You’re out of free articles.
Log in
To continue reading, log in to your account.
Create a Free Account
To unlock more free articles, please create a free account.
Sign In or Create an Account.
By continuing, you agree to the Terms of Service and acknowledge our Privacy Policy
Welcome to Heatmap
Thank you for registering with Heatmap. Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our lives, a force reshaping our economy, our politics, and our culture. We hope to be your trusted, friendly, and insightful guide to that transformation. Please enjoy your free articles. You can check your profile here .
subscribe to get Unlimited access
Offer for a Heatmap News Unlimited Access subscription; please note that your subscription will renew automatically unless you cancel prior to renewal. Cancellation takes effect at the end of your current billing period. We will let you know in advance of any price changes. Taxes may apply. Offer terms are subject to change.
Subscribe to get unlimited Access
Hey, you are out of free articles but you are only a few clicks away from full access. Subscribe below and take advantage of our introductory offer.
subscribe to get Unlimited access
Offer for a Heatmap News Unlimited Access subscription; please note that your subscription will renew automatically unless you cancel prior to renewal. Cancellation takes effect at the end of your current billing period. We will let you know in advance of any price changes. Taxes may apply. Offer terms are subject to change.
Create Your Account
Please Enter Your Password
Forgot your password?
Please enter the email address you use for your account so we can send you a link to reset your password:

China’s car industry has been on a tear lately. Last year, China became the world’s largest auto exporter, and its home-grown carmaker BYD recently eclipsed Tesla as the world’s No. 1 maker of electrified vehicles.
If China were following a playbook first written by Japanese or Korean automakers, you’d expect them to start selling their cars in the United States pretty soon. But China — unlike Japan or South Korea — is not an American ally, and so it’s going to have to follow a different path.
On Thursday, the Biden administration opened an investigation into the national security risks posed by Chinese-made “connected vehicles,” which essentially means any vehicle or any car part that connects to the internet. New cars, especially EVs, are outfitted with cameras, sensors, or cellular modems required for modern safety features.
The probe is the first part of what is likely to be a broad American policy response to the rise of Chinese electric vehicles. “China’s policies could flood our market with its vehicles, posing risks to our national security,” President Joe Biden said in a statement. “I’m not going to let that happen on my watch.”
The investigation is a big deal, in part because it marks that the backlash to Chinese EVs has begun in earnest in the U.S. Look closely and you’ll see Biden’s quote this morning gives away the game: Is the risk that Chinese vehicles flood the market, or is the risk that they’ll harm national security? For this administration, one has the sense that it’s both.
In a press briefing with reporters, Commerce Secretary Gina Rainmondo, whose office will lead the investigation, argued that these sensors and computers could pose a risk to national security.
“Imagine if there were thousands, or hundreds of thousands, of Chinese connected vehicles on American roads that could be immediately and simultaneously disabled by somebody in Beijing,” she said. “It doesn’t take a lot of imagination to figure out how a foreign adversary like China with access to this sort of information at scale could pose a serious risk for national security and the privacy of U.S. citizens.”
It was crucial to launch the investigation now, she added, before Chinese-made vehicles became more prevalent on American roads. Today, only a handful of brands — including Volvo, Polestar, and Buick — sell Chinese-made vehicles in the United States, and no Chinese-originating brand sells cars here.
There are three more things to observe about the sudden American action against Chinese EVs.
First, the administration’s actions aren’t particularly surprising. As I’ve previously written, the rise of Chinese EVs poses an existential threat to the legacy American automakers, including Ford and General Motors. These companies employ four times more workers in Michigan than in any other state, and Biden’s path to reelection runs straight through Michigan this November.
And even though Biden’s climate agenda has been aggressively focused on domestic development — you could argue that the Inflation Reduction Act is as much about national competitiveness as emissions reductions, per se — Donald Trump will claim no matter what that Biden’s climate policy is a “job-killing” gift to China. So Biden has to be especially certain that Chinese-made EVs don’t threaten — can’t even seem like a threat — to the Michigan auto industry.
Democrats, too, are not alone in calling for action against Chinese EV makers. Republicans have already branded Biden’s pro-EV campaign as a giveaway to China. On Wednesday, Senator Josh Hawley, a far-right Missouri Republican, proposed legislation that would raise tariffs on Chinese EVs much higher than their current level — to an astounding 125%. That would exceed the highest tariff rates on the books, and it would also apply the duties to Chinese-branded EVs made anywhere in the world, including in countries that the U.S. has a free-trade agreement with.
Second, the investigation reflects just how difficult it will be for the United States and China to keep from fighting over their highest quality technological exports. Over the past few years, the U.S. has targeted or restricted Huawei devices and the social network TikTok. China has slapped rules on how Apple’s and Tesla’s products can be used.
At Heatmap, we have written frequently about how the effort to deploy green technologies is becoming inseparable from geopolitics. But this fight is over something much broader than zero-carbon technologies — it’s potentially about digitized products, anything with software, which includes electric vehicles and batteries as well as smartphones and gadgets. If the American government now believes that Chinese-made products with cameras or sensors risk U.S. national security, then potentially a whole range of products — robot vacuums, e-bikes, GPS watches, even home appliances — could pose some sort of security risk. Electric vehicles may represent a greater security risk, but the difference between them and, say, phones is one of degrees and not kind.
Finally, the investigation reveals something that canny observers have already noted: Tariffs alone probably can’t keep Chinese-branded EVs out of the American market forever. BYD, the world’s No. 1 seller of electrified vehicles, is planning to open a factory in Mexico; it already sells its cars there. If BYD succeeds in establishing a North American beachhead, then its cars could potentially fall under U.S.-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement rules and freely enter the United States. (The Hawley bill would theoretically circumvent this by applying its tariffs to Chinese-branded vehicles wherever they are made. Whether this would actually be worth the rift it would open with one of our most important manufacturing partners is an open question.)
Those vehicles could rapidly become the most affordable new cars on the road — if not in the United States itself, then in Mexico and Canada, where American brands compete. BYD recently advertised an $11,000 plug-in hybrid targeted at the Chinese market. Even if meeting American highway safety regulations added another $4,000 to that vehicle’s cost, it would still be among the cheapest new cars sold in this country. Even doubling its price with tariffs would keep it firmly among the country’s most affordable new vehicles.
That could be good. Electric vehicles need to get cheaper everywhere, including the U.S., if we are to fight climate change. Likewise, the Commerce Department’s investigation could result in a happy outcome, by which the national security and privacy risks of Chinese EVs could be managed — through software, for instance — allowing BYD or Polestar to sell some cars here without exposing Americans to significant risk. But that’s not the the direction that I expect things to take.
Log in
To continue reading, log in to your account.
Create a Free Account
To unlock more free articles, please create a free account.
Rob digs deep on critical minerals with Full Tilt Strategies’ Nathaniel Horadam.
President Trump announced on Monday that the U.S. would create a domestic stockpile of critical minerals for civilian use — essentially a Strategic Petroleum Reserve, but for lithium, copper, rare earths, and other rocks central to electronics and decarbonization.
It’s one of many experimental and unusual steps that the administration has taken to boost U.S. mineral production over the past 13 months. But are any of those plans working? What could improve — and what does any of this mean for clean energy?
On this week’s Shift Key, we talk to someone who saw these policies up close. From 2023 to 2025, Nathaniel Horadam worked on electric vehicle and mineral policy at the Department of Energy’s Loan Programs Office, eventually overseeing the office’s critical mineral portfolio last year. The office is the department’s in-house bank (it’s since been rechristened the Energy Dominance Financing Office) and it runs some of the federal government’s most ambitious industrial policy.
Horadam is now founder and president of Full Tilt Strategies, LLC, and he writes about mineral issues for his Tailings substack. He joins us to discuss what’s working, what’s not working, and what needs to improve. Shift Key is hosted by Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap, and Jesse Jenkins, a professor of energy systems engineering at Princeton University. Jesse is off this week.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, or wherever you get your podcasts.
You can also add the show’s RSS feed to your podcast app to follow us directly.
Here is an excerpt from our conversation:
Nathaniel Horadam: My like third cardinal rule here: Losing money is okay. At the end of the day, you’re providing an insurance policy —
Robinson Meyer: The government losing money is okay.
Horadam: Yeah. I mean, at the end of the day, one of my biggest observational complaints with the way the Trump administration’s approaching a lot of these deals right now is they’re being structured to not lose money.
Even if they’re taking risk, you’re taking equity stakes, and you’re looking to collateralize enough stuff. It’s a private equity mindset. It’s not necessarily setting up projects to succeed in the long term, and mechanisms to succeed in the long term. And the same thing — I mean, the Export-Import Bank, I applaud them for getting creative here and trying to find ways to extend its existing authorities as much as possible. But Ex-Im has a pretty strict loss cap that has traditionally constrained the amount of risk it can take. And between that and the fact that they were able to pull in outside investors to do this means it’s being structured to make a profit.
That may run against the goals of actually trying to provide the shock absorbers that you need for actual critical materials. I hope it doesn’t end up steering deal flow toward things that are more lucrative to try and keep this in the green and meet investor expectations. Certainly the encouraging bit that I saw in the Bloomberg story is that they are letting the industrial end users dictate what they stockpile. But at the end of the day, it’s still controlled by an administration that’s getting a lot of pressure to fix various markets for different materials, and it may be inclined to intervene in places that are a little bit outta scope. Let’s put it that way.
Mentioned:
Final 2025 List of Critical Minerals
Reuters: US moves away from critical mineral price floors
“What exactly are ‘Critical Minerals’?,” by Nathaniel Horadam
The Secure Minerals Act, by Senators Todd Young and Jeanne Shaheen
The Pentagon’s Rare Earths Deal Is Making Former Biden Officials Jealous
This episode of Shift Key is sponsored by ...
Accelerate your clean energy career with Yale’s online certificate programs. Explore the 10-month Financing and Deploying Clean Energy program or the 5-month Clean and Equitable Energy Development program. Use referral code HeatMap26 and get your application in by the priority deadline for $500 off tuition to one of Yale’s online certificate programs in clean energy. Learn more at cbey.yale.edu/online-learning-opportunities.
Music for Shift Key is by Adam Kromelow.
The FREEDOM Act aims to protect energy developments from changing political winds.
A specter is haunting permitting reform talks — the specter of regulatory uncertainty. That seemingly anodyne two-word term has become Beltway shorthand for President Donald Trump’s unrelenting campaign to rescind federal permits for offshore wind projects. The repeated failure of the administration’s anti-wind policies to hold up in court aside, the precedent the president is setting has spooked oil and gas executives, who warn that a future Democratic government could try to yank back fossil fuel projects’ permits.
A new bipartisan bill set to be introduced in the House Tuesday morning seeks to curb the executive branch’s power to claw back previously-granted permits, protecting energy projects of all kinds from whiplash every time the political winds change.
Dubbed the FREEDOM Act, the legislation — a copy of which Heatmap obtained exclusively — is the latest attempt by Congress to speed up construction of major energy and mining projects as the United States’ electricity demand rapidly eclipses new supply and Chinese export controls send the price of key critical minerals skyrocketing.
Two California Democrats, Representatives Josh Harder and Adam Gray, joined three Republicans, Representatives Mike Lawler of New York, Don Bacon of Nebraska, and Chuck Edwards of North Carolina, to sponsor the bill.
While green groups have criticized past proposals to reform federal permitting as a way to further entrench fossil fuels by allowing oil and gas to qualify for the new shortcuts, Harder pitched the bill as relief to ratepayers who “are facing soaring energy prices because we’ve made it too hard to build new energy projects.”
“The FREEDOM Act delivers the smart, pro-growth certainty that critical energy projects desperately need by cutting delays, fast-tracking approvals, and holding federal agencies accountable,” he told me in a statement. “This is a common sense solution that will mean more energy projects being brought online in the short term and lower energy costs for our families for the long run.”
The most significant clause in the 77-page proposal lands on page 59. The legislation prohibits federal agencies and officials from issuing “any order or directive terminating the construction or operation of a fully permitted project, revoke any permit or authorization for a fully permitted project, or take any other action to halt, suspend, delay, or terminate an authorized activity carried out to support a fully permitted project.”
There are, of course, exceptions. Permits could still be pulled if a project poses “a clear, immediate, and substantiated harm for which the federal order, directive, or action is required to prevent, mitigate, or repair.” But there must be “no other viable alternative.”
Such a law on the books would not have prevented the Trump administration from de-designating millions of acres of federal waters to offshore wind development, to pick just one example. But the legislation would explicitly bar Trump’s various attempts to halt individual projects with stop work orders. Even the sweeping order the Department of the Interior issued in December that tried to stop work on all offshore wind turbines currently under construction on the grounds of national security would have needed to prove that the administration exhausted all other avenues first before taking such a step.
Had the administration attempted something similar anyway, the legislation has a mechanism to compensate companies for the costs racked up by delays. The so-called De-Risking Compensation Fund, which the bill would establish at the Treasury Department, would kick in if the government revoked a permit, canceled a project, failed to meet deadlines set out in the law for timely responses to applications, or ran out the clock on a project such that it’s rendered commercially unviable.
The maximum payout is equal to the company’s capital contribution, with a $5 million minimum threshold, according to a fact-sheet summarizing the bill for other lawmakers who might consider joining as co-sponsors. “Claims cannot be denied based on project permits or energy technology type,” the document reads. A company that would have benefited from a payout, for example, would be TC Energy, the developer behind the Keystone XL oil pipeline the Biden administration canceled shortly after taking office.
Like other permitting reform legislation, the FREEDOM Act sets new rules to keep applications moving through the federal bureaucracy. Specifically, it gives courts the right to decide whether agencies that miss deadlines should have to pay for companies to hire qualified contractors to complete review work.
The FREEDOM Act also learned an important lesson from the SPEED Act, another bipartisan bill to overhaul federal permitting that passed the House in December but has since become mired in the Senate. The SPEED Act lost Democratic support — ultimately passing the House with just 11 Democratic votes — after far-right Republicans and opponents of offshore wind leveraged a special carveout to continue allowing the administration to commence its attacks on seaborne turbine projects.
The amendment was a poison pill. In the Senate, a trio of key Democrats pushing for permitting reform, Senate Energy and Natural Resources ranking member Martin Heinrich, Environment and Public Works ranking member Sheldon Whitehouse, and Hawaii senator Brian Schatz, previously told Heatmap’s Jael Holzman that their support hinged on curbing Trump’s offshore wind blitz.
Those Senate Democrats “have made it clear that they expect protections against permitting abuses as part of this deal — the FREEDOM Act looks to provide that protection,” Thomas Hochman, the director of energy and infrastructure policy at the Foundation for American Innovation, told me. A go-to policy expert on clearing permitting blockages for energy projects, Hochman and his center-right think tank have been in talks with the lawmakers who drafted the bill.
A handful of clean-energy trade groups I contacted did not get back to me before publication time. But American Clean Power, one of the industry’s dominant associations, withdrew its support for the SPEED Act after Republicans won their carveout. The FREEDOM Act would solve for that objection.
The proponents of the FREEDOM Act aim for the bill to restart the debate and potentially merge with parts of the previous legislation.
“The FREEDOM Act has all the critical elements you’d hope to see in a permitting certainty bill,” Hochman said. “It’s tech-neutral, it covers both fully permitted projects and projects still in the pipeline, and it provides for monetary compensation to help cover losses for developers who have been subject to permitting abuses.”
Maybe utilities’ “natural monopoly” isn’t so natural after all.
Debates over electricity policy usually have a common starting point: the “natural monopoly” of the transmission system, wherein the poles and wires that connect power plants to homes and businesses have exclusive franchises in a certain territory and charge regulated rates to access them.
The thinking is that without a monopoly franchise, no one would make the necessary capital expenditures to build and maintain the power lines and grid infrastructure necessary to connect the whole system, especially if they thought someone would build a new transmission line nearby. So while a government body oversees investment and prices, the utility itself is not subject to market-based competition.
But what if someone really did want to build their own wires?
“There are at least two of us who do not think that electricity is a natural monopoly,” Glen Lyons, the founder of Advocates for Consumer Regulated Electricity, told me.
The other one is Travis Fisher, an energy scholar at the Cato Institute, who corrected his friend and colleague.
“Between me, and Joseph Schumpeter, and Wayne Crews, and Glen Lyons, there’s at least four of us. Only three of us are alive,” Fisher said, referencing the Austrian economist Schumpeter, who died in 1950, and the libertarian scholar Crews, who was a critic of the restructuring of the electricity market in the 1990s.
Fisher and Lyons, however, are the team behind a proposal put out on Tuesday by the libertarian Cato Institute calling for “consumer-regulated electricity.” Instead of a transmission system with a monopoly franchise that independent generators can connect to and sell power to utilities in a process regulated by a combination of a public utility commission and regional transmission organization or independent system operators, CRE systems would be physically islanded electricity systems that customers would privately and voluntarily sign up for.
Crucially, CRE would not be regulated under existing federal law, and would have no connection to the existing grid, allowing for novel price structures and even physical set-ups, like running on different frequencies or even direct current, Fisher said.
They would also, Fisher and Lyons argue, help solve the dilemma haunting electricity policymakers: how to bring new load on the grid quickly without saddling existing ratepayers with the cost of paying for utility upgrades.
“If enabled, CRE utilities would generate, transmit, and sell electricity directly to customers under voluntary contracts, without interconnecting to the existing regulated grid or seeking permission from economic regulators at the state or federal level,” the Cato proposal reads.
This idea has a natural audience among political conservatives, as it’s essentially a bet that more entrepreneurship and less regulation will solve some of our biggest energy system problems. On the other hand, utilities tend to be a powerful force in conservative politics at both the state and federal levels, which is one reason why these kinds of ideas are still marginal.
But less marginal than they have been.
Consumer-regulated electricity is more than just another think tank white paper. It has also won the approval of the influential American Legislative Exchange Council, better known as ALEC, a conservative group that writes model legislation for state legislatures to adopt. Fisher proposed version of the consumer-regulated utilities plan to the network in December of last year, and ALEC approved it in January.
A few days after the group finalized the model policy to allow CRE at the state level, Arkansas Senator Tom Cotton proposed his own version in the form of the DATA Act, which would “amend the Federal Power Act to exempt consumer-regulated electric utilities from Federal regulation.”
While the CRE proposal is a big conceptual departure from about a century of electricity regulation, the actual reform is modest. Fisher and Lyons propose a structure would apply solely to “sophisticated customers … who voluntarily contract for service and can manage their own risks,” i.e. big industrial users like data centers, not your home.
While this sounds like behind the meter generation, whereby large electricity users such as, say, xAI in Memphis, simply set up their own electricity plants, CRE goes further. The idea is to capture the self-regulation benefits of building your own power within a structure that still allows for the economies of scale of a grid. Or in the words of Cato’s proposal, CRE “would enable third-party utilities to serve many customers, resulting in lower costs, higher reliability, and a smaller environmental footprint compared to self-supply options.”
Fisher and Lyons argue that CRE would also have an advantage over so-called co-location, where data centers are built adjacent to generation and share interconnection with the grid, which still requires interacting with public utility commissions and utilities. The pair have also suggested that the Department of Energy and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission use its existing rulemaking process on data center interconnection to encourage states to pass the necessary laws to allow islanded utility systems.
While allowing totally private utility systems may be a radical — and certainly a libertarian — departure from the utility regulation system as it exists today, proposals are popping up on both the left and the right to try to reduce utility influence over the electricity system.
Tom Steyer, the hedge fund billionaire and climate investor who is running for governor of California, has said that he would “break up the utility monopolies to lower electric bills by 25%.” In a January press conference, Steyer clarified that he “wants to force utility companies to choose cheaper ways of wildfire-proofing their infrastructure and give customers other options for buying power, including making it easier to build neighborhood-level solar projects or allowing more communities to operate their own local grids,” according to CalMatters. California already has some degree of retail choice, although a more expansive version of a retail competition model infamously collapsed during the 2001 rolling blackouts.
To Fisher, while his and Lyons’ proposal is in some ways radical, it is also not a particularly big risk. If there’s truly no demand for private electricity networks, none will be built and nothing will change, even if there’s regulatory reform to allow for it.“I’m not surprised to see it get traction,” Fisher said of the plan, “just because there’s no downside, and the upside could be absolutely nothing — or it could be a breakthrough.”