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The senator from West Virginia is retiring. Who will we think about now?
What can you say about Joe Manchin, perhaps the most important — and most complicated — American climate policy maker of the past decade?
Let’s start here: Soon, he won’t be a senator any more. On Thursday, Manchin announced that he will not pursue re-election in West Virginia in 2024.
“I’ve made one of the toughest decisions of my life and decided that I will not be running for re-election to the United States Senate,” he said in a video message. Instead, he said, he will be “traveling the country and speaking out to see if there is an interest in creating a movement to mobilize the middle and bring Americans together.”
We don’t have many details about what “mobilizing the middle” might look like; Manchin was recently said to be considering a third-party presidential run. If he did make a go for the White House, that would seemingly have disastrous consequences for Joe Biden’s re-election effort — and, in all likelihood, for climate action generally — because it could probably hand the 2024 race to Donald Trump.
But pending that possibility, Manchin’s decision immediately reframes several aspects of next year’s elections.
It means, first, that West Virginia Governor and serial coal-mine-safety violator Jim Justice will likely win Manchin’s seat, marking the end of a tectonic political realignment that saw the state go from solidly Democratic to solidly Republican.
Without West Virginia, Democrats’ path to a Senate majority now looks more like a tightrope: It requires Democrats to hold difficult seats in Ohio, Montana, Pennsylvania, and Arizona. Then the party needs to win in one additional state. But the pickings are slim. Are Texas or Florida really going to elect a Democrat to the Senate? Is Mississippi, Missouri, or Nebraska?
Manchin’s decision will, in other words, have big implications for what Democrats can and cannot do in government. Without a working Senate majority, Democrats will struggle to pass laws or appoint justices to the Supreme Court even if they control the House of Representatives and the White House.
But, of course, Manchin’s decision is even more profound because who he is — his anxieties, whims, and cognitive biases — has long had an outsized influence on legislation. Setting aside presidents and a few jurists, there may not be a recent Democratic policymaker whose personal views more closely shaped the law.
Manchin wielded power, above all, because he represented West Virginia, the most conservative state to send a Democrat to the Senate. That meant he was his caucus’s obvious marginal member and swing vote.
And you could tell. What other Democrat could get away with owning a coal plant while ostensibly overseeing the coal industry? (Manchin is the chairman of the Senate energy and natural resources committee.) What other Democrat could demand last-minute changes to an economic recovery package?
Manchin’s crowning legacy will be the Inflation Reduction Act, which is often described as “President Biden’s signature climate bill,” but which is smudged with Manchin’s fingerprints, too. As chairman of the Senate energy committee, Manchin had a good deal of de jure authority over the law; as the Senate’s swing vote, he had even more de facto power. The final bill text was hammered out in negotiations between Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer’s team — who were essentially negotiating on behalf of the rest of the caucus — and Manchin’s team.
You can see it in the law’s final policies.
Some of the Inflation Reduction Act’s most generous subsidies will go to the nascent clean hydrogen industry, which Manchin has long nurtured. If hydrogen becomes an anti-environmental boondoggle on par with ethanol, then Manchin will bear a good deal of the blame; if it decarbonizes the American industrial sector, he should get some credit.
Likewise, Manchin is why the bill’s tax credits for electric vehicles do not incentivize union membership.
He is behind the law’s peculiar rules about exactly which industries and organizations can claim their subsidies as direct cash payments. He also shaped the design of its carbon-capture tax credits.
If there is something distinctive in the IRA, the odds are good that Manchin either insisted on it, approved it, or didn’t notice it.
But Manchin drove other climate and energy policy too. He cowrote the bipartisan Energy Act of 2020 with Senator Lisa Murkowski of Alaska. That law focused the federal government’s industrial policy on carbon management, clean hydrogen, and critical minerals — some of the same topics that would dominate the IRA. It also expanded the powers of the Loan Programs Office, the Department of Energy’s in-house bank.
He criticized the Environmental Protection Agency and sometimes voted to overturn its rules. He consistently opposed carbon taxes or pricing carbon in any way, all but ensuring the idea’s political death in the short-term. Even his Senate career more or less began with him taking aim — literally — at Obama’s climate bill. During his first race for Senate in 2010, Manchin ran a TV ad in which he shot a rifle at a stack of papers labeled “cap and trade bill” and promised to take on then-President Barack Obama’s proposal.
In short, if you thought about climate policy over the past decade, you wound up thinking quite a lot about the likes, dislikes, and peculiarities of Joe Manchin. What he might support or oppose mapped the frontier of political possibility in the United States. He was, in short, potentially the most influential force in shaping American climate policy during the 2010s. (Only Mary Nichols, who has been California’s chief air-pollution regulator since 2007, might match his importance.)
My first thought is that Manchin may soon join that list of capricious ex-senators — Joe Lieberman and Ben Nelson come to mind — whose names, once synonymous with power itself, become the answer to bad trivia questions. But I have been thinking about Joe Manchin, 76, for a long time, and I expect to find it a hard habit to break. He is an ambitious, eccentric, and preternaturally lucky man. I suspect his next few decisions will prove even more important than those that have come before.
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Just turn them off sometimes, according to new research from Duke University.
Grid planners have entered a new reality. After years of stagnant growth, utilities are forecasting accelerating electricity demand from artificial intelligence and other energy-intense industries and using it to justify building out more natural gas power plants and keep old coal plants online. The new administration has declared that the United States is in an “energy emergency,” bemoaning that the country’s generating capacity is “far too inadequate to meet our Nation’s needs.” Or, as President Trump put it at the Republican National Convention, “AI needs tremendous — literally, twice the electricity that’s available now in our country, can you imagine?”
The same logic also works the other way — the projected needs of data centers and manufacturing landed some power producers among the best performing stocks of 2024. And when it looked like artificial intelligence might not be as energy intensive as those producers assumed thanks to the efficiency of DeepSeek’s open source models, shares in companies that own power plants and build gas turbines crashed.
Both industry and policymakers seem convinced that the addition of new, large sources of power demand must be met with more generation and expensive investments to upgrade the grid.
But what if it doesn’t?
That’s the question Tyler Norris, Tim Profeta, Dalia Patino-Echeverri, and Adam Cowie-Haskell of the Nicholas Institute of Energy, Environment and Stability at Duke University tried to answer in a paper released Tuesday.
Their core finding: that the United States could add 76 gigawatts of new load — about a tenth of the peak electricity demand across the whole country — without having to upgrade the electrical system or add new generation. There’s just one catch: Those new loads must be “curtailed” (i.e. not powered) for up to one-quarter-of-one-percent of their maximum time online. That’s it — that’s the whole catch.
“We were very surprised,” Norris told me, referring to the amount of power freed up by data centers if they could curtail their usage at high usage times.
“It goes against the grain of the current paradigm,” he said, “that we have no headroom, and that we have to make massive expansion of the system to accommodate new load and generation.”
The electricity grid is built to accommodate the peak demand of the system, which often occurs during the hottest days of summer or the coldest days of winter. That means much grid infrastructure is built out solely to accommodate power demand that occurs over just a few days of the year, and even then for only part of those days. Thus it follows that if those peaks can be shaved by demand being reduced, then the existing grid can accommodate much more new demand.
This is the logic of longstanding “demand response” programs, whether they involve retail consumers agreeing not to adjust their thermostats outside a certain range or factories shuttering for prescribed time periods in exchange for payments from the grid authority. In very flexible markets, such as Texas’ ERCOT, some data center customers (namely cryptominers) get a substantial portion of their overall revenue by agreeing to curtail their use of electricity during times of grid stress.
While Norris cautioned that readers of the report shouldn’t think this means we won’t need any new grid capacity, he argued that the analysis “can enable more focus of limited resources on the most valuable upgrades to the system.”
Instead of focusing on expensive upgrades needed to accommodate the new demand on the grid, the Duke researchers asked what new sources of demand could do for the grid as a whole. Ask not what the grid can do for you, ask what you can do for the grid.
“By strategically timing or curtailing demand, these flexible loads can minimize their impact on peak periods,” they write. “In doing so, they help existing customers by improving the overall utilization rate — thereby lowering the per-unit cost of electricity — and reduce the likelihood that expensive new peaking plants or network expansions may be needed.” urtailment of large loads, they argue, can make the grid more efficient by utilizing existing equipment more fully and avoiding expensive upgrades that all users might have to pay for.
They found that when new large loads are curtailed for up to 0.25% of their maximum uptime, the average time offline amounts to just over an hour-and-a-half at a go, with 85 hours of load curtailment per year on average.
“You’re able to add incremental load to accept flexibility in most stressed periods,” Norris said. “Most hours of the year we’re not that close to the maximum peaks.”
In the nation’s largest electricity trading market, PJM Interconnection, this quarter-percent of total uptime curtailment would enable the grid to bring online over 13 gigawatts of new data centers — about the capacity of 13 new, large nuclear reactors — while maintaining PJM’s planners’ desired amount of generation capacity. In other words, that’s up to 13 gigawatts of reactors PJM no longer has to build, as long as that new load can be curtailed for 0.25% of its maximum uptime.
But why would data center developers agree to go offline when demand for electricity rises?
It’s not just because it could help the developers maintain their imperiled sustainability goals. It also presents an opportunity to solve the hardest problem for building out new data centers. One of the key limiting factors to getting data centers online is so-called “time to power,” i.e. how long it takes for the grid to be upgraded, either with new transmission equipment or generation, so that a data center can get up and running. According to estimates from the consulting firm McKinsey, a data center project can be developed in as little as a year and a half — but only if there’s already power available. Otherwise the timeline can run several years.
“There’s a clear value add,” Norris said. There are “very few locations to interconnect multi-hundred megawatt or gigawatt load in near-term fashion. If they accept flexibility for provision interim period, that allows them to get online more quickly.”
This “time to power” problem has motivated a flowering of unconventional ideas to power data centers, whether it’s large-scale deployment of on-site solar power (with some gas turbines) in the Southwest, renewables adjacent to data centers,co-located natural gas, or buying whole existing nuclear power plants.
But there may be a far simpler answer..
On breaching 1.5, NYC’s new EV chargers, and deforestation
Current conditions: Unusually hot and dry weather in Ivory Coast has farmers worried about a looming shortage of cocoa beans • Construction on one of Britain’s busiest roads has been extended by nine months due to extreme weather • The first of three winter storms hitting the U.S. this week will arrive today, bringing snow to the Mid-Atlantic region.
Two new studies published this week concluded that we’re probably already beyond the 1.5 degrees Celsius global warming threshold outlined in the Paris Agreement. Last year was the first full calendar year with global temperatures averaging more than 1.5C above pre-industrial averages, but scientists have been divided on whether this was a short-term anomaly or the beginning of a new and irreversible era. The new studies, both published in the journal Nature Climate Change, used different methodology to investigate this question, but came to the same conclusion: “Most probably Earth has already entered a 20-year period at 1.5C warming.” The findings echo research published last week from famed climate scientist James Hansen, who predicted that warming will ramp up by 0.2 or 0.3 degrees Celsius per decade to breach 2 degrees Celsius in warming by 2045. Last month was the hottest January on record, at 1.75 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial averages.
Rivian is making its electric commercial van available to all business customers that want to electrify their fleets. Up until now the vans have been available only for Amazon, but the EV maker said yesterday that exclusive partnership has ended. The vans come in two sizes: the smaller RCV 500 (available for $79,900) and the larger RCV 700 (for $83,900). Both are eligible for the $7,500 tax credit. “This will be one of Rivian’s greatest tests yet,” said Mack Hogan at InsideEVs. “If it can prove to business owners that it can build robust, dependable vans that can be serviced in the field, it should have no issue winning retail customers’ trust when it launches the R2 and R3.”
Rivian
New York State is giving $60 million to EV infrastructure startup Revel to build 267 DC fast chargers across NYC by 2027. Gov. Kathy Hochul announced the loan, which comes from the NY Green Bank, on Monday, saying “it is critical that we continue to build electric vehicle infrastructure to ease the shift to EV ownership for more New Yorkers, especially those in urban areas.” The chargers will be spread across nine sites, five of which will be completed within the next year. Those include 44 chargers near LaGuardia Airport, 24 chargers near JFK Airport, as well as sites in Queens, Brooklyn, and the Bronx. The public chargers will be open 24/7. This marks the first EV charging infrastructure loan from the NYGB.
The fallout continues from last month’s fire at the world’s largest battery storage plant in California. Four people who live near the site of the blaze are suing Vistra Energy, which owns the Moss Landing Power Plant, and a handful of other energy companies for insufficient safety measures. Public awareness about the possible health hazards of the fire are also growing, with The New York Timesreporting on several studies that have detected toxic levels of heavy metals in soil samples surrounding the facility, and spotlighting complaints from local residents who say they have experienced headaches, sore throats, nosebleeds, and other symptoms in the weeks following the disaster. The fire raises questions about the safety of large battery storage facilities, which store excess energy to be deployed on-demand and are seen as essential to decarbonizing the grid. The International Energy Agency has said that “grid-scale batteries are projected to account for the majority of storage growth world wide.”
India, the world’s third largest producer of greenhouse gas emissions, does not plan to submit new targets for limiting those emissions, Bloombergreported. Under the Paris Agreement, nations are required every five years to submit new climate plans – known as nationally determined contributions – that outline emissions reduction goals and strategies for hitting those goals. But India apparently plans to focus its NDC on climate change adaptation measures. Yesterday was the official deadline for all Paris Agreement parties to submit their updated NDCs, but most countries are running behind.
Deforestation levels in Colombia in 2024 rose slightly from 2023, but were still the third lowest in 23 years.
Editor’s note: This article originally misstated the location of the Moss Landing battery fire. It’s been corrected. We regret the error.
The new president is annihilating his predecessor’s energy policy.
Every time the White House changes hands from one party to another, some policies toggle back to what they were before, a reset meant to restore the status quo ante. The best-known example may be the Mexico City policy, which forbids U.S. foreign aid funds from going to any organization that performs or even gives information about abortions; since it was first instituted under Ronald Reagan, every Democratic president has revoked it and every Republican president has reestablished it. The change is as predictable as the sunrise.
But presidents also hope that even if their party loses the next election, they will have created more durable policy change. If the outgoing president has been clever enough at creating smart design, administrative momentum, and political reality, even a hostile new president may find it difficult to roll back everything their predecessor did. That was certainly the Biden administration’s goal when it came to climate policy. Some even hoped that President Trump would just be too preoccupied with the things he cares more about — especially deporting immigrants and imposing tariffs — to devote too much time and effort to undoing the progress that has been made on climate.
In other words, Trump could have taken much the same approach as Biden, except with the favored industries reversed. Biden worked hard to boost renewable energy, but apart from a few high-profile moves like the cancellation of the Keystone XL pipeline and a temporary suspension of approvals for new liquified natural gas export facilities, he mostly left the fossil fuel industry alone. The result was a boom time for oil and gas, with record production and almost limitless profits. Turn it upside down, and you’d have an administration that gives fossil fuel companies what they want — relaxed regulations, speeded-up permits, the opening of federal lands for more drilling — without a frontal assault on renewables.
Unfortunately, Trump has not chosen that mirror-image course. Instead, he seems determined to undermine, roll back, and impair the transition to clean energy in almost every way his administration can think of. As it has in one area after another, the Trump government is acting with a head-spinning speed and ambition, as though it will count itself as successful only if the entire renewables industry lies in ruins by the end of its term.
This is a strange approach to take if Trump actually believes there is an “energy emergency” that demands a mobilization to produce dramatically more power, as he declared in an executive order he signed on his first day in office. But that order made clear the administration’s belief that wind and solar are literally not energy; it states that “The term ‘energy’ or ‘energy resources’ means crude oil, natural gas, lease condensates, natural gas liquids, refined petroleum products, uranium, coal, biofuels, geothermal heat, the kinetic movement of flowing water, and critical minerals.”
Trump didn’t write the order himself, but it certainly reflects the sweeping policy moves his administration has made against renewable energy and environmental enforcement, including the following:
All that is in addition to the expected policy reversals, such as withdrawing the U.S. from the Paris Agreement, which Trump abandoned in his first term and Biden rejoined. Even including those, it’s still not a comprehensive list.
For years, Republicans (including Trump) have described their approach to energy as “all of the above,” i.e. that every kind of energy, including fossil fuels, should be developed as much as possible. That phrase is clearly no longer operative, as the administration is showing an unmitigated hostility to solar and wind power. The administration also seems determined to arrest the growth of the electric vehicle industry, which raises the question of how one particular interested party — Elon Musk — may be reacting to these moves.
Whether or not you think this question has already been settled depends on how much you trust Musk as a reliable exponent of his own true beliefs. On the campaign trail, he boasted that killing the $7,500 EV tax credits would only help Tesla by damaging its competition. After the election, when asked about the tax credit during a visit to Capitol Hill, Musk told reporters, “I think we should get rid of all credits.” But there are other EV-related policies Trump has trained his crosshairs on, including California’s ability to set more stringent fuel efficiency standards than the federal government, granted under a waiver from the Environmental Protection Agency. The law allows companies to buy and sell credits in order to meet the required mix, and as a maker of entirely zero-emission vehicles, Tesla has plenty of credits to sell. As of last November, selling those credits accounted for more than 40% of Tesla’s net income for the year to date.
So far, Musk hasn’t commented on the subject, but it isn’t hard to imagine that if he tried to convince Trump to reverse some of these decisions and pursue a true “all of the above” strategy, Trump would be highly persuadable. But Musk is no longer an ally of the renewables industry, and his interest in the electrification of the nation’s auto fleet begins and ends with his own company.
Part of the theory underlying Biden’s limited moves against the fossil fuel industry was that the energy transition has so much momentum that it can’t be stopped — that, while every day we continue burning oil and gas makes climate change worse, the eventual arrival of a net-zero-emissions future is inevitable. That reality hasn’t changed, but the Trump administration is determined to delay it as long as possible. And in order to do so, it’s bringing the same commitment to rapid, aggressive, destructive policy change it’s deploying across the entire federal government.