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The Biden administration is hoping they’ll be a starting gun for the industry. The industry may or may not be fully satisfied.
In one of the Biden administration’s final acts to advance decarbonization, and after more than two years of deliberation and heated debate, the Treasury Department issued the final requirements governing eligibility for the clean hydrogen tax credit on Friday.
At up to $3 per kilogram of clean hydrogen produced, this was the most generous subsidy in the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act, and it came with significant risks if the Treasury did not get the rules right. Hydrogen could be an important tool to help decarbonize the economy. But without adequate guardrails, the tax credit could turn it into a shovel that digs the U.S. deeper into a warming hole by paying out billions of dollars to projects that increase emissions rather than reducing them.
In the final guidelines, the Biden administration recognized the severity of this risk. It maintained key safeguards from the rules proposed in 2023, while also making a number of changes, exceptions, and other “flexibilities” — in the preferred parlance of the Treasury Department — that sacrifice rigorous emissions accounting in favor of making the program easier to administer and take advantage of.
For example, it kept a set of requirements for hydrogen made from water and electricity known as the “three pillars.” Broadly, they compel producers to match every hour of their operation with simultaneous clean energy generation, buy this energy from newly built sources, and ensure those sources are in the same general region as the hydrogen plant. Hydrogen production is extremely energy-intensive, and the pillars were designed to ensure that it doesn’t end up causing coal and natural gas plants to run more. But the final rules are less strict than the proposal. For example, the hourly matching requirement doesn’t apply until 2030, and existing nuclear plants count as new zero-emissions energy if they are considered to be at risk of retirement.
Finding a balance between limiting emissions and ensuring that the tax credit unlocks development of this entirely new industry was a monumental challenge. The Treasury Department received more than 30,000 comments on the proposed rule, compared to about 2,000 for the clean electricity tax credit, and just 89 for the electric vehicle tax credit. Senior administration officials told me this may have been the most complicated of all of the provisions in the IRA. In October, the department assured me that the rules would be finished by the end of the year.
Energy experts, environmental groups, and industry are still digesting the rule, and I’ll be looking out for future analyses of the department’s attempt at compromise. But initial reactions have been cautiously optimistic.
On the environmental side, Dan Esposito from the research nonprofit Energy Innovation told me his first impression was that the final rule was “a clear win for the climate” and illustrated “overwhelming, irrefutable evidence” in favor of the three pillars approach, though he did have concerns about a few specific elements that I’ll get to in a moment. Likewise, Conrad Schneider, the U.S. senior director at the Clean Air Task Force, told me that with the exception of a few caveats, “we want to give this final rule a thumbs up.”
Princeton University researcher Jesse Jenkins, a co-host of Heatmap’s Shift Key podcast and a vocal advocate for the three pillars approach, told me by email that, “Overall, Treasury’s final rules represent a reasonable compromise between competing priorities and will provide much-needed certainty and a solid foundation for the growth of a domestic clean hydrogen industry.”
On the industry side, the Fuel Cell and Hydrogen Energy Association put out a somewhat cryptic statement. CEO Frank Wolak applauded the administration for making “significant improvements” but warned that the rules were “still extremely complex” and contain several open-ended parts that will be subject to interpretation by the incoming Trump-Vance administration.
“This issuance of Final Rules closes a long chapter, and now the industry can look forward to conversations with the new Congress and new Administration regarding how federal tax and energy policy can most effectively advance the development of hydrogen in the U.S.,” Wolak said.
Constellation Energy, the country’s biggest supplier of nuclear power, was among the most vocal critics of the proposed rule and had threatened to sue the government if it did not create a pathway for hydrogen plants that are powered by existing nuclear plants to claim the credit. In response to the final rule, CEO and President Joe Dominguez said he was “pleased” that the Treasury changed course on this and that the final rule was “an important step in the right direction.”
The California governor’s office, which had criticized the proposed rule, was also swayed. “The final rules create the certainty needed for developers to invest in and build clean, renewable hydrogen production projects in states like California,” Dee Dee Myers, the director of the Governor’s Office of Business and Economic Development, said in a statement. The state has plans to build a $12.6 billion hub for producing and using clean hydrogen.
Part of the reason the Treasury needed to find a Goldilocks compromise that pleased as many stakeholders as possible was to protect the rule from future lawsuits and lobbying. But not everyone got what they wanted. For example, the energy developer NextEra, pushed the administration to get rid of the hourly matching provision, which though delayed remained essentially untouched. NextEra did not respond to a request for comment.
Companies that fall on the wrong side of the final rules may still decide to challenge them in court. The next Congress could also make revisions to the underlying tax code, or the incoming Trump administration could change the rules to perhaps make them more favorable to hydrogen made from fossil fuels. But all of this would take time — a rule change, for example, would trigger a whole new notice and comment process. Though the one thing I’ve heard over and over is that the industry wants certainty, which the final rule provides, it’s not yet clear whether that will outweigh any remaining gripes.
In the meantime, it's off to the races for the nascent clean hydrogen industry. Between having clarity on the tax credit, the Department of Energy’s $7 billion hydrogen hubs grant program, and additional federal grants to drive down the cost of clean hydrogen, companies now have numerous incentives to start building the hydrogen economy that has received much hype but has yet to prove its viability. The biggest question now is whether producers will find any buyers for their clean hydrogen.
Below is a more extensive accounting of where the Treasury landed in the final rules.
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On “deliverability,” or the requirement to procure clean energy from the same region, the rules are largely unchanged, although they do allow for some flexibility on regional boundaries.
As I explained above, the Treasury Department also kept the hourly matching requirement, but delayed it by two years until 2030 to give the market more time to set up systems to achieve it — a change Schneider said was “really disappointing” due to the potential emissions consequences. Until then, companies only have to match their operations with clean energy on an annual basis, which is a common practice today. The new deadline is strict, and those that start operations before 2030 will not be grandfathered in — that is, they’ll have to switch to hourly matching once that extended clock runs out. In spite of that, the final rules also ensure that producers won’t be penalized if they are not able to procure clean energy for every single hour their plant operates, an update several groups applauded.
On the requirement to procure clean power from newly built sources, also known as “incrementality,” the department made much bigger changes. It kept an overarching definition that “incremental” generators are those built within three years of the hydrogen plant coming into service, but added three major exceptions:
1. If the hydrogen facility buys power from an existing nuclear plant that’s at risk of retirement.
2. If the hydrogen facility is in a state that has both a robust clean electricity standard and a broad, binding, greenhouse gas cap, such as a cap and trade system. Currently, only California and Washington pass this test.
3. If the hydrogen facility buys power from an existing natural gas or coal plant that has added new carbon capture and storage capacity within three years of the hydrogen project coming into service.
The hydrogen tax credit is so lucrative that environmental groups and energy analysts were concerned it would drive companies like Constellation to start selling all their nuclear power to hydrogen plants instead of to regular energy consumers, which could drive up prices and induce more fossil fuel emissions.
The final rules try to limit this possibility by only allowing existing reactors that are at risk of retirement to qualify. But the definition of “at risk of retirement” is loose. It includes “merchant” nuclear power plants — those that sell at least half their power on the wholesale electricity market rather than to regulated utilities — as well as plants that have just a single reactor, which the rules note have lower or more uncertain revenue and higher operational costs. Looking at the Nuclear Energy Institute’s list of plants, merchant plants make up roughly 40% of the total. All of Constellation Energy’s plants are merchant plants.
There are additional tests — the plant has to have had average annual gross receipts of less than 4.375 cents per kilowatt hour for at least two calendar years between 2017 and 2021. It also has to obtain a minimum 10-year power purchase agreement with the hydrogen company. Beyond that, the reactors that meet this definition are limited to selling no more than 200 megawatts to hydrogen companies, which is roughly 20% for the average reactor.
Esposito, who has closely analyzed the potential emissions consequences of using existing nuclear plants to power hydrogen production, was not convinced by the safeguards. “I don't love the power price look back,” he told me, “because that's not especially indicative of the future — particularly this high load growth future that we're quickly approaching with data centers and everything. It’s very possible power prices could go up from that, and then all of a sudden, the nuclear plants would have been fine without hydrogen.”
As for the 200 megawatt cap, Esposito said it was better than nothing, but he feels “it's kind of an implicit admission that it's not really, truly clean” to produce hydrogen with the energy from these nuclear plants.
Schneider, on the other hand, said the safeguards for nuclear-powered hydrogen projects were adequate. While a lot of plants are theoretically eligible, not all of their electricity will be eligible, he said.
The rules assert that in states that meet the two criteria of a clean electricity standard and a binding cap on emissions, “any increased electricity load is highly unlikely to cause induced grid emissions.”
But in a paper published in February, Energy Innovation explored the potential consequences of this exemption in California. It found that hydrogen projects could have ripple effects on the cap and trade market, pushing up the state’s carbon price and triggering the release of extra carbon emission allowances. “In other words, the California program is more of a ‘soft’ cap than a binding one — the emissions budget ‘expands or contracts in response to price bounds set by the legislature and [California Air Resources Board],’” the report says.
Esposito thinks the exemption is a risk, but that it requires further analysis and he’s not sounding the alarm just yet. He said it could come down to other factors, including how economical hydrogen production in California ends up being.
Producers are also eligible for the tax credit if they make hydrogen the conventional way, by “reforming” natural gas, but capture the emissions released in the process. For this pathway, the Treasury had to clarify several accounting questions.
First, there’s the question of how producers should account for methane leaked into the atmosphere upstream of the hydrogen plant, such as from wells and pipelines. The proposal had suggested using a national average of 0.9%. But researchers found this would wildly underestimate the true warming impact of hydrogen produced from natural gas. It could also underestimate emissions from natural gas producers that have taken steps to reduce methane leakage. “We branded that as one size fits none,” Schneider told me.
The final rules create a path for producers to use more accurate, project-specific methane emissions rates in the future once the Department of Energy updates a lifecycle emissions tool that companies have to use called the “GREET” model. The Environmental Protection Agency recently passed new methane emissions laws that will enable it to collect better data on leakage, which will help the DOE update the model.
Schneider said that’s a step in the right direction, though it will depend on how quickly the GREET model is updated. His bigger concern is if the Trump administration weakens or eliminates the EPA’s methane emissions regulations.
The Treasury also opened up the potential for companies to produce hydrogen from alternative, cleaner sources of methane, like gas captured from wastewater, animal manure, and coal mines. (The original rule included a pathway for using gas captured from landfills.) In reality, hydrogen plants taking this approach are unlikely to use gas directly from these sources, but rather procure certificates that say they have “booked” this cleaner gas and can “claim” the environmental benefits.
Leading up to the final rule, some climate advocates were concerned that this system would give a boost to methane-based hydrogen production over electricity-based production, as it's cheaper to buy renewable natural gas certificates than it is to split water molecules. Existing markets for these credits also often overestimate their benefits — for example, California’s low carbon fuel system gives biogas captured from dairy farms a negative carbon intensity score, even though these projects don’t literally remove carbon from the atmosphere.
The Treasury tried to improve its emissions estimates for each of these alternative methane sources to make them more accurate, but negative carbon intensity scores are still possible.
The department did make one significant change here, however. It specified that companies can’t just buy a little bit of cleaner methane and then average it with regular fossil-based methane — each must be considered separately for determining tax credit eligibility. Jenkins, of Princeton, told me that without this rule, huge amounts of hydrogen made from regular natural gas could qualify.
Producers also won’t be able to take this “book and claim” approach until markets adapt to the Treasury’s reporting requirements, which isn’t expected until at least 2027.
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On a dead wind farm, a bankrupt solar company, and a possible rescue for energy funding
Current conditions: Tropical Storm Barbara has weakened from hurricane strength and is heading northwest, away from Mexico • A heat advisory is in place for the Sacramento Valley in California, with temps expected to top 100 degrees Fahrenheit Tuesday night • Severe thunderstorms will bring heavy rain to the Southeast today.
If the U.S. is going to lead on nuclear power, the “best way to get shovels in the ground” is for the Department of Energy’s Loan Programs Office to provide low-cost debt, Secretary of Energy Chris Wright said during an interview at a conference on Monday. The budget reconciliation bill that passed the House last month would gut the LPO’s budget to provide such loans. Wright accused the Biden administration of abusing its lending authority and giving the office a bad name. “I’m in a little bit of a negotiation trying to keep it around,” Wright said, adding that he saw opportunities to support transmission lines and critical mineral projects in addition to nuclear. “It will be around, the question is just going to be the scale and scope of how much we can do with the Loan Programs Office.” The Senate Energy committee is expected to release its own proposal for the LPO in the budget reconciliation bill as soon as today.
Wright at the White House in April.Andrew Harnik/Getty Images
Last fall, Heatmap named Atlantic Shores, a 2,800-megawatt proposed wind farm off the coast of northern New Jersey, one of the most at-risk projects of the energy transition. Eight months later, Atlantic Shores is officially dead. The developer submitted a filing to New Jersey regulators seeking to terminate its agreement to sell power into the state. The move came after the oil giant Shell pulled out of the project in January, and the Trump administration revoked its air permits in March. The administration’s anti-wind actions have forced the company “to materially reduce its personnel, terminate contracts, and cancel planned project investments,” the filing says.
A new report from the Clean Air Task Force argues that the “levelized cost of energy,” the dominant metric used to make financial comparisons between energy sources, is not fit for purpose in today’s discussions about meeting power demand. The calculation covers capital and operating costs, but it does not take into account increasingly important factors such as when the power is available (i.e. not at night, for solar without batteries, which represent an additional cost), and whether it will require new transmission lines or upgrades. While LCOE can illustrate that solar has gotten cheaper over time, it can’t say what will most economically serve the needs of the grid in a given region, my colleague Matthew Zeitlin explains.
Rooftop solar company Sunnova has filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection after laying off just over half its staff last week, its second major round of layoffs this year. The news came shortly after Solar Mosaic, a residential solar financing company, also filed for bankruptcy. Between high interest rates that are cratering demand and policy uncertainty due to proposals in Washington to kill solar subsidies, the industry is in turmoil. Sunnova asserted that the bankruptcy filing “is not expected to have a material effect on our servicing operations for existing customers.” More on what this all means for customers in my story from yesterday.
The Environmental Protection Agency on Monday proposed approving Texas’ application to regulate carbon dioxide injection wells, kicking off a 45-day comment period. If its application is approved, Texas would become the fifth state to be granted oversight of such “class VI” wells at the state level, following North Dakota, Wyoming, Louisiana, and West Virginia. Last year, a group of Texas Democrats sent a letter to the agency advising it to reject Texas’ application due to the state’s history of poor enforcement. The EPA had opened a probe into the state’s oversight of other types of injection wells after a petition from environmental groups said Texas had failed to protect groundwater. The agency will hold one virtual public hearing on the decision on July 24.
Automakers are pivoting en masse to hybrids as federal support for EVs is thrown in reverse. “The unprecedented EV head-fake has wreaked havoc on product plans,” Bank of America analysts wrote in a recent report. “The next four+ years will be the most uncertain and volatile time in product strategy ever.”
A new report from the Clean Air Task Force casts shade on “levelized cost of energy.”
Forgive me, for I have cited the levelized cost of energy.
That’s what I was thinking as I spoke with Kasparas Spokas, one of the co-authors of a new paper from the Clean Air Task Force that examines this popular and widely cited cost metric — and found it wanting.
Levelized cost of energy, or LCOE, is a simple calculation: You take a generator, like a solar panel (with a discount for future costs), and add up its operating and capital expenditures, and then divide by the expected energy output over the life of the project (also discounted).
LCOE has helped underline the economic and popular case for renewables, especially solar. And it’s cited everywhere. The investment bank Lazard produces an influential annual report comparing the LCOE of different generation sources; the latest iteration puts utility-scale solar as low as $29 per megawatt-hour, while nuclear can be as high as $222. Environmental groups cite LCOE in submissions to utilities regulators. Wall Street analysts use it to project costs. And journalists, including me, will cite it to compare the cost of, say, solar panels to natural gas.
We probably shouldn’t, according to Spokas — or at least we should be more clear about what LCOE actually means.
“We continue to see levelized cost of electricity being used in ways that we think are not ideal or not adequate to what its capabilities are,” Spokas told me.
The report argues that LCOE “is not an appropriate tool to use in the context of long-term planning and policymaking for deep decarbonization” because it doesn’t take into account factors that real-world grids and grid planners also have to consider, such as when the generator is available, whether the generator has inertia, and what supporting infrastructure (including transmission and distribution lines) a generator needs to supply power to customers.
We see these limitations and constraints on real-life grids all the time, for instance in the infamous solar “duck curve.” During the middle of the day, when the sun is highest, non-solar generation can become essentially unnecessary on a solar-heavy grid. But these grids can run into problems as the sun goes down but electricity demand persists. In this type of grid, additional solar may be low cost, but also low value — it gives you electricity when you need it the least.
“If you’re building a lot of solar in the Southwest, at some point you’ll get to the point where you have enough solar during the day that if you build an incremental amount of solar, it’s not going to be valuable,” Spokas said. To make additional panels useful, you’d have to add battery storage, increasing the electricity’s real-world cost.
Looking for new spots for renewables also amps up conflict over land use and provides more opportunities for political opposition, a cost that LCOE can’t capture. And a renewables-heavy grid can require investments in energy transmission capacity that other kinds of generation do not — you can put a gas-fired power plant wherever you can buy land and get permission, whereas utility-scale solar or wind has to be where it’s sunny or windy.
“The trend is, the more renewable penetration you have, the more costly meeting a firm demand with renewables and storage becomes,” Spokas said.
Those real-world pressures are now far more salient to grid planners than they were earlier this century, when LCOE became a popular metric to compare different types of generators.
“The rise of LCOE’s popularity to evaluate technology competitiveness also coincided with a period of stagnant load growth in the United States and Europe,” the report says. When there was sufficient generation capacity that could be ramped up and down as needed, “the need to consider various system needs and costs, such as additional transmission or firm capacity needs was relatively low.”
This is not the world we’re in today.
Demand for electricity is rising again, and the question for grid planners and policymakers now is less how to replace fossil generators going offline, and more how to meet new electricity demand in a way that can also meet society’s varied goals for cost and sustainability.
This doesn’t always have to mean maxing out new generation — it can also mean making large sources of electricity load more flexible — but it does mean making more difficult, more considered choices that take in the grid as a whole into account.
When I asked Spokas whether grid operators and grid planners needed to read this report, he chuckled and said no, they already know what’s in it. Electricity markets, as imperfect as they often are, recognize that not every megawatt is the same.
Electricity suppliers often get paid more for providing power when it’s most needed. In regions with what’s known as capacity markets, generators get paid in advance to guarantee they’ll be available when the grid needs them, a structure that ensures big payouts to coal, gas, and nuclear generators. In markets that don’t have that kind of advance planning, like Texas’ ERCOT, dispatchable generators (often batteries) can get paid for providing so-called “ancillary services,” meeting short term power needs to keep the grid in balance — a service that batteries are often ideally placed to provide.
When grid planners look at the entirety of a system, they often — to the chagrin of many renewables advocates — tend to be less enthusiastic about renewables for decarbonizing the energy system than many environmental groups, advocates, and lawmakers.
The CATF report points to Ontario, Canada where the independent system operator concluded that building a new 300-megawatt small modular nuclear reactor — practically the definition of high LCOE generation, not least because such a thing has never been deployed before in North America — would actually be less risky for electricity costs than building more battery-supported wind and solar, according to the Globe and Mail. Ontario regulators recently granted a construction license to the SMR project, which is part of a larger scheme to install four small reactors, for a total 1.2 gigawatts of capacity. To provide the equivalent supply of renewable energy would require adding between 5.6 and 8.9 gigawatts of wind and solar capacity, plus new transmission infrastructure, the system operator said, which could drive up prices higher than those for advanced nuclear.
None of this is to say that we should abandon LCOE entirely. The best use case, the report argues, is for comparing costs for the same technology over time, not comparing different technologies in the present or future. And here the familiar case for solar — that its cost has fallen dramatically over time — is borne out.
Broadly speaking, CATF calls for “decarbonization policy, industry strategy, and public debate” to take a more “holistic approach” to estimating cost for new sources of electricity generation. Policymakers “should rely on jurisdiction-specific system-level analysis where possible. Such analysis would consider all the system costs required to ensure a reliable and resilient power system and would capture infrastructure cost tradeoffs over long and uncertain-time horizons,” the report says.
As Spokas told me, none of this is new. So why the focus now?
CATF is catching a wave. Many policymakers, grid planners, and electricity buyers have already learned to appreciate all kinds of megawatts, not just the marginally cheapest one. Large technology companies are signing expensive power purchase agreements to keep nuclear power plants open or even revive them, diving into the development of new nuclear power and buying next-generation geothermal in the hope of spurring further commercialization.
Google and Microsoft have embraced a form of emissions accounting that practically begs for clean firm resources, as they try to match every hour of electricity they use with a non-emitting resource.
And it’s possible that clean firm resources could get better treatment than theycurrently get in the reconciliation bill working its way through Congress. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright recently called for tax credits for “baseload” power sources like geothermal and nuclear to persist through 2031, according to Foundation for American Innovation infrastructure director Thomas Hochman.
“It’s not our intention to try to somehow remove incentives for renewables specifically, but to the extent that we can preserve what we can, we’re happy if it would be used in that way,” Spokas said.
When I asked Spokas who most needed to read this report, he replied frankly, “I think climate advocates would be in that bucket. I think policymakers that have a less technical background would also be in that bucket, and media that have a less technical background would also be in there.”
I’ll keep that in mind.
The Rivian R1S’s sprawling touchscreen delivered the good news: After 40-plus minutes of charging at the halfway-point pit stop between San Francisco and L.A., we could easily make it the 220 miles home. Sure, fate might dictate an extra pit stop if the toddler collapsed into an inconsolable meltdown or one of the adults needed a bathroom break. But the math was clear: At a 95% charge, the big electric SUV’s battery could go an estimated 350 miles in Conserve Mode — more than enough to get home from Coalinga in one shot.
And then it happened. The baby held it together, thanks in part to the soothing power of pop song covers by a singing cat. We blew through the last leg of the journey over the mountains into greater Los Angeles.
For a fossil fuel vehicle, this would have been no big achievement; just about any old gas-burner could make a 400-mile highway trip with a single stop. In an EV, it’s a picture of what’s becoming possible as batteries get bigger and better, and more EVs have ranges that top 300 miles. Because believe me, if you want to road trip in an electric vehicle, you should buy all the range you can afford.
When my wife and I got a Tesla Model 3 six years ago, our simple single-motor edition came with a nominal 240 miles of Environmental Protection Agency-rated range. Pretty good, we thought. That’s nearly the distance to Las Vegas, and certainly enough to make the trip of 350 miles or so to San Francisco on one recharging stop.
How young I was. Range, remember, is a relative thing; an EPA miles rating doesn’t mean you’ll go that far. Compared to driving 50 miles per hour on some lonesome highway, range dips noticeably when you’re ignoring the 70 mile-per-hour speed limit on Interstate 5, just trying to get home. It is also impractical to use a battery’s entire capacity. Once you’ve passed 80% to 85% capacity, recharging slows dramatically, so much so that it’s annoying to sit there and accumulate a few extra miles unless you really need them. And when you’re driving, the miles below 10% aren’t usable unless you’re totally comfortable arriving at the next charger with just a percent or two left on the battery.
Because of these limitations, my little Tesla can’t really travel more than 140 to 150 real miles at freeway speed. As the battery has gotten older and its range has dwindled, the journey to San Francisco can be accomplished in two charging stops only if we begin with a full battery, carefully plan our stops, and don’t have to waste energy running the A/C on full blast because it’s obscenely hot. More commonly, the trip takes three full charging stops.
To be clear, this is not the worst thing in the world. It adds travel time, certainly, when compared to the Cannonball Run my wife used to make in college, stopping just once at the halfway point to get some gas. But with a baby in the back, we’re taking at least a couple breaks no matter what. The real problem driving long distances in an EV with low or fading range is that the trip becomes an exercise in logistics. You’re constantly aware of the car’s estimate for how much range will remain when you reach your destination — and alarmed if that number starts to decline. You also rarely stop just because you want to when there are so many stops you have to make.
To get a taste of the better life to come, I borrowed an R1S Tri Max Ascend for a long weekend trip to the Bay Area. A triple-motor, absurdly overpowered version of Rivian’s SUV, the Tri Max is a $105,000, nearly 7,000-pound behemoth that can outrace sports cars on a drag strip. Yet because of its enormous battery pack, the giant EV can still deliver more than 300 real-world miles on a charge, enough to fulfill my long-held fantasy of charging only once on the way to San Francisco.
The difference was apparent within the first two hours. As we crept through heavy traffic leaving Los Angeles on U.S. 101, the baby threw a fit. In my shorter-range EV, I would’ve powered through the ear-piercing misery for as long as it took to reach a Supercharger in Santa Barbara, then eaten whatever happened to be around. In the R1S, we knew we could make it comfortably all the way to Rivian’s fast charger in Pismo Beach, about halfway to S.F. So we pulled off in one of our favorite seaside towns, Carpinteria, for happy hour crab cakes to give the child a break from her seat.
It took a lengthy stop in Pismo to refill the Rivian’s gigantic battery, one we spent buying baby clothes at the outlet mall. But that got us to the Bay Area, where a quick pit stop at one of the Tesla Superchargers now open to non-Tesla cars provided plenty of electricity to bum around town all weekend. The only hitch in road-tripping in the Rivian is where you choose to stay — our hotel had one compatible slow-charging bay for overnight energy, but I never could snag it.
No, long range can’t duplicate the mad dash experience for the kind of drivers who want to stop only five minutes every four hours in order to “make good time.” And EV driving still requires more mental math than the old ways, where you would notice the fuel gauge is getting close to E and pull off at any of America’s multitude of gas stations. But extended range does give the EV driver more of the classic road trip experience, where stops are determined by life — bathroom breaks, coffee refills, backseat tantrums — and not solely by charging needs. And there’s nothing like having enough range to just get home when everybody in the family needs the trip to end.
The good news is that range is getting better across the board. A half-decade ago, a lot of pure EVs came with ranges that were barely above 200. Now, many more come with at least 240 to 250 miles in their entry-level versions, with battery upgrades available that take the figure north of 300.
The bad news is that range costs. No, you don’t have to splurge for a six-figure vehicle like the R1S Tri Max to get a big battery. Even with more affordable EVs, though, it costs thousands of dollars extra to get the larger battery, and with it, road trip peace of mind. An ideal solution to this problem is leasing, which gets people into better EVs for a lower monthly payment (and doesn’t leave them worrying about a battery’s long-term health as they would if they bought the car). But a lot of great lease deals are going to get a bit worse if the current government succeeds in undoing electric vehicle incentives.
For plenty of drivers, the extra cost won’t be practical or worthwhile — they could spend much less to stick with a hybrid vehicle, or settle for making a few extra road trip stops in a less expensive EV. But if I’m being honest, long range is a life-changer for anybody who loves the open road. EVs are already better than combustion cars in the city. Once driving range reaches well above 300 miles, they’re just about as good on the interstate, too.