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Forget data centers. Fire is going to make electricity much more expensive in the western United States.

A tsunami is coming for electricity rates in the western United States — and it’s not data centers.
Across the western U.S., states have begun to approve or require utilities to prepare their wildfire adaptation and insurance plans. These plans — which can require replacing equipment across thousands of miles of infrastructure — are increasingly seen as non-negotiable by regulators, investors, and utility executives in an era of rising fire risk.
But they are expensive. Even in states where utilities have not yet caused a wildfire, costs can run into the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars. Of course, the cost of sparking a fire can be much higher.
At least 10 Western states have recently approved or are beginning to work on new wildfire mitigation plans, according to data from E9 Insights, a utility research and consulting firm. Some utilities in the Midwest and Southeast have now begun to put together their own proposals, although they are mostly at an earlier phase of planning.
“Almost every state in the West has some kind of wildfire plan or effort under way,” Sam Kozel, a researcher at E9, told me. “Even a state like Missouri is kicking the tires in some way.”
The costs associated with these plans won’t hit utility customers for years. But they reflect one more building cost pressure in the electricity system, which has been stressed by aging equipment and rising demand. The U.S. Energy Information Administration already expects wholesale electricity prices to increase 8.5% in 2026.
The past year has seen a new spate of plans. In October, Colorado’s largest utility Xcel Energy proposed more than $845 million in new spending to prepare for wildfires. The Oregon utility Portland General Electric received state approval to spend $635 million on “compliance-related upgrades” to its distribution system earlier this month. That category includes wildfire mitigation costs.
The Public Utility Commission of Texas issued its first mandatory wildfire-mitigation rules last month, which will require utilities and co-ops in “high-risk” areas to prepare their own wildfire preparedness programs.
Ultimately, more than 140 utilities across 19 states have prepared or are working on wildfire preparedness plans, according to the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.
It will take years for this increased utility spending on wildfire preparedness to show up in customers’ bills. That’s because utilities can begin spending money for a specific reason, such as disaster preparedness, as soon as state regulators approve their plan to do so. But utilities can’t begin passing those costs to customers until regulators review their next scheduled rate hike through a special process known as a rate case.
When they do get passed through, the plans will likely increase costs associated with the distribution system, the network of poles and wires that deliver electricity “the last mile” from substations to homes and businesses. Since 2019, rising distribution-related costs has driven the bulk of electricity price inflation in the United States. One risk is that distribution costs will keep rising at the same time that electricity itself — as well as natural gas — get more expensive, thanks to rising demand from data centers and economic growth.
California offers a cautionary tale — both about what happens when you don’t prepare for fire, and how high those costs can get. Since 2018, the state has spent tens of billions to pay for the aftermath of those blazes that utilities did start and remake its grid for a new era of fire. Yet it took years for those costs to pass through to customers.
“In California, we didn’t see rate increases until 2023, but the spending started in 2018,” Michael Wara, a senior scholar at the Woods Institute for the Environment and director of the Climate and Energy Policy Program at Stanford University, told me.
The cost of failing to prepare for wildfires can, of course, run much higher. Pacific Gas and Electric paid more than $13.5 billion to wildfire victims in California after its equipment was linked to several deadly fires in the state. (PG&E underwent bankruptcy proceedings after its equipment was found responsible for starting the 2018 Camp Fire, which killed 85 people and remains the deadliest and most destructive wildfire in state history.)
California now has the most expensive electricity in the continental United States.
Even the risk of being associated with starting a fire can cost hundreds of millions. In September, Xcel Energy paid a $645 million settlement over its role in the 2021 Marshall fire, even though it has not admitted to any responsibility or negligence in the fire.
Wara’s group began studying the most cost-effective wildfire investments a few years ago, when he realized the wave of cost increases that had hit California would soon arrive for other utilities.
It was partly “informed by the idea that other utility commissions are not going to allow what California has allowed,” Wara said. “It’s too expensive. There’s no way.”
Utilities can make just a few cost-effective improvements to their systems in order to stave off the worst wildfire risk, he said. They should install weather stations along their poles and wires to monitor actual wind conditions along their infrastructure’s path, he said. They should also install “fast trip” conductors that can shut off powerlines as soon as they break.
Finally, they should prepare — and practice — plans to shut off electricity during high-wind events, he said. These three improvements are relatively cheap and pay for themselves much faster than upgrades like undergrounding lines, which can take more than 20 years to pay off.
Of course, the cost of failing to prepare for wildfires is much higher than the cost of preparation. From 2019 to 2023, California allowed its three biggest investor-owned utilities to collect $27 billion in wildfire preparedness and insurance costs, according to a state legislative report. These costs now make up as much as 13% of the bill for customers of PG&E, the state’s largest utility.
State regulators in California are currently considering the utility PG&E’s wildfire plan for 2026 to 2028, which calls for undergrounding 1,077 miles of power lines and expanding vegetation management programs. Costs from that program might not show up in bills until next decade.
“On the regulatory side, I don’t think a lot of these rate increases have hit yet,” Kozel said.
California may wind up having an easier time adapting to wildfires than other Western states. About half of the 80 million people who live in the west live in California, according to the Census Bureau, meaning that the state simply has more people who can help share the burden of adaptation costs. An outsize majority of the state’s residents live in cities — which is another asset, since wildfire adaptation usually involves getting urban customers to pay for costs concentrated in rural areas.
Western states where a smaller portion of residents live in cities, such as Idaho, might have a harder time investing in wildfire adaptation than California did, Wara said.
“The costs are very high, and they’re not baked in,” Wara said. “I would expect electricity cost inflation in the West to be driven by this broadly, and that’s just life. Climate change is expensive.”
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A conversation with Sam Lyman of the Bitcoin Policy Institute.
This week’s conversation is with Sam Lyman, head of research at the Bitcoin Policy Institute. Originally focused on cryptocurrency, Lyman’s organization has expanded to policy and messaging development around data centers, most notably providing research many AI boosters cite to claim foreign influence is driving opposition to new hyperscale projects. Last week, the think tank released a new report calling for a novel solution to the data center permitting bottleneck: direct cash payments from data center projects to individuals involved with building them, as well as residents nearby facilities once they’re operating.
I reached out to BPI and asked for a chat with Lyman about the data center dividend proposal. I also tried to get to the bottom of where this increasingly relevant think tank stands on the general idea of a national data center law. The conversation was immensely informative. So here it is, in a lightly abridged and edited format.
Let’s start with the data center dividend proposal. Walk my readers through it.
Data center dividends came from the idea that, ideally in the AI revolution, we want all Americans to benefit. Especially rural Americans. You look at the landscape today, the majority of AI data centers are being built in rural America. It’s critical they’ll benefit from the massive wealth AI will unlock.
There’s lots of ways to make that happen. People point to the jobs AI data centers will build out, for example. But with data center dividends, we take the logic of the Alaska Permanent Fund and we apply it to America’s rural counties, which are sitting on a proverbial gold mine right now but lack any kind of public mechanism allowing them to benefit from that in a maximal way.
If you look at the tax revenue these data centers create, which is astronomical, how do we distribute this tax revenue in a way where it has the most tangible impact on the families living there? We believe data center dividends are the best way to do that – after allocating money for schools, public safety, and infrastructure, it allows these counties with tens of millions of dollars left over to distribute them as they see fit. They should distribute that money to the men and women who make those data centers happen in the first place.
The most effective form of a dividend would take a direct payment: a cash payment, a physical check, a direct deposit. Or the form of credits paying back property taxes, utility bills, an endowment for scholarships. There’s a number of different forms this can take.
Hopefully this gets the conversation going about how we can make these work for everybody.
Who do you want to see set up this dividend mechanism? How’s your approach to implementation?
The report is addressed to county commissioners. I’m thinking of commissioners who represent both sides of the political spectrum facing this huge backlash. Many of them want to do good by their communities and their voters, even if it means doing a data center, in places where it’s difficult to explain right now. Dividends make this indisputably clear.
I tried to put myself in the shoes of an enterprising county commissioner who sees the merits in the data center buildout and wants to break out of the political storm. It’s important to note data centers can be a huge economic boon for communities, in ways that can impact lives positively.
Have any communities – counties, as you noted – taken this idea up yet? Are there any models for this proposal?
The best analogue is West Feliciana, Louisiana, which is the case study we feature. West Feliciana made an agreement with a data center developer where in lieu of taxes, they make direct payments of about $90 million a year to the parish. That triples the community’s tax budget every year. It leaves ample room not only for essential services but dividends afterwards. Louisiana then passed a law – Act 434 – that allowed West Feliciana to remit some of those payments to residents as a tax credit. This bill first provided the opportunity for the parish to even remit those payments as cash, but it was changed in the legislature to make it a credit. That’s the closest we’ve gotten so far.
As far as reaching out to individual counties, we’re a think tank. We put ideas into the universe. We haven’t had anyone reach out to us since the publication of the report so far but we’re hoping they will.
Your report does lay out how there’s a bottleneck in development and this could help with easing it. Do you see an impetus to put ideas like the dividend out there right now, in light of the increased data center scrutiny in this year’s midterms?
Our publication is irrespective of the midterms. But it is tied to the fact that a bottleneck facing the data center buildout includes it becoming a politicized issue. We’re of the belief these projects shouldn't be political at all. One way to break through the noise is by showing how they can benefit those involved in construction and residents who live there. Data centers are critical infrastructure; other forms of critical infrastructure aren’t being politicized. Our efforts are to demonstrate how these shouldn’t be political.
When it comes to the future of AI data center regulation, this proposal is obviously geared towards incentivizing a resolution to the bottleneck through using resources produced from data centers – namely, new investment.
Where does your organization stand on the increased push for environmental or siting regulation on AI data centers?
I’m not familiar with what you might be referring to there.
I mean, there’s all kinds of proposals at the federal level and in states for everything from being required to pay for infrastructure upgrades to being required to use closed-loop cooling to siting restrictions, like temporary moratoria.
What I’m asking is, what else do you as an organization believe when it comes to regulating AI data center development at the federal level? State level?
We believe data centers should work for the communities where they’re being built. That’s important. So the concept of BYOP – Bring Your Own Power – we very much support that idea. We think the Ratepayer Protection Pledge is a great proposal because ultimately we want data centers, with them being critical infrastructure, to not only strengthen our national security but strengthen the communities where they’re being built.
Some states are rejecting data centers. We think that’s a mistake because it's something that’ll ultimately short-change the people who live there. For the states that do decide to build data centers, it's up to them what regulations make data centers more sustainable over time.
There’s increased public discussion for policy on AI development – as an organization, do you see any role in the federal government making policy here with a national data center law?
We think AI will be key to America’s prosperity over the long-term. We have concerns about the regulation of open-source artificial intelligence; bitcoin is a form of open-source software and open-source money. We believe intelligence should be something available to all Americans. That’s our concern with talk about regulating AI right now, it feels like a ploy for regulatory capture.
But what about national policy on AI data centers? Does your think tank support the national legislature doing a federal data center bill or is that something best for localities or states?
It depends on the bill. Are you talking about Sen. Bernie Sanders’ national moratorium?
With a permitting deal seemingly on the horizon, Republican Gabe Evans and Democrat Scott Peters may be about to see their partnership pay off.
The fate of permitting reform legislation that could smooth the way to all kinds of new and improved energy infrastructure — including transmission lines and renewables — is currently hostage to opaque discussions between Senate committee chairs. Rhode Island Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, the Democratic ranking member of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, told a Rhode Island business group earlier this week that “we’re actually in a pretty good place on permitting reform,” and that there was “maybe another week of negotiations.” Whitehouse’s Republican counterpart on the EPW committee, West Virginia Senator Shelly Moore-Capito, told Semafor on Friday that any bill has “got to pop out of here in the next 48 hours.”
If that’s going to happen, it will be because Republicans and Democrats have decided it’s worth it to get along. Any deal will eventually have to be voted on by the House, which has already produced several bills on a bipartisan basis, and even passed one — the SPEED Act — late last year.
Two of the busier House members on this issue are Scott Peters, a Democratic former environmental lawyer from San Diego, and Gabe Evans, a first term Colorado Republican representing a suburban and rural district north of Denver that includes wind farms and crude oil production. “The district that I represent truly is an all of the above energy district,” Evans told me.
Their latest effort is a bill aimed at smoothing out permitting for transmission development, especially interregional transmission. Last week, the two congressmen unveiled the CLEAR Act, seeking to apply a stricter set of standards for lawsuits against transmission projects that aligned with how natural gas and hydropower projects are treated under the Federal Power Act (it’s much harder to sue to stop these projects). Earlier this year, the two also sponsored the CERTAIN Act, a more comprehensive streamlining of federal permitting for energy infrastructure projects.
“We’re proud to have a lot of our work as the foundation for this, and I think if they send us over something that includes this, it’s got a really good chance of passing in the House,” Peters told me. Evans added that bringing forward bipartisan bills “gives a little bit more impetus to the Senate to know that the House is looking for these things.”
While the Senate’s deal will be up to the senators, Peters told me he envisions a broad permitting package that could include reforms to the National Environmental Policy Act to shorten permitting timelines, preventing the president from nixing individual projects, and reform Section 401 of the Clean Water Act which effectively devolves power to tribes and states to block a variety of interstate projects. “I think it’s coming together pretty well,” Peters said. “Obviously, we’re waiting for white smoke from the Senate.”
A permitting reform package may be one of the last major bills several bipartisan-minded House members get to vote on.
Election day is about six weeks off, and while Peters will likely have an easy time getting reelected for this eighth term, Evans is in a tough race. His purple-hued district is a target for the House Democratic campaign arm, which is hoping to flip it to former Colorado House of Representatives member Manny Rutinel, who worked as a lawyer at the environmental group Earthjustice. The Cook Political Report rates the race as toss-up, and Nate Silver gives Rutinel a roughly 75% to win.
But Rutinel won’t be getting any campaign help from Peters.
When I asked Peters about the timing of releasing a bill that could boost an endangered Republican’s bipartisan bona fides less than two months before an election, Peters told me that he and Evans had been working on it “for a while,” and that “my colleagues know that I’ve worked with Republicans to get problems solved.”
He said he wasn’t “participating in Gabe’s election” and wasn’t giving any money to his campaign, but also that he wouldn’t campaign Evans’ challenger, despite the opportunity to bolster his own caucus.
Peters is not shy about praising Evans. “What I appreciate about Gabe is that it takes a little bit of initiative to separate yourself from the majority — particularly when you’re in the trifecta — and do your own thing. He’s been a good partner in helping find ways to reduce process and make things go faster,” he told me.
Evans told me that he and Peters met early in this Congress, as Evans was getting settled into his new office in the Longworth building. “We’ve built the relationship over the last two years with a lot of the different areas that we’ve collaborated on.”
“I always try to meet the members of my committee and find out who will work with me. And I was fortunate to find Gabe,” Peters said.
“I do want to win the majority in the next Congress,” Peters went on, but “the norm should be that we figure out ways to work together to solve problems, and, you know, we’ll let the voters of Colorado 8 decide who to send me.”
Evans, for his part, told me that he had to work with Democrats to get anything passed as a member of a minuscule Republican minority in the Colorado statehouse, and that the 40-plus members of the bipartisan Problem Solvers Caucus have agreed not to campaign against each other. “There’s 385 other members that you can go pick fights with,” he said.
A new analysis by a one-time atomic energy opponent makes a bull case for big reactors.
If you know anything about the cost of nuclear energy in America, you probably are aware that the most recent reactors built — the only two new ones designed, planned, and constructed since the 1990s — were budget busters. Units 3 and 4 of Southern Company’s Alvin W. Vogtle Generating Station in eastern Georgia were the first of a new generation of reactor technology ever to be deployed in the U.S. Construction delays, changes to the design, and corporate bankruptcies ultimately sent the price of the pair of Westinghouse AP1000s — the Ford Mustang of American nuclear technology, with safety features that essentially make them not just powerful but also meltdown-proof — to nearly $40 billion, or about $16,350 per kilowatt.
But the U.S. once built reactors for half that — and it did so in the chaotic aftermath of the nation’s worst civilian nuclear accident, when mounting regulations made atomic power construction more onerous than ever before.
That’s the landmark finding of a new report by a veteran nuclear researcher, who quantified and broke down the cost of constructing nearly every civilian atomic power station the U.S. built in the 20th century. Adjusting the dollar figures using the Handy-Whitman Index, a specialized formula for calculating inflation in the utility sector’s construction costs, the analysis — shared exclusively with Heatmap — concluded that 47 reactors built in the U.S. between the 1979 partial meltdown at Pennsylvania’s Three Mile Island nuclear plant and the turn of the millennium came in at an average of $8,200 per kilowatt.
“Costs are only going to come down from that,” Charles Komanoff, the economist and energy policy analyst whose consultancy conducted the study on behalf of the Clean Air Task Force, told me.
The paper carves out a pathway down the cost curve that runs counter to the industry’s broader consensus at the moment on the best way to make nuclear less of a luxury choice compared to other generating sources. Billions of dollars have flooded into companies promising to commercialize small modular reactors that generate 300 megawatts or less. The concept is a bet on what Komanoff calls the economies of duplication, meaning that if customers need more individual reactors, developers can ride that repetition to lower prices. But the paper suggests that the way developers have historically reduced nuclear costs — through economies of scale — achieves the same per-kilowatt savings with one gigawatt-sized, water-cooled reactor as 20 smaller reactors would net.
Some small and microreactor developers say that using alternative coolants — molten salt, liquid sodium, high-temperature gases such as helium — could further raise the efficiency of their technologies, allowing them to make up for whatever they lose on economies of scale. But large, traditional reactors such as the AP1000 are “a proven technology” that, unlike next-generation reactors with far less operating experience, won’t have to overcome “teething problems” to reach maximum efficiency levels, Komanoff told me.
There are other options to the AP1000, such as the ABWR that the parent companies of GE Vernova Hitachi Nuclear Energy built in Japan and Taiwan in the 1990s. One was planned for Texas, but abandoned a decade ago amid declining interest in nuclear power post-Fukushima. The technology is approved by the NRC, but GE-Hitachi has since turned its attention to its 300-megawatt BWRX-300. Given that no ABWR was built in the U.S., James Boucher, the former Deloitte nuclear consultant who co-authored the paper, said the AP1000 is the reactor best positioned to replicate the country’s successful buildout of the 1980s.
“We have two AP1000s. They're fully built. They’re operating. They’re doing, as far as I can tell, quite well. And they are like these reactors in our sample,” Boucher told me. “If we wanted to build 20, 30, 50 more AP1000s, I think we’d have a good shot.”
The Nuclear Company, a startup developer that hired much of the team behind the Vogtle buildout in a bid to become the go-to project manager for future AP1000s, called Komanoff’s report “promising because it demonstrates how cost can come down when we don’t focus on building first-of-a-kind projects.”
“There was a 30% overnight capital cost reduction just moving from Unit 3 to Unit 4 on the Vogtle project — there is no reason we can’t continue down the learning curve on the next AP1000s built in this country,” Joe Klecha, The Nuclear Company’s chief nuclear officer and president, told me after reviewing the report I sent him. “Especially with our mix of experience building these reactors and advancements in technology we’re leveraging to scale, achieving below $10,000 per kilowatt is just the beginning for us. We believe we can execute safer, faster, and at lower cost than we’ve achieved in the past.”
Back in the 1980s, the military-like regimentation common at nuclear plants and construction sites wasn’t yet as ingrained in the industry. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission had replaced the Atomic Energy Commission, which was seen as too deferential to the companies it oversaw, and spent the decade tightening rules on constructing and operating nuclear plants. New accident scenarios were being discovered, requiring new plants and existing ones up for relicensing to change operating protocols, upgrade equipment, and conduct additional research.
Komanoff was among those pushing for the changes. In reports he authored on behalf of Greenpeace, an arch opponent of nuclear power, he dissected the fiscal woes atomic energy developers faced, making the economic case for shutting down electrical stations that his fellow activists battled on ecological or moral grounds. Eventually, Komanoff moved on to advocating for a carbon tax as the fairest and clearest way to guide the economy away from fossil fuels and toward decarbonization. While serving as director of the Carbon Tax Center, which he co-founded, he noticed a trend among nuclear plants: They were getting better at operating.
The regulatory changes that followed Three Mile Island succeeded in raising the operating efficiencies of nuclear plants. In the 1970s, reactors had a capacity factor — a measure of how frequently a generating source actually produces electricity — of about 50%. Yet by 1991, that number had risen to 70%, putting atomic energy on par with the most efficient fossil fuel and hydroelectric plants. In 2002, that national average hit 90%. In 2019, it rose to 94%. When the final reactor at Indian Point, the nuclear station that served Komanoff’s native New York City, closed in 2021 due to political opposition to its relicensing, it had just set a world record for an uninterrupted 753-day run of electricity production.
Gradually, Komanoff came to see nuclear power as a vital tool for decarbonization. But, ensconced in the climate movement through his carbon tax advocacy, he found it easier to stay mum on his conversion, lest he ruffle the feathers of fellow activists who remained stalwart anti-nuclearists. After all, he thought, if a carbon tax passes, nuclear plants will benefit, so why bother speaking up specifically for atomic energy? Indian Point’s early shutdown, however, caused Komanoff pangs of regret.
“It just forced me to confront the consequences of not advocating for nuclear power,” he said. “I felt the way I imagined I would feel if a climbing partner — I used to be a sort of mountaineer — had died because of some negligence on my part. I really took personal responsibility because I imagined that — and maybe I’m just in a complete fantasy about my shamanistic power — as someone who had argued 40 years ago for shutting Indian Point, that if I had gone public say ‘Don’t do it,’ that I might have been able to begin turning the tide.”
While $8,200 per kilowatt is half of what Vogtle cost, it’s still nearly four times the cost of building a new natural gas-burning power plant with combined-cycle turbines, which itself rose to $2,157 per kilowatt last year from less than $1,500 in 2023. But the “regulatory churn” that kept the price of nuclear high, Komanoff said, is unlikely to return for new nuclear plants using proven designs such as the AP1000.
“Part of my optimism about nuclear being less subject to regulatory churn going forward is because it’s not a whipping boy,” he said. “It’s really hard to overstate the aura of incompetence that surrounded the nuclear power sector in the United States in the ‘70s into the ‘80s. But when you’ve got plants that are averaging 90% or higher capacity factors, things change.”