You’re out of free articles.
Log in
To continue reading, log in to your account.
Create a Free Account
To unlock more free articles, please create a free account.
Sign In or Create an Account.
By continuing, you agree to the Terms of Service and acknowledge our Privacy Policy
Welcome to Heatmap
Thank you for registering with Heatmap. Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our lives, a force reshaping our economy, our politics, and our culture. We hope to be your trusted, friendly, and insightful guide to that transformation. Please enjoy your free articles. You can check your profile here .
subscribe to get Unlimited access
Offer for a Heatmap News Unlimited Access subscription; please note that your subscription will renew automatically unless you cancel prior to renewal. Cancellation takes effect at the end of your current billing period. We will let you know in advance of any price changes. Taxes may apply. Offer terms are subject to change.
Subscribe to get unlimited Access
Hey, you are out of free articles but you are only a few clicks away from full access. Subscribe below and take advantage of our introductory offer.
subscribe to get Unlimited access
Offer for a Heatmap News Unlimited Access subscription; please note that your subscription will renew automatically unless you cancel prior to renewal. Cancellation takes effect at the end of your current billing period. We will let you know in advance of any price changes. Taxes may apply. Offer terms are subject to change.
Create Your Account
Please Enter Your Password
Forgot your password?
Please enter the email address you use for your account so we can send you a link to reset your password:
The small hydrogen plant at the Port of Stockton illustrates a key challenge for the energy transition.

Officials at the Port of Stockton, an inland port in the Central Valley of California, were facing a problem. Under pressure from California regulators to convert all port vehicles to zero-emissions models over the next decade or so, they had made some progress, but had hit a wall.
“Right now we only have one tool, and that is to electrify everything,” Jeff Wingfield, the port’s deputy director, told me. The Port of Stockton has actually been something of a national leader in electrifying its vehicles, having converted about 40% of its cargo-handling equipment from diesel-powered to battery-electric machines to date. But there aren’t electric alternatives available for everything yet, and the electric machines they’ve purchased have come with challenges. Sensors have malfunctioned due to colder weather or moisture in the air. Maintenance can’t be done by just any mechanic; the equipment is computerized and requires knowledge of the underlying code. “We’ve had a lot of downtime with the equipment unnecessarily. And so when we’re trying to sell that culture change, you know, these things can set back the mindset and just the overall momentum,” said Wingfield.
The port also needs its tenant companies to make the switch, but according to Wingfield, they are hesitant to invest in the electric truck models available today. They’re more interested in hydrogen fuel-cell trucks, he said, which are also zero-emissions, and there’s even a vendor selling them right down the street. The problem was there was no source of hydrogen within an hour and a half of the port.
It was these conditions that got Wingfield and his colleagues excited about BayoTech, a company that wanted to build a new hydrogen plant there — even though BayoTech was going to make hydrogen from methane, the main component of natural gas, in a carbon emissions-intensive process. Hydrogen fuel-cell powered trucks don’t release any of the carbon or toxic pollutants that diesel trucks release, but the process of making the hydrogen fuel can still be dirty.
While the port was considering BayoTech’s proposal, California leadership was committing the state to building out a climate-friendly hydrogen industry. In July, the Biden administration awarded California $1.2 billion for a $12.6 billion plan to build new, zero-emissions hydrogen supply chains. “California is revolutionizing how a major world economy can clean up its biggest industries,” Governor Gavin Newsom said. “We’re going to use clean, renewable hydrogen to power our ports and public transportation – getting people and goods where they need to go, just without the local air pollution.”
Nonetheless, the port approved the fossil fuel-based hydrogen plant in August.
The case illustrates the complexities of this moment in the energy transition. At its center is a question: Should we gamble with higher emissions today on the premise that it could help lower emissions in the future? It’s a gamble that many climate advocates, guided by warnings from scientists about the consequences of continued fossil fuel use, fear will do more harm than good.
The port, which was the lead agency for the environmental review process, estimated that if all of the fuel BayoTech produced was used as a replacement for diesel, it would result in a net decrease in emissions of 4,317 metric tons of CO2 per year, which is like taking 1,000 cars off the road. Still, the plant will emit about 18 kilograms of carbon for every kilogram of hydrogen it produces — more than four times higher than the Department of Energy’s standard for “clean” hydrogen.
Climate and environmental groups in Stockton oppose the project. They’ve raised a number of concerns about it and the conditions under which it was approved, but one is the missed opportunity. “At a time when incentives are lining up for cleaner production methods,” Davis Harper, the carbon and energy program manager at the local group Restore the Delta, told me, “and at a time when the state in particular is really trying to transition away from methane, to approve a new steam methane reforming project in a community that’s already suffering from so many cumulative impacts of industrial pollution — it’s a major regression.”
Between operations at the port, highways, warehouses, and other industrial activity, Stockton ranks in the 96th percentile for pollution burden in California, and in the 100th percentile for cases of asthma. In addition to carbon dioxide, the BayoTech plant will release nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, and particulate matter. Harper and other local advocates want the community to have more of a say in shaping regional economic development and defining what its hydrogen future looks like. “I think it puts a stain on what the opportunity for hydrogen might be in the community,” he said.
But Wingfield told me it wasn’t an either/or scenario. “I mean, nobody was approaching us with a green hydrogen project,” he said. Even if someone was, Wingfield said green hydrogen was still too expensive and that no one would buy it. The port is supporting state-wide efforts to develop a more sustainable supply of hydrogen in the future, he said, “but it is slow, and for us, we need something now.”
There’s a chicken-and-egg challenge to getting a clean hydrogen economy going. In addition to a new supply of fuel, it will require investments in new vehicles, fueling stations, and modes of delivering the gas — and that’s just for trucking. Decarbonization experts also see potential to use hydrogen for cargo ships, steelmaking, and aviation. “I agree, you know, don’t wait around for the green projects that are being planned to come online,” Lew Fulton, the director of the energy futures research program at the U.C. Davis Institute of Transportation Studies, told me. “There’s a whole bunch of things we need to learn by doing. And so from that point of view, you could argue, well, in the first few years, it doesn’t matter that much what kind of hydrogen it is.”
When I asked Catharine Reid, BayoTech’s chief marketing officer, what brought the company to Stockton, she told me California is a key market and the San Joaquin Valley is currently a dead-zone for the fuel. The Regional Transit District recently purchased five new fuel-cell buses, but to fuel them, it will have to truck in hydrogen from other parts of the state. BayoTech’s business model is designed to address this kind of local need. The company builds small, modular plants and sites them as close to the point of consumption as possible to avoid the cost and emissions associated with transporting the fuel. The project in Stockton will produce just 2 tons of hydrogen per day, or enough to fill the tanks of about 50 trucks. By contrast, the average hydrogen plant in California, which mostly delivers the gas to oil refineries and fertilizer plants, produces closer to 200 tons per day. “We anticipate that that demand will be snapped up quickly,” said Reid.
The port approved the plant using an abbreviated environmental review process — another aspect that troubled the advocates I spoke to — which required BayoTech to mitigate some of its most significant impacts. To reduce pollution, the company will install equipment that cuts the plant’s nitrogen oxide emissions. It has also committed to using zero-emissions vehicles for at least 50% of deliveries. But the biggest pollutant that will come out of the plant is carbon dioxide — just over 12,000 metric tons of it per year. That’s not much compared to the average hydrogen plant. The smallest existing hydrogen plant in California, Air Products’ Sacramento facility, has the capacity to produce more than twice as much hydrogen as BayoTech will, but emitted nearly four times as much carbon in 2021, according to state data. One of BayoTech’s selling points is its technology’s efficiency.
The company has also committed to developing a community benefits plan, which is still in the works, though BayoTech has already signed an agreement to use local union labor and committed to donate $200,000 over the next four years to the community.
Part of BayoTech’s agreement with the port is that it will lower its emissions by purchasing carbon credits from producers of so-called “renewable natural gas,” or RNG, which can mean methane captured from landfills or from cow manure pits. It’s considered low-carbon because the methane would otherwise be released into the atmosphere, where it would warm the planet far more than carbon dioxide. In theory, credit sales help finance systems to capture the gas and use it for energy instead.
I asked Reid why, when there was so much focus on and funding available for clean hydrogen, like California’s $12.6 billion initiative and lucrative new federal tax credits, the company was investing in the fossil-fueled kind. She suggested that once the federal tax credit rules are finalized, the plant may in fact be eligible for the subsidies. That’s because the guidelines might allow hydrogen plants that buy RNG credits to qualify. “It’s a well established system that’s validated,” Reid said of the credits, “and the environmental benefits are there.”
It’s true that this system of RNG credits is well-established. It’s already written into California climate policy. The state has a low carbon fuel standard designed to drive down the average carbon intensity of transportation fuels over time. When it comes to calculating the carbon intensity of hydrogen for the regulations, there’s a workaround. If the hydrogen is made from natural gas, but the supplier purchases RNG credits, they can report their hydrogen as having a very low or even negative carbon intensity.
But the environmental benefits of these credits are the subject of much debate. Notably, fuel producers can buy credits from all over the country, and they don’t have to prove that their purchase had an additional effect on emissions beyond what might have happened otherwise. Though these credits may have some environmental benefit, they are certainly not causing carbon to be removed from the atmosphere, as implied by a negative carbon intensity. In an op-ed for Heatmap, scholars Emily Grubert and Danny Cullenward urged the Treasury Department not to adopt this same carbon accounting scheme for the federal tax credit, writing that it “would undermine the tax credit’s entire purpose.” They estimate that a fossil hydrogen project could qualify as zero-emissions by offsetting just 25% of its natural gas use. This could make it much harder for truly green hydrogen — like the kind made from electricity and water — to compete.
Interestingly, California’s new $12.6 billion clean hydrogen initiative appears to renounce RNG credits. A frequently asked questions page for the plan says that it “will not include the use of plastics, dairy biogas, or fossil methane paired with biomethane credits.”
Still, the California Governor’s Office of Business and Economic Development praised the BayoTech project in public comments, writing that it would “contribute to achieving California’s ambitious climate and pollution reduction goals.”
The letter seemed to be mistaken about what it was supporting, however, noting that the facility would “utilize woody biomass, helping to address two needs — utilization of a waste stream and production of renewable hydrogen.” When I reached out to the governor’s office, spokesperson Willie Rudman told me the reference to woody biomass was an accident, “resulting from a mix-up with another project.” Still, the office supports the project, he said, due to “commitments made by the developer to utilize renewable natural gas as the feedstock, which can be transported to the production facility via existing natural gas pipelines.”
When I noted that this, too, was a mix-up, and that BayoTech would be buying RNG credits, not using the fuel directly, Rudman responded that this was a cost-effective and perfectly acceptable practice under California’s low-carbon fuel standard.
If you view BayoTech’s plant as a bridge to get the hydrogen economy underway, Ethan Elkind, director of the climate program at the University of California, Berkeley’s Center for Law, Energy and the Environment, told me, it’s important to know how to get to the other side. “Is this just a lifeline for the oil and gas industry, to give them another product that they can sell, which those profits then go back into drilling more oil and gas?” He said he wasn’t categorically opposed to the idea of using natural gas to produce hydrogen for now, as long as there were built-in mechanisms to convert the facility to zero-emissions down the line.
Wingfield of the Port of Stockton asserted that BayoTech’s plant would become cleaner over time, but the port has no such commitment in writing, and it’s also not entirely clear how. BayoTech’s Reid was not sure whether the Stockton plant would find a local source of RNG. She said the company was looking, but that it was rare to find alignment between BayoTech’s business model — putting hydrogen production very close to demand — and RNG suppliers. The only other route to cleaner production, other than completely replacing the plant with one that runs on electricity, would be to install carbon capture equipment. But Reid said the amount of carbon the plant produces will be so small that it may not justify the expense. “We continue to talk to players in the industry and evaluate what they’re bringing out commercially to see if there’s a match with our production units,” she said.
Construction on the plant will begin in a few months, Reid told me, and won’t take long. BayoTech expects to be delivering hydrogen in 2025.
Log in
To continue reading, log in to your account.
Create a Free Account
To unlock more free articles, please create a free account.
Microsoft dominated this year.
It’s been a quiet year for carbon dioxide removal, the nascent industry trying to lower the concentration of carbon already trapped in the atmosphere.
After a stretch as the hottest thing in climate tech, the CDR hype cycle has died down. 2025 saw fewer investments and fewer big projects or new companies announced.
This story isn’t immediately apparent if you look at the sales data for carbon removal credits, which paints 2025 as a year of breakout growth. CDR companies sold nearly 30 million tons of carbon removal, according to the leading industry database, CDR.fyi — more than three times the amount sold in 2024. But that topline number hides a more troubling reality — about 90% of those credits were bought by a single company: Microsoft.
If you exclude Microsoft, the total volume of carbon removal purchased this year actually declined by about 100,000 tons. This buyer concentration is the continuation of a trend CDR.fyi observed in its 2024 Year In Review report, although non-Microsoft sales had grown a bit that year compared to 2023.
Trump’s crusade against climate action has likely played a role in the market stasis of this year. Under the Biden administration, federal investment in carbon removal research, development, and deployment grew to new heights. Biden’s Securities and Exchange Commission was also getting ready to require large companies to disclose their greenhouse gas emissions and climate targets, a move that many expected to increase demand for carbon credits. But Trump’s SEC scrapped the rule, and his agency heads have canceled most of the planned investments. (At the time of publication, the two direct air capture projects that Biden’s Department of Energy selected to receive up to $1.2 billion have not yet had their contracts officially terminated, despite both showing up on a leaked list of DOE grant cancellations in October.)
Trump’s overall posture on climate change reduced pressure on companies to act, which probably contributed to there being fewer new buyers entering the carbon removal market, Robert Hoglund, a carbon removal advisor who co-founded CDR.fyi, told me. “I heard several companies say that, yeah, we wouldn't have been able to do this commitment this year. We're glad that we made it several years ago,” he told me.
Kyle Harrison, a carbon markets analyst at BloombergNEF, told me he didn’t view Microsoft’s dominance in the market as a bad sign. In the early days of corporate wind and solar energy contracts, he said, Microsoft, Google, and Amazon were the only ones signing deals, which raised similar questions about the sustainability of the market. “But what it did is it created a blueprint for how you sign these deals and make these nascent technologies more financeable, and then it brings down the cost, and then all of a sudden, you start to get a second generation of companies that start to sign these deals.”
Harrison expects the market to see slower growth in the coming years until either carbon removal companies are able to bring down costs or a more reliable regulatory signal puts pressure on buyers.
Governments in Europe and the United Kingdom introduced a few weak-ish signals this year. The European Union continued to advance a government certification program for carbon removal and expects to finalize methodologies for several CDR methods in 2026. That government stamp of approval may give potential buyers more confidence in the market.
The EU also announced plans to set up a carbon removal “buyers’ club” next year to spur more demand for CDR by pooling and coordinating procurement, although the proposal is light on detail. There were similar developments in the United Kingdom, which announced a new “contract for differences” policy through which the government would finance early-stage direct air capture and bioenergy with carbon capture projects.
A stronger signal, though, could eventually come from places with mandatory emissions cap and trade policies, such as California, Japan, China, the European Union, or the United Kingdom. California already allows companies to use carbon removal credits for compliance with its cap and invest program. The U.K. plans to begin integrating CDR into its scheme in 2029, and the EU and Japan are considering when and how to do the same.
Giana Amador, the executive director of the U.S.-based Carbon Removal Alliance, told me these demand pulls were extremely important. “It tells investors, if you invest in this today, in 10 years, companies will be able to access those markets,” she said.
At the same time, carbon removal companies are not going to be competitive in any of these markets until carbon trades at a substantially higher price, or until companies can make carbon removal less expensive. “We need to both figure out how we can drive down the cost of carbon removal and how to make these carbon removal solutions more effective, and really kind of hone the technology. Those are what is going to unlock demand in the future,” she said.
There’s certainly some progress being made on that front. This year saw more real-world deployments and field tests. Whereas a few years ago, the state of knowledge about various carbon removal methods was based on academic studies of modeling exercises or lab experiments, now there’s starting to be a lot more real-world data. “For me, that is the most important thing that we have seen — continued learning,” Hoglund said.
There’s also been a lot more international interest in the sector. “It feels like there’s this global competition building about what country will be the leader in the industry,” Ben Rubin, the executive director of the Carbon Business Council, told me.
There’s another somewhat deceptive trend in the year’s carbon removal data: The market also appeared to be highly concentrated within one carbon removal method — 75% of Microsoft’s purchases, and 70% of the total sales tracked by CDR.fyi, were credits for bioenergy with carbon capture, where biomass is burned for energy and the resulting emissions are captured and stored. Despite making up the largest volume of credits, however, these were actually just a rare few deals. “It’s the least common method,” Hoglund said.
Companies reported delivering about 450,000 tons of carbon removal this year, according to CDR.fyi’s data, bringing the cumulative total to over 1 million tons to date. Some 80% of the total came from biochar projects, but the remaining deliveries run the gamut of carbon removal methods, including ocean-based techniques and enhanced rock weathering.
Amador predicted that in the near-term, we may see increased buying from the tech sector, as the growth of artificial intelligence and power-hungry data centers sets those companies’ further back on their climate commitments. She’s also optimistic about a growing trend of exploring “industrial integrations” — basically incorporating carbon removal into existing industrial processes such as municipal waste management, agricultural operations, wastewater treatment, mining, and pulp and paper factories. “I think that's something that we'll see a spotlight on next year,” she said.
Another place that may help unlock demand is the Science Based Targets initiative, a nonprofit that develops voluntary standards for corporate climate action. The group has been in the process of revising its Net-Zero Standard, which will give companies more direction about what role carbon removal should play in their sustainability strategies.
The question is whether any of these policy developments will come soon enough or be significant enough to sustain this capital-intensive, immature industry long enough for it to prove its utility. Investment in the industry has been predicated on the idea that demand for carbon removal will grow, Hoglund told me. If growth continues at the pace we saw this year, it’s going to get a lot harder for startups to raise their series B or C.
“When you can't raise that, and you haven't sold enough to keep yourself afloat, then you go out of business,” he said. “I would expect quite a few companies to go out of business in 2026.”
Hoglund was quick to qualify his dire prediction, however, adding that these were normal growing pains for any industry and shouldn’t be viewed as a sign of failure. “It could be interpreted that way, and the vibe may shift, especially if you see a lot of the prolific companies come down,” he said. “But it’s natural. I think that’s something we should be prepared for and not panic about.”
America runs on natural gas.
That’s not an exaggeration. Almost half of home heating is done with natural gas, and around 40% — the plurality — of our electricity is generated with natural gas. Data center developers are pouring billions into natural gas power plants built on-site to feed their need for computational power. In its -260 degree Fahrenheit liquid form, the gas has attracted tens of billions of dollars in investments to export it abroad.
The energy and climate landscape in the United States going into 2026 — and for a long time afterward — will be largely determined by the forces pushing and pulling on natural gas. Those could lead to higher or more volatile prices for electricity and home heating, and even possibly to structural changes in the electricity market.
But first, the weather.
“Heating demand is still the main way gas is used in the U.S.,” longtime natural gas analyst Amber McCullagh explained to me. That makes cold weather — experienced and expected — the main driver of natural gas prices, even with new price pressures from electricity demand.
New sources of demand don’t help, however. While estimates for data center construction are highly speculative, East Daily Analytics figures cited by trade publication Natural Gas Intel puts a ballpark figure of new data center gas demand at 2.5 billion cubic feet per day by the end of next year, compared to 0.8 billion cubic feet per day for the end of this year. By 2030, new demand from data centers could add up to over 6 billion cubic feet per day of natural gas demand, East Daley Analytics projects. That’s roughly in line with the total annual gas production of the Eagle Ford Shale in southwest Texas.
Then there are exports. The U.S. Energy Information Administration expects outbound liquified natural gas shipments to rise to 14.9 billion cubic feet per day this year, and to 16.3 billion cubic feet in 2026. In 2024, by contrast, exports were just under 12 billion cubic feet per day.
“Even as we’ve added demand for data centers, we’re getting close to 20 billion per day of LNG exports,” McCullagh said, putting more pressure on natural gas prices.
That’s had a predictable effect on domestic gas prices. Already, the Henry Hub natural gas benchmark price has risen to above $5 per million British thermal units earlier this month before falling to $3.90, compared to under $3.50 at the end of last year. By contrast, LNG export prices, according to the most recent EIA data, are at around $7 per million BTUs.
This yawning gap between benchmark domestic prices and export prices is precisely why so many billions of dollars are being poured into LNG export capacity — and why some have long been wary of it, including Democratic politicians in the Northeast, which is chronically short of natural gas due to insufficient pipeline infrastructure. A group of progressive Democrats in Congress wrote a letter to Secretary of Energy Chris Wright earlier this year opposing additional licenses for LNG exports, arguing that “LNG exports lead to higher energy prices for both American families and businesses.”
Industry observers agree — or at least agree that LNG exports are likely to pull up domestic prices. “Henry Hub is clearly bullish right now until U.S. gas production catches up,” Ira Joseph, a senior research associate at the Center for Global Energy Policy at Columbia University, told me. “We’re definitely heading towards convergence” between domestic and global natural gas prices.
But while higher natural gas prices may seem like an obvious boon to renewables, the actual effect may be more ambiguous. The EIA expects the Henry Hub benchmark to average $4 per million BTUs for 2026. That’s nothing like the $9 the benchmark hit in August 2022, the result of post-COVID economic restart, supply tightness, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Still, a tighter natural gas market could mean a more volatile electricity and energy sector in 2026. The United States is basically unique globally in having both large-scale domestic production of coal and natural gas that allows its electricity generation to switch between them. When natural gas prices go up, coal burning becomes more economically attractive.
Add to that, the EIA forecasts that electricity generation will have grown 2.4% by the end of 2025, and will grow another 1.7% in 2026, “in contrast to relatively flat generation from 2010 to 2020. That is “primarily driven by increasing demand from large customers, including data centers,” the agency says.
This is the load growth story. With the help of the Trump administration, it’s turning into a coal growth story, too.
Already several coal plants have extended out their retirement dates, either to maintain reliability on local grids or because the Trump administration ordered them to. In America’s largest electricity market, PJM Interconnection, where about a fifth of the installed capacity is coal, diversified energy company Alliance Resource Partners expects 4% to 6% demand growth, meaning it might even be able to increase coal production. Coal consumption has jumped 16% in PJM in the first nine months of 2025, the company’s Chairman Joseph Kraft told analysts.
“The domestic thermal coal market is continuing to experience strong fundamentals, supported by an unprecedented combination of federal energy and environmental policy support plus rapid demand growth,” Kraft said in a statement accompanying the company’s October third quarter earnings report. He pointed specifically to “natural gas pricing dynamics” and “the dramatic load growth required by artificial intelligence.”
Observers are also taking notice. “The key driver for coal prices remains strong natural gas prices,” industry newsletter The Coal Trader wrote.
In its December short term outlook, the EIA said that it expects “coal consumption to increase by 9% in 2025, driven by an 11% increase in coal consumption in the electric power sector this year as both natural gas costs and electricity demand increased,” while falling slightly in 2026 (compared to 2025), leaving coal consumption sill above 2024 levels.
“2025 coal generation will have increased for the first time since the last time gas prices spiked,” McCullagh told me.
Assuming all this comes to pass, the U.S.’s total carbon dioxide emissions will have essentially flattened out at around 4.8 million metric tons. The ultimate cost of higher natural gas prices will likely be felt far beyond the borders of the United States and far past 2026.
Lawmakers today should study the Energy Security Act of 1980.
The past few years have seen wild, rapid swings in energy policy in the United States, from President Biden’s enthusiastic embrace of clean energy to President Trump’s equally enthusiastic re-embrace of fossil fuels.
Where energy industrial policy goes next is less certain than any other moment in recent memory. Regardless of the direction, however, we will need creative and effective policy tools to secure our energy future — especially for those of us who wish to see a cleaner, greener energy system. To meet the moment, we can draw inspiration from a largely forgotten piece of energy industrial policy history: the Energy Security Act of 1980.
After a decade of oil shocks and energy crises spanning three presidencies, President Carter called for — and Congress passed — a new law that would “mobilize American determination and ability to win the energy war.” To meet that challenge, lawmakers declared their intent “to utilize to the fullest extent the constitutional powers of the Congress” to reduce the nation’s dependence on imported oil and shield the economy from future supply shocks. Forty-five years later, that brief moment of determined national mobilization may hold valuable lessons for the next stage of our energy industrial policy.
The 1970s were a decade of energy volatility for Americans, with spiking prices and gasoline shortages, as Middle Eastern fossil fuel-producing countries wielded the “oil weapon” to throttle supply. In his 1979 “Crisis of Confidence” address to the nation, Carter warned that America faced a “clear and present danger” from its reliance on foreign oil and urged domestic producers to mobilize new energy sources, akin to the way industry responded to World War II by building up a domestic synthetic rubber industry.
To develop energy alternatives, Congress passed the Energy Security Act, which created a new government-run corporation dedicated to investing in alternative fuels projects, a solar bank, and programs to promote geothermal, biomass, and renewable energy sources. The law also authorized the president to create a system of five-year national energy targets and ordered one of the federal government’s first studies on the impacts of greenhouse gases from fossil fuels.
Carter saw the ESA as the beginning of an historic national mission. “[T]he Energy Security Act will launch this decade with the greatest outpouring of capital investment, technology, manpower, and resources since the space program,” he said at the signing. “Its scope, in fact, is so great that it will dwarf the combined efforts expended to put Americans on the Moon and to build the entire Interstate Highway System of our country.” The ESA was a recognition that, in a moment of crisis, the federal government could revive the tools it once used in wartime to meet an urgent civilian challenge.
In its pursuit of energy security, the Act deployed several remarkable industrial policy tools, with the Synthetic Fuels Corporation as the centerpiece. The corporation was a government-run investment bank chartered to finance — and in some cases, directly undertake — alternative fuels projects, including those derived from coal, shale, and oil.. Regardless of the desirability or feasibility of synthetic fuels, the SFC as an institution illustrates the type of extraordinary authority Congress was once willing to deploy to address energy security and stand up an entirely new industry. It operated outside of federal agencies, unencumbered by the normal bureaucracy and restrictions that apply to government.
Along with everything else created by the ESA, the Sustainable Fuels Corporation was also financed by a windfall profits tax assessed on oil companies, essentially redistributing income from big oil toward its nascent competition. Both the law and the corporation had huge bipartisan support, to the tune of 317 votes for the ESA in the House compared to 93 against, and 78 to 12 in the Senate.
The Synthetic Fuels Corporation was meant to be a public catalyst where private investment was unlikely to materialize on its own. Investors feared that oil prices could fall, or that OPEC might deliberately flood the market to undercut synthetic fuels before they ever reached scale. Synthetic fuel projects were also technically complex, capital-intensive undertakings, with each plant costing several billion dollars, requiring up to a decade to plan and build.
To address this, Congress equipped the corporation with an unusually broad set of tools. The corporation could offer loans, loan guarantees, price guarantees, purchase agreements, and even enter joint ventures — forms of support meant to make first-of-a-kind projects bankable. It could assemble financing packages that traditional lenders viewed as too risky. And while the corporation was being stood up, the president was temporarily authorized to use Defense Production Act powers to initiate early synthetic fuel projects. Taken together, these authorities amounted to a federal attempt to build an entirely new energy industry.
While the ESA gave the private sector the first shot at creating a synthetic fuels industry, it also created opportunities for the federal government to invest. The law authorized the Synthetic Fuels Corporation to undertake and retain ownership over synthetic fuels construction projects if private investment was insufficient to meet production targets. The SFC was also allowed to impose conditions on loans and financial assistance to private developers that gave it a share of project profits and intellectual property rights arising out of federally-funded projects. Congress was not willing to let the national imperative of energy security rise or fall on the whims of the market, nor to let the private sector reap publicly-funded windfalls.
Employing logic that will be familiar to many today, Carter was particularly concerned that alternative fuel sources would be unduly delayed by permitting rules and proposed an Energy Mobilization Board to streamline the review process for energy projects. Congress ultimately refused to create it, worried it would trample state authority and environmental protections. But the impulse survived elsewhere. At a time when the National Environmental Policy Act was barely 10 years old and had become the central mechanism for scrutinizing major federal actions, Congress provided an exemption for all projects financed by the Synthetic Fuels Corporation, although other technologies supported in the law — like geothermal energy — were still required to go through NEPA review. The contrast is revealing — a reminder that when lawmakers see an energy technology as strategically essential, they have been willing not only to fund it but also to redesign the permitting system around it.
Another forgotten feature of the corporation is how far Congress went to ensure it could actually hire top tier talent. Lawmakers concluded that the federal government’s standard pay scales were too low and too rigid for the kind of financial, engineering, and project development expertise the Synthetic Fuels Corporation needed. So it gave the corporation unusual salary flexibility, allowing it to pay above normal civil service rates to attract people with the skills to evaluate multibillion dollar industrial projects. In today’s debates about whether federal agencies have the capacity to manage complex clean energy investments, this detail is striking. Congress once knew that ambitious industrial policy requires not just money, but people who understand how deals get done.
But the Energy Security Act never had the chance to mature. The corporation was still getting off the ground when Carter lost the 1980 election to Ronald Reagan. Reagan’s advisers viewed the project as a distortion of free enterprise — precisely the kind of government intervention they believed had fueled the broader malaise of the 1970s. While Reagan had campaigned on abolishing the Department of Energy, the corporation proved an easier and more symbolic target. His administration hollowed it out, leaving it an empty shell until Congress defunded it entirely in 1986.
At the same time, the crisis atmosphere that had justified the Energy Security Act began to wane. Oil prices fell nearly 60% during Reagan’s first five years, and with them the political urgency behind alternative fuels. Drained of its economic rationale, the synthetic fuels industry collapsed before it ever had a chance to prove whether it could succeed under more favorable conditions. What had looked like a wartime mobilization suddenly appeared to many lawmakers to be an expensive overreaction to a crisis that had passed.
Yet the ESA’s legacy is more than an artifact of a bygone moment. It offers at least three lessons that remain strikingly relevant today:
As we now scramble to make up for lost time, today’s clean energy push requires institutions that can survive electoral swings. Nearly half a century after the ESA, we must find our way back to that type of institutional imagination to meet the energy challenges we still face.