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Counties that veered from Obama in 2008 to Trump in 2016 are more likely to oppose renewables development.

In Texas, the Oak Run Solar Project would have been a slam dunk.
Developers would install 800 megawatts of solar panels — enough to power 800,000 homes — across nine square miles of unused land. It would devote some of its acreage to new farming practices that incorporate solar panels. And it would sell its electricity cheaply — and profitably — because it was near the state capital and because it could take advantage of a pre-existing onsite connection to the regional power grid.
But Oak Run wasn’t proposed in Texas. It was proposed in Ohio, and that means it has faced enormous opposition. Ohio has some of the country’s strictest restrictions on solar development, and 10 counties have blocked solar development outright.
Although Madison County, where Oak Run was proposed, is not one of them, the blowback to the project cost a local Republican county commissioner his job. Oak Run was eventually approved by the state’s power siting board earlier this year, but its opponents are now appealing that decision in the state’s Supreme Court.
Madison County, Ohio, also illustrates the political transformation that has revolutionized the upper Midwest. The predominantly rural county near the state’s capital, Columbus, has favored Republicans since the 1960s. But in recent decades it has swung hard to the right. In 2008, Barack Obama won nearly 40% of the county’s vote. Eight years later, Hillary Clinton picked up just 27%.
These two facts may seem like they have little to do with each other. But they point to one of the biggest trends in clean energy development across the country: The counties that voted for Barack Obama in 2008 and then Donald Trump in 2016 are some of the worst places in the country to permit and build renewable projects.
The size of a county’s swing from 2008 to 2016 is one of the biggest predictors of whether a proposed wind or solar project will be contested or blocked, according to a new Heatmap Pro analysis of more than 8,500 projects and local policies around the country.
The magnitude of that swing is by far the most important political variable to emerge from Heatmap Pro’s analysis of more than 60 risk factors influencing community support or opposition to renewable projects. It is more strongly associated with a given project’s success than whether a county votes for Democratic or Republican candidates overall.
The only variables that are more closely correlated than the 2008-to-2016 swing are fundamental measures of a region’s population or local economy, such as its median income, racial demographics, or dominant industries. Towns and regions that heavily depend on farming, for instance, have become particularly reluctant to accept new solar projects in recent years.
Heatmap Pro’s analysis focused not only on whether a county’s residents support wind or solar projects in theory, but also on whether renewable projects proposed in the area are canceled, contested, or exposed to political turbulence. It surveyed more than 7,000 wind and solar projects proposed and built across the United States since the 1990s.
Many of the counties with the largest Obama-to-Trump swings have passed proposals meant to limit renewable development. Vermillion County in Indiana — where more than a quarter of voters swung from Obama to Trump — has an extensive set of restrictions on new solar projects. Solar projects in Elk County, Pennsylvania, which saw a similar swing, have also turned out against solar projects using up “prime farmland.”
There are a few reasons why the Obama-to-Trump swing might be associated with more opposition to renewables.
In 2008, solar and wind were still frontier technologies and were not price-competitive with fossil fuels. Although vaguely associated with Democrats, politicians on both sides of the aisles championed wind and solar so as to wean the country off foreign oil.
But in the following decade, the U.S. increased its solar capacity by roughly 100-fold, while it has more than doubled its installed wind capacity.. Today, solar and wind energy are major features of the electricity system, and many Republicans have openly embraced fossil fuels and cast doubt on the value of cleaner alternatives.
To be sure, the Obama-to-Trump swing was influenced by other social and economic factors, as well as a state’s specific political environment. Leah Stokes, a UC Santa Barbara political scientist who has studied the growing local opposition to wind farms, told me that the correlation with Obama-Trump voters may originate from Trump’s dominance of the upper Midwest in 2016. Because a small group of anti-renewable advocates can change an entire region’s policies, that could lead to more opposition to renewables in one part of the country or another.
“Is there a person, or a network of people, who are going place by place pushing these anti-solar and wind local laws? That would lead to a geographic concentration,” she said.
Even within individual counties, the electorate wasn’t the same in 2016 as it was in 2008. Throughout the 2010s, tens of millions of Americans moved around the country, with the largest net change moving from the Northeast to the South. Cities became younger on average, while rural areas and suburbs became older.
Even within counties, a different set of voters showed up to the polls in each election. One reason why the 2012 election might not be correlated with opposition to renewables is that many voters who voted for Obama in 2008 skipped the next cycle. Those same voters — many of whom were white and working class — showed back up in 2016 and backed Trump.
What is driving the opposition to renewables? Perhaps a county’s swing against renewable energy is happening precisely because voters there are persuadable. From 2008 to 2016, many voters in these counties changed their minds about which candidate or political party to support. As they shifted their stance to the right, they also adopted more seemingly Republican views about wind and solar development. Donald Trump has distinguished himself by his embrace of fossil fuels and climate change skepticism — perhaps as voters come to support him, they also adopt his positions.
What’s interesting, however, is that deep red counties that have not seen a political shift — places that backed, say, McCain and Romney by roughly the same margin as they backed Trump in 2016 — continue to build wind and solar at a good clip. Texas, for instance, is the No. 1 state for renewable deployment. A county’s partisanship, in other words, is not as good a predictor of its opposition to renewables as its swinginess.
Edgar Virguez, an energy systems engineer at the Carnegie Institution for Science at Stanford University, has studied what drives opposition to renewables in North Carolina. He told me that some of the same factors that predict a county’s Trump support — such as its population density and education level — also predict whether that county has enacted a local restriction on renewable energy.
When he and his colleagues studied local policies in North Carolina, they found that lower density and less educated counties “had significantly higher reductions in the land available for solar development” when compared with denser or more educated counties, he said. Once a county has fewer than 35 people per square mile, or when less than 20% of the population has a bachelor’s degree, the number of restrictions on local land use shot up. That’s a problem for decarbonization, he added, because less dense counties also usually have the best and most affordable land available for solar development.
That finding may not hold true in other states. Heatmap, for instance, has found that whiter and more educated counties are more likely to oppose renewables. And to some degree, less dense counties are exactly where you’d expect to see more solar and wind projects get built — and thus more local policies restricting them pop up. But it is nonetheless not great news for advocates, given that a couple of America’s political institutions — namely, the Senate and the Electoral College — favor rural voters or Midwestern states. If the trend takes root, then it could eventually curtail renewable development across the country. That question — and many others — will partly be decided in this week’s presidential election.
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For the first time in six years, House Democrats have put forward a climate platform.
Well, sort of. On Tuesday, a subset of nine House Democrats who are part of the Sustainable Energy and Environment Coalition published a menu of hundreds of policy proposals called the Thriving Economy Project. It’s a federal blueprint for the age of AI, surging energy demand, worsening natural disasters, and growing geopolitical uncertainty.
Kathy Castor, a representative from Florida who led the project, told me that instead of a platform, I should think of the project as “a workable plan for long term economic and job growth.”
“We’re not introducing a bill after this,” she said. “We’re providing it to policymakers in Washington for them to build the bipartisan support you need to get something across the finish line. The Trump administration is going to be there for two more years. What can we get done now that would have bipartisan support?”
Nevertheless, this is still the most sweeping environment and energy policy document Democrats have published since 2020, when the House Select Committee on the Climate Crisis — which Castor also chaired — published a nearly 550-page plan to “solve the climate crisis.” Much of that work became a part of the 2021 bipartisan infrastructure law and the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act. Of course, significant chunks of those laws, including tax credits for wind and solar projects, were later dismantled by the Trump administration in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act.
The Climate Crisis Committee disbanded in 2023, but the Thriving Economy Project is, in some ways, a continuation of its work. The document itself is the product of an independent nonprofit, which Democrats from the Sustainable Energy and Environment Coalition enlisted to probe experts, local leaders, companies, and advocates around the country for ideas about what Congress should do to create jobs, lower energy costs, foster innovation, and shore up communities. The nonprofit, known as the Sustainable Energy and Environment Coalition Institute, convened working groups, roundtables, and listening sessions. It also issued a public Request for Information that generated more than 1,300 policy recommendations from around 150 responders, including businesses and trade associations, local governments, nonprofits, and universities, the report said, and assembled a “20-person steering committee of ideologically diverse experts” to challenge its own assumptions.
The resulting report asserts that it is “not a consensus document, nor was it ever intended to be. It is a menu of ideas that have been challenged, refined, and improved by people approaching the same problems from very different perspectives.”
Perhaps that’s why the document reads a little bit like throwing spaghetti at the wall. There’s plenty in it that could conceivably be bipartisan, but there’s also a lot that stands no chance of passing under Trump, even if Democrats take the House and Senate in November’s midterm elections. In that light, it’s both a menu for the next two years and a window into how Democrats are generally thinking about climate policy in the post-IRA era. Here are five of my takeaways after going through it.
The authors do not spill any digital ink lamenting Trump’s dismantling of the IRA. They do, however, propose restoring a bunch of what’s been lost and building on the lessons learned from the brief time the policies were in effect.
For example, the report suggests reinstating federal tax credits for home energy efficiency improvements and residential clean energy systems such as rooftop solar, but recommends offering the credits as a point-of-sale rebate rather than a return claimed on the buyer’s taxes. That would be similar to the way electric vehicle buyers could transfer their tax credit to the dealer to get the discount on their purchase immediately. The goal, according to the report, is to “minimize the upfront costs and administrative frictions for consumer-facing incentives.”
Speaking of the electric vehicle tax credit, bringing it back is also on the menu, justified as a demand pull to support domestic supply chains and as a complement to the manufacturing tax credits, which largely survived the IRA purge (more on that below). Interestingly, a separate section of the report proposes a perhaps more politically palatable consumer rebate for new vehicles based on fuel efficiency rather than a strict EV-only subsidy, framing the idea as an option to address “unaffordable gasoline.”
There is a meaty section on extending and expanding the manufacturing tax credits, which, as you may remember, will no longer apply to wind turbine components after 2027, thanks to Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act. The report suggests cancelling that early termination. It also proposes extending the subsidy to a long list of additional advanced energy technologies, including power transformers, industrial heat pumps, and long duration energy storage components. Additionally, there are several sections on improving federal support for early-stage technologies, helping them get through the “valley of death” to commercial deployment — a major theme in both the bipartisan infrastructure law and IRA.
Notably absent is any discussion of reinstating the tax credits for wind and solar generation. When I asked Castor about that, she said “a lot of that ground had been plowed already,” referring to the contentious battle over the credits during the OBBBA negotiations. “In this Congress, that’s not going to happen. This effort is driven by solving problems ASAP where we think there can be bipartisan support going forward.”
The report intentionally stays away from one of the most significant ways Congress could speed up solutions to address rising energy demand: permitting reform. A disclaimer at the top notes that since Congress was actively debating legislation on that issue while the report was being written, the authors chose not to tackle it directly.
It does, however, spend plenty of time working around the edges on ways to clear up clogged interconnection queues and fix bottlenecks to getting more transmission online. For one, it suggests more funding for the Department of Energy’s Transmission Facilitation Program, which allows the agency to temporarily serve as an anchor customer for new transmission lines. Creating a 30% investment tax credit for transmission lines is another idea in the report.
A lot of the recommendations revolve around improving grid planning and integrating grid-enhancing technologies, advanced conductors, and energy storage into the process. The report suggests establishing a national transmission conductor standard, for example, setting a minimum efficiency level for the wires strung along transmission lines to reduce waste.
Beyond transmission, there are a slew of ideas for reforming energy markets to better support demand response and virtual power plants. Congress could create federal guidance for how grid operators and state regulators assess the value of energy storage to the grid, and direct the DOE to provide more technical assistance to operators on incorporating flexible resources that can shift load, relieve congestion, and integrate more renewables into the grid.
One of the biggest challenges Democrats will have to contend with is writing policy that can endure past a change in party control. Trump has found myriad ways to block projects approved by the previous administration and withhold congressionally mandated funding. The courts are still deciding whether his administration’s methods are actually legal. Nonetheless, the report reflects an interest in creating more certainty for federal grantees and restoring trust in the federal government as a funding partner.
For one, it explicitly recommends that Congress restore awards that were legally obligated under IRA programs such as the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund, the Environmental and Climate Justice Block Grants, the Community Change Grants, and the Neighborhood Access and Equity Grants that the Trump administration has attempted to terminate — though it stops short of specifying how.
In the future, though, it recommends that federal funding be funneled through “trusted third-party fiscal intermediaries to allow for nimbler program management and structural insulation from political shifts.” Congress should also more narrowly define the circumstances under which an award can be terminated, it says, offering the suggested language: “funds awarded under [identified programs] may not be rescinded, reprogrammed, or deferred except by law.”
In cases where an administration does rescind or terminate funding, it recommends that Congress put in law that any legal challenge to the termination belongs in the U.S. District Courts. The Department of Justice is attempting to argue that the disputes over Trump’s grant terminations constitute breach of contract claims, and therefore belong in the court of federal claims. If the cases end up there, however, the grantees will only be able to sue for damages — they won’t be eligible to get their grants reinstated. A provision explicitly placing these cases in the district court would ensure awardees have a path to actually contributing to congressionally-mandated goals.
While these provisions are promising, however, it’s hard to imagine that Trump would sign off on them.
One of the most obvious differences between the world we live in now and the world lawmakers occupied in 2020 is that the race for artificial intelligence is in full swing, driving a surge in electricity demand the country has not seen in decades. Data centers have become the locus of a number of intersecting issues — permitting obstacles for energy infrastructure, rising electricity costs, local opposition to anything getting built at all, fear of AI, and concerns about cybersecurity.
The Thriving Economy Project treats data centers as a central organizing problem across several of its chapters. It offers policies to address environmental concerns such as requiring data centers to use closed-loop cooling systems to reduce water use. It proposes unifying the piecemeal approach states are taking to meet data center electricity demand under a federal standard that would require large loads to pay the full cost of connecting to the grid.
There’s a whole section on the challenges of meeting data centers’ power needs that contains more than two dozen policy ideas. A few that stand out include mandatory energy and water use disclosure requirements, a federal Energy Star-equivalent for AI tools, and the creation of a “U.S. Electron Accelerator.” That last idea is one of the most interesting proposals I came across. Data centers would pay into a fund for every kilowatt-hour of their demand not met with clean electrons generated at the same time and in the same location. The funds would then be available to help data centers cover the premium for procuring round-the-clock clean electricity from nuclear and geothermal plants.
Similarly, the report suggests requiring data centers to pay into a fund to support the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program and the Weatherization Assistance Program, two perennially underfunded federal programs that help Americans who are struggling to pay their energy bills.
It also raises the concern that data centers powered by behind-the-meter natural gas plants will drive up the price of natural gas for other customers, thereby increasing home heating and residential electricity bills. The report suggests several ideas to reduce natural gas price volatility, including taxing oil and gas companies to create a “strategic energy affordability reserve.” If the president declares an “energy affordability emergency,” it says, the funds can be released to states to help residents pay their bills. Additionally, Congress could create an “energy price safety valve” to temporarily ban exports of key fuels when prices spike.
A lot of the Thriving Economy Project reads like a manual for playing defense in an increasingly dangerous world. It is consumed with addressing risk — the risk of cybersecurity attacks on our electric grid, water systems, and airports, and of global supply shocks that throttle domestic energy prices and supply chains. While discussion of “climate change” as a problem to tackle is notably absent from the report, a rhetorical shift I wrote more about here, adapting to the realities of a warming planet is one of its main preoccupations.
It suggests establishing a federal climate relocation program, for example, and setting federal climate-adapted transportation standards, such as elevation in flood zones and transit facility shading. There’s a recommendation to build a “national climate-health early warning system” to alert people about extreme heat, wildfire smoke, vector-borne diseases, and harmful algal blooms. Along those lines, it suggests that severe wildfire smoke events qualify for federal disaster assistance. At the same time, federal disaster assistance is too fragmented across various agencies, it says, and the government could establish a single, mobile-friendly app “as the front door to all federal individual disaster aid.”
It recommends creating an independent National Disaster Safety Board, an independent watchdog to investigate deaths and damages after a disaster and issue recommendations for how governments at all levels can prevent these losses the next time. Congress could also establish a national climate risk disclosure standard for the real estate industry, giving homebuyers access to more consistent, transparent data about property risks.
These are just a few of many dozens of proposals to improve federal leadership on this especially local, disjointed issue.
A new set of policy proposals from House illustrates a marked change in rhetoric since 2020.
Nine House Democrats from the Sustainable Energy and Environment Coalition published a sweeping federal policy blueprint on Tuesday called the Thriving Economy Project. While it is explicitly not a policy platform, it is the first window we’ve gotten into how lawmakers are thinking about their next set of climate moves in the post-One Big Beautiful Bill Act era.
The last time House Democrats published a major energy and environment policy document was in 2020, when the House Select Committee on the Climate Crisis released the aptly titled report “Solving the Climate Crisis.” The Thriving Economy Project covers many of the same themes as that 2020 platform — energy, agriculture, disaster recovery, innovation. It even contains some of the same policy proposals. But as the contrast in titles suggests, the approach is markedly different.
The 2026 version doesn’t call itself climate policy at all. Though it contains plenty of proposals to support cleaner energy and reduced emissions, it frames them in terms of affordability, economic opportunity, resilience, and competitiveness, rather than as a means to stop planetary warming. The words “climate change” aren’t entirely absent, but they appear primarily as the context for proposals to improve disaster preparedness, response, and recovery, or to adapt infrastructure to higher seas and hotter days.
This isn’t a huge shock. We’ve written quite a bit at Heatmap about how climate change advocacy is shifting away from talking about the crisis directly to messaging about the benefits of actions that just so happen to cut carbon or shore up communities against disasters. When I compared the number of times certain words and phrases appeared in the 2020 package versus this new one, the evidence of that rhetorical shift was decisive.
Mentions of “climate change” dropped from more than 500 to 22. Whereas the 2020 package cited the “climate crisis” more than 150 times, the new report casually references it in just four places. In 2020, Democrats framed their entire platform around hitting “net-zero” by 2050, citing the goal 139 times. Net-zero appears just once in the new package in a chapter about investing in innovation. According to the International Energy Agency’s “Net Zero Roadmap,” it says, about a third of the emissions reductions required to get there “will come from technologies still under development.”
While lawmakers took a stand six years ago to fight for “environmental justice,” that term is wholly absent from the new report. Instead of pushing for policies that improve outcomes for “communities of color,” a phrase which appears just five times in the Thriving Economy Project, it focuses on building “thriving communities” and improving outcomes for “low income” and “underserved” populations.
It’s easy to be cynical about the political calculation these rhetorical shifts reflect, but the two policy platforms were also written for different audiences. Florida Representative Kathy Castor, a Democrat who led the creation of both versions, told me that the goal of the Thriving Economy Project was to come up with policies that could be adopted in the next two years. “This effort is driven by solving problems ASAP where we think there can be bipartisan support,” she said. The 2020 document, by contrast, was a wishlist for a future Democrat-led Congress and administration. Much of what was in it later became part of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and the IRA, but has since been dismantled under Trump.
The increased frequency of certain other terms — such as “energy security,” “cybersecurity,” and “geopolitical” — is also a reminder that between the war over Ukraine, the war in Iran, and the AI race, a lot really has changed since 2020.
Just because the report is not explicitly about climate change doesn’t mean it’s not a climate policy document, however. When I asked Sean Casten, a Democratic representative from Illinois who also worked on the project, whether he considered the policies to be about addressing climate change, he responded that there was no way to talk about energy or home insurance and not talk about climate. “You also don’t necessarily have to use the word climate to talk about all of those things, right?” he added.
Under new rules, the United States will impose virtually no limits on greenhouse gas pollution from power plants.
This is an edition of Heatmap Daily, an evening review of the day’s news written by our executive editor. Sign up for it here.
Happy Monday. It’s going to be a big week. Let’s begin with the immediate news.
This afternoon, the Environmental Protection Agency formally rolled back limits on greenhouse gas pollution from existing power plants — and proposed scrapping the rest. If the proposal is finalized, then coal and natural gas power plant operators could soon release as much heat-trapping pollution as they want into the atmosphere. And thanks to other recent rollbacks, power plants can release more mercury, microscopic soot, and other hazardous air pollutants, too.
EPA Administrator Lee Zeldin made the announcement at a Group of 20 energy minister meeting in Houston.
On a legal basis, the agency is formalizing the change in two steps: First, it partially repealed some rules for power plant emissions; second, it filed a separate legal argument that the Clean Air Act “does not authorize the EPA to regulate emissions from power plants” to fight climate change. Both documents will likely go into effect later this year. Those documents were released as I wrote this newsletter, and we’re still digging through them at Heatmap.
But there are two broader ways, I think, to see this news.
The first is that it confirms America’s abdication of environmental leadership under the Trump administration. Global climate politics is now in a quite different situation than it was in, say, 2018, when the Trump administration last made similar deregulatory moves. China now operates the world’s largest carbon emissions trading system — and while that system targets an odd “intensity” measurement, and gives away many free allowances, it is expanding to other sectors of the economy and the country plans to adopt more conventional targets next year.
Which isn’t to say it’s perfect. I could find something important to criticize about China, Canada, and the European Union’s various carbon schemes. But they have policies at the national or supranational level, and the United States does not. While we still have a handful of state regional policies — such as the-cap and-trade market for Northeastern states — they have been transformed by the politics of inflation.
And things could still get worse. Earlier this year, the Trump administration repealed the EPA’s scientific finding that heat-trapping greenhouse gases can endanger the environment. If it successfully defends that move in court, then any future government will face extra hurdles when seeking to limit carbon pollution. And if the Trump administration secures the Supreme Court ruling it is obviously angling for — and gets the high court to overturn its landmark 2007 decision that said the EPA could regulate greenhouse gases in the first place — then a future Democratic administration might find itself virtually without tools to limit carbon emissions.
The second way of seeing this news, though, is that little has actually changed on the ground — and the biggest unanswered question in American climate policy remains unanswered. Since the Obama administration, the federal government has regulated carbon pollution from cars and trucks (though Trump has of course sought to put an end to those rules, too). But it has never found a way to limit power plant carbon emissions in a comprehensive way.
Instead, successive Democratic presidents, Trump administrations, and the Supreme Court have played a slow-motion, 12-year-long game of regulatory ping pong. In 2014, President Obama proposed a scheme to cut carbon emissions from power plants. Since then, the first Trump administration repealed those rules, the Supreme Court stayed them (and then eventually nixed them), and President Biden proposed a new and more narrow version of them — which the Trump administration has just repealed. And Trump wants to end the game forever by preventing the Clean Air Act from ever regulating carbon emissions.
Trump and his officials are acting irresponsibly by doing so — to say the least. But the truth is that Democratic presidents have never found an enduring way to regulate power plant carbon emissions that the Supreme Court has blessed. And doing so has only gotten harder as the court has marched right over the past decade.
We will keep diving into these new documents here at Heatmap. But we have already covered this story in depth over the past 18 months, too. Check out:
There is one more thing to look forward to this week, by the way. On Wednesday, the Federal Reserve will decide whether to raise interest rates. Investors now expect it to bump the federal funds rate by one-quarter of a percentage point, which will affect the investment climate for every part of the energy system — including renewables.
As my colleague Matt Zeitlin has written, interest rates dictate the economics of clean energy because most spending on renewables and other zero-carbon power plants happens at the front end, as capital expenditure. Spending on fossil fuel projects, on the other hand, is more spread out, because operators must purchase fuel over time.
One big question that the Fed will eventually need to confront: Is there any way to rein in above-trend inflation without reducing artificial intelligence spending?
We’ll be covering that story and more as the week develops. Thanks as always for reading.