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New guidance on the Inflation Reduction Act’s “foreign entities of concern” provision didn’t do much to clarify things.

If you’re in the market for a new car and considering cashing in on the $7,500 federal tax credit for an electric vehicle, I have good news. Also bad news.
The good news is, starting January 1, the credit will be a lot easier to claim. You won’t need to meet a certain level of tax liability to qualify or wait for your tax refund. You can transfer the credit to the dealership and take $7,500 off the sticker price right then and there.
The bad news is that suddenly, nobody knows which — if any — EVs will qualify. On Friday, the Biden administration proposed additional guidelines limiting where the components in eligible EVs are allowed to come from. Those guidelines won’t be finalized until early next year. But all signs indicate that the list of qualifying vehicles is set to shrink.
These changes aren’t coming out of nowhere — they’re part of the way the EV tax credit in the Inflation Reduction Act was designed. Over time, the law phases in additional rules that ask more of automakers in terms of onshoring their production and supply chains and minimizing their reliance on China. Beginning in 2024, if a vehicle contains any battery components that were manufactured or assembled by what’s known as a “foreign entity of concern,” it will no longer meet the requirements for the tax credit. Beginning in 2025, the same rule applies to vehicles containing critical minerals that were extracted or processed by a foreign entity of concern.
What, exactly, is a foreign entity of concern? Under U.S. law, the term applies to a company that is “owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of” North Korea, Russia, Iran, or, yes, China. But what constitutes ownership or control is somewhat fuzzy.
“The implications are enormous because right now, it seems as if every battery that's going into an electric vehicle has some material ties to China,” Jay Turner, a professor of environmental studies at Wellesley College and author of a book on the history of batteries, told me.
In the proposal published Friday, the Biden administration recommended three criteria for interpreting the rule that it hopes will further strengthen American manufacturing of EV components and help diversify supply chains:
1. If the company producing the battery component or mineral is headquartered or incorporated in China, or if the relevant production activities occur in China, the vehicle will not qualify for an IRA tax credit.
2. If China has a 25% or more voting interest, board control, or equity interest in the company producing the component or mineral, the vehicle will not qualify.
3. If a company licenses or contracts with a Chinese firm, and the license entitles the Chinese firm to “exercise effective control” over production, the vehicle will not qualify.
This is a strict interpretation that’s likely to knock some vehicles off the eligibility list. But in a series of meetings with reporters on Wednesday, officials from the Department of the Treasury and Department of Energy said they didn’t know which or how many vehicles would be affected. “Part of the goal here is to put out this rule, and then the auto companies are going to come back to us,” said Wally Adeyomo, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury. “And then we will know which cars qualify.”
Automakers and EV experts have been anxiously awaiting guidance on the IRA’s foreign entities of concern provision. Adeyomo stressed that companies have been aware that these new rules would be coming ever since the law passed and have been making investments to ensure “that their cars would be able to qualify for this over the long term.”
Though it’s hard to fact check that claim, according to an EV supply chain database maintained by Turner and his students, at least 19 battery component factories have been announced in the U.S. and Canada since the passage of the IRA; none are yet operating, but automakers also have the option to buy components from U.S. trade partners. A report on the EV supply chain published by the International Energy Agency in 2022 notes that while China dominates cell component production, controlling 70% of capacity for cathodes and 85% of anodes, Japan and South Korea also had “considerable shares of the supply chain.”
Turner said it was conceivable that there will be models that qualify for the first phase of the rule beginning in January, which only applies to these battery components, but he was skeptical automakers would be able to continue qualifying in 2025, when the limits on critical minerals go into effect. “The further you get up the supply chain, the greater the exposure is to China,” he said. “It's not because China's got all of the critical minerals. It's that China has the processing facilities to turn those minerals into highly refined materials that are needed for the batteries.”
John Podesta, senior advisor to the president on clean energy innovation, said that Biden is “rewriting that story.” Officials pointed to a recent report from the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, which found that the Salton Sea region in California has enough mineable lithium to support more than 375 million batteries for EVs. Turner’s database shows at least a dozen projects planned, rumored, or under construction to process minerals including lithium, cobalt, and graphite.
The guidance also raises questions about a $3.5 billion factory that Ford is building in Michigan to bring the production of safer, cheaper EV batteries to the U.S. The company is licensing technology from the Chinese company CATL, the world’s largest battery manufacturer, to produce batteries made of lithium, iron, and phosphate — which are more abundant than the cobalt and nickel used in the dominant batteries on the market. But the deal has come under scrutiny from House Republicans, who accuse CATL of having business ties to mining companies that use forced labor. Ford put construction on hold in September.
When asked about CATL, Deputy Secretary of Energy David Turk said the agency has not evaluated any individual company’s situation, but that they designed the licensing guidance to ”get at who has effective control in these kinds of situations.“
That could mean Ford is off the hook. Months ago, analysts told The Washington Post that the Chinese company will have little control over the Ford plant’s daily operations. “The way they structured this deal, they are keeping CATL at arm’s length as much as possible,” Sam Abuelsamid, head of e-mobility research at Guidehouse Insights, said.
The Biden administration is attempting to race forward on two sets of goals that are somewhat at odds with each other: speeding adoption of EVs while shifting their production away from China, thereby stimulating domestic industry and creating domestic jobs. When I spoke to Jane Nakano, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, earlier this week, she said that if the Biden administration went with a strict 25% threshold for ownership, it could really accelerate automakers’ efforts to diversify sourcing away from China. “But that will take some time,” she added. “In the immediate future, many of the companies may simply try to compete without being able to access the consumer tax credit.”
Turner said that the question is not whether automakers can compete with low-cost EVs produced in China, but rather whether they can put out EVs that are cheaper than conventional cars on the market here.
“Once you get to the point that EVs are cheaper and we have a robust enough charging network that people aren't worried about running out of juice, I think that'll be the tipping point,” he said.
I should note that if you’re interested in this purely as a prospective consumer of an EV, the only thing you need to know is that your options to take advantage of the tax credit might be more limited come January. However, there is one weird trick to get around this and have a lot more options: Leasing. None of the rules around sourcing, assembly, or ownership apply to leased vehicles.
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Cement, plywood, and some electronic equipment will face 50% levies. But the real cost is much higher.
Here we go again. The United States will impose new 50% tariffs on a slew of imports from Canada, the White House announced on Monday afternoon. The trade levies — which will hit more than 500 categories of goods, from anoraks, beer, and curtains, to yarn, wool, and whey protein — will take effect in 30 days.
The new tariffs don’t seem to be wildfire-related. President Trump threatened to impose new tariffs last week after smoke from Canadian wildfires drifted south over the northern U.S. border, but administration officials have claimed to CNN that these new levies were already in motion by then.
Even so, a few aspects of the announcement stand out. Most important, at least from a generalist perspective, is the legal mechanism that President Trump is using to apply them: Section 338 of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. This passage, which has never been used by a previous president to levy tariffs, allows the United States to tax trade from countries that the president says have “discriminated against” U.S. commerce.
Significant, too, is the fact the White House asserts this new kind of tariff could apply to any kind of product — even those that would normally be covered by the North American free trade pact, the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement. So far, the “Big Three” automakers — whose supply chains cross the Mexican or Canadian borders half a dozen times before a car is finally assembled — have avoided major tariff danger because auto parts and other inputs fall under the USMCA’s auspices. If the White House now thinks it can levy taxes despite that pact, then the risks for Ford, General Motors, and their suppliers have increased.
Energy and critical minerals are exempt from the new tariffs, so Canadian crude oil, gasoline, diesel, natural gas, and electricity will presumably keep flowing into the United States. (That explicit carve-out might be ominous in its own right, because energy had been protected by USMCA so far, too.) By omitting energy, Trump and his officials may be calculating they can avoid major inflationary hazards from this round of tariffs.
Who knows. In any case, to my eye, these tariffs do seem like they could aggravate construction costs and possibly contribute to wider U.S. inflation. There’s already some evidence that data centers are driving a new wave of inflation, for instance, by hiking construction input and labor costs. Yet data centers use a lot of cement — and cement will now face a 50% tariff under the new regime. So too will plywood, plaster, and paperboard, as well as industrial cooling equipment, chemicals, and some circuit boards.
I could keep listing the potential economic costs here — I could point out that overall inflation risk is rising or that average U.S. gas prices rose to $4 a gallon today on the Iran war news — but I think it’s important to look at least one step beyond the hits to commerce alone.
I mentioned earlier that these tariffs are meant to punish “discrimination.” In this case, some of the “discrimination” appears to be what some Canadian provinces did to retaliate against the president’s earlier tariffs. The state-owned liquor stores in Quebec and Ontario, for instance, stopped buying U.S.-made booze after Trump slapped 25% tariffs on Canada in March 2025; those boycotts are mentioned by name in today’s proclamation. Canada, you see, is not supposed to respond to Trump’s tariffs. It is just supposed to take it — just like it’s supposed to take the constant stream of falsehoods, abuse, belittling, and invasion threat.
Over the past few years, politicians and pundits have learned to respond to Trump’s policies by appealing to U.S. self-interest — by explaining how the president’s policies are making Americans poorer. It is a sensible strategy for a morally denuded era. A recent statement from Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer about Canada, for example, criticized the president for hurting “our closest ally and partner … right when summer tourism season is arriving.” I get the move here — and I think, in some sense, Schumer is trying to avoid polarizing Trump’s treatment of Canada along partisan lines — but Canadians are more than their tourism dollars.
For the past several years, Trump has threatened to strip Canada of its sovereignty and its dignity. He has treated what was once a deep and secure relationship as something to be bartered and mined and dissipated. It is a mucilaginous approach to statecraft, and as recent reporting has made clear, its long-term costs will exceed any simple accounting. We Americans have been robbed of an honorable friendship. Some losses cannot be counted in dollars.
In seven years of owning an electric car, I’ve done practically no maintenance. My 2019 Tesla Model 3 has gotten a new set of tires and windshield wipers, but because an EV doesn’t require oil changes or many of the other occasional chores that come with gas cars, that’s about it.
The one thing I have had to fix is the battery, and no, I don’t mean the big one that makes the car go.
Twice in those seven years, I’ve replaced the car’s 12-volt battery. This is the toolbox-sized unit that’s familiar to millions — it’s what the phrase “car battery” used to mean back before electric vehicles. Lots of new or aspiring EV drivers may not even realize their car has a second, smaller battery borrowed from combustion days. But this crucial holdover — the most recycled object on the planet, by the way, at a rate of more than 100 million annually — has already been a source of annoyance for EV engineers and drivers.
The reason behind the weird setup is straightforward. Despite the fact that EVs are effectively giant batteries on wheels, they need a backup source to operate the power windows and doors. If you’re in a car accident that disables the main battery, for instance, you need power to the doors to escape, and also a way to disconnect the high-voltage battery. Thus, the old-fashioned 12-volt battery squirreled away deep inside the car to protect it during collisions.
It’s not just a matter of backup power, either. A large, high-voltage battery would have to step down its electrical output for applications other than pushing a car down the road; it’s simpler to power them with a 12-volt battery and use the big unit to recharge the smaller one. After all, legacy carmakers have decades of experience building this kind of electrical system for gasoline-powered cars. Some EVs also use the 12-volt setup to disconnect the high-voltage power supply when the car is simply parked for a long time.
All this makes solid engineering sense. It also means that a sleek, modern EV is reliant upon the clunky car battery of yesteryear. Some drivers, including those in new Kia EVs, have said they can’t drive their cars even though there’s plenty of juice in the big unit because something went wrong with the 12-volt. As one Reddit commenter wrote: “It seems absurd to design a car that can run out of electrons and not be able to start while it is carrying 70 kWh of energy in a giant battery.” Yet that’s exactly the reality.
There are a few reasons why. As InsideEVs has noted, the rugged old 12-volt keeps getting more and more responsibility. Nowadays, the constant cellular connectivity of modem EVs — as well as features that can be used while the car is parked, such as security systems that tap into the vehicle’s exterior cameras to monitor the surrounding area — can cause a continuous drain on the 12-volt battery. That requires the car’s big battery to “wake up” and recharge the smaller one, which not only bleeds the vehicle’s driving range while it’s sitting still but also causes lots of recharging cycles for the 12-volt, prematurely aging the small battery.
Rivian had notorious problems from this issue for the older R1T and R1S and had to engineer a fix. Hyundais and Kias, meanwhile, have had longstanding issues with their Integrated Charging Control Unit, the system that recharges the 12-volt battery, that have caused a variety of recalls and headaches widely documented in online posts and videos. Chevy and Toyota have endured their own growing pains trying to make a low-voltage electrical system work well inside an EV.
But the car companies are getting smarter. Rather than duplicating what works in gas cars, more of them are building EV-specific systems with this application in mind. For example, the 12-volt in an EV doesn’t need to provide the big single burst needed to start up a gas engine, but it does need to be able to survive being subjected to more recharging cycles. In other words, it’s not that using these batteries in modern EVs is a bad idea — we just need to be smarter about how.
Perhaps EV builders one day will engineer away the old battery. Rivian, for one, has filed a patent for an electrical architecture that would work without a low-voltage battery at all. But those workarounds are a long way out. For now, even the most futuristic-feeling electric cars are stuck with the same kind of battery your dad had to jump-start in the church parking lot that time you left the AC on and the engine wasn’t running. My big, high-voltage battery might keep running forever, even as its capacity continues to diminish. But inevitably, I’ll need another small, dumb battery when this one goes kaput.
GOP lawmakers know climate change is real. But they lack political incentives to do anything about it.
The New York Times recently profiled former Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist and his increasing engagement on climate change. Many of the online comments accused him of hypocrisy. Why, they asked, did he only become concerned about climate change after leaving Congress?
It’s an understandable question.
I have spent the better part of a decade discussing climate change with Republican members of Congress and can see a frequently overlooked part of the answer. During my hundreds of one-on-one conversations with Republican senators and representatives, almost none of them deny that climate change is occurring. Most understand the science well enough, and many acknowledge privately that it presents serious long-term risks.
They don’t lack knowledge. They lack political incentives.
Members of Congress have finite political capital. Every day they must decide which issues deserve their attention. Naturally, they devote their time to the issues that voters, donors, activists, staff, and party leaders tell them matter most.
Politics is a marketplace of incentives. For decades, climate advocates have devoted their efforts to changing Republicans’ minds, but have devoted little effort to changing the incentives for Republicans to act.
The political ecosystem for Democrats could not be more different. Democrats are surrounded by organizations that continually reinforce the importance of climate policy. Environmental groups, philanthropies, labor organizations, advocacy organizations, academics, campaign donors, think tanks, and congressional staff all create an environment in which climate engagement is expected and rewarded.
Republicans experience almost none of that.
When I was quoted in the New York Times article, I described the “eco right” as “a lonely place.” I meant it literally. There are remarkably few conservative organizations whose primary mission is helping Republican elected officials develop serious climate policy. Few donors make climate engagement a condition of support. Few advocacy groups reward constructive leadership. Few congressional staff have access to a deep bench of conservative climate experts. Climate is far more often presented as a political liability than a leadership opportunity.
In that environment, addressing climate change is rarely a priority. This largely explains what puzzles many observers — that Republican leaders often become noticeably more outspoken about addressing climate change after leaving office. The science has not changed. Their incentives have.
Freed from primary elections, fundraising pressures, and the constant competition for legislative attention, they’re able to think about problems whose consequences unfold over decades instead of election cycles.
That observation leads to an uncomfortable conclusion for those of us who want stronger climate policy: Persuading Republicans that climate change is real is not just unnecessary, it’s unproductive. They know it’s real. The more important task is building the institutions that make climate engagement a priority. That means investing in conservative policy organizations, developing Republican congressional staff expertise, supporting Republican governors and state legislators, encouraging business leaders to engage, creating donor networks that reward constructive center-right leadership, and giving Republican members credible partners they can trust.
In other words, we need to make the eco-right a much less lonely place.
Building institutions requires capital, both political and financial. Today, the overwhelming majority of climate-related political spending — whether by advocacy organizations, political action committees, or philanthropically supported campaigns — flows to Democratic candidates and causes. It’s understandable. Democrats have generally been more supportive of climate action, and donors naturally want to reward those who stand with them.
But rewarding allies isn’t the same as expanding the number of them.
If the objective is durable climate policy rather than simply electing more Democrats, then the current allocation of political spending deserves reconsideration. Congress writes laws, and lasting legislation almost always requires bipartisan support. A movement that invests overwhelmingly in one party shouldn’t be surprised when the other party lacks champions, expertise, and political incentives.
Climate philanthropists, advocacy organizations, and political action committees should explicitly seek to create Republican allies by committing a more significant portion of their electoral spending to Republican candidates. This support would send a powerful signal throughout Republican politics that constructive engagement on climate change will be rewarded. More Republican candidates would respond to those incentives, and the universe of viable partners would expand.
For Republicans, the greatest opportunity lies in primary elections. While general elections determine which party governs, primaries determine what kind of Republicans and Democrats will govern. Donors should identify Republican candidates who are willing to engage on a variety of climate-related topics — from adaptation and resilience to market-based policies that reduce emissions to energy innovation — and help them succeed. The objective isn’t ideological purity. It’s to demonstrate that constructive climate leadership is politically viable within today’s Republican Party, and to give those candidates the confidence that they aren’t alone.
Over time, this approach would accomplish something today’s funding model cannot. Rather than simply rewarding an existing coalition, it would create a larger one. It would produce more Republican members who see climate engagement as compatible with conservative principles. Climate change would still be a scientific and economic challenge, but politics would no longer preclude addressing it.
Rather than increasingly evident climate change adding to political division, it could drive both parties to act. America’s biggest policy achievements have generally occurred when a president elevated an issue as a national priority and Congress responded. Tax reform, welfare reform, civil rights, and other major agreements all required presidential leadership before they produced durable bipartisan legislation.
Climate policy has not yet reached that level. While voters increasingly care about it, it does not determine presidential elections or dominate governing agendas.
The closest climate change has come to being a top-tier issue was when President George H.W. Bush signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992, but that was before addressing climate change became so partisan. More recently, President Joe Biden included clean energy tax credits in the Inflation Reduction Act. That modest success is noteworthy in part because it rode upon legislation to address inflation, a top-tier voter issue — and because the provisions were largely repealed less than three years later. Until climate change becomes a presidential-level issue — one that candidates in both parties believe they must address — Congress is unlikely to devote sustained attention to it.
That day will come. And when that moment arrives, the quality of the legislation will depend on the work being done now. If we want bipartisan climate policy tomorrow, we need to build bipartisan political capacity today.
The climate movement has spent decades rewarding allies. The next several decades should be spent adding more. Politics follows incentives more than information. If we want Republicans to lead on addressing climate change or at least become those allies, we must stop just trying to persuade them and start investing in the institutions, incentives, and people that make it possible.