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A vicious climate-political cycle is developing.

When Donald Trump won the 2024 U.S. presidential election, the risk to recent progress on climate policy was immediately obvious: He ran on a promise to increase fossil fuel production, has a long history of denigrating renewable energy, and is hostile to anything with Joe Biden’s name on it, including a raft of policies enacted over the past four years to reduce emissions.
But as unique a character as Trump is, his victory was just one part of an international surge in right-wing populism that has occurred over the past few years, especially in Europe. Right-wing populists focus their appeals on a supposed conflict between ordinary people and what they claim is a corrupt elite; the philosophy is also usually characterized by nativism and a suspicion of international cooperation and integration. All of that comfortably translates into antagonism toward climate action. So if right-wing populists are on the march globally, what are the risks for global climate policy?
The picture is complex — not every populist party puts environmental issues near the center of its agenda. The Alternative for Germany party (also known as AfD) recently gained a high-profile supporter when Elon Musk wrote an op-ed calling it “the last spark of hope” for Germany, citing “cultural integrity” as one of the reasons he supports it. But it was already gaining, even if most Germans find it repellent: In September, it became the first far-right party to win a state election since World War II.
The AfD’s platform (which it has helpfully translated into English) is as full-on denialist as you can find from any major political party; it rejects the idea of anthropogenic climate change and demands an end to German efforts to reduce emissions. “We want to end the perception of CO2 as an exclusively harmful substance and set a stop to Germany’s maverick policy in the reduction of CO2 emissions,” it says.
Meanwhile in the Netherlands, Geert Wilders’ PVV is now the largest party in the governing coalition (though after six months of negotiations following the PVV’s showing in the last election, Wilders agreed to let another coalition partner become prime minister). Its platform promised that the Dutch “Climate Act, the [Paris] climate accord and all other climate measures go straight into the shredder.” Austria’s far-right FPO party placed first in elections in September; it opposes most efforts to combat climate change. (Austria’s Chancellor Karl Nehammer, from the center-right OVP or “People’s Party,” resigned Saturday after coalition talks with FPO broke down.)
In last summer’s parliamentary elections in France, the far-right National Rally pledged a rollback of environmental laws, including “slashing the value-added tax on gas, power and fuel from 20 percent to 5.5 percent; freezing all new wind projects; and easing energy efficiency requirements for homeowners looking to sell their properties,” according to Politico. The party failed to win a plurality in the second round of voting, but it displayed a strength that alarmed many environmentalists. And after last year’s European Parliament elections, far-right parties now control a quarter of the seats in the body, more than ever before.
For these parties, the single most important issue is immigration; their appeal is driven by backlash to influxes of newcomers from Syria and northern African countries, which has contributed to a changing demographic picture. But while environmental policies may be secondary, the issues are hardly unrelated. Versions of “Great Replacement” theory are visible everywhere, the idea that liberal elites are importing non-white immigrants to displace native-born whites and transform the nation. In this telling, green policy is one more way the conspiracy of cultural elites tries to control the lives of the nation’s truest citizens.
Far-right parties often get their strongest support in rural areas, just as Republicans do in the U.S., where farmers protest environmental policies imposed from urban capitals and which they see as the brainchildren of cosmopolitan elites who are either indifferent or actively hostile to their needs. Last spring, farmers staged dramatic protests in France, Germany, Belgium, and other countries, protesting environmental policies they said made it difficult for them to earn a living.
In that way, opposition to climate action fits neatly within the rest of the right-wing populist philosophy and agenda, which usually reject international accords like the Paris Agreement and even the existence of the European Union itself. Repealing climate laws can be a way of striking back at experts and cosmopolitan urbanites, whether it’s Trump rolling back EV subsidies or European rightists attacking the EU’s Green Deal, which among other things obligates the continent to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050.
The far-right populist parties aren’t the only ones pushing back certain kinds of climate action; center-right parties are also playing a part, even if historically they have been far more progressive on climate than the GOP. Consider the European Union’s law requiring that no internal-combustion cars be produced after 2035, which passed in 2022. That law is now under attack from the center-right, especially the European People’s Party, the largest bloc in the European Parliament. The EPP (which includes EU president Ursula von der Leyen among its members) is seeking to have the ban repealed, or at least modified to allow for continued production of plug-in hybrids and ICE cars that run on biofuels.
Nevertheless, far-right parties that want to maximize their power to the point where they can lead governing coalitions have an incentive to moderate their rhetoric on climate. One can see that dynamic in Italian prime minister Georgia Meloni, whose rhetoric on the international stage sounds much more progressive than her party does at home, where it still traffics in climate denial. She has even presented climate as a right-wing issue, saying “The right loves the environment because it loves the land, the identity, the homeland.” This version of environmentalism seeks to combat climate change in order to minimize the numbers of future climate migrants from the Global South, many of whom will wind up seeking refuge in Europe.
However you feel about that motivation, it points to a vicious cycle that could emerge in the future: As global temperatures increase and natural disasters become more frequent, more places become uninhabitable and millions of people become climate refugees. They head north into developed countries, where their presence spurs a right-wing backlash that puts far-right populist parties into power. Those parties then reverse progressive climate policies, making it more difficult to reduce emissions and continuing the cycle.
That might not be our future, and the changes to climate policy advocated by the resurgent populist parties haven’t yet been implemented. It’s also possible that the far right’s political moment could be fleeting. But the next few years will offer plenty of reasons to worry.
Editor’s note: This story has been updated to reflect political developments in Austria.
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The data center boom is everywhere you look in U.S. economic and emissions data.
This is an edition of Heatmap Daily, an evening review of the day’s news written by our executive editor. Sign up for it here.
It isn’t exactly a new thought, but I’ve been struck recently by how many trends in America’s economic and environmental data are fundamentally about the data center boom and the return of electricity demand:
First, the Energy Information Administration reported this week that U.S. emissions grew by more than 2% last year, driven by surging electricity demand and an increase in coal-fired generation. What caused that higher power demand? New factories and data centers — as well as record summertime cooling demand.
Second, many of the new factories driving that higher power demand are themselves producing goods that are … let’s say … data center-adjacent. There are the enormous new semiconductor fabs, of course. But Ford and General Motors have also set up new production lines (or repurposed old ones) to manufacture grid-scale batteries to meet power demand.
Third, take a look at the recent U.S. spending on private non-residential construction — in other words, everything American companies are building that is not houses, condos, or apartments.
The construction industry’s spent almost $60 billion on data centers over the past year, which is more than it spent on all other office buildings combined (and more than it spent building warehouses, too). Just a handful of categories — data centers, power plants, electricity infrastructure, and certain kinds of electronics manufacturing — now make up a third of all U.S. private non-residential construction investment. They’ve never made up such a large share of construction spending since data collection began in 2014.
As The New York Times recently noted, the American economy is unusually dependent on the American stock market right now — and the stock market is unusually dependent on artificial intelligence. This week, investors started to balk at the enormous spending hyperscalers are planning to keep building out the AI boom; Alphabet’s shares dropped 8% this week after it boosted its planned 2026 capital expenditure and signaled 2027 will be even bigger. If the data center boom started to slow down in earnest, then more than just that budget will change.
Speaking of which, my colleague Emily Pontecorvo wrote earlier this week about how many businesses are struggling to even estimate their carbon emissions from artificial intelligence. The carbon accounting startup Watershed recently unveiled a new formula to help companies get a sense of their AI-related emissions.
But even that formula is still limited by the amount of data hyperscalers publish — and they don’t publish that much. Google, for instance, is the only AI company that has (laudably) provided estimates of its emissions on a per-prompt basis. Yet no company has published its per-token emissions, or how emissions sync up with particular models or regions.
So Emily asked Google: Why aren’t you — or any other model provider — disclosing this kind of data yet?
The tech company didn’t get back to us until after we’d published Emily’s story. But its response was interesting enough that I wanted to quote some of it here.
The problem is “industry consensus,” Cooper Elsworth, a Google spokesperson, told us. “There is currently very little consensus on how to comprehensively and fairly measure the serving environmental impact of generative AI (such as text generation),” he wrote. “Without standardized, ‘apples-to-apples’ frameworks, it is difficult to compare different providers accurately.”
That’s partly because energy use — and emissions data — can vary from site to site and depend on “custom-built hardware, software compilers, and advanced inference techniques.” And he claimed Google doesn’t always have the measurement hardware in place to provide such specific estimates: “Providing precise, repeatable data requires highly advanced measurement infrastructure,” he said. “For example, software-based energy monitoring tools often suffer from sampling biases. For our study, we had to step away from top-down averages and directly measure actual energy at the physical power supply unit (PSU) level across our deployed fleet. Not all providers have the telemetry or data sets required to benchmark their operations at this level of granularity.”
Read Emily’s story to understand the other reasons why estimating — or even “guesstimating” — AI-related carbon emissions is so challenging.
A conversation with Emma Uridge of the Kansas Health Institute.
This week’s conversation is with Emma Uridge, analyst with the Kansas Health Institute. Uridge spent copious hours analyzing state and local laws on data center development to best understand how policymakers are responding to the potential environmental public health impacts of large AI infrastructure, including power and water. The report, which came out this week, also goes in depth into those health impacts. I reached out to her to discuss what she sees as must-watch territory for our readers on this emerging policy arena.
Our conversation was lightly edited for clarity.
What is actually being done on policy when it comes to data centers — beyond moratoria of course?
So first I’d like to just talk about the point of moratoria. It’s helpful to talk about how these policies emerge in the first place. One area where moratoria are helpful is when a data center is proposed but the county has no approach for how they’d like to potentially regulate them. That’s temporary, most of the time. It lets local governments conduct research on the various impacts and also negotiate community benefits, ones that can mitigate any potential negative impacts — like Lancaster Pennsylvania, which instituted a community benefit agreement that maximized the potential benefits of development while mitigating what large data centers can do. That agreement looked at capping municipal water use at 20,000 gallons per day and requiring 100% clean energy. It had financial penalties for non-compliance. The company also committed $20 million to their local economic development and clean energy fund. There are ways to negotiate with developers.
We also see amendments to existing zoning. Data center proposals are increasingly popping up in rural areas, many of which are unzoned, so there’s no way a county can negotiate unless there’s a moratorium in place.
Other policy solutions include different performance standards or requiring on-site renewable energy, like what Jefferson County, Missouri, looked at. Also setback requirements, mandatory noise buffers, ending by-right zoning.
Where are local governments getting ideas for regulating data centers?
A lot of the technical information comes from developers. That can in cases be seen as a biased source of information. I wouldn’t say there’s a dedicated group providing assistance to local governments when a project is proposed — which is a similar story to wind industry development, where we have only a handful of consultants who provide technical advice. It can be really helpful to get a multi-disciplinary approach to hearing information. It can be helpful to have the utility commission, public health folks, those in academia, as well as the developer.
As of right now, especially in rural areas, local governments have a hard task of balancing pushback while getting the most accurate, evidence-based, neutral information to make decisions. That balance can be contentious.
What is the federal government doing on data center policy? How is the Trump administration approaching it?
A few things there. In the early days, the drive was for AI expansion and to be competitive with foreign adversaries. Now due to the amount of public pushback in red and blue localities and a more cautious approach.
I’m not seeing a lot of actual policy movement at this time.
I know the EPA is looking at the chemicals used in cooling data centers because when that water is cycled through the system, some of it is discharged into the water system, so they’re looking at the Toxic Substances and Control Act for monitoring that.
How much of an impact does this minimal federal role have on industry behavior?
Y’know, this isn’t specific to data centers. This is true for all kinds of large-scale development: there’s a need to require some sort of federal monitoring and regulation.
That’s where I see an emerging role for public health. At the federal level, there could be policy movement towards requiring some sort of environmental monitoring at data centers to make sure they’re operating responsibility. Looking at specific water use relative to water availability and what happens when there’s a time of severe, persistent drought. With air quality too — we’ve seen areas where the grid isn’t as reliable so their diesel generators are kicking on more and affecting air quality for residents.
We’re just not seeing all of that right now. We need corporate disclosure.
What do you see as the most important public health impacts from data center development?
It varies by localities. The most discussed obviously is water usage. One thing I’d note about my conversations with folks enthusiastic around emerging tech is, there are still questions that need to be asked about the capacity of localities to support a data center. Like a small town in Kansas may only be using 40% of their water for their utility needs. If a data center came online, how much of that water goes to the data center?
One area underexplored within the public health discipline is energy poverty and energy security. The ability of a household to meet the needs of everything energy provides in our lives. It’s known we have an aging electric grid but we’re not talking enough about large-scale blackouts when the grid is not sufficient to support some of these new data centers.
Plus more of the week’s big development fights.
1. Laramie County, Wyoming — Meta is fighting the fine it received in the Cheyenne data center water pollution controversy, and the conflict between the tech giant and the city’s small board of public utilities is continuing to spill out into the public.
2. Niagara County, New York — This county just rejected a solar project’s highway work permits in a show of retaliation against the state’s Office of Renewable Energy Siting.
3. Barron County, Wisconsin — The anti-solar protest is the new campaign stop in deep red Wisconsin.
4. Chesapeake, Virginia — A large battery storage project on the Virginia coastline is on the rocks amidst rampant local opposition.
5. Lewis County, West Virginia — West Virginia is now a key battleground in the fight over transmission, as a line spanning all of West Virginia and Maryland — and cutting through Data Center Alley in Virginia — causes compounding consternation.