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Ecolectro, a maker of electrolyzers, has a new manufacturing deal with Re:Build.

By all outward appearances, the green hydrogen industry is in a state of arrested development. The hype cycle of project announcements stemming from Biden-era policies crashed after those policies took too long to implement. A number of high profile clean hydrogen projects have fallen apart since the start of the year, and deep uncertainty remains about whether the Trump administration will go to bat for the industry or further cripple it.
The picture may not be as bleak as it seems, however. On Wednesday, the green hydrogen startup Ecolectro, which has been quietly developing its technology for more than a decade, came out with a new plan to bring the tech to market. The company announced a partnership with Re:Build Manufacturing, a sort of manufacturing incubator that helps startups optimize their products for U.S. fabrication, to build their first units, design their assembly lines, and eventually begin producing at a commercial scale in a Re:Build-owned factory.
“It is a lot for a startup to create a massive manufacturing facility that’s going to cost hundreds of millions of dollars when they’re pre-revenue,” Jon Gordon, Ecolectro’s chief commercial officer, told me. This contract manufacturing partnership with Re:Build is “massive,” he said, because it means Ecolectro doesn’t have to take on lots of debt to scale. (The companies did not disclose the size of the contract.)
The company expects to begin producing its first electrolyzer units — devices that split water into hydrogen and oxygen using electricity — at Re:Build’s industrial design and fabrication site in Rochester, New York, later this year. If all goes well, it will move production to Re:Build’s high-volume manufacturing facility in New Kensington, Pennsylvania next year.
The number one obstacle to scaling up the production and use of cleaner hydrogen, which could help cut emissions from fertilizer, aviation, steelmaking, and other heavy industries, is the high cost of producing it. Under the Biden administration, Congress passed a suite of policies designed to kick-start the industry, including an $8 billion grant program and a lucrative new tax credit. But Biden only got a small fraction of the grant money out the door, and did not finalize the rules for claiming the tax credit until January. Now, the Trump administration is considering terminating its agreements with some of the grant recipients, and Republicans in Congress might change or kill the tax credit.
Since the start of the year, a $500 million fuel plant in upstate New York, a $400 million manufacturing facility in Michigan, and a $500 million green steel factory in Mississippi, have been cancelled or indefinitely delayed.
The outlook is particularly bad for hydrogen made from water and electricity, often called “green” hydrogen, according to a recent BloombergNEF analysis. Trump’s tariffs could increase the cost of green hydrogen by 14%, or $1 per kilogram, based on tariff announcements as of April 8. More than 70% of the clean hydrogen volumes coming online between now and 2030 are what’s known as “blue” hydrogen, made using natural gas, with carbon capture to eliminate climate pollution. “Blue hydrogen has more demand than green hydrogen, not just because it’s cheaper to produce, but also because there’s a lot less uncertainty around it,” BloombergNEF analyst Payal Kaur said during a presentation at the research firm’s recent summit in New York City. Blue hydrogen companies can take advantage of a tax credit for carbon capture, which Congress is much less likely to scrap than the hydrogen tax credit.
Gordon is intimately familiar with hydrogen’s cost impediments. He came to Ecolectro after four years as co-founder of Universal Hydrogen, a startup building hydrogen-powered planes that shut down last summer after burning through its cash and failing to raise more. By the end, Gordon had become a hydrogen skeptic, he told me. The company had customers interested in its planes, but clean hydrogen fuel was too expensive at $15 to $20 per kilogram. It needed to come in under $2.50 to compete with jet fuel. “Regional aviation customers weren’t going to spend 10 times the ticket price just to fly zero emissions,” he said. “It wasn’t clear to me, and I don’t think it was clear to our prospective investors, how the cost of hydrogen was going to be reduced.” Now, he’s convinced that Ecolectro’s new chemistry is the answer.
Ecolectro started in a lab at Cornell University, where its cofounder and chief science officer Kristina Hugar was doing her PhD research. Hugar developed a new material, a polymer “anion exchange membrane,” that had potential to significantly lower the cost of electrolyzers. Many of the companies making electrolyzers use designs that require expensive and supply-constrained metals like iridium and titanium. Hugar’s membrane makes it possible to use low-cost nickel and steel instead.
The company’s “stack,” the sandwich of an anode, membrane, and cathode that makes up the core of the electrolyzer, costs at least 50% less than the “proton exchange membrane” versions on the market today, according to Gordon. In lab tests, it has achieved more than 70% efficiency, meaning that more than 70% of the electrical energy going into the system is converted into usable chemical energy stored in hydrogen. The industry average is around 61%, according to the Department of Energy.
In addition to using cheaper materials, the company is focused on building electrolyzers that customers can install on-site to eliminate the cost of transporting the fuel. Its first customer was Liberty New York Gas, a natural gas company in Massena, New York, which installed a small, 10-kilowatt electrolyzer in a shipping container directly outside its office as part of a pilot project. Like many natural gas companies, Liberty is testing blending small amounts of hydrogen into its system — in this case, directly into the heating systems it uses in the office building — to evaluate it as an option for lowering emissions across its customer base. The equipment draws electricity from the local electric grid, which, in that region, mostly comes from low-cost hydroelectric power plants.
Taking into account the expected manufacturing cost for a commercial-scale electrolyzer, Ecolectro says that a project paying the same low price for water and power as Liberty would be able to produce hydrogen for less than $2.50 per kilogram — even without subsidies. Through its partnership with Re:Build, the company will produce electrolyzers in the 250- to 500-kilowatt range, as well as in the 1- to 5-megawatt range. It will be announcing a larger 250-kilowatt pilot project later this year, Gordon said.
All of this sounded promising, but what I really wanted to know is who Ecolectro thought its customers were going to be. Demand for clean hydrogen, or the lack thereof, is perhaps the biggest challenge the industry faces to scaling, after cost. Of the roughly 13 million to 15 million tons of clean hydrogen production announced to come online between now and 2030, companies only have offtake agreements for about 2.5 million tons, according to Kaur of BNEF. Most of those agreements are also non-binding, meaning they may not even happen.
Gordon tied companies’ struggle with offtake to their business models of building big, expensive, facilities in remote areas, meaning the hydrogen has to be transported long distances to customers. He said that when he was with Universal Hydrogen, he tried negotiating offtake agreements with some of these big projects, but they were asking customers to commit to 20-year contracts — and to figure out the delivery on their own.
“Right now, where we see the industry is that people want less hydrogen than that,” he said. “So we make it much easier for the customer to adopt by leasing them this unit. They don’t have to pay some enormous capex, and then it’s on site and it’s producing a fair amount of hydrogen for them to engage in pilot studies of blending, or refining, or whatever they’re going to use it for.”
He expects most of the demand to come from industrial customers that already use hydrogen, like fertilizer companies and refineries, that want to switch to a cleaner version of the fuel, or hydrogen-curious companies that want to experiment with blending it into their natural gas burners to reduce their emissions. Demand will also be geographically-limited to places like New York, Washington State, and Texas, that have low-cost electricity available, he said. “I think the opportunity is big, and it’s here, but only if you’re using a product like ours.”
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On California solar eating gas, China’s newest reactor, and GOP vs. CCS
Current conditions: Snow is blanketing parts of the Mountain West and Upper Midwest, making travel difficult in Montana, North Dakota, and Minnesota • Winds of up to 40 miles per hour could disrupt some air travel through Chicago and Detroit • A cold snap in China is set to drop temperatures by double digit degrees Fahrenheit in northern areas.
In just the last three months, Georgia Power has removed 6 gigawatts of projected demand from its 2030s forecasts — enough to serve every household in the Atlanta metropolitan area more than three times over, according to a filing Friday with the Georgia Public Service Commission. The cause: canceled or postponed data center developments. Projects totaling nearly 6 gigawatts of projected demand by the mid 2030s fell off the books. Of the 28 large power user projects the Southern Company-owned utility disclosed in its report to regulators, 18 have broken ground and 10 are pending constructions. That indicates that the developers are pushing to make sure they advance, and suggests the dip in the last quarter may not extend. In the report, Utility Dive noted, Georgia Power said the “majority of new generation” the company wanted approval for was “not backed by” contracts with large power users.
The adjustment comes as Georgia Power pushes regulators to approve a large new buildout of power plants that could raise monthly bills by $20, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution reported. Voters ousted long-time Republicans from the Public Service Commission, electing two Democrats who campaigned on slashing rising rates, Heatmap’s Emily Pontecorvo reported earlier this month. Data centers, however, are proliferating elsewhere. Just last night, Amazon unveiled plans to invest $15 billion in data center complexes in northern Indiana.

Over the last three years, California generated steadily more electricity from utility-scale solar farms while generation from natural gas-fired plants dropped. Gas still dominates the state’s power generation, but industrial solar generation more than doubled in the first eight months of 2025 compared to the same period in 2020, new analysis from the federal Energy Information Administration found. Between January and August of this year, natural gas supplied 18% less power than during the same months five years ago. Gas-fired generation spiked in 2021 to compensate for droughts reducing hydroelectric output, and has fallen since. But the largest year-over-year drop occurred this year.
You can count on one hand the number of new nuclear reactors built in the United States and Europe in recent memory. And while the Trump administration is taking major steps toward spurring new reactor projects in the U.S., the long-trumpeted nuclear renaissance has scarcely led to any new power plants with the promise of producing electrons anytime soon. That’s certainly not the case in China. Friday’s newsletter included China’s latest approval of two new reactors to begin construction. Today’s newsletter includes the update that China has officially patched yet another reactor onto the grid. China National Nuclear Corporation, one of the two major state-owned atomic power utilities in the country, announced that Unit 2 of its Zhangzhou nuclear plant is officially hooked up to the grid, World Nuclear News reported. It’s the second of six planned reactors, based on the Chinese-designed Hualong One model, at the same location in Fujian province.
It’s that capacity to build even the most complex of clean-energy infrastructure that has flattened out China’s emissions in recent years, as I wrote earlier this month. To go deeper on China’s grid, you should listen to the episode of Heatmap’s Shift Key podcast that includes UC San Diego export Michael Davidson.
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The Environmental Protection Agency has granted certain states the power to permit so-called Class VI wells to store captured carbon dioxide. Now many of those Republican-led states want to use that authority to reject carbon wells, E&E News reported. In Texas, the colorful energy regulator Wayne Christian called his agency’s decision to permit a major carbon removal and storage project “a danger.” In Florida, Governor Ron DeSantis called carbon storage a “scam” in a video posted on Facebook in March. In Louisiana, Governor Jeff Landry issued an executive order in October slapping a moratorium on new applications for Class VI permits until the state could “put into place a well-thought-out and methodical approach to application review and permitting.” And in Alabama, GOP state lawmaker Matthew Hammett prefiled a bill that would ban CO2 wells in the state’s southern county of Covington.
Arguably the biggest problem facing carbon capture technology is where to put that captured carbon and how to get it there. CO2 pipelines come with some risks, and mounting pushback. Until there’s somewhere for those pipelines to go, such as a well, it’s hard to justify the investment. No wells and no pipelines mean capturing carbon emissions before they enter the atmosphere will likely remain an unaffordable luxury.
The Trump administration has granted polluters waivers from Clean Air Act rules as part of its effort to revive heavy industry. But until recently, regulators appointed by President Donald Trump said such a pass wasn’t needed for the coking industry, which distills coal into fuel for a blast furnace. On Friday, Trump issued a proclamation granting a dozen coke manufacturing plants a two-year extension on fully meeting hazardous air pollutant rules, E&E News reported.
The move isn’t entirely unexpected. Trump has tried to revive coal-fired power generation, but keeps coming up against broken equipment that shuts down stations anyway, as Heatmap’s Matthew Zeitlin reported. But as Matthew wrote in July, global coal demand is rising, and the U.S. wants in on it.
As recently as 2022, when Cameco bought its 49% share of Westinghouse, the Canadian uranium producer doubted the company had a future in reactors. Cameco was primarily interested in Westinghouse’s fuel fabrication and maintenance service businesses. “We just assumed there wouldn’t be anything new,” Grant Isaac, Cameco’s president and chief operating officer, told The Wall Street Journal. Now, the Trump administration putting up $80 billion to fund at least 10 new Westinghouse AP1000, each with the capacity to power 1 million American homes.
Automakers aren’t sure what to do with their EVs in the age of Trump.
The Los Angeles Auto Show over the years has been the launchpad for lots of new electric vehicles and a place for carmakers to declare their EV ambitions. It’s a fitting stage given California’s status not only as the home of American car culture, but also as the United States’ biggest EV market by far.
At the 2025 show, which had its media day on Thursday, electrification was more off to the side than front-and-center, however. The new breed of affordable models that could give many more drivers access to the electric car market — such as the Nissan Leaf and Chevy Bolt revivals and the upcoming Toyota C-HR electric — could be found on the show floor, waiting to be discovered by the car fans who would descend on the L.A. Convention Center in the days to come.
But fanfare over the electric future was decidedly tamped down. The atmosphere reflected the uneasy state of EVs in America in this first year of the new Trump administration. During Kia’s press conference to start the day, for example, the EV9 three-row electric crossover lingered at the edge of the stage while brand bigwigs revealed a redesign of its petroleum-powered cousin, the best-selling Telluride, whose climate credentials go only as far as a 30-miles-per-gallon hybrid version.
Hyundai has been perhaps the most successful brand outside of Tesla in selling America on EVs, but its L.A. presentation pushed battery power into niche corners of the car world, the racetrack and the trail. One of its two attractions was the North American reveal of the limited-edition Ioniq 6N, the powered-up sports car version of the Ioniq 6 electric sedan, which the brand revealed at this very show three years ago.
This 641-horsepower battery-powered beast was an inevitability, given that Hyundai’s high-performance “N” division has built limited-edition racing versions of many of the carmakers’ stock vehicles, and its muscular version of the Ioniq 5 hatchback has been one of the best-regarded performance-focused EVs yet to hit the car market. Like its predecessor, Ioniq 6N is a test case in how to make electric power appeal to car enthusiasts who crave stick shifts and snarling V8s, so Hyundai built in simulated gear shifts and sounds to simulate the sensations of pushing a combustion car to its limits.
More compelling — and curious — was the Crater, the kind of otherworldly angular tank that Tesla’s Cybertruck wishes it were. A concept car rather than a vehicle ready to go into real production, the Crater is meant to signify the vision of Hyundai’s XRT sub-brand that makes off-roading versions of the brand’s vehicles, combustion ones included.
Although Hyundai barely said the “e” word during its presentation, Crater is meant to at least suggest an all-electric version of a supremely rugged vehicle that would compete with the likes of the Jeep Wrangler and Ford Bronco. The concept has no tailpipe or engine, and the pixelated lights are taken from those used on the Ioniq series. Yet even this is uncertain: Having been burned by the back-and-forth of regime change in America, with Biden-era EV incentives disappearing just as the Korean brands were adjusting their production lines to meet the rules, the carmakers are wondering how hard to push battery power here.
Even the all-electric car brands didn’t arrive with sound and fury to show off all-new cars that would invigorate the EV market. Instead, they are doing the slow and steady work that legacy car companies have been doing for years, hoping to build long-term stability by filling out their vehicle lineups with more subtly different versions at more price points.
The Rivian R2 sat at the edge of the brand’s small display, giving many people their first in-person look at what could be the make-or-break vehicle for the EV startup. Its quiet presence was a subtle reminder that the smaller SUV is coming next year at a promised price of around $45,000, which would provide a (more) affordable option for drivers who’ve lusted after the brand’s $70,000-plus initial slate of electric SUVs and pickup trucks.
Likewise, Lucid took the mic after Hyundai to introduce a somewhat more attainable version of its electric SUV. The Gravity Touring edition brings the vehicle’s starting price from six figures down to $80,000, thanks in part to a smaller battery pack that still delivers more than 300 miles of range thanks to the carmaker’s hyper-focus on aerodynamics and efficiency. The price is still high, but this is a compelling vehicle: Gravity is a spacious three-row vehicle that goes 0 to 60 miles per hour in four seconds and recharges its battery at blazing speed thanks to 1,000-volt architecture that can add a claimed 200 miles in 15 minutes.
Car show stories come with a big caveat: These events don’t have the status they did in the heyday of old media, when new vehicles greeted the world for the first time in front of the assembled reporters. Tesla has always hosted its own vehicle events rather than share the stage, and these days, lots of brands have followed suit. Rivan revealed the R2 and R3 on its own turn last year, which is why the R2 could loom, unheralded, in a quiet corner of the show floor in Los Angeles.
Yet what the car industry chooses to show and say in front of the car media is still a telling indicator. What the companies said and didn’t say on Thursday suggests an industry that’s clearly struggling to navigate the electrification transition in America. Kia has been at the forefront of building great EVs for the States; its trumpeting of a hybrid Telluride is welcome, but 10 years out of date. The absence of EV hype in press events reveals an industry putting the brakes on the big talking points and preparing to lean back toward fossil fuels to maintain their profitability through this era of American EV limbo.
The Paris Agreement goal of limiting warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius is now all but impossible. Limiting — and eventually reversing — the damage will take some thought.
For the second year in a row, the United Nations climate conference ended without a consensus declaration that tackling global warming requires transitioning away from fossil fuels. The final agreement at COP30 did, however, touch on another uncomfortable subject: Countries resolved to limit “the magnitude and duration of any temperature overshoot.”
In the 2015 Paris Agreement, 197 nations pledged to try to prevent average temperature rise of more than 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial temperatures. Now 10 years later, scientists say that exceeding that level has become inevitable. It may be possible to turn the thermostat back down after this “overshoot” occurs, though — a possibility this year’s COP agreement appears to endorse.
The idea demands a far meatier discussion than world leaders have had to date, according to Oliver Geden, a senior fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, and a key contributor to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s scientific reports. If limiting warming to 1.5 degrees now requires surpassing that level and coming back to it later, and if this is something that countries actually want to attempt, there are a lot of implications to think through.
Geden and Andy Reisinger, an associate professor at Australian National University and another IPCC author, published an article last week spelling out what it would mean for policymakers to take this concept of “temporary overshoot” seriously. For example, the final agreement from COP30 encourages Parties to align their nationally determined contributions towards global net zero by or around mid-century.” Net zero, in this case, means cutting CO2 emissions as far as possible, and then cancelling out any residuals with efforts to remove carbon from the atmosphere.
Scientists now estimate that if the world achieves that balance by 2050, we’ll pass 1.5 and bring warming to a peak of about 1.7 degrees above pre-industrial levels. At that point, the planet will not begin to cool on its own. Ensuring that an “overshoot” of 1.5 degrees is temporary, then, requires removing even more carbon from the atmosphere than is being emitted — it requires achieving “net-negative” emissions.
Suffice it to say, you will not find the words “net negative” in any COP agreements. “If 1.5 degrees C is to remain the core temperature goal, then net zero can no longer be seen as an end point but only as a transition point in climate policy,” Geden and Reisinger wrote. The two stress that this wouldn’t prevent all of the harms of going past that level of warming, but it would reduce risk, depending on the magnitude and duration of the overshoot.
I spoke to Geden on Thursday, while the UN climate conference was still underway in Belém, Brazil, about what policymakers are missing about overshoot and the 1.5 degree goal. Our conversation has been lightly edited for clarity.
I’ve had scientists tell me they don’t like the term “overshoot” because the 1.5 degree boundary is arbitrary. How do you think about it?
You can apply the concept of overshoot to any level. You could also apply it to 2 degrees or 1.6 or 1.7. It’s just saying that there is a defined level you care about, and it’s about exceeding that level and returning to it later. That is the basic concept, and then 1.5 is the logical application right now in terms of where climate policy is. That return idea is not very well represented, but that’s how it has been used in the IPCC for quite some time — exceedance and return.
What was the impetus for writing the article with Reisinger and what was your main message?
We wanted to explain the concept of overshoot because it seems that it’s now being discussed more. The UN secretary general started using it in a speech to the World Meteorological Association two weeks before Belém, and now has continuously done so. It also led to some irritation because people interpret it as, He just called 1.5 off, although he usually says, “Science tells us you can come back to it.”
These overshoot trajectories and pathways for 1.5 degrees have been around since at least the Special Report on 1.5 Degrees in 2018, and then increasingly dominated the modeling of 1.5. But we feel that the broader climate policy community never quite got the point that it is baked into these trajectories whenever scientists say 1.5 is still possible. But then this element of, what does this now mean? Who has to do what? How is it possible to get temperature down? That’s even more obscure, in a way, in the political debate, because it means net-zero CO2 is not enough. Net-zero CO2 would halt temperature increase. To get it down, you need to go net negative. And then the obvious question, politically, would be, who’s going to do that?
In the paper, you write that the amount of net-negative emissions required to reduce global average temperatures by just 0.1 degrees is about equal to five years of current annual emissions, or 100x our current annual carbon removal, which is mostly from planting trees. Given that, is it realistic to talk about reversing warming?
That’s not for me to say. If you think about the trajectory — how would, let’s say, a temperature trajectory in the 21st century look? What you would get now is a peak warming level above 1.5. Then really the question is, what happens afterwards? If everybody only talks about going to net-zero CO2 then we should assume it’s that new peak temperature level, and then we just stay there. But if you want to say the world needs to go back down to 1.5 by the end of the century then we have to talk about net-negative levels, and we still may find out that it’s not realistic.
This kind of circumvents the conversation of how good we look on getting to net zero. We all assume that’s doable. I also assume that’s doable. But you cannot forget the fact that right now, our emissions are still rising.
One of the policy implications you write about in the piece is that if Europe were to set a target to go net negative, its carbon pricing scheme could go from a source of income to a financial burden. Can you explain that?
If you have carbon pricing and you have emitters, you can finance carbon dioxide removal through the revenues from carbon pricing. But if you want to go net negative, you need more removals than you have emissions. The question is, who’s going to pay for it? You would always have residual emitters, but if you want to go deeply into net negative, you will run out of revenue sources to finance these removals.
One of the big problems is, conceptually, a government can say, Okay, your factory does not have a license to produce anymore, and you can force it to close down. But you cannot force any entity to remove CO2 for you. So how can a government guarantee that these removals are really going to happen? Would the acceleration of this carbon dioxide removal actually work? Which methods do we prefer? Do we have enough geological storage? It’s all unresolved. This paper is not a call to Europe to say hey, just make a promise. [It’s saying,] can you please really think about it? Can we please stop assuming somebody is going to organize all this to go net negative and then it magically happens? You need to make a serious plan. And you may find out that it’s too hard to do.
Another question is, how will other actors react? I think that’s part of the reluctance to talk about going net negative. The mental model right now of being a frontrunner is going down to the net zero line and then waiting there for the others to come. But if you enter net negative territory, it becomes basically bottomless. So every developing country could, reasonably so, demand ever higher levels of you. In the European Union, where you have 27 member states, even there, you would get into distributional challenges because some member states may ask others to go net negative because they are disadvantaged.
Also, which sectors would be forced to go net negative, which ones can stay net positive? Agriculture, at least as long as you have livestock, will be net positive. Then you have a country like Ireland, with 30% of the emissions coming from agriculture. They will stay a net-positive country, probably, and then others would have to go net negative. So you can imagine what kind of tensions you would get in.
I know you’re not in Belém, but from what you’ve read and from what you’re hearing, do you think that overshoot and all of these questions that you raise are being discussed more there? Do you get the sense that they are making their way into the conversation more?
A bit. The talk you hear is only just about 1.5 and 1.5-aligned, and it makes you wonder what governments or NGOs think, how this is going to happen. In the text presented by the Brazilian government, overshoot is mentioned, and “limiting or minimizing magnitude and duration of overshoot.” But it does not talk about what that actually means.
The whole 1.5 conversation, I think it’s hard for governments to understand. At the same they’re getting told, “if you just look at the pledges, you will end up at 2.6 or 2.7 or 2.8 by the end of the century, you have to do more.” Of course they all have to do more, but to really get to 1.5 they have to do more than they can imagine. If the world does not want to cross 1.5, never ever, it would need to be at net-zero CO2 in 2030, between 2030 and 2035. And if you go later, then you have to go net negative. It’s actually quite easy, but it seems to be uncomfortable knowledge. And then the way we communicate the challenge — governments, scientists, media — it’s not very straightforward.
All these temperature targets are special in the sense that they set an absolute target. Usually policymakers, governments, set relative targets, like 0.7% of national GDP for overseas development aid — you can miss that every year, but then you can say, next year we’re going to meet it. That logic does not apply here. Once you are there, you are there. Then it’s not enough to say that next year we are going to put more effort into it. You just then can limit the extra damage.