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Robinson Meyer:
Hello, it’s Wednesday, September 23, and it’s New York Climate Week. Thousands of people are piling into the city today to discuss climate and energy issues. One topic that’s very likely to be on the agenda is nuclear energy. I think over the past few years, there’s been a resurgence of interest in nuclear, and it’s one of the few issues that Democrats and Republicans in Congress can seemingly still agree on.
Robinson Meyer:
The Energy Department has this new multi-billion dollar program to subsidize 10 new nuclear reactors across the country. And in an age of rising electricity demand and overall load growth, nuclear has become more alluring because it’s one of the few sources of energy where you can bring on a whole gigawatt of power online just at one go.
Robinson Meyer:
One other thing that’s changed recently in nuclear is the rise of what I would call nuclear developers. These are standalone companies who want to develop and then sell off new gigawatt scale nuclear power plants. The most prominent of these companies is a startup called, as it happens, The Nuclear Company.
Robinson Meyer:
They arose a few years ago, and they’re involved in taking over the VC Sumner nuclear project in South Carolina. VC Sumner, as you’ll hear, they were gonna build two new AP1000 nuclear reactors in South Carolina on one site, and the company trying to build the project actually went bankrupt before it could finish the power plant.
Robinson Meyer:
That project has now been taken over by Brookfield, the asset investor, and, by The Nuclear Company. Today, we are joined by the CEO of The Nuclear Company, Jonathan Webb. Jonathan previously worked for the Department of Defense and then started and ran a startup called AppHarvest, which built large greenhouses in Kentucky before going bankrupt.
Robinson Meyer:
Jonathan started The Nuclear Company in late 2023. He and I had an interesting conversation. I tried to understand what exactly The Nuclear Company does, what they believe their advantage to be, and what could come next for them. I’m Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News, and it’s all coming up on Shift Key.
Robinson Meyer:
Jonathan Webb, welcome to Shift Key.
Jonathan Webb:
Thank you for having me.
Robinson Meyer:
So can you just start by giving us the rundown on what the nuclear company is? Certainly your name suggests that you make nuclear reactors, but you operate in this very distinct kind of segment of the industry. I’m not even sure if at the time you were founded there were other companies like you. So give us the rundown on what your company does and how it’s different from other firms in the industry.
Jonathan Webb:
So we’re about 200 people, built to deploy, operate, and service nuclear at scale in the Western world, obviously a focus in the U.S. And right now we have about 40 to 50 people on site daily at VC Summer, which was the abandoned site back in 2018 where $9 billion was spent, but unfortunately had to pause that effort. And so, you know, when starting this about three years ago, had a little bit of a counter thesis viewpoint that, while we remain technology agnostic and very optimistic about some of the great technologies that are gonna come to market with these reactors, our viewpoint was we wanted to be an enabler to support the community, and starting with the AP1000 because it’s the only technology that we can go deploy today. So building a team to support that program while being ready to help support others in the market, as they reach a point to commercialize their technologies.
Robinson Meyer:
So just give us a sense of where the nuclear company sits kind of with other segments of the industry, because you know, there’s utilities that tend to operate or off take power from big nuclear reactors. There’s a handful of companies that make reactors, including Westinghouse, with the AP1000. The nuclear company seems to sit somewhere in between, almost in a project management role. Can you just describe what you handle in the ecosystem of scaling up nuclear?
Jonathan Webb:
Nuclear is uniquely different and challenging than almost any other sector or industry in a lot of different ways, in which building a static building, building a manufacturing facility. You know, the Western world, we talk about nuclear as if it’s not working today. And what we forget to remember is it took decades to get to a point where we had fleets of nuclear operating at 93% capacity factor, meaning when the plant is up and running, it’s operating at 93% of the time. You know, the viewpoint to build this team, I hired much of the people I could off of the Vogtle 3 and 4 site, so I didn’t want to theorize about what the problem was.
Jonathan Webb:
I wanted to listen to the people that actually lived on the Vogtle 3 and 4 site. I was fortunate, Steve Kaczynski, who was the CEO and chair of Southern Nuclear, Joe Klech, our chief nuclear officer, many of Joe’s colleagues. And that first year, we were kind of just, for the investor term, in stealth. Really trying to study the problem. What happened? And what are we trying to solve for? And really the best analogy, it’s not a great one, but the one that was told to me that I now repeat a bit is like, think of Airbus and Boeing, highly regulated, zero margin of error. You need to get the plane up and running 100% of the time every time.
Jonathan Webb:
But they don’t actually make the jet engine. GE and Rolls-Royce do. And so while the reactor is critically important, the reactor can be maybe 20% of the total project cost when you look at the overall materials. But even after it’s built, you look at China and how they’ve essentially borrowed in a loose term or developed on their own or have looked at every reactor possible around the world, and they’re building reactors similar to an AP1000. Once it is up and running, it’ll operate for about 100 years at 93% capacity factor, and that is very hard to achieve. And so you have other reactors that, you know, in China and Russia and France, even in the US, that you might build them on budget, but they get up and running at 20% capacity factor.
Jonathan Webb:
And so even getting a reactor up and operating at 70%, 80% capacity factor, if you look at the fine-tuned machine of what an AP1000 is and give immense credit to Southern Company and everyone involved that was able to complete the job, while the build was a challenge, the way they’re operating those units is just absolutely phenomenal. What we wanted to be a part of is enable, whether it’s a utility or reactor technology. I mean, the reactor technology is essentially IP. It’s a blueprint, right? So you have to drag the blueprint through a supply chain. You have to get thousands of people to install them.
Jonathan Webb:
Even if they’re small or micro, you still have to get people in the field and physically install things. You can’t manufacture everything. And then you have to get it up and running. So what I really wanted to do, our chief nuclear officer is really the head of deployment, ’cause we’re viewing this entirely through the lens of: What do I need to do to get this up and running safely at the highest possible quality, at the highest capacity factor?
Jonathan Webb:
And those last 18 months of delivery is where all the magic really begins. And so, you know, again, the team we’ve built, and the gap that we see in the market, assuming the country builds, right? We’ve got a goal of 300 gigawatts, is we’re gonna need a team to deploy these reactors, commission them, get them started up, get them running, and then service them.
Jonathan Webb:
And so we wanted to be, you know, that team that you can call that you’ve put your life and everything into the R&D of those reactor designs. But the AP1000 is an incredible unit, and you just gotta build it on time, on budget. And then once you do, it’s up and running, and now the question’s gonna be: Can we find other units that are gonna be built at a lower cost, at a faster pace?
Jonathan Webb:
But will they get up and running the way an AP1000 will? Will they last 100 years the way an AP1000 will?
Robinson Meyer:
Even a few years ago, this question of whether load growth was gonna show up, whether we would see the kind of rapid growth in electricity demand that we are now experiencing nationwide, was a bit of an open question. Obviously, it’s now here, and data center providers, utilities, just straight up industrial customers, governors are rushing to get all the electricity that they can.
Robinson Meyer:
Tell us a little bit about the genesis of the company. Like evidently, you were early a little bit to the load growth thesis. You kind of had the sense that it was coming, before it was a certainty. So just give us a sense of how the company started and how you became convinced that fleet scale nuclear and that ramping up nuclear specifically was the best option.
Jonathan Webb:
I mean, for me, growing up in a coal state, Kentucky, was very foundational. I lived in a moment where, in my early part of my career, graduated from public schools, went to a public university, but didn’t quite grow up in a community of world that talked about these global issues that much.
Jonathan Webb:
But you could kind of see the writing on the wall where we’re shutting down these coal plants, and for every gigawatt of coal, you need thousands, if not tens of thousands of acres of solar. And in my early career, was a part of building solar, and so ended up being a contractor, had a clearance, was in the Pentagon helping the U.S. Army build energy assets on military installations. Very foundational being in the Pentagon. So I think going from a coal state, understanding that it was very bizarre for me where wars, I think many people would say don’t work typically very well.
Jonathan Webb:
You create an adversary. And so this war on coal was a little bizarre to me to the sense of we should thank the people that powered us through the Industrial Revolution and two World Wars so that we could have the freedoms we have today. And many people don’t realize this, but 100,000 people have died in this country in coal mining accidents.
Jonathan Webb:
Unfortunately, my grandmother grew up on a situation where she was impacted, her dad died in a coal mining accident. And so when I hear we can’t build gigawatt scale nuclear in this country, I don’t take it very kindly.
Jonathan Webb:
There’s a lot of people that have had to sacrifice a lot to get to this point, and you’re telling me we can’t do something the country’s already done before in the ’60s and ’70s, and we have much better tools and technologies today, and we have all the lessons learned of the past. We have an incredible safety record in the operating nuclear fleet.
Jonathan Webb:
So, A, saw the gigawatts were gonna need to be deployed, and there’s multiple ways to get there. So you could string together SMRs or you could string together large reactors. I’m pretty indifferent there. For me, it’s about safety and quality and speed and cost. But I do think the thesis of this company, for better or worse, depending on how you look at it, is only gonna become more extreme in the years ahead, where why can China build six gigawatts on one site and we can’t? Why are we talking about places around the world that — I thought we’re the US. I thought this is the most dynamic economy on planet Earth, that this idea that we’re gonna give up on big things because they’re too hard is unacceptable. So finding a team of people that believed in this idea that we’ve done it before, we will do it again, and yes, we might use different reactor technologies to achieve the same outcome, but we’re gonna go deliver dozens of campuses, and we’re gonna put gigawatts of nuclear on those campuses.
Jonathan Webb:
I don’t wanna get to the if we don’t, but I can tell you, unfortunately, going through some of these Appalachian communities and hearing from local leaders, what motivated me with this company was an ice storm in the region several years ago, where unfortunately I’d been read into a scenario where we were tipping close to a blackout.
Jonathan Webb:
And if a blackout in my state would’ve happened, we would’ve had, in zero degree weather, you’d likely, the number of casualties in a not well-insulated trailer park, elderly women, elderly men, young children. I don’t know about you, but that seems unacceptable to me. So we need to figure out how to work together and solve these problems.
Jonathan Webb:
We don’t really have any other choice, and what we’ve had over 30 years is the luxury of 2 to 3% load growth, and you and me and others all see that that’s radically changing quickly. And so while micro and small are certainly gonna be a part of the solution, we’ve also gotta be able to deploy gigawatts on campuses across the country.
Robinson Meyer:
I think that coal is actually kind of a useful, like, way in here because there was a small advocacy effort. There was an advocacy effort from some national environmental groups to shut down coal plants. But the only reason that could succeed is because coal was also facing this huge threat in the marketplace from natural gas.
Robinson Meyer:
Because at the same time, right, I mean, in the late aughts, in the mid-teens, the country found a new way of extracting natural gas, was able to tap these enormous natural gas reserves, and suddenly natural gas was available to producers extremely cheaply. And because you could sub in a gas turbine into what used to be a coal stack because gas was cheaper, it was cleaner, it produced far less pollution and was easier to manage, you could drop in gas into coal, and coal was basically out-competed.
Robinson Meyer:
Now, there were forces that were trying to subject all generation, right, to air pollution constraints, but coal was out-competed. And so —
Jonathan Webb:
Can I go on this one really quick? So yes, markets ended up dictating what happened, but I think what was not contemplated and what I maybe didn’t quite touch on when I was just explaining that is that coal, you have about three months supply. If you go to an operating coal plant, you have about three months supply on site.
Jonathan Webb:
So if there’s a disruption in supply, you have three months. Natural gas, you pipe in, and natural gas freezes at the wellhead and slows in the pipes anywhere around zero degrees. And so when we talk about climate, it goes up, it goes down. We didn’t used to have zero-degree weather too much in Kentucky.
Jonathan Webb:
We do now. It happens. And that, when I talked about that potential rolling blackout, it was because our coal plants were shut off, where you typically have three months supply. We’ve transitioned to a lot of natural gas, and while natural gas is resilient, it’s not nearly as resilient as coal because it can slow down in the pipeline.
Jonathan Webb:
And as a result, you can’t feed the plant that needs to consume it to create power. That’s why nuclear. We have the thing that we’ve done before that is clean, it’s reliable, it runs 93% of the time. It can run in ice, it can run in heat. And so yeah, this is why a diversified portfolio of power, but, you know, going full tilt and running the entire country on gas, whether you wanna debate about carbon or not —
Jonathan Webb:
There are studies and everyone can read. But separate from that and go to reliability, it is why both solar and wind and natural gas, they all have their vulnerabilities, which is why a diversified portfolio, but a country of our size not having large amounts of nuclear on the grid is borderline reckless.
Robinson Meyer:
It seems like another kind of advantage of nuclear at this moment is that it is an energy technology that both parties can agree on. The current administration seems to support nuclear for a number of reasons, including it’s resilient, kind of a classic type environmentalist doesn’t like it, which is a benefit in some quarters.
Robinson Meyer:
Democrats have — like nuclear because it doesn’t create emissions. You can bring on megawatts, gigawatts in one go.
Jonathan Webb:
Okay, you touched on the environmental thing. I’m gonna say it. I grew up in Kentucky, but I love nature. I walk around in creeks. I grew up this way. The worst thing we did as a country, and I don’t know why we got here, I don’t know if it was fossil fuel lobbies, I don’t know if it was just voodoo fear and panic of celebrities who were scared of nuclear but had no idea what they were talking about.
Jonathan Webb:
I don’t know if it was environmental, but my goodness, maybe the worst industrial policy that’s ever happened in this country, I might argue it could end up being one of the worst policy decisions in the history of this country, was not continuing to build nuclear. The fact that we have a 20% of our grid comes from nuclear power, and the fact that we’ve only built two reactors in 30 years, we’re living off of our grandparents who built one-fifth of our grid, and we shut that down.
Jonathan Webb:
My goodness, had we kept building and the amount of abundant power we would have and how low cost it would’ve been, I would argue probably the worst... I’m very biased. I live my life every day, so I see it through one lens of the world. But abundant, reliable, low-cost power enables civilizations since the dawn of fire, and I would argue this will be the singularly most critical issue that this country’s had that has allowed China to now beat us and potentially become the largest economy and certainly the largest energy producer in the world.
Robinson Meyer:
I think one of the interesting things about this moment is that there’s bipartisan interest in nuclear. I mean, I think there was interest from the Biden administration, and I think there’s been programs from the Trump administration. And one of those big programs has been this effort from the Energy Department to subsidize, help organize and back, the creation of 10 new reactors across the country. How is that effort going, to the degree you can speak about it? And kind of what needs to happen, from on the government side to build nuclear at, let’s just say the scale that the country was doing it in the 1980s and late 1970s?
Jonathan Webb:
Maybe it’s an unpopular opinion, a popular opinion, I have no idea. I try not to pay attention too much, just do my job. But I would say I have no idea what else Washington, D.C. can do for this community. The private sector needs to get a backbone and deliver. There are more than enough levers on the left side, on the right side, with this administration, with the last administration.
Jonathan Webb:
To me, the private sector making excuses about the regulator is just unconscionable. We have the safest nuclear in the world. No one in this country has ever been negatively impacted by nuclear power. Three Mile Island is our biggest incident, where, no casualties. The technology failed exactly the way it should.
Jonathan Webb:
We have a great regulator. We have great operators. So I mean, where we do need to turn our attention is what we do do right here, which is we have the absolute best nuclear operators in the world, the safest nuclear operators in the world. But my goodness, when it comes to getting out in the field and building, we have to empower workforce, we have to organize teams of people, we have to utilize technology to enable those teams of people, and we have to go deliver.
Jonathan Webb:
We need to compete with the other sources of electricity on pricing, and that’s it. There’s infinite supply demand for the electrons. More than enough people will buy the power. There’s more than enough capital to fund the projects. Private sector needs to sign up to a budget and a schedule and go deliver.
Jonathan Webb:
That’s it. But yeah, I would love to see more support in D.C. There’s a lot of support now. I hope the support continues, but they’ve done more than enough to ignite the industry, and we need to go deliver. It’s on the private sector.
Robinson Meyer:
Let’s talk about delivery then. So I think you guys are working with Brookfield in South Carolina on this old plant, VC Summer. The local utility spent billions of dollars about a decade ago to get a plant up and running in this site in South Carolina and didn’t get it done.
Robinson Meyer:
In fact, there was — it, they, I think it went bankrupt trying to get it done. Ultimately, that site has kind of sat fallow as this extremely over budget project in Georgia ultimately did reach completion. That was Vogtle. You’ve now gone back into VC Summer with, I think, Brookfield.
Robinson Meyer:
How is that going, and what’s gonna be different about it this time?
Jonathan Webb:
Well, I don’t take lightly the privilege yet obligation that the state of South Carolina and the people of South Carolina and, candidly, every stakeholder involved that have given us the right and opportunity to be there. We have about 40, 50 people on site at VC Summer right now, and every day we’re there.
Jonathan Webb:
People ask me, “When does construction start?” I mean, for me, I’m the type of person that construction starts the moment you put your feet on soil and you’re planning way in advance. So there’s a Gantt chart with a schedule and all these milestones and, you know, when officially FID to COD. But I can tell you our team has taken it very seriously, and —
Jonathan Webb:
I mean, you had $9 billion spent. It’s been sitting there since 2018. It was hard enough to finish in the first place, and now we’re stepping back in midstream to go finish it.
Jonathan Webb:
And we owe it to the state of South Carolina and the community there to get these units up and running. It’s not that we’re a Westinghouse company or an AP1000 company. It’s that we just believe that if the country’s gonna go deliver on this promise of gigawatts, micro, small, large, whatever it may be, we got something to finish.
Jonathan Webb:
And it’s to prove to not only the U.S. and the industry, but around the world, that if we start something, we’re gonna get it done. And so, I think we’ve developed a unique approach that we’re bringing to this project, but it’s gonna be results-driven. We’re gonna have to deliver a budget and a schedule, and everyone in the world’s gonna see that.
Robinson Meyer:
Can you give me an example of what better execution would look like on this project? I realize it’s, you know, tens of thousands of engineering decisions that go one way and not another way. But can you give me an example of an execution decision that maybe went wrong in VC Summer the first time around, or that often goes wrong with AP1000s, or that went wrong early on with Vogtle that you’re focused on getting right this time?
Jonathan Webb:
Well, one has nothing to do with this company and has everything to do with the technology itself, that you cannot go build commercial nuclear. I think it’s been probably proven over time at this point until the design is completed and you’ve finished some projects. So one just sheer baseline benefit is the fact that Vogtle 3 and 4 in Georgia were completed while VC Summer was not completed.
Jonathan Webb:
So at a bare minimum, we have the lessons learned coming off of what worked, what didn’t work, and how to solve these problems differently going forward. And we also have the team that did it. So we have people that lived on the job site, slept in the trailers, worked on, you know, that institutional knowledge is obviously critical.
Jonathan Webb:
Brookfield’s gonna be controlling much of the joint venture that we’ve announced with them, and we’re here to deliver based on, you know, how they decide to run on a go-forward basis. So I’m not gonna talk too much about VC Summer. So what I will say about what we’re doing unique and what I can talk about there is when I did start about three years ago on this effort after bringing a lot of people in and kind of hearing about the stories of Vogtle 3 and 4, again, the two reactors that were completed in Georgia, it was budgeted around 14 billion.
Jonathan Webb:
The project came in at around 35 billion, 36 billion. It was supposed to take seven years. It took 12 years. It was supposed to take 5,000 people, and it took about 10,000 people. So I was like, all right, these are pretty astronomical numbers. How did we get here? So the thing we have to solve for sounds like rocket science.
Jonathan Webb:
It’s really not. It’s pretty simple. Well, interest on debt, so if you’re carrying $20 billion of debt over 12 years instead of seven years, so time. Oh, shocker. So we need to do this faster. Okay, that makes sense. And then less people. If we have 10,000 people on a job site every day, which you’re in — I think you said you’re in New York City — buy a ticket to a concert venue that holds 10,000 people.
Jonathan Webb:
Go to that concert, look around. Think, those people have to show up and leave every day on your construction site. And a lot of this was being managed not with advanced work packages, not with... I’ve got a lot of friends in the tech community. We hosted a Deep Tech Week event at our office recently. I look at the technologies this country has to offer, and I look at mega project construction sites, not even necessarily unique to nuclear.
Jonathan Webb:
Why are we not equipping our men and women with the most advanced technologies to organize and execute? It’s unacceptable. So the first year was studying the problem. The second year was okay, and that’s where we partnered with Palantir and others. But we developed what we have in-house.
Jonathan Webb:
This is a nuclear operating system, AI-enabled, you know, logistics, supply chain, real-time information. But to get to the point, those 10,000 people at Vogtle 3 and 4 were maybe working 15 to 20% of the time labor productivity. Now, some people might say, “Okay, lazy Americans.” I take deep offense to that. I, me and my wife, we, I lived on a construction site in an RV at one point.
Jonathan Webb:
Can tell you there’s some hardships in rain and cold. Our men and women need the best and latest technology, and so everything we’ve tried to build is for that frontline worker. How do I get them the information they need? How do I get them the training they need? How do I prepare them on the ground so that they are ready to show up at 6:00 a.m. in the rain or 9:00 p.m. at night when their shift starts?
Jonathan Webb:
We have technologies that are available today, and if you and your friends go walk around on a construction site, you’re gonna think we’re in 1975. So, again, I can’t speak for the joint venture, and I’m not gonna speak for Brookfield, what’s happening there, but I can tell you we are closely going to announce our own sites where we’ll be developing our own projects, where it’s still in the phase of site selection, still in the phase of technology selection.
Jonathan Webb:
But I look forward to hosting you and some of your colleagues sometime and you can come see, we’re going to be unleashing the American worker in a way that we know is possible to get that labor productivity to 60% and 70%, or even north of 80. And that’s through just real information in real time, and we can do it.
Jonathan Webb:
The technologies are available today, but we have to enable our workforce, and we can’t think like, “Okay, we’re gonna go build like we did in the ’60s,” when we have tools and technologies available today.
Robinson Meyer:
It sounds like part of what you’re saying is the better execution comes from software, which is, maybe, like a Musk world lesson because this isn’t as frequently discussed. But when you talk to folks who’ve worked in the Musk companies, what they say is that engineering software is actually what’s so good and often isn’t shared.
Robinson Meyer:
So is that part of the play here?
Jonathan Webb:
Absolutely. And I’m fortunate to have a lot of people that have worked in those camps. Brad Buss just joined our board. He was on the board of Tesla for 10 years. Mike ran security at Tesla for about 10 years. He’s with us. Yeah, it’s, it’s — that is our internal tool of how we’re going to take millions, if in some cases not billions of data points, and get people real-time information.
Jonathan Webb:
I mean, here’s an example. So if you have 138 people that are supposed to install some object on the site at 7:00 AM, I’m on a site in the Ohio River that site is connected to a rail that connects to the Port of Norfolk in Virginia. A ship was supposed to arrive sometime at 3:00 AM or pick a time, 1:00 AM, and that object was supposed to be unloaded.
Jonathan Webb:
It never showed up. In today’s world, unfortunately of what we’ve seen in nuclear or other industry, you wouldn’t know, and those 138 people would be there at 7:00 AM. Now, why would we not be able to, with AI and logistics integration, have real-time updates? Okay, here are the 138 people. Here are their skill sets.
Jonathan Webb:
Here are their talents. They’re not gonna be able to do that work at 7:00 AM, but they can do this other work, so let’s now send them an update on their phone when they’re waking up in their RV at 5:00 AM. Here’s a tutorial of where you’re gonna need to go to the site. Here’s what we’re gonna need you to do.
Jonathan Webb:
I don’t take kindly to this idea that Americans aren’t willing to work. I think we’ve put the blue-collar and frontline worker in unimaginably difficult working conditions, and our job is to reduce that friction, make their life just a little bit easier, remove the constraints every day, and we can do that through technology.
Jonathan Webb:
So I would love to say we’re splitting the atom or sending a man to the moon, but really all we’re doing is taking technologies that are available and ensuring in a secure and safe way, which is what’s difficult with the IP related to nuclear, ensuring that we can have the data integration and real-time information, but be able to get our teams real-time updates just so they can do their job.
Robinson Meyer:
I think you might actually be splitting the atom, although I, maybe that happens upstream.
Robinson Meyer:
You’ve hired the team that executed the Vogtle projects, and both of the Vogtle projects were AP1000 reactors, this American design from Westinghouse. That’s the design, as you mentioned, China’s building. Why go with AP1000s in the first place? Why bet on that technology?
Jonathan Webb:
It’s the only thing I can build today. I get this question all the time, and it’s — there’s only one permitted reactor that’s been built a few times that I can go build today. And maybe that’s the only reactor we build. Maybe we build five different ones, and the market will dictate how that plays out. I have met so many different teams that are designing new reactors, and I am rooting for every single one of them.
Jonathan Webb:
The reality is we’re probably not gonna have 100 different reactor types. There’ll be a few in different class and category, and they’ll be used in different applications. So a few micro, a few small. Small is relative. So, all right, there’s a gigawatt reactor, which is the large light water reactors. A lot of the reactors in the U.S. are gigawatt reactors. Coal plants are gigawatt coal plants. So, gigawatt, there’s 1,000 megawatts in a gigawatt. So when we even say SMR, small modular reactor, that’s somewhere in the 100 to 300, maybe a little above 300 megawatts.
Jonathan Webb:
Still not small, but small enough to modularize. So the theory was, well, let’s take thousands of people off the construction site. Let’s move them into a manufacturing facility. Let’s manufacture off-site. And then that’s even further downstream to the microreactor, where you’re looking maybe a megawatt, five megawatts, 10, maybe 20.
Jonathan Webb:
I don’t know if there’s an exact number on the categories, but essentially micro, small, large. And we’re building the AP1000 because we believe it’s a... Well, there’s no belief. It’s a great machine that’s running incredibly well right now in Georgia, and got up and running very swiftly to 93% capacity factor.
Jonathan Webb:
While I think some of these other technologies you might be able to build at a lower cost, theoretically, there’s also the challenge of getting them up and operating and getting them to 93% capacity factor. So it’s a bit of whack-a-mole. So okay, is it easier to build?
Jonathan Webb:
Well, I’m a little more concerned about the 100-year operating asset that you’re then stuck with on the other side. And so is it a low-cost fuel? Is it low cost to maintenance? Is it low cost to service? Is it low cost to operate?
Jonathan Webb:
And then the other one is, I mean, there’s really only, for better or worse, and I don’t know why, but one individual in this country that’s really figured out manufacturing at scale.
Jonathan Webb:
It seems like there’s a lot of others that have tried, but Elon’s one of them. So this idea that we’re gonna manufacture things at a lower cost, it’s like, okay, well, call every car company that tried to do that that wasn’t able to, right? So this idea that we’re just gonna manufacture off-site and it’s gonna be cheaper, again, a great idea in theory, but China’s not figured that out, and China has endless buckets of capital.
Jonathan Webb:
They’ve been doing this for decades, and they’ve concluded that the lowest cost, most efficient, best way to deploy gigawatts of nuclear in their country were to do what we did in the 50s, 60s, and 70s. So while I’m rooting for every technology, we’re trying to figure out which one of the few are gonna actually going to work across the spectrum, and we wanna help enable their success.
Jonathan Webb:
So that’s a long, very long-winded way of saying why the AP1000. So it’s available today. I can build it today. We can get it up and operating today, and I hope there are many other reactor types that’ll get there, but for better or worse, at the moment, we have one to work with.
Robinson Meyer:
Are you looking at this Toshiba — ’cause there is another NRC certified, boiling water reactor. It’s this Toshiba boiling water reactor that got built in Japan and Taiwan, and was gonna get built in South Texas, hasn’t been. Is that something you’re looking at, and how does that compare to the AP1000?
Jonathan Webb:
I’ll say our team has looked at every viable technology on planet Earth, both in the US and abroad, that’s available.
Jonathan Webb:
I’ve got a bunch of engineers upstairs right now that are all evaluating every day what’s coming to market, what’s in market, what’s been in market. So when you asked early on, “What are we?” So I didn’t quite get to this, and sometimes I go off and don’t explain the company very well, so —
Jonathan Webb:
That is where we see a core part of our role, right? So everyone’s coming out saying, “I got the new Bugatti engine. I got the new Lamborghini engine. I got new this engine, new that engine.” When the reality is, like, not every engine’s gonna be the best race car engine, right? So again, if I go back to that original analogy, which I think I talked about when the airline industry, you know, we have the best airline operators in the world.
Jonathan Webb:
These are safe airplanes. They fly. We’re, you know, I know we all go to the airport and get a little frustrated at times, but typically speaking, our pilots are great. Airline operators are great. Very safe, high quality airline industry. The utility industry, the electric utility industry in the U.S., exact same.
Jonathan Webb:
They’re elite. Best nuclear operators on planet Earth. Just data. We operate these plants at a 93% capacity factor, have the best safety record in the world, 100% safety. What we are trying to do is evaluate a wildly complex market that’s evolving every day, every week, to figure out how do we get operators the best airlines, best airplane to fly.
Jonathan Webb:
And I can tell you it is dynamic, evolving, and we’re trying to stay ahead of it, and that’s our team’s job every day. Again, our job is to be objective and just review the data and try to figure out how to bring reactors online at the lowest cost, the fastest speed, the highest quality, and the safest.
Jonathan Webb:
So we’re bullish. I mean, we think the country has a great reactor right now. It’s the AP1000, and, very fortunate to have the Cameco team who owns half of Westinghouse. You hear about Brookfield a lot. What you don’t hear about is the largest uranium miner in the Western world, our partner friend up in Canada, Cameco, who owns the other half of Westinghouse.
Jonathan Webb:
Really wouldn’t be doing what I’m doing today without a few of their team members helping early on, kinda helped me get into the industry. While we’re incredibly bullish on what they have and they’re gonna have an incredible run at getting these AP1000s in market, there are a lot of others that are coming, and there’s some others that have been in the past that could be brought back off the shelf.
Jonathan Webb:
And so again, our team’s job, we’ve had some of the largest electric utilities in the US visit our offices in the last few weeks. And our job is to look them in the eye and be able to say, “Look, you, you fly the best airplanes. You run the power plants.”
Jonathan Webb:
So our job really is to stay ahead of the market, evaluate what’s possible, evaluate these reactors, and then try to cut through the sales job of, you know, which engine’s better than the other engine, and just data-driven of what is actually gonna perform better in the end.
Robinson Meyer:
What’s changed about your company’s thesis since you launched back in 2023?
Jonathan Webb:
Not much, a couple additives.
Jonathan Webb:
So my motivations surely are gigawatts on the grid at a low cost as quickly as possible. I think that thesis unfortunately is becoming more true by the day, where we are way behind the queue.
Jonathan Webb:
We’ve got AI data compute that anyone who’s been following AI for at least five years could have seen the ball a bit. Re-industrialization, we knew we had to make more stuff in this country. We outsourced for a long time, so we’re doing that. And the electrification of everything. So those three things happening at once are, you know, we had a luxury in time with that 2% to 3% load growth, so that means power went up 2% to 3% demand.
Jonathan Webb:
And part of that was because we outsourced our manufacturing, so load growth went down a bit. We did have energy efficiency technologies, but all that stuff’s happened. So now it’s, you know, we’re gonna have to figure out 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10% load growth in this country. So the thesis I think is right. The only thing we’ve added to is we did get into nuclear services.
Jonathan Webb:
There’s a lot we don’t talk about with this company, and this is one that I think you’re gonna hear us talk more about next year. But we are now servicing over 40% of the operating nuclear fleet today, and I don’t know that many people even know it.
Jonathan Webb:
And so then people ask me, “Okay, why did we do it?” Well, two things. One, we are in a business. As much as I’m mission-oriented, we gotta return capital to shareholders, and I gotta pay employees so we can recruit more people, and it’s gonna take a while to build projects. So we started in services because, okay, great, I could tell my CFO it’s a good way to get revenue.
Jonathan Webb:
But, more importantly for me is it’s a good way for us to build credibility in this industry, show the utilities that we can show up and fix, and maintenance, and assist in their operating fleet. So we did add services. So when I say —
Robinson Meyer:
When you say services, kind of what do you mean? Like maintenance and repair?
Jonathan Webb:
Yes, sir. That’s, you know, we’ve got a team right now that’s out doing work that I would say, we probably doubled, tripled in the last year. And so it’s work that’s needed throughout the year to keep the fleet up and operating, right?
Jonathan Webb:
So another way for us to build relationships with trades, build relationships with frontline workers. I mean, again, I look at what is my job, my client is the frontline worker in the end. If we do this right, I’m probably one of the more relevant people, and I would say much of our corporate team and even board and even whoever’s buying the power in the end, that’s not really our client or who we work for.
Jonathan Webb:
Our job is to reduce the friction, understand the constraints of the frontline worker. And so it was a great opportunity for us to build those relationships with tradesmen and women to understand what do you need to be successful? How do we get you on and off a site more quickly? How do you do this where we can train you in a better way?
Jonathan Webb:
It’s been an incredible jolt for our organization. I can tell you one example on training. I was someone that couldn’t read too well until I got into the third grade. Retain information differently. I can absorb information differently. That didn’t go well in average curriculums. But if you look at how we’re trying to train our tradesmen and women, it’s black and white pages, PDFs.
Jonathan Webb:
I read one 84-page document. It was a very specific way to train on one specific part. I tried to read the 84 pages. By the time I got to the end, I could barely remember the first part of it. It’s just, my brain doesn’t work fully linear always that way. But we took that and with the software and technology we’ve developed and agentic AI quickly turned that into 3D models, 3D renderings.
Jonathan Webb:
Now you can take, you know, maybe a young man or woman who didn’t graduate from high school but is very talented and maybe is gonna struggle in a classroom. To contribute, we can meet them where they’re at and we can do it in a way where technology’s available, which is again, what gets me deeply frustrated when we say the American worker can’t work.
Jonathan Webb:
It’s like we’re not even giving them a shot. If you wanna go tour community colleges and trade schools with me, you will look around and you’ll go, “Wow, this is incredibly uninspiring. This is not acceptable.” We have VR, we have AR, we have the best technology in San Francisco. We have AI. Why are we treating people and teaching people with Word, you know, PDFs and pieces of paper?
Jonathan Webb:
So again, services for me in this company is less... Well, it’s very important to our CFO, so we’re gonna double revenue year over year. He’s excited about that. But more importantly, it’s our ability to build a relationship with those tradesmen and women, understand what their problems are, figure out how to fix those problems now so that when we have to go mobilize 5,000 people on a construction site, I can train them in six weeks instead of six months.
Jonathan Webb:
We can get them tools and technologies on the construction site to help assist in their work so they can be better welders, better pipe layers, and better craftsmen and women. And unfortunately, our country’s not doing that right now.
Robinson Meyer:
I mean, I was curious because I think when the nuclear company first came out of the gate, you guys were kind of the only nuclear project managers, developers out there.
Robinson Meyer:
I think since then there have been a number of companies that have announced, that have been founded or kind of entered a similar space. There’s —
Jonathan Webb:
Yeah, we —
Robinson Meyer:
— been Elemental. So what makes you different?
Jonathan Webb:
I don’t know the teams incredibly well, so I can’t say what they do specifically, but I’ve, you know, some interaction here and there. We’re maniacally focused on nuclear, so I know some are trying to bridge nuclear to gas and natural gas to nuclear.
Jonathan Webb:
We think nuclear, in delivering gigawatts of nuclear, there’s plenty of space for us to run. So we’re solely dedicated and focused on the nuclear industry. There’s others that are out buying land and trying to permit the land and trying to get financing for the land, which is kind of what you would see in like a typical solar developer world.
Jonathan Webb:
We have a team and a deep bench of capability to deploy, operate, and service nuclear power plants. And, you know, if someone develops a piece of property and they need a team to go deploy the reactor, that’s a perfect place for us to step in. So, people try to ask me again all the time, what, project manager, developer.
Jonathan Webb:
Yeah, those are small segments of like what we do. Like I would say maybe two, you know, two people on our team do like siting work at this point, and there’s a couple hundred. So yeah, that’s a piece of what we do, but I would say very akin to what we do and what I’ve not found a direct corollary to yet, although I’m starting to try to reach out more into the community to collaborate.
Jonathan Webb:
We hosted a bunch of, actually hosted a bunch of people in our office that, quote unquote, “competitor.” I hate that term. How do we partner and collaborate? What do we do? But as far as deploying the asset like an Airbus or Boeing airline industry, I don’t see anyone doing that. We have a team that can take a reactor, turn it into a power plant, get it up and running, and service it.
Jonathan Webb:
If there’s people in the world that can partner with us to do that more efficiently, our really only competitor in the Western world, we as an industry, it’s China, and they’re winning. We’re all losing. They’re building 10 gigawatts a year in perpetuity. They’re about to be the largest nuclear operator on planet Earth, and we as an industry have got to work together and lock arms and go deliver.
Jonathan Webb:
And so I personally don’t find anyone in this industry to be a competitor. I also don’t find anyone exactly yet doing what we’re doing. But we’re happy to collaborate. We’re happy to, you know, I would say look at our joint venture with Brookfield as a great example. You know, there’s a lot a trillion-dollar allocator Brookfield can bring to bear.
Jonathan Webb:
There’s a lot Westinghouse to bear, and on that specific joint venture, we’re trying to be an enabler of that success. And I would say to those listening that are in the industry, don’t hesitate to reach out to our team. We are going to win as an industry or we’re not, and the consequences of not winning as an industry has much more impacts than people’s balance sheets.
Jonathan Webb:
It’s our country’s at stake. We need more power, and we need to work together to get that power online efficiently, safely, and at a high quality as quickly as possible.
Robinson Meyer:
What do you think China does here that the US isn’t doing?
Jonathan Webb:
Well, they started where we stopped in the ’80s. So essentially you look at the, when we offshored manufacturing, when they started in the ’80s, when we slowed down in the ’80s.
Jonathan Webb:
There’s this idea in the U.S. that technology is going to just save so many... Like, and then you look at people like, you know, who ran Redwood, the former CTO of Tesla, JB. It’s maniacal execution.
Jonathan Webb:
It took China decades to get to where they’re at today. They’ve been doing this since the ’80s. They’ve tried to build every reactor type on planet Earth. You do it over and over again. You train people, you get better, you figure out how to whittle away costs. It’s the repetition. So I would end with fleet scale deployment in this country.
Jonathan Webb:
We’ve gotta design once and build many. We need to get reactors out, small reactors, micro reactors, also gigawatt scale reactors. And we need to print and print and print and print and keep getting these reactors in the field. And you will talk to some of the people that built the power plants down in Georgia.
Jonathan Webb:
You had people outta school, people with not great college degrees necessarily, that were the most brilliant people in the industry now because they lived on that construction site. One year on one of these sites is like 10 years in a classroom. So China’s done the hard work. They’ve enabled the industry, and this country needs to get back to building, and we need to build at fleet scale, and we need to not only double but triple the current operating fleet we have today.
Jonathan Webb:
And the only way to do that is to get in the field and build.
Robinson Meyer:
So they built up the know-how. I mean, it sounds like in other words, right? They’ve accumulated kind of human capital and know-how over the decades to be able to execute now at this high level.
Jonathan Webb:
Yeah, you look at France, they built 40 reactors in 15 years.
Robinson Meyer:
It’s interesting ’cause this would be the case for SMRs. I mean, this would be the case, like, right?
Robinson Meyer:
I mean, it, this would be another lesson you could take from the Musk companies is that modularity wins and manufacturability wins. But it kind of sounds what you’re saying. Ultimately, nobody has figured out how to make these things manufacturable. And so even though in theory modularity wins for —
Jonathan Webb:
I can tell you I’m trying to decons- I’ve got like drawings of cranes that China has on how they’re moving like one of the largest cranes in the world to move large reactor vessels, you know, advanced rail cars. I mean, somehow China hasn’t figured it out. So I don’t know about you, but I personally didn’t want to bet my career against China.
Jonathan Webb:
I assume if there was a cheaper, more efficient way to do things and get things up and running, they have a pretty large country that built a lot of stuff at a very low cost, and they have a pretty good way of, you know, finding out maniacal execution. So I’m not saying it won’t happen. I’m just saying to this point, China hasn’t figured it out.
Jonathan Webb:
It’s certainly gonna happen. There will be a few of the micro and SMRs that work, and we look forward to enabling their success and be a part of that. Hopefully, they’ll choose us as a partner. But it’s all gonna be hard. Manufacturing is hard. Field erecting things are hard. Thousands of people in a manufacturing facility is hard.
Jonathan Webb:
Thousands of people on a construction site is hard. All of it’s very challenging. We just gotta roll up our sleeves, do the work, and I’m a big all the above. So where we started earlier on in the energy portfolio and solar and wind have attributes, batteries and natural gas, nuclear’s got attributes, but with inside of nuclear, you know, there’s going to be applications where different reactors are gonna play better, but we gotta get in the field and do it, and my only thing with this company was can we not give up the thing we did before and act like we can’t do it again?
Jonathan Webb:
That to me just seems flatly unacceptable if we wanna continue to act like we’re the greatest country in the world and have the largest economy in the world.
Robinson Meyer:
We’ve used the plane analogy a lot to talk about kind of nuclear development and how Rolls-Royce or GE make the engines and then Boeing or Airbus make the planes.
Robinson Meyer:
It does seem though there’s a lot of like reasons why a company that makes the reactor would wanna eventually bring project development in-house. And you’re working with Brookfield actually in South Carolina, so what’s your theory of like why it makes sense to have a standalone nuclear developer basically as opposed to this eventually being vertically integrated within the reactor companies?
Jonathan Webb:
So again, I would say deployment operations services. Anyone can develop a property and go permit it and get financing and, you know, developing solar is vastly different than deploying these assets. I, again, go back to the airline industry because it’s one of the most heavily regulated industries. You need to be 100% all the time, and probably one of the better corollaries to nuclear power.
Jonathan Webb:
Not to say some wouldn’t, and they should. I mean, I hope so. And, and just, you know, but Westinghouse tried it before and that didn’t quite work well, so others have tried it before and haven’t. I would say having a team, back to at some point midstream we were talking about being objective, so, I mean, personally, again, I’m biased.
Jonathan Webb:
I think there’s value in having an objective team that can look out and work through. So if you, again, we throw this word develop, you know, what is our role? In many ways, we are trying to figure out, depending on what region, what community, where we’re working, you have local regional assets and supply chain.
Jonathan Webb:
You have local regional construction teams and engineering teams. You have large EPC firms nationally and globally. And so what is our team’s responsibility is to look at, okay, what is the IP? What are the blueprints? What are the drawings? What’s the best supply chain to efficiently run those drawings through?
Jonathan Webb:
And then how do we deploy these on sites with teams? And so evaluating, we do have great constructors in the U.S. We have some wood to chop and get a bit better, but there’s good constructors, but they’re not good at everything, right? So understanding, you know, which EPC firm should take this portion of the work, which regional firm should take this portion of the work.
Jonathan Webb:
What can we do to accelerate, auxiliary buildings, annex buildings, road? That to us is the deployment aspect. So could these companies do all of this in-house? Absolutely, and we hope they do, and some of them will. Do we think there’s gonna be a place in the market for what we’re doing? I would say all we’re doing is what U.S. utilities used to do in the ’50s, ’60s, ’70s, which is you didn’t have the reactor team be the team to get it up and running and get it deployed. And so the question for us was, you know, does every U.S. utility wanna go build our team and invest in technology, or can we help enable their success? But to answer your question head on, there will absolutely be a few companies that can figure it out full stack.
Jonathan Webb:
And maybe we can be a part of their success as well in some ways, but we’re gonna be here for those that have a gap in the market and need our help.
Robinson Meyer:
Well, we’re gonna have to leave it there, but Jonathan, thank you so much for joining us on Shift Key.
Jonathan Webb:
Thank you.
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On The Nuclear Company, Venture Global’s power dreams, and super pollutants
Current conditions: A cold front is sweeping into the Northeast, potentially bringing snow to higher elevations in New York and New England • Early snow is blanketing parts of the Mountain West, with as much as 16 inches in Great Falls, Montana • Temperatures in Jakarta are nearing 100 degrees Fahrenheit as Indonesia battles the world’s worst air with haze brought on by forest fires.

President Donald Trump’s controversial and potentially illegal deal to unilaterally lift U.S. sanctions on Russia to allow Moscow to export millions of tons of diesel to the global market was meant to curb the surging price of the fuel, which has added as much as $1,000 per week to commercial truckers’ costs in the U.S. in recent months. But the agreement with Russian President Vladimir Putin could backfire as Ukraine responds by breaking with Washington and once again targeting the Kremlin’s oil refineries. In an interview Thursday with the Financial Times, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the ban on attacking refineries “is out” after U.S. intelligence pulled back from sharing information with Kyiv and Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite internet service, on which the Ukrainian military has depended for drone attacks, weakened amid a wave of Russian attacks. “We’re done,” Zelenskyy said.
When Jair Bolsonaro took power in 2019, Brazil’s right-wing firebrand former president vowed to industrialize the Amazon, clearing the way for ranchers, loggers, and miners to exploit the vast jungle’s resources. Later that year, fires consumed broad chunks of the Amazon. Now Flávio Bolsonaro, Jair’s son, is the frontrunner in the October 25 runoff election against left-wing President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Bolsonaro’s supporters post semi-facetious, AI-generated videos depicting a hulking, muscly Flávio riding on the back of a velociraptor, flamethrowering the rainforest to make way for rows of McDonald’s. Right on cue, the Amazon is once again on fire. Droughts brought on by El Niño have “left the Amazon rainforest primed to burn, and scientists say the region has entered the early stages of what they think will be a long and severe fire season,” according to an analysis by NASA. Already, satellite images show a sharp increase in fire and smoke in the central and Eastern Amazon. Brazil now has the worst wildfire-wrought air quality in the world after Indonesia.
Last month, Holtec Nuclear — the company behind the nation’s first restart of an atomic power station and a frontrunner to build some of our first small modular reactors — canceled its plans to debut itself on the stock market with an initial public offering. The reason? Every nuclear company that went public in recent months has seen its stock price plummet. On Thursday, Axios reported that The Nuclear Company, the developer that brought together the team that helped build the country’s first Westinghouse AP1000 reactors at Georgia’s Plant Vogtle to build more large-scale plants, had backed away from its own IPO plans. (Listen to my colleague Robinson Meyer’s interview with The Nuclear Company’s chief executive here.)
The detail highlights how the market has cooled to nuclear startups since next-generation SMR developer Oklo went public and made billions of dollars as retail investors sought to bet on a nuclear comeback. And yet The Nuclear Company only raised its first Series A funding round last year. Its fate has always seemed tied to Westinghouse, which is eyeing its own IPO. While The Nuclear Company will almost certainly need to go public at some point, given the capital intensity of its projects, it hadn’t yet filed a confidential S-1 to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Without that, it’s unlikely The Nuclear Company would be IPOing by next year anyway.
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Venture Global has inked a deal with GE Vernova and Baker Hughes Energy Services to build up to 16 new 720-megawatt power island units and transformers as America’s No. 2 liquified natural gas company builds out a behind-the meter industrial power network. The deal, per a press release, provides “a pathway to make up to 10 gigawatts of new compute capacity available over time” at sites owned by Venture Global. The company already boasts 4.5 gigawatts of what it calls “island mode modular, gas-fired generation.” In a statement, Venture Global CEO Mike Sabel said the company will maintain “one of the world’s largest private industrial electric grids.”
The move comes as the U.S. added a record 89 gigawatts of clean power capacity in the second half of this year, with momentum building for another new high next year, according to the latest market outlook from BloombergNEF. The consultancy projected that solar will reach 48.9 gigawatts in 2026, with 430 gigawatts of utility-scale solar forecast to come online through 2036. That, surprisingly, is down nearly 8% from BNEF’s previous estimate at the start of the year. More surprising is the energy source that is on the rise: Onshore wind additions could peak at 9.2 gigawatts in 2028, with 99.7 gigawatts forecast through 2036 — and that’s 15% above BNEF’s past forecast. Energy storage is on track to add 383 gigawatts through 2036, a 35% bump from BNEF’s past estimate. Nuclear, meanwhile, is expected to pick up again after a decade of stagnation, with 13.7 gigawatts on track to come online through 2036.
Back in 2024, my colleague Emily Pontecorvo covered Google’s first-of-a-kind deals to lock in carbon removal. Two years later, she was lamenting the “sorry state” of the industry amid a broader pullback from the cutting-edge technology to suck carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere. Things may be picking back up again. On Thursday, the tech giant backed an $11.7 million deal with the carbon marketplace Frontier to pay to remove 20,932 tons of carbon from the atmosphere using the startup 44.01’s mineralization technology, which converts carbon into solid rock within three years. “44.01’s technology dissolves captured CO2 that is injected deep beneath the Earth’s surface. There, it reacts to form solid carbonate minerals within a few years,” Randy Spock, Google’s head of carbon removal, wrote in a post on LinkedIn. “Those minerals stay put for millennia with no risk of reversal.”
In May, the Trump administration eased U.S. restrictions on so-called super pollutants, the class of refrigerants that rapidly spur on global warming. On Thursday, a coalition of climate philanthropies announced over $36 million in new funding to support a push to expand energy-efficient, sustainable cooling. “As demand for cooling grows, so do potential emissions,” Christie Ulman, president of Sequoia Climate Foundation, said in a press release. “Targeted philanthropic funding can be a catalytic force in unlocking broader investments in sustainable cooling and fast-acting super pollutant solutions that shield vulnerable communities and advance climate goals.”
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Robinson Meyer:
Hello, it's October 16, and the Senate is considering a bipartisan permitting bill. Last month, a group of four senators, two Republicans and two Democrats, introduced the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act. That is “BAAJA” or “bei-ja.” I've been flipping between the two pronunciations.
At the heart of that bill is a compromise.
The bill would make it easier to build, and in some cases mandate, lots of types of new infrastructure that are essential for decarbonization, including long-distance power lines. It would also make it easier in some cases to build natural gas pipelines. So how should Democrats, and climate hawks more broadly, think about such a compromise?
Is there any case in which lawmakers should accept building more fossil-fuel infrastructure in exchange for a lot of climate-friendly or decarbonization or electrification-friendly measures? Well, joining us today is someone who is among the most cited authors on this topic. Peter Erickson is an affiliated researcher at the Stockholm Environment Institute. He's written some of the most important papers on why it's essential to look at fossil fuel infrastructure, and specifically fossil fuel supply infrastructure, when considering climate policy. He wrote a very influential paper, as you'll hear, on the Keystone XL pipeline, arguing that that pipeline would have created way more carbon emissions than the State Department thought at the time.
He's since become an expert witness testifying against fossil fuel infrastructure in court cases, and I'm pretty sure he's been cited in more court cases about fossil fuel infrastructure and fossil fuel supply than any other climate researcher. But in recent years, he has taken a nuanced approach to the question.
He's come to think that some of the claims about fossil fuel infrastructure are perhaps running ahead of the science. He joins me on this episode of Shift Key to discuss the long arc of his work, because I think in tracking his work, you can see the evolution of a very important approach to climate policy and where that approach may go next in years to come.
You'll also get a sense of what all of this could mean for “BAAJA” or “bei-ja” or whatever we're calling it. I'm Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News, and all that and more, it's all coming up on Shift Key.
Peter Erickson, welcome to Shift Key.
Peter Erickson
Hi, Rob. I think this is gonna be really fun.
Robinson Meyer
Excited you're here.
Could you just describe, like, your distinct role as a fossil fuel and energy systems researcher?
Peter Erickson
So my name is Peter Erickson, and my background is in science, in geology specifically. And for the last couple of decades, my main role in the climate policy space has been to do, as best as I can, objective analysis of how climate policies would affect greenhouse gas emissions. And so that role has led me to various places, but one place that it has led me to is to be an expert witness in court cases about fossil fuel infrastructure.
And the reason that in my mind has fit into my role as a climate policy analyst is that sometimes information is surfaced or brought forward by project proponents into these permitting decisions. Sometimes the information that's brought forward is clearly wrong and/or it seems like the permitting decision is a proxy for the policy decision made by the government.
And because I care more than anything about good analysis being brought to these decisions, that is why I have gotten involved as an expert witness.
Robinson Meyer
Yeah, I wanna talk today about a number of papers you've written and some of your ideas in the space and kind of how they inform thinking about permitting reform, but also I think the state of climate politics in 2026 more broadly. But before we get there, I wanna start in 2014, with this paper you wrote about the Keystone XL Pipeline.
I think a lot of your writing is about the role of fossil fuel supply and how it drives greenhouse gas emissions and how climate policy should think about fossil fuel supply. But what were you doing before you got into that, and how did you get into this world of fossil fuel supply thinking?
Peter Erickson
Yeah, and the Keystone XL Pipeline is a great example because that was my entry point into the fossil fuel stuff. Before that, I was working much more on either city scale or, local scale, or international scale climate policy. So one of my major things before getting into fossil fuel supply was looking at carbon offsets.
For example, I had just been working with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, who had commissioned me to do a study of whether carbon offsets were or were not reducing emissions under the Kyoto Protocol. So, you know, I really viewed myself, and I still do to some extent, as just, let's just look at the numbers as best we can about this type of policy, right?
And so Keystone XL came along, and I wasn't really all that interested, but I saw the State Department's environmental impact statement about it, and I thought, “This can't be right." Something is wrong if they're concluding that this major pipeline from the oil sands is not going to change emissions at all.
And so that really got me looking at this question in the first place, reading economics textbooks, talking to economists, understanding oil market dynamics.
Robinson Meyer
I realize I should make one observation that I wanna touch on before we get into the actual process here, I suppose. Which is when I read these papers, when I read your research, when I read your written work, I do see what I would describe as an evolution, or at least a change of thinking on your part about... I'm not even sure you've, like, changed your mind per se, but in some ways I, I see an evolution from a world that wasn't taking, you know, your belief that questions of fossil fuel supply were not being taken seriously at all to now maybe a concern...
It might be wrong to say that you're worried that it's gone too far, but a concern that claims being made about the role that fossil fuel supply plays in greenhouse gas emissions are, like, overstated compared to the role that it actually plays. Am I right to detect in your research a broad turn?
Peter Erickson
I think it's fair. I think it's fair to detect an evolution and a change in emphasis, perhaps. But the fundamental math has stayed, and research findings have stayed true throughout, right? I was interested in Keystone XL in the first place because I thought that truth was somewhere between it can't matter at all and it matters absolutely, right?
That is still the position I'm taking based on my research. It's just that I think we have gotten to the point with some of the fossil fuel supply discussions where not only the rhetoric, that's always been the case, but the actual evidence being brought forward in front of very serious policy venues and very serious courts is straying from what I think is defensible in some cases.
And so if you detect a change in my posture, it's because it's the exaggerated claims are no longer just on the fossil fuel side.
Robinson Meyer
Let's start with the Keystone XL Pipeline, because I think to some degree, Keystone, both for you but also for society at large, winds up setting the terms for how we talk about fossil fuel infrastructure in a new way. And this was partly by design; this was part of the point of the Keystone XL Pipeline campaign was to make people aware of the role of fossil fuel infrastructure in perpetuating climate change and worsening climate change.
What's interesting about it is that part of the question with Keystone, and this will come up again with later fossil fuel projects, comes down to this analytical question where President Obama at the time says, "We're only going to approve Keystone if it doesn't significantly worsen greenhouse gas emissions or significantly worsen climate change."
The State Department then comes out with an analysis that says basically, "No, it won't." Keystone XL Pipeline, which for readers who are blissfully younger than you or I, was a big old pipeline that was gonna connect the Albertan tar sands, a particularly carbon-intensive form of oil extraction, to refineries in the Gulf Coast, allowing a broader expansion of refinery activity.
And because of the particular chemistries of Canadian oil and fracking oil, it was going to allow for a big expansion of activity. But the US State Department came out with this analysis, and it said, “Listen, don't worry. It's only going to worsen greenhouse gas emissions by 1 to 27 million tons of CO2.” And you wrote a paper, it was in Nature Climate Change 2014, and you said, “Actually, that’s not right.” And so what did you say?
Peter Erickson
What we said was that 1 to 27 million range that the State Department came out with was only about how much dirtier the oil sands were than whatever they would be replacing out there in the market. And what we said is, that can't be the only thing, right? You have this major oil producer that is Canada. It is capacity constrained in how and whether it can get its oil to market. Keystone XL is changing that, right? That is the fundamental point of the project, is to expand the ability of Canada to get its oil to market. That is going to change oil markets and therefore oil consumption in ways globally that we can use math about.
This is not unknown. It is, as I was criticized for, using Econ 101, but we should at least bring Econ 101 to bear and look at it from that and other perspectives. And so that's why that paper got published. That's why the State Department cited our paper in a footnote, as if to say, "Look, this is the way we think it is, but it could be this other way, too."
Robinson Meyer
And what did their analysis miss? It was this idea that basically every additional barrel you bring to market slightly lowers the global cost of oil and therefore increases the global market's propensity to consume oil, right?
Peter Erickson
That's exactly right. Yeah, each additional barrel slightly lowers the price of oil in the market, and that means that consumers might drive a little more, and car companies might make cars that are slightly less efficient. it means that whole cascading chain of decisions that is affected by price.
Robinson Meyer
This has come up in previous pieces of legislation, previous policy questions as well, which is you have to think about several different systems, and they're all in equilibrium. One of them is that you're opening up this new fossil fuel resource.
You're producing fossil fuel from it. You're producing oil, in this case, from it, and that's going to slightly increase the amount of oil supply on the global market, and that is going to also make it so oil's cheaper and people burn oil. But it also seems like by decreasing the global cost of oil, you're going to keep other fossil fuel reserves off the market. You're going to, by just a little bit, lower the global cost of oil. And that's going to take, you know, potential oil fields or potential oil field upgrades that other countries or, you know, companies elsewhere in the US or North America could make that would open up new sources of oil.
It's gonna make those projects uneconomic, and therefore, they're not gonna make those investments. And that's going to tick the price of oil a little bit up from where it was. And so how do you think about this relationship between new fossil fuel or new oil supply in this case, crowding out other supply, out-competing other supply versus it creating a market for itself?
Peter Erickson
Yes, that's right. And so the way that economists or oil market economists would deal with all that equilibrium is they would look at just how sensitive the producers are and the new producers are to price. They look at how the consumers and the new consumers are sensitive to price, and they essentially, you know, balance out those different factors in a complicated or, as I've done, a really simple model of how to look at this.
And so, you know, those parameters are called elasticities. We don't need to get into them per se, but when you put that kind of basic fundamentals and math together, what you end up finding is that, for each new oil barrel brought online, abou 0.4 barrels of that are newly consumed and 0.6, that adds to 1 by design, right, are, no longer produced elsewhere.
Robinson Meyer
Has our assessment of that number changed? I'm asking only — obviously I'm reading this paper you wrote 12 years ago. Stipulate it; it's a 12-year-old paper. I think your number there is 0.6, and it's funny 'cause I was reporting on this question like a year ago, and the number a year ago was 0.4, and I was like, "Have we knocked this down by two-tenths of a barrel?"
Peter Erickson
You know, maybe by chance during the Keystone XL era, the oil market was really tight, right? An analyst thought we were way up high on the cost curve for oil where it is very steep, and so where each new unit of production costs that much more.
Or, you know, considerably more than the last unit of production. And so in that environment, like, that is the kind of environment where affecting supply really matters. But in the current oil crisis notwithstanding, we are not exactly in that world anymore. And it's reasonable to think, or at least if you believe the energy transition is happening at the speed and scale that some people think, demand goes down.
That brings us further down the supply curve into an area where it's flatter and where supply restrictions matter, or rather would have less effect on prices and emissions. So in, you know, elasticity terms, we're going from a place of low elasticity in 2014 to a place perhaps with higher elasticity going forward.
Robinson Meyer
The way we would see that, if that change was happening, is that there's now alternatives to, say, in the oil market, there's alternatives to liquid-fueled vehicles in a way that there was not alternatives to liquid-fueled vehicles like in 2014.
Peter Erickson
That is completely the biggest change. And, in Econ 101 terms, the demand curve has shifted to the left because these other alternatives are now available, and consumers are choosing for price or other reasons, other options, and they have those options available.
So there is good reason to think that going forward, and I haven't seen this published in rigorous ways yet, but going forward, the elasticity of oil supply may be higher than it was in the past. And therefore, you know, further shifts in the demand curve or shifts in the supply curve are less consequential for price than they were in the past.
Robinson Meyer
That's so interesting. Let's stay on the chronology. All of that lay ahead. So Keystone XL brings infrastructure as this big climate policy question to the forefront, and I do think it's interesting. What wound up happening, I believe, was that in the final days of his presidency, Obama then revoked the permit from the pipeline or didn't grant it.
Peter Erickson
He did. That's correct.
Robinson Meyer
It was ultimately reinstated by Trump and then partially built, and then President Biden later revoked the permit, and now we live in the world we live in. Have we ever gone back and looked? Because I think what you hear now is that a lot of oil was able to leave the tar sands even-- You know, Keystone XL basically, as I was just describing, never opened.
Peter Erickson
So, your analysis was like zero, you know, the, the Keystone XL CO2 impact was gonna be like zero to 110 million tons. Do we have a sense of where in that range we wound up?
Yeah. I don't think we really do. I mean, what I did was, you know, a forward-looking analysis. What you're suggesting is maybe there's a way to go back and look, do a backward analysis to see what actually happened. But, you know, we do know that Canada's oil was capacity constrained at times. And so, you know, they ended up building another pipeline, and you know, if you believe the Canada Energy Regulator, they may be capacity constrained again.
And so, I think there's good evidence to say that it wasn't near the zero end of that range, right? It was at least somewhere in the middle, if not higher.
Robinson Meyer
Why would it have been zero? Sorry, I just wanna — 'cause I feel like the headline of this paper is that the impact of the Keystone XL pipeline may have been way bigger than the State Department said, but the range is actually like, instead of the State Department range, which was zero to 27 million tons, yours was like zero to 110 million tons.
So what is, like, going on at the zero end of that range that would make it—
Peter Erickson
At the zero end of that range, it's just all the oil is getting to market some other way, right? And we know that didn't happen.
Robinson Meyer
Yeah. And for it to be 110, it would've been like, none of…
Peter Erickson
None of that oil was getting out otherwise.
Robinson Meyer
Do we also know that didn't happen?
Peter Erickson
Yeah, we also know that didn't happen because then they went and built, you know, the Trans Mountain Express TMX pipeline and got a lot of that oil out that way. So, you know, these are dynamic systems.
Robinson Meyer
Cool. Okay, so anyway, all of that lay in the future. So then about a decade ago, I think you wrote two papers. One is about this idea of carbon lock-in, and the other is about limiting fossil fuel production as the next big step in climate policy.
Let's talk about carbon lock-in first. So what is this idea of carbon lock-in?
Peter Erickson
Carbon lock-in is this idea that these energy systems, once you build them, especially the fossil fuel energy systems, they are able to maintain their inertia, maintain their dominance through a whole bunch of factors. But that includes economic, that includes institutional, by which I mean, you know, they have all the trade associations and community colleges and pipeline of workers that they need, and political factors, right?
They are able to continue the lobbying and other activities that keep them there as the center provider of energy for an economy.
Robinson Meyer
Is it like mostly a technical and economic story where you have these pipelines, they're expensive to build but cheap to run? I think your example is gas power plants or coal power plants as big capital-intensive projects that then once you have them, they're pretty cheap to just keep running.
So is it that's like a technical economic story? Or is it like a political story where once you have this big investment that was successful that's throwing off cash, you can reinvest a relatively small amount of that cash into your right to continue to operate?
Peter Erickson
That's right. It's both of those things. In that paper assessing carbon lock-in in 2015, we tried to bring all of those dimensions into a single framework for how to look at lock-in. Both, you know, the economic dimensions of how cheap is it to build this thing, but also another economic dimension, which is, well, once you have built it, does it really stick around for its full lifetime? Or how easy it is to unlock that thing again, right? Which is a key thing. So it's not binary.
Once you build this stuff, it's not like it's just going to keep doing its thing for 30 years necessarily, right? There are analysis tools we can bring to that. And then there are the sociopolitical dimensions, which we tried to find ways to quantify, as well in that paper.
Robinson Meyer
I do think one of the examples in that paper is coal power plants, which at the time and even now still are in— I mean, actually less now because they've been given the great gift of load growth. But through the early 2020s, even though they were locked in, were being outcompeted by gas and therefore shutting down with the help of a lot of EPA regulatory assist and legal campaigns as well.
Peter Erickson
That's a great example of why a thing that's built may not keep operating the way it was intended. And, you know, again, it's a special situation in the U.S. for reasons you know. You know, a lot of the coal plants were really old. They were beyond their useful lifetimes anyway.
But, you know, we could apply the same logic to gas plants, for example, going forward, right? Like, lots of those are being built under duress and under pressure by data centers or otherwise because they feel that they need to. But it's not automatic that those things are gonna be operated for 30 years or 40 years.
Robinson Meyer
At the same time as the carbon lock-in paper, you wrote another piece with two co-authors in Nature Climate Change, It's a case study. It looks at California specifically, but I think it builds on the Keystone XL work to say, look, climate policy should be thinking more proactively about limiting fossil fuel production as a centerpiece of climate policy.
So can you just talk about that paper a little bit?
Peter Erickson
Yeah, of course. And the slight modification I would make to what you say is I would say we were saying it could be, it can be. Here are some of the reasons why it might make sense to be, rather than a normative statement of “it should be.” But nonetheless, what we were seeing at the time is that some of the reasons to not look at supply, didn't hold up to us.
And we looked at the California context in particular, where there was a debate and activism focused on Jerry Brown, the then-governor, about stopping production and starting to wind down production in California of oil, and which is among some of the most carbon-intensive oil in the country and the world is in California, right?'Cause it's this old, very thick, dirty oil.
And what we looked at was, you know, limiting oil supply could make sense as part of a standard, just straight up by-the-books climate policy, in the sense that as you are winding down your oil demand, as California was making great plans to do, if you also wound down production at similar rates or in concert, you would be reducing the fact that downward pressure on prices that you are helping to create by reducing demand, that downward pressure in prices then makes it easier for everyone else around the world to consume oil.
And could you not, at the same time, be winding down your own oil supply and perhaps not even affecting, you know, the net import balance, right? It could all be part of a planned transition. I still stand by that concept, right? These two things can go together: energy policy about oil and gas supply, and climate policy about reducing demand for those things.
Robinson Meyer
I can see why at the time, and I would put myself in the same category here, that would be a very attractive argument, not only because you're limiting fossil fuel production, it has these global effects on the global oil market. You know, as always, the question in climate policy that nobody has a completely satisfying answer on is: How do you do climate policy in your state, your subnational or national entity in a way that advances global decarbonization? How do you do global climate policy in your state or country?
Peter Erickson
That's completely right. And just one, one more thing on that is like, I mean, that exact argument, as you just stated, was influential with the Obama White House on the question of Arctic drilling. So I don't know if you remember, but very late in Obama's presidency, he took off-line, by you know, using his presidential determinations, a bunch of oil from the Arctic that could no longer be considered, in theory, you know, for perpetuity for oil drilling.
And the argument that was with John Holdren, as I understand it, there in the White House at the time, was: how can we expect the rest of the world to be getting off oil in the ways that we, the U.S., want them to do if we're then providing them even more oil in the process?
Robinson Meyer
Oil especially is an unusually global fossil fuel market, it's a very distinctive set of global problems. Like coal is obviously in some ways worse for the climate, but coal markets are often national or regional.
But oil is this nice, big, happy global market. We build all the infrastructure so that it effectively settles on a global basis, except in moments of profound supply shock, such as right after the Iran war, and right after the Iran war started. And, because of that, removing barrels of oil from anywhere kind of affects everyone's consumption in a way that is not nearly as satisfying with, say, natural gas or coal.
It also seems like I can see, and in fact I think I, like, remember, there's another reason this argument is, I think, so appealing, or the potential for this policy is so appealing, which is not only does it satisfy, you know, our, Utopian liberal aspirations of economic planning but it also seems to address a big problem of climate policy, which is that the fossil fuel industry or the set of interests that are aligned around fossil fuels, make a lot of money and extract a lot of political power.
I mean, it's this carbon lock-in idea that they become entrenched through revenues from this existing infrastructure. Part of the case that's made for limiting fossil fuel production is also that it addresses, especially at the time, especially in the late 2010s, is also that it addresses the power of the fossil fuel industry and weakens it as a political power and political entity going forward.
Peter Erickson
I have so much to say about this, but let me just start by saying that paper that you're referencing from 2018, Limiting Production is the Next Big Step in Climate Policy, led to the California Air Resources Board holding — I mean, I'm oversimplifying, it wasn't just my paper that led to—
Robinson Meyer
No, no.
Peter Erickson
California Air Resources Board held a workshop, like a public meeting, on this in Sacramento to try to surface some of the arguments and evidence around this set of ideas.
And I was paired opposite Severin Borenstein, who I think has been a guest on your show before, and he was basically there to rebut this paper, you know, from Nature Climate Change. And, you know, we had a lively debate. We sparred, it was a lot of fun. And what he argued is that, you know, maybe Erickson has a point here. His math is basically correct, but there's another thing that he didn't show you from his math, which is that price increase that, you know, the supply-side theory is counting on to help reduce emissions, that is, in effect, a transfer of wealth from global consumers who had no say in this policy in California to the incumbent producers all around the world, the ones that are not in California, and that transfer of wealth is substantial.
And, you know, I thought that was a good point, but I thought it kind of missed this, "Hey, aren't we doing this in tandem?" idea, right? But it stuck with me ever since, just in the back of my head. And so this summer, I went back to it, and I was like, "Let's look back at that math." And I reconstructed from, you know, scratch, this economic model.
I got it to verify the calcs that Severin put forward in 2018, and I looked at, okay, say we leave that barrel of oil in the ground, and prices increase just the way we think, and it helps reduce emissions, the whole storyline that you and I have been talking about, what else happens? And it turned out— and this was what I was kind of afraid to look at in 2018, right? It turned out that the overall transfer of money from the world's consumers to the world's incumbent fossil fuel producers was greater than the amount of money that was denied that company that you no longer let develop their assets, right? And that finding is inseparable from the climate benefits that limiting supply would bring, right?
And so to me, that really complicated this idea that limiting supply is a stick in the eye to the fossil fuel industry, right? Like they are actually on net winning out when you limit supply in many cases. And of course, they know this, right? That's why they have OPEC and OPEC Plus to try to manage and limit supply themselves.
So it just made me think, you know, I don't think this part of the debate should be limited to some notes in a t2018 debate in Sacramento. I think this needs to be out there for climate advocates to wrestle with.
Robinson Meyer
So before we get to this paper you wrote this summer, in 2021 you wrote a paper that looks at U.S. fossil fuel subsidies, and it draws a very interesting conclusion. The paper looks at what you describe as — the U.S. has 16 different policies that could be construed as fossil fuel subsidies. You take a very rigorous look at subsidies. What did you find in this paper? Because when we talk about fossil fuel subsidies in the U.S., people assume when we say the U.S. is subsidizing fossil fuels, that it means the U.S. is producing more fossil fuels than it would if not for the non-existence of these subsidies.
But you find something surprising, What was it?
Peter Erickson
Find something surprising. And of course, this is all dependent on the price of oil and gas and economics and stuff, but that is what we looked at, so I think you should pay attention to what I say here. What we looked at is we gathered data on tens of thousands of oil and gas fields in the United States that were known.
They were discovered, but they had not yet been developed, right? So these are the ones that either are or are not gonna be affected by subsidies and other regulatory exemptions. And what we found is that the existence of those, like you say, 16 subsidies or regulatory exemptions, what those do is they mainly steer more profit to these projects.
They are not, at least at oil and gas prices at the time, which have been somewhat similar since, what those subsidies are not doing is leading to new projects on the ground. The project economics are not changing all that much. And so we found that well over 90% of the value of those subsidies is going directly to the profits of those companies, but that is not necessarily trickling down to new projects on the ground, which also means, you know, the jobs and other economic benefits that the fossil fuel industry claim that they are providing, right?
Robinson Meyer
Why is that?
Peter Erickson
Yeah. The reason that is, is because this is a really mature industry, right? It is sort of a, almost a, you know, classic rentier industry where they're given a huge amount of, by geology, oil and gas in the ground, and they can draw a line around that, and create a moat for themselves and produce it, right?
And so the price of oil is enough higher than the cost of developing those fields that they are able to do that. They are able to get profits, and the subsidies that are still in place are not essential, are not what is driving that investment on the ground, right? They still have enough profit margin, 15%, say, rate of return on their new projects with or without the subsidies, right?
And so, say the subsidies are taking a project that was gonna get 15% return and they're turning it into a 22% return, right? That's bad either way if you're concerned about the climate, right? We don't want this industry to have any more profits than it already has. But what we really care about at the end of the day is, are new fossil fuel projects being developed, and does the fossil fuel industry have the power to block, you know, clean energy?
Robinson Meyer
I mean, first of all, I think it actually points — and maybe we can get back to this at the end of the conversation — but it seems to point to a place you, climate policy advocates could look if they wanted to go after industry profits specifically, which is go look at the subsidies because it is, uh, actually the subsidies that's driving the surplus.
I mean, it's not only the subsidies that are driving the surplus. The surplus is kind of chemical. That's kind of the whole problem. But if you wanna look at where the additional surplus is coming from, so to speak, that these companies are using to help entrench their political power and support political candidates who oppose climate policy and, you know, lobby against climate policy, you could go after the subsidies.
It would be significant.
Peter Erickson
Yeah, and you could go after windfall, windfall profits and, you know, there are campaigns and ideas to try to do that. But, you know, just one other like specific math finding from that study, which is that we found that basically, you know, subsidies were responsible for basically almost none of the new oil projects to be developed this decade and maybe, you know, a quarter of the gas projects that would be developed this decade in the US, you know, would or would not happen without subsidies.
So, you know, essentially none of the new oil projects were dependent on these subsidies or regulatory exemptions. I mean, that tells you how mature this industry is.
Robinson Meyer
One could go after the subsidies, but be sure if you go after the subsidies you don't think you're going after emissions, 'cause you're not. You're only going after a second order input into the ultimate cocktail of political factors that determine emissions. Because as you said, you don't need the subsidies to make these projects make sense.
Peter Erickson
I think that's basically right. I mean, you know, globally there's perhaps different stories in different parts of the world, but in the U.S.…
Robinson Meyer
Is the U.S. context for…
Peter Erickson
Yeah.
Robinson Meyer
In some ways, the paper is one about corporate decision-making, you know, and what drives corporate decision-making is not lots of little tweaks on the margin to see if a project is just gonna eke out profitability or not. For oil companies to make the, you know, multi-billion dollar investments required to open a new field or open a new resource, they have to be so sure that this thing is gonna be enormously profitable going forward that it justifies them risking that capital. This is not an industry that's operating at the tenths of a margin of profit.
Peter Erickson
No, that's right. And I mean, that's why you hear so much about certainty being an issue with regard to all kinds of energy investment and why, for a long time, you know, major international commissions have gone, "Well, we need the renewable industry to be able to have more certainty in its projects to go forward."
Well, you know, there's a reason for that, right? Certainty really does matter.
Robinson Meyer
Okay, so then let's get to this 2026 paper. So if you've been listening to this, you're like, "Why are we talking about all these papers?" First of all, they're all in the, gonna be in the show notes. But second of all, we're gonna get to the future of climate policy, all that.
So this paper, "Rethinking the Case Against New Oil and Gas Fields," it was published this summer in Environmental Research Letters. I think it does complete this turn, or this honing of your thinking from, hey, we're not thinking about the importance of individual fossil fuel projects in the global marketplace in equilibrium, to like, whoa, whoa, whoa, we need better evidence before we turn every additional new fossil fuel project into, like, a fight over the future of climate policy, perhaps would be one way of putting it.
Peter Erickson
Yeah, and so big things changed in the world in that time too, right? We had, like we had COVID, we had the war in Ukraine, we've had the Strait of Hormuz, and the war on Iran really changing supply. So we've had some big real-world tests to see how supply and demand shocks play out that we can draw from.
Robinson Meyer
So first of all, let's just talk about this finding that you've already previewed, which is that when you restrain fossil fuel supply, you might be able to keep those barrels off the market. But what you are doing is engineering a massive shift of wealth to the existing fossil fuel industry. I know you've already described it a little, but just why is that?
Peter Erickson
Yeah, the reason that is, is because when you constrain supply and constrain supply outlooks, you are causing an increase in price, and that is what is needed to bring on the other new projects. And that increase in price and price outlooks is what causes consumers and all of the institutions that surround consumers, the car industries, et cetera, to reduce their oil consumption.
But that increase in price applies to every single producer in the whole world, right? You've penalized one producer or one whole region of the world by saying, "You can't produce oil here," but the price increase applies globally, and all producers see that, right? And all consumers see that. And when those economics balance out, and a new equilibrium is found, the consumers are paying for that price increase and giving the money to the producers.
And you can do straight-ahead math on that to give a first-order estimate of what happens.
Robinson Meyer
And you cite a recent example that everyone just saw, that we've been talking about on this show, which is in early 2026, Iran, following the US-Israeli war starting, closed the Strait of Hormuz. The price for oil and refined products spiked everywhere around the world.
That increased fuel costs for consumers, and it increased profits for producers. It was quite mechanical, and we all saw it happen. And effectively, what you're saying is that when you constrain fossil fuel production in some subnational region, effectively what you're doing is like a mini version of that.
Peter Erickson
That's completely right. And the logic of that has been consistent through all of my papers. But I think Hormuz and other events mean that this dynamic needs to be considered upfront. It needs to be daylighted in climate policy and in the fossil fuel supply-limiting community to grapple with, right? It is price. Price is the mechanism that causes a decrease in supply to lead to a reduction in consumption and a reduction in emissions, and that price has other effects that need to be considered.
Robinson Meyer
You'll see this idea that people will say, which is, "Look, to hit 1.5C, we need to have no new oil and gas fields." In fact, opening any new oil and gas fields or doing any kind of fossil fuel expansion is completely incompatible with a 1.5C world. is that claim supported by the literature?
Peter Erickson
Well, let's just say first, it is appealing, right? I mean, we are at the final moments of a carbon budget that would allow us to stay within 1.5C. And so therefore, it's appealing to have such simple rubrics. You know, no new fossil fuel projects are compatible. But the simplicity of that is also its real weakness, right?
I mean, if the carbon budget is so vanishingly small that no new fossil fuel projects are compatible with it, well, then nothing is compatible with it, right? Any individual ton of emissions could be the one that you point to and say, "Incompatible," right? And so really it puts the question back in my mind as to what is the effectiveness, what is the effect of any given policy that you're going to be looking at, and is that going to actually bring about the transition, help bring about the transition that we want?
And I think the idea that limiting supply or that specifically the new oil and gas fields are incompatible, like I don't think that really stands up very well in the literature. And I mean, there's like one or two papers that sort of claim that, but they don't — they have flaws.
Robinson Meyer
You mention, for instance, that one of the parts of the IPCC report that looks at, okay, how are we gonna meet these climate targets, of the 97 scenarios that preserve 1.5 C that they look at, and these are scenarios for the path of global energy development and the global energy system, fewer than half show declines in oil and gas demand rapid enough that no new oil and gas fields would be needed.
Even fewer of those that show, you know, 2 C, that show us hitting the 2 C target, show declines that are that rapid.
Peter Erickson
Yeah, just given that, to say that new oil and gas fields are incompatible with 1.5C requires a very narrow reading of the literature, meaning the science, meaning the IPCC. Or it requires saying, you know, those scenarios are a few years old now. We actually know more. You know, this newer scenarios would say that no new oil and gas fields are required. But even that requires that those pathways are feasible, right? Like the reason that the IEA, for example, comes to the logic that it does, that no new oil and gas fields are required is that they first say, they first find that oil demand would decline or would be able to decline this fast, and therefore we wouldn't, quote, need these new fields.
But they actually do not go and say that no-- that those new fields should be stopped. And they actually even explicitly say stopping new fields is not a tactic or a strategy that we think makes a lot of sense.
Robinson Meyer
In other words, the IEA wrote a scenario, and they said, "If you were to hit 1.5 C, if you wanted to do it, oil demand would have to decrease so fast that you wouldn't need new oil and gas fields. But by the way, we don't think that you should respond to this by trying to proactively shut down new oil and gas fields. We're just saying if you were to actually hit this target, then you wouldn't need these fields." And then that was kind of like that if-then statement was then, like, reversed to a then-if and said, "If you want to hit 1.5 C, then you should have no new fields.” But actually, the literature doesn't support that.
Peter Erickson
That logic is plainly wrong, you know? And the literature doesn't support it. So you can then go concoct the literature to try to support it, as some have done, but that doesn't make it right.
Robinson Meyer
It seems like you're making another argument in this paper, which is that the current arguments against limiting oil and— no new oil and gas have these analytical errors, but they also have political errors. And can you talk about the political errors, stipulating that we will never be able to analyze political errors as quantitatively and objectively as we can analyze analytical errors and economic errors?
Peter Erickson
I come at this from having experience working with, you know, Governor Jerry Brown's office or the Obama White House, and seeing how they think about this very real question. And I just think it is a really big ask to ask a politician, someone like Joe Manchin, to go against this sort of basic availability of fossil fuels and the basic community needs in their jurisdiction to make this bigger policy that would basically not necessarily be in the immediate near-term interests of their jurisdiction for very good reasons, right?
And so I just think the politics are much more complicated than this idea that we can develop an anti-fossil fuel norm or that we can, you know, shift the social license around fossil fuel companies in the way that leads to actual policy decisions by real people that face trade-offs in their jurisdictions in the United States.
And I think Joe Manchin is a great example of that. I mean, you know, he has been the most debated politician in the U.S. since the Inflation Reduction Act. But the fact that he had shot a gun at, a literal gun, at cap and trade previously in his ads, and that he got to a yes on this, you know, path-breaking legislation, I think was a huge triumph.
And the fact that he got so excoriated by anti-fossil fuel activists over it, and more to the point, not celebrated for what he actually did, I think misreads the politics of what an actual rural decision-maker in a resource-dependent community faces. And you can debate whether Joe Manchin really is that or whether he's more the face of capital, but the incentives are real.
Robinson Meyer
There's various ways I think about kind of the meso-scale of humanity's future. But one of the big ways is climate change. One of the big ways is these baseline assumptions that climate impacts are gonna be getting worse, and that at the same time, I would hope, and I am trying to advocate for policies that decarbonize the energy system over that timescale.
What can be hard is that those are our interests, yours and mine, and voters don't care. Voters don't care at all. That's not how they see the future at all. They care primarily about cheap energy. They care about the environment. They would like to see something done about climate change, but it is not a fundamental part of their worldview in the same way that it's a part of my worldview or your worldview.
And that can make it very hard, I think, for you— for people like us — to reason about it and to make arguments about it, and to say relatively common-sense things like it is a big deal that Joe Manchin, who came from a state whose economy is dominated by fossil fuels, was willing to be the yes vote on so many important parts of climate policy. Because people can point to all the bad things that he was doing that I don't think he should've been doing about climate policy. But guess what? If I was Joe Manchin, then I wouldn't have won that Senate seat because my politics aren't Joe M— You know, someone with my politics would not have won the Senate seat that…
Peter Erickson
You wouldn't have gotten in that position, and Joe Manchin was in that position. And the material interests, regardless of how he was fracturing those through his own holdings or whatever, the material interests led him to be, for very good reasons, led him to be skeptical of climate policy, and yet he got to a deal. And, you know, I don't think that many of the things he said were all that unreasonable. I don't think his advocacy for the Mountain Valley Pipeline was all that unreasonable. And—
Robinson Meyer
Well, this is the crazy thing. If environmental advocates had taken Joe Manchin's permitting reform, we wouldn't be talking about the package we're talking about right now.
Peter Erickson
That's exactly right. I mean, there's a way to look at this where Joe Manchin got massively sold out because he didn't get what he wanted. And this — I'm not saying any of this to excuse the bad parts about Joe Manchin or say that we should have taken his exact deal, but, like, it was a deal, was it not?
And the Mountain Valley Pipeline as a flashpoint for emission... I mean, I have a lot to say about the Mountain Valley Pipeline and the emissions consequences of that, that go behind the scenes in ways maybe we shouldn't get to. But, you know, there was a major group that came out and said, "Our number one climate priority is stopping the Mountain Valley Pipeline." And that same group had a consultant, that was me, who was looking at the emissions consequences of the Mountain Valley Pipeline, which were very, very small. So if you want to talk about the epistemic environment and how climate analysis of emissions connects to, you know, the statements of major environmental organizations, there's a pretty good case study of mine.
Robinson Meyer
I think that there's another piece of this that we've already kind of touched on, but that I think is worth just hitting on one more time as we leave this paper and then talk about permitting reform, talk about future climate policy. The analysis behind no new oil and gas are dubious, and it can lead people to take political stances that they don't need to take and prevent compromises from happening that would ultimately be helpful for decarbonization.
You describe going back and looking at Severin Borenstein's math. and that what he said at the time was true, which is that if you constrain fossil fuel development, you're basically engineering a massive transfer of wealth from fossil fuel consumers to fossil fuel producers. Just not the particular producer whose production you're constraining at that moment. Probably. I mean, if it's Chevron or Exxon, guess what? They have a lot of other assets in the world. And by the way, there's another whole story here, too, which is that throughout most of the history of the oil market, the key question was how would you constrain supply, not how would you increase demand. And for this reason, cartels continually emerge in the history of the global oil market to constrain the global oil market.
What you find in this paper is that if you, say, do withhold production, if you do constrain production, this transfer of wealth from consumers to producers is, like, not small. Not only is it not small, it is bigger than the scale of the barrel you have kept off the market. So you write, "For each $70 barrel of oil," of course, now it would be $90, but setting that aside — "For each $70 barrel of oil left undeveloped as a result of production-limiting policy, between about 60 and $350 are transferred from global oil consumers to producers. The enrichment of oil producers is greater than the revenue denied the company no longer able to develop its oil assets."
And so if you keep oil off the market, you're actually engineering more than the value of that oil going to the global fossil fuel capital stack.
Peter Erickson
Yeah. That's right. And given what we know right now, I mean, I did also point to a few special cases, you know, certain combinations of elasticities where that would not be the case, right? You know, if we really were on a very rapid transition down in energy demand, then we would be at a place where oil producers would be much more competitive, right?
And the increase in price as a result of any additional barrel pulled off the market would be so low that the sign of that would flip. And, you know, some people I've talked to in response to this paper said, "Well, Isn't it plausible that we're on that path? Aren't we winning the war against oil demand?" And they point to, you know, rates of electric vehicle purchases in Brazil or China or wherever. And I say, "I mean, that's fine. That is maybe — maybe we are on that path." But like people have been telling us we're at peak oil demand for a long time now, right? We are probably at more of a plateau in oil demand. And until we see really good signs that oil demand has peaked and is going down, I think economics and the politics of limiting supply are not as strong as many advocates would like.
Robinson Meyer
All of this now brings us to today, where, in a concrete way, there's a bill in Congress that would include some concessions for fossil fuel companies and also include a lot of concessions and incentives and things that clean energy companies want. It would make it easier, much easier to build clean and I wanna talk about that bill.
This is not the first time this has happened since 2020, where there is a piece of legislation or a piece of policy on the table that would make it easier for oil companies in some ways and make it easier for clean energy companies in a lot of other ways. Where does this leave you? How are you thinking about these issues in a broad way today? What are you thinking about climate policy today?
Peter Erickson
It's a tough place for climate policy qua climate policy, right? And I think there is reason to be really hopeful about the pace of renewables, you know, as we've seen costs coming down, et cetera. But there's a difference between a rapidly accelerating industry, a low-carbon energy industry, and one that we know can keep going at the pace that we need it to ultimately displace fossil fuels, right?
Some people talk about this in terms of increasing returns to scale or, you know, S-curve type dynamics, where there's sort of a line out there among climate and energy policy folks that like, "Oh, you know, we've finally gotten somewhere. Renewables are finally up the S-curve. They are winning. They are going fast." And I think while that is true and that is hopeful, that speed and the continuation of that is not guaranteed at all, right? There's a paper that came out this summer from a group of social scientists in Europe that looked at past energy transitions, like in individual countries, and what they found is, like, how far the S-curve goes before it plateaus and flattens out is really also a function of policy. And you need the policies that allow that speed to keep going. You need the grid integration. You need the permitting reform, even, to let that industry keep growing up into something that can really take on fossil fuels.
So, I think this is a bill that comes at a very important time.
Robinson Meyer
I think where this conversation started, right, actually why it started, in some ways why you and I started talking about this topic and about permitting reform was you said in your carbon lock-in paper you wished you had emphasized things a little differently. And that you'd wish you'd emphasized them differently 'cause they're ideas that are as important now as they were then. So what do you wish you had done differently in that paper that to some degree started all of this off, you know…
Peter Erickson
I think that assessing carbon lock-in paper from 2015 was really good, and it's been cited a whole —
Robinson Meyer
It's great. Yes, it's great. I wanna…
Peter Erickson
But it was in a policy environment where carbon lock-in was much on the people's minds, and we framed the analysis as, you know, you need to not keep making carbon lock-in worse.
But all of the math and the analysis that we did and put into that could just as easily have supported a different take, and it still can support a different take. And that take is that the best way to unseat carbon lock-in, based on our same math and our same findings and all of the literature, is to grow what can beat it, grow low-carbon energy as fast as you can and for as long as you can.
And let me try to crystallize that in terms of one of the pieces of analysis that we did then. As I mentioned, we looked at a whole bunch of different ways to look at carbon lock-in, right? What is carbon lock-in, and how do you unseat it? And one of the things we looked at is we developed this ratio that would say you give a unit of help to both the fossil fuel industry and its obvious replacement in clean energy.
We developed this ratio: say you give the same unit of help, who benefits more? And so we looked at, for example, gas power versus either wind or solar. And if you give those two the same unit of help, the renewables are gonna benefit two to three times more from that same benefit of help as would the gas power plant.
And the reason for that is economics in part, but it extends beyond economics too, right? Because we've heard that these renewables can compete on cost, and so that's sort of the price and economics reason. You know, you're moving them up the S-curve of technology deployment.
But there's a whole set of other conditions that go around that, that allow that speed to be maybe accelerated or allow that speed to be maintained, and that is the institutions that sit around these insurgent industries that the incumbents already have and that the insurgents don't really. So these are things like the trade associations that have enough members and are big enough to actually do things on the ground.
These are things like the fact that there are enough people that work in this industry that you know them in your community, and maybe you go to the bar together, and then maybe you have a softball team, and then maybe, you know, the whole community comes and rallies around your softball team. And all of a sudden, you are a going concern culturally and politically.
And those extra factors are really important in how far an industry can go and how quickly it can scale in the long term. And so that is what we were trying to capture with that dynamic, with that ratio of a unit of help to fossil versus clean benefits clean like two to three times more than it does the fossil.
Robinson Meyer
Where does that shake out for permitting reform?
Peter Erickson
Well, where permitting reform shakes out, you know, there are so many provisions in the bill, but on the fundamentals, I think what that means for permitting reform is that the renewable industry really does need this. This is a critical time to help the renewable industry keep its pace of growth.
This is gonna be a cheesy metaphor, right? But when we're talking about the power of the fossil fuel industry, like it's sometimes talked about as David and Goliath, right? And I'm sure that there were all kinds of lawsuits to try to take Goliath's sword away, and I'm sure there were all kinds of comms campaigns to move the Overton window about just how bad Goliath was, right? But like, if some upstart who's been working with their slingshot to throw things really fast, and they've got five smooth stones, and they've practiced on all the lions and the bears out there, let's have that upstart get a shot.
Robinson Meyer
What would you need to see in the permitting ... and you haven't looked at it. I mean, you're not a U.S. senator. It's not your job to say whether it's a good deal or not. But if you were, or just like what would you need to see to make you think the permitting deal or compromises like it are worth it, versus what would make you think that it's not worth it?
Peter Erickson
I care a lot about climate change. I am a climate policy analyst. I look at bills for my whole career and policy from the perspective of, does this thing dramatically reduce emissions or not? You know, is the upside better and substantially better than the downside? So that is the lens that I would look at, that I am looking at it.
I am a quantitative analyst. I like to see the numbers. There's lots of opinions being weighed on this that are hard to weigh without some analysis. So I think those are forthcoming. I have reasonable, you know, confidence that those are forthcoming. So I'm on the sidelines waiting to look at that, and that is the yardstick that I will use.
Robinson Meyer
Well that is great, and when they come out we'll have to talk about them. This has been a great conversation. Peter Erickson, thank you so much for joining us on Shift Key.
Peter Erickson
Thank you, Rob. Was really fun.
Rob talks with Peter Erickson, an affiliated researcher at the Stockholm Environment Institute
No researcher has been more cited in lawsuits against fossil fuel infrastructure than Peter Erickson. As an affiliated researcher at the Stockholm Environment Institute, Peter studies how pipelines and other oil and gas supply expansions can increase global carbon emissions. His work has been critical to the activist fights against the Keystone XL pipeline, the Enbridge pipeline, and others.
But in recent years, he’s taken a more nuanced approach to fossil fuel supply — in part because, as he has shown, it can enrich the oil and gas industry in a surprising but direct way. On this episode of Shift Key, Peter joins Rob to discuss why blocking fossil fuel supply can lower emissions, why it can counterintuitively transfer wealth from energy consumers to fossil fuel firms, and what it all might mean for the future of climate policy.
Shift Key is hosted by Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News.
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Here is an excerpt from their conversation:
Robinson Meyer: So first of all, let's talk about this finding that you've already previewed, which is that when you restrain fossil fuel supply, you might be able to keep those barrels off the market. But what you are doing is engineering a massive shift of wealth to the existing fossil fuel industry. I know you've already described it a little, but just why is that?
Peter Erickson: Yeah, the reason for that is because when you constrain supply and constrain supply outlooks, you are causing an increase in price, and that is what is needed to bring on the other new projects. And that increase in price and price outlooks is what causes consumers and all of the institutions that surround consumers, the car industries, et cetera, to reduce their oil consumption.
But that increase in price applies to every single producer in the whole world, right? You've penalized one producer or one whole region of the world by saying, "You can't produce oil here," but the price increase applies globally, and all producers see that. And all consumers see that. And when those economics balance out, and a new equilibrium is found, the consumers are paying for that price increase and giving the money to the producers.
And you can do straight-ahead math on that to give a first-order estimate of what happens.
Robinson Meyer: And you cite a recent example that everyone just saw, that we've been talking about on this show, which is in early 2026, Iran, following the US-Israeli war starting, closed the Strait of Hormuz. The price for oil and refined products spiked everywhere around the world. That increased fuel costs for consumers, and it increased profits for producers. It was quite mechanical, and we all saw it happen. And effectively what you're saying is that when you constrain fossil fuel production in some subnational region, effectively what you're doing is like a mini version of that.
Peter Erickson: That's completely right. And the logic of that has been consistent through all of my papers. But I think Hormuz and other events mean that this dynamic needs to be considered upfront. It needs to be daylighted in climate policy and in the fossil-fuel-supply-limiting community to grapple with. Price is the mechanism that causes a decrease in supply to lead to a reduction in consumption and a reduction in emissions, and that price has other effects that need to be considered.
You can find a full transcript of the episode here.
Mentioned:
Peter’s papers:
"Impact of the Keystone XL pipeline on global oil markets and greenhouse gas emissions"
"Limiting fossil fuel production as the next big step in climate policy"
"Rethinking the case against new oil and gas fields"
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