You’re out of free articles.
Log in
To continue reading, log in to your account.
Create a Free Account
To unlock more free articles, please create a free account.
Sign In or Create an Account.
By continuing, you agree to the Terms of Service and acknowledge our Privacy Policy
Welcome to Heatmap
Thank you for registering with Heatmap. Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our lives, a force reshaping our economy, our politics, and our culture. We hope to be your trusted, friendly, and insightful guide to that transformation. Please enjoy your free articles. You can check your profile here .
subscribe to get Unlimited access
Offer for a Heatmap News Unlimited Access subscription; please note that your subscription will renew automatically unless you cancel prior to renewal. Cancellation takes effect at the end of your current billing period. We will let you know in advance of any price changes. Taxes may apply. Offer terms are subject to change.
Subscribe to get unlimited Access
Hey, you are out of free articles but you are only a few clicks away from full access. Subscribe below and take advantage of our introductory offer.
subscribe to get Unlimited access
Offer for a Heatmap News Unlimited Access subscription; please note that your subscription will renew automatically unless you cancel prior to renewal. Cancellation takes effect at the end of your current billing period. We will let you know in advance of any price changes. Taxes may apply. Offer terms are subject to change.
Create Your Account
Please Enter Your Password
Forgot your password?
Please enter the email address you use for your account so we can send you a link to reset your password:
Oh, he’d never self-identify as an environmentalist. But not even climate activists have had the courage to propose a 10% tax on energy.

Dear Donald Trump,
I will be honest with you. I doubted at first. I didn’t understand the plan. But now that I see what you are doing, I have to say: I underestimated you. I was not really familiar with your game.
Yes, I finally see it all now. Even though you have attacked environmentalists for years, even though you have called climate change a “hoax” and a “scam,” and even though you have given climate deniers access to the highest echelons of your administration, I finally appreciate your peculiar genius.
You say that your big and beautiful tariffs are meant to bring about a new American golden age, but I know you’re hiding the truth. With your unprecedented tariffs on Canadian and Mexican imports — and your levies on building materials of all sorts — you are doing what nobody else has had the courage to do.
You are trying to engineer the shock decarbonization of America — no matter the peril, no matter the cost.
Yes, it might seem crazy. But think about it. For years, whenever environmentalists have gathered in secret — and I’m talking the real radicals here, not the ones who send out mailers or go on TV — they plot about a vast agenda to remake America. They hate the fossil fuel industry, of course. But they go further than that. They loathe driving, so they want to destroy the auto industry. They hate big trucks, especially SUVs and pickups. They want to make gasoline more expensive. And really, if we’re being honest, they want to force everyone to live in cities.
I don’t go for such a radical agenda, myself. I’m much more of a moderate. But I have to admit: I know a secret radical environmentalist when I see one. And you, Mr. Trump — well, I won’t say it out loud. But as one former Democratic climate official texted me (and this is real), it might be time to start talking about a “GREEN NEW DONALD.”
Just think about it. Transportation is the most carbon-intensive sector of the U.S. economy, and big personal vehicles — SUVs and pickups — are responsible for the largest share of that pollution. Selling those big trucks to Americans is what drives Ford and General Motors’ profits, and those two companies have developed complex supply chains that can cross the U.S., Mexican, and Canadian borders half a dozen times before their vehicles’ final assembly. The biggest trucks — like the Chevy Silverado — have a particularly arcane value chain, spanning Canada, Mexico, Germany, and Japan.
Environmentalists have struggled to figure out how to deal with Americans’ affinity for these big cars. But you, Mr. Trump, you knew just what needed to be done. You slapped giant tariffs on cars and trucks and auto parts, which could spike new car prices by $4,000 to $10,000, according to Anderson Economic Group.
There’s even a good chance that price hike could hit internal combustion cars worse than it hits EVs — in part because the internal-combustion car supply chain has existed for longer and has had more time to ooze across North America. This widespread damage could prompt layoffs at Ford and GM — but you didn’t hesitate for the climate’s sake, comrade! You were ruthless.
But Mr. Trump, you didn’t stop there. As you surely know, roughly a third of America’s greenhouse gas emissions come from natural gas. It is the prize jewel of fossil fuels, and it’s absolutely core to the U.S. energy system — and Mr. Trump, you did not hesitate to tax it directly. Thanks to your new 10% tariff on Canadian energy imports, American consumers can now expect to pay an extra $1.1 billion a year for natural gas, according to the American Gas Association. Those higher costs will be concentrated in western states and New England.
Your tariffs are also going to make electricity prices go up, particularly in some of the swingiest congressional districts around the Great Lakes. Electricity will also get more expensive in Maine, which has a Senate race in 2026. Mr. Trump, this is an act of true political courage. Normally, environmentalists wouldn’t support raising electricity prices, because it might discourage people from buying EVs or electrifying their homes. But since you’re raising electricity and natural gas and oil prices at the same time, you’re practically begging Americans to buy heat pumps, induction stoves, and invest in energy efficiency technologies essential for decarbonization. And to do so even though it might put your own party’s control of the Senate at risk? You are one hell of an environmental zealot.
Even your steel and aluminum tariffs and your new levies on Canadian lumber are inspired by your climate fervor. By raising the cost of new construction, you are discouraging single-family home construction and all but forcing more Americans to live in multi-family buildings, which are more energy efficient and have lower emissions. Mr. Trump, you really think of everything! I never should have doubted. You are going to make us live in the pods! And with your steep agricultural tariffs, you might even make us eat the bugs!
The most impressive thing you’ve done, though, is your sly little attack on the American oil industry.
The American fossil fuel industry imports more than a million barrels of oil from western Canada every day. This sulfurous sludge is important to the U.S. refining industry because it complements the lighter oil that comes roaring out of American fracking wells. By combining America’s lighter oil with Canada’s heavy crude, U.S. refineries can cheaply churn out a range of high-value products, including gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel.
It’s really important that these American refineries have easy access to as much western Canadian oil as they need as its easy availability lets them ramp up and down different types of fuel production depending on what the market requires at the moment. That’s why they have invested tens of billions of dollars in equipment specially designed to process heavy, sulfur-rich Canadian oil.
In the past, Canadian companies have tried to expand these exports. As you remember, more than a decade ago, one Canadian company wanted to build a pipeline known as Keystone XL. But this came with downsides for the climate: Canadian crude is some of the most carbon-intensive oil in the world, and burning it in large quantities could have meant it was “game over for the climate,” according to journalist-turned-activist Bill McKibben.
The goal of fighting the Keystone XL pipeline was to raise the cost of importing Canadian crude oil, hopefully keeping it in the ground, while undercutting U.S. refinery profit margins. Activists won that fight — and they had your help, Mr. Trump. After the Biden administration revoked Keystone XL’s construction permit in 2021, its developer sued the U.S. government in international trade court and lost. Ironically, it may have had a better shot at winning its case under NAFTA than under its Trump-negotiated replacement, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement.
But of course, even that didn’t unwind America’s and Canada’s decades of economic integration. The United States still imports hundreds of millions of barrels of Canadian oil a year, and all that oil damages the climate while simultaneously keeping U.S. gasoline prices low.
But Mr. Trump — you are now attacking this too! You astound me. You have bashed those Canadian oil imports with a 10% energy tax. This will prove even more effective at hurting the North American fossil fuel industry and raising American gasoline prices than blocking the Keystock XL pipeline did, because it will knock refineries right in their profit margins. If you play your cards right, you might even raise the cost of diesel and jet fuel too!
Now, Mr. Trump: I realize you can’t come out and say all this. In fact, you claimed last week that you wanted to revive Keystone XL, even though its developer has given up on it.
This struck many people as silly, but I know just what you are doing here. With your words, you are trying to look like a fossil-fuel-friendly Republican to please your base. But with your actions, you are actually raising taxes on the U.S. fossil fuel industry. What other explanation is there? Surely nobody would be so silly as to propose making it cheaper to import Canadian crude oil at the same time that they deliberately make it more expensive. And surely nobody would say they support autoworkers while actually destroying the U.S. auto industry. That would be truly self-defeating — and Mr. Trump, you are a winner!
Some people — well, really, just your Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick — have implied that you might lift these tariffs as soon as tomorrow. I don’t believe them. I know what you’re up to here. You are not going to fold so soon. You are trying to keep talking the talk even as you whack away at cars, oil, and gas. I might even say that you are like a moldy strawberry: “Republican red” on the outside but “deep green” on the inside.
Now, you could go even further. Conservatives have long observed, however sarcastically, that since carbon emissions correlate with GDP in so many countries (although not in the U.S.), the fastest way to fight climate change is to engineer a giant recession. Some might assume this would be going too far for you — it would be going much too far for me. But on Tuesday, the International Chamber of Commerce warned that your tariffs could set off spiraling trade wars, putting the country in “1930s trade-war territory” and triggering a new Great Depression. Just think of how the emissions will fall from that!
Oh, Mr. Trump! You really ARE a Green New Donald. You truly are willing to sacrifice anything for the climate — even if it means kneecapping the American economy, bamboozling the world, and even ending industrial civilization to do it! Oh, Mr. Trump, I am overcome. You astound, captivate, and enthrall me. Now I understand how JD Vance feels.
Log in
To continue reading, log in to your account.
Create a Free Account
To unlock more free articles, please create a free account.
This transcript has been automatically generated.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, or wherever you get your podcasts.
You can also add the show’s RSS feed to your podcast app to follow us directly.
Robinson Meyer:
[0:59] Hello, it’s Wednesday, April 15, and there’s big news in the small but extremely important world of carbon removal. Last week, Microsoft informed some partners and suppliers that it’s pausing its carbon removal purchases. I first reported the news here at Heatmap on Friday. Bloomberg and Carbon Herald have confirmed the story as well. And it’s a huge deal for the carbon removal industry. That is, the set of companies trying to develop technologies that can reduce or eliminate heat-trapping carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Sometimes you’ll hear it get called CDR for carbon dioxide removal. And no matter what you call it, in recent years, Microsoft basically was the industry. Since 2020, it’s bought more than 70 million tons of carbon removal, which is 40 times more than any other organization or coalition has purchased. The CDR scientist Julio Friedmann told me that there are lots of tech companies out there whose whole business model was basically, we’re going to develop a CDR technology, and then we’ll sell to Microsoft. Well, now Microsoft won’t be buying any more, at least for the time being.
Robinson Meyer:
[1:59] I think it’s important to intervene here and say CDR is not a nice-to-have technology. The IPCC says we’ll need carbon removal to meet the Paris Agreement’s goals. And by one estimate, the world will need to be removing 7 billion to 9 billion tons of carbon a year by 2050 in order to maintain its Paris targets. Now, Microsoft, for its part, says its program isn’t totally over. Melanie Nakagawa, their chief sustainability officer, told me in a statement, quote, our carbon removal program has not ended. We continue to both build on and support our existing portfolio of nature-based and technology-based solutions. At times, we may adjust the pace or volume of our carbon removal procurement as we continue to refine our approach towards sustainability goals. Any adjustments we make are part of our disciplined approach and not a change in ambition, unquote. But even if just the pace and volume are changing, it’s still a big deal. We are going to need this technology, and we just lost its biggest buyer. So what comes next? Here to chat about it today is Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh. He’s the director of the Carbon Management Program at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University, and he’s the president of Carbon Middle Management Incorporated. He was previously policy manager for carbon management at Breakthrough Energy. Jack and I talk about the history of CDR, what Microsoft’s departure might mean, and what’s coming next for the industry. I’m Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatap News, and it’s all coming up on Shift Key. Jack Cavanaugh, welcome to Shift Key.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[3:26] Thanks for having me on, Rob. Good to see you.
Robinson Meyer:
[3:28] Good to see you. So let’s start here. Why was Microsoft such an important player in the carbon removal system?
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[3:35] Yeah, well, I think it’s important to do, you know, a little unearthing of the history of carbon removal, how we got to where we’re at today.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[3:43] There was, you know, a lot of seminal work done in the 1990s, the early 2000s about this crazy thing called direct air capture, where you could remove CO2 from the ambient air.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[3:54] And a lot of that was done by Klaus Lochner and David Keith, who have both founded different director capture companies, David Keith, carbon engineering, which was eventually sold to Occidental Petroleum. And then it was mostly R&D academic research. And then in 2019, Stripe, the payment processing company, announced $1 million for purchasing of carbon dioxide removal. And then in 2020, Microsoft announced their net negative by 2030 sustainability goal. And in 2022, that was followed up by the Frontier Fund, which was Stripe following on with a number of other partners, a $1 billion advanced market commitment. And so up until that point, what we think of today as carbon removal and the carbon removal market really didn’t exist. And so Microsoft was the first to get in and say, we are going to put relatively large capital outlays towards purchasing carbon removal alongside what Frontier did with the advanced market commitment and essentially kicked off a massive hype cycle for CDR that went across some government policy and certainly private investment.
Robinson Meyer:
[5:11] That history is super helpful. And also I feel like it is worth kind of hammering that at least when I started being a climate reporter, which was like 2016, 2017, 2015,
Robinson Meyer:
[5:23] carbon removal was seen as this purely science fictional technology. Like basically something we might need to develop down the line. There had been work on it done. It was a little taboo to talk about it because the sense was that talking about it would discourage the work of emissions reductions. And there was a sense that it would be really hard. And I mean, it is really hard, but there was a sense that it was like something to talk about in decades to come, but not something we were going to be talking about scaling in the next 10 years. And I do feel like the big milestone there, you know this, I’m just injecting it into the history, was the 1.5C report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which kind of said, hey, if the world wants to hit 1.5C or even 2C, first of all, it would be really bad for us to hit 1.5C. There’d be lots of near-term consequences. And of course, it’s pretty clear those are going to happen now. But there was a lot of energy around avoiding that. But also, if we want to not be at 1.5C by the end of the century, then the only way to do that is to know that we’re going to overshoot in the middle of the century and then draw down carbon at the end of the century. And that will require carbon removal. And so therefore, we need to start working on this technology now. And at least for me, that was the point as a reporter where it went from like, is this real? Should I be thinking about this? Like, does this matter? It seems like it would be a useful thing to have, but maybe there’s a reason nobody’s talking about it to like, oh, this is just like a tool that we are going to need to deal with climate change. And we need to start working on the tool now.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[6:52] Yeah, absolutely. And, you know, not to, there’s a much longer history than I laid out. I mean, to your point on the IPCC report, my colleague at Columbia, Noah Deich, founded Carbon180 around the time of that report coming out, which is the first CDR-specific NGO. And there were all sorts of folks that were talking about thinking about building a lot of the frameworks in the federal programs that we have today and building the bedrock of scientific understanding and R&D that have become companies today. And so a lot more happened, but you’re totally right that that report really kicked, like brought carbon removal from, you know, the sort of fringes of climate discussions into a more focal point that we are going to need this at a relatively large scale to reach any climate goals, 1.5 or above.
Robinson Meyer:
[7:43] Yeah. So without that context preloaded then, what was the importance of Microsoft to the carbon removal market? Because it seemed to play a pretty essential role.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[7:52] Yeah. So as you reported, I laid out in a piece that I published as well, Microsoft was somewhere around 80% of all voluntary carbon removal purchases in the market. And so just to be clear, voluntary means voluntary. This was done not because of any sort of compliance regulatory mechanism or some sort of incentive to be able to purchase. This was part of their sustainability plan. And being 80% of the market is a really interesting position to be in. And Microsoft, not just on the purchases that they made, the billions of dollars they have allocated towards carbon removal, they haven’t just done that, which in and of itself is an incredible thing to be able to get through all the intermachinations of a for-private business to be able to do this with discretionary spending. But they also then had the ability to sort of shape criteria, standardized contracts, all of these sorts of enabling pieces of financial and project infrastructure to be able to work, de-risk some aspects of the carbon removal market the voluntary market and so yeah they were quintessential in being able to buy build and then also bring in other buyers into the market to some extent now they tried very hard i’m sure they wished that more folks would have joined them but yeah if you’re 80% of the market you are the market essentially.
Robinson Meyer:
[9:20] It’s funny, I’ve been reporting out the consequences of this pullback from Microsoft or this pause or whatever we’re going to call it. And I think a number of folks in the industry have said, well, Microsoft did actually was amazing. I mean, they set this ambitious goal and they have met it and they’ve bought, I think, depending on how you count, 20 to 25 times more carbon removal than anyone else. It’s that that hasn’t been followed by other companies. The frontier companies are in second place, right? But it’s after that, no one has shown up to the same extent as Microsoft has. And that’s really significant. So I guess that naturally leads to the next question, which is how bad is it that Microsoft has gone? What does it mean for the carbon removal economy? And let’s bracket that like stuff should happen next. I mean, let’s bracket that, but let’s just kind of track fallout for now. How bad is it that Microsoft is now gone given that they were 80% of the market?
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[10:11] Yeah. So starting out, it’s obviously not good, right? There’s no way to sugarcoat losing potentially 80% of the market is good for an industry.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[10:22] However, you look at broad sweeping trends across the voluntary carbon market across public policy, which I know that we’ll get to. And we were already in the downturn of the large scale venture capital and some project finance level investment that went into CDR. And so what you have is hundreds of companies that are doing some form of carbon dioxide removal. Very few of those have a credible ability to claim that they are going to remove the amount of tons that Microsoft was buying. Microsoft was buying relatively large tonnage amounts, right? The hundreds of thousands, potentially millions of tons per purchase. And so not that many companies had the ability to scale, were at the appropriate time in their technology to scale that big. And so it’s actually, relative to the entire CDR industry, a fairly small subset of companies that could even have considered Microsoft as a potential buyer. Now, that leaves the 20% of the market that tends to buy in slightly smaller amounts. And so you have all of those folks, including the potential large-scale providers, now fighting over 20% of the market. And fundamentally, what it will mean is just an acceleration of something that was going to happen anyway, which is consolidation and bankruptcies or dissolutions. This was always going to happen at this moment because we don’t have supportive policy.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[11:49] And everyone in CDR knew it was in every conference, every conversation knew that this moment was going to happen. There was going to be a moment where Microsoft wasn’t going to buy the clip that they are anymore. And so you really could have had this story written for two years. And it was just like hit send when it occurred. And we’re just at that point right now.
Robinson Meyer:
[12:07] Something that’s come up in my reporting that I think is now kind of an interesting facet of the next step here is that because Microsoft was buying so much more than anyone else, there was no one else who was able to set prices with them. They were kind of setting the price and they were doing all the price exploration themselves as one firm, which is obviously suboptimal, let’s put it that way, and very tricky, I think, as a place to be in as a buyer. And I guess now there’ll be a lot more competition for buyers. And so maybe the price of carbon removal will fall. I don’t know. But one of the problems with no other buyer showing up is that Microsoft basically had to do all the price discovery itself. What are the next steps for carbon removal? It sounds like there is going to be a wave of bankruptcies to some degree. Maybe that’s a little inevitable. It’s a growing technology. But on the other hand, we’d like to retain the ability to continue to make advances in carbon removal technology. So like what should happen next across the market?
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[13:03] You’re absolutely right. There are going to be consolidations. There are going to be bankruptcies. The consolidations are going to increase the runway for the companies that will consolidate to try to hold on as long as they can. There’s an organization called Ctrl-S that Jason Hochman started up that is looking to retain some of the IP for some of these bankruptcies.
Robinson Meyer:
[13:22] My colleague, Emily Pontecorvo, wrote a story about it, which we’ll stick in the show notes.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[13:26] Yeah, yeah. Yeah, and I think it’s an interesting model because there is an incredibly diverse set of technologies. Within every CDR pathway, there’s a hundred different DAC companies or something like that, and they all do something slightly different. And you could imagine a world in which there is incentivizing policy for carbon removal. That IP could be valuable to folks to be able to learn faster, to build quicker.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[13:50] I also just want to take a brief note, just a moment to say, I’m like, what happens next is it is sort of incredible to me that there was a moment in time that there were folks at Microsoft, that got in with the C-suite, with the people that were allocating capital within the company and were able to carve out this program. That is amazing. This is voluntary discretionary spending at billions of dollars. And although the tech companies have free cash flow to be able to spend on this, having that same conversation today almost feels impossible, like going into, and Microsoft did have these conversations with a lot of other private companies about trying to spur folks into the market. And that’s sort of incredible. And so one pathway forward, I think that it’s been clear that sort of shut off is I don’t have a lot of confidence that there are going to be new private buyers at a meaningful amount. I just don’t think when you look at the broad fiscal reality of the world at the moment, that it just makes sense for any amount of discretionary spending to be spent on carbon removal, let alone many other climate technologies.
Robinson Meyer:
[14:57] And the key kind of elephant in the room here, right, is that a lot of the private spending on climate technologies, be it carbon removal or renewable construction and development or electric vehicle manufacturing, frankly, was coming from
Robinson Meyer:
[15:11] these big tech companies. I mean, Amazon is an investor in Rivian, right? And is it major source of offtake for Rivian to buy a lot of Rivian delivery vans? Apple and Google and Microsoft had these very aggressive renewable acquisition targets. And part of what’s happened over the past three years is that all the companies that were doing, basically directing some amount of free cash flow to climate investment, have become basically cash strapped light industrial companies that have to build as much physical infrastructure as they can and as much power generation infrastructure as they can. And every dollar matters much more than it did, say, two or three years ago. I think the exception would be Apple here. But for a while, we were able to kind of finance a lot of the climate ecosystem off the back of what was basically an employee perk because it was a very aggressive market for tech employees and they liked working at companies that had these big climate programs. And that is like fully over. The bull market for tech labor employment is over. The ability of these companies to finance climate tech is over. The willingness of them to finance climate tech as opposed to to dump another marginal dollar into data center development or AI model development is over. Like it’s all over.
Robinson Meyer:
[16:27] And that’s a major moment, not only for I mean, to some degree, carbon removal is like most illustrative version of it because it was the closest to like the gargoyle on the cathedral for Microsoft. The beautiful thing they could fund as a result of their incredible societal surplus, but like it’s over for a lot of different things.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[16:45] Yeah. And, and like you said, this is just one story amongst many other stories
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[16:50] that could be written in, in a similar vein. And to your original question about where to go forward from now, You could have another surplus of what you just described come up and you, climate commitments could kick back up again. And we would just do this whole thing over again. We would run it back and we would be having this conversation, you know, five years from now or whenever that is. And the way to hedge against that from happening and to some extent stop it from happening is to have federal governments across the globe pass durable policy that either compels the regulation or incentivizes the deployment of carbon dioxide removal and that because carbon dioxide removal outside of the co-benefits of some pathways, which are fantastic, just removing carbon from the atmosphere for pure carbon sake. Is the tragedy of the commons in a single climate technology entity. Like this is something that will need federal support in the long run to some extent in a way that other climate technologies don’t. That’s true of most of the carbon management world, but it is uniquely true of CDR.
Robinson Meyer:
[18:01] But it’s a form of waste management. Trash and recycling also require ongoing government support. Now, at this point, it tends to come from the state and local level. But governments still pay to handle waste. That’s part of what we expect governments to do. It’s just that this waste happens to be in the atmosphere and requires a particularly high form of technology to dispel.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[18:23] Yeah, it’s a very costly trash pickup service. And it also is contingent upon people caring about the trash. There is a relatively large constituency around the world that is unconvinced that the trash is an issue. And that is the big challenge.
Robinson Meyer:
[18:40] Yeah, agnostic on the trash. You know, historically, Congress has been quite supportive of carbon removal technology, but the current administration has not been as supportive. What has been funded in terms of federal policy that could potentially begin to pick up the pieces here? And then what should be funded with a more constructive Congress, a more constructive administration? What kind of policy should we eventually hope to see that could fight off some of this carbon removal wave of consolidation and bankruptcies?
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[19:11] Well, there was some appropriations money that was put into place for carbon removal R&D, and that is valuable and it’s good to be able to work on the research and development to help scale these technologies. But in terms of actual federal funds that have been spent, the DAC hubs program at the end of the Biden administration issued two $50 million grants to the large DAC hubs. That is the full extent to which is the monies that have been spent on the $3.5 billion DAC hubs program. The rest of that money is sitting at DOE, going through some internal review or whatever is happening at the moment with the DAC hubs program.
Robinson Meyer:
[19:53] It’s like the movie Brazil, presumably.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[19:55] Yes, exactly. The purchase prize is in a similar position, paused indefinitely, unclear of if or when that money will be spent. And the only existing policy that incentivizes carbon removal to any extent only incentivizes direct air capture and BECCS which is the 45Q tax credit you.
Robinson Meyer:
[20:14] Get 180 dollars a ton if you remove a ton of carbon from the atmosphere
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[20:17] Yeah with direct air capture one yeah and and with BECCS you would get 85 dollars a ton and that you know to count that as CDR there are some LCAs in terms of what biomass feedstocks you’re using into the process.
Robinson Meyer:
[20:32] But remind listeners what BECCS is.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[20:34] Oh, bioenergy with CCS. So you burn some sort of biomass feedstock and capture that CO2 at a point source. So you could imagine heat and power being used to create pulp and paper, and then you capture the CO2. And that receives $85 a ton because it’s point source capture. But even then, $85 a ton is not enough to reach final investment decision on the BEX facility. and $180 a ton isn’t enough to reach profitability for a DAC company. And so you still have to make up the delta to profitability and that is in the voluntary market, which as we discussed, has greatly retracted and the appetite for relatively expensive DAC credits is pretty low right now considering the fiscal situation of it all. And so.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[21:18] If I’m looking at it right now from the U.S. federal government, there’s basically very little to no current outlays for carbon removal. Going forward, there was a specific carbon removal tax credit that was introduced that had increased dollar amounts for various forms of CDR, basically functionally all forms of CDR. There has been discussions of in carbon border adjustment mechanism that Europe put in, Senator Cassidy as well as Senator Whitehouse each have a sort of trade policy as a sort of response to the carbon border adjustment mechanism. And that could include compliance pathways for carbon removal. I think it is important that, Because the cost of carbon removal is so high and because the political winds of the United States have been shifting very rapidly back and forth in terms of how political parties view climate and execute on climate policies or not execute on climate policies, that you have as many bites of the apple as you can. And CDR is embedded into as many policies as you can get it into, whether it’s trade policies, whether it’s tax credits, whether it’s direct procurement, or even farming smart programs for soil carbon sequestration. And there’s all sorts of different policy and regulatory opportunities. It’s just a matter of which ones the politics and the finances will allow.
Robinson Meyer:
[22:41] What’s happening around the world? Are other countries beginning to put money toward carbon removal that are not the U.S.?
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[22:47] Yeah, Canada has a $10 million procurement program, which is the first procurement program of its kind that’s ever been put into place. They’re soliciting proposals for that now. I mean, $10 million admittedly isn’t a lot, but it’s something. And you build on policies like this, and so it’s a good first start.
Robinson Meyer:
[23:04] $10 million Canadian.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[23:06] Yeah, that is true. $10 million Canadian. And then in Europe, Europe is integrating carbon removals into their emissions trading system. And that the final rules on that will happen in the next couple of years, which leaves a gap in terms of when that market will be accessible. Japan has compliance pathways in their domestic ETS for carbon removal. But in terms of pure policy market incentives that actually will get carbon dioxide removal projects built in the real world, incredibly limited in the next three to five years or whenever Europe integrates them, if not all else will equal nothing else goes forward, Europe will become the largest carbon removal market in the world. Until that happens, there is nothing in the near term that is moving forward.
Robinson Meyer:
[23:52] Is there anything happening in China? Because often the story of these climate tech investments is that the West starts them up, gets bored, allows all this IP to die on the vine. I think this is part of the idea of Ctrl-S. And then basically all the IP goes to China and China decides this is a frontier technology that it wants to invest in. And lo and behold, five years later is the best at it in the world. Like, is that happening right now with carbon removal, or is this not a field that China has indicated much interest in so far?
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[24:20] It’s tough to find data or information on carbon removal in China, although Tencent? Yeah. They announced some prizes structurally similar to sort of the Musk XPRIZE that $100 million for carbon removal. And there have been some reports of direct or capture R&D projects that have been built. But in my view, this is structurally different from China than any of the other things that they’ve done relative to the climate technologies that they’ve developed. Because again, you produce an EV, you produce a solar panel, you produce a battery, there’s a consumer that gains something valuable to them, whether it’s power from a solar panel or a battery, right? Power your car to help with the backup power on your house or an EV that is great and has cool features and is a, you know, a computer, but that’s not the same for carbon removal. And so like even totally China or like you look other places like the Gulf that Climeworks partnered with Saudi Arabia and obviously the Gulf countries are highly invested in a number of different technologies and have at least on balance sheet the money to be able to put towards this. But again, what is the value proposition for them to invest heavily in this industry when nowhere else around the world is?
Robinson Meyer:
[25:32] I mean, I think if also if you think about Chinese energy policy flows from a triangle of concern about conventional air pollution, you know, like PM2.5, energy security and wanting to stay at the frontier of technological development is really only that last point that would drive them
Robinson Meyer:
[25:48] to invest in carbon removal. At what point will the Chinese energy policy triangle become a diamond and we’ll see China make concerted investments focused not only on kind of playing up the climate benefits of its existing supply side investments, but affirmatively making supply side investments to advance international climate agenda. At that point, maybe we’ll see it invest in carbon removal. But until then, it doesn’t really fit into the existing Chinese paradigm.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[26:13] There are a number of CDR pathways that have really interesting co-benefits associated with them that have a clearer way to scale than something like direct air capture, unless you’re using for enhanced soil recovery, which is possible, even then still expensive. But you look at things like enhanced rock weathering and the potential to increase yields for crops, as well as decrease the need for fertilizer. You can imagine there are ocean health benefits associated with some forms of ocean CDR. And so in that way, I think that there is an opportunity, and you are currently seeing this amongst the CDR pathways, that they are finding ways, like all climate tech is at the moment, to highlight everything but the climate value associated with their technology. And this was a bit of a doomy and gloomy pod, but I think that that is a very near-term pathway that a market has a value associated with these things, and it’s not a voluntary one on carbon.
Robinson Meyer:
[27:14] Well, we’re going to have to leave it there, but you and I know that at some point you’re going to come back on Shift Key to talk about another favorite topic of ours, which is how to dress for 1.5C. And we’ll have to talk about many other developments as well. But Jack Havanaugh, thank you so much for joining us on Shift Key. It was great to have you.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[27:32] Thanks for having me on, Rob.
Robinson Meyer:
[27:38] And that will do it for us on Shift Key today. We’ll be back soon with another episode of Shift Key. Until then, if you love this show, if you hated it, if you had lots of thoughts, you can find me on X, Bluesky, or LinkedIn at Robinson Meyer. Stick around after the credits. We have a great message from our sponsor for this week, Lunar Energy, that I’m very excited about. Until then, Shift Key is a production of Heatmap News. Our editors are Jillian Goodman and Nico Lauricella. Multimedia Editing and Audio Engineering is by Jacob Lambert and by Nick Woodbury. Our music is by Adam Kromelow. Thanks so much for listening. We’ll see you real soon.
Mike Munsell:
[28:16] Hi, my name is Mike Munsell, and I’m the Vice President of Partnerships with Heatmap. For the last two episodes, I chatted with Lunar Energy’s Sam Weavers about solar, batteries, and utility rate design. Today, we dive into virtual power plants and international markets.
Sam Wevers:
[28:30] My name is Sam Wevers, and I’m Director of Product at Lunar Energy.
Mike Munsell:
[28:35] I know we’ve been talking a lot about VPPs. It seems like every company or even a research firm has a different definition of a virtual power plant. How does Lunar define a VPP?
Sam Wevers:
[28:47] I’ve certainly come across this myself. You can get right into the weeds of defining what a VPP is. But, I mean, to me, it’s really just connecting distributed assets together with software and controlling them in smart ways so that those assets deliver value to the grid and homes get paid for that sort of service in return. A VPP turns thousands of disparate homes into something that can look like a power plant to the grid, except it’s a power plant that can be segmented and provide very locational and temporal services to the grid, or it can be grouped together at sort of the top level to provide bulk level power when measured at sort of that transmission or sort of ISO level. That’s probably my definition of a VPP.
Mike Munsell:
[29:31] Do other countries, other markets have VPPs or VPP-like structures?
Sam Wevers:
[29:36] Yeah, for sure. I mean, this is something that’s been emerging in Europe and in Australia in particular for a good 10 years or so. It’s also worth flagging that when I talk about VPPs, I’m in the main talking about VPPs for residential assets. VPPs have been providing demand response services with arc furnaces and large industrial loads for some time.
Sam Wevers:
[29:58] And we are now in a world where it’s not just big factories and manufacturing processes that can provide flexible demand to the grid, but also thousands and thousands of homes. Lots of the Nordic countries have residential assets providing grid frequency services. In the U.K., residential assets can be traded by independent aggregators in markets that are used to balance the grid after the wholesale market closes. And Australia has, you know, a really active and competitive market for residential VPP services.
Mike Munsell:
[30:29] And I know most Shift Key listeners are based in the U.S., but what can the U.S. learn from power markets of other countries?
Sam Wevers:
[30:37] One point is the same problem has been addressed in lots of different ways in different markets, whether that’s more on the rate design side or more on the VPP sort of program design side. One common trend that we talked about earlier is certainly this idea that as there is a shift away from feed-in tariffs in other markets for solar, which is akin to net metering, so really generous solar compensation, that ushered in a big deployment of batteries. There are over a million residential batteries installed in Japan, and they were installed to maximize the value of customers’ solar and also to provide outage protection. It’s a big reason why Lunar provides and has provided software services in Japan with our Gridshare platform for many years now, connecting to residential assets to optimize them daily against time of use rates.
Sam Wevers:
[31:28] I think the other key learnings probably go to exposure of price signals to customers like Octopus Agile in the U.K., all those time of use rates in Japan, and the automated load-shaping effects that these sort of rate shapes can have. The other one probably to flag is 10 years ago in the UK, it used to be that you couldn’t really play residential assets in these sort of wholesale level markets. The markets were very much designed around big minimum clip sizes and sort of performance standards that were very tailored to existing gas turbines and the like. But over time, National Grid over there in the UK and others has done a bunch of work to adjust those market rules to allow VPPs of residential assets to start to participate in new services. And they are participating in those services. They’re providing value to the grid and to customers and millions of pounds a year are getting paid out on a purely market basis. It’s not a subsidy-based thing. It’s just markets being designed to allow the value of these assets to be recognized. But I would also say that the scale of VPP programs in the USA is remarkable.
Sam Wevers:
[32:40] Last year in the DSGS program, I think the Brattle Group put out a report. There was over 500 megawatts dispatched in one dispatch last year and you know one needn’t start with the most complex market structure but the core goal should be the same right which is recognize the true sort of physical and economic value of these residential assets and by doing so costs of managing the grid can reduce customers can save money and make money and more renewables can reliably be brought online.
New documents add to doubt over President Trump’s deal to buy back the multinational energy company’s U.S. offshore wind leases.
Interior Secretary Doug Burgum's announcement last month that the administration was cancelling two offshore wind leases and reimbursing the lessee, TotalEnergies, nearly $1 billion, raised a host of questions. What authority was he using to do this? Where would the money come from? Was this legal? Could the Trump administration kill the offshore wind industry by paying it exorbitant sums to go away?
A newly unearthed copy of one of the agency’s official lease cancellation decisions begins to fill in the picture. It confirms what the Department of the Interior has thus far refused to acknowledge: The agency intends to pay TotalEnergies using the Judgment Fund, a cache of public money overseen by the Department of Justice intended for agency settlements.
Tony Irish, a former solicitor in the Department of the Interior, was digging around in a public Bureau of Ocean Energy Management database on Tuesday when he stumbled upon the document, which is dated April 9, 2026 — more than two weeks after Burgum’s lease cancellation announcement.
The document is a letter to Jen Banks, the permitting and development director for TotalEnergies’ Carolina Long Bay project, which is the smaller of the two leases that were cancelled. It says the agency reached a settlement agreement with Carolina Long Bay on March 23, in which the Interior Department “determined that cancelling Lease OCS-A 0545 is in the public interest,” and established that Carolina Long Bay “would have asserted claims in litigation against the United States related to the lease.”
It ends by saying that, pursuant to the settlement agreement, “DOI will, through the Department of Justice, request payment in the amount of $133,333,333 to Carolina Long Bay from the Judgment Fund Branch at the United States Department of Treasury.”
The letter does not include a copy of the settlement agreement or reference the stipulation that TotalEnergies reinvest the money into U.S. oil and gas development, as described in Burgum’s announcement.
While the Judgment Fund is essentially bottomless, there are strict rules about when it can be used. Agencies can draw on it to settle litigation that cannot be remedied by injunctive relief and requires monetary compensation. They can also request a payment from the Judgment Fund to settle “imminent litigation” — claims that have not yet been filed in court.
As there’s no record of claims filed in court, the TotalEnergies settlement likely falls into the latter category. But Irish, the former solicitor, told me it's hard to see how litigation could have been credibly imminent. TotalEnergies’ lease terms, which the Biden administration updated and the company agreed to in January 2025, explicitly state that the lease cannot be canceled “unless and until” the Interior Secretary has suspended operations for at least five years and extended the company’s lease for an equal amount of time. Given that TotalEnergies’ lease is less than five years old — it was purchased in 2022 — and there’s no evidence that it had been under suspension for any period of time, there appears to be little basis for any claim of imminent litigation.
It’s also unclear what claim TotalEnergies could have brought to warrant monetary payment. “It looks like the result of any viable claim TotalEnergies would have brought forth is not monetary damages, but enforcement of this lease provision that requires suspension and extension first,” Irish told me.
There is not yet any decision document in the database for TotalEnergies’ second lease, called Attentive Energy, for which the company stands to receive $795 million in reimbursements. Secretary Burgum will appear before the House Appropriations Committee on Monday morning, where Representative Chellie Pingree of Maine has vowed to question him on the deal. “The appropriations process for Fiscal Year 2027 will be getting underway soon with budget hearings, and I intend to press for answers,” she said in a statement shared with me by email in March. “Secretary Burgum should be prepared to provide them.”
According to more than 70 people who helped implement it.
There has been no shortage of post-mortems on the Inflation Reduction Act, Joe Biden’s crowning climate policy achievement that was swiftly dismantled by the Trump administration less than three years after going into effect. And yet there’s been little public reflection on the law from the individuals who were entrusted with actually implementing it.
A new report by three former Biden administration staffers shared exclusively with Heatmap offers that inside perspective, looking at what it took to roll out the nearly 30 clean energy tax credits and associated bonus provisions in the law and what future policymakers and officials can learn from the effort. In the wake of extraordinary federal staffing cuts under Trump, the authors also wanted to create a blueprint that a future administration could use to build back capacity and implement similarly ambitious policy.
“There was an enormous amount of interagency collaboration,” Dorothy Lutz, who served as a senior policy advisor in Biden’s White House, told me. “We wanted to take the time to preserve the lessons learned across as many of the agencies as possible, anticipating that there would have to be some future capacity-building and making sure that we were starting on day one building on the successes and not needing to go through the same learning curve.”
Lutz compiled the report with Ted Lee, the former deputy assistant secretary for tax policy and delivery at the Treasury Department, and Emily Barkdoll, a former strategic and policy design analyst at the Department of Energy. Each of them has since moved on to roles in either the private sector or state governments. The trio released the report independently with financial support from a philanthropy called the Navigation Fund.
Past analyses have highlighted the IRA’s failure to build a political coalition for clean energy and the lack of public awareness about the law. This new report, which draws on more than 70 interviews with officials across the federal government, is more interested in the mechanics of the policies — how they were written, how they were administered, and why some tax credits were more effective than others. Here are three key takeaways.
While the Biden administration was often taken to task for working too slowly, the report makes the case that the government machinery was turning more quickly than ever before in the years following the IRA’s passage.
The Treasury Department published 96 pieces of tax credit guidance — more than 5,000 pages — in 26 months, as well as hundreds of additional resources for taxpayers. That’s nearly triple what the department achieved over a similar time period when it implemented Trump’s 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. It also created new online portals and processes to replace antiquated paper systems.
“What allowed that to happen, and is an important historical precedent for the future, is the funding for the IRS — $80 billion that was included in the Inflation Reduction Act — along with funding for Treasury and the Office of Tax Policy to actually do the implementation work required,” Lee told me.
The IRA created enormous demand for attorneys with tax and regulatory expertise, both inside and outside the federal government, and the Treasury Department struggled to compete with the private sector for top talent. “To put it bluntly,” the report says, “there simply were not enough of these highly skilled, highly talented staff” considering the large number of new and modified tax provisions to implement.
The next time Congress passes a policy package of this magnitude and complexity, it should unlock the ability for agencies to offer more competitive compensation, the authors told me, either through more flexible pay scales or the creation of temporary, higher-paid positions. Barkdoll also emphasized the need for faster hiring processes — she said that roughly seven months passed between when she applied for her role at the DOE and when she was onboarded.
A related challenge stemmed from the wide-ranging expertise required to develop guidance on the tax credits. While the Treasury led the process, closely collaborating with the DOE, it relied on input from many other agencies — the Environmental Protection Agency on lifecycle analysis of greenhouse gas emissions, the Department of Agriculture on biofuels markets, the Department of Labor on prevailing wage and apprenticeship requirements, the Department of Housing and Urban Development on the low-income communities bonus, to name just a few examples. All of these agencies were housed in different buildings, and the government did not have good systems for digital collaboration.
Other than the DOE, none of these agencies were allocated additional funding to undertake this advisory work. Career staffers were “finding the space in their day job to lend their expertise to this,” Barkdoll said. “It was an unnecessary friction.” The fact that, in most cases, the legislation did not explicitly direct the Treasury to consult with these agencies also created uncertainty over who had the authority to weigh in on any given credit.
The reason all hell failed to break loose, according to the report, was the creation of the White House Office of Clean Energy Innovation and Implementation. Led by John Podesta, the group served as a central clearinghouse and coordinator for interagency communications and acted as the final arbiter of decisions in cases of disagreement. The authors are emphatic that future ambitious policy efforts should repeat this approach.
Part of what made the IRA so ambitious is also what made it incredibly complicated to implement. The tax credits were not just designed to incentivize clean energy deployment. Several were written with the explicit requirement of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, requiring complex lifecycle emissions calculations. Others were engineered to spur domestic manufacturing, bring economic development to low-income communities, and create good-paying jobs.
The statute was not always clear about how implementers should prioritize these different goals, which sometimes conflicted with one another. For example, the lack of domestic supply for many clean energy components created tradeoffs between the goals of the domestic content bonus credit and clean energy deployment. Lenient rules for the domestic content bonus might have failed to enhance domestic supply chains, while too-strict rules would have removed any incentive for companies to source locally.
Perhaps the clearest example of these kinds of trade-offs was the clean hydrogen production tax credit. “The hydrogen tax credit was, like, the ‘final boss’ of all of the challenges that we talk about,” Lutz told me. It was designed to reward producers on a sliding scale depending on how clean their hydrogen was, but the science behind making that kind of calculation was new and rapidly evolving. The credit was also extremely generous, meaning that the stakes of getting the balance right were high. Clean hydrogen is also a nascent industry in the U.S., with very few operating projects, which exacerbated the pressure.
In the end, Treasury erred on the side of issuing more rigorous rules that would ensure lower greenhouse gas emissions, at the risk of limiting uptake of the credit from taxpayers and growth of the hydrogen industry.
In general, the report warns that credits that require precise calculations of the emissions associated with a given process will always present a challenge. “These calculations are rarely straightforward and are often the subject of ongoing methodological disputes, even within the scientific community,” it says.
The report emphasizes that the tax credits were most effective when they supported more mature markets where the biggest barrier was cost; when they were written with straightforward policy goals; and when they were relatively easy for taxpayers to claim. The $7,500 credit for electric vehicles, for example, was highly successful for all of those reasons: The primary barrier to EV uptake for consumers was cost, and the design of the credit, which enabled dealers to reduce the vehicle price at the time of sale, made it incredibly easy to claim.
That being said, the authors don’t want policymakers to think they’re arguing for reduced ambition. “The federal government can and should do highly ambitious policy, and I hope that our report can be used by folks to take the next steps to do so,” Lutz said. “What we are trying to articulate is making sure that for each specific tool, you understand what the intended policy goal is, and then you design it to directly influence that behavior as sharply as possible.”