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Robinson Meyer:
Hello, it’s Tuesday, June 2, and three makes a trend in journalism, but two is a pattern. And two of the country’s most liberal states just watered down their state-level climate policy. Last week, New York announced that it would rewrite parts of its state climate law, the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act, or CLCPA. That law was originally passed in 2019, and it sought to turn New York State into a North American climate leader on par with California or British Columbia. It set very ambitious goals, including a headline target of cutting New York’s emissions by 40% by 2030, as compared to their 1990 levels. But those goals have now changed. New York’s governor, Kathy Hochul, has successfully watered down key provisions in the law as part of a budget deal with the state legislature. You’ll hear more about those changes in a moment. Just a few days later, California, one of those North American climate leaders, also altered its state-level climate policies. On Friday evening, the state’s Air Resources Board voted to change how the state’s cap-and-trade program works. Under the new change, industrial facilities such as oil refineries will get access to a big pot of up to $4 billion in free carbon credits if they invest in emissions-cutting projects within the state.
Robinson Meyer:
Environmental groups have been critical of both the New York and California changes. And now I realize that depending on where you live, these changes might sound like maybe fairly technical reforms to laws that only apply to just over one in six Americans and an even smaller share of U.S. emissions. I realize we’re not talking about U.S. climate policy in this episode, but I think these two changes reflect a deeper division among climate advocates and among Democrats about just how stringently to enforce climate policy during this period. You know, in the next few years, climate targets set half a decade ago or a decade ago are coming due. And a lot of those climate targets were going to be enforced by raising fossil fuel prices. But at the same time, Democrats have become more politically committed to low prices and cutting costs than they’ve been at almost any point since the global financial crisis in 2008. Cheap prices, affordability and cheap energy prices specifically has become key to Trump era democratic policymaking. So how are Democrats navigating this era of affordability in climate policy? That’s what we’re going to talk about today.
Robinson Meyer:
My guest today is Emily Pontecorvo. She’s a founding staff writer here at Heatmap News and an expert on all things state climate policy. She’s been covering recent changes to New York’s policy here at Heatmap. We’re going to talk about how New York’s laws have changed, why the state failed to meet the targets that it initially set in 2019, and whether the new targets are defensible, and what any of this means for the future of blue state climate policy. I should say we don’t get to California in this discussion because the changes came in too late for this conversation, but I’m sure we’ll talk about them soon and cover them on Heatmap. I’m Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News, and it’s all coming up today on Shift Key.
Emily, welcome to Shift Key.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Hey, Rob. Good to be here.
Robinson Meyer:
Emily, you wrote a great story for Heatmap this week about this budget deal between the governor and the statehouse that, in our word, kind of weakened or reformed parts of the CLCPA. And I have to say it’s a funny lot to me because when it passed, there was a sense that New York was now joining California in having extremely robust and ambitious state-level climate policy. And in some ways, New York’s climate policy was now more ambitious than California’s and we should really put New York first. Since then, I don’t know that we really heard about this law. Certainly, it doesn’t seem to play the same role in New York level governance
Robinson Meyer:
that like California’s climate laws seem to play in California’s governance. And at the same time, I think why we’re suddenly talking about it being weakened is maybe a little unclear. So can we just start by talking about like what has been happening in this law for listeners who are like me, who maybe remember when it was passed or maybe don’t remember when it was passed? What has happened with this law since 2019? And why did this year become the moment when Governor Kathy Hochul happened to move to try to weaken it and has now successfully done so?
Emily Pontecorvo:
It’s a really, really good question. And I think the answer has a lot to do with why we haven’t heard about it as much as we’ve heard about like California’s climate policymaking, for example. And I’m excited to be here and talk about it because I just think everything that’s happening around New York’s climate law is really interesting and really relevant to the kind of broader climate policy conversation right now. But, yeah, so after New York passed this law in 2019, what was unique about New York’s approach to climate policymaking is instead of passing a law that said our, you know, environmental department is going to make X, Y and Z regulations or this is how we’re going to go about trying to cut emissions, the law just basically set these high level targets. Yeah.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Cut economy-wide emissions 40% by 2030, and then cut emissions 85% by 2050. It’s kind of high-level targets. And then it created a new body called the Climate Action Council to basically meet for like three or four years and study New York’s economy and study all of the options for decarbonization and make a series of recommendations to the state about how to achieve those targets. So there was this like multi-year delay built into the law. I don’t know of any other states that have kind of gone about it that way. And so that’s what happened. I mean, the Climate Action Council, it was this group of scientists and environmental groups and industry representatives and state representatives, and they met for years. They came up with something called the Scoping Plan, which had a series of recommendations that they gave to the state. That happened in 2022. The Scoping Plan came out in 2022.
Robinson Meyer:
Did that Scoping Plan then have to be legislated or did it instantly become law or instantly kind of have regulatory force?
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah, it had no force. So it was just a series of recommendations that then it was the state and the legislature’s job to kind of take or leave and decide what to do with. And it didn’t it did turn into, you know, policy like it turned into bills and policies. So, for example, like the New York all electric buildings law that passed, I believe, last year. And that is one example where that law has now been delayed because there were a series of lawsuits and Kathy Hochul has sort of agreed to delay that law. But that was one of the recommendations that came out of the scoping plan. Another recommendation that came out of the scoping plan was a cap and invest program. And this is very similar to what California has, where they cap emissions across the economy and it sort of puts a tax on emissions above the cap. And then that revenue is kind of funneled back into the economy, back into clean energy programs. It’s a way to raise money for clean energy programs.
Robinson Meyer:
Okay, so basically what happened is New York set very high level targets for itself, which was very in vogue in the late 20-teens. It set up a blue ribbon commission to tell us how to meet those targets. And then it sounds like some policies came out of those targets. And we were approaching crunch time for those policies, if we had not technically
Robinson Meyer:
legally already passed crunch time. So before we get into the conversation, let me just ask one more question, which is so New York set this climate law in the CLCPA of cutting its emissions economy wide by 40% by 2030 relative to 1990 levels. Can you give us a sense of like how have emissions changed since 1990? How close is New York State to the 40% goal?
Emily Pontecorvo:
So in 1990, New York’s emissions were around 400 million metric tons of carbon. And today they’re, you know, they’ve fallen slightly. The most recent report from 2023 had emissions at about 350 million metric tons. And the 2030 target is much closer to about 250. So we’ve made a tiny bit of progress, but we’re still a ways to go. So if you look at New York State’s own dashboard on all of the kind of goals in the climate law, that first 2030 target, we’re only about a third of the way there.
Robinson Meyer:
I mean, it sounds like maybe our emissions have come down like 15% since 1990, but they are nowhere, we’re nowhere close to cutting them by the third or 40% that we would need to cut them to comply with the law. In some ways, that might just answer this question for me. But like,
Robinson Meyer:
why did the governor move to change these targets now? Why was 2026 the year when the governor and the statehouse decided to weaken these goals?
Emily Pontecorvo:
Kathy Hochul has talked about this in terms of the targets being unrealistic and not achievable. And to some degree, that may be true. But I, you know, based on my reporting, it seems like the real reason the governor has pushed to change the targets is more to do with a lawsuit. You know, another part of the climate law was ... said that New York had to put regulations into place by 2024 that would help the state achieve these targets. So that was supposed to be sort of after the scoping plan was out and after it gave these recommendations, the state would then have sort of a limited period of time, about two years, to actually enact regulations to achieve the goals. And the state began to do that. It started to put together this cap and invest program that I was talking about earlier. But then all progress on that just kind of stopped. In 2024, the state was behind.
Emily Pontecorvo:
They kept kind of pushing it down the road. And then eventually Kathy Hochul started to say, this is going to be too expensive. It’s, you know, we’re in an affordability crisis. This is going to hurt New Yorkers’ wallets. And this is not the right time to enact this policy. And when she basically said she wasn’t going to do it, a bunch of environmental groups sued because that was literally written in the law that those regulations needed to be in place and they won. And so it was after that that the governor started to propose to change the targets because changing the targets would then enable her to also get more time for those regulations.
Robinson Meyer:
Well, it’s funny because it does seem like the CLCPA was written almost knowing that these moments when politicians care about emissions are brief and fleeting. And so therefore, deadlines and traps and doodads need to be built into the law itself in order to actually get the politicians to do things when we’re not in a moment when climate change seems like a very urgent issue. And to some degree, it sounds like the history of this law so far has been Democratic politicians basically writing them into the law, and then as they begin to come across them, like furiously writing them out of the law. So there are two big changes that happened in the deal.
Robinson Meyer:
And let’s break them out. So the first is around the state has now set a new target for its, to reduce its carbon emissions. The old target, as we’ve been talking about, was this 40% by 2030 goal. What is the new goal?
Emily Pontecorvo:
So that 2030 goal is actually still in place, but it no longer really has any teeth. And what the budget deal did was create a new interim target for 2040 to cut emissions by 60%. And it also created a new deadline for those regulations that we’ve been talking about, this most likely cap and invest program, that now has to be in place by the end of 2028.
Robinson Meyer:
Do we think the state is going to meet that target? I mean, it seems like it’s already kind of moved the deadline for itself. It’s part of the idea here that that will be in a new presidential year and, I guess, kind of offset from any gubernatorial election, I guess. And so therefore, the state will heroically actually commit itself to implementing the cap and invest plan that year.
Emily Pontecorvo:
That’s an impossible question, of course. But first of all, the state already has a blueprint. I mean, they were working on the cap and invest program for several years. And whether or not they actually get it across the finish line is a matter of how much pressure they’re facing from the environmental community. How the affordability landscape changes, the political landscape changes. In 2028, is worrying about affordability going to be as politically salient as it is at this moment? Will climate feel more urgent then or less? It’s hard to imagine less, but who knows?
Robinson Meyer:
Is there a date they have to get it up by in 2028? Is it literally December 31?
Emily Pontecorvo:
It’s December 31. So it’s 2029, essentially. Yeah.
Robinson Meyer:
And I would actually say that to some degree, Kathy Hochul’s already solved this problem once of, when do you implement a new tax that you have to implement? Because it’s a very similar story with congestion pricing, right? Like congestion pricing was supposed to go into effect in June of 2024. In some ways, she began soft peddling the cap and invest program at the same time she began soft peddling congestion pricing. There was way more uproar about soft peddling, congestion pricing, and ultimately it was implemented in that period of time between the end of a presidential election cycle and the inauguration of a new president. You know, downtown congestion pricing went into effect on January 3, 2025.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Right.
Robinson Meyer:
And if we assume that the cap and invest kicks in on December 31, 2028, the new statutory deadline, that would be very, very close to kicking
Robinson Meyer:
in basically during the exact same political window. So they moved the deadline. That’s one thing. The other thing they did was this accounting change around how the state law considers methane. Can you talk a little bit about that?
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah. So one of the things that made the New York climate law especially ambitious was they created in the law this rule that they were going to account for methane very differently than the way that almost any other state and most of the rest of the world does. And I’m sure listeners know, but like methane is another greenhouse gas. It’s much more powerful than carbon dioxide, but it doesn’t stay in the atmosphere as long. It breaks down more quickly. And so when you’re trying to kind of convert all greenhouse gases into sort of one number, a carbon dioxide equivalent, there’s different ways to do that. You can measure methane on its effect on the atmosphere on warming over a 20-year period, which will make it look very, very strong because it’s strongest during that period. Or you can measure it over a 100-year period. These are the sort of two common ways of doing it. And while much of the rest of the world uses the 100-year global warming potential of methane, New York was using the 20-year, which meant that all of New York’s methane emissions from landfills, from natural gas,
Emily Pontecorvo:
Those emissions had a much bigger effect on the state’s overall emissions. So it made the overall emissions seem higher on paper than if New York had used this other 100-year global warming potential. And there was actually a second thing that New York did that was unique, which is the state said, we’re not just going to account for the methane emissions that happen within our economy, within our borders. We’re also going to take ownership and take responsibility for methane from upstream from the natural gas that we use. So New York gets a lot of its natural gas from Pennsylvania, from West Virginia. And so New York is keeping on its own books the methane that’s leaks out of the drilling and pipelines and other infrastructure in those other states. And so the big change in the budget deal was one, that New York was no longer going to include those emissions upstream in its own ledger. And two, that it’s going to switch to this 100-year accounting global warming potential. And so those two things combined, it really just takes a lot of carbon dioxide equivalent, or it takes a lot of methane off of New York’s books and makes the distance between now and the 2030 goal look a lot smaller.
Robinson Meyer:
Stepping back, methane, as we’ve been saying, is a short-lived greenhouse gas. It’s extremely potent when it’s first released into the atmosphere, and then it quickly breaks down into carbon dioxide. And what’s interesting about it is that if you look at a molecule of methane, it is actually going to trap far more heat. So methane CH4, it will eventually kind of oxidize down and break down into CO2. A singular molecule, the carbon in a molecule of methane, is going to trap more heat. Over its lifetime as an emission in the atmosphere in its CO2 form than in its CH4 form. And that’s because CO2 is extremely long-lived in the atmosphere. Basically, methane lasts 20 years in the atmosphere or so. It has this somewhat unstable and changing rate of decay in the atmosphere, but it’s not going to last longer than 100 years. And then CO2 will last roughly 1,000 years in the atmosphere. It essentially has a geological time scale in the atmosphere. So methane’s going to matter way more later on as CO2. But as the U.S. energy system has come to rely more on natural gas, and therefore as methane emissions have gone up, because methane is the largest component of natural gas, there was an effort to basically, I want to say make the methane emissions look worse, but like.
Robinson Meyer:
Try to capture, I think the counter argument here was that like a lot of short-term warming seems to be coming from methane. And so therefore we should make methane look worse in the accounting than it might if we took a totally kind of apolitical, long-termist, geological accounting scale here. Because like what we want to do is make near-term methane emissions really painful, right?
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah, I think there’s two things. I think one is that it puts more urgency around near-term reductions because they can really go quite a ways in mitigating warming. I think also in New York, it was a choice around really wanting to focus on natural gas and getting natural gas out of New York’s economy. You know, New York is one of band fracking in 2014. Like it has this history of really strong activism against natural gas. And when you measure methane on a 20-year global warming potential, that really makes actions like, you know, switching to electric heating and electric stoves, like things like that, it makes them look, you know, way more powerful as options and builds more kind of political will around those types of actions.
Robinson Meyer:
In some ways, it basically builds into the law itself a higher tax rate for natural gas than for other forms of carbon emissions. And really, really presses harder on natural gas. I guess the risk here is that it winds up having climate policy do something that isn’t quite what climate policy is maybe necessarily designed to do, in that if you adopt GWP-20, my sense is it makes coal.
Emily Pontecorvo:
And now New York’s not at risk of building a coal plant soon,
Robinson Meyer:
But it makes coal look in some cases better than gas.
Emily Pontecorvo:
I think that there are tradeoffs. And, you know, if it’s a political choice to focus on natural gas mitigation. But, you know, the alternative that, you know, I wrote a story about this actually a couple of years ago because Kathy Hochul tried to do this in 2023. And there was a big uproar about it and it didn’t end up happening. But at the time when I spoke to folks about it, one thing that came up was like when you, you know, when methane doesn’t look as urgent or pressing, the state might focus on something like transportation. Right now in New York, buildings are like the biggest source of carbon emissions. After this accounting change, transportation will look like the biggest source of carbon emissions. So maybe there’ll be a big push to try to electrify vehicles and build more public transit. And in the long run, you know, mitigating those carbon emissions could be better because those will be in the atmosphere much longer than the methane. So, you know, there’s those trade-offs.
Robinson Meyer:
I’ve seen coherent philosophical arguments that when you judge natural gas on the basis of these extremely short-term warming effects versus how natural gas emissions net out long-term compared to carbon dioxide emissions, you wind up, is downplaying basically anthropogenic climate change itself. Because you go, you wind up shifting from a system where you’re saying what matters is CO2 driven warming over the long term to a system that says what matters is eliminating this one source of very potent oil and gas emissions and trying to drive them out of the system. And now there might be political economic reasons to want to fight near-term emissions from the domestic fossil fuel industry. But that is not the same thing as actually going out and trying to reduce carbon emissions.
Robinson Meyer:
And in some ways, it confuses the two tasks, perhaps.
Emily Pontecorvo:
I’ve spoken to scientists and other policy experts who would argue that we should have separate targets, that we shouldn’t just have one CO2 equivalent target for 2030, that we should have, we should look at like, you know, the timeline for reducing methane, the timeline for reducing CO2. I do want to just note this group at NYU did an interesting analysis of this change, the global warming potential change. And they looked at, you know, I think one of the reasons the governor wanted to do this is that it would kind of give New York a little more time. It would look like they were further along. It would maybe make mitigation look more affordable, what they found was that Even though this change reduces the distance between today and the 2030 target, it doesn’t necessarily mean meeting that target is cheaper because it all depends on like the marginal cost of abating each greenhouse gas and kind of how efficiently the policies are at doing that.
Robinson Meyer:
And so in other words, basically, it sounds like you could take the revenue from New York City’s cap and invest under the old system and go spend it entirely on mitigating upstream emissions basically in Pennsylvania. Where we get a lot of our gas from. And that would pay out really well. But now, am I interpreting this right? But now basically what has to happen is the state has to go in and use its revenue from its cap and invest program to like change this deep, industrial stock in the state, be it buildings or transportation or the power system. And because the state is kind of grading its report card accurately, it actually has to go where the carbon emissions are. And where the carbon emissions are is always going to be or often going to be like a very expensive change to the actual fixed investment in the state.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah. I mean, I think the report didn’t come down, you know, definitively. It said like, you know, more data would be needed to know this for sure. But because methane has such a bigger effect, mitigating it also has a bigger effect. And so, you know, you would have gotten more bang for your buck with a focus on methane, potentially, than with a focus on carbon.
Robinson Meyer:
What’s your read about these two big changes? I mean, you’ve been covering, now, New York’s state-level climate law for a long time. These are two pretty significant changes to how the law works, although it sounds like a lot of the skeleton of the legislation has maybe been left intact. What have you taken away from covering this? And what relevance do you think New York’s experience has for other states or other countries that are trying to regulate carbon emissions?
Emily Pontecorvo:
In some ways, I feel like I have been kind of waiting and wondering if this moment would come for years now. I’ve covered state climate policy in a lot of different states over the past several years and none of them are on track. I mean, none of them, you know, are really going to hit their targets. And
Emily Pontecorvo:
I’ve been curious, you know, when those deadlines were nearing, would states move the targets? Would they speed up their, you know, policymaking? Would they wave the targets away and say, well, the numbers don’t matter as much as the fact that we’re doing something like I was curious to see how that would be handled. And so, you know, it’s not it’s not entirely surprising, but it is so the way that everything went down in New York is so tied to this particular moment we’re in where, I mean, the Trump administration has really taken away the option of building more renewable energy quickly. And that has made it very, very difficult for New York to make progress toward these targets and made the prospect of doing so more expensive. And so it’s partly the Trump administration. It’s partly just the huge political anxiety around affordability right now that have all kind of created these changes. You know, when I talk to people from my most recent story, there were some who were glad that there was at least new deadlines, like new, you know,
Emily Pontecorvo:
New York would have to get these regulations in place by 2028. The budget agreement does specifically note that cap and invest should be considered as part of that. Whereas, like, you know, the original climate law doesn’t say anything about cap and invest. That kind of came out of the scoping plan. So I think people are optimistic that things will happen. There’s plenty of other things that New York could be doing. There’s other types of laws New York could pass or regulations New York could do in the meantime.
Robinson Meyer:
You mean to reduce its emissions?
Emily Pontecorvo:
To reduce its emissions, to speed up permitting, to get more batteries on the grid. New York has been really, really slow with storage deployment. And so I’ll be looking to see... Are we just going to basically pause all climate policymaking until 2028? Or are they going to be able to get some things done in the meantime?
Robinson Meyer:
Well, and not only that, but there was a recent transmission reliability report from New York, New York’s ISO, our state level grid, that basically said, starting potentially quite soon, but starting officially on paper, I think, as soon as 2029, that New York City doesn’t have enough capacity to meet its security margin, basically the amount of electricity that it projects it might need in an emergency to meet a summer weather event. And what this means is like what we’re going to be pulling up with barges connected to the grid that have diesel gensets on them on the hottest days of the year.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Well, what it really means is I think that some diesel gensets that were supposed to be retired by then will be kept online longer. So yeah, that’s not ideal. But I mean, there has been a proposal in New York for a long time to replace some of those peaker plants with batteries, with storage. And that has really not gone anywhere. So I think there is potential to get at that reliability need another way, but we’ll see if that happens.
Robinson Meyer:
Last question. This is not the only energy news to emerge from the New York State House this week. I think there were a few utility level changes or changes to utility level regulation that were passed in the state budget deal. Can you describe them to us really quickly?
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah, there were a couple other things. So the governor has this ratepayer protection plan where she included a bunch of policies to try to reform utilities and put a much bigger focus on affordability in the whole rate making process. So this includes like tying executive pay at utility companies to new affordability metrics, some reforms to the process of when utilities ask for rate hikes and requiring added justification over the necessity of those hikes, more scrutiny over the way that they’re spending money on lobbying and PR campaigns and things like that. And then there’s this new energy affordability index where the state is going to sort of benchmark its performance against other states. And, you know, kind of any time a utility asks for a rate hike, look at how that would impact the state’s index.
Robinson Meyer:
Well, we look forward to following that more. Well, you know, two more years until the state begins to enforce its cap and invest rules, allegedly now under the law. That means we have two more years to keep having these conversations, Emily. Thank you so much for joining us on Shift Key. I’m looking forward to them.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Thanks for having me.
Robinson Meyer:
Thanks so much for listening we’ll be back soon with a new episode of Shift Key. Until then, Shift Key is a production of Heatmap News. Our editors are Jillian Goodman and Nico Lauricella. Multimedia editing and audio engineering is by Jacob Lambert and by Nick Woodbury. Our music is by Adam Kromelow. Thanks so much for listening, we’ll see you soon.
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A dispatch from Day 1 of New York Climate Week.
It’s the first day of New York Climate Week, and I spent the morning attending events hosted by companies and nonprofits focused on carbon dioxide removal, i.e. sucking greenhouse gas out of the atmosphere. The vibes were, somewhat surprisingly, optimistic — not about the state of the planet or politics or climate change, per se, but about the future of an industry with a very uncertain fate.
Senator Brian Schatz of Hawaii struck a high note opening the first event I attended, a panel hosted by the Carbon Removal Alliance titled “Progress, Politics, and the Path Forward.” “It’s not a secret that for those of us who care about climate, these are challenging times,” he told the audience. “But the momentum behind CDR is real.”
Schatz cited the nearly $1 billion fund that Frontier Climate, a coalition of carbon removal buyers, pledged earlier this year to put toward supporting the industry, as well as the fact that Congress has continued funding carbon removal on a bipartisan basis through the 45Q tax credit for carbon capture and storage, which survived last year’s clean energy policy purge.
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During the panel that followed, a lot of the discussion centered on what the industry needs from federal policy and how to build a bigger tent of supporters to lobby for those changes. It was moderated by Ella Nilsen, a former CNN climate reporter who recently became the vice president of Echo Communications. She started by acknowledging that carbon removal has a lot of skeptics in the climate movement — many are concerned that it’s a waste of money compared to investing in emission reductions, or that it’s become a justification to continue using fossil fuels. How do you change their minds?
I was interested to hear Joanna Klitzke, the head of market development at Frontier, recommend that the industry be honest about methods and projects that are not working. A few of the companies Frontier has purchased carbon removal from have failed, she said, including one trying to do carbon mineralization using steel slag on roads. “It just doesn’t work. The economics don’t pencil, The technical feasibility isn’t there,” she said. (I followed up with Klitzke by email to ask for clarification on which companies have failed, but I hadn’t heard back as of press time.) Being transparent about the failures might help convince skeptics to support the things that are working, she argued.
Broadening the tent also means getting more members of Congress interested in supporting carbon removal. Cristina Shoffer, the cofounder and director of the Clean Economy Project, stressed that carbon removal companies should be building relationships with their members of Congress before they need something. When it came to defending the tax credits during the passage of Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act, she said, a lot of the companies that were trying to make their case to Congress didn’t have an existing with their representatives. Jeremy Harrell, the CEO of the conservative clean energy nonprofit Clearpath, added that we are about to be in a historic turnover point for federal policymakers, so it’s an opportune time to go to new members elected in November’s midterms, teach them about the industry, and “foster new champions.”
And what, pray tell, should the industry ask of these members? That part is still a little fuzzy. The industry’s biggest challenge is, and has long been, a lack of customers. Giana Amador, the executive director of the Carbon Removal Alliance, was optimistic that Frontier’s fund and other voluntary buyers will carry the industry forward for the next few years, but “we need to be thinking about, what is that baton pass?” she said. I heard this expression a few times today, and it refers to the moment when buying carbon removal moves from the hands of volunteers to the hands of government.
Amador mentioned potentially embedding carbon removal into California’s cap and trade market, passing federal tax credits that support a broader range of CDR methods, or expanding the federal carbon removal purchase prize — a Biden-era program to have the Department of Energy vet and buy carbon removal that is still technically alive but that, by all accounts, Trump’s Department of Energy has not carried on. “The field really needs to come together around, what is our big ask around carbon removal demand? How can the U.S. federal government create these opportunities for demand?”
Later in the day, at a summit hosted by the carbon removal registry Puro.Earth, there was more talk about how various voluntary and government frameworks are shaping demand. Kyra Power, the engagement manager for North America for the Science Based Targets Initiative, addressed some potential disappointment in the room around the Initiative’s recent Net-Zero Standard update.
In the absence of regulatory requirements that compel companies to buy carbon removal, SBTi’s standard is the next closest thing. The latest version of its standard for what counts as a “science-based” corporate net zero plan, released in June, introduced guidance requiring larger companies in higher-income countries to begin offsetting their ongoing emissions with carbon removal beginning in 2035, later than the CDR industry — which is desperate for more buyers — hoped. SBTi will also encourage companies to purchase carbon removal before that date by creating an optional “recognition program.” It hasn’t spelled out all the details yet, but it would essentially mean giving companies that buy CDR early a gold star.
Power explained that corporate buyers told SBTi that starting the requirement earlier, in 2030, was “not feasible.” But she tried to reassure the audience, noting that SBTi is already fielding inquiries from companies about how they can go after the optional recognition program.
“I hope at some point that we’re able to publish some of those reflections and insights that we’re gaining internally,” she said, “but I think it is more like an indicator that there is interest in this recognition program, there’s interest in this above and beyond framework.”
A few other quick notes on big CDR announcements before I go:
It became remarkable by being pretty normal.
Quick: What’s the most successful EV in America that’s not a Tesla? At various points over the years, vehicles such as the Toyota Bz, Chevy Bolt, and Chevy Equinox EV have claimed the title. But the most popular non-Tesla in the first half of 2026 was the Hyundai Ioniq 5 — a car that looks essentially the same as it did at its debut in 2021. It also just finished first in Edmunds’ testing of the top electric SUVs, a smidge ahead of the Tesla Model Y and the much-lauded Rivian R2.
In a market as volatile as electric cars, it’s odd for a standout vehicle to be one that hasn’t changed much in half a decade. But Ioniq 5’s sales have been slowly ticking up over the past several years because of some smart choices that allowed Hyundai to navigate the chaos of the EV transition in the U.S. Ioniq 5 has always just been there, in plain sight. So this week, I finally drove it on a California road trip — the Los Angeles to San Francisco journey I use to test many electric vehicles — to see what it does so right.
First, that look. The Ioniq 5 hasn’t changed its appearance much since 2021 because it remains so distinctive. Angular details on the doors and Ioniq’s signature pixelated taillights feel futuristic, but the overall shape is familiar. It scans more like a hatchback from the old days than an SUV, but scaled up to the high riding height Americans love in their crossovers.
The shape also makes Ioniq 5 more practical. What’s underneath the quirky exterior is essentially a five-seat crossover, the most popular vehicle type in the U.S., with a decently spacious cargo area underneath the rear liftgate. Compare that to its stablemate, the Ioniq 6. That lovely car has been discontinued in the U.S. in part because its low-riding sedan shape and small trunk didn’t appeal enough to Americans. Ioniq 5 is also just the right size, not a battleship like the gorgeous but enormous three-row Ioniq 9 I drove last summer.
Inside its EVs, Hyundai has struck an admirable balance between old and new. The central touchscreen isn’t up to the size or sophistication of what’s in a Tesla or Rivian. It does, however, incorporate EV route planning into its built-in navigation, and the driver can scan through nearby compatible chargers. The interface can be frustrating to use — it’s more of a drop-down list of stations, not the map in a Tesla that lets you tap into a Supercharger station to get its real-time information. But Hyundai gets points for trying, since I’ve criticized the likes of Toyota and Subaru for omitting the feature.
Compared to offerings by the EV-only carmakers, Ioniq 5 does, at times, feel like an EV built by a company that doesn’t specialize in electric cars. But while that leads to some annoyances and missing features, it’s not always a bad thing. For example, Ioniq 5 retains plenty of physical buttons to please the analog crowd. A row of physical buttons can put the touchscreen into map, media, or other modes. It’s a helpful touch, allowing you to change what you’re seeing on the display without the need to tap the screen. Climate control runs through a smaller touchscreen located below, and while it may not use physical buttons, it is a simple and straightforward menu that never changes.
Range delivers what you need. Longer-range versions can top 300 miles on their official Environmental Protection Agency rating, while all-wheel drive versions score in the high 200s. Our tester in the high-end “Limited” trim is rated at just 269, but that was enough to get well over 200 real-world miles while driving 75 miles per hour down the interstate. The real key here — and what made Ioniq stand out in Edmunds’ testing — is Hyundai’s 800-volt electrical architecture that allows it to charge much faster than most U.S. EVs, adding 100 miles of range in as little as eight minutes. Remember: Once you reach a good amount of range, charging speed is perhaps more important since it gets you back on the road fast.
Efficiency-wise, ours eked out a respectable 2.5 to 2.7 miles per kilowatt despite enduring some headwinds and 100-degree temperatures thanks to California’s insufferable El Niño summer. On the more temperate trip home from San Francisco, it scored more than 3 miles per kilowatt, pushing its range well above 200 real highway miles. At slower speeds and in better conditions, Ioniq 5 is efficient enough to make your electricity dollar go pretty far.
The price is right, too. A few years ago, Ioniq 5s started in the $40,000s. Since then, however, Hyundai has aggressively slashed prices and offered cheap leases to make up for the loss of the $7,500 tax credit for EV purchases last year and to keep this car competitive in the market. Today you can get the entry-level Ioniq 5 with 245 miles of range for $35,000, while a stepped-up version that can achieve 318 miles in rear-wheel drive configuration starts at $37,500. (Plus, Hyundai has sold more than 175,000 of these in the U.S. and Canada, so you could probably score a good deal on a used one, especially given the accelerated depreciation of EVs.)
Though it has been around for a long time in EV terms, Ioniq 5 looks to be Hyundai’s signature EV for America for years to come. As noted, the Ioniq 6 sedan is going away in the U.S. Hyundai has revealed a compact and affordable Ioniq 3 that might sell in big numbers in the U.K. and Europe, but it isn’t coming to America, a size-first country where small $30,000 EVs like the new Chevy Bolt just can’t gain a foothold. The other EV that will remain in the American lineup is the three-row Ioniq 9. It’s a lovely car for big families, but with a starting price just under $60,000, it prices out many buyers.
Happily for Hyundai, Ioniq 5 still sits right in the sweet spot of what we do want.
Current conditions: Tropical Storm Fay just became the sixth named storm of the 2026 Atlantic hurricane season, but it’s not expected to make landfall • A new tropical storm is brewing in the Pacific, threatening Mexico with flooding and dangerous swells • It’s a hot, sunny day in Tzfat, the mountain enclave in Israel known for giving rise to the Jewish mystic movement of Kabbalah, where much of the population is marking Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the year for Jews.

When Denmark fell to the Nazi blitzkrieg in April 1940, the still-neutral United States — fearing a German military expansion into North America — invaded the Danish kingdom’s island territory of Greenland. After the war ended, as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Washington and Copenhagen agreed to a mutual defense pact that granted the U.S. the right to build and maintain military bases across the world’s largest island. Now President Donald Trump has announced an update to that agreement that would permanently bar foreign adversaries such as China or Russia from setting up rival bases in Greenland, “completely addressing all of our many U.S. concerns.” In a post on his Truth Social platform Friday evening, the president said the U.S. would have veto power over any foreign military base or “sensitive investments” in Greenland. “For over 100 years, presidents have known the strategic importance of Greenland, but none of them were able to do anything about it,” Trump said. “I am proud to be the president that permanently and conclusively addressed this very important situation.” British Prime Minister Andy Burnham hailed the deal as a win for Arctic security. “You had an agreement already,” one Greenlander told CBS News in Nuuk, the capital. “Why not just put more troops here? It’s a little weird.”
The move comes a month after the Greenlandic government rebuked a Trump-linked company called Greenland Energy that has told investors it plans to drill exploratory wells seeking oil. Just two weeks ago, a U.S. company called Greenland Mines inked a deal to buy the Sarfartoq Rare Earths Project in southwest Greenland for over $35 million. But for all the hype over the potential to extract minerals from lands recently made accessible by retreating glaciers, the logistics of producing and exporting material out of the rugged North continue to represent a significant hurdle to commercialization.
The Trump administration is reviewing proposals for at least a dozen data centers and related infrastructure projects on federal lands spanning at least six states. The Bureau of Land Management is considering applications for at least 17,600 acres of public land across Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and Wyoming, according to right-of-way proposals reviewed by The Washington Sun. Valar Atomics, the next-generation microreactor developer, later confirmed to the news outlet that it had submitted an application for survey access at a 10,200-acre site in Utah, but said it had abandoned the plans.
Three-quarters of Americans now oppose nearby data center construction, according to Heatmap Pro polling. In response, the Trump administration has sought to speed up construction by using federal lands that aren’t subject to the whims of local and state officials. That effort began with a proposal to site a project at a former Department of Energy nuclear weapons site in Kentucky.
The hundreds of millions of gallons of toxic wastewater the fracking industry has disposed of in Ohio over the years is now bubbling to the surface. That’s happening in a literal sense: As The New York Times exposed in a July investigation, wastewater thought to contain radioactive materials is spewing from injection wells meant to store it underground indefinitely. It’s also happening in a figurative sense, with the state’s toxic import now becoming a political issue. Last week, Democratic gubernatorial candidate Amy Acton pledged to back a moratorium on fracking wastewater disposal during a campaign stop in Marietta, a town where the water has been resurfacing, according to the latest reporting from the nation’s newspaper of record.
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For much of my lifetime, flat electricity demand meant that transformers — the devices that works like locks in a canal to keep electricity flowing smoothly along distribution wires and step the intense voltage down to the levels needed to flow into your home — were in low but predictable demand, too. That’s all changed. The grid is aging, and the U.S. is finally doing something about it, which means swapping out old transformers for now ones. At the same time, increasingly frequent extreme weather is wiping out dozens of transformers at a time, forcing big bulk orders after a disaster. And data centers and electrification are hiking demand even higher. Meanwhile, manufacturers have struggled to keep pace, wrangling with costly assembly line upgrades, uncertain regulations, and high tariffs.
Now, however, factories are getting up and running. As my colleague Katie Brigham wrote in April, a whole new wave of startups is promising to innovate the industry. And more industrial behemoths are investing in more capacity. Hitachi Energy plans to more than double its U.S. production capacity of small- and medium-sized power transformers with a new, $528 million factory in Mississippi, Utility Dive reported last week.
The world’s biggest battery maker is betting that the U.S. market will still have plenty of demand for stuff made in China. CATL, based in Fujian province, has developed new battery technology for American pickup trucks despite U.S. tariffs all but banning Chinese automotive equipment and other electronics over security concerns. The company told the Financial Times the batteries had already been tested by U.S. carmakers, but did not specify which ones. The remarks came ahead of Sunday’s meeting between U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and his Chinese counterpart He Lifeng in New York, where trade was a top issue. That discussion set the stage for talks in Washington between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping, which are scheduled for Thursday.
The fleet of electric vehicles powered by CATL batteries in China can now depend on a slightly cleaner grid. The People’s Republic brought its 61st power reactor online last week. The Changjiang-3 reactor — a Hualong One, the country’s flagship designed that cribs from America’s Westinghouse AP1000 — entered into commercial operation, according to NucNet.
California’s big virtual power plant experiment just notched a record. During the heatwave on September 9, Sunrun and Tesla dispatched more than 580 megawatts of peak power to the California grid, making “the largest distributed power plant dispatch event on record.” That’s enough capacity to power all households in Sacramento County during peak hours. “Sunrun’s distributed home batteries are operating at a scale larger than many peaker power plants combined,” Sunrun CEO Mary Powell said in a statement. “Families depend on their Sunrun energy systems for outage protection and energy independence. This historic dispatch shows that the benefits of distributed energy go well beyond individual households as we help control the cost of electricity for all Californians and reduce the need for new costly poles and wires.”