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A conversation with Resources for the Future’s David Wear on the fires in the Carolinas and how the political environment could affect the future of forecasting.

The Wikipedia article for “wildfire” has 22 photographs, including those of incidents in Arizona, Utah, Washington, and California. But there is not a single picture of a fire in the American Southeast, despite researchers warning that the lower righthand quadrant of the country will face a “perfect storm” of fire conditions over the next 50 years.
In what is perhaps a grim premonition of what is to come, several major fires are burning across the Southeast now — including the nearly 600-acre Melrose Fire in Polk County, North Carolina, a little over 80 miles to the west of Charlotte, and the more than 2,000-acre Carolina Forest fire in Horry County, South Carolina. The region is also battling hundreds of smaller brush fires, the smoke from which David Wear — the land use, forestry, and agriculture program director at Resources for the Future — could see out his Raleigh-area window.
Wear is also the co-author of a study by RFF and the U.S. Forest Service that came out in late 2024 and singled out the Southeast as facing a “particularly worrisome” rise in wildfire risk over the next half-century. I spoke with him this week to learn more about why the Carolinas are burning and what the future of fire looks like for the region. Our conversation has been edited and condensed for clarity.
When discussing fires in the American West, we often talk about how historic suppression efforts are responsible for the megafires we see today. What was the historic fire regime like in the Southeast? What’s going on to make it a hot spot for wildfires?
First, there are the similarities. Both Western and Southeastern forests, especially pine forests, are fire-adapted systems; they need regular fires to maintain health. Anything that takes those forests out of balance is a problem, and fire suppression is an issue in the East and the West, and especially in the Southeast. But forests in the Southeast are the most heavily managed forests in the country — perhaps in the world. In many cases, they’re regularly burned; the South does more prescribed burning than the rest of the country combined. It’s a very, very common practice in this part of the world.
So we shouldn’t be surprised that there is fire in Southeastern forests. There have been big, episodic fires in the South, though they’re not as common. There was the fire in 2016 in East Tennessee, from the Smokies into Gatlinburg, with a number of fatalities and lots of structures damaged or destroyed. There have been big fire years in east and west Texas. And there have been big fire seasons in Florida, though it’s been a while.
How is population growth in the Southeast adding to the strain?
We’re accustomed to talking about the wildland-urban interface in the West, but it’s also a big issue in the Southeast. Some of our urban growth centers in the Southeast include the Raleigh-Durham area, where I live, and Atlanta, Nashville, and Florida. These are generally flat landscapes, as well as very heavily forested landscapes. As the population grows out of the city centers, they go into pine and mixed-pine hardwood forests that are fire-adapted ecosystems. Then you have interspersed communities with forest vegetation, and that’s a big issue.
I also read in your report that much of that land is privately owned, which makes management tricky.
Private ownership is about 89% of forests in the South. [Editor’s note: By comparison, only about a third of forests in the West are privately owned.] Even where you have public ownership, a lot of that is by the Department of Defense and concentrated in a couple of different areas in the Ozarks and southern Appalachians. Much of the landscape in the coastal plain and Piedmont — which is most of the South — is predominantly private ownership.
There’s a distinction to be made between commercial owners, like timber investment management companies or real estate investment trusts, who actively manage landscapes. With timber harvesting, there are a lot of risk mitigation activities and a lot of prescribed burning. But then you have over a million non-industrial private landowners with small holdings. If you’re trying to coordinate any kind of wildfire mitigation scheme using fuel treatments and the like, it requires some work.
Horry County, South Carolina, and Polk County, North Carolina, were not part of your paper’s list of counties vulnerable to wildfire. I’m curious if you think what we’re seeing now says something about the limits of the study and the data you had available, or if you have another takeaway about what’s going on.
Importantly, our study looked at long-term averages. Throughout the South, there is a fire regime, and in any given year, it is possible to have wildfires of consequence. I would point out that we were especially concerned this year because Hurricane Helene laid down an awful lot of trees and created a fuel load.
We’re also entering one of the two fire seasons in the South. Wildfire is most predominant in the spring and in the fall; it’s at those times when temperatures begin to rise but humidity remains low, and there are extended dry periods that allow the fuels to dry out. You have warm temperatures and wind in the spring, setting the stage for wildfire. Typically, that window will begin to close at the end of April because it’s pretty darn humid in the South at that point, and it’s much less likely that fuels will get dry enough to carry a fire.
The same thing happens in the fall: Temperatures may remain high, and if we don’t have a lot of precipitation and humidity — usually in October and into November — then you have the conditions right for fire. But as the climate shifts, we see the length of those seasons growing to the point where the fall is approaching the spring. Wildfires in January and February indicate that these two seasons are growing toward one another and providing a much longer season. Our paper showed that, when you account for climate change across all of those global climate models and representative concentration pathways, the windows for more wildfire activity and more intense wildfire activity are expanding.
Your paper cited wildfire risks across the Sun Belt. Today, the National Weather Service is warning of “potentially historic” fire conditions in central Texas. Can local emergency managers use your modeling to prepare for such situations?
Things like the year-to-year fire projections and the day-to-day forecasts best serve local emergency managers. Wildfire in the South is determined by the drying of fuels and temperature and humidity conditions, which vary daily. If we look over the last week, Saturday was beautiful in the Carolinas. It was sunny, in the 70s, dry, and a little windy. That was the day [hundreds of] fires started across the Southeast. And the next day, there were very few new fires. Mid-week projections of wildfire potential in the Southeast show that it’s really low, with the exception of Texas. It changes day to day, driven by fine-grain weather forecasts, and that gives emergency managers some insight into where they might want to pre-position crews or do pre-suppression activities.
What we’re doing with the modeling is asking, What is this going to look like in 50 years? The takeaway is that wildfire activity is going to remain strong and perhaps grow in the West, but the big structural change is really strong growth and active fire in the Southeast, where you have wildfire and wildlands proximal to millions of people and more vulnerable communities. It’s a fire regime that’s going to affect more people.
I also wanted to ask about the USDA Forest Service’s contributions to your paper. Do you think research like this could still happen today, given the Trump administration’s efforts to eliminate anything climate-related from the federal agenda?
I came to Resources for the Future six years ago after a long career with the Forest Service, so it’s hard for me to remain a dispassionate scientist here. I think we need to see how the dust settles. It’s hard to imagine a future where the agency and federal government do not have a high level of concern regarding fire — and I don’t think you can do any kind of effective planning, or thinking about the future, or targeting of activities without understanding how climate is likely to impact these disturbance regimes.
I don’t have the crystal ball that many people are seeking right now. We’ll have to wait to see. But our research demonstrates the vital role of understanding climate dynamics, and it shows how critical weather forecasts are for people with boots on the ground who are trying to stay ahead of disaster.
Editor’s note: This story has been updated to reflect that about a third of land in the West is privately owned, not publicly owned.
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The losers are myriad and most definitely include Gulf oil producers.
Exactly what is going on between the United States, the Gulf States, Israel, and Iran is legitimately unclear. While the U.S. and Iran have said they agreed to a Pakistan-broked ceasefire and want to reach a permanent agreement to end the war, there have been reported strikes in Lebanon, Iran, and several Gulf States. The Speaker of the Iranian parliament, Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, has accused the United States of violating “three key clauses” of the “framework” the country says the U.S. has agreed to, while Iranian media said earlier today that tankers were halted from passing through the Strait of Hormuz — which has, in theory, reopened — due to Israeli strikes on Lebanon.
While the outcome of planned negotiations between the United States and Iran over the two-week ceasefire announced Tuesday evening remains anybody’s guess, we can start to evaluate which industries, countries, and regions stand to benefit from the new era inaugurated the war, and which stand to suffer.
China’s neighbors got a crash course in the dangers of fossil fuel dependence for their essential energy needs. The vast majority of oil and gas that generally flows out of the strait is bound for Asia, leaving countries to embrace some mix of rationing, higher costs, and finding new supplies.
Going forward, these Asian countries may want to reduce their fossil fuel import bill, either by developing solar power and storage to replace gas-fired electricity generation or by expanding electrification to reduce reliance on gasoline (or both!). No matter what path they pick, it will likely be Chinese companies selling the solar panels, batteries, and electric vehicles necessary to traverse it.
China itself, despite its heavy use of Persian Gulf petroleum, was able to weather the crisis far better than its neighbors. While the country is the world’s largest consumer of fossil fuels, it has spent decades preparing for this type of crisis, building up the world’s largest oil stockpiles and an electric grid that largely relies on its own coal, as well as nuclear, renewables, and hydropower.
The nuclear industry has often flourished in response to crises in the oil markets. Much of the Japanese, French, and American nuclear buildouts occurred in the wake of the 1970s oil shocks. Already, the Hormuz shock has revived Asian nuclear power. Taiwan shut down its last operating nuclear reactor last year, but already the utility Taipower has applied to restart a nuclear plant. Vietnam and Russia signed a deal to develop Southeast Asia’s first operational nuclear power plant, while the South Korean government announced plans to accelerate the restart of several reactors.
While in the long run the Hormuz crisis could spur Asian economies to embrace nuclear, storage, renewables, and electrification, in the short run they need to keep the lights on. Capacity limits on coal-fired power plants have been lifted across Asia, and prices for coal have risen accordingly. And while Taiwan for example, is reembracing nuclear power, it’s also looking to boost its coal output.
When the consulting firm Wood Mackenzie modeled the effects through 2050 of a “a major geopolitical escalation beginning in early 2026 [Editor’s note: wink wink], disrupting 15–20% of global oil and LNG supply,” the analysts found that “coal plays a larger role in the near term as countries respond to supply shocks by maximising domestic energy sources and delaying plant retirements.”
(“Over the longer term,” the report continued, “nuclear expands significantly, providing stable, fuel-secure baseload power as new capacity comes online from the 2030s.”)
As national governments get more concerned about energy security and reliance on fuels that come through geopolitically sensitive chokepoints, major coal exporters like Australia, Indonesia, and South Africa stand to benefit. And even if countries pursue electrification in order to get off of oil, this can still benefit coal exporters, at least in the short to medium term.
The shale revolution has birthed a diverse, sprawling ecosystem of independent exploration and production companies that can cover their operating expenses when oil prices are below $50 and profitably drill new wells at $70. If global oil prices are permanently higher due to tolling in the Strait of Hormuz, as well as due to hundreds of millions of barrels of shut-in production never reaching the market, then these companies are likely to see permanently higher profits.
Even if oil prices fall substantially as the crisis subsides, these producers have likely experienced the past six or so weeks as a pure profit-taking opportunity, with anxious investors keeping the leash on new exploration. And if the crisis continues and the strait continues to be closed, they can either profit from their existing operations or choose to profitably drill new wells.
As long as the Strait of Hormuz remained closed, about a fifth of the world’s LNG supply wasn’t reaching its largely Asian customers. Even if the strait fully reopens, Qatar’s Ras Laffan LNG facility has sustained damage that will take years to fix. While this supply shock will mean higher spot prices for other LNG exporters — most notably the United States — future LNG investment will likely be chilled by this reminder of the fuel’s essential geopolitical instability.
Even if LNG flows resume for the duration of the shaky planned ceasefire, analysts at BloombergNEF estimate that “the combined loss of supply could remove roughly 16 million tons” of LNG from the market this summer. (Qatar’s total LNG capacity is 77 million tons per year.) “Hormuz crossings remain the critical variable driving prices in the coming days. If vessel transits accelerate, the market will price in improving availability. If crossings stall, risk premiums will rebuild quickly, reinforcing the view that even a ceasefire is insufficient to restore reliable Hormuz transit,” BNEF analysts wrote in a note Wednesday.
Already, the Vietnamese conglomerate Vingroup has proposed scrapping a planned LNG import project and replacing it with renewables and batteries. Chinese LNG imports already dropped in 2025, indicating that the Asian growth the LNG industry was counting on may not end up redounding to its benefit.
The Gulf states are supposed to be the central players in the world oil market. They can produce oil cheaply at scale, and Saudi Arabia especially is considered the world’s “swing” producer, able to ramp up and ramp down oil production to respond to market conditions
Now, no matter what happens in the Strait of Hormuz, hundreds of millions of barrels of oil have been shut-in and won’t reach global markets. Gulf states will likely have to embark on expensive pipeline projects to lessen their dependence on the strait, and their ability to diversify their economies by attracting tourism or high-end service industries may be permanently imperiled by six weeks of drone and missile assaults from Iran.
The necessary reconstruction may also pull capital away from their Gulf producers’ high-profile overseas investment projects, whether in movie studios or green energy, forcing these states to be more insular and less ambitious in forging overseas economic and political links that were supposed to keep them safe.
And while a higher floor on oil prices may help refill these states’ coffers, to the extent that Asian economies electrify in response to the Hormuz shock, it could mean that oil demand begins falling faster than expected.
While the United States has not been wholly insulated from the war’s economic effects — gas prices have risen dramatically — it has managed to benefit from oil exports and its electricity sector has been largely unaffected thanks to natural gas prices staying basically unchanged since the war began.
The story is different on the West Coast and in Hawaii. California is essentially the furthest east section of the Asian energy complex, meaning that its refineries and gas stations have had to compete for scarce supplies of oil and gasoline thanks to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile Hawaii, which depends on oil for the bulk of its electricity generation, will soon see price hikes.
Even if traffic is restored through the strait, the shockwaves from its closure will still hit the United States’s westernmost points.
A toll on oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz isn’t technically a carbon tax ... but it also isn’t not.
The United States and Iran have agreed to a 10-day ceasefire, and thank goodness. Israel, the third combatant in the conflict, was reportedly informed late about the ceasefire and isn’t happy about it.
The tentative agreement brings to end, at least for now, a destructive and strategically inept war that has weakened Trump’s political position and strengthened China’s solar, battery, and electric vehicle industries. The conflict paused soon after Trump fantasized about committing genocide against Iran.
The monthlong war has changed the global state of play for the oil industry. Until late February, the Strait of Hormuz was an open shipping lane through which 20% of the world’s crude oil — and even more of its liquified natural gas and jet fuel — passed. But Iran closed the strait during the war’s early phases, threatening to blow up ships with drones or missiles and commencing the worst global energy crisis since the 1970s.
Now, as part of its peace proposal, Iran has pledged to take joint control of the waterway with Oman. It wants to set a toll of roughly $1 per barrel of oil on every ship that passes through the strait, along with as-yet-unspecified fees on food, natural gas, and refined products. The toll will reportedly need to be paid in Chinese yuan or stablecoins so as to circumvent American sanctions.
One of the enjoyable ironies of this state of affairs is that the Iranian regime seems to appreciate a good tariff just as much as President Trump does. But another irony is that this fee — imposed, as it would be, on just under a quarter of the world’s fossil fuels — would amount to a de facto carbon tax.
Naturally, we had to know: How significant a carbon tax would it be?
The answer: Not very big. The Environmental Protection Agency estimates that every barrel of oil produces 0.43 metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions. Divide the new $1 per barrel fee by that figure, and it comes to a tax of roughly $2.33 for every ton of emissions. If you figure that some oil barrels coming out of the strait are more carbon-intensive than others — Basrah Heavy from Iraq is especially dirty, whereas Saudi Arab Light is much cleaner — then the effective carbon tax can flex up or down by about 20 cents. But for even the cleanest fuels, the mooted Iran fee would be about $2.50.
That isn’t very big, as these things go. Nearly a decade ago, a group of former Republican statesmen proposed a $40 per metric ton carbon tax. That was below the $50 per ton social cost of carbon preferred by the Obama administration. It’s closer to what Trump has floated — during his first term, officials suggested a much smaller $2 per ton fee. Of course, all those figures would be much larger today given robust post-pandemic inflation.
(Yes, we know that the “social cost of carbon” isn’t quite the same thing as a carbon tax, but in theory you would set a carbon tax at the social cost of carbon, so as to internalize the emissions’ environmental harms.)
Of course, any future HormE-ZPass system won’t really resemble a carbon tax at all. Because it will only be levied on some of the world’s oil supply, any Iranian tariff will predominantly be paid by Persian Gulf drillers, not by international energy consumers, according to the European think tank Breughel. (And to the degree that the rest of the world can switch to non-oil-burning alternatives, such as electric vehicles, Gulf producers will bear even more of the burden.) Most importantly, the revenue collected by the tariff will go to fund the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, not to decarbonizing the economy or paying down the federal deficit.
But it’s still going to increase the cost of shipping oil out of the Persian Gulf. The kind of tanker that predominates in the strait — aA Very Large Crude Carrier, or VLCC — holds roughly 2 million barrels of oil. That’s a roughly $2 million per ship fee.
A year ago, I joked that Trump seemed to be pursuing a crash decarbonization agenda — cutting off global trade, raising oil and gas drilling costs, and pursuing an energy policy that encouraged countries to switch to batteries, renewables, and electric vehicles. Call him “Degrowth Donald,” I said. Never in my wildest dreams did I envision that Donald would actively consider a carbon tax — and especially an Iranian one, paid in yuan. The president continues to astound.
New research about artificial light tells a nuanced story about our energy usage.
The last time NASA went to the moon, the Apollo 17 astronauts brought back the famous “Blue Marble” photograph of the Earth, as seen from 18,000 miles away. Fifty-three years later, it was time for an update. This week, the Artemis II crew beamed back its own version of the Blue Marble, titled “Hello World.” Though they used a Nikon D5 instead of a 70mm camera, the resulting picture was, in many ways, stunningly similar to the original. Each shows our garden planet, dizzyingly small and bright against the vast blackness of space, looking peaceful and untouched.
Were “Blue Marble” and “Hello World” taken from the night side of the Earth instead, the pictures would differ dramatically. In the 25 years between 1992 and 2017 alone, detectable artificial light on the planet has grown by an estimated 50%. Many parts of the world are expected to lose more than half their visible stars within a generation due to light pollution. Night is “being lost in many countries” due to the onward and upward march of progress and development, the BBC warned in 2017. Researchers have even found that plants, animals, and microbes release more planet-warming carbon dioxide under artificial nighttime light than their counterparts in the natural dark.
But our assumption that the planet is brightening gradually and unidirectionally is flawed, according to a new study in Nature, published today. While prior research on artificial light tracked its changes across months or years, University of Connecticut Professor Zhe Zhu and his colleagues analyzed nearly 1.2 million daily images captured between 2014 and 2022 by NASA’s Black Marble Night Time Light satellites to deepen their understanding of the day-to-day dynamics. “It’s an entirely different perspective” on artificial light compared to what existed before, Zhu told me. “I’d say I’m quite shocked.”
Rather than illustrating the well-known story about the Earth getting brighter, Zhu’s research describes a dynamic, volatile, flickering planet. Though the researchers confirmed a 34% overall increase in brightness during the study’s nine-year scope, it was offset by an 18% dimness, meaning the net increase in brightness was only 16%. Further, nearly half of the portions of land area that experienced at least one change in artificial light also experienced some form of abrupt change — that is, a brightening or dimming event that unfolded over weeks or months rather than years, such as grid failures in Venezuela, load-shedding in South Africa, changes to fossil fuel operations in Texas, and armed conflicts such as the war in Gaza. “We see all the ups and downs of human civilization reflected on a daily basis” in the artificial light, Zhu said.
The data also illustrates the planet’s energy story. In Western Europe, for example, Zhu expected to see increased brightness due to the region’s high level of development. “But it’s entirely the opposite,” he said. “All of Europe is in a dimming area.” The researchers looked more closely and attributed the change largely to the switch to LED bulbs, which are better at directing light at the ground. (Some argue that LED lights have created a kind of Jevons paradox by making affordable lighting cheaper and more widespread; a 2017 study led by Christopher Kyba from the GFZ German Research Centre for Geoscience also argued that LEDs are making skyglow worse because they scatter blue light. Zhu acknowledged that the satellites used in their study do not pick up blue light, which is part of why the transition shows up as a dimming effect; Kyba is a coauthor on the study.)
Dimming in Europe is also attributable to regional energy conservation-related policies. The dimming patterns mapped neatly onto national borders, such as a 33% net drop in France and a 22% drop in the U.K.
Dimming and brightening aren’t necessarily negative or positive indications, though. The Midwest, for example, has dimmed due to economic contraction, including declining urban cores and manufacturing sectors. But like Europe, the region has also implemented energy-efficient lighting programs. In places like West Africa and parts of Asia, brightening indicates improvements in energy access and investment in new infrastructure; in other parts of the world, it might indicate increased fossil fuel extraction, as evidenced by abrupt changes in brightness caused by flaring. Overall, though, artificial light has outpaced population growth. “Each person is emitting more light, so efficiency is, at the global scale, mostly decreasing,” Zhu said.
Beyond the broadest conclusions, using averages in nighttime light as a proxy for economic growth and energy use, as researchers have for decades, is grossly inaccurate, Zhu’s paper shows. His research will likely have significant implications for those working in fields that touch on animal migration, insect behavior, and human health as they relate to light pollution — fields where the assumption had been a gradual increase in light, rather than the more complicated picture of abrupt shifts and changes.
Zhu and his team were working on a three-year grant that has since expired. But he said he hopes that one day there will be a near-real-time, publicly available version of the Dark Marble satellite images his team used for their research. Such a tool would have obvious applications in the climate, energy, and humanitarian sectors, from monitoring energy access, natural disasters, and emissions to tracking regional policies — especially since existing averages, which only relay long-term trends, miss the more dynamic ebbs and flows of our energy infrastructure at the global scale. “It’s not just people using more lights,” he said of the findings. “It’s a tug-o-war.” You just have to know how to look.