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A conversation with Matt Weiner on the Fix Our Forests Act and why the Senate needs to take action — now.

After the Los Angeles County wildfires in January, it seemed like the federal government was finally poised to do something about the decades of flawed forestry practices and land management policies that have turned the West into a tinderbox. On January 23, before the L.A. fires were even fully extinguished, the House of Representatives passed the Fix Our Forests Act on a bipartisan 279–141 vote, queuing up a bill that proponents say would speed and simplify forest and wildfire management projects that have gotten bogged down in a regulatory morass.
Then … not much happened. Though Republican Senators John Curtis of Utah and Tim Sheehy of Montana teamed up with Democrats John Hickenlooper of Colorado and Alex Padilla of California to write their own version of the Fix Our Forests Act for the Senate, the bill stalled after a summer spent focused on the reconciliation bill. Meanwhile, more wildfires made headlines.
Matt Weiner, the founder and CEO of the nonprofit advocacy group Megafire Action, wants to bring some urgency back. This week, the organization launched a six-figure ad campaign in Washington, D.C., aimed at spurring senators to get back to working on wildfire resilience and forestry reform. Though the bill’s approach is divisive — the House version drew initial pushback from more than 100 environmental organizations, including the Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council, and League of Conservation Voters, for opening up large tracts of federal forest to logging, among other concerns — Weiner told me “there’s no huge substantive holdup in the Senate that is keeping it from getting to 60 votes.”
I caught up with Weiner this week to learn more about where things stand with the Fix Our Forests Act and talk through some of the bill’s more controversial regulatory rollbacks. Our conversation has been edited and condensed for clarity.
Catch our readers up: Why the Fix Our Forests Act, and why now?
We’re looking at a generational opportunity to change the way we do land management. This is the most significant change Congress has considered since the Healthy Forest Restoration Act, and maybe even since the original National Forest Act.
The smoke impacts of wildfires are killing more people than the flames. Wildfires are the most significant driver of PM 2.5 emissions growth in the country right now. The clean air community has done a fantastic job of reducing industrial emissions of PM 2.5, which has had real public health impacts, but those gains are in danger of vanishing because of the growth of wildfire smoke exposure.
Then there’s the climate. If you care about carbon emissions, this is a huge opportunity at a time when a lot of other climate issues seem to be on the backburner. The 2020 fire season in California — a particularly bad year — released enough carbon to undo 20 years of the state’s emissions reduction progress. The 2023 Canadian wildfires, if treated as a country, would have been the third-largest emitter in the world that year. And if you start thinking about Alaska and the Boreal burning in the way the West has been burning, it could potentially be game over for the climate. It’s important that people understand that this is an existential climate issue and that we have an opportunity to make progress in a bipartisan way.
You and I have chatted before — we first spoke about the Fix Our Forests Act almost a year ago, now. What’s happened in the past 12 months with the bill?
The bill passed the House right after the Los Angeles fires. The last time we spoke [in October 2024], the bill had passed the House in the previous Congress with a bipartisan margin. But this time, it got a much bigger bipartisan show of support: 64 Democrats and all the Republicans in the House.
The bill saw some changes and improvements to focus on the immediate needs in Los Angeles County [after the January 2025 fires] — things like improving the ability of a city like Los Angeles to gain access to Community Wildfire Defense Grant funding and improvements to the Wildfire Intelligence Center targeted at making sure it plays a role in helping local governments make decisions on where to place assets before a high risk event.
Then the bill went to the Senate, but instead of moving the House bill through, a group of senators came together to write a bipartisan version with some changes. Senator Curtis from Utah was the lead, along with Senators Padilla, Hickenlooper, and Sheehy. Their version included changes to the litigation section from the House bill, which had raised concerns among a lot of environmental organizations, as well as modifications to the permitting section. That earned the bill the support of more environmental organizations than the version from the House — they have the Nature Conservancy, the Environmental Defense Fund, the Audubon Society, and the National Wildlife Federation on board, as well as a lot of local organizations and wildfire groups like the Alliance for Wildfire Resilience.
But then a lot of the oxygen in the Senate was taken up by the reconciliation package. That put a pause on things through the August recess, and now they’re looking to hopefully mark up the bill during the October work period. We’re very optimistic about being able to get floor time. We think there’s a clear path to 60 votes in the Senate for this bill, and if there’s a good, constructive markup, it could be much more than that. There’s no substantive holdup as much as there is the ever-present fear of stasis and losing momentum. That’s why we launched an ad campaign with an eye toward building the urgency back up.
How did the ad campaign come together?
The idea was that this is a bipartisan issue, so where is the support? We didn’t need to launch a big persuasion campaign; we needed to highlight the absurdity of the fact that, eight months after Los Angeles, we still haven’t had any meaningful action from Congress. There is an opportunity before them that would make a big difference in wildfire policy writ large.
I’m interested in your focus on using “state-of-the-art science” and “new and innovative technologies” to address wildfires and forest health. What have you seen in this space that has made you excited?
The bill is about improving the planning and implementation of wildfire policy — especially mitigation work like treatment projects, but also in the built environment. A big cornerstone of that would be the creation of a new Wildfire Intelligence Center, which would use the most advanced technology to understand what our risk profile is on the ground across landscapes and jurisdictions. Right now, there is no one entity in government responsible for taking a comprehensive look at risk across landscapes, what we’re doing on the ground, and how that buys down risk.
At the same time, one of the things we’re negotiating is making sure that the Forest Service and the Department of Interior are positioned to work with some of the companies doing advanced modeling, detection, and tracking work — as opposed to having the government try to build its own clunky system. We’ve modeled it after successful efforts elsewhere in government, such as the Defense Innovation Unit and other Department of Defense and NASA programs that have been great at harnessing private sector innovation for government use. There’s also a new pilot program in the bill, in Section 303, that would create a pathway for the Forest Service to start identifying and piloting new technologies and give them a path to scale across the agency if they find that it helps them do the job better, faster, and cheaper.
The timber industry has collaborated with the Forest Service on fire suppression since the 1920s. In the decades since, “forest management” has at times been used as a euphemism for industry-friendly practices like tree thinning, which many ecologists say would allow invasive species and brush to flourish, and would actually worsen wildfires. How would cutting the red tape around “vegetation management activities” not be a handout to the timber industry?
We all know that the best tool for mitigation is good fire, prescribed fire, beneficial fire, and — where appropriate — managed fire, as well. Unfortunately, because we’ve taken fire out of these landscapes, forested landscapes in particular are so overgrown that you couldn’t introduce good fire even if you wanted to. So mechanical thinning has to be a part of this.
One of the tensions here is that the timber industry wants merchantable timber. They want the big trees, and in a lot of cases, those are the ones we want to keep in the ground with these projects. What we’re focused on is invasive species, overgrown areas, and dead trees from morbidity events like recent droughts so that we can reintroduce good fire at scale. If we all let it burn, like some have proposed, you’d end up with hundreds of thousands of acres of landscape burning at a time, like we saw in the [2021] Caldor fire, where nothing will grow back in a way we recognize for at least decades — and given climate change, maybe not ever.
It’s important to make sure that we don’t go back to the timber wars [of the 1980s and 1990s between environmentalists and loggers in the Pacific Northwest], but at the same time, we need to recognize that the biggest threat to our forests right now is catastrophic fire, not the timber industry. We want to deal with the threat at hand and make sure the pendulum that swung during the timber wars — for very good reason — against the timber industry comes back a little, but doesn’t swing too far in the wrong direction, either. The Senate bill strikes the right balance there.
A number of major environmental groups initially came out in opposition to the Fix Our Forests Act over numerous concerns, including that it erodes Endangered Species Act protections by exempting the Forest Service and BLM from the requirement to adjust land management policies as new information about how projects could affect threatened species arises. What is the other side of this tradeoff? How would limiting the consultation requirement advance the goal of reducing wildfires?
The biggest challenge right now is that, because of all of the regulatory hurdles, it can take upwards of a thousand days to get a project off the ground anywhere in the country. One great example of that is in the Angeles National Forest. They announced a fuel break maintenance strategy in 2020, but they were not able to get the requisite approvals until the start of December 2024. It took four years — and then the last of the permits that were most relevant to Altadena didn’t get approved until March, two months after the fire. There are very real consequences to this kind of delay, both for the environment and for human health and safety, that need to be taken into account.
If you take a step back and look at the bill, the main tool that it uses is not broad NEPA exemptions or writ-large changes in the law. It utilizes categorical exclusions, a method that has been used for energy projects in other areas and is increasingly sought after to advance targeted projects with public benefits.
One great example is the Tahoe categorical exclusion, on which a significant portion of this bill is based. It was a 10,000-acre CE created in 2016, which allowed for work that protected communities and ecosystems and got good fire on the ground. It’s work that directly saved South Lake Tahoe from the Caldor Fire. But one of the challenges right now is that the current level for CE is 3,000 acres, and when we’re talking about landscapes in forests that are hundreds of thousands of miles big and a fireshed that nationwide is 50 million acres, then 3,000 acres is not enough for it to be worth it for the Forest Service and Park Service and DOI officials to go through the CE process — which takes six months and is very rigorous.
But we also wanted to show restraint here for environmental purposes. We wanted to make sure that this was as targeted as it needed to be, and not overly expansive.
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In practice, direct lithium extraction doesn’t quite make sense, but 2026 could its critical year.
Lithium isn’t like most minerals.
Unlike other battery metals such as nickel, cobalt, and manganese, which are mined from hard-rock ores using drills and explosives, the majority of the world’s lithium resources are found in underground reservoirs of extremely salty water, known as brine. And while hard-rock mining does play a major role in lithium extraction — the majority of the world’s actual production still comes from rocks — brine mining is usually significantly cheaper, and is thus highly attractive wherever it’s geographically feasible.
Reaching that brine and extracting that lithium — so integral to grid-scale energy storage and electric vehicles alike — is typically slow, inefficient, and environmentally taxing. This year, however, could represent a critical juncture for a novel process known as Direct Lithium Extraction, or DLE, which promises to be faster, cleaner, and capable of unlocking lithium across a wider range of geographies.
The traditional method of separating lithium from brine is straightforward but time-consuming. Essentially, the liquid is pumped through a series of vast, vividly colored solar evaporation ponds that gradually concentrate the mineral over the course of more than a year.
It works, but by the time the lithium is extracted, refined, and ready for market, both the demand and the price may have shifted significantly, as evidenced by the dramatic rise and collapse of lithium prices over the past five years. And while evaporation ponds are well-suited to the arid deserts of Chile and Argentina where they’re most common, the geology, brine chemistry, and climate of the U.S. regions with the best reserves are generally not amenable to this approach. Not to mention the ponds require a humongous land footprint, raising questions about land use and ecological degradation.
DLE forgoes these expansive pools, instead pulling lithium-rich brine into a processing unit, where some combination of chemicals, sorbents, or membranes isolate and extricate the lithium before the remaining brine gets injected back underground. This process can produce battery-grade lithium in a matter of hours or days, without the need to transport concentrated brine to separate processing facilities.
This tech has been studied for decades, but aside from a few Chinese producers using it in combination with evaporation ponds, it’s largely remained stuck in the research and development stage. Now, several DLE companies are looking to build their first commercial plants in 2026, aiming to prove that their methods can work at scale, no evaporation ponds needed.
“I do think this is the year where DLE starts getting more and more relevant,” Federico Gay, a principal lithium analyst at Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, told me.
Standard Lithium, in partnership with oil and gas major Equinor, aims to break ground this year on its first commercial facility in Arkansas’s lithium-rich Smackover Formation, while the startup Lilac Solution also plans to commence construction on a commercial plant at Utah’s Great Salt Lake. Mining giant Rio Tinto is progressing with plans to build a commercial DLE facility in Argentina, which is already home to one commercial DLE plant — the first outside of China. That facility is run by the French mining company Eramet, which plans to ramp production to full capacity this year.
If “prices are positive” for lithium, Gay said, he expects that the industry will also start to see mergers and acquisitions this year among technology providers and larger corporations such as mining giants or oil and gas majors, as “some of the big players will try locking in or buying technology to potentially produce from the resources they own.” Indeed, ExxonMobil and Occidental Petroleum are already developing DLE projects, while major automakers have invested, too.
But that looming question of lithium prices — and what it means for DLE’s viability — is no small thing. When EV and battery storage demand boomed at the start of the decade, lithium prices climbed roughly 10-fold through 2022 before plunging as producers aggressively ramped output, flooding the market just as EV demand cooled. And while prices have lately started to tick upward again, there’s no telling whether the trend will continue.
“Everyone seems to have settled on a consensus view that $20,000 a tonne is where the market’s really going to be unleashed,” Joe Arencibia, president of the DLE startup Summit Nanotech, told me, referring to the lithium extraction market in all of its forms — hard rock mining, traditional brine, and DLE. “As far as we’re concerned, a market with $14,000, $15,000 a tonne is fine and dandy for us.”
Lilac Solutions, the most prominent startup in the DLE space, expects that its initial Utah project — which will produce a relatively humble 5,000 metric tons of lithium per year — will be profitable even if lithium prices hit last year’s low of $8,300 per metric ton. That’s according to the company’s CEO Raef Sully, who also told me that because Utah’s reserves are much lower grade than South America’s, Lilac could produce lithium for a mere $3,000 to $3,500 in Chile if it scaled production to 15,000 or 20,000 metric tons per year.
What sets Lilac apart from other DLE projects is its approach to separating lithium from brine. Most companies are pursuing adsorption-based processes, in which lithium ions bind to an aluminum-based sorbent, which removes them from surrounding impurities. But stripping the lithium from the sorbent generally requires a good deal of freshwater, which is not ideal given that many lithium-rich regions are parched deserts.
Lilac’s tech relies on an ion-exchange process in which small ceramic beads selectively capture lithium ions from the brine in their crystalline structure, swapping them for hydrogen ions. “The crystal structure seems to have a really strong attraction to lithium and nothing else,” Sully told me. Acid then releases the concentrated lithium. When compared with adsorption-based tech, he explained, this method demands far fewer materials and is “much more selective for lithium ions versus other ions,” making the result purer and thus cheaper to process into a battery-grade material.
Because adsorption-based DLE is already operating commercially and ion-exchange isn’t, Lilac has much to prove with its first commercial facility, which is expected to finalize funding and begin construction by the middle of this year.
Sully estimates that Lilac will need to raise around $250 million to build its first commercial facility, which has already been delayed due to the price slump. The company’s former CEO and current CTO Dave Snydacker told me in 2023 that he expected to commence commercial operations by the end of 2024, whereas now the company plans to bring its Utah plant online at the end of 2027 or early 2028.
“Two years ago, with where the market was, nobody was going to look at that investment,” Sully explained, referring to its commercial plant. Investors, he said, were waiting to see what remained after the market bottomed out, which it now seems to have done. Lilac is still standing, and while there haven’t yet been any public announcements regarding project funding, Sully told me he’s confident that the money will come together in time to break ground in mid-2026.
It also doesn’t hurt that lithium prices have been on the rise for a few months, currently hovering around $20,000 per tonne. Gay thinks prices are likely to stabilize somewhere in this range, as stakeholders who have weathered the volatility now have a better understanding of the market.
At that price, hard rock mining would be a feasible option, though still more expensive than traditional evaporation ponds and far above what DLE producers are forecasting. And while some mines operated at a loss or mothballed their operations during the past few years, Gay thinks that even if prices stabilize, hard-rock mines will continue to be the dominant source of lithium for the foreseeable future due to sustained global investment across Africa, Brazil, Australia, and parts of Asia. The price may be steeper, but the infrastructure is also well-established and the economics are well-understood.
“I’m optimistic and bullish about DLE, but probably it won’t have the impact that it was thought about two or three years ago,” Gay told me, as the hype has died down and prices have cooled from their record high of around $80,000 per tonne. By 2040, Benchmark forecasts that DLE will make up 15% to 20% of the lithium market, with evaporation ponds continuing to be a larger contributor for the next decade or so, primarily due to the high upfront costs of DLE projects and the time required for them to reach economies of scale.
On average, Benchmark predicts that this tech will wind up in “the high end of the second quartile” of the cost curve, making DLE projects a lower mid-cost option. “So it’s good — not great, good. But we’ll have some DLE projects in the first quartile as well, so competing with very good evaporation assets,” Gay told me.
Unsurprisingly, the technology companies themselves are more bullish on their approach. Even though Arencibia predicts that evaporation ponds will continue to be about 25% cheaper, he thinks that “the majority of future brine projects will be DLE,” and that DLE will represent 25% or more of the future lithium market.
That forecast comes in large part because Chile — the world’s largest producer of lithium from brine — has stated in its National Lithium Strategy that all new projects should have an “obligatory requirement” to use novel, less ecologically disruptive production methods. Other nations with significant but yet-to-be exploited lithium brine resources, such as Bolivia, could follow suit.
Sully is even more optimistic, predicting that as lithium demand grows from about 1.5 million metric tons per year to around 3.5 million metric tons by 2035, the majority of that growth will come from DLE. “I honestly believe that there will be no more hard rock mines built in Australia or the U.S.,” he said, telling me that in ten years time, half of our lithium supply could “easily” come from DLE.
As a number of major projects break ground this year and the big players start consolidating, we’ll begin to get a sense of whose projections are most realistic. But it won’t be until some of these projects ramp up commercial production in the 2028 to 2030 timeframe that DLE’s market potential will really crystalize.
“If you’re not a very large player at the moment, I think it’s very difficult for you to proceed,” Sully told me, reflecting on how lithium’s price shocks have rocked the industry. Even with lithium prices ticking precariously upwards now, the industry is preparing for at least some level of continued volatility and uncertainty.
“Long term, who knows what [prices are] going to be,” Sully said. “I’ve given up trying to predict.”
A chat with CleanCapital founder Jon Powers.
This week’s conversation is with Jon Powers, founder of the investment firm CleanCapital. I reached out to Powers because I wanted to get a better understanding of how renewable energy investments were shifting one year into the Trump administration. What followed was a candid, detailed look inside the thinking of how the big money in cleantech actually views Trump’s war on renewable energy permitting.
The following conversation was lightly edited for clarity.
Alright, so let’s start off with a big question: How do investors in clean energy view Trump’s permitting freeze?
So, let’s take a step back. Look at the trend over the last decade. The industry’s boomed, manufacturing jobs are happening, the labor force has grown, investments are coming.
We [Clean Capital] are backed by infrastructure life insurance money. It’s money that wasn’t in this market 10 years ago. It’s there because these are long-term infrastructure assets. They see the opportunity. What are they looking for? Certainty. If somebody takes your life insurance money, and they invest it, they want to know it’s going to be there in 20 years in case they need to pay it out. These are really great assets – they’re paying for electricity, the panels hold up, etcetera.
With investors, the more you can manage that risk, the more capital there is out there and the better cost of capital there is for the project. If I was taking high cost private equity money to fund a project, you have to pay for the equipment and the cost of the financing. The more you can bring down the cost of financing – which has happened over the last decade – the cheaper the power can be on the back-end. You can use cheaper money to build.
Once you get that type of capital, you need certainty. That certainty had developed. The election of President Trump threw that into a little bit of disarray. We’re seeing that being implemented today, and they’re doing everything they can to throw wrenches into the growth of what we’ve been doing. They passed the bill affecting the tax credits, and the work they’re doing on permitting to slow roll projects, all of that uncertainty is damaging the projects and more importantly costs everyone down the road by raising the cost of electricity, in turn making projects more expensive in the first place. It’s not a nice recipe for people buying electricity.
But in September, I went to the RE+ conference in California – I thought that was going to be a funeral march but it wasn’t. People were saying, Now we have to shift and adjust. This is a huge industry. How do we get those adjustments and move forward?
Investors looked at it the same way. Yes, how will things like permitting affect the timeline of getting to build? But the fundamentals of supply and demand haven’t changed and in fact are working more in favor of us than before, so we’re figuring out where to invest on that potential. Also, yes federal is key, but state permitting is crucial. When you’re talking about distributed generation going out of a facility next to a data center, or a Wal-Mart, or an Amazon warehouse, that demand very much still exists and projects are being built in that middle market today.
What you’re seeing is a recalibration of risk among investors to understand where we put our money today. And we’re seeing some international money pulling back, and it all comes back to that concept of certainty.
To what extent does the international money moving out of the U.S. have to do with what Trump has done to offshore wind? Is that trade policy? Help us understand why that is happening.
I think it’s not trade policy, per se. Maybe that’s happening on the technology side. But what I’m talking about is money going into infrastructure and assets – for a couple of years, we were one of the hottest places to invest.
Think about a European pension fund who is taking money from a country in Europe and wanting to invest it somewhere they’ll get their money back. That type of capital has definitely been re-evaluating where they’ll put their money, and parallel, some of the larger utility players are starting to re-evaluate or even back out of projects because they’re concerned about questions around large-scale utility solar development, specifically.
Taking a step back to something else you said about federal permitting not being as crucial as state permitting–
That’s about the size of the project. Huge utility projects may still need federal approvals for transmission.
Okay. But when it comes to the trendline on community relations and social conflict, are we seeing renewable energy permitting risk increase in the U.S.? Decrease? Stay the same?
That has less to do with the administration but more of a well-structured fossil fuel campaign. Anti-climate, very dark money. I am not an expert on where the money comes from, but folks have tried to map that out. Now you’re even seeing local communities pass stuff like no energy storage [ordinances].
What’s interesting is that in those communities, we as an industry are not really present providing facts to counter this. That’s very frustrating for folks. We’re seeing these pass and honestly asking, Who was there?
Is the federal permitting freeze impacting investment too?
Definitely.
It’s not like you put money into a project all at once, right? It happens in these chunks. Let’s say there’s 10 steps for investing in a project. A little bit of money at step one, more money at step two, and it gradually gets more until you build the project. The middle area – permitting, getting approval from utilities – is really critical to the investments. So you’re seeing a little bit of a pause in when and how we make investments, because we sometimes don’t know if we’ll make it to, say, step six.
I actually think we’ll see the most impact from this in data center costs.
Can you explain that a bit more for me?
Look at northern Virginia for a second. There wasn’t a lot of new electricity added to that market but you all of the sudden upped demand for electricity by 20 percent. We’re literally seeing today all these utilities putting in rate hikes for consumers because it is literally a supply-demand question. If you can’t build new supply, it's going to be consumers paying for it, and even if you could build a new natural gas plant – at minimum that will happen four-to-six years from now. So over the next four years, we’ll see costs go up.
We’re building projects today that we invested in two years ago. That policy landscape we invested in two years ago hasn’t changed from what we invested into. But the policy landscape then changed dramatically.
If you wipe out half of what was coming in, there’s nothing backfilling that.
Plus more on the week’s biggest renewables fights.
Shelby County, Indiana – A large data center was rejected late Wednesday southeast of Indianapolis, as the takedown of a major Google campus last year continues to reverberate in the area.
Dane County, Wisconsin – Heading northwest, the QTS data center in DeForest we’ve been tracking is broiling into a major conflict, after activists uncovered controversial emails between the village’s president and the company.
White Pine County, Nevada – The Trump administration is finally moving a little bit of renewable energy infrastructure through the permitting process. Or at least, that’s what it looks like.
Mineral County, Nevada – Meanwhile, the BLM actually did approve a solar project on federal lands while we were gone: the Libra energy facility in southwest Nevada.
Hancock County, Ohio – Ohio’s legal system appears friendly for solar development right now, as another utility-scale project’s permits were upheld by the state Supreme Court.