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The bright side of Chinese “overinvestment” in clean technology.

As nearly any six year old would be more than happy to tell you, the problem is never that there is too much ice cream, or too many toys, or too much screen time. Yet adults considering the political and economic challenges of decarbonizing energy systems continue to harp on the downsides of “overcapacity” — in China, specifically — of production for clean technologies, namely solar and batteries and EVs.
As Heatmap’s own Robinson Meyer has argued, China’s monumental “overinvestment” in clean technologies may lead to trade difficulties with the United States and European Union, which are attempting to stand up cleantech production either inside their own borders or within others they’ve deemed acceptable (a concept that goes by various names, such as reshoring, nearshoring, and friendshoring) and see Chinese competition as likely to strangle these infant industries before they can stand up on their own.
However accurate that view might be, it’s important to remember that China’s investments in solar and batteries are largely responsible for the immense cost declines in these technologies across the globe. Solar is now the cheapest source of electricity the world has ever seen. Inexpensive batteries allow Chinese automakers like BYD to sell electric vehicles for prices well below those traditional internal combustion vehicles.
If anything, these huge investments represent a breakthrough that allows all of us to envision a clean, abundant future. If Europe and the U.S. are sour about not controlling the said future, the developing world will likely be too busy celebrating the end to their energy poverty to care.
As Heatmap readers likely already know, clean electrification is the skeleton key to global decarbonization. It obviously doesn’t solve everything (hello agriculture), but it’s more of a giant leap along the net zero path than a small, first step. Solar, wind, and batteries are its principal components and all have followed learning curves--with greater production yielding price declines over and over again.
China dominates global cleantech manufacturing today, and it’s investing more in production and deployment than the rest of the world. As for what that means, the International Energy Agency’s recently published Renewables Report helps fill in the picture:
The United States has tried to defend its turf by putting tariffs on Chinese EVs, and the myriad subsidies for clean technologies in the Inflation Reduction Act almost all have restrictions on the country of origin as well as whether components were made by “foreign entities of concern.” The European Union, meanwhile, launched an investigation into Chinese EV subsidies and is in the process of implementing its Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism to try to put imports on equal footing with its internal carbon pricing scheme.
While China blasts these actions as simple protectionism, there is a strong argument to be made that maintaining a politically durable coalition in favor of decarbonization inside these countries requires some degree of domestic EV production to provide good jobs. Production of these specific tradable goods takes place in factories where the prototypical good job — union, blue collar — has been located, historically. Whether decarbonization efforts should so heavily emphasize these particular high quality jobs instead of less tradable positions in energy installations, grid maintenance, and efficiency is an open question.
Even if we accept that argument, though, it wouldn’t change the fact that what matters most for the planet is building and deploying lots of clean technologies — and continuing to get better at making and using them.
This matters because the rich countries are not going to define the world’s emissions trajectory for the next 75 years. The Rhodium Climate Outlook 2023 projects likely pathways of global emissions to 2100. It forecasts emissions will decrease from the equivalent of around 50 billion metric tons today to around 40 billion by 2060, but then rise again to around 50 billion metric tons by 2100. That reversal comes about because Rhodium sees decarbonization as both more partial and more local than it’s often imagined. Only China and the member countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development dramatically reduce their emissions over the next 25 years while most of the world merely holds steady — with the exception of Africa, where emissions grow substantially.
All of this is because Rhodium also assumes that getting the final bits of carbon out of the global economy will be much more difficult than picking off the low-hanging fruit, as we’re doing today by moving from coal to gas and increasingly to renewables. Solar is already so cheap that it is showing up everywhere — in South Africa when citizens are tired of rolling blackouts; in Nigeria, stepping in for generators after diesel subsidies were reduced; even with a random YouTuber rehabbing an abandoned French chateau. Batteries are also getting cheaper and helping grids in stress. Maybe green hydrogen will, as well.
Building clean, resilient electrical grids starting as soon as possible will have immense benefits for the climate. But doing it at scale everywhere in the world is contingent on these technologies being affordable. And to date Chinese prices remain lower than in the rest of the world. Take solar: A December 2023, analysts at Wood MacKenzie priced Chinese modules at 15 cents a watt compared with 40 cents in the U.S., 30 in Europe, and 22 in India.
This isn’t to say that the rest of the world should stop trying to produce more and lower costs — again, more good things are good, and adding resilience and reducing dependence on a single country has real benefits — but rather that we should remember to celebrate a bit how much of a win we’ve already seen. The point, after all, is not to win climate change, but rather to avoid it. How well we manage to do that will depend in no small part on putting rivalries aside.
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The data center boom is everywhere you look in U.S. economic and emissions data.
This is an edition of Heatmap Daily, an evening review of the day’s news written by our executive editor. Sign up for it here.
It isn’t exactly a new thought, but I’ve been struck recently by how many trends in America’s economic and environmental data are fundamentally about the data center boom and the return of electricity demand:
First, the Energy Information Administration reported this week that U.S. emissions grew by more than 2% last year, driven by surging electricity demand and an increase in coal-fired generation.What caused that higher power demand? New factories and data centers — as well as record summertime cooling demand.
Second, many of the new factories driving that higher power demand are themselves producing goods that are … let’s say … data center-adjacent. There are the enormous new semiconductor fabs, of course. But Ford and General Motors have also set up new production lines (or repurposed old ones) to manufacture grid-scale batteries to meet power demand.
Third, take a look at the recent U.S. spending on private non-residential construction — in other words, everything American companies are building that is not houses, condos, or apartments.
The construction industry’s spent almost $60 billion on data centers over the past year, which is more than it spent on all other office buildings combined (and more than it spent building warehouses, too). Just a handful of categories — data centers, power plants, electricity infrastructure, and certain kinds of electronics manufacturing — now make up a third of all U.S. private non-residential construction investment. They’ve never made up such a large share of construction spending since data collection began in 2014.
As The New York Times recently noted, the American economy is unusually dependent on the American stock market right now — and the stock market is unusually dependent on artificial intelligence. This week, investors started to balk at the enormous spending hyperscalers are planning to keep building out the AI boom; Alphabet’s shares dropped 8% this week after it boosted its planned 2026 capital expenditure and signaled 2027 will be even bigger. If the data center boom started to slow down in earnest, then more than just that budget will change.
Speaking of which, my colleague Emily Pontecorvo wrote earlier this week about how many businesses are struggling to even estimate their carbon emissions from artificial intelligence. The carbon accounting startup Watershed recently unveiled a new formula to help companies get a sense of their AI-related emissions.
But even that formula is still limited by the amount of data hyperscalers publish — and they don’t publish that much. Google, for instance, is the only AI company that has (laudably) provided estimates of its emissions on a per-prompt basis. Yet no company has published its per-token emissions, or how emissions sync up with particular models or regions.
So Emily asked Google: Why aren’t you — or any other model provider — disclosing this kind of data yet?
The tech company didn’t get back to us until after we’d published Emily’s story. But its response was interesting enough that I wanted to quote some of it here.
The problem is “industry consensus,” Cooper Elsworth, a Google spokesperson, told us. “There is currently very little consensus on how to comprehensively and fairly measure the serving environmental impact of generative AI (such as text generation),” he wrote. “Without standardized, ‘apples-to-apples’ frameworks, it is difficult to compare different providers accurately.”
That’s partly because energy use — and emissions data — can vary from site to site and depend on “custom-built hardware, software compilers, and advanced inference techniques.” And he claimed Google doesn’t always have the measurement hardware in place to provide such specific estimates: “Providing precise, repeatable data requires highly advanced measurement infrastructure,” he said. “For example, software-based energy monitoring tools often suffer from sampling biases. For our study, we had to step away from top-down averages and directly measure actual energy at the physical power supply unit (PSU) level across our deployed fleet. Not all providers have the telemetry or data sets required to benchmark their operations at this level of granularity.”
Read Emily’s story to understand the other reasons why estimating — or even “guesstimating” — AI-related carbon emissions is so challenging.
A conversation with Emma Uridge of the Kansas Health Institute.
This week’s conversation is with Emma Uridge, analyst with the Kansas Health Institute. Uridge spent copious hours analyzing state and local laws on data center development to best understand how policymakers are responding to the potential environmental public health impacts of large AI infrastructure, including power and water. The report, which came out this week, also goes in depth into those health impacts. I reached out to her to discuss what she sees as must-watch territory for our readers on this emerging policy arena.
Our conversation was lightly edited for clarity.
What is actually being done on policy when it comes to data centers — beyond moratoria of course?
So first I’d like to just talk about the point of moratoria. It’s helpful to talk about how these policies emerge in the first place. One area where moratoria are helpful is when a data center is proposed but the county has no approach for how they’d like to potentially regulate them. That’s temporary, most of the time. It lets local governments conduct research on the various impacts and also negotiate community benefits, ones that can mitigate any potential negative impacts — like Lancaster Pennsylvania, which instituted a community benefit agreement that maximized the potential benefits of development while mitigating what large data centers can do. That agreement looked at capping municipal water use at 20,000 gallons per day and requiring 100% clean energy. It had financial penalties for non-compliance. The company also committed $20 million to their local economic development and clean energy fund. There are ways to negotiate with developers.
We also see amendments to existing zoning. Data center proposals are increasingly popping up in rural areas, many of which are unzoned, so there’s no way a county can negotiate unless there’s a moratorium in place.
Other policy solutions include different performance standards or requiring on-site renewable energy, like what Jefferson County, Missouri, looked at. Also setback requirements, mandatory noise buffers, ending by-right zoning.
Where are local governments getting ideas for regulating data centers?
A lot of the technical information comes from developers. That can in cases be seen as a biased source of information. I wouldn’t say there’s a dedicated group providing assistance to local governments when a project is proposed — which is a similar story to wind industry development, where we have only a handful of consultants who provide technical advice. It can be really helpful to get a multi-disciplinary approach to hearing information. It can be helpful to have the utility commission, public health folks, those in academia, as well as the developer.
As of right now, especially in rural areas, local governments have a hard task of balancing pushback while getting the most accurate, evidence-based, neutral information to make decisions. That balance can be contentious.
What is the federal government doing on data center policy? How is the Trump administration approaching it?
A few things there. In the early days, the drive was for AI expansion and to be competitive with foreign adversaries. Now due to the amount of public pushback in red and blue localities and a more cautious approach.
I’m not seeing a lot of actual policy movement at this time.
I know the EPA is looking at the chemicals used in cooling data centers because when that water is cycled through the system, some of it is discharged into the water system, so they’re looking at the Toxic Substances and Control Act for monitoring that.
How much of an impact does this minimal federal role have on industry behavior?
Y’know, this isn’t specific to data centers. This is true for all kinds of large-scale development: there’s a need to require some sort of federal monitoring and regulation.
That’s where I see an emerging role for public health. At the federal level, there could be policy movement towards requiring some sort of environmental monitoring at data centers to make sure they’re operating responsibility. Looking at specific water use relative to water availability and what happens when there’s a time of severe, persistent drought. With air quality too — we’ve seen areas where the grid isn’t as reliable so their diesel generators are kicking on more and affecting air quality for residents.
We’re just not seeing all of that right now. We need corporate disclosure.
What do you see as the most important public health impacts from data center development?
It varies by localities. The most discussed obviously is water usage. One thing I’d note about my conversations with folks enthusiastic around emerging tech is, there are still questions that need to be asked about the capacity of localities to support a data center. Like a small town in Kansas may only be using 40% of their water for their utility needs. If a data center came online, how much of that water goes to the data center?
One area underexplored within the public health discipline is energy poverty and energy security. The ability of a household to meet the needs of everything energy provides in our lives. It’s known we have an aging electric grid but we’re not talking enough about large-scale blackouts when the grid is not sufficient to support some of these new data centers.
Plus more of the week’s big development fights.
1. Laramie County, Wyoming — Meta is fighting the fine it received in the Cheyenne data center water pollution controversy, and the conflict between the tech giant and the city’s small board of public utilities is continuing to spill out into the public.
2. Niagara County, New York — This county just rejected a solar project’s highway work permits in a show of retaliation against the state’s Office of Renewable Energy Siting.
3. Barron County, Wisconsin — The anti-solar protest is the new campaign stop in deep red Wisconsin.
4. Chesapeake, Virginia — A large battery storage project on the Virginia coastline is on the rocks amidst rampant local opposition.
5. Lewis County, West Virginia — West Virginia is now a key battleground in the fight over transmission, as a line spanning all of West Virginia and Maryland — and cutting through Data Center Alley in Virginia — causes compounding consternation.