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A conversation with former congressman Bob Inglis.

Bob Inglis was snorkeling in Australia’s Great Barrier reef in 2008 when he had what he called “an epiphany.’’
The then-Republican congressman from a very conservative district in South Carolina had scoffed at climate change throughout his two terms in the House, but his certainty had begun to give way four years earlier when his son told him, upon turning 18, that he needed to “clean up his act on the environment.’’
The comment stung. Inglis was still thinking about it in 2008 during a congressional trip to Antarctica, where he saw researchers extract ice cores that showed steadily rising levels of carbon dioxide since the Industrial Age began. His belief that climate change was a hoax began to weaken.
It was on another fact-finding trip that Inglis toured the Great Barrier Reef. Alongside the Australian oceanographer Scott Heron, he saw that the once-colorful reef was being bleached and killed by warmer, more acidic waters. It was visible proof of the destructive power of climate change.
Heron, a fellow Christian, talked about the need to save the reef and the planet with such passion, Inglis said, that “I could see that he was worshipping God in what he was showing me. My metamorphosis was complete. I decided that I was ready to act.’’
The next year, Inglis co-sponsored legislation to impose a tax on carbon emissions. That “heresy’’ did not go over well in his district, and he was crushed in the 2010 primary, 71% to 29%. (The bill, meanwhile, never made it out of committee.) “I knew that I was making the right choice,’’ he said. “It’s a choice that I’d make again.’’
His newfound commitment to addressing climate change led him to launch a nonprofit group, RepublicEn, devoted to bringing conservatives into the climate conversation. Today, Inglis tours the country, doing about 100 events a year at conservative groups such as College Republicans, Rotary Clubs, hunting and fishing clubs, and local GOP organizations.
The following interview has been edited for length and clarity.
You’ve talked about how, as a Republican congressman, you refused to accept climate change because the issue was associated with Al Gore, a Democrat. Do you think that what political scientists call “negative partisanship’’ is a major reason why conservatives still resist action on climate change?
Yes, it is. That’s why we need credible messengers who can speak the language of the tribe and who can make the tribe believe that conservative ideas can add something to this conversation. Conservatives have an undeserved inferiority complex on climate and energy. We understand the concepts of negative externalities and market distortion and accountability. Free enterprise — accountable free enterprise — can fix climate change.
You are referring to the libertarian concept of negative externalities, actions that negatively affect other people. Can you explain how it relates to carbon emissions?
When you burn fossil fuels, you’re basically dumping trash into the sky. You don’t pay a tipping fee for putting carbon waste into the atmosphere and contributing to climate change, so there is an implicit subsidy for burning these fuels and belching carbon — in fact, it’s the granddaddy of all energy subsidies.
Take that subsidy away and everything changes. Virtually all coal would be quickly replaced with natural gas and wind and solar and other methods. If you use a tax to set the real price of carbon, the free market will figure out cheaper and better ways to produce electricity. Things will start happening faster. You’ll see more development of hydrogen and better batteries that don’t use lithium to store the energy created by solar and wind. Climate change is an economic problem. Just fix the economics and innovation will happen. That’s the language of conservatism, and it’s how I talk to conservatives about it.
Why do you believe a carbon tax is the best way to bring Republicans aboard?
It is still the most obvious way to solve climate change, and the most efficient. This is an idea that goes back to Milton Friedman in the 1980s, when he said, instead of trying to regulate polluters, tax pollution. Make them pay for their negative externalities. You tax the trash they dump into the sky, just the way we impose a cost for dumping trash on land. It has to be a substantial tax, and it has to be steadily rising to increase incentives to find other forms of energy that don’t turn the sky into a dump for emissions. If you do that, you don’t need tax incentives for solar and wind — the rising cost of fossil fuels will provide all the incentives they need. But you also need to make this tax apply to other nations and the goods they import into the U.S.
How do you do that?
You can put a tax on the carbon produced in goods imported from China. Sen. Bill Cassidy [R-Louisiana] recently proposed a foreign pollution tax like the carbon border adjustment mechanism the European Union has already adopted. We very much welcome this idea because it’s a way of making the transition away from fossil fuels worldwide. Many Republicans say it’s not fair if the U.S. lowers emissions while China can do what it wants. The beauty of a foreign pollution fee is that it addresses this problem in an efficient way. It creates economic incentives for China to reduce its own emissions.
A carbon tax has been talked about for a long time but has gone nowhere in Congress. Do you see any evidence that it’s more politically palatable today?
I think a carbon tax is like the rescue of the banks after the financial crisis in 2008. Until the banks collapsed, bailing out the U.S. financial system seemed impossible. But when the consequences of not doing it became clear, the bailout went from impossible to inevitable without passing through probable.
Several catalyzing events could propel the carbon tax forward. The most likely is the momentum created by the European border adjustment mechanism, which is really a carbon tariff. Companies in the U.S. who deal with Europe are going to be calling their members of Congress and Senators and saying, wouldn’t you really rather collect that revenue for carbon emissions here at home through a carbon tax rather than sending the money to Europe? At some point, the light will go on at the U.S. Capitol — wow, the Europeans are getting a lot of revenue with a tariff on carbon, and we could do that, too. We could do that to China. We could say, the stuff you are selling here, you have to pay a carbon tariff.
Another momentum-maker is our federal debt. If interest rates stay high, interest will really start eating more and more of the federal budget. I have always said that a carbon tax should be revenue neutral, but given what’s happening to the deficit, it could also provide that revenue. Necessity may force Congress to turn to what used to seem impossible.
Could extreme weather provide another incentive?
Yes, there could be some catalyzing climate event that really focuses the mind. I don’t know what it will be. During the civil rights movement, when Americans saw segregated cities turn the police dogs and fire hoses on protestors, it really turned the tide on Jim Crow. We’ve had so much extreme weather that people are getting desensitized to it, but there still might be a catastrophic event that changes people’s priorities.
This year, we’ve already seen some of the most extreme weather and weather-related disasters in recent human history — massive wildfires that darkened skies across the country, relentless heat waves, fierce storms, and destructive flooding. Do you see evidence that this is registering with conservatives?
A lot of people won’t change their minds because of what a scientist says. But experience is different. Experience is a harsh teacher. You can’t argue with the thermometer. You can’t argue with the yardstick showing that sea is rising. You can’t argue with the water coming into your home. In 2010, when I was getting tossed out of Congress, there was a lot of aggressive disbelief in climate change. People told me, I don’t believe in climate change, and you shouldn’t, either.
Right now, it’s quite different. Conservatives say to me, sure, you can switch to clean energy here, but what difference does it make if you don’t get the rest of the world in on this? Why should we do this alone? That’s when I talk about negative externalities and a carbon tax, and imposing a carbon tariff on China and other countries. That changes their perspective.
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What do you say to The Wall Street Journal conservatives who concede that climate change is occurring but insist that it’s less disruptive and cheaper to invest in adaptation to a hotter, more extreme climate?
Adaptation is a defeatist argument. Good luck building a seawall in Miami-Dade, for example. As sea levels rise, the water there is coming up into streets through the porous bedrock under that area. In South Carolina, go to coastal areas and you’ll see the big stands of pine trees dying because of salt water intrusion. In Montana, the forests are now filled with dead and dying trees because bark beetles that used to die in the winter now survive and go on attacking the trees year-round.
Adaptation won’t work in many places where people are going to lose what they love. It won’t work in New England when maple trees no longer produce maple sap for syrup because the winters are too warm. It won’t work at ski resorts that no longer have snow. When you stop arguing and pay attention to what you’re losing, you start saying, wow, how do we fix this?
Polls show there is still a big partisan divide on climate change. Do you think that can change?
The problem is no longer a lack of information. People can see what is happening. The problem is a lack of validation, and it’s a lack of hope. We need validation from conservative leaders that climate change is obviously real, and that we obviously need to do something about it. And we need to show conservatives that the free enterprise system can provide solutions once we get the true cost of carbon right.
If you keep telling people about all the terrible things happening and that we’re all hosed, it’s depressing. It makes people say, I don’t want to work with you. But if you can come to conservatives and say, we can light the world with new energy sources, and we can have more energy and more freedom and more manufacturing and more jobs — we can have a better world if we act on this. We can have true energy independence, so we don’t need to depend on energy from authoritarian regimes who chop journalists up into pieces. I’d like to be free of those people. I’d like to able to say to the Saudis, we don’t need your oil. Why don’t you see if you can drink that stuff?
The current Republican presidential field is not validating that climate change needs to be addressed.
In the first debate Nikki Haley did say climate change is real, but immediately pivoted to talking about how China and India have to lower their emissions, too. That’s a step forward, but it’s not enough. In 2018, when Republicans lost the House, it dawned on then-Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy and some other Republicans that you can’t win suburban swing districts with a retro position on climate change. So McCarthy convened a special Republican conference on climate, and the takeaway was, we need to get with it.
Polling data shows a majority of young conservatives and young evangelicals want action on climate change, and if you want to win in 2024, 2028, and 2032, you need to have a plan that you can talk about. But then Trump decided to run again, and he’s doubling down on climate disputation, and everyone in the party is afraid of the Death Angel. Trump can’t get anyone elected, but if he comes after you, he can get you killed in a primary.
But even if Trump wins, he will be a lame duck by 2026, and then the party is going to ask, where do we go next? My prediction at that point is that Republicans will be tired of reruns of the Trump show and will want a fresh approach that can win over young voters and suburban voters. And if he loses in 2024, that’s when you’ll have the reevaluation.
You’ve said of climate change, “We’re all in this together.’’ That sounds progressive — maybe even vaguely socialistic. Does that message resonate with conservatives who are suspicious of collective action?
[Laughs.] Maybe I should examine that statement more closely. But as a person of faith, I think it is just obvious we are literally in this fight together.
I think you can summon all Americans to a higher cause. I think if we can assure conservatives, I’m not trying to cancel you, and you have ideas to contribute to this discussion about the power of economic incentives, free enterprise, and innovation. You have to make conservatives feel that they have something important to contribute.
You have to make them feel they have something to gain from the solutions. If you the United States makes a bold move on carbon taxes and tells China and other nations, you have to pay a carbon tariff on the stuff you export to us, then it becomes an international effort to curtail emissions. Then conservatives start saying, we’re really talking about realistic and fair solutions. That’s when you can say, we need to take action because we do not want to lose this amazingly beautiful planet. That’s when you can say to them, we’re really all in this together.
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On a $6 billion EV write-down, a disappointing bullet train, and talks on a major mining merger
Current conditions: Nearly all of Australia is under a heat warning as wildfires continue to burn • 65,000 properties in the United Kingdom lose power due to Storm Goretti • Two tornadoes ripped through Oklahoma on Thursday, the first in the U.S. in 2026.
After writing a memo last year that shook up the climate community with its call for a pragmatic “pivot,” Microsoft founder and philanthropist Bill Gates published another missive Friday morning laying out his ideas on global problems — and their solutions. The bulk of his “The Year Ahead: Optimism with Footnotes” letter touches on his primary philanthropic concern, global public health, and he laments that “the world went backwards last year on a key metric of progress: the number of deaths of children under 5 years old.” Across both public health and climate change, he maintains his characteristic optimism about innovation (now, innovation buoyed by artificial intelligence), but says that “my optimism comes with footnotes.”
On climate change specifically, Gates hails “meaningful progress” in the past 10 years in cutting projected emissions, but returns to his mantra of technological advancements to decarbonize hard-to-abate sectors and bring down the cost of green technology. “We still have a lot of innovation and scaling up to do in tough areas like industrial emissions and aviation. Government policies in rich countries are still critical because unless innovations reach scale, the costs won’t come down and we won’t achieve the impact we need,” Gates says. As for his philanthropy, he writes that “I will be investing and giving more than ever to climate work in the years ahead while also continuing to give more to children’s health, the foundation’s top priority.”
Glencore and Rio Tinto, two of the world’s largest mining companies, are considering a merger, Bloomberg News reported Thursday. If Rio Tinto were to buy Glencore, they would form a $200 billion mining giant. While the two mine and trade a number of commodities, they are both big players in copper, a key metal for electrification and decarbonization because of its use in electrical equipment. Glencore is also a major producer of coal, a business Rio Tinto has exited. People familiar with the merger talks told Bloomberg that Rio Tinto would be “open to retaining Glencore’s coal business if talks are successful,” however.
General Motors said in a regulatory filing that it expects to “record charges of approximately $6.0 billion” related to downsizing its electric vehicle business. The company cited “the termination of certain consumer tax incentives and the reduction in the stringency of emissions regulations,” which caused “industry-wide consumer demand for EVs in North America … to slow in 2025.” The filing is a marked change from October, when the company predicted a $1.6 billion charge. which Heatmap contributor Andrew Moseman attributed at the time to “chaos” induced by the Trump administration.
GM has been reducing its EV and battery commitments in the United States of late, including by transitioning an EV manufacturing facility to producing internal combustion pickup trucks and selling its stake in a battery cell joint venture. GM said in its regulatory filing that the $6 billion worth of charges “include non-cash impairments and other non-cash charges of approximately $1.8 billion as well as supplier commercial settlements, contract cancellation fees, and other charges of approximately $4.2 billion.” In other words, it's writing down the value of investments made in manufacturing capacity it won’t need and making payments to suppliers who had invested as well. It also said it expects “to recognize additional material cash and non-cash charges in 2026 related to continued commercial negotiations with our supply base” and that “proposed regulatory changes to the greenhouse gas emission standards could result in an impairment of our emissions credits.”

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Tom Cotton, the Arkansas Republican Senator, introduced a new data center proposal on Thursday called the DATA Act. Like many government officials at the state, local, and federal levels, Cotton is aiming to balance support for data center development with protections for consumers on electricity costs. Cotton’s bill goes beyond previous proposals to promote “behind the meter” generation and would seek to foster generation that served specific customers with a setup known as a“consumer-regulated electric utility” — i.e. not a public utility.
These CREUs would exist “exclusively for the purpose of serving new electric loads that were not previously served by any retail electricity supplier” — in other words, a new electric system for new demand. These systems would operate outside of regulatory requirements for public utilities, as long as they’re “physically islanded” from the existing electric grid. “American dominance in artificial intelligence and other crucial emerging industries should not come at the expense of Arkansans paying higher energy costs,” Cotton wrote on X.
Stellantis, the parent company of Jeep and Chrysler, is ceasing production of all its brands’ plug-in hybrid models. These include the Wrangler 4xe, which Moseman described as the company’s “signature electrified effort so far.”
Stellantis confirmed the news to industry publication The Drive, telling the outlet: “With customer demand shifting, Stellantis will phase out plug‑in hybrid (PHEV) programs in North America beginning with the 2026 model year, and focus on more competitive electrified solutions, including hybrid and range‑extended vehicles where they best meet customer needs.”
“I debated whether or not to include this in my comments,” California Governor Gavin Newsom said in his final State of the State address before discussing the progress being made on California’s troubled high-speed rail project. The project is due to start running — albeit only from Bakersfield to Modesto — in 2033. The estimated cost to complete the full Los Angeles-to-San Francisco line is now some $128 billion, compared to the $33 billion targeted in 2020.
Two international law experts on whether the president can really just yank the U.S. from the United Nations’ overarching climate treaty.
When the Trump administration moved on Wednesday to withdraw the U.S. from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, we were left to wonder — not for the first time — can he really do that?
The UNFCCC is the umbrella organization governing UN-organized climate diplomacy, including the annual climate summit known as the Conference of the Parties and the 2015 Paris Agreement. The U.S. has been in and out and back into the Paris Agreement over the years, and was most recently taken out again by a January 2025 executive order from President Trump. The U.S. has never before attempted to exit the UNFCCC — which, unlike the Paris Agreement, it joined with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Whether or not a president can unilaterally remove the U.S. from a Senate-approved treaty is somewhat uncharted legal territory. As University of Pennsylvania constitutional law professor Jean Galbraith told me, “This is an issue on which the text of the constitution is silent — it tells you how to make a treaty, but it doesn’t tell you anything about how to unmake a treaty.” Even if a president can simply withdraw from a treaty, there’s still the question of what happens next. Could a future president simply rejoin the UFCCC? Or would they again need to seek the advice and consent of the Senate, which would require getting 67 senators to agree that international climate diplomacy is a worthy enterprise? And what does all of this mean for the future of the Paris Agreement? Is the U.S. locked out for good?
In an attempt to wrap my head around these questions, I spoke to both Galbraith and Sue Biniaz, a lecturer at Yale School of the Environment and a former lead climate lawyer at the State Department who worked on both the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC. Biniaz and Galbraith were part of a 2018 symposium on the question of treaty withdrawal that was prompted, in part, by Trump’s first attempt to remove the U.S. from the Paris Agreement, during his first term in the White House. Those conversations led Galbraith to consider the question of rejoining treaties in a 2020 Virginia Law Review article. Suffice it for now to say that both questions are complicated, but we dig into the answers to both and more in our conversation below.
Interviews have been edited for length and clarity.
At the most basic level, what are the constitutional questions at play in an executive withdrawal from the UNFCCC?
Galbraith: Typically, the U.S. president needs to think about both international law and domestic law. And as a matter of international law, there is a withdrawal provision in the UNFCCC that says you can withdraw after you’ve been in it for a few years, after one year of notice. Assuming they give their notice of withdrawal and wait a year, this is an issue on which the text of the constitution is silent — it tells you how to make a treaty, but it doesn’t tell you anything about how to unmake a treaty.
And we have no definitive answer from the courts. The closest they got to deciding that was in a case called Goldwater v. Carter, which was when President Carter terminated the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. That was litigated, and the Supreme Court ducked — four justices said this is a political question that we’re not going to resolve, and one justice said this case is not ripe for resolution because I don’t know whether or not Congress likes the withdrawal. There was no majority opinion, and there was no ruling on the merit for the constitutional question.
Presidents have exercised the authority to withdraw the United States from various international agreements. So in practice, it happens. The constitutionality has not been finally settled.
Both Trump administrations have removed the U.S. from the Paris Agreement, but the Paris Agreement was not a Senate-ratified treaty, whereas the UNFCCC is. How does that change things?
Galbraith: The text of the constitution only clearly spells out one way to make an international treaty, in the treaty clause [of Article II]. When you make an Article II treaty, it’s signed by the president and secretary of state. It goes over to the Senate; the Senate provides advice and consent — the U.S. is still not in it. At that point, the president has to take a final act of ratifying the treaty, which means depositing the instrument of ratification with the international depository, and that’s the moment you’re in. And it’s perfectly permissible for a president after the Senate has given advice and consent not to ratify a treaty, or to leave those resolutions of advice and consent for years and then go ahead and ratify.
In practice, you have all these kinds of other ways of making [a treaty]. You have what happened with the Paris Agreement, where the president does it largely on their own authority, but maybe pointing to pre-existing facts of, say, the UNFCCC’s existence. You have some international agreements that have been negotiated, then taken to Congress rather than to the Senate. Sometimes you have Congress pass a law that says, Please make this kind of agreement. So you have a lot of different pathways to making them. And I think there is a story in which the pathway to making them should be significant in thinking about, what is the legitimate, constitutional way for exiting them?
To me, it’s pretty obvious that if you don’t get specific approval for an agreement in the first place, then you should be able to unilaterally withdraw, assuming you’re doing so consistent with international law. I think the concerns around the constitutionality of withdrawal are more significant for the UNFCCC than they are for the Paris Agreements. But there nonetheless is this fairly strong body of practice in which presidents have viewed themselves as authorized to withdraw without needing to go to Congress or the Senate.
Biniaz: The Senate doesn’t ratify. It sounds like a detail, but the Senate basically authorizes the president to ratify — they give their advice and consent. And that’s important because it’s not the Senate that decides whether we join an agreement. They authorize the president, the president does not have to join. And that becomes relevant when we talk about withdrawing and rejoining.
We did not address, when we sent up the framework convention, whether it was legally necessary to send it to the Senate. But we sent it in any event, and it was approved basically unanimously by the full Senate back in 1992. With respect to the Paris Agreement, there are a lot of different considerations when you’re trying to figure out whether something needs to go to the Senate or not, but the fact that we already had a Senate-approved convention changed the legal calculus as to whether this Paris Agreement needed to go to the Senate. And then when the Paris Agreement ended up essentially elaborating the convention and the targets were not legally binding, we decided we could do it as an executive agreement. There was some quibbling in some quarters — more from a political point of view than a legal point of view — but I didn’t hear any objection from a legal point of view.
Now, in terms of withdrawing from an agreement, whether or not an agreement has been approved by the Senate, my view would be: The president can withdraw unilaterally. That is the mainstream view. It’s certainly the view that the president can withdraw unilaterally from an agreement that didn’t even go to Congress, like the Paris Agreement. And in part, that’s for the reasons that I mentioned. The Senate is not deciding to join the agreement — they’re authorizing, but it’s up to the president whether to actually join, and the president does that unilaterally. And then the mirror image of that would be he or she can withdraw unilaterally.
There’s a related legal question that has not been litigated, which is if Congress passes a law that says, Thou shalt not withdraw from a particular agreement, would that law be constitutional? Some would say no, because the president can withdraw, and so the Congress can’t fetter that right. So that’s like uncharted waters, but that’s not a live issue in this case.
Trump took the U.S. out of the Paris Agreement. Biden put the us back into the Paris Agreement. Trump then took us out of the Paris Agreement again, and is now withdrawing the U.S. from the umbrella organization of the Paris Agreement. I assume that would complicate the efforts of a future president to rejoin the Paris Agreement. Would it be possible for them to rejoin the framework convention? What would have to happen?
Galbraith: So first, the framework convention is the gateway to the Paris Agreement. There’s a provision in the Paris Agreement that says, in order to be in the Paris Agreement, you’ve got to be in the framework convention. And so as a matter of international law, in order to rejoin the Paris Agreement — at least unless it were dramatically amended, which is its own unlikely thing — you would need to be a member of the UNFCCC, which does mean that the question of how you rejoin the UNFCCC becomes significant. We have very little practice on any kind of rejoining. I myself think that the president could simply rejoin the UNFCCC by pointing back to the original Senate resolution of advice and consent to it. You could go back to the Senate. You could ask Congress for a resolution.
My own view is that if the president withdraws the U.S., well, they still have on the books this resolution in which the Senate has consented to ratification — they want to go back in, they go back in. I think this is pretty logically clear, but also an important constraint on presidential power. Because it’s a much more concerning increase in presidential power if you have to do all the work of getting two-thirds of the Senate, then any president can, just at the snap of their fingers, take you out, and you have to go all the way back to the beginning.
Biniaz: There are many options. One is a straightforward option: You go back to the Senate, get 67 votes. Another would be you get both houses of Congress to authorize it [on a majority vote basis]. Another would be — and there may be more — but another would be the idea that the original Senate resolution which we used in 1992 to join still exists, and nothing has extinguished it. And there the analogy would be to a regular law.
There’s several laws in the United States that authorized the president to join some kind of international body or institution. There’s a law that authorizes the president to join the International Labor Organization. There’s a law that authorized the president to join UNESCO. In both of those cases, the U.S. has been in and out and back in — and I think in one case, at least, back out. No one has batted an eye because, well, it’s a law. So the question there would be, is there any reason why a Senate resolution would be any different? Professor Galbraith explores in her law review article that exact question, and concludes that, no, there shouldn’t be a difference — I’m simplifying, but that’s the gist. And under that theory, yeah, a future president could rejoin the convention on his or her own, utilizing that authority, and then after having rejoined the convention, rejoin the Paris Agreement.
So you mentioned that there’s a provision in the UNFCCC that says you have to give notice that you’re exiting, and you wait a year, and then you exit. What does not waiting a year look like?
Galbraith: It can happen that an entity will announce its exit and then violate international law by violating the treaty terms during that one-year period. If there are, say, reporting obligations that the United States has, it would be a violation of international law not to meet those during the period while you’re still a party to the treaty.
This is obviously an escalation of Trump’s previous actions to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, in the sense that it cuts off the path to rejoining that. What does this tell us about the way the Trump administration views its position within global climate diplomacy, and also the international community, period?
Galbraith: It adds to the impression that we already see other contexts, which is that the second Trump administration is even less inhibited and climate-aware than the first administration was — which is really saying something, right? This is an escalation of a position that was already an international outlier. Every other country is in these things, and it shows a real, powerful, and deeply upsetting failure to address the crisis of the global commons.
Biniaz: The way I think about it is that, during Trump 1, it was more like there was an absence of a positive — so in other words, the administration continued to participate in negotiations. They were not pressing countries to take climate action, but neither were they pressing countries not to take climate action. This administration, you could think of it as not just the absence of a positive, but the presence of a negative. I don’t mean that in any judgmental sense. I just mean there’s been much more of an active push from the administration for others to sort of follow suit or to vote against climate-related agreements such as at the [International Maritime Organization]. That’s quite a difference between 1 and 2.
Going into this past year’s COP, it seemed like there was already a sense that international climate diplomacy was, if not dead, at least the wind had come out of the sails. Do you agree? And if so, do you think that wind will come back?
Biniaz: You have to think of international climate diplomacy very broadly. It’s not just the UNFCCC Paris Agreement and decisions that are taken by consensus. That was pretty thin gruel that came out of COP30. But if you think of international climate diplomacy more broadly as all kinds of initiatives, coalitions that are operating among subgroups of countries and at all levels of stakeholders, there’s really a lot going on in what people call the real world. I think over the next couple of years, the proportion of action that’s taken officially, by consensus, dips somewhat, and action goes up. And maybe that balance shifts over time. But I think it’s wrong to judge climate diplomacy simply by what was achievable by 197 countries, because that’s always going to be the hardest to achieve, with or without the United States.
I think it’s more difficult without a pro-climate U.S. because of the role the U.S. has historically played, in terms of promoting ambition and brokering compromises and that kind of thing. But I don’t think, if you only look at that, it’s not the right metric for judging all of global climate diplomacy.
On Venezuela’s oil, permitting reform, and New York’s nuclear plans
Current conditions: Cold temperatures continue in Europe, with thousands of flights canceled at Amsterdam Schiphol Airport, while Scotland braces for a winter storm • Northern New Mexico is anticipating up to a foot of snow • Australia continues to swelter in heat wave, with “catastrophic fire risk” in the state of Victoria.
The White House said in a memo released Wednesday that it would withdraw from more than 60 intergovernmental organizations, including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the international climate community’s governing organization for more than 30 years. After a review by the State Department, the president had determined that “it is contrary to the interests of the United States to remain a member of, participate in, or otherwise provide support” to the organizations listed. The withdrawal “marks a significant escalation of President Trump’s war on environmental diplomacy beyond what he waged in his first term,” Heatmap’s Robinson Meyer wrote Wednesday evening. Though Trump has pulled the United States out of the Paris Agreement (twice), he had so far refused to touch the long-tenured UNFCCC, a Senate-ratified pact from the early 1990s of which the U.S. was a founding member, which “has served as the institutional skeleton for all subsequent international climate diplomacy, including the Paris Agreement,” Meyer wrote.
Among the other organizations named in Trump’s memo was the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which produces periodic assessments on the state of climate science. The IPCC produced the influential 2018 report laying the intellectual foundations for the goal of limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.
More details are emerging on the Trump administration’s plan to control Venezuela’s oil assets. Trump posted Tuesday evening on Truth Social that the U.S. government would take over almost $3 billion worth of Venezuelan oil. On Wednesday, Secretary of Energy Chris Wright told a Goldman Sachs energy conference that “going forward we will sell the production that comes out of Venezuela into the marketplace.” A Department of Energy fact sheet laid out more information, including that “all proceeds from the sale of Venezuelan crude oil and oil products will first settle in U.S. controlled accounts,” and that “these funds will be disbursed for the benefit of the American people and the Venezuelan people at the discretion of the U.S. government.” The DOE also said the government would selectively lift some sanctions to enable the oil sales and transport and would authorize importation of oil field equipment.
As I wrote for Heatmap on Monday, sanctions are just one barrier to oil development among a handful that would have to be cleared for U.S. oil companies to begin exploiting Venezuela’s vast oil resources.
In a Senate floor speech, Senator Martin Heinrich of New Mexico blasted the Trump administration’s anti-renewables executive actions, saying that the U.S. is “facing an energy crisis of the Trump administration’s own making,” and that “the Trump administration is dismantling the permitting process that we use to build new energy projects and get cheaper electrons on the grid.” Heinrich, a Democrat, is the ranking member of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and a key player in any possible permitting reform bill. Though he said he supports permitting reform in principle, calling for “a system that can reliably get to a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’ on a permit in two to three years — not 10, not 17,” he said that “any permitting deal is going to have to guarantee that no administration of either party can weaponize the permitting process for cheap political points.” Heinrich called on Trump officials “to follow the law. They need to reverse their illegal stop work orders, and they need to start approving legally compliant energy projects.”
He did offer an olive branch to the Republican senators with whom he would have to negotiate on any permitting legislation, noting that “the challenge to doing permitting reform is not in this building,” specifying that Senators Mike Lee, chair of the ENR Committee, and Shelly Moore-Capito, chair of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, have not been barriers to a deal. Instead, he said, “it is this Administration that is poisoning the well.”

The climate science nonprofit Climate Central released an analysis Thursday morning ranking 2025 “as the third-highest year (after 2023 and 2024) for billion-dollar weather and climate disasters — with 23 such events causing 276 deaths and costing a total of $115 billion in damages,” according to a press release.
Going back to 1980, the average number of disasters costing $1 billion or more to clean up was nine, with an average total bill of $67.9 billion. The U.S. hit that average within the first weeks of last year with the Los Angeles wildfires, which alone were responsible for over $61 billion in damages, the most economically damaging wildfire on record.
The New York Power Authority announced Wednesday that 23 “potential developers or partners,” including heavyweights like NextEra and GE Hitachi and startups like The Nuclear Company and Terra Power, had responded to its requests for information on developing advanced nuclear projects in New York State. Eight upstate communities also responded as potential host sites for the projects.
New York Governor Kathy Hochul said last summer that New York’s state power agency would go to work on developing 1 gigawatt of nuclear capacity upstate. Late last year, Hochul signed an agreement with Ontario Premier Doug Ford to collaborate on nuclear technology. Ontario has been working on a small modular reactor at its existing Darlington nuclear site, across Lake Ontario from New York.
“Sunrise Wind has spent and committed billions of dollars in reliance upon, and has met the requests of, a thorough review process,” Orsted, the developer of the Sunrise Wind project off the coast of New York, said in a statement announcing that it was filing for a preliminary injunction against the suspension of its lease late last year.