You’re out of free articles.
Log in
To continue reading, log in to your account.
Create a Free Account
To unlock more free articles, please create a free account.
Sign In or Create an Account.
By continuing, you agree to the Terms of Service and acknowledge our Privacy Policy
Welcome to Heatmap
Thank you for registering with Heatmap. Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our lives, a force reshaping our economy, our politics, and our culture. We hope to be your trusted, friendly, and insightful guide to that transformation. Please enjoy your free articles. You can check your profile here .
subscribe to get Unlimited access
Offer for a Heatmap News Unlimited Access subscription; please note that your subscription will renew automatically unless you cancel prior to renewal. Cancellation takes effect at the end of your current billing period. We will let you know in advance of any price changes. Taxes may apply. Offer terms are subject to change.
Subscribe to get unlimited Access
Hey, you are out of free articles but you are only a few clicks away from full access. Subscribe below and take advantage of our introductory offer.
subscribe to get Unlimited access
Offer for a Heatmap News Unlimited Access subscription; please note that your subscription will renew automatically unless you cancel prior to renewal. Cancellation takes effect at the end of your current billing period. We will let you know in advance of any price changes. Taxes may apply. Offer terms are subject to change.
Create Your Account
Please Enter Your Password
Forgot your password?
Please enter the email address you use for your account so we can send you a link to reset your password:
That means it’s also buying natural gas — but by storing the emissions, the company says, it can still meet its climate goals.

Google is buying gas. The hyperscale tech company — which invented the power purchase agreement as a way to support renewables development in the 2010s and has been a leader in setting standards for and procuring renewable power — announced on Thursday that it is agreeing to buy the majority of the power generated by a planned natural gas-fired plant in Decatur, Illinois. Here’s the twist: The plant will also capture and store its carbon emissions, a first of its kind installation at commercial scale.
The Broadwing Energy Center will be developed by Low Carbon Infrastructure on a site owned by agribusiness giant ADM. The facility features an existing ethanol plant with carbon capture and storage nearby, including the Class VI wells necessary for carbon dioxide sequestration. The plant will provide 400 megawatts of power, as well as steam for the ADM facility.
“We’re going to work with LCI to hopefully have it all up and running by early 2030,” Michael Terrell, Google’s head of advanced energy, told me.
While CCS has not yet been developed at anything like a commercial scale, it is already both a bogeyman and a panacea in the decarbonization debate — or as my colleague Emily Pontecorvo has called it, “an oil exec’s fantasy, an environmentalist’s nightmare, and an energy expert’s object of fascination.”
Natural gas with CCS promises the dispatchability of natural gas — power produced exactly when and in the exact amounts the grid needs — without the greenhouse emissions of traditional gas plants. The problem is that the technology is expensive, meaning that its development has largely been seen to depend on emissions regulations that would essentially force generators to build or install CCS.
Those regulations were finalized during the final year of Biden’s presidency and, unsurprisingly, are no longer happening. That leaves the private sector to bear the cost and technological uncertainty of CCS development, with little obvious financial incentive to do so.
While this is Google’s first gas deal, it is not entirely unexpected. Google hit its initial goal of matching its worldwide energy consumption with renewable energy generation on an annual basis in 2017, upgrading that goal in 2020 to aim at generating clean power on a 24/7 basis in the same area that its energy consumption occurs by 2030.
This meant going beyond wind and solar and procuring power from generators that worked in all weather and at night.
In the same 2020 whitepaper where Google set out its hourly matching goal, it specifically mentioned CCS as one of “a number of emergent technologies” that “appear to be making good progress.”
In another 2023 whitepaper, Google affirmed its commitment to clean firm technology beyond wind and solar, adding that “we must also develop and commercialize new technologies to fully decarbonize electricity systems quickly and cost-effectively while maintaining reliability.” Once again it called out “power generation with carbon capture and storage” by name.
Since then Google has struck a number of deals to support clean firm development, including a development agreement with the advanced nuclear company Kairos and a “clean transition tariff” agreement with utility NV Energy to pay for geothermal power in Nevada produced by the enhanced geothermal company Fervo.
But carbon capture and storage remained in the picture as something that would be key for Google to meet its goals. “We set 24/7 carbon free energy as our North Star,” Terrell told me. “The other critical piece to that is CCS.”
At the same time, Google — and the rest of the technology industry — has been on a data center building spree, moving as fast as it can to put up bigger data centers that turn electricity into artificial intelligence. This has meant rising power usage and emissions. In 2024, Google reported that its emissions had gone up almost 50% over the previous five years, following a similar announcement from Microsoft.
“We’re still committed to those goals. They’re extremely ambitious, and we’ve never been shy about sharing that. 24/7 carbon free energy is a moonshot, but we are pushing very, very hard,” Terrell said.
The turn to CCS is not just driven by the advantages gas has over renewables — namely dispatchability — but also by the current political environment.
Google has a long track record of buying the output from renewables projects, including wind, in the broader Midcontinent Independent System Operator grid, where the Decatur project sits. But on a national basis, Terrell noted, “we’re seeing headwinds in the market due to policy changes” for renewables.
Solar and wind have now lost some of the incentives that spurred huge growth in both sectors in recent years, while projects that can pass the regulatory gauntlet have to linger in interconnection queues to get approved by electricity markets and often require transmission that can be expensive and challenging to build. The Trump administration has specifically targeted renewables — especially wind — for regulatory scrutiny, which will likely hinder renewable development in MISO, which gets 15% of its power from wind — far more than from solar, and about comparable with its nuclear generation.
“The markets are tough because of some of the changes in policy, interconnection rules, and lack of transmission,” Terrell said. “That’s certainly affecting our ability to procure with speed and scale.”
Google and LCI claim that the Broadwing plant will be able to capture and store over 90% of its carbon dioxide emissions.
The project started, LCI chief executive Jonathan Wiens told me, in 2020, primarily as an industrial decarbonization project to provide low-emissions steam to ADM for its food processing efforts, with the rest of the power going to the grid.“In the midst of this development,” Wiens said, “there were data centers that were 40 megawatts. Now they’re aspiring to be a gigawatt-plus, and it’s totally changed the power end of this.”
Of Google, he said, “they put their money where their mouth is and they’re willing to participate in a project.”
Both Terrell and Wiens confirmed that Google wanted to work with LCI beyond developing and purchasing power from the Broadwing facility. “It’s not just this one plant,” Wiens said. “It’s a much broader approach to deploying this in as many places as we can.”
Google did not disclose the terms of the PPA, but Terrell said, “We believe that CCS can be competitive at scale with other generation technologies, and certainly other low carbon or zero carbon generation technologies.”
Over time, he added, LCI and Google should be able to drive down prices as they work on more power plants. “That’s certainly something that we’re hoping to do.”
Log in
To continue reading, log in to your account.
Create a Free Account
To unlock more free articles, please create a free account.
The data center boom is everywhere you look in U.S. economic and emissions data.
This is an edition of Heatmap Daily, an evening review of the day’s news written by our executive editor. Sign up for it here.
It isn’t exactly a new thought, but I’ve been struck recently by how many trends in America’s economic and environmental data are fundamentally about the data center boom and the return of electricity demand:
First, the Energy Information Administration reported this week that U.S. emissions grew by more than 2% last year, driven by surging electricity demand and an increase in coal-fired generation. What caused that higher power demand? New factories and data centers — as well as record summertime cooling demand.
Second, many of the new factories driving that higher power demand are themselves producing goods that are … let’s say … data center-adjacent. There are the enormous new semiconductor fabs, of course. But Ford and General Motors have also set up new production lines (or repurposed old ones) to manufacture grid-scale batteries to meet power demand.
Third, take a look at the recent U.S. spending on private non-residential construction — in other words, everything American companies are building that is not houses, condos, or apartments.
The construction industry’s spent almost $60 billion on data centers over the past year, which is more than it spent on all other office buildings combined (and more than it spent building warehouses, too). Just a handful of categories — data centers, power plants, electricity infrastructure, and certain kinds of electronics manufacturing — now make up a third of all U.S. private non-residential construction investment. They’ve never made up such a large share of construction spending since data collection began in 2014.
As The New York Times recently noted, the American economy is unusually dependent on the American stock market right now — and the stock market is unusually dependent on artificial intelligence. This week, investors started to balk at the enormous spending hyperscalers are planning to keep building out the AI boom; Alphabet’s shares dropped 8% this week after it boosted its planned 2026 capital expenditure and signaled 2027 will be even bigger. If the data center boom started to slow down in earnest, then more than just that budget will change.
Speaking of which, my colleague Emily Pontecorvo wrote earlier this week about how many businesses are struggling to even estimate their carbon emissions from artificial intelligence. The carbon accounting startup Watershed recently unveiled a new formula to help companies get a sense of their AI-related emissions.
But even that formula is still limited by the amount of data hyperscalers publish — and they don’t publish that much. Google, for instance, is the only AI company that has (laudably) provided estimates of its emissions on a per-prompt basis. Yet no company has published its per-token emissions, or how emissions sync up with particular models or regions.
So Emily asked Google: Why aren’t you — or any other model provider — disclosing this kind of data yet?
The tech company didn’t get back to us until after we’d published Emily’s story. But its response was interesting enough that I wanted to quote some of it here.
The problem is “industry consensus,” Cooper Elsworth, a Google spokesperson, told us. “There is currently very little consensus on how to comprehensively and fairly measure the serving environmental impact of generative AI (such as text generation),” he wrote. “Without standardized, ‘apples-to-apples’ frameworks, it is difficult to compare different providers accurately.”
That’s partly because energy use — and emissions data — can vary from site to site and depend on “custom-built hardware, software compilers, and advanced inference techniques.” And he claimed Google doesn’t always have the measurement hardware in place to provide such specific estimates: “Providing precise, repeatable data requires highly advanced measurement infrastructure,” he said. “For example, software-based energy monitoring tools often suffer from sampling biases. For our study, we had to step away from top-down averages and directly measure actual energy at the physical power supply unit (PSU) level across our deployed fleet. Not all providers have the telemetry or data sets required to benchmark their operations at this level of granularity.”
Read Emily’s story to understand the other reasons why estimating — or even “guesstimating” — AI-related carbon emissions is so challenging.
A conversation with Emma Uridge of the Kansas Health Institute.
This week’s conversation is with Emma Uridge, analyst with the Kansas Health Institute. Uridge spent copious hours analyzing state and local laws on data center development to best understand how policymakers are responding to the potential environmental public health impacts of large AI infrastructure, including power and water. The report, which came out this week, also goes in depth into those health impacts. I reached out to her to discuss what she sees as must-watch territory for our readers on this emerging policy arena.
Our conversation was lightly edited for clarity.
What is actually being done on policy when it comes to data centers — beyond moratoria of course?
So first I’d like to just talk about the point of moratoria. It’s helpful to talk about how these policies emerge in the first place. One area where moratoria are helpful is when a data center is proposed but the county has no approach for how they’d like to potentially regulate them. That’s temporary, most of the time. It lets local governments conduct research on the various impacts and also negotiate community benefits, ones that can mitigate any potential negative impacts — like Lancaster Pennsylvania, which instituted a community benefit agreement that maximized the potential benefits of development while mitigating what large data centers can do. That agreement looked at capping municipal water use at 20,000 gallons per day and requiring 100% clean energy. It had financial penalties for non-compliance. The company also committed $20 million to their local economic development and clean energy fund. There are ways to negotiate with developers.
We also see amendments to existing zoning. Data center proposals are increasingly popping up in rural areas, many of which are unzoned, so there’s no way a county can negotiate unless there’s a moratorium in place.
Other policy solutions include different performance standards or requiring on-site renewable energy, like what Jefferson County, Missouri, looked at. Also setback requirements, mandatory noise buffers, ending by-right zoning.
Where are local governments getting ideas for regulating data centers?
A lot of the technical information comes from developers. That can in cases be seen as a biased source of information. I wouldn’t say there’s a dedicated group providing assistance to local governments when a project is proposed — which is a similar story to wind industry development, where we have only a handful of consultants who provide technical advice. It can be really helpful to get a multi-disciplinary approach to hearing information. It can be helpful to have the utility commission, public health folks, those in academia, as well as the developer.
As of right now, especially in rural areas, local governments have a hard task of balancing pushback while getting the most accurate, evidence-based, neutral information to make decisions. That balance can be contentious.
What is the federal government doing on data center policy? How is the Trump administration approaching it?
A few things there. In the early days, the drive was for AI expansion and to be competitive with foreign adversaries. Now due to the amount of public pushback in red and blue localities and a more cautious approach.
I’m not seeing a lot of actual policy movement at this time.
I know the EPA is looking at the chemicals used in cooling data centers because when that water is cycled through the system, some of it is discharged into the water system, so they’re looking at the Toxic Substances and Control Act for monitoring that.
How much of an impact does this minimal federal role have on industry behavior?
Y’know, this isn’t specific to data centers. This is true for all kinds of large-scale development: there’s a need to require some sort of federal monitoring and regulation.
That’s where I see an emerging role for public health. At the federal level, there could be policy movement towards requiring some sort of environmental monitoring at data centers to make sure they’re operating responsibility. Looking at specific water use relative to water availability and what happens when there’s a time of severe, persistent drought. With air quality too — we’ve seen areas where the grid isn’t as reliable so their diesel generators are kicking on more and affecting air quality for residents.
We’re just not seeing all of that right now. We need corporate disclosure.
What do you see as the most important public health impacts from data center development?
It varies by localities. The most discussed obviously is water usage. One thing I’d note about my conversations with folks enthusiastic around emerging tech is, there are still questions that need to be asked about the capacity of localities to support a data center. Like a small town in Kansas may only be using 40% of their water for their utility needs. If a data center came online, how much of that water goes to the data center?
One area underexplored within the public health discipline is energy poverty and energy security. The ability of a household to meet the needs of everything energy provides in our lives. It’s known we have an aging electric grid but we’re not talking enough about large-scale blackouts when the grid is not sufficient to support some of these new data centers.
Plus more of the week’s big development fights.
1. Laramie County, Wyoming — Meta is fighting the fine it received in the Cheyenne data center water pollution controversy, and the conflict between the tech giant and the city’s small board of public utilities is continuing to spill out into the public.
2. Niagara County, New York — This county just rejected a solar project’s highway work permits in a show of retaliation against the state’s Office of Renewable Energy Siting.
3. Barron County, Wisconsin — The anti-solar protest is the new campaign stop in deep red Wisconsin.
4. Chesapeake, Virginia — A large battery storage project on the Virginia coastline is on the rocks amidst rampant local opposition.
5. Lewis County, West Virginia — West Virginia is now a key battleground in the fight over transmission, as a line spanning all of West Virginia and Maryland — and cutting through Data Center Alley in Virginia — causes compounding consternation.