty, whereas the UNFCCC is. How does that change things?
Galbraith: The text of the constitution only clearly spells out one way to make an international treaty, in the treaty clause [of Article II]. When you make an Article II treaty, it’s signed by the president and secretary of state. It goes over to the Senate; the Senate provides advice and consent — the U.S. is still not in it. At that point, the president has to take a final act of ratifying the treaty, which means depositing the instrument of ratification with the international depository, and that’s the moment you’re in. And it’s perfectly permissible for a president after the Senate has given advice and consent not to ratify a treaty, or to leave those resolutions of advice and consent for years and then go ahead and ratify.
In practice, you have all these kinds of other ways of making [a treaty]. You have what happened with the Paris Agreement, where the president does it largely on their own authority, but maybe pointing to pre-existing facts of, say, the UNFCCC’s existence. You have some international agreements that have been negotiated, then taken to Congress rather than to the Senate. Sometimes you have Congress pass a law that says, Please make this kind of agreement. So you have a lot of different pathways to making them. And I think there is a story in which the pathway to making them should be significant in thinking about, what is the legitimate, constitutional way for exiting them?
To me, it’s pretty obvious that if you don’t get specific approval for an agreement in the first place, then you should be able to unilaterally withdraw, assuming you’re doing so consistent with international law. I think the concerns around the constitutionality of withdrawal are more significant for the UNFCCC than they are for the Paris Agreements. But there nonetheless is this fairly strong body of practice in which presidents have viewed themselves as authorized to withdraw without needing to go to Congress or the Senate.
Biniaz: The Senate doesn’t ratify. It sounds like a detail, but the Senate basically authorizes the president to ratify — they give their advice and consent. And that’s important because it’s not the Senate that decides whether we join an agreement. They authorize the president, the president does not have to join. And that becomes relevant when we talk about withdrawing and rejoining.
We did not address, when we sent up the framework convention, whether it was legally necessary to send it to the Senate. But we sent it in any event, and it was approved basically unanimously by the full Senate back in 1992. With respect to the Paris Agreement, there are a lot of different considerations when you’re trying to figure out whether something needs to go to the Senate or not, but the fact that we already had a Senate-approved convention changed the legal calculus as to whether this Paris Agreement needed to go to the Senate. And then when the Paris Agreement ended up essentially elaborating the convention and the targets were not legally binding, we decided we could do it as an executive agreement. There was some quibbling in some quarters — more from a political point of view than a legal point of view — but I didn’t hear any objection from a legal point of view.
Now, in terms of withdrawing from an agreement, whether or not an agreement has been approved by the Senate, my view would be: The president can withdraw unilaterally. That is the mainstream view. It’s certainly the view that the president can withdraw unilaterally from an agreement that didn’t even go to Congress, like the Paris Agreement. And in part, that’s for the reasons that I mentioned. The Senate is not deciding to join the agreement — they’re authorizing, but it’s up to the president whether to actually join, and the president does that unilaterally. And then the mirror image of that would be he or she can withdraw unilaterally.
There’s a related legal question that has not been litigated, which is if Congress passes a law that says, Thou shalt not withdraw from a particular agreement, would that law be constitutional? Some would say no, because the president can withdraw, and so the Congress can’t fetter that right. So that’s like uncharted waters, but that’s not a live issue in this case.
Trump took the U.S. out of the Paris Agreement. Biden put the us back into the Paris Agreement. Trump then took us out of the Paris Agreement again, and is now withdrawing the U.S. from the umbrella organization of the Paris Agreement. I assume that would complicate the efforts of a future president to rejoin the Paris Agreement. Would it be possible for them to rejoin the framework convention? What would have to happen?
Galbraith: So first, the framework convention is the gateway to the Paris Agreement. There’s a provision in the Paris Agreement that says, in order to be in the Paris Agreement, you’ve got to be in the framework convention. And so as a matter of international law, in order to rejoin the Paris Agreement — at least unless it were dramatically amended, which is its own unlikely thing — you would need to be a member of the UNFCCC, which does mean that the question of how you rejoin the UNFCCC becomes significant. We have very little practice on any kind of rejoining. I myself think that the president could simply rejoin the UNFCCC by pointing back to the original Senate resolution of advice and consent to it. You could go back to the Senate. You could ask Congress for a resolution.
My own view is that if the president withdraws the U.S., well, they still have on the books this resolution in which the Senate has consented to ratification — they want to go back in, they go back in. I think this is pretty logically clear, but also an important constraint on presidential power. Because it’s a much more concerning increase in presidential power if you have to do all the work of getting two-thirds of the Senate, then any president can, just at the snap of their fingers, take you out, and you have to go all the way back to the beginning.
Biniaz: There are many options. One is a straightforward option: You go back to the Senate, get 67 votes. Another would be you get both houses of Congress to authorize it [on a majority vote basis]. Another would be — and there may be more — but another would be the idea that the original Senate resolution which we used in 1992 to join still exists, and nothing has extinguished it. And there the analogy would be to a regular law.
There’s several laws in the United States that authorized the president to join some kind of international body or institution. There’s a law that authorizes the president to join the International Labor Organization. There’s a law that authorized the president to join UNESCO. In both of those cases, the U.S. has been in and out and back in — and I think in one case, at least, back out. No one has batted an eye because, well, it’s a law. So the question there would be, is there any reason why a Senate resolution would be any different? Professor Galbraith explores in her law review article that exact question, and concludes that, no, there shouldn’t be a difference — I’m simplifying, but that’s the gist. And under that theory, yeah, a future president could rejoin the convention on his or her own, utilizing that authority, and then after having rejoined the convention, rejoin the Paris Agreement.
So you mentioned that there’s a provision in the UNFCCC that says you have to give notice that you’re exiting, and you wait a year, and then you exit. What does not waiting a year look like?
Galbraith: It can happen that an entity will announce its exit and then violate international law by violating the treaty terms during that one-year period. If there are, say, reporting obligations that the United States has, it would be a violation of international law not to meet those during the period while you’re still a party to the treaty.
This is obviously an escalation of Trump’s previous actions to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, in the sense that it cuts off the path to rejoining that. What does this tell us about the way the Trump administration views its position within global climate diplomacy, and also the international community, period?
Galbraith: It adds to the impression that we already see other contexts, which is that the second Trump administration is even less inhibited and climate-aware than the first administration was — which is really saying something, right? This is an escalation of a position that was already an international outlier. Every other country is in these things, and it shows a real, powerful, and deeply upsetting failure to address the crisis of the global commons.
Biniaz: The way I think about it is that, during Trump 1, it was more like there was an absence of a positive — so in other words, the administration continued to participate in negotiations. They were not pressing countries to take climate action, but neither were they pressing countries not to take climate action. This administration, you could think of it as not just the absence of a positive, but the presence of a negative. I don’t mean that in any judgmental sense. I just mean there’s been much more of an active push from the administration for others to sort of follow suit or to vote against climate-related agreements such as at the [International Maritime Organization]. That’s quite a difference between 1 and 2.
Going into this past year’s COP, it seemed like there was already a sense that international climate diplomacy was, if not dead, at least the wind had come out of the sails. Do you agree? And if so, do you think that wind will come back?
Biniaz: You have to think of international climate diplomacy very broadly. It’s not just the UNFCCC Paris Agreement and decisions that are taken by consensus. That was pretty thin gruel that came out of COP30. But if you think of international climate diplomacy more broadly as all kinds of initiatives, coalitions that are operating among subgroups of countries and at all levels of stakeholders, there’s really a lot going on in what people call the real world. I think over the next couple of years, the proportion of action that’s taken officially, by consensus, dips somewhat, and action goes up. And maybe that balance shifts over time. But I think it’s wrong to judge climate diplomacy simply by what was achievable by 197 countries, because that’s always going to be the hardest to achieve, with or without the United States.
I think it’s more difficult without a pro-climate U.S. because of the role the U.S. has historically played, in terms of promoting ambition and brokering compromises and that kind of thing. But I don’t think, if you only look at that, it’s not the right metric for judging all of global climate diplomacy.
On Venezuela’s oil, permitting reform, and New York’s nuclear plans
Current conditions: Cold temperatures continue in Europe, with thousands of flights canceled at Amsterdam Schiphol Airport, while Scotland braces for a winter storm • Northern New Mexico is anticipating up to a foot of snow • Australia continues to swelter in heat wave, with “catastrophic fire risk” in the state of Victoria.
The White House said in a memo released Wednesday that it would withdraw from more than 60 intergovernmental organizations, including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the international climate community’s governing organization for more than 30 years. After a review by the State Department, the president had determined that “it is contrary to the interests of the United States to remain a member of, participate in, or otherwise provide support” to the organizations listed. The withdrawal “marks a significant escalation of President Trump’s war on environmental diplomacy beyond what he waged in his first term,” Heatmap’s Robinson Meyer wrote Wednesday evening. Though Trump has pulled the United States out of the Paris Agreement (twice), he had so far refused to touch the long-tenured UNFCCC, a Senate-ratified pact from the early 1990s of which the U.S. was a founding member, which “has served as the institutional skeleton for all subsequent international climate diplomacy, including the Paris Agreement,” Meyer wrote.
Among the other organizations named in Trump’s memo was the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which produces periodic assessments on the state of climate science. The IPCC produced the influential 2018 report laying the intellectual foundations for the goal of limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.
More details are emerging on the Trump administration’s plan to control Venezuela’s oil assets. Trump posted Tuesday evening on Truth Social that the U.S. government would take over almost $3 billion worth of Venezuelan oil. On Wednesday, Secretary of Energy Chris Wright told a Goldman Sachs energy conference that “going forward we will sell the production that comes out of Venezuela into the marketplace.” A Department of Energy fact sheet laid out more information, including that “all proceeds from the sale of Venezuelan crude oil and oil products will first settle in U.S. controlled accounts,” and that “these funds will be disbursed for the benefit of the American people and the Venezuelan people at the discretion of the U.S. government.” The DOE also said the government would selectively lift some sanctions to enable the oil sales and transport and would authorize importation of oil field equipment.
As I wrote for Heatmap on Monday, sanctions are just one barrier to oil development among a handful that would have to be cleared for U.S. oil companies to begin exploiting Venezuela’s vast oil resources.
In a Senate floor speech, Senator Martin Heinrich of New Mexico blasted the Trump administration’s anti-renewables executive actions, saying that the U.S. is “facing an energy crisis of the Trump administration’s own making,” and that “the Trump administration is dismantling the permitting process that we use to build new energy projects and get cheaper electrons on the grid.” Heinrich, a Democrat, is the ranking member of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and a key player in any possible permitting reform bill. Though he said he supports permitting reform in principle, calling for “a system that can reliably get to a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’ on a permit in two to three years — not 10, not 17,” he said that “any permitting deal is going to have to guarantee that no administration of either party can weaponize the permitting process for cheap political points.” Heinrich called on Trump officials “to follow the law. They need to reverse their illegal stop work orders, and they need to start approving legally compliant energy projects.”
He did offer an olive branch to the Republican senators with whom he would have to negotiate on any permitting legislation, noting that “the challenge to doing permitting reform is not in this building,” specifying that Senators Mike Lee, chair of the ENR Committee, and Shelly Moore-Capito, chair of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, have not been barriers to a deal. Instead, he said, “it is this Administration that is poisoning the well.”

The climate science nonprofit Climate Central released an analysis Thursday morning ranking 2025 “as the third-highest year (after 2023 and 2024) for billion-dollar weather and climate disasters — with 23 such events causing 276 deaths and costing a total of $115 billion in damages,” according to a press release.
Going back to 1980, the average number of disasters costing $1 billion or more to clean up was nine, with an average total bill of $67.9 billion. The U.S. hit that average within the first weeks of last year with the Los Angeles wildfires, which alone were responsible for over $61 billion in damages, the most economically damaging wildfire on record.
The New York Power Authority announced Wednesday that 23 “potential developers or partners,” including heavyweights like NextEra and GE Hitachi and startups like The Nuclear Company and Terra Power, had responded to its requests for information on developing advanced nuclear projects in New York State. Eight upstate communities also responded as potential host sites for the projects.
New York Governor Kathy Hochul said last summer that New York’s state power agency would go to work on developing 1 gigawatt of nuclear capacity upstate. Late last year, Hochul signed an agreement with Ontario Premier Doug Ford to collaborate on nuclear technology. Ontario has been working on a small modular reactor at its existing Darlington nuclear site, across Lake Ontario from New York.
“Sunrise Wind has spent and committed billions of dollars in reliance upon, and has met the requests of, a thorough review process,” Orsted, the developer of the Sunrise Wind project off the coast of New York, said in a statement announcing that it was filing for a preliminary injunction against the suspension of its lease late last year.
The move would mark a significant escalation in Trump’s hostility toward climate diplomacy.
The United States is departing the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the overarching treaty that has organized global climate diplomacy for more than 30 years, according to the Associated Press.
The withdrawal, if confirmed, marks a significant escalation of President Trump’s war on environmental diplomacy beyond what he waged in his first term.
Trump has twice removed the U.S. from the Paris Agreement, a largely nonbinding pact that commits the world’s countries to report their carbon emissions reduction goals on a multi-year basis. He most recently did so in 2025, after President Biden rejoined the treaty.
But Trump has never previously touched the UNFCCC. That older pact was ratified by the Senate, and it has served as the institutional skeleton for all subsequent international climate diplomacy, including the Paris Agreement.
The United States was a founding member of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. It first joined the treaty in 1992, when President George H.W. Bush signed the pact and lawmakers unanimously ratified it.
Every other country in the world belongs to the UNFCCC. By withdrawing from the treaty, the U.S. would likely be locked out of the Conference of the Parties, the annual UN summit on climate change. It could also lose any influence over UN spending to drive climate adaptation in developing countries.
It remains unclear whether another president could rejoin the framework convention without a Senate vote.
As of 6 p.m. Eastern on Wednesday, the AP report cited a U.S. official who spoke on condition of anonymity because the news had not yet been announced.
The Trump administration has yet to confirm the departure. On Wednesday afternoon, the White House posted a notice to its website saying that the U.S. would leave dozens of UN groups, including those that “promote radical climate policies,” without providing specifics. The announcement was taken down from the White House website after a few minutes.
The White House later confirmed the departure from 31 UN entities in a post on the social network X, but did not list the groups in question.