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Robinson Meyer:
Hello, it’s Tuesday, June 2, and three makes a trend in journalism, but two is a pattern. And two of the country’s most liberal states just watered down their state-level climate policy. Last week, New York announced that it would rewrite parts of its state climate law, the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act, or CLCPA. That law was originally passed in 2019, and it sought to turn New York State into a North American climate leader on par with California or British Columbia. It set very ambitious goals, including a headline target of cutting New York’s emissions by 40% by 2030, as compared to their 1990 levels. But those goals have now changed. New York’s governor, Kathy Hochul, has successfully watered down key provisions in the law as part of a budget deal with the state legislature. You’ll hear more about those changes in a moment. Just a few days later, California, one of those North American climate leaders, also altered its state-level climate policies. On Friday evening, the state’s Air Resources Board voted to change how the state’s cap-and-trade program works. Under the new change, industrial facilities such as oil refineries will get access to a big pot of up to $4 billion in free carbon credits if they invest in emissions-cutting projects within the state.
Robinson Meyer:
Environmental groups have been critical of both the New York and California changes. And now I realize that depending on where you live, these changes might sound like maybe fairly technical reforms to laws that only apply to just over one in six Americans and an even smaller share of U.S. emissions. I realize we’re not talking about U.S. climate policy in this episode, but I think these two changes reflect a deeper division among climate advocates and among Democrats about just how stringently to enforce climate policy during this period. You know, in the next few years, climate targets set half a decade ago or a decade ago are coming due. And a lot of those climate targets were going to be enforced by raising fossil fuel prices. But at the same time, Democrats have become more politically committed to low prices and cutting costs than they’ve been at almost any point since the global financial crisis in 2008. Cheap prices, affordability and cheap energy prices specifically has become key to Trump era democratic policymaking. So how are Democrats navigating this era of affordability in climate policy? That’s what we’re going to talk about today.
Robinson Meyer:
My guest today is Emily Pontecorvo. She’s a founding staff writer here at Heatmap News and an expert on all things state climate policy. She’s been covering recent changes to New York’s policy here at Heatmap. We’re going to talk about how New York’s laws have changed, why the state failed to meet the targets that it initially set in 2019, and whether the new targets are defensible, and what any of this means for the future of blue state climate policy. I should say we don’t get to California in this discussion because the changes came in too late for this conversation, but I’m sure we’ll talk about them soon and cover them on Heatmap. I’m Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News, and it’s all coming up today on Shift Key.
Emily, welcome to Shift Key.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Hey, Rob. Good to be here.
Robinson Meyer:
Emily, you wrote a great story for Heatmap this week about this budget deal between the governor and the statehouse that, in our word, kind of weakened or reformed parts of the CLCPA. And I have to say it’s a funny lot to me because when it passed, there was a sense that New York was now joining California in having extremely robust and ambitious state-level climate policy. And in some ways, New York’s climate policy was now more ambitious than California’s and we should really put New York first. Since then, I don’t know that we really heard about this law. Certainly, it doesn’t seem to play the same role in New York level governance
Robinson Meyer:
that like California’s climate laws seem to play in California’s governance. And at the same time, I think why we’re suddenly talking about it being weakened is maybe a little unclear. So can we just start by talking about like what has been happening in this law for listeners who are like me, who maybe remember when it was passed or maybe don’t remember when it was passed? What has happened with this law since 2019? And why did this year become the moment when Governor Kathy Hochul happened to move to try to weaken it and has now successfully done so?
Emily Pontecorvo:
It’s a really, really good question. And I think the answer has a lot to do with why we haven’t heard about it as much as we’ve heard about like California’s climate policymaking, for example. And I’m excited to be here and talk about it because I just think everything that’s happening around New York’s climate law is really interesting and really relevant to the kind of broader climate policy conversation right now. But, yeah, so after New York passed this law in 2019, what was unique about New York’s approach to climate policymaking is instead of passing a law that said our, you know, environmental department is going to make X, Y and Z regulations or this is how we’re going to go about trying to cut emissions, the law just basically set these high level targets. Yeah.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Cut economy-wide emissions 40% by 2030, and then cut emissions 85% by 2050. It’s kind of high-level targets. And then it created a new body called the Climate Action Council to basically meet for like three or four years and study New York’s economy and study all of the options for decarbonization and make a series of recommendations to the state about how to achieve those targets. So there was this like multi-year delay built into the law. I don’t know of any other states that have kind of gone about it that way. And so that’s what happened. I mean, the Climate Action Council, it was this group of scientists and environmental groups and industry representatives and state representatives, and they met for years. They came up with something called the Scoping Plan, which had a series of recommendations that they gave to the state. That happened in 2022. The Scoping Plan came out in 2022.
Robinson Meyer:
Did that Scoping Plan then have to be legislated or did it instantly become law or instantly kind of have regulatory force?
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah, it had no force. So it was just a series of recommendations that then it was the state and the legislature’s job to kind of take or leave and decide what to do with. And it didn’t it did turn into, you know, policy like it turned into bills and policies. So, for example, like the New York all electric buildings law that passed, I believe, last year. And that is one example where that law has now been delayed because there were a series of lawsuits and Kathy Hochul has sort of agreed to delay that law. But that was one of the recommendations that came out of the scoping plan. Another recommendation that came out of the scoping plan was a cap and invest program. And this is very similar to what California has, where they cap emissions across the economy and it sort of puts a tax on emissions above the cap. And then that revenue is kind of funneled back into the economy, back into clean energy programs. It’s a way to raise money for clean energy programs.
Robinson Meyer:
Okay, so basically what happened is New York set very high level targets for itself, which was very in vogue in the late 20-teens. It set up a blue ribbon commission to tell us how to meet those targets. And then it sounds like some policies came out of those targets. And we were approaching crunch time for those policies, if we had not technically
Robinson Meyer:
legally already passed crunch time. So before we get into the conversation, let me just ask one more question, which is so New York set this climate law in the CLCPA of cutting its emissions economy wide by 40% by 2030 relative to 1990 levels. Can you give us a sense of like how have emissions changed since 1990? How close is New York State to the 40% goal?
Emily Pontecorvo:
So in 1990, New York’s emissions were around 400 million metric tons of carbon. And today they’re, you know, they’ve fallen slightly. The most recent report from 2023 had emissions at about 350 million metric tons. And the 2030 target is much closer to about 250. So we’ve made a tiny bit of progress, but we’re still a ways to go. So if you look at New York State’s own dashboard on all of the kind of goals in the climate law, that first 2030 target, we’re only about a third of the way there.
Robinson Meyer:
I mean, it sounds like maybe our emissions have come down like 15% since 1990, but they are nowhere, we’re nowhere close to cutting them by the third or 40% that we would need to cut them to comply with the law. In some ways, that might just answer this question for me. But like,
Robinson Meyer:
why did the governor move to change these targets now? Why was 2026 the year when the governor and the statehouse decided to weaken these goals?
Emily Pontecorvo:
Kathy Hochul has talked about this in terms of the targets being unrealistic and not achievable. And to some degree, that may be true. But I, you know, based on my reporting, it seems like the real reason the governor has pushed to change the targets is more to do with a lawsuit. You know, another part of the climate law was ... said that New York had to put regulations into place by 2024 that would help the state achieve these targets. So that was supposed to be sort of after the scoping plan was out and after it gave these recommendations, the state would then have sort of a limited period of time, about two years, to actually enact regulations to achieve the goals. And the state began to do that. It started to put together this cap and invest program that I was talking about earlier. But then all progress on that just kind of stopped. In 2024, the state was behind.
Emily Pontecorvo:
They kept kind of pushing it down the road. And then eventually Kathy Hochul started to say, this is going to be too expensive. It’s, you know, we’re in an affordability crisis. This is going to hurt New Yorkers’ wallets. And this is not the right time to enact this policy. And when she basically said she wasn’t going to do it, a bunch of environmental groups sued because that was literally written in the law that those regulations needed to be in place and they won. And so it was after that that the governor started to propose to change the targets because changing the targets would then enable her to also get more time for those regulations.
Robinson Meyer:
Well, it’s funny because it does seem like the CLCPA was written almost knowing that these moments when politicians care about emissions are brief and fleeting. And so therefore, deadlines and traps and doodads need to be built into the law itself in order to actually get the politicians to do things when we’re not in a moment when climate change seems like a very urgent issue. And to some degree, it sounds like the history of this law so far has been Democratic politicians basically writing them into the law, and then as they begin to come across them, like furiously writing them out of the law. So there are two big changes that happened in the deal.
Robinson Meyer:
And let’s break them out. So the first is around the state has now set a new target for its, to reduce its carbon emissions. The old target, as we’ve been talking about, was this 40% by 2030 goal. What is the new goal?
Emily Pontecorvo:
So that 2030 goal is actually still in place, but it no longer really has any teeth. And what the budget deal did was create a new interim target for 2040 to cut emissions by 60%. And it also created a new deadline for those regulations that we’ve been talking about, this most likely cap and invest program, that now has to be in place by the end of 2028.
Robinson Meyer:
Do we think the state is going to meet that target? I mean, it seems like it’s already kind of moved the deadline for itself. It’s part of the idea here that that will be in a new presidential year and, I guess, kind of offset from any gubernatorial election, I guess. And so therefore, the state will heroically actually commit itself to implementing the cap and invest plan that year.
Emily Pontecorvo:
That’s an impossible question, of course. But first of all, the state already has a blueprint. I mean, they were working on the cap and invest program for several years. And whether or not they actually get it across the finish line is a matter of how much pressure they’re facing from the environmental community. How the affordability landscape changes, the political landscape changes. In 2028, is worrying about affordability going to be as politically salient as it is at this moment? Will climate feel more urgent then or less? It’s hard to imagine less, but who knows?
Robinson Meyer:
Is there a date they have to get it up by in 2028? Is it literally December 31?
Emily Pontecorvo:
It’s December 31. So it’s 2029, essentially. Yeah.
Robinson Meyer:
And I would actually say that to some degree, Kathy Hochul’s already solved this problem once of, when do you implement a new tax that you have to implement? Because it’s a very similar story with congestion pricing, right? Like congestion pricing was supposed to go into effect in June of 2024. In some ways, she began soft peddling the cap and invest program at the same time she began soft peddling congestion pricing. There was way more uproar about soft peddling, congestion pricing, and ultimately it was implemented in that period of time between the end of a presidential election cycle and the inauguration of a new president. You know, downtown congestion pricing went into effect on January 3, 2025.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Right.
Robinson Meyer:
And if we assume that the cap and invest kicks in on December 31, 2028, the new statutory deadline, that would be very, very close to kicking
Robinson Meyer:
in basically during the exact same political window. So they moved the deadline. That’s one thing. The other thing they did was this accounting change around how the state law considers methane. Can you talk a little bit about that?
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah. So one of the things that made the New York climate law especially ambitious was they created in the law this rule that they were going to account for methane very differently than the way that almost any other state and most of the rest of the world does. And I’m sure listeners know, but like methane is another greenhouse gas. It’s much more powerful than carbon dioxide, but it doesn’t stay in the atmosphere as long. It breaks down more quickly. And so when you’re trying to kind of convert all greenhouse gases into sort of one number, a carbon dioxide equivalent, there’s different ways to do that. You can measure methane on its effect on the atmosphere on warming over a 20-year period, which will make it look very, very strong because it’s strongest during that period. Or you can measure it over a 100-year period. These are the sort of two common ways of doing it. And while much of the rest of the world uses the 100-year global warming potential of methane, New York was using the 20-year, which meant that all of New York’s methane emissions from landfills, from natural gas,
Emily Pontecorvo:
Those emissions had a much bigger effect on the state’s overall emissions. So it made the overall emissions seem higher on paper than if New York had used this other 100-year global warming potential. And there was actually a second thing that New York did that was unique, which is the state said, we’re not just going to account for the methane emissions that happen within our economy, within our borders. We’re also going to take ownership and take responsibility for methane from upstream from the natural gas that we use. So New York gets a lot of its natural gas from Pennsylvania, from West Virginia. And so New York is keeping on its own books the methane that’s leaks out of the drilling and pipelines and other infrastructure in those other states. And so the big change in the budget deal was one, that New York was no longer going to include those emissions upstream in its own ledger. And two, that it’s going to switch to this 100-year accounting global warming potential. And so those two things combined, it really just takes a lot of carbon dioxide equivalent, or it takes a lot of methane off of New York’s books and makes the distance between now and the 2030 goal look a lot smaller.
Robinson Meyer:
Stepping back, methane, as we’ve been saying, is a short-lived greenhouse gas. It’s extremely potent when it’s first released into the atmosphere, and then it quickly breaks down into carbon dioxide. And what’s interesting about it is that if you look at a molecule of methane, it is actually going to trap far more heat. So methane CH4, it will eventually kind of oxidize down and break down into CO2. A singular molecule, the carbon in a molecule of methane, is going to trap more heat. Over its lifetime as an emission in the atmosphere in its CO2 form than in its CH4 form. And that’s because CO2 is extremely long-lived in the atmosphere. Basically, methane lasts 20 years in the atmosphere or so. It has this somewhat unstable and changing rate of decay in the atmosphere, but it’s not going to last longer than 100 years. And then CO2 will last roughly 1,000 years in the atmosphere. It essentially has a geological time scale in the atmosphere. So methane’s going to matter way more later on as CO2. But as the U.S. energy system has come to rely more on natural gas, and therefore as methane emissions have gone up, because methane is the largest component of natural gas, there was an effort to basically, I want to say make the methane emissions look worse, but like.
Robinson Meyer:
Try to capture, I think the counter argument here was that like a lot of short-term warming seems to be coming from methane. And so therefore we should make methane look worse in the accounting than it might if we took a totally kind of apolitical, long-termist, geological accounting scale here. Because like what we want to do is make near-term methane emissions really painful, right?
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah, I think there’s two things. I think one is that it puts more urgency around near-term reductions because they can really go quite a ways in mitigating warming. I think also in New York, it was a choice around really wanting to focus on natural gas and getting natural gas out of New York’s economy. You know, New York is one of band fracking in 2014. Like it has this history of really strong activism against natural gas. And when you measure methane on a 20-year global warming potential, that really makes actions like, you know, switching to electric heating and electric stoves, like things like that, it makes them look, you know, way more powerful as options and builds more kind of political will around those types of actions.
Robinson Meyer:
In some ways, it basically builds into the law itself a higher tax rate for natural gas than for other forms of carbon emissions. And really, really presses harder on natural gas. I guess the risk here is that it winds up having climate policy do something that isn’t quite what climate policy is maybe necessarily designed to do, in that if you adopt GWP-20, my sense is it makes coal.
Emily Pontecorvo:
And now New York’s not at risk of building a coal plant soon,
Robinson Meyer:
But it makes coal look in some cases better than gas.
Emily Pontecorvo:
I think that there are tradeoffs. And, you know, if it’s a political choice to focus on natural gas mitigation. But, you know, the alternative that, you know, I wrote a story about this actually a couple of years ago because Kathy Hochul tried to do this in 2023. And there was a big uproar about it and it didn’t end up happening. But at the time when I spoke to folks about it, one thing that came up was like when you, you know, when methane doesn’t look as urgent or pressing, the state might focus on something like transportation. Right now in New York, buildings are like the biggest source of carbon emissions. After this accounting change, transportation will look like the biggest source of carbon emissions. So maybe there’ll be a big push to try to electrify vehicles and build more public transit. And in the long run, you know, mitigating those carbon emissions could be better because those will be in the atmosphere much longer than the methane. So, you know, there’s those trade-offs.
Robinson Meyer:
I’ve seen coherent philosophical arguments that when you judge natural gas on the basis of these extremely short-term warming effects versus how natural gas emissions net out long-term compared to carbon dioxide emissions, you wind up, is downplaying basically anthropogenic climate change itself. Because you go, you wind up shifting from a system where you’re saying what matters is CO2 driven warming over the long term to a system that says what matters is eliminating this one source of very potent oil and gas emissions and trying to drive them out of the system. And now there might be political economic reasons to want to fight near-term emissions from the domestic fossil fuel industry. But that is not the same thing as actually going out and trying to reduce carbon emissions.
Robinson Meyer:
And in some ways, it confuses the two tasks, perhaps.
Emily Pontecorvo:
I’ve spoken to scientists and other policy experts who would argue that we should have separate targets, that we shouldn’t just have one CO2 equivalent target for 2030, that we should have, we should look at like, you know, the timeline for reducing methane, the timeline for reducing CO2. I do want to just note this group at NYU did an interesting analysis of this change, the global warming potential change. And they looked at, you know, I think one of the reasons the governor wanted to do this is that it would kind of give New York a little more time. It would look like they were further along. It would maybe make mitigation look more affordable, what they found was that Even though this change reduces the distance between today and the 2030 target, it doesn’t necessarily mean meeting that target is cheaper because it all depends on like the marginal cost of abating each greenhouse gas and kind of how efficiently the policies are at doing that.
Robinson Meyer:
And so in other words, basically, it sounds like you could take the revenue from New York City’s cap and invest under the old system and go spend it entirely on mitigating upstream emissions basically in Pennsylvania. Where we get a lot of our gas from. And that would pay out really well. But now, am I interpreting this right? But now basically what has to happen is the state has to go in and use its revenue from its cap and invest program to like change this deep, industrial stock in the state, be it buildings or transportation or the power system. And because the state is kind of grading its report card accurately, it actually has to go where the carbon emissions are. And where the carbon emissions are is always going to be or often going to be like a very expensive change to the actual fixed investment in the state.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah. I mean, I think the report didn’t come down, you know, definitively. It said like, you know, more data would be needed to know this for sure. But because methane has such a bigger effect, mitigating it also has a bigger effect. And so, you know, you would have gotten more bang for your buck with a focus on methane, potentially, than with a focus on carbon.
Robinson Meyer:
What’s your read about these two big changes? I mean, you’ve been covering, now, New York’s state-level climate law for a long time. These are two pretty significant changes to how the law works, although it sounds like a lot of the skeleton of the legislation has maybe been left intact. What have you taken away from covering this? And what relevance do you think New York’s experience has for other states or other countries that are trying to regulate carbon emissions?
Emily Pontecorvo:
In some ways, I feel like I have been kind of waiting and wondering if this moment would come for years now. I’ve covered state climate policy in a lot of different states over the past several years and none of them are on track. I mean, none of them, you know, are really going to hit their targets. And
Emily Pontecorvo:
I’ve been curious, you know, when those deadlines were nearing, would states move the targets? Would they speed up their, you know, policymaking? Would they wave the targets away and say, well, the numbers don’t matter as much as the fact that we’re doing something like I was curious to see how that would be handled. And so, you know, it’s not it’s not entirely surprising, but it is so the way that everything went down in New York is so tied to this particular moment we’re in where, I mean, the Trump administration has really taken away the option of building more renewable energy quickly. And that has made it very, very difficult for New York to make progress toward these targets and made the prospect of doing so more expensive. And so it’s partly the Trump administration. It’s partly just the huge political anxiety around affordability right now that have all kind of created these changes. You know, when I talk to people from my most recent story, there were some who were glad that there was at least new deadlines, like new, you know,
Emily Pontecorvo:
New York would have to get these regulations in place by 2028. The budget agreement does specifically note that cap and invest should be considered as part of that. Whereas, like, you know, the original climate law doesn’t say anything about cap and invest. That kind of came out of the scoping plan. So I think people are optimistic that things will happen. There’s plenty of other things that New York could be doing. There’s other types of laws New York could pass or regulations New York could do in the meantime.
Robinson Meyer:
You mean to reduce its emissions?
Emily Pontecorvo:
To reduce its emissions, to speed up permitting, to get more batteries on the grid. New York has been really, really slow with storage deployment. And so I’ll be looking to see... Are we just going to basically pause all climate policymaking until 2028? Or are they going to be able to get some things done in the meantime?
Robinson Meyer:
Well, and not only that, but there was a recent transmission reliability report from New York, New York’s ISO, our state level grid, that basically said, starting potentially quite soon, but starting officially on paper, I think, as soon as 2029, that New York City doesn’t have enough capacity to meet its security margin, basically the amount of electricity that it projects it might need in an emergency to meet a summer weather event. And what this means is like what we’re going to be pulling up with barges connected to the grid that have diesel gensets on them on the hottest days of the year.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Well, what it really means is I think that some diesel gensets that were supposed to be retired by then will be kept online longer. So yeah, that’s not ideal. But I mean, there has been a proposal in New York for a long time to replace some of those peaker plants with batteries, with storage. And that has really not gone anywhere. So I think there is potential to get at that reliability need another way, but we’ll see if that happens.
Robinson Meyer:
Last question. This is not the only energy news to emerge from the New York State House this week. I think there were a few utility level changes or changes to utility level regulation that were passed in the state budget deal. Can you describe them to us really quickly?
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah, there were a couple other things. So the governor has this ratepayer protection plan where she included a bunch of policies to try to reform utilities and put a much bigger focus on affordability in the whole rate making process. So this includes like tying executive pay at utility companies to new affordability metrics, some reforms to the process of when utilities ask for rate hikes and requiring added justification over the necessity of those hikes, more scrutiny over the way that they’re spending money on lobbying and PR campaigns and things like that. And then there’s this new energy affordability index where the state is going to sort of benchmark its performance against other states. And, you know, kind of any time a utility asks for a rate hike, look at how that would impact the state’s index.
Robinson Meyer:
Well, we look forward to following that more. Well, you know, two more years until the state begins to enforce its cap and invest rules, allegedly now under the law. That means we have two more years to keep having these conversations, Emily. Thank you so much for joining us on Shift Key. I’m looking forward to them.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Thanks for having me.
Robinson Meyer:
Thanks so much for listening we’ll be back soon with a new episode of Shift Key. Until then, Shift Key is a production of Heatmap News. Our editors are Jillian Goodman and Nico Lauricella. Multimedia editing and audio engineering is by Jacob Lambert and by Nick Woodbury. Our music is by Adam Kromelow. Thanks so much for listening, we’ll see you soon.
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The Iran War laid bare the two energy regimes fighting for global dominance.
We have an Iran deal. We think. Since President Trump and Iran announced the arrangement on Sunday afternoon, its details have had a Heisenbergian quality — not even Israeli leaders seem to be sure what they are. From an energy markets standpoint, Trump told The New York Times on Sunday that the text guarantees “permanently toll-free” access to the Strait of Hormuz, but it remains unclear how and when the waterway will reopen.
What we do know is that some version of the deal is set to be signed on Friday. At the same time, the U.S. and Iran will start 60 days of “technical negotiations” to discuss Iran’s nuclear program and sanctions relief, according to Vice President JD Vance. “A lot of very important details” have yet to be figured out, Vance told reporters on Monday. If Iran doesn’t agree to give up its nuclear program in those talks, Trump told the Times yesterday, he would either order bombing to restart or make the United States “the guardian of the Middle East” in exchange for oil revenues. (So much for toll-free access! At least then CENTCOM could establish a hotline.)
Regardless, it may take weeks for Iran to remove its sea mines from the strait. Then ships and their exhausted crews will begin trickling out of the Persian Gulf. My colleague Matthew Zeitlin has the full rundown on what will happen next in Iran — and what it means for oil, natural gas, and the energy transition.
But let’s assume, for a moment, that the war really is over. What did we learn from the past 107 days of conflict?
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For me, the most astonishing thing about the conflict remains that China, which used to buy 11 million barrels of oil a day from global markets, only imported about 7.8 million barrels a day in May. That’s just over 3 million barrels a day of demand, seemingly vaporized overnight. (For context, the world used about 104 million barrels a day last year.) China’s enormous domestic oil and gas stockpiles and its high concentration of electric vehicles seem to have produced the cut — as did a domestic increase in energy prices that helped dampen demand on its own.
For the past few years, climate and energy journalists like me have hammered that China’s solar, battery, and electric vehicle manufacturing complex is the real deal. But the war clarified that the world now has two real and rivalrous energy regimes. There is the oil-and-gas regime, heavily concentrated in the OPEC+ countries and North America, and there is the electricity-and-batteries regime, located in East Asia and especially China.
These systems are linked and interdependent, yet in competition for consumer demand — as well as policy-driven and infrastructural lock-in from countries. The United States is the lynchpin of the former system: Not only is it the world’s No. 1 producer of oil and natural gas, but it also (allegedly) guarantees security and freedom of navigation in the Middle East. China anchors the electric regime: Not only does it dominate the manufacturing of solar panels, wind turbines, lithium-ion batteries, and electric vehicles, but it also owns or refines the minerals essential to their production. While America can boast better petroleum engineers than anywhere else in the world, China has the manufacturing know-how necessary to spin off new innovations. Each country, in other words, dominates the stocks, flows, and knowledge that drive these planet-spanning regimes.
To be clear, I don’t agree with the interpretation — sometimes in vogue — that the United States is a “petrostate” while China is an “electrostate.” America has a much more diversified economy than most petrostates; oil makes up 10% to 15% of our dollar-denominated goods exports and an even smaller share of our overall exports. In Saudi Arabia, by comparison, oil is more than 70% of goods exports. Nor do I think “electrostate” evokes the reality that China, notwithstanding its world-historic renewables buildout, still gets 60% of its power from coal.
Much still unites these systems too — notably the petrochemicals sector, which produces from oil and gas the necessary inputs to solar, batteries, and EVs. But that’s why China’s coal-to-chemicals sector — which I previously discussed on our podcast Shift Key with the energy analyst Lauri Myllyvirta — has played such an important role during the past few months, allowing the country to cut crude demand without slowing down production lines. Given that the coal-to-chemicals industry is more carbon intensive than the sector it ostensibly replaces — and that India is already looking at developing its own version of the sector — I suspect we’ve only heard the beginning of it. We’ll examine it more in the days and weeks to come.
And it’ll take energy markets even longer.
The United States and Iran have agreed on a process that could result in the end of their armed conflict and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Both countries have signed the agreement, U.S. officials told reporters, though the text itself has yet to be released.
The markets, at least, are taking the deal and the promises that the strait will reopen at face value. Benchmark oil prices are now at around $83 per barrel, down slightly from $87 Friday, when traders expected that the U.S. and Iran would soon reach a deal.
“I hereby fully authorize the toll free opening of the Strait of Hormuz, and, simultaneously herewith, authorize the immediate removal of the United States Naval blockade. Ships of the World, start your engines. Let the oil flow!” Trump posted Sunday afternoon on Truth Social.
But that will not happen immediately. No matter what the United States and Iran say, it’s shippers and insurers who will make the final determination of whether the strait is truly open.
For that they will need assurances that Iran means it when it says that vessels are free to sail through, and that it won’t try to impose tolls or force ships through specific routes. “Are the Iranians going to try and control passage?” Robin Mills, chief executive officer of Qamar Energy and non-resident fellow at the Columbia University Center on Global Energy Policy, a consulting and advisory firm in the United Arab Emirates, asked me rhetorically.
This need for evidence of good faith on both sides was a theme of my conversations about the peace deal on Monday.
“The key problem isn’t whether or not the Iranians or the U.S. says the strait is open,” oil analyst Rory Johnston told me. “It is whether shippers — ships that are trapped in the Gulf, as well as ships that are waiting to move into the Gulf — have made the determination that the strait is safe for transit.”
Though some countries were able to divert substantial flows through pipeline networks to avoid the strait, that represented a relatively small amount of Gulf oil production. Johnston has estimated that of the 20 million barrels per day of oil and products that flowed through the Strait before the war, some 13 million to 15 million barrels per day worth of production have been “shut in,” meaning that they were never extracted from the ground.
Even with a peace process underway, the Gulf oil complex won’t be fully operational until ships can first get out of the Strait of Hormuz unencumbered, then get back in to pick up oil shipments, which Johnston estimates won’t happen until the beginning of next month. Some of this is just a judgement call, one that some shippers had already made before the weekend’s announcement.
“There’s been a fairly steady stream of ships that have been exiting the strait by going dark and traveling at night,” Johnston said, “so there is already an understanding for some shipping companies and some regional states that you can transit the waterway safely.”
The number of ships chancing a transit roughly correlates with the temperature of the rhetoric between the U.S. and Iran over the past few weeks. “A total of 29 verified vessel crossings were recorded through the Strait of Hormuz between 10 and 14 June,” according to the maritime analytics service Kpler said Monday. “The data aligns with reports of progress in U.S.-Iran discussions and supports the assessment that the Strait remains operational, although traffic volumes, route transparency and directional balance have yet to return to a clearly normalised pattern.”
The volumes getting through are still far off their pre-war totals, however. In the first two weeks of June, J.P. Morgan analysts estimated Hormuz flows at just over 5 million barrels per day, although about a sixth of that was likely Iranian shipments at risk of being interceded by the U.S. blockade. While that an improvement from around 3 million barrels per day in April and March, it was still well short of the 15 million to 20 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum products flowing through the strait before the war began in February.
The ships that have sailed the strait have largely hugged the Omani coast, according to Eurasia Group energy analyst Greg Brew, or else going through close to the Iran side, which is directly controlled by the country’s military. Three months’ worth of shooting (and mining), however, have made the central artery a no go. “There’s no certainty as to whether there are mines, how many there are, and where they are, and that matters in terms of restoring security of transit through the main waterway,” Brew told me.
The portions of the channel that offer safe passage “are not good routes for the largest ships, especially for big container ships and the largest tankers,” Brew added. Clearing the strait will likely involve navies from outside the region, including European fleets and “potentially” China, he said, many of which have ships in the area “specifically equipped for clearing mines.”
That process is likely to be iterative, Johnston told me. “It’s not like there are mines or there are not mines across the entire area,” he said. Instead, he told me, certain widths of the strait will be judged to be mine-free, allowing for safe passage, and that width will expand over time. Brew estimated that it will take two to three weeks to complete that process.
Getting the tankers back in should give oil producers the confidence to restart operations, Johnston said. “But then the challenge becomes how much upstream infrastructure was damaged,” he said. Even if the extraction infrastructure is functional, so-called “downstream” refining infrastructure could still be down, meaning that crude oil production could recover before refined products like gasoline or petroleum liquids begin returning to their previous levels.
As for how long it will take to get back up to full production, Brew told me that will vary country by country. In the short run, Gulf oil producers can pull from existing inventories of oil, with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which never fully shut down production, getting back to full flows in a few weeks. Iraq and Kuwait, which had to more severely curtail production, may take a few months.
Governments and companies will eventually have to rebuild their oil and natural gas stockpiles after drawing on them extensively to keep fuel prices from spiking. Among rich nations, inventories have sunk to levels not seen since depths of the post-9/11 conflict in 2003, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. The United States’ Strategic Petroleum Reserve had around 415 million barrels of oil before the war began, and has since fallen to around 350 million barrels, the lowest level since 1983.
All told, Johnston told me, “well over” a billion barrels of global fuel reserves have been used up since the war began.
Refilling these inventories — or, for countries newly interested in energy security, establishing them — will be a long-run addition to demand for oil, which could keep prices from falling as sharply as they might have otherwise. “We’re probably going to have two, three years of structurally higher demand as people try to restock,” Johnston said.
But the course of the war has defied risks of prices spiking higher. “This war was the biggest supply disruption in history, and oil had a hard time staying above $100 a barrel,” Brew said. “That implies that the structural factors inside the market are more keeping prices low than pulling prices high.”
A new Searchlight Institute report joins a growing chorus arguing that corporate climate targets do more harm than good.
When Jane Flegal was working in market development for Frontier Climate, a $1 billion initiative to catalyze advances in carbon removal, she had what she called a “radicalizing experience.”
Frontier went out to corporate sustainability teams, selling them on large carbon removal offtake agreements with vetted startups that were developing technologies to suck measurable amounts of carbon directly out of the air. These were more expensive than the carbon offsets companies could buy to support forest conservation or clean cookstoves in Africa, but the investment would support innovation important for fighting climate change. In return, the companies would eventually be able to count the resulting carbon removal toward their net zero emissions targets.
Most companies, however, were more concerned about the cost. “We were trying to get companies to spend more than $1,000 per ton on a new technology we know the world needs,” Flegal told me. “Making that pitch to a corporation when they could also just go make the exact same claim with a $4-a-ton carbon offset credit was a crazy-making experience.”
The revelation, for Flegal, was that the prevailing paradigm for corporate climate action — a single-minded focus on carbon accounting — was not just inadequate, but actively harmful to bringing about the systems-level change required to decarbonize the economy. It incentivized companies to optimize for reducing their individual carbon footprints and failed to recognize the arguably more impactful contributions they could be making to systems change. “Most of the best things they could be doing are just not legible at all in the existing accounting frameworks,” she said.
Flegal fleshed out her critique in a paper published Monday by the Searchlight Institute, a center-left think tank where she is now a senior fellow. The data center boom has exacerbated these perverse incentives, she argues. Tech companies are pursuing corporate power purchase agreements to fulfill their individual clean energy commitments, but mostly failing to help break down the structural barriers to decarbonizing the grid, such as transmission constraints and interconnection backlogs.
The paper challenges the logic of treating a “complex, global, sociotechnical problem as if it were a matter of property rights,” where investors and the public expect companies to own their individual carbon messes. Flegal proposes some alternative measures by which to evaluate corporate climate ambition. One is the quality of a company’s investments — are they causing more clean energy or crucial climate infrastructure to get built than would be otherwise based on market conditions? How many miles of transmission have they financed, or policy proceedings have they influenced? She also calls for companies to be explicit about their theory of change and report how they are taking action consistent with that theory.
“I recognize that these are not perfect metrics, but let’s be real, neither are the ones we have today,” she told me. “The danger of the ones we have today is that they imply a false precision that could be worse for climate outcomes than just being honest about uncertainty.”
The climate community has always fought about carbon accounting, but recently the quarrel has reached a fever pitch. The Greenhouse Gas Protocol, a nonprofit that sets voluntary standards for how companies should measure their emissions, is in the middle of overhauling its rules, a process that has sparked major schisms over how to account for companies’ clean electricity purchases, the carbon stored in forests, and other complex aspects of corporate carbon bookkeeping.
At the same time, the Science Based Targets Initiative, a separate group that acts as an arbiter of whether companies’ climate plans are consistent with the goal of limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, has been updating its own standard for “corporate net zero.” A third group, the International Organization for Standardization, is also revising its greenhouse gas reporting rulebooks.
The challenge across all of these efforts is developing standards that are scientifically rigorous but not so rigid as to discourage companies from acting. Companies are lobbying these revision processes to get the rules they want, but many experts worry the outcomes will enable greenwashing.
Flegal joins a growing chorus of thought leaders arguing that this system that feigns precision and prioritizes compliance with an impossible bottom line risks pushing companies away from doing anything at all. Some propose getting rid of individual carbon targets altogether in favor of more qualitative reporting, while others advocate for creating a separate space for companies to earn recognition for their harder-to-measure “contributions” to fighting climate change.
In September, Michael Gillenwater, the executive director of the Greenhouse Gas Management Institute, who has been working on carbon accounting issues for more than 20 years, called for a “paradigm shift” in corporate climate reporting. He and Derik Broekhoff of the Stockholm Environment Institute, another 20-year soldier in this space, argue that boiling down a company’s climate impact to a single inventory of emissions traps “companies in a ’doom loop’ where they are simultaneously criticized for not taking full responsibility for indirect emissions and for greenwashing when they attempt to address these emissions through market-based mechanisms,” such as renewable energy certificates.
They propose instead a “multi-statement” reporting framework in which companies would separate their actual, physical emissions from their investments in carbon offsets, renewable energy certificates, and other market-based tools for climate mitigation. This system reframes carbon credits from “compensating” for a company’s ongoing emissions to playing a more philanthropic role in achieving global net zero and “eliminates the perception that companies can be absolved of responsibility through offsetting,” they write. They also propose a third section where companies would report on remaining barriers to decarbonizing their particular business. Companies could set targets for each section individually, but would not be allowed to combine them into a single performance metric.
Robert Hoglund, the co-founder of the carbon removal tracking site CDR.fyi and head of climate at Milkywire, a corporate advisory firm, published yet another idea in a paper earlier this month. He and his co-author argue that the distinction existing frameworks make between a company’s “direct” and “indirect” emissions doesn’t actually illuminate what’s within its control to reduce. They recommend companies split their net zero targets into two categories, separating “unconditional” emissions cuts — those that are currently feasible — from “conditional” reductions, or those that depend on changes in policy, infrastructure, technoeconomics, etc.
Creating a conditional target “does not make it optional,” they write. “It creates an obligation to help build the world the target assumes. That means policy advocacy, supplier engagement, financing climate solutions, supporting carbon removal, and other system-changing actions are not side activities but flow from the target itself.”
The Science Based Targets Initiative published its new net zero standard this past week, and it appears to adopt at least some of the ideas Flegal, Gillenwater, and Hoglund proposed — namely, attention to systemic constraints. It shifts from looking only at absolute emission reductions to recognizing companies for putting their “best efforts” toward net zero. It stops short, however, of explaining how SBTi will judge what counts as a “best effort.” It also allows companies to use some kinds of carbon certificates to lower their emissions on paper.
Based on an initial read, Hoglund told me he thought SBTi made some positive changes. Flegal hadn’t had a chance to dig into them yet when we spoke. Another critic I spoke to was less pleased.
If Lisa Sachs, the director of Columbia University’s Center on Sustainable Investment, had her way, companies would get rid of net zero targets altogether. She published her own treatise on the subject in May, pointing out that corporate net zero “relies on a mistaken aggregation logic.” It assumes that if every company works to reduce, offset, or neutralize their own emissions, the efforts will sum up to global net zero. Like Flegal, she told me that not only is that impossible without systems change, but she fears that company-level net zero goals “disincentivize the things companies can and should do that would have maximum systems impact.”
While it’s relatively common today for companies to talk openly about the systemic barriers they face in decarbonizing, it’s much more rare for them to say what they’re doing about it. I asked Flegal whether she truly believed sustainability officers would be able to get CEO approval for investments in “systems change,” which is more difficult to break down into clear KPIs.
She pointed out that a lot of companies already make significant philanthropic investments, and this could be put in that bucket. In some cases, like when grid constraints are a barrier to powering a new facility, they could argue that investing in transmission lines is a strategic move and not just part of their climate commitment.
Actions like lobbying in support of regulatory reform and other policy changes seem like a harder sell. The investor-led initiative Climate Action 100+ tracks how companies are attempting to influence climate-related policy debates, and has consistently found that few companies — just 2%, in the latest count — align their lobbying activities with their climate goals.
Reading these papers took me back to 2019 and 2020, when many companies first made net zero commitments. In one sense, it felt like a sea change — all these powerful corporations publicly dedicating themselves to a net zero future — but it was also dubious. They all seemed to have a different definition of what “net zero” meant. For some oil and gas companies, it meant zero-ing out the emissions from their operations, but not from the oil and gas they sold. A lot of companies made the pledge without providing any details about how they would achieve it. SBTi started developing its first net zero standard in 2020 to address this problem by creating a common definition and set of expectations. While having SBTi validate a company’s net zero target is entirely voluntary, more than 11,000 companies have done it.
When I mentioned this history to Flegal and Sachs, they countered that the problem SBTi is trying to address is downstream of the actual problem — that a voluntary net zero framework for companies creates incentives that are not aligned with what really matters for decarbonization.
Both also raised the opportunity cost of the enormous intellectual and financial capital that has gone into refining all of these accounting methodologies and producing reams of reporting to comply with them. “All of these organizations and rule setters for the rule setters for the rule setters, I think we’ve gotten lost in the sauce a bit,” Flegal said.
“These frameworks have become a business — literally a business, in SBTi’s case,” Sachs said, since it has a for-profit arm that validates companies’ reporting for a fee. “I’d rather have a few leaders who raise the tide than to have 11,000 companies aligned with SBTi, and to be finding ourselves in five years figuring out another way to lower the standard.”