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The One Big Beautiful Bill Act is one signature away from becoming law and drastically changing the economics of renewables development in the U.S. That doesn’t mean decarbonization is over, experts told Heatmap, but it certainly doesn’t help.
What do we do now?
That’s the question people across the climate change and clean energy communities are asking themselves now that Congress has passed the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, which would slash most of the tax credits and subsidies for clean energy established under the Inflation Reduction Act.
Preliminary data from Princeton University’s REPEAT Project (led by Heatmap contributor Jesse Jenkins) forecasts that said bill will have a dramatic effect on the deployment of clean energy in the U.S., including reducing new solar and wind capacity additions by almost over 40 gigawatts over the next five years, and by about 300 gigawatts over the next 10. That would be enough to power 150 of Meta’s largest planned data centers by 2035.
But clean energy development will hardly grind to a halt. While much of the bill’s implementation is in question, the bill as written allows for several more years of tax credit eligibility for wind and solar projects and another year to qualify for them by starting construction. Nuclear, geothermal, and batteries can claim tax credits into the 2030s.
Shares in NextEra, which has one of the largest clean energy development businesses, have risen slightly this year and are down just 6% since the 2024 election. Shares in First Solar, the American solar manufacturer, are up substantially Thursday from a day prior and are about flat for the year, which may be a sign of investors’ belief that buyer demand for solar panels will persist — or optimism that the OBBBA’s punishing foreign entity of concern requirements will drive developers into the company’s arms.
Partisan reversals are hardly new to climate policy. The first Trump administration gleefully pulled the rug from under the Obama administration’s power plant emissions rules, and the second has been thorough so far in its assault on Biden’s attempt to replace them, along with tailpipe emissions standards and mileage standards for vehicles, and of course, the IRA.
Even so, there are ways the U.S. can reduce the volatility for businesses that are caught in the undertow. “Over the past 10 to 20 years, climate advocates have focused very heavily on D.C. as the driver of climate action and, to a lesser extent, California as a back-stop,” Hannah Safford, who was director for transportation and resilience in the Biden White House and is now associate director of climate and environment at the Federation of American Scientists, told Heatmap. “Pursuing a top down approach — some of that has worked, a lot of it hasn’t.”
In today’s environment, especially, where recognition of the need for action on climate change is so politically one-sided, it “makes sense for subnational, non-regulatory forces and market forces to drive progress,” Safford said. As an example, she pointed to the fall in emissions from the power sector since the late 2000s, despite no power plant emissions rule ever actually being in force.
“That tells you something about the capacity to deliver progress on outcomes you want,” she said.
Still, industry groups worry that after the wild swing between the 2022 IRA and the 2025 OBBBA, the U.S. has done permanent damage to its reputation as a business-friendly environment. Since continued swings at the federal level may be inevitable, building back that trust and creating certainty is “about finding ballasts,” Harry Godfrey, the managing director for Advanced Energy United’s federal priorities team, told Heatmap.
The first ballast groups like AEU will be looking to shore up is state policy. “States have to step up and take a leadership role,” he said, particularly in the areas that were gutted by Trump’s tax bill — residential energy efficiency and electrification, transportation and electric vehicles, and transmission.
State support could come in the form of tax credits, but that’s not the only tool that would create more certainty for businesses — considering the budget cuts states will face as a result of Trump’s tax bill, it also might not be an option. But a lot can be accomplished through legislative action, executive action, regulatory reform, and utility ratemaking, Godfrey said. He cited new virtual power plant pilot programs in Virginia and Colorado, which will require further regulatory work to “to get that market right.”
A lot of work can be done within states, as well, to make their deployment of clean energy more efficient and faster. Tyler Norris, a fellow at Duke University's Nicholas School of the Environment, pointed to Texas’ “connect and manage” model for connecting renewables to the grid, which allows projects to come online much more quickly than in the rest of the country. That’s because the state’s electricity market, ERCOT, does a much more limited study of what grid upgrades are needed to connect a project to the grid, and is generally more tolerant of curtailing generation (i.e. not letting power get to the grid at certain times) than other markets.
“As Texas continues to outpace other markets in generator and load interconnections, even in the absence of renewable tax credits, it seems increasingly plausible that developers and policymakers may conclude that deeper reform is needed to the non-ERCOT electricity markets,” Norris told Heatmap in an email.
At the federal level, there’s still a chance for, yes, bipartisan permitting reform, which could accelerate the buildout of all kinds of energy projects by shortening their development timelines and helping bring down costs, Xan Fishman, senior managing director of the energy program at the Bipartisan Policy Center, told Heatmap. “Whether you care about energy and costs and affordability and reliability or you care about emissions, the next priority should be permitting reform,” he said.
And Godfrey hasn’t given up on tax credits as a viable tool at the federal level, either. “If you told me in mid-November what this bill would look like today, while I’d still be like, Ugh, that hurts, and that hurts, and that hurts, I would say I would have expected more rollbacks. I would have expected deeper cuts,” he told Heatmap. Ultimately, many of the Inflation Reduction Act’s tax credits will stick around in some form, although we’ve yet to see how hard the new foreign sourcing requirements will hit prospective projects.
While many observers ruefully predicted that the letter-writing moderate Republicans in the House and Senate would fold and support whatever their respective majorities came up with — which they did, with the sole exception of Pennsylvania Republican Brian Fitzpatrick — the bill also evolved over time with input from those in the GOP who are not openly hostile to the clean energy industry.
“You are already seeing people take real risk on the Republican side pushing for clean energy,” Safford said, pointing to Alaska Republican Senator Lisa Murkowski, who opposed the new excise tax on wind and solar added to the Senate bill, which earned her vote after it was removed.
Some damage has already been done, however. Canceled clean energy investments adds up to $23 billion so far this year, compared to just $3 billion in all of 2024, according to the decarbonization think tank RMI. And that’s before OBBBA hits Trump’s desk.
The start-and-stop nature of the Inflation Reduction Act may lead some companies, states, local government and nonprofits to become leery of engaging with a big federal government climate policy again.
“People are going to be nervous about it for sure,” Safford said. “The climate policy of the future has to be polycentric. Even if you have the political opportunity to make a big swing again, people will be pretty gun shy. You will need to pursue a polycentric approach.”
But to Godfrey, all the back and forth over the tax credits, plus the fact that Republicans stood up to defend them in the 11th hour, indicates that there is a broader bipartisan consensus emerging around using them as a tool for certain energy and domestic manufacturing goals. A future administration should think about refinements that will create more enduring policy but not set out in a totally new direction, he said.
Albert Gore, the executive director of the Zero Emission Transportation Association, was similarly optimistic that tax credits or similar incentives could work again in the future — especially as more people gain experience with electric vehicles, batteries, and other advanced clean energy technologies in their daily lives. “The question is, how do you generate sufficient political will to implement that and defend it?” he told Heatmap. “And that depends on how big of an economic impact does it have, and what does it mean to the American people?”
Ultimately, Fishman said, the subsidy on-off switch is the risk that comes with doing major policy on a strictly partisan basis.
“There was a lot of value in these 10-year timelines [for tax credits in the IRA] in terms of business certainty, instead of one- or two- year extensions,” Fishman told Heatmap. “The downside that came with that is that it became affiliated with one party. It was seen as a partisan effort, and it took something that was bipartisan and put a partisan sheen on it.”
The fight for tax credits may also not be over yet. Before passage of the IRA, tax credits for wind and solar were often extended in a herky-jerky bipartisan fashion, where Democrats who supported clean energy in general and Republicans who supported it in their districts could team up to extend them.
“You can see a world where we have more action on clean energy tax credits to enhance, extend and expand them in a future congress,” Fishman told Heatmap. “The starting point for Republican leadership, it seemed, was completely eliminating the tax credits in this bill. That’s not what they ended up doing.”
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Why regional transmission organizations as we know them might not survive the data center boom.
As the United States faces its first significant increase in electricity demand in decades, the grid itself is not only aging, but also straining against the financial, logistical, and legal barriers to adding new supply. It’s enough to make you wonder: What’s the point of an electricity market, anyway?
That’s the question some stakeholders in the PJM Interconnection, America’s largest electricity market, started asking loudly and in public in response to the grid operator’s proposal that new large energy users could become “non-capacity backed load,” i.e. be forced to turn off if ever and whenever PJM deems it necessary.
PJM, which covers 13 states from the Mid-Atlantic to the Midwest, has been America’s poster child for the struggle to get new generation online as data center development surges. PJM has warned that it will have “just enough generation to meet its reliability requirement” in 2026 and 2027, and its independent market monitor has said that the costs associated with serving that new and forecast demand have already reached the billions, translating to higher retail electricity rates in several PJM states.
As Heatmap has covered, however, basically no one in the PJM system — transmission owners, power producers, and data center developers — was happy with the details of PJM’s plan to deal with the situation. In public comments on the proposed rule, many brought up a central conflict between utilities’ historic duty to serve and the realities of the modern power market. More specifically, electricity markets like PJM are supposed to deal with wholesale electricity sales, not the kind of core questions of who gets served and when, which are left to the states.
On the power producer side, major East Coast supplier Talen Energy wrote, “The NCBL proposal exceeds PJM’s authority by establishing a regime where PJM holds the power to withhold electric service unlawfully from certain categories of large load.” The utility Exelon added that owners of transmission “have a responsibility to serve all customers—large, small, and in between. We are obligated to provide both retail and wholesale electric service safely and reliably.” And last but far from least, Microsoft, which has made itself into a leader in artificial intelligence, argued, “A PJM rule curtailing non-capacity-backed load would not only unlawfully intrude on state authority, but it would also fundamentally undercut the very purpose of PJM’s capacity market.”
This is just one small piece of a debate that’s been heating up for years, however, as more market participants, activists, and scholars question whether the markets that govern much of the U.S. electric grid are delivering power as cheaply and abundantly as they were promised to. Some have even suggested letting PJM utilities build their own power plants again, effectively reversing the market structure of the past few decades.
But questioning whether all load must be served would be an even bigger change.
The “obligation to serve all load has been a core tenet of electricity policy,” Rob Gramlich, the president of Grid Strategies LLC, told me. “I don’t recall ever seeing that be questioned or challenged in any fundamental way” — an illustration of how dire things have become.
The U.S. electricity system was designed for abundance. Utilities would serve any user, and the per-user costs of developing the fixed infrastructure necessary to serve them would drop as more users signed up.
But the planned rush of data center investments threatens to stick all ratepayers with the cost of new transmission and generation that is overwhelmingly from one class of customer. There is already a brewing local backlash to new data centers, and electricity prices have been rising faster than inflation. New data center load could also have climate consequences if utilities decide to leave aging coal online and build out new natural gas-fired power plants over and above their pre-data center boom (and pre-Trump) plans.
“AI has dramatically raised the stakes, along with enhancing worries that heightened demand will mean more burning of fossil fuels,” law professors Alexandra Klass of the University of Michigan and Dave Owen at the University of California write in a preprint paper to be published next year.
In an interview, Klass told me, “There are huge economic and climate implications if we build a whole lot of gas and keep coal on, and then demand is lower because the chips are better,” referring to the possibility that data centers and large language models could become dramatically more energy efficient, rendering the additional fossil fuel-powered supply unnecessary. Even if the projects are not fully built out or utilized, the country could face a situation where “ratepayers have already paid for [grid infrastructure], whether it’s through those wholesale markets or through their utilities in traditionally regulated states,” she said.
The core tension between AI development and the power grid, Klass and Owen argue, is the “duty to serve,” or “universal service” principle that has underlain modern electricity markets for over a century.
“The duty to serve — to meet need at pretty much all times — worked for utilities because they got to pass through their costs, and it largely worked for consumers because they didn’t have to deal very often with unpredictable blackouts,” Owen told me.
“Once you knew how to build transmission lines and build power plants,” Klass added, “there was no sense that you couldn’t continue to build to serve all customers. “We could build power plants, and the regulatory regime came up in a context where we could always build enough to meet demand.”
How and why goes back to the earliest days of electrification.
As the power industry developed in the late 19th and early 20th century, the regulated utility model emerged where monopoly utilities would build both power plants and the transmission and distribution infrastructure necessary to serve that power to customers. So that they would be able to achieve the economies of scale required to serve said customers efficiently and affordably, regulators allowed them to establish monopolies over certain service territories, with the requirement that they would serve any and everyone in them.
With a secure base of ratepayers, utilities could raise money from investors to build infrastructure, which could then be put into a “rate base” and recouped from ratepayers over time at a fixed return. In exchange, the utilities accepted regulation from state governments over their pricing and future development trajectories.
That vertically integrated system began to crack, however, as ratepayers revolted over high costs from capital investments by utilities, especially from nuclear power plants. Following the deregulation of industries such as trucking and air travel, federal regulators began to try to break up the distribution and generation portions of the electricity industry. In 1999, after some states and regions had already begun to restructure their electricity markets, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission encouraged the creation of regional transmission organizations like PJM.
Today some 35 state electricity markets are partially or entirely restructured, with Texas operating its own, isolated electricity market beyond the reach of federal regulation. In PJM and other RTOs, electricity is (more or less) sold competitively on a wholesale basis by independent power producers to utilities, who then serve customers.
But the system as it’s constructed now may, critics argue, expose retail customers to unacceptable cost increases — and greenhouse gas emissions — as it attempts to grapple with serving new data center load.
Klass and Owen, for their part, point to other markets as models for how electricity could work that don’t involve the same assumptions of plentiful supply that electricity markets historically have, such as those governing natural gas or even Western water rights.
Interruptions of natural gas service became more common starting in the 1970s, when some natural gas services were underpriced thanks to price caps, leading to an imbalance between supply and demand. In response, regulators “established a national policy of curtailment based on end use,” Klass and Owen write, with residential users getting priority “because of their essential heating needs, followed by firm industrial and commercial customers, and finally, interruptible customers.” Natural gas was deregulated in the late 1970s and 1980s, with curtailment becoming more market-based, which also allowed natural gas customers to trade capacity with each other.
Western water rights, meanwhile, are notoriously opaque and contested — but, importantly, they are based on scarcity, and thus may provide lessons in an era of limited electricity supply. The “prior appropriation” system water markets use is, “at its core, a set of mechanisms for allocating shortage,” the authors write. Water users have “senior” and “junior” rights, with senior users “entitled to have their rights fulfilled before the holders of newer, or more ’junior,’ water rights.” These rights can be transferred, and junior users have found ways to work with what water they can get, with the authors citing extensive conservation efforts in Southern California compared to the San Francisco Bay area, which tends to have more senior rights.
With these models in mind, Klass and Owen propose a system called “demand side connect-and-manage,” whereby new loads would not necessarily get transmission and generation service at all times, and where utilities could curtail users and electricity customers would have the ability “to use trading to hedge against the risk of curtailments.”
“We can connect you now before we build a whole lot of new generation, but when we need to, we’re going to curtail you,” Klass said, describing her and Owen’s proposal.
Tyler Norris, a Duke University researcher who has published concept-defining work on data center flexibility, called the paper “one of the most important contributions yet toward the re-examination of basic assumptions of U.S. electricity law that’s urgently needed as hyperscale load growth pushes our existing regulatory system beyond its limits.”
While electricity may not be literally drying up, he told me, “when you are supply side constrained while demand is growing, you have this challenge of, how do you allocate scarcity?”
Unlike the PJM proposals, “Our paper was very focused on state law,” Klass told me. “And that was intentional, because I think this is trickier at the federal level,” she told me.
Some states are already embracing similar ideas. Ohio regulators, for instance, established a data center tariff that tries to protect customers from higher costs by forcing data centers to make minimum payments regardless of their actual electricity use. Texas also passed a law that would allow for some curtailment of large loads and reforms of the interconnection process to avoid filling up the interconnection queue with speculative projects that could result in infrastructure costs but not real electricity demand.
Klass and Owen write that their idea may be more of “a temporary bridging strategy, primarily for periods when peak demand outstrips supply or at least threatens to do so.”
Even those who don’t think the principles underlying electricity markets need to be rethought see the need — at least in the short term — for new options for large new power users who may not get all the power they want all of the time.
“Some non-firm options are necessary in the short term,” Gramlich told me, referring to ideas like Klass and Owen’s, Norris’s, and PJM’s. “Some of them are going to have some legal infirmities and jurisdictional problems. But I think no matter what, we’re going to see some non-firm options. A lot of customers, a lot of these large loads, are very interested, even if it’s a temporary way to get connected while they try to get the firm service later.”
If electricity markets have worked for over one hundred years on the principle that more customers could bring down costs for everyone, going forward, we may have to get more choosy — or pay the price.
A judge has lifted the administration’s stop-work order against Revolution Wind.
A federal court has lifted the Trump administration’s order to halt construction on the Revolution Wind farm off the coast of New England. The decision marks the renewables industry’s first major legal victory against a federal war on offshore wind.
The Interior Department ordered Orsted — the Danish company developing Revolution Wind — to halt construction of Revolution Wind on August 22, asserting in a one-page letter that it was “seeking to address concerns related to the protection of national security interests of the United States and prevention of interference with reasonable uses of the exclusive economic zone, the high seas, and the territorial seas.”
In a two-page ruling issued Monday, U.S. District Judge Royce Lamberth found that Orsted would presumably win its legal challenge against the stop work order, and that the company is “likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction,” which led him to lift the dictate from the Trump administration.
Orsted previously claimed in legal filings that delays from the stop work order could put the entire project in jeopardy by pushing its timeline beyond the terms of existing power purchase agreements, and that the company installing cable for the project only had a few months left to work on Revolution Wind before it had to move onto other client obligations through mid-2028. The company has also argued that the Trump administration is deliberately mischaracterizing discussions between the federal government and the company that took place before the project was fully approved.
It’s still unclear at this moment whether the Trump administration will appeal the decision. We’re still waiting on the outcome of a separate legal challenge brought by Democrat-controlled states against Trump’s anti-wind Day One executive order.
Harmonizing data across federal agencies will go a long, long way toward simplifying environmental reviews.
Comprehensive permitting reform remains elusive.
In spite of numerous promising attempts — the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023, for instance, which delivered only limited improvements, and the failed Manchin-Barrasso bill of last year — the U.S. has repeatedly failed to overhaul its clogged federal infrastructure approval process. Even now there are draft bills and agreements in principle, but the Trump administration’s animus towards renewable energy has undermined Democratic faith in any deal. Less obvious but no less important, key Republicans are quietly disengaged, hesitant to embrace the federal transmission reform that negotiators see as essential to the package.
Despite this grim prognosis, Congress could still improve implementation of a key permitting barrier, the National Environmental Policy Act, by fixing the federal government’s broken systems for managing and sharing NEPA documentation and data. These opaque and incompatible systems frustrate essential interagency coordination, contributing immeasurably to NEPA’s delays and frustrations. But it’s a problem with clear, available, workable solutions — and at low political cost.
Both of us saw these problems firsthand. Marc helped manage NEPA implementation at the Environmental Protection Agency, observing the federal government’s slow and often flailing attempts to use technology to improve internal agency processes. Elizabeth, meanwhile, spent two years overcoming NEPA’s atomized data ecosystem to create a comprehensive picture of NEPA litigation.
Even so, it’s difficult to illustrate the scope of the problem without experiencing it. Some agencies have bespoke systems to house crucial and unique geographic information on project areas. Other agencies lack ready access to that information, even as they examine project impacts another agency may have already studied. Similarly, there is no central database of scientific studies undertaken in support of environmental reviews. Some agencies maintain repositories for their environmental assessments — arduous but less intense environmental reviews than the environmental impact statements NEPA requires when a federal agency action substantially impacts the environment. But there’s still no unified, cross-agency EA database. This leaves agencies unable to efficiently find and leverage work that could inform their own reviews. Indeed, agencies may be duplicating or re-duplicating tedious, time-consuming efforts.
NEPA implementation also relies on interagency cooperation. There, too, agencies’ divergent ways of classifying and communicating about project data throws up impediments. Agencies rely on arcane data formats and often incompatible platforms. (For the tech-savvy, an agency might have a PDF-only repository while another has XML-based data formats.) With few exceptions, it’s difficult for cooperating agencies to even know the status of a given review. And it produces a comedy of errors for agencies trying to recruit and develop younger, tech-savvy staff. Your workplace might use something like Asana or Trello to guide your workflow, a common language all teams use to communicate. The federal government has a bureaucratic Tower of Babel.
Yet another problem, symptomatic of inadequate transparency, is that we have only limited data on the thousands of NEPA court cases. To close the gap, we sought to understand — using data — just how sprawling and unwieldy post-review NEPA litigation had become. We read every available district and appellate opinion that mentioned NEPA from 2013 to 2022 (over 2,000 cases), screened out those without substantive NEPA claims, and catalogued their key characteristics — plaintiffs, court timelines and outcomes, agencies, project types, and so on. Before we did this work, no national NEPA litigation database provided policymakers with actionable, data-driven insights into court outcomes for America’s most-litigated environmental statute. But even our painstaking efforts couldn’t unearth a full dataset that included, for example, decisions taken by administrative judges within agencies.
We can’t manage what we can’t measure. And every study in this space, including ours, struggles with this type of sample bias. Litigated opinions are neither random nor representative; they skew toward high-stakes disputes with uncertain outcomes and underrepresent cases that settle on clear agency error or are dismissed early for weak claims. Our database illuminates litigation patterns and timelines. But like the rest of the literature, it cannot offer firm conclusions about NEPA’s effectiveness. We need a more reliable universe of all NEPA reviews to have any chance — even a flawed one — at assessing the law’s outcomes.
In the meantime, NEPA policy debates often revolve unproductively around assumptions and anecdotes. For example, Democrats can point to instances when early and robust public engagement appeared essential for bringing projects to completion. But in the absence of hard data to support this view, GOP reformers often prefer to limit public participation in the name of speeding the review process. The rebuttal to that approach is persuasive: Failing to engage potential project opponents on their legitimate concerns merely drives them to interfere with the project outside the NEPA process. Yet this rebuttal relies on assumptions, not evidence. Only transparent data can resolve the dispute.
Some of the necessary repair work is already underway at the Council on Environmental Quality, the White House entity that coordinates and guides agencies’ NEPA implementation. In May, CEQ published a “NEPA and Permitting Data and Technology Standard” so that agencies could voluntarily align on how to communicate NEPA information with each other. Then in June, after years using a lumbering Excel file containing agencies’ categorical exclusions — the types of projects that don’t need NEPA review, as determined by law or regulation — CEQ unveiled a searchable database called the Categorical Exclusion Explorer. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s PermitAI has leveraged the EPA’s repository of environmental impact statements and, more recently, environmental review documents from other agencies to create an AI-powered queryable database. The FAST-41 Dashboard has brought transparency and accountability to a limited number of EISs.
But across all these efforts, huge gaps in data, resources, and enforcement authority remain. President Trump has issued directives to agencies to speed environmental reviews, evincing an interest in filling the gaps. But those directives don’t and can’t compel the full scope of necessary technological changes.
Some members of Congress are tuned in and trying to do something about this. Representatives Scott Peters, a Democrat from California, and Dusty Johnson, Republican of South Dakota, deserve credit for introducing the bipartisan ePermit Act to address all of these challenges. They’ve identified key levers to improve interagency communication, track litigation, and create a common and publicly accessible storehouse of NEPA data. Crucially, they recognize the make-or-break role of agency Chief Information Officers who are accountable for information security. Our own attempts to upgrade agency technology taught us that the best way to do so is by working with — not around — CIOs who have a statutory mandate.
The ePermit Act would also lay the groundwork for more extensive and innovative deployment of artificial intelligence in NEPA processes. Despite AI’s continuing challenges around information accuracy and traceability, large language models may eventually be able to draft the majority of an EIS on their own, with humans involved to oversee.
AI can also address hidden pain points in the NEPA process. It can hasten the laborious summarization and incorporation of public comment, reducing the legal and practical risk that agencies miss crucial public feedback. It can also help determine whether sponsor applications are complete, frequently a point of friction between sponsors and agencies. AI can also assess whether projects could be adapted to a categorical exclusion, entirely removing unnecessary reviews. And finally, AI tools are a concession to the rapid turnover of NEPA personnel and depleted institutional knowledge — an acute problem of late.
Comprehensive, multi-agency legislation like the ePermit Act will take time to implement — Congress may want or even need to reform NEPA before we get the full benefit of technology improvements. But that does not diminish the urgency or value of this effort. Even Representative Jared Huffman of California, a key Democrat on the House Natural Resources Committee with impeccable environmental credentials, offered words of support for the ePermit Act, while opposing other NEPA reforms.
Regardless of what NEPA looks like in coming years, this work must begin at some point. Under every flavor of NEPA reform, agencies will need to share data, coordinate across platforms, and process information. That remains true even as court-driven legal reforms and Trump administration regulatory changes wreak havoc with NEPA’s substance and implementation. Indeed, whether or not courts, Congress, or the administration reduce NEPA’s reach, even truncated reviews would still be handicapped by broken systems. Fixing the technology infrastructure now is a way to future-proof NEPA.
The solution won’t be as simple as getting agencies to use Microsoft products. It’s long past time to give agencies the tools they need — an interoperable, government-wide platform for NEPA data and project management, supported by large language models. This is no simple task. To reap the full benefits of these solutions will require an act of Congress that both provides funding for multi-agency software and requires all agencies to act in concert. This mandate is necessary to induce movement from actors within agencies who are slow to respond to non-binding CEQ directives that take time away from statutorily required work, or those who resist discretionary changes to agency software as cybersecurity risks, no matter how benign those changes may be. Without appropriated money or congressional edict, the government’s efforts in this area will lack the resources and enforcement levers to ensure reforms take hold.
Technology improvements won’t cure everything that ails NEPA. This bill won’t fix the deep uncertainty unleashed by the legal chaos of the last year. But addressing these issues is a no-regrets move with bipartisan and potentially even White House support. Let it be done.