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Now we just need to know how well they work.
A new direct air capture facility built by the Alphabet-backed 280 Earth is officially plucking carbon dioxide from the surrounding air along the Columbia River in Oregon, the company announced on Monday. It’s the third-largest “direct air capture” plant operating in the United States and the latest entrant in the race to design the cheapest, most efficient machine to strip the heat-trapping gas from the atmosphere.
The small-scale demonstration project, which neighbors a Google data center in a city called The Dalles, is expected eventually to capture carbon at a rate of 500 tons per year. The two other U.S. facilities — Global Thermostat’s plant in Commerce City, Colorado, and Heirloom’s plant in Tracy, California — are both designed to capture 1,000 tons per year. All three came online in just the past 13 months. (There are also a handful of smaller facilities operating in the U.S. that capture 100 tons per year or less.)
The team that is now 280 Earth first began working on their direct air capture system inside X, the tech incubator at Google also known as the “Moonshot Factory.” They spun out into their own company in 2022, after four-and-a-half years of research and development. The name comes from 280 parts per million, the amount of carbon in the atmosphere before industrialization. Today we’ve reached nearly 420 parts per million. But if the world manages to reduce emissions nearly to zero, it may be possible to pull enough carbon out of the air to restore the atmosphere to levels closer to pre-industrial times.
In general, direct air capture technologies suck in ambient air and pass it through a special material called a sorbent that attracts CO2 molecules. They then use heat to remove the carbon from the sorbent so that it can be transported and safely stored underground.
280 Earth’s approach is unique in a few ways. To begin with, the company is using a “pelletized” sorbent — CEO John Pimental described it to me as a “half a piece of uncooked rice,” or the innards of a bean bag chair. The tiny pellets of sorbent flow through the system almost like water, resulting in some operational efficiency gains.
For the second step, the company plans to use waste heat from other industrial facilities like data centers to remove the captured carbon from the sorbent. Many data centers circulate cold water through their facilities for cooling, then send the hot water to a cooling tower where the heat is released into the atmosphere. 280 Earth can instead take that hot water and run it through a heat exchanger, sending the now-cooled water back to the data center. “It means their cooling tower needs to work less hard, it has less load on it,” said Pimental. “So it's an additional revenue source for our company to provide those cooling services to a neighbor.”
This waste heat can meet up to 80% of 280 Earth’s operational needs, reducing the amount of electricity the company buys. It’s also a win-win for the data center — 280 Earth’s process pulls water from the air in addition to carbon, and can supply that water to the data center, which in turn doesn’t have to rely as much on natural sources.
Direct air capture technology is often called “speculative” and “unproven.” But with an increasing number of deployments in the real world, it’s worth being more specific. These machines have proven to be able to separate carbon out of the air. The question is whether they can do so permanently, economically, and at a scale that will actually make a difference for climate change.
Although more plants are coming online every year, those questions are unlikely to be answered anytime soon. For example, it will be impossible to judge the efficiency claims made by 280 Earth or any other company until there is more public data — or any public data — about the energy these plants consume or what they cost to operate. Even the companies that are farthest along, like Climeworks, which has been operating a 4,000 metric ton per year commercial plant in Iceland since 2021 and just opened a 36,000-ton plant earlier this month, say that they are still testing the technology and therefore are not ready to share any stats that could be misinterpreted.
The potential to scale could also have less to do with the details of any one company’s technology and more to do with the ability to procure clean energy or to find somewhere to store the captured carbon.
Though 280 Earth is officially collecting CO2, the company doesn’t yet have anywhere to put it. Pimental told me the company plans to transport the gas by truck or rail to a carbon dioxide storage well, but it has not yet signed any agreements with well operators, and it’s unclear how long that could take. There are currently only a few operating carbon storage wells in the country, located in Illinois and North Dakota. But additional wells have been permitted in California, Indiana, and Wyoming, and many more are under review by the Environmental Protection Agency. Rather than sequester the carbon underground, the company could also sell it for industrial uses. Heirloom, for example, has an agreement with a company called CarbonCure to take the CO2 it captures and store it in concrete.
Regardless, 280 Earth company is aiming to scale up quickly and plans to build a new unit that can capture 5,000 tons of CO2 per year by 2025. Pimental told me that equipment procurement and permitting for that project are already underway. 280 Earth has not been awarded any government funding to date, but the company plans to compete to be one of the Department of Energy’s next direct air capture “hubs.”
Pimental told me he likes his odds. “I think we'll be in a very strong position because not many people have a 500 ton commercial demonstration facility up and running.”
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Rob and Jesse riff on the state of utility regulation in America — and how to fix it.
Electricity is getting more expensive — and the culprit, in much of the country, is the poles and wires. Since the pandemic, utility spending on the “last mile” part of the power grid has surged, and it seems likely to get worse before it gets better.
How can we fix it? Well, we can start by fixing utility regulation.
On today’s episode of Shift Key, Rob and Jesse talk about why utility regulation sucks and how to make it better. In Europe and other parts of the world, utilities are better at controlling their cost overruns. What can the U.S. learn from their experience? Why is it so hard to regulate electricity companies? And how should the coming strains of electrification, and climate change affect how we think about the power grid? Shift Key is hosted by Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap, and Jesse Jenkins, a professor of energy systems engineering at Princeton University.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, YouTube, or wherever you get your podcasts.
You can also add the show’s RSS feed to your podcast app to follow us directly.
Here is an excerpt from our conversation:
Robinson Meyer: This is, I think, exactly where the wonky habit of referring to this as “T&D,” or transmission and distribution —
Jesse Jenkins: Yeah, we should split those.
Meyer: — simply because it’s a part of people’s bills, is actually driving the misnomer, because it allows renewable opponents — like the current administration, like officials in the current administration to say, Oh, well, the transmission and distribution section, the wire is part of the grid, is the surging part of electricity costs, this is driven by renewables. And that kind of does cohere to a mental model people might have of, oh, you have to build a lot of solar farms everywhere, or, oh, you have to build a lot of wind farms everywhere. They’re distributed over the landscape, unlike a single big power plant or something, and therefore that is driving up transmission spending.
And indeed, for renewables, as Jesse was saying, you do have to build more transmission. But where you look at the actual increase in prices is coming from in that T&D section of the bill, it is not at all that story. It’s all coming from distribution.
Jenkins: It’s certainly not coming from long-distance transmission because we’re not building any long-distance transmission, right?
And that’s the other big problem, is we have not been building transmission at anywhere near the pace that we have historically during periods when demand was growing rapidly to tap into the best resources around the country. But also, then, we should be, if we were to try to tap into American renewable energy resources that could lower consumer costs. The transmission we are building is mostly also local, short-distance, reliability-related upgrades that the transmission utilities are able to build with much less regulatory oversight.
Mentioned:
Rob on how electricity got so expensive
Matthew Zeitlin on Trump’s electricity price problem
Ofgem’s price cap
Previously on Shift Key: How to Talk to Your Friendly Neighborhood Public Utility Regulator
Jesse’s upshift (plus one more); Rob’s upshift.
This episode of Shift Key is sponsored by …
Hydrostor is building the future of energy with Advanced Compressed Air Energy Storage. Delivering clean, reliable power with 500-megawatt facilities sited on 100 acres, Hydrostor’s energy storage projects are transforming the grid and creating thousands of American jobs. Learn more at hydrostor.ca.
Music for Shift Key is by Adam Kromelow.
A new report from Rhodium Group takes stock of how Trump’s policies will affect America’s emissions future.
In less than a year, the Trump administration has fully transformed U.S. climate and energy policy. The changes have come through the tax code, regulatory repeals, and sweeping but fickle tariffs. Taken together, it means that the worst-case scenario for climate action under Biden has now become the best-case scenario under Trump.
That’s one of the key findings of the Rhodium Group’s latest Taking Stock report, an annual look at how U.S. policies will shape our energy system and emissions trajectory. It’s the first comprehensive assessment of the degree to which Trump’s second term, early as it is, could impede the energy transition. While total U.S. emissions are not expected to go up in the coming decade, the report projects greatly diminished progress compared to the path we were on a year ago.
That point is most clearly illustrated by the following finding: For the past two decades, the U.S. has been reducing emissions by an average of 1% per year. In the coming decade, Rhodium projects that Trump’s policies could reduce this rate by more than half.
Last year’s report, produced at the absolute peak of U.S. climate policy, modeled the effect of clean energy tax credits in the Inflation Reduction Act, new regulations on cars, trucks, power plants, and oil and gas operations, Biden’s freeze on new liquified natural gas export facilities, and a number of state-level policies. While these actions were not expected to be enough to fulfill Biden’s promise to the rest of the world under the Paris Agreement to cut emissions by 50% to 52% by 2030 compared to 2005, they represented America’s first credible show of climate leadership on the global stage. The report estimated that by 2035, we would be able to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 38% to 56%.
Now the low end of that spectrum has become overly optimistic. Rhodium has revised its estimate downwards to reflect revisions to the tax credits in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act — namely, the early end of subsidies for wind, solar, and EVs. The new report also takes into account tariffs, which primarily serve to reduce industrial activity in the U.S. in the near term, Congress’ cancellation of California’s vehicle emissions waivers, and Trump’s efforts to roll back greenhouse gas regulations. The result is that Rhodium expects emissions to decline by 26% to 35% by 2035.
The gap between this projection and last year’s represents about 800 million to 1.3 billion metric tons of carbon. On the high end, that’s roughly equivalent to the emissions from California, Texas, and Michigan combined.
The estimates are expressed as a range because the report looks at what would happen under three different scenarios. The highest emissions scenario models a world where oil and gas prices remain low, clean technology costs remain high, and the economy grows faster than current projections. The low emissions scenario is the opposite — it shows how Trump’s policies will affect our trajectory if oil and gas prices are higher, clean technologies see steeper cost declines and performance improvements, and economic growth is more aligned with current projections. The mid-emissions scenario splits the difference.
The most significant policies for shifting our emissions trajectory, according to Ben King, one of the report’s authors, are the combination of tax credits and regulations affecting the power sector. The regulations, in particular, mean the difference between having almost no coal plants on the grid by 2040 and retaining as many as 77 gigawatts of coal power by that date. “That’s still a massive decline in the amount of coal relative to what we have today,” King said, “but it is a very different-looking grid than if those regulations were to stay in place.”
Whether coal plants are replaced by clean energy or natural gas largely depends on the cost of each. Somewhat counterintuitively, the report projects less coal in the high emissions scenario because low natural gas prices mean that gas plants supplant both coal and renewables.
Even the forms of clean energy that the Trump administration supports, such as nuclear and geothermal, are not expected to play a significant role in reducing emissions over the next 15 years. For example, in the low emissions scenario, where oil and gas prices are high, about 2 gigawatts of new advanced nuclear is added to the grid in the 2030s. But because the tax credit for existing nuclear plants is set to expire in 2032, the models project that 2 gigawatts to 5 gigawatts of nuclear power will shut down in the 2030s, more than canceling out the additions.
The effect of unwinding transportation-related regulations and incentives is more straightforward — fewer EVs, higher emissions. Last year’s report projected that up to 72% of all light duty vehicle sales would be electric by 2032. The new report expects light duty EV sales to make up just 43% of the total, at most, by 2040. This is almost entirely due to the loss of greenhouse gas rules. If those remained in place, EV sales could reach 71% by 2040.
Perhaps the only bright side in the report is a section on household energy costs. The loss of tax credits for renewables and home efficiency upgrades will raise electricity bills compared to the projections in last year’s report. But despite that, Rhodium expects overall household energy costs to decrease in the coming decades — in all scenarios. That’s primarily due to the switch to electric vehicles, which lowers transportation costs for EV drivers and puts downward pressure on the cost of gasoline for everyone else.
No modeling exercise is perfect, and this one contains a number of caveats. One of the biggest points of uncertainty right now is how much energy demand from data centers will grow. The authors modeled just one pathway for data centers, with power demand nearly doubling by 2030 and more than tripling by 2040. But they note that analyst estimates fall as much as 80% higher or 80% lower. If demand turns out to be higher, “it would effectively turn up the dial on the trends that we’re seeing already,” King said.
Another area of uncertainty is that the Trump administration is working overtime to find creative new ways to stymie wind and solar development, as my colleague Jael Holzman has documented. It could turn out that these moves are even more effective than what Rhodium has captured in this report, King told me. With tariffs changing on a weekly, sometimes even daily basis, it was also difficult to capture how much of an impact they will have on technology prices, he said. Lastly, there’s a human behavior element that’s difficult for models to project.
“In the absence of government support, this is all going to happen on the basis of what private investors see as wise moves moving forward,” King said. “I don’t know the extent to which they might look at the uncertainty that the Trump administration is introducing for some of these technologies, and say, ‘Gosh, I’m going to avoid that for the foreseeable future, and maybe even beyond.’”
You might even call the Energy Secretary ... Chris Wrong.
I resent, as a rule, any news story about a politician’s social media presence. The social media post is simultaneously the lowest form of political communication and, for the journalist, the lowest hanging fruit. It is too easy to sit at your laptop, read tweets, and then write about them.
But I speak for hundreds of engineers, policy wonks, and hangers-on across the world of energy and climate when I ask: What the heck is happening with Chris Wright’s Twitter account?
Chris Wright is the current Secretary of Energy; before his appointment, he was the chief executive officer of Liberty Energy, the country’s second largest fracking company. He has been by far the most publicity-seeking member of President Trump’s energy policy team. He has helped oversee the president’s somewhat contradictory goals of seeking to reduce energy costs for Americans, support domestic fossil fuel companies, get OPEC to drill more, export as much natural gas as possible, and block the construction of new large-scale transmission lines and wind farms.
His substantive policy work is the focus of many other articles on Heatmap. For now, I want to focus on his and his department’s unpredictably confused political communications.
It began with the Department of Energy on the social network X. Several weeks ago, I started to conclude that the official agency account must have at least two authors. One of these people is familiar with how federal agencies usually speak — even if they add a small Trumpian flourish:
The other enjoys capitalizing verbs and has only a vague grasp of economic history:
One could nitpick here — “planes,” in the mid-1800s? — but there is no need to do so. As time has gone on, the official Energy Department account has begun to make more meaningful errors.
On Monday, for instance, the official DOE account proclaimed: “6 gigawatts of AMERICAN NUCLEAR ENERGY added to our grid!”
Six gigawatts of new nuclear energy is a lot. It took 11 years to build two new nuclear reactors at Plant Vogtle in Georgia, and that project added only 2.2 gigawatts. But the U.S. did not really add 6 gigawatts. In reality, the Tennessee Valley Authority had signed a confidential memo to eventually develop up to 6 gigawatts of modular nuclear reactor capacity. The memo contained no project timeline or financial terms. These 6 gigawatts remain, in other words, largely hypothetical.
As X users will know, some especially erroneous posts now get a “community note,” a community correction of sorts containing “important context” or an outright fact check written by other users. These notes are supposed to contain a link to an authoritative source. The Energy Department “6 gigawatts” tweet is the first post I’ve ever seen to get a community note linking to a news story also linked to in the post itself.
But this is not the end of the foolishness. Take this claim, from last week:
This is just not a very sophisticated thing to say. It is true that wind and solar pose a distinct reliability challenge for power grids, and that grid engineers have expended time and effort thinking about how to manage that challenge. It is even true that advocates sometimes downplay these challenges. But it is not true that these technologies — or the power they generate — are “essentially worthless.” Grid-scale batteries, for instance, exist; they can store energy during the day and then release it onto the grid at times of peak demand. Transmission lines — like the sizable Grain Belt Express project, which was due to receive a federal loan guarantee until Wright canceled the funding — can also help manage these resources.
But perhaps such errors are forgivable when they come from an official account. What’s odd is that the secretary’s own account has made even stranger errors:
I had to reread this post several times to make sure I understood it correctly. Even then, I didn’t believe I had the right interpretation until the internet energy pundit Alex Epstein clarified it.
At first, I thought Wright was making some technical argument about how solar panels will never be able to meet total global energy demand. This would not have been true, but at least it would have been sort of interesting. No, per Epstein, what Wright was trying to communicate is that if you coated the world in solar panels, you would only produce electricity. And since electricity makes up 20% of the world’s total energy use today, “you would” — as Wright says “only be producing 20% of global energy.”
Never mind that if you did cover the world with solar panels (which would, to be clear, be a very bad idea), you would in fact produce vastly more energy than the global economy consumes today. Never mind that if you even covered half or a quarter of the world with solar panels (still a bad idea), you would obviously shift the economics of electricity — so that you could then, for instance, use the excess power to synthesize liquid fuel replacements for use in cars, ships, planes, etc. Never mind that, by one estimate, a single solar farm the size of New Mexico would meet the world’s electricity demand. (Building this would also be a bad idea, but not nearly as bad as the others.)
No, Wright is not saying any of that. What Wright is saying is the far more inane thought that solar panels only generate electricity, and the global economy does not only run on electricity. Thank you for that insight, Mr. Secretary.
Perhaps Wright does not know much about renewables; he was, after all, a fracking executive until recently. But his account is also curiously mistaken about fossil fuels:
This tweet is somehow wrong twice — it understates our own accomplishments. The United States is already the world’s powerhouse of natural gas. It has held that position since the first Obama administration, when it surpassed Russia to become the leading producer of natural gas globally. It became the world’s largest exporter of liquified natural gas in 2023.
Natural gas, however, is not the world’s fastest growing source of energy; it is merely the fastest growing source of fossil fuel energy. The fastest growing energy source — of any kind — is solar photovoltaics. Solar generation grew by an astounding 30% from 2023 to 2024, according to the International Energy Agency. By a slightly different metric, renewables (which include wind) grew by 6% last year, while natural gas grew by 2.7%, per the IEA.
It is worth reading some of the replies to Wright’s solar tweet; what you see are plenty of Trump-friendly (or at least Trump-agnostic) accounts raising their eyebrows at his clownishness. Fossil nerds, based tech bros, even AI experts are raising their eyebrows and asking: Surely the Energy Secretary couldn’t be this, well, ignorant?
I can’t claim to know what’s happening in Wright’s mind. But I do know what’s happening with his policy — and this weak messaging, in my view, points to the intractability of Wright’s position. On the one hand, Wright leads the Trump administration’s energy policy, and that policy is now dominated by a culture war against any type of electricity generation that doesn’t, in some way, “own the libs” — meaning coal, natural gas, and nuclear. The government has arbitrarily halted offshore wind construction, blocked hundreds of millions in funding, and yanked approvals away from nearly complete projects. Even if Wright believes that offshore wind is ill-advised, this kind of interference with businesses and contracts is even more costly — it is not how someone acts when he is focused on energy affordability above all.
On the other hand, Wright represents that quadrant of the modern Republican Party that remains focused (however feebly) on technological development and economic growth. This cohort champions artificial intelligence and American re-industrialization; they want an abundance of cheap energy; they fear a rising China. They are also alert and informed enough to realize that China must be doing something right — otherwise it wouldn’t be industrializing so quickly — and that a country that can add 256 gigawatts of electricity in six months without breaking a sweat will probably find some useful way to use it.
Between these two poles, Wright must scurry. So he insists that the Trump administration is working to add as much electricity capacity as possible for AI, and brags that AI turns electricity into intelligence, then qualifies that only some types of electricity generation are good for AI:
He says that AI “is going to massively empower the human mind” and transform the economy, but adds implicitly that this can only come under certain conditions, which don’t involve power lines that irritate farmers, wind farms that trouble the president, or the fastest-growing new source of power on the planet. He calls AI “the Manhattan Project of our time” and says that therefore the government needs to get out of the way.
It is an act that has worked, up to a point, so far. But Wright’s public performance of his complicated role can only go on for so long. Everyone who enters the Trump administration imagines that they will do so with their public image and integrity intact. Not everyone can pull it off.