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Robinson Meyer:
[0:08] Hi, I’m Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News. It is Wednesday, February 25th. I don’t know if you were paying attention, but on Monday, the S&P 500 dropped over 1%, as did the Nasdaq, because of a memo from an investment research firm that was basically a science fiction short story. We’ll put it in the show notes, but it argued that AI is going to work, is going to be so successful that it will in fact cause mass unemployment and trigger a recession. Now, it wasn’t the first memo or argument that there might be bad effects for the economy if huge amounts of white collar workers are put out of work.
Robinson Meyer:
[0:46] But it was the first that argued it may be in a persuasive way, in a mechanical way. And for whatever reason, it caused absolute carnage in the stock market. And I think it showed not only that artificial intelligence is the biggest story in the American economy right now, something we already knew, but that nobody knows what’s going on with it. And that holds true for data centers, which are the biggest topic in energy and climate and electricity, but that are changing in a way that is very hard to track. And so on this episode of Shift Key, we’re going to talk to someone who is tracking the way that data centers are changing. A year ago, Jesse and I spoke with Peter Freed about exactly what the data center buildout was doing for electricity and renewables. Peter is great. He’s a founding partner at the Near Horizon Group. He has over 20 years working at the nexus of clean energy, climate, and computing.
Robinson Meyer:
[1:31] And I think most saliently for 10 years from 2014 to 2024, he was director of energy strategy at Meta. He was right up against the coalface of energy procurement for data centers. A year ago, we talked to him. We learned a lot about what data centers meant for electricity and renewables at that moment. But a lot has changed since then. And so on Monday, the same day the stock market was down 1%, I talked to Peter Freed for a Heatmap Pro webinar about how data centers have changed over the past year and what he thinks they’ll mean for electricity and renewables and energy and emissions going forward into 2026. It was a really educational if disconcerting conversation. We talked about the enormous surge, the $600 billion to $700 billion of investment in data centers that are going to happen this year, why data centers are driving a huge off-grid natural gas build out now, and why data centers are also splitting the battery industry from the renewable industry. It was really, really interesting. I learned a lot, and we liked our conversation
Robinson Meyer:
[2:30] so much that we’re releasing it now as a special Shift Key episode. Thanks as always for listening, and let’s go to that conversation now.
Robinson Meyer:
[2:41] Hello, everyone. I am Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News, and you are watching Heatmap Pro’s special live webinar presentation of Shift Key. It is Monday, February 23rd, and I’m going to welcome our guest in for a moment. You can already see he’s joined us here in the virtual recording studio. But before we get started, I just want to put a word in for our sponsor today, keeping it all in the family. Our sponsor today is none other than our very own Heatmap Pro. If you want to keep following how data centers are reshaping the energy transition in practice, that is the work we do every day at Heatmap. Our pro team tracks where energy and data centers projects move forward, where they get delayed or canceled, and how community response shapes outcomes. We have data nobody else has on renewable energy projects as well as data center projects and the political risk that they’re facing. If you’re interested in learning more about the software, visit heatmap.news/pro. That’s heatmap.news/pro. Okay, let’s get started. Peter Freed is our guest today. He’s a founding partner at the Near Horizon Group. He was director of energy strategy at Meta from 2014 to 2024. And he brings to this conversation over 20 years of working at the nexus of
Robinson Meyer:
[3:51] clean energy, climate, and recently data centers. It’s always great to talk to him. Peter, welcome to the Heatmap Pro live Shift Key.
Peter Freed:
[4:00] I’m so excited to be here. It’s been like a year since we did one of these. So there’s a lot to talk about.
Robinson Meyer:
[4:07] There’s so much to talk about. Okay. So I want to actually start exactly there. So the last time we talked, it was February 2025. It’s been exactly a year. Let me start by asking, are you busier now than you were a year ago?
Peter Freed:
[4:21] That’s a great question. So, you know, I have built my current professional life on trying not to be too busy. So I’m doing okay at that. I could certainly be unlimitedly busy right now. There is a lot going on. The market has certainly not settled down. In fact, if anything, it’s gotten crazier. So yeah, it’s pretty nuts right now.
Robinson Meyer:
[4:41] So a year ago when we spoke, one of the key themes is the amount of speculative froth in the market that I think your term was, you know, two guys in a pickup truck announced they would be data center developers, and then they were treated as data center developers, and that was entering the math. Has any of that froth started to fall out? Or is it more intense now than it was a year ago?
Peter Freed:
[5:04] So the answer is yes and no. I think a couple of different things are happening. And I always find myself when I’m talking to you, Rob, referring to your own reporting, but I’m actually going to start there. Rob does not pay me to do this. I just really like the work that Heatmap does. So I think like a lot of the speculative activity that began in 2024, like that we were talking about a year ago in early 2025.
Peter Freed:
[5:26] Especially from inexperienced developers, well, we are now starting to see some of those projects kind of falling out and maybe the less polite way to say it would be falling apart. Like, you know, these are very complicated projects. They are getting bogged down in permitting processes. They’re getting bogged down in community opposition and all of this other stuff. And so I think that, you know, Heatmap Pro had done some really interesting reporting around the number of projects that had failed in 2025 and that that was growing. And I’d provided some comments on that then. But I think that’s what we’re starting to see, right? Like, I am someone who believes that maybe 10% of the projects that have been proposed around the country will actually end up being fully built out data center campuses. And part of what falling apart means or falling out of that process means is just that like projects will be canceled in various ways. Commercially, you won’t really see that. Maybe in the regulatory process or utility interconnection proceeding, the timelines will be so long that someone will fail to do it. The most public stuff, of course, is what we’re seeing around community opposition and these, you know, town hall meetings where dozens of people will show up and be protesting a facility for whatever reason. And then I think ultimately the financing, you know, people have to figure out how to secure the money to build these projects.
Peter Freed:
[6:41] And as it turns out, it’s a lot of money. And while there is capital available, like figuring out how to put those pieces together has been challenging. So I think that’s the yes stuff has fallen apart side.
Peter Freed:
[6:52] On the other side, there is still a ton of activity going on, people bringing new things to the market. And, you know, I can’t tell you how many like
Peter Freed:
[7:02] calls I get where someone’s like, hey, I’ve got a refrigerated warehouse that has electrical capacity. Can I turn that into a data center? So that sort of stuff is still happening. And I think maybe the difference is people have realized a little bit more that if you have a refrigerated warehouse that you want to turn into a data center, that maybe you shouldn’t do that yourself. And so I think what I’m seeing a little bit more of is partnership between the more established and experienced data center developers with people that bring other pieces of the puzzle to the table. And so there’s still a lot going on, but I do think that maybe the level of complete ridiculousness where it’s just very random people trying to do very random things, like maybe that’s coming down a little bit.
Robinson Meyer:
[7:47] We’re going to talk about every facet of this question, but what is the biggest bottleneck right now for projects?
Peter Freed:
[7:54] So I bet if you asked five people in the industry that question, you get five different answers. I have always said, and I think I said this to you the last time we talked, that I am very confident in the ability of the power sector, not necessarily the utility sector, but the ability of the power sector to meet the needs of the AI demand signal. And I do think that that is continuing to be the case. Last time we spoke, you all had done some really good reporting around the constraints on gas turbine supply chains. And those supply chains were indeed constrained. They’re still relatively constrained. But what we’re seeing is people are building data centers with a whole bunch of different thermal generation technologies, very small reciprocating engines, simple cycles, aeroderivatives, like all of the different flavors of put gas into it, power comes out. And so I think, you know, we’re definitely seeing that sort of thing happening more and more. And so, you know, the power sector is figuring out how to do this. So there are still plenty of people that say, oh, the power sector is the big bottleneck. I’ve never really thought that the power sector would be the key bottleneck. It might just look different than we thought it was going to look.
Peter Freed:
[9:04] I am hearing on the ground that now this is something that I’ve been wondering about slash worried about for a long time. Construction labor is becoming very constrained in many markets, in particular skilled trades. So skilled electricians have been a group of workers that have always been challenging to get enough of a data center construction. And now we’re ballooning the industry. So skilled electricians are an issue. Long lead equipment has and will continue to be an issue. So this is not necessarily the generators themselves, but on the electrical side, we’re talking circuit breakers, we’re talking transformers, and, you know, people are ramping up production capability, people are trying, you know, there’s a couple of startups that are doing like new cool power electronics for that kind of stuff. So that’ll need to catch up. But, you know, these are sort of the ups and downs. Is it power? Is it labor? Is it long lead equipment? Is it chips? Is it, you know, you get all of those answers even today.
Robinson Meyer:
[9:59] I feel like a year ago, there was this idea that only renewables had speed to power. And then really, X.ai and Elon Musk demonstrated that you could still get gas turbines if you didn’t care about the pollution that you pumped into an urban neighborhood or any of the other externalities. Do renewables still have an edge when powering data centers? Or has X.ai and this idea that there’s all sorts of gas available to you if you care far less about the externalities or are willing to pay to not care about
Robinson Meyer:
[10:30] them. Has that kind of changed the game?
Peter Freed:
[10:32] I think that there are certainly companies which still care about the clean aspect and the hyperscalers themselves. So really, we’re talking, you know, Meta, Microsoft, Google, and Amazon who have public clean energy commitments.
Peter Freed:
[10:46] You know, you look at a company like Google, which I think very philosophically has been chasing this for a long time. We’ve seen them do all sorts of interesting things. They appear to still be quite interested in using renewables as part of the actual power solution for the data center. So they recently acquired Intersect Power. That is a company which was formed around the idea that you could do these campuses that included solar and storage and some gas. But like mostly it was a clean orientation on that. Google has also announced a CCS project. So that’s sort of one bookend. The other bookend, hopefully, is that people continue with their existing renewable energy commitments, which just say like, all right, however much power we’re going to use, we’re going to make sure that a similar quantity of power is deployed onto the system. And so, you know, that that is still happening. The whole like speed to power equals the fastest way to get data centers on and that we’re going to do renewables as part of that. I’m not seeing a huge amount of that happening right now. Now, you know, Cloverleaf Infrastructure is another fantastic company that has done some really, really creative things working with utilities to put portfolios together that are largely clean portfolios and bring data center capacity on. But the other thing that I’ve been saying to people for a while now is like, if you figure out how to do ...
Peter Freed:
[12:09] Very rapid deployments with gas. And that in and of itself is actually extremely complicated. Like the engineering required to get all of the power quality and reliability characteristics that you would get from a grid interconnection from a standalone power plant. You’re going to do that with gas turbines and storage in most cases. Adding the additional layer of renewables to that is mostly seen as a complicating factor right now. So, you know, there’s a bit of interest, but it’s not universal interest.
Robinson Meyer:
[12:39] But you’re also describing, I think, a pairing that might be normal for data center developers to think about, but a pairing that I think in climate world, we don’t think about that much, which is gas plus batteries. Oh, yeah. Which we normally talk about solar plus batteries as being what, you know, the kind of classic pairing, but gas plus batteries is developers value it because it basically adds reliability onto their gas.
Peter Freed:
[13:01] That’s right. So, So, you know, data center reliability, the industry parlance is like nines of reliability, right? So that means like 99.999, five nines, 99.99. And so if you want reliability that is nines coming after your 99% uptime, you typically do have to add some battery storage. And data centers, by the way, I always used to say like data centers are the biggest battery storage installations on the grid and have been basically forever because they have uninterrupted power supplies inside of the facility. So these are batteries that are inside of the data centers. They usually have a minute and a half to five minutes of backup capacity. And this is for little blips in power quality or, you know, something happens. We’re talking about utility scale batteries, multi-hour batteries now, where people are adding that to the design of the facility in order to get you
Peter Freed:
[13:56] those higher reliability numbers. And some people are requiring that, some people aren’t, and it’s driven as much by cost as anything else.
Robinson Meyer:
[14:04] Are most of the batteries like lithium-ion, standard, multi-hour ... You know, battery installations, or are we seeing these more exotic or kind of frontier batteries with like multi-day storage coming online at projects?
Peter Freed:
[14:16] Yeah. I mean, so right now it’s off the shelf lithium ion, either two- or four-hour, and there’s a lot you can do with that. There’s a much more interesting conversation, which I think we will have at some point in the next hour, 45 remaining minutes around like what you might do with those longer duration batteries. You know the simple fact is there just aren’t enough of those yet to sort of see more deployments like you know i was chatting with some of the folks at form not so long ago i was like oh my god like such a great technology like how do we get a 100X your current supply chain onto the market because think what we get you know and it it just takes time it.
Robinson Meyer:
[14:56] Takes time yeah yeah before we move on from kind of where we’ve been where we’re going last year when we talked it was right after DeepSeek. And actually, there’s been reporting today that DeepSeek is about to come out with its next model. The last time this happened, it was shocking to people because the DeepSeek model seemed to use so much less electricity than any of the current American frontier models. And there was this discussion of Jevons Paradox, which to vastly simplify, is the idea that as something gets cheaper and less energy intensive,
Robinson Meyer:
[15:28] we tend to use more of it rather than less. We tend to enjoy those energy savings by using more of the thing rather than, you know, decreasing our overall energy usage. So a year after DeepSeek with another model on the horizon, has the idea that AI is going to be subject to Jevons Paradox borne out, or has all the use been at these frontier models?
Peter Freed:
[15:52] I am so glad that you asked this question, because actually, like, Jevons was getting so much discussion through sort of the back half of 2024 and into 2025. And then I feel like people have sort of stopped talking about it. I remember, actually, when we talked about it on the last shift, because Jesse did such a nice job of explaining it very professorially. And I was like, oh, that’s that’s why you’re a professor. And I’m not. But yeah, people get it at this point. And the short answer is, yes, Jevons is holding. It’s happening. I think if you look at the efficiency gains that are coming in, facility design to some extent, but mostly algorithmic design and chip design. I don’t remember what the stats are, but if you talk to someone from Nvidia about the efficiency of their chips, it’s remarkable how much efficiency they have brought into the design of those chips. That’s true across the board on all of these new custom silicon and all of these other things. And by the way, AI demand continues to surge through the roof. So, you know, Jevons is something which has applied through history since it was identified pretty selectively. Like it definitely doesn’t apply to everything, but by all accounts, it applies to this. I’m not an economist, but, you know, we are seeing efficiency gains in all of the places that people thought we would see efficiency gains and AI consumption only continues to climb. And in fact, if anything, we’re seeing an acceleration of the climb.
Robinson Meyer:
[17:12] Back two years ago, when we really started talking about the data center story, the idea was, well, we don’t know whether these power, this huge amount of load growth is going to show up or not on the data center side, because at the same time we were beginning to talk about massive load growth, Nvidia was also announcing, you know, its new chip, which uses 99% less electricity or 90% less electricity. And it’s now been several years since then. Those chips are deploying. I mean, they were frontier chips, so they’re still very expensive and supply constrained. But it’s not like the load growth story has gone away, even as those chips has diffused.
Robinson Meyer:
[17:48] What is the biggest trend you’re seeing right now that you feel like nobody else or or the market or the rest of the industry hasn’t caught up to yet? And if you want to affirm another trend on the way here and say, ah, people know about this trend, but it’s actually a big deal. You should do that, too. But like, what’s the trend nobody’s talking about yet?
Peter Freed:
[18:06] Yeah, I mean, OK, so I think we’ve already been talking about this a little bit, but but going back to 2025 to now, so call it the last year, I do think gas is like the idea that we’re going to see behind the meter gas of one sort or another that has arrived. So, you know, it was probably I feel for companies that were really chasing that hard in early 2024 because deals weren’t getting done. But now there are a lot of deals that are either done and not talked about yet or in the works right now. So we are seeing a ton of behind the meter gas. All of these are almost all of them are what we would call bridge to grid. So it’s you know, you’re you’re building a gas fired power plant with the notion that at some point you get connected to the power grid. So I think that’s the trend that that has certainly been affirmed. It just took a little bit longer than I think people thought.
Peter Freed:
[18:55] The one maybe that that I think is being talked about in a way that I think
Peter Freed:
[19:00] of it somewhat differently is flexibility. And, you know, there was all of this conversation around like flexibility is going to be the key to all of these different things. And, you know, a bunch of different companies were pursuing it. Google has demonstrated repeatedly that technologically it’s possible to work with the compute loads inside of a data center. And basically you modulate compute as a means of adjusting power consumption. So we know that technologically it’s feasible. We also haven’t seen outside of Google a lot of companies successfully doing that at scale. There’s a bunch of startups that are sort of chasing different flavors of it. I think what we are also finding is that you can achieve, back to the battery conversation, you can achieve a lot of that flexibility synthetically with batteries.
Peter Freed:
[19:49] And where I feel like we are right now, and we can and should talk more about this, is that all of the pieces are on the table. All the puzzle pieces are out on the table now. We don’t need new puzzle pieces, but we do need people to sort of put those puzzle pieces together in a repeatable and scalable way that we haven’t seen yet. And that means, you know, basically.
Peter Freed:
[20:11] Technology solutions, potentially, you know, touching the operations of the data center, although ideally not, at least in my view, like if you’re going to work on one of these, make it look the same as it always looked at the data center operator and you just sort of handle it. Then you need a software solution that finds the actual configuration and makes that work. And there’s some startups that are chasing that. And ultimately you need the utility or the grid operator to sit in the middle of all of that and say, yes, maybe I couldn’t find this myself, but I concur with what you are saying. And therefore I am validating the underlying value proposition to the data center operator or owner that’s going to have to pay for that in order to unlock new capacity. So I think we’re getting closer to the cusp and I’m hoping that 2026 is the year where we see more of that. So we’ll see.
Robinson Meyer:
[21:00] I want to go back to something you said at the very beginning of that answer. That was all so useful. And we’re going to touch on so many parts of that, but I want to go back to something you said at the very beginning, which was that this is that behind the meter gas has showed up, that new data center projects are building large scale gas installations as they wait for a hookup to the grid. We’ve been observing this and covering this at Heatmap, but to describe it as an industry-wide trend does seem like a huge deal because we’ve talked about data centers for the past two years as an electricity story. And when we look at the electricity statistics, what we see is 90 percent, 95 percent of new capacity coming online is renewables. And there’s a reason why renewables would like perform especially well in capacity statistics rather than kind of power statistics. But. This huge amount of capacity coming onto the grid nationally according to eia is renewables but it sounds like kind of what you’re saying is that data centers are now a gas demand story and are hooking deep into the gas system and we should expect to see that demand showing up in the gas system even before we see it in the power system and so the fact that there’s all these data centers using electricity we might not see their electricity demand in grid statistics that’s
Peter Freed:
[22:18] Right because if you’re about if you’re a fully private behind the meter gas project you’re not reporting no one’s reporting that to anybody now you know, Maybe on the gas demand side, yes, although many of these projects are basically being built on top of the big gas plays, right? You know, that’s why we’re seeing so much of this in West Texas and some of this stuff in Ohio. And so where that would show up in reported statistics and when is a big question. One could imagine a universe in which, you know, you’ve built this behind the meter gas-fired solution and your grid interconnection is going to take five years or seven years.
Peter Freed:
[22:59] Maybe at the end of that time when that plugs into the system, then it shows up somewhere. But there’s actually a bunch of really interesting questions about what happens to those gas-generating assets when the grid connection comes along, right? So, you know, there’s like the VoltaGrid model, which is a company that X.ai has worked with. They’ve got a pretty long track record where a lot of times they literally take the generators, they put them on the back of a truck and they take them on to the next project. And so, you know, some of these projects that people are doing with relatively small, like reciprocating engines, which don’t have the world’s greatest heat rates and they’re not that efficient. Maybe they’ll go on to the next project. In other cases, maybe those generators become the backup generation solution to the grid connection and suddenly go from being a prime power source, so running almost all of the time, to running 20 or 30 hours a year when you’re testing, you know, just for testing. And then the middle ground, I think we’ll see some of this too, is those resources become grid resources. So either they’re being dispatched economically as a grid resource, or it goes into sort of the planning paradigm of the local utility. And the costs have already been borne by the data center customer. And so maybe that works from kind of an affordability perspective or otherwise. And I think we’re at the earliest stages of thinking about that. And maybe just because I like to throw out.
Peter Freed:
[24:23] Ideas for people. Like one of the things that I’ve been wondering about having now seen so much of this happening is, could we be a little bit more thoughtful or strategic about how we’re doing this? I’ll put a little shout out into the utility practice at McKinsey. I really like that team. I find them very thoughtful. And so we’ve just been starting to like virtual whiteboard. Like if you wanted to bring an overall grid orientation to like all of these random behind the meter data centers, which mostly just work in where is there land with gas available? That’s sort of the driving factor, right? I need a big piece of land that has gas availability. Could we be more strategic about that from eventually all of this gets hooked into the grid seven years from now, whatever it is like, is there a way to add like one little thumb on the scale of strategy and planning that says I would optimize this location versus that location or I would do it this way versus that way? And it’s really early days, but that’s one of the things that I’ve been sort of pondering a bunch lately is like, is there a better way to do this that feels more strategically oriented than just like finding the biggest piece of land you can with gas available?
Robinson Meyer:
[25:30] Well, it sounds like what you’re also talking about is the massive gas buildout happening totally outside the reach of any utility IRP, totally outside of any utility planning process, massive gas electricity capacity buildout that right now we don’t see on the grid, but at some point in the future could surge online as this bottleneck works its way through. There’s a great question in the chat that I want to ask, which is what percentage
Robinson Meyer:
[25:53] of data centers total expected demand is the bridge being built for? So if it’s a 100-megawatt project, I mean, are developers building 100 megawatts on site of gas and then waiting for 100-megawatt interconnect? Or is it like they build 50 megawatts and then they wait for the rest, the next 50 to show up?
Peter Freed:
[26:12] You know, I can’t speak for every project, but within the projects that I am familiar with, it’s 100% of the projected project load. You know, these projects ramp through time, right? It’s not like if you want a one gigawatt data center, you don’t just turn on a 1-gigawatt data center. In fact, a gigawatt data center could take years to ramp up, not just because of construction time, but because you have to put the computers in, you have to turn them on, you have to make sure they all work together. The old industry rule of thumb used to be 50 megawatts every 90 days or so at a given site. Now it’s accelerated some, but it’s not like you’re just turning on 100 megawatts every couple of weeks, you know, like it takes time. So anyway, what I would say is at least the projects that I’m familiar with, people are... Not deploying as much gas as they possibly can. And then when the grid connection shows up, you get into that conversation that we were just having, what do you do with those generators? Or depending on the size of the site, in some cases, they think of them as additive. So if you’re going to do 500 megawatts of behind the meter generation, and you’ve got a 500-megawatt grid connection, in some jurisdictions, you might say, well, that’s 1,000 megawatts of capacity, You’re actually probably more likely you’re going to work with the utility and it’s 750, right? The grid connection will take more and suddenly now the utility has a peaking asset sitting there that helps them manage it.
Peter Freed:
[27:38] Whereas in Texas, interestingly, which is the hottest, you know, this is where a great significant percentage of all of this is happening. With SB6, you can’t, that’s the Senate Bill 6 that, you know, was related to data centers coming online and how you’re going to think about that from the perspective of the grid. And basically, you can’t get a new grid connection without somewhere adding new generation associated with it. And so interestingly, like, there are some proposals and projects that I’ve seen or heard people talking about, where actually the idea is that you build a bridge project to a large scale gas fire generator and still get a grid connection. And that large scale gas fire generator, usually a combined cycle unit, is helping accelerate the interconnection timeline to the grid, because basically what you’re saying to the grid operator is like, I’ve got enough generating capacity sitting here that I can cover this entire load if I need to, but it would still be more efficient. For everybody to have this thing connected. And, you know, so one of the questions that’s really interesting is, do those folks get interconnected to the grid faster because there’s some big resource sitting there? And I think probably the answer is going to be yes.
Robinson Meyer:
[28:52] We know there’s this giant capex surge coming from the hyperscalers. I mean, it’s reached the point now where tech companies’ stocks suffer when they announce investment because they seem to be in an arms race of spending on data centers. We were just talking about the behind the meter gas boom. There’s a lot of renewable energy developers in this audience or battery developers. How should they be thinking about this moment and what do they need to be doing to make their projects or to work with data center developers in the most attractive way?
Peter Freed:
[29:22] I’ll bring us back a couple of minutes to when I said, look, if you’re a data center developer and you’re building gas plus storage and you’re thinking of that as a pretty complicated thing, someone is really going to have to work out on explaining why the introduction of a variable renewable resource into that configuration is worthwhile.
Peter Freed:
[29:45] And obviously there are people that believe that that’s true. Intersect believed that that was true and it worked out really, really well for them. There are ways to tell that story. And I think that the renewable energy development community probably still has some work to do to help explain that. So that’s sort of thing number one, like the closer you get to the operations of the.
Peter Freed:
[30:08] the data center facility, the more work you’re going to have to do to explain why you believe that the integration of renewables into that makes sense. Now, you can remove yourself somewhat from the actual operations of the facility. And this is where we get into that, what, bring your own capacity conversations. And, you know, there’s been some really interesting stuff sort of talking about, okay, maybe there is a utility which has sufficient wires capacity as — and like, there’s enough room on the transmission lines to plug a data center in and turn the lights on, but they don’t have enough market capacity. Like, they don’t have enough of the financial products required by the RTO that they operate in to serve that facility. And so that can become an interesting opportunity for renewables in particular, storage in particular, trying to figure out how to put together these bring your own capacity products to serve data centers. And I’ll say, you know, when I first heard about these bring your own capacity opportunities, I thought that they were pretty niche. I was like, okay, well, you know, a utility has sufficient wires capacity to serve a giant data center, but they don’t have capacity in the market. Like that, that feels like something that’s not going to happen that often, but apparently I mean, I was incorrect.
Robinson Meyer:
[31:30] How would this happen?
Peter Freed:
[31:31] Yeah. I mean, basically like the generation that they’ve built or contracted with is, is sufficient to serve the needs of their existing customer base. And also there is room on the physical infrastructure that underpins that for growth. You know, a lot of, you know, utilities are rarely building exactly to what they need in that moment, right? There’s always some anticipation of growth. And so, you know, particularly with a utility which maybe doesn’t have a huge generation fleet, which is procuring capacity from the market, you could find yourself in a situation where their physical infrastructure could accommodate new load, but they don’t actually have the market product to serve it. And so, you know, either the answer to that is the utility itself goes out and builds a whole bunch of new, probably gas-fired generation to get sufficient capacity to serve, or the customer can bring its own capacity. And if you look at, for example, like some of the nuclear deals that have happened with existing plants or with upgrades or some of those things, like assuredly, the capacity elements of nuclear service are useful in putting together a solution to serve new data center loads across those markets.
Robinson Meyer:
[32:44] If we’re talking about data centers now being major gas fire generator, you know, if you’re talking about putting 500 megawatts or gigawatt of gas generation on a data center site, then suddenly these things shift from having the footprint of a classic cloud data center or even an Amazon warehouse to being a major, I mean, having literally a gigawatt scale power plant in your backyard. So we don’t have these polling results out yet, but at Heatmap Pro, we do periodic polling on the community support for data centers. And we ask questions like, would you welcome a data center in your community? The most recent poll, which is not out yet, we’re going to publish it later this week, is net 24, is negative 24. And more than half of respondents would oppose a data center in their community. It’s a huge decrease in our data set. But do you see backlash to the pollution aspect of data centers or is it to the whole package?
Peter Freed:
[33:43] I think it’s the whole package. And my guess would be that the pollution element makes it worse. So, you know, public sentiment polling for AI as a technology category is extremely poor. Like, I think there was a really interesting article in The New York Times this weekend about how, like, of all of the technology booms where there’s polling data, this one is by far the worst. Like people historically have gotten very enthusiastic about this kind of stuff. And like the public is just very skeptical about the benefit.
Robinson Meyer:
[34:11] In part because the CEOs of the companies tell us it’s going to be bad. Mark Zuckerberg told us that he was going to connect the world, you know, 20 years ago. People had concerns, but it seemed like people were. I mean, they turned out, of course, that technology had massive downsides. But it seems like everyone was pretty jazzed about it. But now even the CEOs are like, this is a major problem. We aren’t able to stop it. And that’s why we’ve adopted these arcane corporate structures in order to contain the technology that we are. Right.
Peter Freed:
[34:40] So with that said, you know, I think. A data center is the closest physical manifestation of AI that a person can encounter right now outside of like robots in your house. And so I think I think in general, public opposition to data centers tends to reflect that public sentiment. And on top of that, pollution elements. Yeah, I don’t think that that that is going to be particularly helpful from a public sentiment standpoint. Now, the question is, does the introduction of renewables to that power solution really obviate any of the concern? And my guess is that the answer is no, because, you know, if it’s a gigawatt data center with a gigawatt of gas-fired power generation or 500 megawatts because there’s a big solar and storage, you know, I don’t think the public generally cares. And so, you know, what I expect that we will be seeing is more and more of these gas-fired projects being in places with favorable permitting regulations. So, you know, think...
Robinson Meyer:
[35:43] Unincorporated county land in this which yes
Peter Freed:
[35:46] We’re already seeing a lot of that places where there’s already industrial zoning and like people you know places and communities that are used to this kind of stuff i think that’s much more likely.
Robinson Meyer:
[35:55] I was going to ask if we’re seeing new hot spots because the hot spot previously was the mid-atlantic you know georgia northern virginia and texas and you already mentioned texas but are there different hot spots emerging slash is construction of PJM, the Mid-Atlantic and the Upper Midwest fading?
Peter Freed:
[36:13] No, nothing is fading. I think West Texas is really like the main story. You know, Meta announced a data center in El Paso and, you know, people were sort of like, oh, El Paso, so interesting. But now the whole Abilene, Midland, Waco, like I would not be at all surprised if within a year or two, if not a true availability zone for the cloud, But that will become a new major computing region. Like enough activity is happening there that we’re just going to see that spring up. You know, I’m hearing a lot of rumblings around Wyoming. Again, not the world’s most populous state. A lot of gas infrastructure runs through it. There have been, you know, Microsoft has got a project there. Meta’s got a project there. I think OpenAI has been rumored to have a project there. So, or Crusoe, you know, maybe with OpenAI attached. Anyway, so, you know, there’s I think Wyoming is going to be a place and then, you know, really anywhere else where you have less dense population zones and the availability of gas may eventually become something.
Robinson Meyer:
[37:15] When we talk about these hyperscalers, so we’re talking about oh, Meta has a project there, Oracle has a project there, OpenAI has a project there. Is that because it’s the hyperscalers that are still driving most of the demand? Or do they act as water buffalo? And then, you know, the flock of independent data center developers kind of follow them because they’re assumed to have detected some price signal. And so you get these big projects that are like the big Meta gigawatt-scale project. And then you get all these little AI data centers around it, which are like independent developers hopping on to what they think might be good price action or something.
Peter Freed:
[37:53] So it’s somewhere in the middle. So all of the major hyperscalers are still self-performing. So they’re building their own data centers. And then there are large developers who are building data centers to also serve those companies. So basically the demand signal for large-scale compute is the four hyperscalers that we’ve already talked about, plus OpenAI and Anthropic, basically. Like that’s pretty much it. Oracle, to the extent that they’re a player here, is largely just a sleeve for OpenAI demand. You know, some exceptions, like they have their own businesses, but a lot of what they’re doing is that. And so almost everything we’re seeing is just consolidating around six companies, which is a very weird market when you think about it.
Robinson Meyer:
[38:41] Is there is someone who’s doing Anthropic’s?
Peter Freed:
[38:44] Actually, the information just had some really interesting reporting on this over the weekend. So right now, like the expectation has been that Anthropic is doing leasing. Either they’re doing direct leasing. So, you know, where they would have more control over how a data center was constructed and built, or they’re buying cloud capacity from the likes of Google Cloud or Amazon Web Services or what have you. So they are not building any of their own data centers, at least nothing that’s been publicly reported. And actually, interestingly, that article that I mentioned that came out over the weekend identified that OpenAI had had these ambitions to build their own data centers and has largely shelved those because for a variety of reasons, including securing financing, they’re mostly also going this leasing route, at least right now.
Robinson Meyer:
[39:28] Well, that bleeds me. So how are hyperscalers navigating, you know, a number of hyperscalers or a number of these big AI companies, notably OpenAI and Anthropic, are at least reportedly trying to IPO this year? That means they need a lot of money. They’re also facing ballooning computing needs. How is that affecting the real world of data center development?
Peter Freed:
[39:50] So we’ve just talked about, in a sense, how the demand signal, I wouldn’t even say consolidated. It was never like, if anything, it’s grown a little bit because now you have two frontier labs along with the four hyperscalers. But you’ve got a very small pool of very large demand. And also what’s happening is I think we are starting to see some consolidation on the capital availability side because the numbers are so large. right? You know, we’re talking hundreds of billions to a trillion plus dollars in the next handful of years. There are very few capital providers that have that kind of money. So the hyperscalers have been using their own balance sheets. They’re flush. But even that is not enough. They’re starting to go out and look for creative sources of financing. There’s large private equity funds that have been playing in this space for a long time. They continue to play. And then ultimately, and we’re seeing this, right, like sovereign wealth funds, that’s kind of the type of money that we’re talking about. And a lot of Middle Eastern money has been getting involved here, other sovereign wealth from around the world, Southeast Asia, etc. So in my view, we are actually seeing both a consolidation of capital supply and demand on the other side and the credit that goes along with that. And so it’s going to be really, really interesting to sort of see how this all shakes out, in part because...
Peter Freed:
[41:16] A lot of the capital providers are relatively risk averse. Like, you know, last year there was a bit of a fear of missing out flavor. And so we saw people at least making big announcements about money that they were going to earmark for stuff. I would say this year, it seems to me that people are really asking real questions around risk. Like, if you are OpenAI or Anthropic who are not public companies that don’t have any credit rating, like, you know, everyone is going to evaluate the risk associated with doing business with those companies. But ultimately, like they don’t have a publicly available credit rating associated with them. How do they go get?
Robinson Meyer:
[41:52] They don’t even have GAAP out. I mean, they don’t have accounting statistics out yet, right? Yeah. Only no open AI and Anthropic’s cash flow from periodic stories, correct?
Peter Freed:
[42:00] And so if you’re a company like that, how do you go get $100 billion to build data center capacity? And the answer is you have to start getting really creative. And that’s where we see, you know, Nvidia throwing some of its credit around to help people go buy their chips. And AMD is doing this and Google is rumored to be doing it. So, you know, there’s it’s this is all financial engineering stuff, which is probably beyond the scope of this podcast. But suffice it to say that people are really working out, trying to figure out how to get the amount of capital that they need to do what they’re proposing to do.
Robinson Meyer:
[42:35] Let’s just lean into this for one more question, because I do want I want to
Robinson Meyer:
[42:40] talk about a few different technologies, and this is an energy and news podcast. But why this matters in a broader sense is when we talk about the scale of organizations that are getting involved, the Saudis, you know, sovereign wealth fund, the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund, insurance companies, I mean, these are the big credit providers, reinsurers, right? These are the big, big wells of money at the basis of the global economy. And when we talk about them getting roped into AI at such a broad scale. We are talking in part, it seems to me, about a situation where
Robinson Meyer:
[43:14] Even though there are various parts of froth in the AI economy, but without anyone feeling like this is a dot-com style story where enormous amounts of wealth are going to be created in a kind of magic way, so you must put all your money in it. Without anyone feeling completely like that or any of the big capital providers feeling completely like that, enough money gets soaked into these projects and has to get involved in these projects just to build them that a huge portion of the economy and business investment and therefore final demand gets tied up in data center projects. And so can you walk us through, from your point of view, like what are the next temporal milestones in the data center story going forward? You know, it sounds like you don’t think power is really ever going to be a bottleneck, partially because of gas. But like what what points this year or in future years will we start to understand, you know, these projects are working or they’re not working, they’re coming together, they’re generating the cash flow they need or they’re not.
Peter Freed:
[44:27] I’m going to answer this question in two ways. One is as like a old energy guy, like how part of the conversation we were talking. And then I’m going to indulge for like half a second in, I live in Menlo Park, California. So like right in the heart of Silicon Valley. Perfect. And I am just like, it’s the only thing that anyone really talks about around here.
Peter Freed:
[44:49] And I do want to give you that answer to that question. So let’s do both. So it’s sort of the traditional energy project finance. Like, how do we think about all of this? Like, you know, I think that there are sufficient pools of capital available to move these projects forward. The question that everyone is going to be looking for is like, is there sufficient revenue quality to justify the amount of money that’s getting put in? And that revenue quality is going to be driven by long-term leases on the data centers and long-term power purchase agreements on the power plants. And I think very likely that people are going to figure enough of that out to move the ball forward at least through 2030. There’s going to have to be some interesting, like particularly The data center industry has historically had at least some speculative development, not the two guys and a dog and a pickup truck that we were talking about earlier, but people doing some amount of work to advance projects to a point that they could begin marketing those projects. And the money associated with that early stage development...
Peter Freed:
[45:49] Was big, but not huge. Now it’s huge. And so I think that’s one of the things that people are still going to have to figure out is like, if you’re a sovereign wealth fund that is used to just really stable returns, because that’s what you do for the citizens of the country whose money you’re managing, you don’t give people billions of dollars to go do speculative development work. So how we address that, I think, is one of the things that people are still trying to figure out. Does it get super disaggregated and you sort of see different pools of capital doing that or, you know, do we just figure out different ways to address that? But that to me is sort of the big question is how do you advance projects to a stage where they can move relatively quickly, but prior to them having some credit-worthy long-term thing locked in? That to me is the thing that the industry is struggling with. And I think people are probably going to figure that out. Now, the like AI-pilled, as they would call it around here, like the AI-pilled answer to that question if you look at claude and claude code so this is like the latest models from anthropic.
Peter Freed:
[46:52] 80% of the code, 80% of the code that is Claude is written by Claude. The expectation by the end of this year is that 90-plus, 95% of the code in Claude will be written by Claude. Which means that we are approaching a point of something that industry hands call recursive self-improvement. Which is basically to say that like the AIs are able to improve themselves and therefore the trajectory and acceleration of improvement will begin to look asymptotic, at least exponential and potentially asymptotic. And the reason that I am particularly interested in this is because all of the work that has happened on AI so far is still not on the giant pieces of infrastructure that we’re constructing right now. So there is really not a gigawatt scale data center. I think the biggest GPU training cluster is probably X.ai is with Colossus and it’s three or 400,000 GPUs. Like no one’s got a million-GPU training cluster. And so if you expect even a linear scaling of performance of the models with the infrastructure that are currently under construction, like one can begin to wrap one’s head around the idea that we will hit this point of like takeoff.
Peter Freed:
[48:11] In which case, all of these things begin becoming better very, very quickly. And maybe data center capacity is actually the limiting factor in terms of how quickly that takes off. That’s what I mean, that’s what people believe, which is why they’re trying to build more of this. So in that universe...
Peter Freed:
[48:28] Who knows what anything looks like, but the ability to run compute at scale will be one of the most significant throttles on that takeoff trajectory. And so I think, you know, I think there is a world in which things look so radically different by 2030 that we can’t even really speculate on what that is. And so that’s the other answer to that question, which is just like, maybe AI figures all this out and we don’t have to worry about it. Like, I don’t know.
Robinson Meyer:
[48:59] And I should say that the day we’re recording this, the market’s down. I mean, the S&P is down 1% because investors have become convinced that were that to happen, it would negatively impact a final demand in the economy rather than positively impact. That being said, let’s assume that it’s 2030 and electricity markets still work roughly like they work. And we might have amazing agents to do all of this stuff, but the actual physical technologies are still binding. And let’s talk about a few technologies that could matter here. The first is batteries. You mentioned that batteries are now being paired with gas to drive reliability. Should we think about flexible data center demand? As some, including current Google employee, Tyler Norris, have talked about as a function of algorithmic, you know, and, you know, actually AI activity flexing up and down. Or at this point, should we think about data center flexibility in the real world as just something created by the batteries you have either on site or behind the substation?
Peter Freed:
[50:01] Yeah, again, there’s nothing technologically infeasible about modulating compute. I just think that generally the economics don’t make sense. I mean, Google has figured out a way to make this make sense, which which actually might mean that other people can figure it out. I think, though, if we can do it synthetically with storage, let’s just say at the fence line and, you know, we can debate what that actually means. That’s probably going to be the fastest, easiest way for most people, like most projects to happen. And again, what does that actually mean? Right. So if we’re if we’re bringing flexibility to the conversation, that means that you are on a system which has sufficient energy in most hours to serve the facility. You’re really addressing a resource adequacy constraint on an August afternoon or a December morning or what have you. And so one of the things that’s actually pretty interesting for the renewables folks is if that flywheel gets going, right, like suddenly we’re effectively addressing these resource adequacy things. We’re using surplus energy, the extra energy that’s available in most hours. If the flywheel gets going, then you need to keep adding more energy to the system. And that’s actually something that is very good for renewables because that will be the fastest, least expensive way to add energy to the system to inject enough surplus energy to keep the like flexibility flywheel moving. Like if you do enough flexibility, flexibility stops working unless you add more energy to the system.
Robinson Meyer:
[51:22] The other way you could do flexibility is through these things that are sometimes called virtual power plants. It’s the idea that you could flex consumer demand household demand up and down you people would get paid to have their air conditioner be a little higher a little lower to run certain processes and energy intensive processes in their house when the grid can withstand it there’s been discussion that ai companies the hyperskillers would be able to pay the amount of money that could actually make these projects feasible is that something you believe will happen and what needs to happen to have a gigawatt of VPPs show up, you know, in, say, the mid-Atlantic or in Texas?
Peter Freed:
[52:02] Yeah, I think it’s possible. Look, I think it’s part of a portfolio. So this bring your own capacity concept, we were talking about it with solar and storage, but there’s no reason why other products couldn’t serve that capacity. And so I think what’s likely to happen is that we will see, you know, consumer demand response or what have you is like a small portion of a portfolio until people get more comfortable with the idea. And then maybe it’ll grow. And ultimately, hopefully the market just says, whatever the most cost-efficient way to provide this particular capacity product at this time, like we’ll do that. So I think, you know, hopefully we’ll see.
Robinson Meyer:
[52:41] Which market?
Peter Freed:
[52:42] Well, I mean, that’s the other question.
Robinson Meyer:
[52:44] Right? In ERCOT, I bet the right market would show up. And PJM, I don’t know.
Peter Freed:
[52:47] It’s hard to say.
Robinson Meyer:
[52:48] I’m just in rapid fire now. One of the things I’m hearing from you is that behind the meter gas, is going to bridge to 2030. Data centers are going to have the electricity they need via behind the meter gas and batteries, and it’s going to get to 2030, at which point more gas turbine, you know, power plant scale, gas turbine capacity comes online. Do you see a role for other technologies at that point? I mean, that’s when I would think about like geothermal become salient to this kind of this kind of story.
Peter Freed:
[53:19] Yeah, I think the broad perception is that post 2030, the aperture of opportunity is wider. And I would agree with that with the following caveat. It won’t be any wider unless people are working on it now. And so that is one of the, like, we’ve been talking about this since 2024. And I wouldn’t necessarily say I’ve seen like the intensive level of investment and preparing for a post 2030 world in the last two years. So, you know, we’ve seen some cool stuff on geothermal. We’ve seen some interesting nuclear stuff. But I wouldn’t necessarily say that like a groundswell of investment and innovation that’s required to have a radically different slate of generating technologies in a post 2030, like I’m not seeing that. And so if the world is going to look really different or we’re going to see a lot more opportunity post 2030, I think people need to be doing more.
Robinson Meyer:
[54:12] What’s the one thing?
Robinson Meyer:
[54:15] Public policy or investment decision that would need to happen to slow down or change the makeup of the huge amount of behind the meter gas that it seems like we’re about to get across the country like if you were a democratic policy maker or an energy policy maker someone who wants
Peter Freed:
[54:35] I mean I’m a I’m a carrots not sticks guy, Rob, so I think rather than slowing that down, I would think about speeding the other stuff up and no great surprise. It’s figuring out how to get more transmission built, just permitting reform. It’s stuff that we’ve been aware of for a long time. And we are now seeing significant levels of government subsidy kind of going into all kinds of different things and in ways that maybe we haven’t seen before. So you could imagine a lot of what we’ve seen in the nuclear industry is probably going to help it have a moment that it wouldn’t have had a couple of years ago.
Robinson Meyer:
[55:10] That’s kind of what I’m asking. Is it that there needs to be investment in these public investment or either permitting reform for transmission or some kind of fixed transmission build out or nuclear build out in order to just like, if you care about emissions, this is what maybe needs to happen. There’s a whole set of questions here that I want to hit that we’re right at time for. But if you had advice to data center developers at this moment, renewable developers for a long time have been in a world where Our communities can give them all sorts of feedback. For data center developers, what separates a good developer from a bad developer? What should good data center developers be doing and what do they look like?
Peter Freed:
[55:47] Yeah, I mean, look, at the end of the day, it’s getting engaged with communities, and it has to be that. And that’s always been the case. And people are just slowly getting better at it.
Robinson Meyer:
[55:56] Great. Well, we’re going to have to leave it there. Peter Freed, thank you so much for joining us. It was great, as always.
Peter Freed:
[56:00] Thank you for having me. A real pleasure.
Robinson Meyer:
[56:02] Thank you so much for listening. If you enjoyed this conversation or conversations like it, please subscribe to Shift Key. In any podcast app you use, you can also find us at heatmap.news. And remember, if you want to keep following how data centers are reshaping the energy transition, because they’re doing quite a bit, then that is the work we do every day at Heatmap in our newsroom and also in our pro team. Our pro team tracks where energy and data center projects move forward, where they get delayed or canceled, and how community response shapes outcomes. You can find the link to that in the chat. If you’re interested in learning more about the software, visit heatmap.news/pro. That’s heatmap.news/pro. If you enjoyed Shift Key, then leave us a review or send this episode to your friends. You can follow me on X or Bluesky or LinkedIn, all of the above, under my name, Robinson Meyer. Shift Key is a production of Heatmap News. Our editors are Jillian Goodman and Nico Lauricella. Multimedia editing and audio engineering is by Jacob Lambert and by Nick Woodbury. Our music is by Adam Kromelow. Thanks so much for listening and see you next week.
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Rob talks with the billionaire investor and philanthropist about how energy, Chinese EVs, and why he’s “very optimistic” that Congress will pass permitting reform this year.
If you work around climate or clean energy, you probably know about John Arnold. Although he began his career as a natural gas trader, Arnold has since become one of the country’s most important clean energy investors. He’s the chairman of Grid United, a transmission development firm undertaking some of the country’s most ambitious power line projects, and he is an investor in the advanced geothermal startup Fervo. He and his wife Laura run the philanthropic organization Arnold Ventures.
On this week’s episode of Shift Key, Rob talks with Arnold about the current energy chaos and what might come next. They discuss Arnold’s first trip to China, whether Congress might pass permitting reform this year, and what clean energy companies should learn from the fossil fuel industry.
Shift Key is hosted by Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, or wherever you get your podcasts.
You can also add the show’s RSS feed to your podcast app to follow us directly.
Here is an excerpt from our conversation:
Robinson Meyer: What do you think is the most plausible endgame? You just observed that basically neither side, I think, feels like it's winning or losing — it's a real stalemate — but meanwhile the physical market is deteriorating what maybe what are the scenarios you're thinking through in your head.
John Arnold: It has to end with a negotiated settlement. I think it's easy to say, but it's very, very difficult to imagine how that happens, especially how emboldened I think both sides are. This notion of Iran's access to nuclear material that can be used to make a bomb has been a stickler for the West for now decades. And you've had many, many administrations saying that Iran cannot be allowed to get the nuclear weapon. And so the question is, how does this end in a better spot with respect to access to nuclear material than when it started, especially with how emboldened that Iran feels today? And I think that is kind of difficult to imagine. And if I had the answer to this, I would maybe be on National Security Council. But we're kind of in this spot where I think had one war gamed this out beforehand, and there was some probability you get to this point, and you would probably say, like, let's just hope that we don't end up there, because there's no easy way out.
You can also find a complete transcript of the episode on Heatmap.
This episode of Shift Key is sponsored by Salesforce.
Salesforce is the No. 1 AI CRM, where humans with agents drive success together. We invest in bold climate technologies and leverage agentic AI to accelerate nature-based solutions that benefit people and the planet. Learn more. You can also learn more about Salesforce's investments in watersheds here.
Music for Shift Key is by Adam Kromelow.
This transcript has been automatically generated.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, or wherever you get your podcasts.
You can also add the show’s RSS feed to your podcast app to follow us directly.
Robinson Meyer: Hello, it's Wednesday, May 6th, and the Strait of Hormuz is still closed. In fact, both the United States and Iran claim to control the strait, and energy traders around the world, not to mention policymakers and the general public, are trying to understand the situation.
So today, I want to welcome someone who's made billions of dollars understanding and monitoring situations a lot like this one. John Arnold has a good claim to be the best energy trader of all time. He began his career when he was 21 years old and working in natural gas trading at Enron. He later established Centaurus Advisors, LLC, a hedge fund specializing in energy in Houston.
But since 2008, he and his wife, Laura, have led Arnold Ventures, which is one of the most interesting and I would say one of the most effective philanthropic organizations out there. They work on criminal justice reform, lowering drug prices, reining in sports betting, and for our purposes, how to build more housing, transportation, and infrastructure in the United States, including how to build more electricity infrastructure. For that reason, they've been at the forefront of the permitting reform conversation. In fact, I'd say they helped to drive it, in part because John is also a clean energy investor. He's a co-founder and chairman of Grid United, which is building some of the most ambitious transmission projects in the United States. And he's an investor in the advanced geothermal company Fervo, which we talked about on a recent episode.
So many of the topics, in fact, that we work on or talk about at Shift Key come down to topics that John Arnold thinks about every day.
One goal of Shift Key, in fact, I think is to step back from the news cycle from time to time and have bigger conversations with guests like John. And so today for the first episode in our new occasional “big interview” series, I'm talking to John Arnold about how he reads the current moment in energy, about what he learned during his recent trip to China, where he went to EV factories — it was the first time he'd ever been to that country — and about what clean energy companies can and should learn from fossil fuels. I'm Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News, and it's all coming up on ShiftKey, Heatmap's podcast about decarbonization and the shift away from fossil fuels. John Arnold, welcome to Shift Key.
John Arnold: Great to be here.
Robinson Meyer: So my colleague is reading Lloyd Blankfein's memoir and found out in the memoir, he confesses he still trades every day, that he can't get away from it. You're one of the great energy traders. Are you still trading on a day-to-day basis?
John Arnold: I do not trade on a day-to-day basis. I still follow the markets on a day-to-day basis. I think I've become every year a little bit more separated from what's actually going on. And what I don't even know, I don't know increases. I will trade a few times a year.
Robinson Meyer: Do you feel in moments like this one, or in I don't know, March 2020, did you feel the pull to get more involved? Were you like, Oh, my gosh, there's stuff happening. I have to be there. Or was it like, Oh, no, there's too much. I can't possibly trade in this moment.
John Arnold: Oh, for sure. I think, you know, in moments of panic, I think is when the best opportunity exists, particularly for somebody who's not in the day-to-day of it. And so you really have to choose your spots about when that chaos comes in and the market might get mispriced. And that's the opportunity for someone like me at this point.
Robinson Meyer: Speaking of which, let's talk about the current moment. So how do you read this current moment in global energy? I would say in oil specifically, then we can get to natural gas and maybe crucially, is the way the oil market is behaving in response to the Strait of Hormuz's closure and this kind of prolonged ceasefire that may be breaking down literally as we record this, should oil be higher? And is the movement of oil confusing you or do you think kind of makes sense?
John Arnold: Yeah, there was this market chaos whenever I think there was the understanding that the Strait was going to be closed for some period of time. And that's when you saw Brent shoot up to $120 plus, at least intraday, and really had the whole panic because this is what the oil market has been fearing for decades. And obviously, in retrospect, that move had gone too far. I think a few things happened. One was it's three weeks to get cargos from the Middle East to either East Asia or to Europe. It took three weeks for the end user to really stop receiving new cargoes. The market was already soft at the time, so there was some kind of looseness in the market. The commercial inventories were healthy, and the steeply backward-aided curve created a tremendous incentive for anybody with those inventories to try to sell them onto the market.
Strategic reserves started getting sent out. There was a little bit of demand destruction. You had the administration was making all sorts of rhetorical claims that this would end soon or that there was a way to open up the strait. So I think that the whole combination of things has been weighing on the market.
The Saudis and others found ways to reroute a number of the barrels. But now, you know, you're a little bit more than two months in to the strait being closed. And you still have this kind of 10 to 12 million barrels a day that's off market. And that's really starting to add up. And the commercial inventories are being worn down. The three weeks is up, so people are not receiving their cargoes that they were expecting. And so I've made this comment before, but each day that goes by that there's not a settlement, that the straight is not open, the fair value of oil goes up. And it's not going to be a straight line up. It's going to bounce around. It bounced up today, bounced down on last Friday. But you are on this upward trend and i think the problem gets harder with each passing day and that's that's you know not a controversial opinion but i do think it is it just starts getting to be the real dilemma especially with both sides thinking that they can play the waiting game and neither side really has a good card to play as to what to do next what's.
Robinson Meyer: What do you think is the most plausible endgame? You just observed that basically neither side, I think, feels like it's winning or losing — it's a real stalemate — but meanwhile the physical market is deteriorating what maybe what are the scenarios you're thinking through in your head
John Arnold: It has to end with a negotiated settlement. I think it's easy to say, but it's very, very difficult to imagine how that happens, especially how emboldened I think both sides are. This notion of Iran's access to nuclear material that can be used to make a bomb has been a stickler for the West for now decades. And you've had many, many administrations saying that Iran cannot be allowed to get the nuclear weapon. And so the question is, how does this end in a better spot with respect to access to nuclear material than when it started, especially with how emboldened that Iran feels today? And I think that is kind of difficult to imagine. And if I had the answer to this, I would maybe be on National Security Council. But we're kind of in this spot where I think had one war gamed this out beforehand, and there was some probability you get to this point, and you would probably say, like, let's just hope that we don't end up there, because there's no easy way out.
Robinson Meyer: I was talking to a few foreign policy people who worked in the past administration over the weekend. And one of them said something like, you have to say the president has somewhat succeeded here in managing the market so far. Because when Russia invaded Ukraine, Brent went to 140 on fears of a supply disruption. But then a supply disruption never really materialized to the same extent that it has today. Well, today, obviously, we're losing 10 million barrels a day. There is a real supply disruption. And, you know, prices are like flirting with Brent, in this case, is flirting with 110. It kind of goes up to 120, comes back down. But do you think that the administration, the president kind of deserves credit for managing prices or is this all going to backfire as this continues and we don't see a supply response from, say, the U.S. because prices have remained depressed?
John Arnold: Yes and yes. So I think he has done a good job of talking down the market to date. And you hear the open the straight or we're going to blow you to smithereens, open the straight or we're going to blockade, open the straight or we're going to escort friendly ships through. There's the we're very close to a deal that gets talked about oftentimes these statements get released on sunday before markets open and so in that sense you know i think those who are along the market live in fear of one bad headline and you lose ten dollars and there's just an air gap in the market and so i think that provides a level of fear and maybe the risk averse are less comfortable in trying to bid up supplies. That being said, the purpose of prices is to allocate scarce resources. And to the extent that we need higher prices in order to create more demand destruction, we're not getting it today. And again, each day that goes on, the market gets even tighter and tighter physically.
And those who had commercial inventories that they drew down, or they bought them back a month or two deferred in the financial markets because you could make a $7 or $10, $15 by just playing the curve. But then you get to the point where, okay, now you want your barrels. And so to some extent that gets met by the release of strategic reserves. I think countries get more hesitant over time to put out those barrels, but you do end up with, I think keeping prices lower in the short term means higher in the medium term if we get there.
Robinson Meyer: We're getting into kind of full-on oil analysis territory, but like, when would higher prices begin to fetch more supply? Because I was at Sierra Week a few weeks ago, and it seemed like part of the issue the administration faces is that even if we were to bring more supply onto the market, it wouldn't arrive till late, till after the midterms. It's a salient political touchpoint, but in the back half of this year, the very end of this year and the beginning of next year.
John Arnold: Exactly. And I think that's what makes energy markets fascinating is that they're relatively inelastic, both supply and demand in the short term. You have to raise gasoline prices to very high levels to get people to change their driving habits. You have to raise jet fuel prices to high levels to get that to start changing, you know, am I going to go on that plane trip or not? And so demand destruction is limited and very inelastic, as well as the ability to bring new supplies on. Plus, the forward curve now is starting to give that real price signal to producers. But for, you know, the first four or six weeks of this, the curve was in steep backwardation. And so a producer would be looking at it and say, you know, it's still WTI $70 or below for when I'm actually going to get that oil that I'm investing a new CapEx in today. And so that wasn't that appealing, even though the short end of the curve was at the 90, 100 plus level.
Robinson Meyer: Stepping back, looking beyond oil, how are you thinking about the energy fallout from this conflict so far, and especially in its long-term implications? I think folks like Fatih Birol have talked about this as an inflection point in energy, as a moment when a number of countries, I think especially in Southeast Asia, are going to look at the energy security implications of relying on seaborne oil. There's a story about Chinese EV sales surging. Do you buy that story, or do you think there's more inertia in the system than we realize and things will snap back basically once the street reopens? And there might be some change in stocks, but this is not the 1970s all over again.
John Arnold: Right. And I think the challenge here is that energy system is enormous. It is long-lived assets that take a long time to build anything new. And things happen at the margin. And so if you just think about what would it take to increase EV market share of cars on the road globally, it's an enormous amount of effort that would be required an enormous amount of time until that starts to become material. The whole stock versus flow issue, even if you're selling 50% market share of EVs, you're still competing with all the autos on the road today. And I think that metaphor is broadly true across much of the energy industry. You can think about the U.S. generation fleet. And while the vast majority of new generation that came on last year was solar and batteries, you know, solar is still a relatively small percentage of the total U.S. System, right? And so that stock versus flow thing, you're not getting away from. And that being said, I think every country is going to value energy security.
John Arnold: In an increasing manner going forward. Now, what that actually means in practice is a little bit harder. And as you said, this is long-term ramifications. This is not how's the energy system going to change in six months or even in a few years. We're talking about how the decisions that get made today that start showing up in any material ways kind of in the five to 10-year window.
Robinson Meyer:So you recently went to China for the first time. Lots of people, when they go to China for the first time, they have a kind of eye-opening experience. Were you expecting an eye-opening experience? What did you expect and what did you encounter?
John Arnold: Yeah, I mean, the reason I went, and I had been kind of embarrassed that I hadn't been previously. I travel a lot, I go international a lot, and just never had the strong desire or the need to go to China, and so I hadn't. But I was growing interested in China as it was starting to be at the technological edge on many things. And so if you think about just kind of the industrialization of China, you know, it's kind of went up from low value to medium value. It was producing lower quality goods even 10 years ago. If you mentioned any type of good from China or most goods from China in the West were deemed to be of inferior quality. And over the past 10 years, particularly over the past five years, I think that's started to flip. And you see a number of industries like EVs, like batteries and solar panels, telecom equipment, et cetera, where China is now on the leading edge, bleeding edge of technology. And they're enormously cost competitive. And so you're starting to see both the world open their eyes to the quality of many Chinese made goods today, as well as the fact that they are often cheaper than one can produce domestically.
And I think this industrial policy challenge that many countries, including the U.S., face are very real. How do you compete with China on EVs given the technological advancement they have today, their relatively inexpensive labor costs, the automation in the factories, these very robust supply chains that they have, cheap cost of capital, willingness to subsidize or run at zero profits, the industry for a long time. And I think that's true not only of the EV industry, but of many other industries going forward. And what's the right response from the West to China that now looks like that?
I thought that was an interesting question that I couldn't answer. I'm not sure I can answer that today either.
Robinson Meyer: So those are all the questions in your head when you went. Then what did you see? Were you surprised? I mean, were they even more advanced? Were things even more advanced there than you expected? Or did you feel like you were kind of adequately prepared by the discourse, but still, you know, it was striking to see it in person?
John Arnold: One of the things that I was expecting was less automation. You should see more automation in places and industries where you have high labor costs. And China seems to be on the forefront of automation and the robotics revolution. So that was kind of a head scratcher, especially if one of the goals, strategic goals of the country is employment — that they've either been long-term planning there to understand that if you're just going to labor your way through this, you're going to be disrupted at some point. But that China is willing to both invest in the robotics and automation, as well as try to create jobs for its citizens, I think is very forward-looking by the country.
I was also trying to just understand where capital comes from. Where's the risk-taking capital come from? And what are the incentives both kind of within the province level as well as from any private capital sources? Who is funding this EV industry that has massive overcapacity and it doesn't seem to be making any money or clearly is not making any money with the exception of maybe BYD. And I think that's true of other industries as well.
So just trying to understand, where's the capital coming from? Are there investment opportunities? Are there sourcing opportunities for the West, particularly on the electrostack that China is so strong in and that the West, particularly in the United States, now has real shortages of any type of power equipment, the transformers and switch gears and all of that. And China has extra capacity there. And in some sense, we are in this race with China on AI. You need a lot of power in order to do that. The supply chain of the power industry is very constrained in the United States right now. There is spare capacity in China should we be utilizing that as a country in order to try to beat them on the AI side I've.
Robinson Meyer: I’ve heard where we kind of are at this point is, whether we like it or not, as the data centers expand, the kind of quotient of where maybe the government or like companies are willing to allow Chinese technology is creeping closer and closer to the chips themselves.
John Arnold: Yes. Yeah. The best I could tell was that American policymakers were okay with Chinese equipment at the edge of the grid. They did not want it kind of on the backbone of the grid such that if it ever got turned off, that the downside was fairly limited.
Robinson Meyer: Where did you see automation in China? What's an example?
John Arnold: So it went to the Nio auto factory. Nio produces one of the higher end EVs, generally in the kind of $50,000 to $100,000 range. They've also been at the forefront of the replaceable battery. I think there's a different phrase from that, but one that you can pull into a charging station if the machine removes the battery from the bottom of the vehicle and puts in an already charged battery. So it's a three-minute in-out process to get a fully charged battery. They had finished a new plant a couple years ago. I think it took them 17 months from breaking ground to having the first car coming off the line, which is just remarkable.
Robinson Meyer: That's crazy.
John Arnold: And was also just surprised that, you know, going through there and touring it, how much automation there was, how few employees there were in the plant.
Robinson Meyer: Okay, so I'm also in the never been to China, but find myself talking about China all the time, kind of embarrassed camp. And it's going away. But this idea that China is competitive because of low cost labor is one that I feel like we're gradually realizing is not true. I mean, it's part of the picture, but it's a much there's a much wider set of capabilities in Chinese manufacturing. Now than there were even 10 years ago, as you were saying.
Did you wind up thinking that that the consumers are different, too, or that maybe the Chinese EV industry has been able to thrive because it addresses a very different need than the American EV industry? I think one thing I've been trying to figure out in my thinking about China is how much the U.S. Still has in dollar terms, the world's largest market or it's up. It's close. But there's more consumers. There's far more people in China and they all buy a version of the thing. Many of them buy cars, right? And that then creates more capacity for learning to scale. Did seeing some aspect of the economy make you realize how difficult or potentially solvable the challenge is?
John Arnold: I think what was striking was, I had a hard time identifying where the weak spot was for Chinese industry, given that they have a highly educated workforce, low cost of labor, that there is risk capital that's provided. A lot of it comes from the government, but then flows through to venture capital groups who are making roughly similar decisions with some constraints on where they can invest to the end of the industries and the geographies as American ones. Talk about the size of the domestic market, the supply chains there, that they are close both in geography and culturally, you know, without having to do cross-border supply chain management. Seeing that and then trying to understand how other countries compete on the electrostack going forward was very challenging. And I walked away saying, I'm not sure if China would be a good investment or not for somebody from the West. I'm not sure those companies are ever going to make money, but I would be very hesitant to invest much in manufacturing companies in the West that are competing with China. I think the auto manufacturing industry is fascinating for a number of reasons, but most countries that have a domestic manufacturing industry for autos view that as strategic. It's a lot of jobs. There's kind of this pride of making cars. And so there's always been a lot of export hurdles and kind of fences being built around countries of various heights. And America.
Has this decision to make of, do we try to compete with Chinese cars globally, or do we build this big wall around our country and say, you have to make it here with American technology?
And I think the risk is what you're seeing in Canada. So the Canadian and American car industries were kind of tied at the hip since forever. And you saw a lot of car parts flow back and forth across borders. The assembly might be done in Canada, but it would use some combination of Canadian and American parts, be done with an American manufacturer, et cetera. You know, the United States is increasingly saying that we don't want that of cars to be assembled in Canada.
And so then Canada's starting to question what should its domestic manufacturing industry look like? And if America is not going to be a good partner, would somebody else? And China's raising their hand saying, try us. And so there was a deal recently in the past maybe six months, where Canada started allowing a certain number of Chinese imports that were essentially with tariff-free, very low tariffs. And the way I read it, I think the way others read it was, that China is testing the market? Is there demand for the product? And if so, then I think China is going to make a very significant investment in Canada. And Canada is protective of its jobs, its domestic industry. And if America is not a good partner for it, maybe China is.
Robinson Meyer: But it doesn't sound like you walked away. I mean, you kind of said this, but it doesn't sound like you walked away with like, okay, there's a clear way that American manufacturing? Because it's more than just auto industry, right? It's kind of this whole set of technologies around electricity at the bleeding edge that I think American policymakers would consider strategic. And I don't know, I would consider strategic, but it doesn't sound like you walked away with a clear sense of what America could do to compete in those industries.
John Arnold: Correct. I think the challenge of industrial policy is that it can end up being zero-sum, right? If one country starts doing it and then the next country says, well, if they're doing it, then I have to do it. And you can end up in a end state where there's very significant subsidies coming from each state and nobody's necessarily better off. And that seems to be where we're headed now.
And the justification that we're having in America to this is, well, China's doing it. And this was part of the rationale for WTO in trying to standardize what the trade rules were and what subsidies and supports a state could give to industry. And to try to really minimize that has always been tough. There's many, many ways that a state can support an industry. But there's been fights about that. And it was relatively stable. It may have been going up slowly. But I do think that China now being a very already healthy competitor in a number of these areas that are deemed to be the future, including things like drones and motors and magnets, et cetera, that there is that question that's happening. And I'm not sure what the answer is for the United States besides either we're going to do this as well. We're going to show supports for our industries that we deem strategic and or that the world's going to build these new alliances with high walls around it. And we have these trading alliances that get created and there's a lot of trading within those alliances and very little that goes across those alliances.
Robinson Meyer: I think it's hard because it's we kind of knew industrial policy had this race to the bottom or zero sum aspect. But what's new is that it works. What's new is that China seems to be doing it in a way that is working and outcompeting Western companies. It was easy for economists to say, oh, we shouldn't do this industrial policy when it didn't seem to work because they could say, oh, it's a race at the bottom and it doesn't work. Well, in that case, who wants to do it? But if China's doing it and it seems to be working, then suddenly we have real issues because an entire set of policy tools that I think both create real negative dynamics in the global market, but also have like huge strategic implications for the US suddenly seem like they're back on the table, but also... Not fit for our current global trading system.
John Arnold: Yeah, I think that's exactly right. It's an economist will give a hundred reasons why the five-year plan should not work and should end up leading to terrible inefficiencies and tremendous waste. But China has five-year plans in recent times have seemed to have been working pretty well.
Robinson Meyer: Yeah.
John Arnold: And so America is moving a little bit more in that direction than China is moving towards our direction.
Robinson Meyer: Exactly. To be continued, speaking, I guess, of the electrostack. So you're involved with a number of companies around electricity, Fervo, Grid United. On the scale of it's a nuisance to it requires a Manhattan project-like effort, how worried are you about the grid? Yeah.
John Arnold: I think there's a limited number of technologies or solutions that seemingly don't have any trade-off. And you can think about the goals of the energy system, and oftentimes you think about something and there's a trade-off, right? And you have trade-offs between affordability and reliability, or trade-offs between the environmental sustainability versus affordability or reliability, for instance. And there's a limited number that have really kind of no obvious trade-offs, at least with respect to the goals of the energy system. And I think about the goals as a lot of people talk about the four of reliability, affordability, sustainability, and security. I would add, I think, good jobs and I think scalability. So if you want to bring on a data center, can you provide power for that? And building out a more integrated grid helps on every one of those six factors.
I think doing things like demand management also doesn't have obvious trade-offs for it. I think adding batteries to the grid is another one of those solutions without the trade-offs. And those are the technologies I think I'm most excited about — again, because if we're in this fight about, you know, the trade-offs, and yes, it's good here, but it has this trade-off — those things are hard to scale or they are very fragile as you change administrations and the prioritization of those goals changes every four or eight years. But if you truly have solutions that are just a net positive then i think they're much easier to scale much more durable.
Robinson Meyer: Have you become convinced that any one grid in the U.S. or area of the U.S. could have does this right as compared to other parts or other grids?
John Arnold: ERCOT is this interesting example. Everybody loves to examine and analyze ERCOT. It's very good on the scalability of the system, which is one of the reasons why so many data centers are now being built in Texas. That was not the case even a few years ago. I think they were going in many different places, but that you can add demand and add the corresponding generation relatively easily in ERCOT, and that you don't have these very long timeframes for grid interconnection, I think is very positive. But what we're trying to do at Grid United is really go across the seams. So accident of history, we have these three grids in the United States. There's almost no connection across them. The benefits of trade that you get of increasing reliability and affordability just by making the system more efficient, more optimized are very real. And so that's really where we're focused.
Robinson Meyer: The Arnold Foundation, you know, your team is very involved in permitting reform. Are there particular policies you would like to see or that you think would solve these issues relatively quickly or at least provide a big boost?
John Arnold: Yeah. So, you know, it's really kind of a question of how do you get your permit? The certainty that you have once you've received your permit. And you want a system where people have the ability and right to object, that those objections are heard in a timely manner. A decision is made and the project's either greenlit or killed. And that certainty of how that process happens is very important to developers. And then maybe even more important is once you have that permit, that you have real certainty that it's not going to get tied up in the courts, right? That judicial review period is set. And again, that the objections get heard, But after the decision's been made, that it's final and we're moving forward. And there's a saying that time is money. It is very true for development, that the best way for an objector of a project to kill it is just to keep the delays. And the judicial system, as it currently works in practice, allows for some types of projects, this never-ending series of delays that happen. And so developers don't even start.
You see this not only with energy, you see this with any type of linear infrastructure, whether it's pipelines or highways or broadband. And you see this in housing as well. We have less housing because developers know in certain geographies that even though they should have their permit in three months, it's going to take them three years. And the cost of capital makes the project go from a profitable one to a money that was never even started. And so certainly today with the growth in demand and power, we need to be able to build again in this country. And if we're still on this trend of, and it's harder and harder to build each project, which makes it longer to bring on and more expensive, then we're never going to meet the goals of the energy system. It's this remarkable moment where I think almost everybody on the political spectrum recognizes that and recognizes the principles of energy permitting. And they're trying to write the fine print today, but I've never seen this issue have so much bipartisan support.
Robinson Meyer: Do you feel like we're going to get a deal this year? Or give me the probability that you think there's a deal this year.
John Arnold: Yeah, so if I go to the prediction markets, what am I going to see?
Robinson Meyer: Yeah, exactly. I haven't even looked to see if there's a Kalshi market.
John Arnold: There probably is.
Robinson Meyer: I'd be too inclined.
John Arnold: I am very optimistic. And we do a lot of policy work at Arnold Ventures. I know how hard it is to pass laws, especially in this era of political dysfunction. The one thing I think almost every member of Congress I talk to understands is the need to do this. There is support from the administration. There is support from congressional leadership on both sides. There's support from the relevant committee heads. If we can't get this done, then we can't get anything done.
Robinson Meyer: What needs to change or what needs to happen between now and, say, the end of the year for it to actually get done?
John Arnold: Yeah. So I think on an election year, it's very unusual for any big piece of bipartisan legislation to get passed really the whole year. And so what we're really looking at is most likely is that it would get passed after the election in the lame duck period. And so you start working backwards from there and really need to have language that's agreed upon in the next 45 days. It's hard to work over the summer. Congress scatters. Everybody scatters. Then you come back. There's a little bit of work time in September, and then everybody's focused on the elections. So the bill needs to get written today. And then again, in the next 45 days, and there's a lot of work happening behind the scenes. So again, sometimes it's hard to know exactly where it is, but everybody's saying the right things. There's been fits and stops to date, particularly when the administration hit the pause on offshore wind. They've made some changes. They brought Senator Whitehouse back to the negotiating table, for instance. So again, everything I think is looking good, but getting anything passed in DC these days might be a long shot.
Robinson Meyer: Arnold Foundation was involved in the MethaneSAT project. And, you know, methane is an interesting problem. I think natural gas would obviously be a much stronger position on emissions terms if we dealt with the methane pollution problem. Of course, then the administration came in and removed rules that were set to begin regulating methane pollution from the oil and gas sector. Why has methane proven so hard to tackle in the U.S.?
John Arnold: Yeah, I think it's a question of who pays for it. And so that well that, you know, is 50 years old, that's kind of barely economic today. It's leaking a little bit as a standalone well, but in aggregate, the number of very old wells or near end of life wells that are leaking, the title to those wells has changed hands many times over the years. And so the current owner says, right, why am I responsible? I just bought this thing a year ago. And when I bought it, there weren't rules about that I had to pay for it. Otherwise, I would have paid a very different price or wouldn't have bought it at all. So I think that's one. I think the industry probably has some fear of if they lose one fight on this, that there'll be the slippery slope argument on regulation. My argument to industry has been that if you want natural gas to be viewed as a clean fuel, then it actually needs to be a clean fuel. And that there's some low hanging fruit on trying to clean up the industry. And it would be good for you economically to make these investments. Now, that's true of the industry, I think. Again, you get down to, okay, which company is actually paying for it?
Robinson Meyer: I've heard this theory that, okay, the majors might be fine with that. They might say, yeah, sure, we can deal with it, whatever. It's the independents who are going out and killing all of this. And the majors don't mind that the independents are killing it, or the miners are killing it, but they would eat it if they had to. Do you buy this theory? Or if you were to lift the lid on any of these kind of big oil companies that have been more facially supportive of the regulations, they would actually be just as opposed?
John Arnold: I think a few things are true. Number one is that a newer well has lower leaks than an older well. Assuming the infrastructure is built, you know, at times whenever there's flaring, that's not true. But in general, once a well is operational and connected, then the newer it is, especially anything that's been put on the system in this decade, is a relatively low leak molecule. And that the larger companies tend to be the ones that are doing the new drilling. They have the capital. And as wells age, the big companies sell them to the small companies, to companies that have a lower cost of operations.
And so there's that natural trajectory of life of a well. And so I think there is some economic rationale to that. I think the large companies are more concerned about the reputation. I think they're more concerned about what's the long-term value and opportunity for the industry. They have publicly traded stocks that represent what the long-term value of the industry is versus kind of being owned privately and people having a shorter-term focus on the financial return market. And I think you're probably right that the big guys are kind of happy to have the little guys have this fight so they don't have to be criticized publicly.
Robinson Meyer: I guess into the point we know the big guys' names. I couldn't tell you all the names of the independents that would oppose this. What should clean energy companies learn from conventional energy companies or the conventional energy industry?
John Arnold: The conventional industry has, it's mature. It has low cost of capital. It has the robust supply chains. They are well capitalized. Right. Yeah. So they're able to do things, right, that kind of newer industries not able to. Look, the oil and gas sector has become tremendously efficient at scale, right? Scaling anything. So if it works, the oil and gas industry can go scale it. And I back up and just say that's something that happens with time.
Robinson Meyer: Yeah.
John Arnold: And so I'm not sure that the clean energy industry can just say, like, we should be like the oil and gas industry. We just need to copy their ways because they don't have the tools.
Robinson Meyer: I think they would love to say that, actually. Yeah, exactly. You know, I think they'd love the bankability. They'd love the scale. Is there anything they might not think of that they should think about?
John Arnold: I think the political power that the oil and gas industry has. And part of that is also time. If you've been donating to a party or to a candidate for three years, that's very different than if you've been donating for 30 years. Yeah. And so the oil and gas industry just has a lot more political power than the clean energy side does. I think there's just larger policy teams, larger budgets for it. The understanding that collectively, everybody has to participate in those PACs and in the trade organizations that I don't think you're seeing today in the clean energy side.
Robinson Meyer: Your work has been really studiously bipartisan. I think there was a phase in the clean energy industry as recently as a year and a half ago where it was not nearly as bipartisan. Was that a mistake? Should it embrace the kind of more Catholic position of the oil and gas industry, or is it not able to because of the policy landscape?
John Arnold: So it's hard because, again, like the longer an industry has been there, the more ingrained in the fabric of any community it is. And so you still see some Democratic states like New Mexico or Colorado that have oil and gas industries. And because the representatives in those states have to represent their communities, they end up having to get support or they do get support for it. Just because, again, just like the number of jobs that are there, the political organization that they have in those states, the number of companies. And so this takes time. It's like developing and becoming more and more of the fabric. And so the irony is that a lot of the wind producing states, a lot of the solar states are red. But they just haven't been around long enough to really have ingrained themselves into the fabric and into the political institutions in that state. So I think this is just more of a time component.
Robinson Meyer: Last question. So you're a big booster of Houston. And I would say the Houston civic culture. City is growing very quickly, of course, has this long term connection to oil and gas. When people visit Houston, what should they do? Or where should they go to see, not in a tourism sense, but if they're interested truly in what has made Houston different and what makes it different today? Like, what should they make sure they not miss?
John Arnold: The Menil Center is kind of this amazing museum that I think captures Houston's spirit and that the de Menils were part of the Schlumberger founding family that during World War II moved from France to Houston. And so it envelops the cosmopolitan nature of Houston that Houston draws from the entire world, often because of the industry we have here, the energy nature of it, and then the cultural assets that we have here. The Chamber of Commerce likes to talk about, we have the second most number of live theater seats, for instance, after New York. The museums we have, it's not New York, it's not maybe LA, but it's right there after those two. the theater. It's one of maybe four or five cities in the U.S. with a grand opera.
And so it has that cultural component as well as this gritty part of being an industrial city. We build things here, come here for scale. And we like growth. There's a number of communities today that, fight growth, right? They don't want to change. Houston does. Texas does, right? It's a state, it's an area that we want to grow. No politician could take office saying, we want to pause growth. That person would never get elected. And so kind of across the political spectrum, it's maybe, how do you grow? But Houston wants more people, it wants more diversity. It wants more growth, more industry. And that's what's made this community better. It's why people have come here in the first place. And that's what we want to give to the next generation.
Robinson Meyer: Well, there's so much more to talk about, but I'm going to respect your time and leave it there. John Arnold, thank you so much for joining us on Shift Key.
John Arnold: Great being here. Thanks.
Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro and Berkshire Hathaway CEO Greg Abel agree: The “regulatory compact” is breaking down.
What are utilities anyway? And what are they supposed to do? Elected officials, regulators, utility executives, and scholars are asking fundamental questions about the so-called “regulatory compact” that has governed electric utilities for — depending on who you ask — decades or a century.
Two events in the past week crystallized the moment of transition electric utilities find themselves in.
In Pennsylvania, Governor Josh Shapiro, wrote a letter to the state’s utilities (including water and gas), telling them that “the 20th century utility model is broken,” citing “markedly higher utility costs” and “rising utility bills” which he claimed were in part the “result from your policy and fiscal decisions, including the excessive rate requests several utilities have sought in recent years.”
And over the weekend at the Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting, its new chief executive Greg Abel, who came up in the conglomerate through its energy division, was also speculating that utilities may be at a precipice. “What’s the challenge? It’s the regulatory compact,” Abel said at the company’s annual meeting.
The way he explained the utility business, “We leave your capital, our owner's capital, Berkshire’s capital, in these businesses, and often a portion of the earnings that they generate, we may reinvest back into those businesses. And for that, we get a very specific set of returns. And, over the long run, it’s been a very balanced and fair return,” Abel said, referring to the setup where utilities make investments approved by state regulators for which they receive a regulated return on their capital. “That model has worked very good for a number of years,” Abel said.
But, he cautioned, that model is becoming “more stressed.”
The dilemma, Abel said, was that utilities’ have high investment needs, including from replacing existing assets, while state regulators and governors want to keep rates as low as possible. “If we don’t see that balance, we don’t deploy our capital back into those businesses or into those utilities.”
The Berkshire Hathaway-owned utility PacifiCorp, which operates in the Western United States, has been challenged by high legal claims stemming from wildfires, especially in Oregon, and has been seeking to get legislation passed in a number of states to limit wildfire liability.
Earlier this year, it agreed to sell almost $2 billion worth of assets in Washington state, citing “diverging policies among the six states PacifiCorp serves [that] have created extraordinary pressure, affecting the company’s ability to meet demand reliably and at the lowest cost to customers.”
The utility was threatened with credit downgrades following large jury awards stemming from wildfire claims in Oregon. Washington is also a state with an aggressive decarbonization timeline and mechanisms that PacifiCorp has chafed against, claiming they would raise costs for its customers in other states.
Americans everywhere are angry about electricity costs but utilities think too much is being demanded of them to profitably run their businesses.
In the West, those high costs stem from wildfire-related damages that existentially threaten utilities. (PG&E in California even went bankrupt over wildfire liability.)
On the East Coast, electricity costs are rising in part due to data center construction and the structure of PJM, the 13-state electricity market that runs from Washington, D.C., to Chicago. Here, elected officials are angry at utilities for skyrocketing costs while those who manage the electricity market say that the real issue is regulatory barriers to bringing on the new generation they think they need (i.e. gas).
In both cases, the “regulatory compact” — utility investment in exchange for regulated rates that allow future investment — is seen as under threat.
Where Greg Abel sees the model endangered by uncapped liability and decarbonization mandates, Shapiro sees the threat in higher costs to consumers. Over the past five years, electricity prices in Pennsylvania have risen 47% while average bills have grown 49%, from $116 per month to $169, according to the Heatmap-MIT Electricity Price Hub.
“We can no longer simply prioritize corporate profitability to drive infrastructure development,” Shapiro wrote in his letter.
The commonwealth’s government has been doing more than just writing letters. The utility PECO Energy, a subsidiary of Exelon that serves the Philadelphia area, withdrew a recent rate case in April asking for over $500 million worth of electricity and gas rate hikes. The Governor’s office didn’t just claim credit for the pulled rate case, it announced it, with Shapiro saying in a statement, “PECO’s proposed rate case would have increased Pennsylvanians’ utility bills, but I demanded that their CEO put customers first and withdraw their rate hike request.”
Now Shapiro wants more fundamental reforms to how utilities operate in the state, including asking the utilities to fund themselves more by borrowing money, including from the federal government through Department of Energy programs.
“Consumers should not be expected to bolster corporate profits through over reliance on costly equity,” Shapiro said in his letter, and asked that utilities fund themselves with a “clear majority” of borrowed money.
Utilities have high investment needs. They finance these with a mix of debt (borrowed money) and equity (shares it sells to investors). They then gets a regulated return on the equity portion of its total approved capital investments, known as its “rate base.” That return on equity is recovered through ratepayers’ bills.
Berkshire Hathaway’s Abel argues that if the utility business becomes less appealing to investors, there will be less investment. But Shapiro thinks that there’s a lower cost way to finance utility investment, money borrowed from investors, i.e. debt. His approach rhymes with other utility reformer ideas around lowering the return on equity that utilities ask for in their rate cases, often around 10%.
“The average Pennsylvania utility requested a return on equity a staggering 682 basis points above the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield last year. Before raising such expensive equity, you should take advantage of more affordable sources of capital,” Shapiro wrote.
For the equity utilities do fund themselves with, Shapiro writes, those returns must be “transparent” and “justifiable,” and no longer be based on “educated guesses.” He instead proposed a market process to determine a fair return based on “competitive bidding by multiple participants to establish a fair market cost of that equity” or setting one by a combination of returns on government debt and a measure of the returns stocks get over debt on average.
Shapiro’s proposal could take down Pennsylvania utilities’ return on equity down to the “high 8%s” according to Jefferies analyst Julien Dumoulin-Smith. In the now-withdrawn PECO rate case, the requested ROE was almost 11%. (Other utility reform advocates have called for pulling ROEs down to around 6%.)
As a result, Dumoulin-Smith argues, Pennsylvania utilities “could see authorized ROE trends well below peers in prospective rate cases,” which will mean “gradual capital expenditure reductions to align with the new reality,” i.e. less investments by utilities in new transmission and distribution lines, substations, and other grid infrastructure even as demand increases.
This gets to the crux of utility regulation at a time of public anger at ballooning prices: how will utilities be able to revamp an aging grid, prepare for electrification of home heating and transportation, build news transmission for new renewable resources, and build out the grid infrastructure necessary for the data center boom? And what about that wildfire liability? All while making a fair return for investors that passes musters with regulators, elected officials, and voters?
The answer many have come up with is to transform the “regulatory compact.” This can mean, as some scholars have proposed, not offering firm service to all new customers. It can mean getting data center developers and their customers to specifically pay for grid upgrades.
In the case of wildfire liability, the California Public Utility Commission has declared that the set-up of the modern regulatory compact in the Golden State, with utilities required to serve all customers in the state (including in severe fire hazard areas) and then be liable for damages that get passed on to ratepayers, is “unsustainable.”
“Our existing system places outsized and unsustainable burdens on utilities and utility ratepayers to mitigate the risks of wildfires and pay for wildfire damages,” the CPUC wrote in a report mandated by a recent wildfire bill. This translates to higher borrowing and cost of equity for utilities, as well as higher rates.
The CPUC recommended a version of opening up the compact, arguing that the state “should consider funding a portion of utility wildfire mitigation from non-ratepayer sources,” including the state’s general fund (i.e. taxpayers). This echoes Shapiro’s proposal to have the state fund itself with cheaper public equity.
“Public debt is typically cheaper than private credit,” Josh Macey, a professor at Yale Law School, told me.
Another approach is to limit what utilities owe, thus ensuring that they can maintain reasonable returns and stay in business in the states they operate in.
In Utah, Berkshire Hathaway was able to win liability limitations for wildfires, including time limits on claims, the ability to use ratepayer dollars for wildfire mitigation plans, and limiting utility liability from wildfire claims if they comply with wildfire mitigation plans, a model it has tried to export to other states PacifiCorp operates in.
But do all these challenges to utilities represent the end of the “regulatory compact,” as Abel might put it?
For Abel, he claims that changes (or lack thereof) in state law have led to Berkshire’s exiting Washington and potentially other states. In Pennsylvania, analysts claim that changes to the debt-equity mix could mean fewer capital investments. In California, state regulators think utilities are being asked to do too much.
But will these utility reforms mean the death of the utility model itself? Maybe not — after all, PacifiCorp was able to sell its Washington assets to another utility.
The compact is “a kind of political intuition that if we’re asking them to provide low cost, consistent service, we have to give them a real right to kind of recover the costs and earn a steady profit,” Macey said. “It’s hard for me to imagine how that could break down, because if you really see a state not allow a utility to have some chance of doing good business in the state, the utility will not be able to attract capital, and as a political matter, the state will not be able follow through with that.”