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Startups Airloom Energy and Radia looked at the same set of problems and came up with very different solutions.

You’d be forgiven for assuming that wind energy is a technologically stagnant field. After all, the sleek, three-blade turbine has defined the industry for nearly half a century. But even with over 1,000 gigawatts of wind generating capacity installed worldwide, there’s a group of innovators who still see substantial room for improvement.
The problems are myriad. There are places in the world where the conditions are too windy and too volatile for conventional turbines to handle. Wind farms must be sited near existing transportation networks, accessible to the trucks delivering the massive components, leaving vast areas with fantastic wind resources underdeveloped. Today’s turbines have around 1,500 unique parts, and the infrastructure needed to assemble and stand up a turbine’s multi-hundred-foot tower and blades is expensive— giant cranes don’t come cheap.
“We’ve only really ever tried one type of technology,” Neal Rickner, the CEO of the wind power startup Airloom Energy, told me. Now, he’s one of a few entrepreneurs trying a new approach.
Airloom’s system uses much-shorter vertical blades attached to an oval track that resembles a flat rollercoaster — no climbs or drops, just a horizontal loop composed of 58 unique parts. Wind propels the blades around the track, turning a vertical shaft that’s connected to an electricity-producing generator. That differs from conventional turbines, which spin on a vertical plane around a horizontal shaft, like a ferris wheel.
The system is significantly lower to the ground than today’s turbines and has the ability to capture wind from any direction, unlike conventional turbines, allowing for deployment in areas with shifting wind patterns. It promises to be mass manufacturable, cheap, and simple to transport and install, opening up the potential to build systems in a wider variety of geographies — everywhere from airports to remote or even mountainous regions.
Airloom’s CTO, Andrew Streett, brings a background in drone tech that Rickner said helped shape the architecture of Airloom’s blades. “It’s all known tech. And it’s not completely off the shelf, but Andrew’s done it on 17 other platforms,” he told me. Rickner himself spent years at GoogleX working on Makani, a now-defunct wind energy project that attempted to commercialize an airborne wind energy system. The concept involved attaching rotors to autonomous kites, which flew in high-altitude loops to capture wind energy.
That system ultimately proved too complicated, something Airloom’s founder Robert Lumley warned Rickner about a decade ago at an industry conference. As Rickner recalls, he essentially told him, “all of that flying stuff is too complicated. Put all that physics — which is great — put it on the ground, on a rail.” Rickner took the lesson to heart, and when Lumley recruited him to join Airloom’s team a few years ago, he said it felt like an ideal chance to apply all the knowledge he’d accumulated “around what it takes to bring a novel wind technology to a very stodgy market.”
Indeed, the industry has proven difficult to disrupt. While Airloom was founded in 2014, the startup is still in its early stages, though it’s attracted backing from some climate sector heavyweights. Lowercarbon Capital led its $7.5 million seed round in 2024, which also included participation from Breakthrough Energy Ventures. The company also secured $5 million in matching funds from the state of Wyoming, where it’s based, and a $1.25 million contract with the Department of Defense.
Things are moving now. In the coming months, Airloom is preparing to bring its pilot plant online in Wyoming, closely followed by a commercial demo. Rickner told me the plan is to begin construction on a commercial facility by July 4, the deadline for wind to receive federal tax credits.
“If you could just build wind without gigantic or heavy industrial infrastructure — cranes and the like —- you will open up huge parts of the world,” Rickner told me, citing both the Global South and vast stretches of rural America as places where the roads, bridges, cranes, and port infrastructure may be insufficient for transporting and assembling conventional turbines. While modern onshore installations can exceed 600 feet from the tower’s base to the blade’s tip, Airloom’s system is about a fifth that height. Its nimble assembly would also allow turbines to be sited farther from highways, potentially enabling a more “out of sight, out of mind” attitude among residents and passersby who might otherwise resist such developments.
The company expects some of its first installations to be co-located with — you guessed it — data centers, as tech giants are increasingly looking to circumvent lengthy grid interconnection queues by sourcing power directly from onsite renewables, an option Rickner said wasn’t seriously discussed until recently.
Even considering Trump’s cuts to federal incentives for wind, “I’d much rather be doing Airloom today than even a year ago,” Rickner told me. “Now, with behind-the-meter, you’ve got different financing options. You’ve got faster buildout timelines that actually meet a venture company, like Airloom. You can see it’s still a tough road, don’t get me wrong. But a year ago, if you said we’re just going to wait around seven years for the interconnection queue, no venture company is going to survive that.”
It’s certainly not the only company in the sector looking to benefit from the data center boom. But I was still surprised when Rickner pointed out that Airloom’s fundamental value proposition — enabling wind energy in more geographies — is similar to a company that at first glance appears to be in a different category altogether: Radia.
Valued at $1 billion, this startup plans to make a plane as long as a football field to carry blades roughly 30% to 40% longer than today’s largest onshore models. Because larger blades mean more power, Radia’s strategy could make wind energy feasible in low-wind regions or simply boost output where winds are strong. And while the company isn’t looking to become a wind developer itself, “if you look at their pitch, it is the Airloom pitch,” Rickner told me.
Will Athol, Radia’s director of business development, told me that by the time the company was founded in 2016, “it was becoming clear that ground-based infrastructure — bridges, tunnels, roads, that kind of thing — was increasingly limiting where you can deploy the best turbines,” echoing Airloom’s sentiments. So competitors in the wind industry teamed up, requesting logistics input from the aviation industry. Radia responded, and has since raised over $100 million as it works to achieve its first flight by 2030.
Hopefully by that point, the federal war on wind will be a thing of the past. “We see ourselves and wind energy as a longer term play,” Athol told me. Though he acknowledged that these have certainly been “eventful times for the wind industry” in the U.S., there’s also a global market eager for this tech. He sees potential in regions such as India and North Africa, where infrastructure challenges have made it tough to deploy large-scale turbines.
Neither Radia nor Airloom thinks its approach will render today’s turbines obsolete, or that other renewable resources will be completely displaced. “I think if you look at most utilities, they want a mix,” Rickner said. But he’s still pretty confident in Airloom’s potential to seriously alter an industry that’s long been considered mature and constrained to incremental gains.
“When Airloom is 100% successful,” he told me, “we will take a huge chunk of market share.”
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A new Brown University report argues powering down a misaligned artificial intelligence would be tougher — and take longer — than many experts assume.
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It’s one of the most popular what-ifs about rogue artificial intelligence: Suppose an AI agent really were to get out of control and start threatening hospitals, flights, critical infrastructure, or even humanity as a whole. Why wouldn’t we just pull the plug on it?
A new report argues: We might not be able to. And the reason has to do with the energy system.
A new white paper from the Climate Solutions Lab at Brown University finds that U.S. electricity law offers essentially no way to rapidly power down a data center where a rogue AI agent is operating.
The problem is primarily legal, although technical issues could interfere as well. The rules and laws governing the power grid simply don’t countenance a scenario whereby an industrial facility might need to be suddenly disconnected from the grid in an urgent way, the report says. They also aren’t built for a world where something happening autonomously in a computing facility could affect people thousands of miles away — and require an immediate emergency response.
“If the United States concluded tomorrow that an AI system had escaped its deployer’s control and had to be stopped by cutting electrical power, neither federal nor state officials could swiftly do so within the law,” the paper warns.
While authorities might eventually be able to get a court order to disconnect a data center under existing law, that disconnection process could take long enough that a rogue agent might still be able to copy itself to another computer. And it would likely require a technician to go into the facility itself and cut backup power generation — which could itself be controlled by the misaligned agent.
Jeff Colgan, a political science and international affairs professor at Brown University and the report’s author, told me that he was inspired to write the report after studying the Hugging Face hack over the summer, in which a swarm of rogue ChatGPT models escaped OpenAI’s systems and infiltrated a French technology platform.
Colgan normally studies oil and gas companies, the power grid, and international political systems. (He put together the Iran War cost tracker earlier this year.) But after looking at loss-of-control research, he realized AI scientists had not always thought about how state and federal power law might interfere with their disaster planning.
“The folks who are focused on artificial intelligence may not realize that how the grid is managed is a complicated story,” he told me on Wednesday.
The paper focuses on what it calls a “middle-range scenario” in which an AI agent goes rogue. It imagines not a case in which a super-intelligent agent is hellbent on human extinction or civilizational destruction — Colgan assumes the army wouldn’t stand on legal ceremony in that scenario — but one in which an AI system, running on identifiable hardware, hacks into companies and hospitals, steals information, and begins to tamper with key software or demand ransom payments.
In such a scenario, leaders would face three core risks, he said — presuming that they even figured out what was happening in the first place. First, it might not be clear what data center to shut down or even where the agent “lives” in a facility, or even if it resides on a single server at all. The data center operator may also not want to assist in an investigation during that phase for fear of incurring liability. Second, even if the data center could be identified and disconnected, then it might have access to on-site backup power, which would require some kind of in-person intervention. Finally, no command structure exists today through which a public official’s order to disconnect a data center would lead to a technician, either on-site or remotely, pulling the plug.
Existing laws are a poor fit for these problems, Colgan told me. During crisis situations today, the FBI can disconnect a building from the power grid in order to avoid immediate harm to life or property. But it can’t do anything about backup generation inside a property’s fence line.
Nor are today’s federal and state laws built for a situation in which a grid connection needs to be be severed because of what a third-party is computing inside a facility, the report finds. Instead, today’s laws “provide emergency authority over the electrical grid only to address a supply problem or a physical attack on the system itself,” the report says.
In fact, in virtually any scenario now imagined by the law, authorities would need to go to the courts to disconnect a data center from the power grid. That could potentially take “valuable time” because it could give a rogue agent time to distribute copies of itself to other servers, the report says. Existing laws would likely treat any urgent disconnection as the state’s prerogative — and not the federal government’s — because states wield most legal authority over the power grid.
Even if authorities could quickly sever a data center’s hookup, there’s also almost no way to do so without causing collateral damage to every other tenant inside a data center, Colgan said. That risk could further delay a utility shut-off or make leaders skittish about pulling the plug. And since some data center tenants keep backup power capacity in the same “cage” where they run their servers, a worker would likely need to go to the specific racks where an agent “resides” inside a facility to power it down.
The report doesn’t make policy recommendations, in part because frontier AI models are developing so rapidly — and the subject is so “deeply technical” — that it exceeds Colgan’s ability to advise legislative changes, he said. But he does recommend that AI experts and developers begin involving local grid authorities in their emergency scenario planning.
“You need someone from Anthropic to sit down with their utility, with someone from their [public utility commission], with someone from FERC,” he told me, referencing the federal agency that oversees the power grid. Those meetings should arguably happen in every state where an AI company is computing, and they should include discussion of how to locate an AI agent on a computing property and what to do if operators lose control.
Colgan offered another recommendation by phone on Wednesday. Given data centers’ deep unpopularity, many tech companies and data center developers are now willing to strike community benefits agreements with state or local governments in exchange for the right to build a new facility. Those contracts should recognize these AI alignment and electricity problems, he argued.
“There is this real political window to say, ‘If you want to build a data center, you must show that you could — if necessary — shut down specific server racks without doing massive collateral damage to everyone else,” he said. “This is the moment to do this, because there is some political leverage and because there is such demand for these data centers.”
‘When China wants to do something, boy, they move fast.’
The electrolyzer has come a long way in the nearly 250 years since a pair of Dutch scientists first used electricity to split water into hydrogen and oxygen. Over the decades, European and American scientists refined and commercialized this technology, yet it is China that now accounts for nearly 70% of global electrolyzer manufacturing capacity, churning out the machines that make clean hydrogen from water at a fraction of Western costs. Its factories are building far more equipment than its domestic hydrogen market can absorb, and exports are climbing. On paper, China looks poised to dominate the global electrolyzer and green hydrogen markets, much as it already has solar panels and batteries.
“It stands to reason that the Chinese would want to capture the market just like they did everything else,” Rinaldo Brutoco, a hydrogen investor and founder of the think tank World Business Academy, told me. Beijing’s latest Five-Year Plan certainly lends credence to that ambition, repeatedly calling for the development of green hydrogen, hydrogen-derived fuels, and electrolyzers, even as other nations lag behind their once-ambitious clean hydrogen targets.
But it’s not actually obvious that the technology will go the way of solar. For one, Western governments are increasingly wary of dependence on Chinese energy technologies and are trying to bolster domestic manufacturing and limit foreign competition through measures like tariffs, domestic-content bonuses, and subsidy eligibility restrictions. The West also specializes in its own electrolyzer tech, which relies on proton exchange membranes. Though more expensive than China’s typical alkaline electrolyzers, PEM systems pair better with intermittent renewable power.
China’s tech is improving, though, and its electrolyzer stacks — the pile of cells where water splits into hydrogen and oxygen — cost about 60% less than Western alternatives. But the stack only accounts for about 6% to 9% of the total levelised cost of clean hydrogen production; most of the expense comes from electrical and process equipment, labor, and, most importantly, clean electricity. That single-digit cost advantage may not be enough to sway foreign buyers, especially since some cheaper designs come with trade-offs in efficiency, lifecycle, and warranty coverage.
“When the project as a whole is considered, there’s a lot less deviation between the Chinese technology and the rest of the world’s,” Thomas Koller, regional hydrogen lead at the Norwegian energy and maritime consultancy DNV, told me. But China is working on that, he added. “They’re very competitive already on the stack. But now they know that they also want to be competitive on how that stack can integrate with the wider electrolyzer system.”
Cracking that system-level cost issue could bring China much closer to achieving global market dominance. DNV calculates that to meet the Paris Agreement’s targets, clean hydrogen would need to supply around 15% of global energy demand by 2050 — and the production equipment and resultant clean molecules would have to come from somewhere.
In the meantime, however, the analysts I spoke with agreed that China’s domestic green hydrogen market is positioned for a near-term boom, as the government pushes adoption across fertilizer, chemicals, oil refining, steel, and transportation. “Demand is really the key takeaway that I see from this new Five-Year Plan — shifting from production to thinking about demand,” Koller told me.
And while the plan was pretty much complete before the Iran war broke out, the ongoing disruption in the Strait of Hormuz has underscored the logic behind China’s hydrogen push, as the country previously relied on the Strait for up to half of its crude oil imports. “It’s placed them in a pretty good position — in respect of hydrogen at least — to try and strengthen one of these areas that can reduce dependence on imported oil,” Koller said of the Five-Year Plan.
China is already the world’s largest hydrogen producer and consumer by a wide margin, using the gas as a key industrial feedstock for its vast chemicals and heavy industry sectors. But today, the industry makes nearly all of that hydrogen with fossil fuels.
Beijing made clear in its latest Five-Year Plan, released in March, that it wants to change that. According to an unofficial translation, the state promised to “expand applications of hydrogen energy in transportation, electricity, industrial, and other domains,” while improving “renewable energy hydrogen production equipment” and advancing “the hydrogen energy industry chain toward green ammonia, methanol, and sustainable aviation fuels.” (China has not published an official English translation of the plan.)
The country certainly has the manufacturing capacity to support these ambitions. After hundreds of manufacturers poured into the electrolyzer industry earlier this decade, China now produces about 35 gigawatts worth of this equipment annually, compared with less than 2 gigawatts of domestic demand. The resulting glut has even led some producers to sell their equipment below cost, echoing the dynamics of the solar industry in the early 2010s. Now, Beijing is trying to build a green hydrogen market to soak up the surplus, elevating production of the fuel — and derivatives like ammonia, methanol, and SAF — to a national priority.
“They’re talking about nationwide pipelines for hydrogen. They’re talking about a regionalized cluster strategy; they have very hard targets for green hydrogen sales,” Brutoco told me.
China is targeting 2 million metric tons of renewable hydrogen production annually by 2030, an eightfold increase from roughly 0.25 million metric tons today. The government has also designated five city clusters as green hydrogen demonstration zones, each eligible for up to about $240 million over four years to scale up the fuel’s use across sectors including transportation, metallurgy, and green ammonia and methanol production — and to build the pipelines required to move it.
“Hydrogen has clearly moved up in political visibility,” Qi Qin, a China analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, told me back in March.
All of this stands in stark contrast to Western markets, where low-carbon hydrogen projects continue to be delayed or scrapped amid weak demand and waning political support. Clean hydrogen is still far more expensive than its fossil fuel-based counterpart; buyers remain reluctant to pay a green premium, and policy uncertainty over the past few years has clouded the industry outlook. In the U.S., the rollback of Inflation Reduction Act incentives has weakened the economic case for green hydrogen, while in Europe, delays to regulatory decisions and missed deadlines for implementing hydrogen mandates have added to the uncertainty.
“Many companies were really thinking that the hydrogen economy was going to take off, and in the end, this has not been the case,” Anne-Sophie Corbeau, a researcher at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, told me. “The cost of the whole electrolyzer system is actually much higher than what we thought at the beginning.” That, combined with advances in batteries and other electrification technologies like industrial heat pumps, has arguably narrowed the range of applications where green hydrogen makes sense.
But perhaps the problem is simply a failure of imagination. After all, no country has yet demonstrated what a scaled-up clean hydrogen industry could look like, either physically or economically. The next few years, however, could offer a decent preview.
“When China wants to do something, boy, they move fast,” Brutoco told me. And there’s no doubt Beijing wants to capitalize on its burgeoning hydrogen economy. “They need more export markets because their housing boom — which busted — ain’t coming back in the near future,” he argued, explaining that new export opportunities could help revive Beijing’s sluggish economy. He sees electrolyzers and hydrogen as “low-hanging fruit,” given the country’s existing domestic buildout.
As for the argument that cheap Chinese electrolyzer stacks do comparably little to reduce the overall installed cost of a clean hydrogen project, Brutoco doesn’t buy it. He doubts developers would forgo potential savings — and the additional revenue that could generate — simply to align themselves with their administration’s protectionist preferences. “Did you ever know a business person that would like to shave 5% to 10%?” he asked.
Then there’s the question of performance. China’s alkaline electrolyzers have historically been slower to ramp up and down in tandem with variable renewable power compared with PEM systems. But Brutoco argues that today’s improving alkaline tech is more than capable of serving utility-scale renewable projects in areas with relatively consistent sun or wind. Koller likewise sees Chinese alkaline manufacturers as credible contenders for a range of overseas projects.
“I would expect that all of the European projects that are electrolyzer-driven, they will be considering Chinese electrolyzers, among others,” he told me. The case could prove even stronger elsewhere in the APAC region, including India, Japan, South Korea, and Australia. “All of the projects that I can recall having seen for Asia Pacific [...] at least some Chinese technology has been considered.”
But since Amy Ouyang, a senior hydrogen associate at the Clean Air Task Force, has been tracking the industry, she told me that “the narrative has shifted.” Just three years ago, many analysts expected Chinese electrolyzers to follow the trajectory of solar panels, with rock-bottom prices eventually squeezing Western manufacturers out of the market. But today’s more protectionist trade environment has made her reconsider that assumption.
“Maybe in the 2010s, the European countries and the U.S. were not really prepared to say, ‘We’re going to turn away Chinese solar panels just because they’re made in China,’” she told me. But Washington in particular has soured on its earlier laissez-faire approach to trade, perhaps regretting that while the U.S. and allied nations pioneered technologies such as solar cells and lithium-ion batteries, China ultimately scaled them — capturing millions of manufacturing jobs in the process.
Energy shocks from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the Iran war have further pushed Western policymakers toward a focus on domestic manufacturing, energy security, and even food security, Corbeau, the Columbia researcher, told me, given that about a third of globally traded fertilizer passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Now, she said, more countries are likely thinking, “What if we use our hydro, geothermal, maybe cheap renewables, in order to produce hydrogen domestically and produce ammonia domestically and produce fertilizer domestically?”
It all adds up to an environment where Ouyang sees “a lot more willingness to protect their own domestic industries from the low price of the Chinese electrolyzers,” she said.
The problem is, there simply isn’t much of a Western clean hydrogen industry to actually protect right now. Spurring demand will require political will and economic incentives to persuade hydrogen end users to make deals and help the nascent industry move down the cost curve. But with wholesale electricity prices rising and the Trump administration dismantling renewable energy legislation, the U.S. in particular looks unlikely to invest in much manufacturing capacity anytime soon.
But if the West does decide to double down, it might be better off conceding the price war from the outset. “A Western electrolyzer stack would probably struggle to match China’s lowest bid on an electrolyzer stack,” Koller explained, advising against trying to replicate China’s commodity-scale manufacturing model. “I would see their stronger position being if they can demonstrate different performance, different integration, offer a different type of service, an improved lifecycle emissions statement.”
That is, the answer probably isn’t to beat China at its own game. The U.S. and Europe might never win on cost, but that doesn’t mean they can’t build and scale a superior technology before yet another industry slips out of their reach.
Only upgrades for pre-existing wind projects have been approved.
In September, the Trump administration told a reporter that the president directed the Pentagon to finally process wind projects through routine airspace approvals as required under a court order. By doing this, it created the appearance of real headway and good faith in talks with Democrats in Congress on energy permitting legislation before the November midterm elections.
But the White House’s assurances are not what they seem.
All of the projects the administration has reportedly advanced over the past week are repowerings, meaning they’re only upgrades of existing projects, and two of the “projects” they’ve advanced were just two individual turbines, the American Clean Power Association on Tuesday told members involved in litigation with the administration.
Over the course of his presidency, the president’s team has turned what was once a sleepy bureaucratic check for radar or flight interference into a weapon against wind energy in the United States. You need Federal Aviation Administration clearance for any structure above 200 feet in the air and that process includes a Pentagon review. By claiming wind projects suddenly needed new scrutiny for national security reasons, the Pentagon held up FAA airspace approvals for apparently hundreds of projects.
This has been a key part of bipartisan energy legislation talks back in D.C., as Democrats in Congress have demanded at least some semblance of regular order be returned to renewable energy in federal permitting. The permitting bill ostensibly has ways to strengthen wind companies’ hand in dealing with a hostile Trump administration but negotiators, including Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, have also previously called attacks on wind projects during negotiations harmful to a final deal becoming law.
In September, Politico reported Trump told his aides he would agree to direct the Defense Department to “start clearing its queue of long-delayed onshore wind projects to strike a deal” citing “two people familiar with the talks and granted anonymity.” Among the commitments Politico reported were made: to approve about 30 projects awaiting a countersignature from the Pentagon on a mitigation agreement related to airspace impacts.
In federal court, the renewable energy trade groups who brought the lawsuit clearly don’t think the Trump administration actually followed through with that promise.
On Oct. 20, after updates from the Justice Department showed little signs of progress (which I wrote about), the trade groups filed a motion to enforce the judge’s stay on their air clearance freeze, saying that very little had advanced since the ruling in early August, and that none of the 30 projects awaiting countersignature on their mitigation agreements actually had advanced from Pentagon review. In addition, they said the government was now asking project developers to sign onto a litany of new requirements in exchange for a sign-off on mitigation agreements. They submitted a joint declaration from subject matter experts, including from former military personnel, who described these requirements as a vast departure from precedent with little basis in security rationale that they said also had terms that could violate state or local laws, like a blanket prohibition on aircraft detection light systems. (You can read the declaration here.)
Two days later, on Oct. 22, it started to look like we were getting somewhere when news outlets reported the Trump administration was "advancing" two “wind projects” in South Dakota and Maine, citing statements from the White House and the Pentagon.
Bob Ditchey, a spokesperson for the Pentagon, told us in an email that the two “wind projects” were Crowned Ridge, which he said consisted of 87 turbines in “Grant, SD,” and “Blue Sky/Hill,” which he said was made up of 19 turbines in “Hancock, ME.” Ditchey described them both as “proposed” wind energy “developments.”
“Following rigorous evaluation of potential impacts on military readiness, radar installations, and airspace operations, the DoW has cleared both projects to proceed to the next phase of federal evaluation,” Ditchey said in an email. “The projects have been formally referred to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for final aeronautical study and determination.”
The South Dakota wind project Trump officials are referencing is likely NextEra’s Crowned Ridge wind farm, which has 87 turbines and has been operational since 2019. On Oct. 5 a NextEra project consultant submitted a litany of height clearance requests for a “repowering project” on behalf of Crowned Ridge Energy Center, LLC, according to the Federal Aviation Administration’s public database. The requests are for turbines in Grant County.
There is no Maine wind project with the name “Blue Sky/Hill,” as far as we can tell, but there is a project in Hancock County that was completed in 2012 called “Bull Hill” that consists of 19 turbines, and which also has pending applications for repowering in the FAA’s database.
Neither NextEra nor Bull Hill’s developer, TerraForm Power, responded to our requests for comment. The Pentagon also did not respond to questions about these projects or the additional ones it said it had advanced.
In addition, as of this story’s publication, all of the air clearance requests for these two projects are all listed as “pending” online.
If you’re wondering why operational wind farms might need air clearances for construction, all of the wind farms’ requests describe the projects as “repowering,” an industry term that applies to upgrading, modifying, altering or restarting pre-existing wind farms. A repowering can mean anything from fixing turbine blades to changing turbine height, or moving a turbine, or commissioning new turbines entirely. Crucially though it’s not really considered a “new wind farm” in the colloquial sense. As my colleague Matthew Zeitlin has explained, repowerings are seen by the energy sector as a simple pathway to the most juice for the squeeze from what has already been permitted and built.
On Tuesday, Punchbowl News reported that the White House was advancing three more wind projects in Illinois and Iowa. After this story ran, American Clean Power told members involved in the airspace litigation clarifying that all of the projects thus far are “repowerings” and that the two Illinois “projects” each were only individual wind turbines. None of the projects were new utility scale projects.
On Wednesday, just before this story went to press, Punchbowl News reported another two wind projects were advancing, calling it “more permitting goodwill from the White House.” We have not yet been able to confirm what these projects are or whether they are also repowering projects.
American Clean Power endorsed the bipartisan Senate permitting bill and called for its passage. The group provided a comment from Frank Macchiarola, their chief advocacy officer: “To date, the administration has moved forward only a handful of the total number of projects they agreed to approve. In order to pass BAAJA and bring down costs for Americans, the Administration needs to get serious about building clean power.”
The White House did not respond to a request for comment.