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America should eat more chicken. But how many is too many?

“The 1992–1993 Jack in the Box E. coli outbreak” sounds like a randomly generated target article for a round of the Wikipedia Game. But it goes a long way to explaining, well, me.
I was two months old when Washington State health officials informed the public about a massive E. coli contamination associated with hamburgers from Jack in the Box, and 3 months old when President Bill Clinton addressed the crisis on national television. My mom swore our family off eating red meat in response — understandably, since the outbreak largely affected, and killed, children within a few miles of our hometown in the Pacific Northwest. Her steadfastness was reinforced after my brother was born in the mid-1990s, just as another beef-borne illness was making international headlines: mad cow disease, a.k.a. the “United Kingdom BSE outbreak.”
As a result, I grew up not eating red meat, though by the time I was in middle school, this elaborate explanation for why I wasn’t touching my pepperoni pizza at a friend’s Skate King birthday party was beginning to draw odd looks (E. coli and mad cow disease long having faded from everyone else’s memories, Boston Legal fans not included). Things became much simpler to explain after I made the switch to full vegetarianism in high school, though I’d still occasionally get the disbelieving “you mean you’ve NEVER had BACON?!” response whenever someone got nosy about my dietary history and if I was abstaining “for animal cruelty reasons, or what?”
It turns out, though, that my weirdo childhood diet is now frequently touted as one of the best ways to eat for the sake of the planet (take that, Jennifer). Sometimes referred to as “pollotarianism” — which is incredibly confusing to try to pronounce if you speak any Spanish — the act of replacing red meat in your diet with poultry has been characterized by Gidon Eshel, a research professor of environmental physics at Bard College, as “the most impactful change” you can make for the climate “save going all-out vegan.”
I admit I was pleasantly surprised — okay, fine, smug — upon discovering that this would mean I’ve eaten positively for the planet my whole life (even if the aforementioned pollotarianism, and subsequent teenage conversion to vegetarianism, had nothing to do with the environment at the time). I could proselytize giving up beef as an accessible way of trying “to eat in the manner that takes note of the finality of Earth,” as Eshel so elegantly phrased it to me. After all, I’ve actually lived that chicken nugg life!
Recent climate activism has focused on pressuring big polluters and governments and moved away from the emphasis on individual responsibility, but one place you actually can feel like you’re making a meaningful difference for the planet is, in fact, in how you eat. “Somewhere between 20 and 35 percent of all emissions come from feeding ourselves,” Eshel explained. Our diets are “one of the few things where we can really take a major chunk out of our total emissions.”
And about a quarter of total greenhouse gas emissions from the food industry can be attributed specifically to beef production, which requires 28 times more land, six times more fertilizer, and 11 times more water than other animal products like chicken, dairy, or eggs. By one frequently cited estimate, replacing beef on your plate with chicken could cut your dietary carbon footprint in half.
That’s not insignificant: To become carbon neutral by 2050, every person on the planet would need to limit their emissions to an annual 2 tons of carbon dioxide equivalents or less, Germany’s Deutsche Welle reports; meat consumption alone “accounts for [a] … staggering 4.1 carbon dioxide equivalents in North America.” Beef is so significantly worse than other protein sources that if just 20 percent of the Americans who currently eat beef switched to anything else, it would “reduce the overall carbon footprint of all U.S. diets by 9.6 percent,” according to one study. Put another way, “people eating the same number of calories and the same number of grams of protein can have a vastly different impact,” Eshel told me. “Much more so than choices of car, much more — like tenfold or more.”
Sure, we could all just become vegetarians and vegans, but judging by how many people I’ve offended by confirming no, I’ve never had bacon, that reality is a long way off. And according to Eshel, it doesn’t even have to be aspirational: “There is only one thing that I can think of where, each time you avail yourself of it, you’re doing a significant damage to your overall diet: that would be beef,” he said. “Everything else is kind of, let’s call it negotiable.”
Eat chicken to save the planet seems like a simple enough sell. But emissions notwithstanding, there’s an ethical problem with this solution.
Standing in my kitchen, visualizing the production chains, something horrible and obvious started to dawn on me. Cows are big. Chickens are small. If we replace beef with poultry, we’re only shifting the barreling, destructive forces of man onto a track aimed straight at an unthinkable number of hens.
“Oh my god,” I blurted to my husband in horror as he was making us dinner. “I think I’ve created the trolley problem, with chickens.”
Because here’s the thing: The meat from one slaughtered cow is roughly the equivalent of meat from something like 100 to 150 chickens. “Globally we slaughter 320 million cows for meat each year,” Wired U.K. has written. “If we sourced all of that meat from chicken instead, we’d be killing an extra 41 billion animals.” There are some animal activists who are so alarmed by that math that they actually urge eating anything but chicken. As Matt Ball, whose organization One Step for Animals endorses this view, explained to me over email, “The only reason to care about the climate is how it impacts sentient beings. The only ethical stance is to promote choices that lead to less suffering.”
Meanwhile, the World Health Organization anticipates 250,000 additional human deaths due to climate change between 2030 and 2050. Though most people value human life over a chicken’s — arguably, in feeding ourselves, this is what we’re actively doing — 41 billion dead animals is a lot of misery. Industrially raised birds have uniquely ghastly existences, even by factory-farmed animal standards; according to John Webster, a veterinarian and leading authority on livestock welfare, the chicken industry is “the single most severe, systematic example of man’s inhumanity to another sentient animal.”
The “climate vs. animal well-being” tradeoff can be extrapolated out even further. Feedlot cows — an animal you don’t especially want to be — are fed greenhouse gas-curbing diets of grain, and thus produce up to 40 percent less methane than comparatively happy, but belchier, grass-fed cattle. Free-range chickens also have higher emissions than those that live in the hellish, windowless sheds exposed in PETA documentaries. There is no way around it: Climate-friendly omnivorous diets, and even climate-friendly vegetarian diets supplemented with eggs and dairy, often come at the expense of the increased suffering of animals.
Reeling in this existential horror, I presented the conundrum to Princeton University professor and renowned bioethicist Peter Singer, whose 1975 book Animal Liberation was foundational in the legitimizing of animal suffering and is considered a cornerstone of the modern animal welfare movement (a revised edition, Animal Liberation Now, will be out in May). The problem with my question, he pointed out, was the entire premise of an “ethical omnivore,” which — while perhaps not entirely impossible — would be very hard to realistically be, given the pervasiveness of inhumane practices in the meat industry. “It’s hard to find what are good choices, both from a humane point of view, not supporting cruelty to animals, and the climate point of view,” he agreed.
But all was not lost! “One thing that anybody can do, of course, is to reduce the consumption of meat and other animal products,” Singer suggested. That way, “you’re then reducing both your greenhouse gas contributions and your support of intensive farming and animal suffering.”
It’s a method Webster, the veterinarian, proposed to me, too. Due to the astonishing production capabilities of modern poultry farms, where hens are bred to grow at monstrous rates and reach slaughter weight around just 6 weeks old, chicken “has become a junk food ... it’s cheaper than dog food, it is grotesque,” he told me. If we’re going to be taking “food from animals, it’s got to be higher quality, less of it,” Webster went on. “And we’ve got to pay more for it, so we don’t eat so much. Which, of course, is incidentally, or coincidentally, entirely good in terms of animal welfare. It’s a win-win situation for the animals.” Of course, it’s not a win-win for the humans always; if meat becomes a luxury good then it will become predominantly a food for the rich, a problematic outcome in different ways.
Still, Americans actually are eating less beef than they used to, but we are also eating more animals, overall, than ever. The year 2022 set a record for meat consumption, and 2023 is projected to set a new one, due mainly to the increased consumption of chicken by U.S. households. “When additional meat choices are offered,” researcher Richard York discovered in a 2021 study, “that additional variety tends to … increase overall meat consumption,” rather than shift Americans from one kind of protein, like beef, to another.
Is the only truly ethical way to eat, then, to be a full vegan? Even that depends on who you ask. In Planta Sapiens: The New Science of Plant Intelligence, a forthcoming book by Paco Calvo, a professor of philosophy of science and the principal investigator at the Minimal Intelligence Lab at the Universidad de Murcia in Spain, the author makes the case that it’s “very unlikely that plants are not far more aware than we intuitively assume.” And if that’s true, then “we can no longer turn a blind eye to the ethical implications of our interactions with them,” he writes, since, “if an organism has awareness, then our treatment of it has implications for its suffering.”
Absurd as such a line of thinking might seem — Singer, for one, outright dismisses the possibility that plants feel pain in Animal Liberation, and Calvo will be the first to admit the theories in his book have yet to be accepted by the wider philosophical and biological science communities — I’ve actually found it to be one of the most enlightening ways to think about how we should approach food. Speaking with Calvo, he advised me against connecting climate-conscious eating and animal welfare too tightly, lest we “run the risk of feeling safe.” Just because someone is a vegetarian, for example, doesn’t mean they’re not practicing or supporting intensive agriculture and in doing so, unnecessarily stressing living organisms; that person might even be in a worse ethical position than someone living off of free-range, free-roaming animals. “It has to do not with the intrinsic value, or with the organism, per se, but with the suffering being inflicted unnecessarily, regardless of the kingdom of precedence,” Calvo said.
The argument of Planta Sapiens, after all, isn’t that we shouldn’t eat salads anymore, but that all life is deserving of dignity, even when that means humbling ourselves with the recognition that we might not have a monopoly on behavior, intelligence, and awareness. While I believe Singer is right — that it is difficult to minimize suffering as an omnivore within the parameters of the world most of us actually live in, i.e. one full of Costcos and Price Choppers — the important thing is to mitigate harm whenever and however we can. “I mean, it takes a toll, being alive,” Calvo counseled me. “So we’ve got to be realistic to some extent.”
Okay, so maybe I don’t have the moral high ground I thought I did on my hamburger-munching elementary school classmates who are now DIYing candles and chronicling their composting efforts on Instagram. The answer to “What is the best and most realistic diet for most people?” continues to be reflected well in the old Michael Pollanism: “Eat food. Not too much. Mostly plants.”
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A new Brown University report argues powering down a misaligned artificial intelligence would be tougher — and take longer — than many experts assume.
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It’s one of the most popular what-ifs about rogue artificial intelligence: Suppose an AI agent really were to get out of control and start threatening hospitals, flights, critical infrastructure, or even humanity as a whole. Why wouldn’t we just pull the plug on it?
A new report argues: We might not be able to. And the reason has to do with the energy system.
A new white paper from the Climate Solutions Lab at Brown University finds that U.S. electricity law offers essentially no way to rapidly power down a data center where a rogue AI agent is operating.
The problem is primarily legal, although technical issues could interfere as well. The rules and laws governing the power grid simply don’t countenance a scenario whereby an industrial facility might need to be suddenly disconnected from the grid in an urgent way, the report says. They also aren’t built for a world where something happening autonomously in a computing facility could affect people thousands of miles away — and require an immediate emergency response.
“If the United States concluded tomorrow that an AI system had escaped its deployer’s control and had to be stopped by cutting electrical power, neither federal nor state officials could swiftly do so within the law,” the paper warns.
While authorities might eventually be able to get a court order to disconnect a data center under existing law, that disconnection process could take long enough that a rogue agent might still be able to copy itself to another computer. And it would likely require a technician to go into the facility itself and cut backup power generation — which could itself be controlled by the misaligned agent.
Jeff Colgan, a political science and international affairs professor at Brown University and the report’s author, told me that he was inspired to write the report after studying the Hugging Face hack over the summer, in which a swarm of rogue ChatGPT models escaped OpenAI’s systems and infiltrated a French technology platform.
Colgan normally studies oil and gas companies, the power grid, and international political systems. (He put together the Iran War cost tracker earlier this year.) But after looking at loss-of-control research, he realized AI scientists had not always thought about how state and federal power law might interfere with their disaster planning.
“The folks who are focused on artificial intelligence may not realize that how the grid is managed is a complicated story,” he told me on Wednesday.
The paper focuses on what it calls a “middle-range scenario” in which an AI agent goes rogue. It imagines not a case in which a super-intelligent agent is hellbent on human extinction or civilizational destruction — Colgan assumes the army wouldn’t stand on legal ceremony in that scenario — but one in which an AI system, running on identifiable hardware, hacks into companies and hospitals, steals information, and begins to tamper with key software or demand ransom payments.
In such a scenario, leaders would face three core risks, he said — presuming that they even figured out what was happening in the first place. First, it might not be clear what data center to shut down or even where the agent “lives” in a facility, or even if it resides on a single server at all. The data center operator may also not want to assist in an investigation during that phase for fear of incurring liability. Second, even if the data center could be identified and disconnected, then it might have access to on-site backup power, which would require some kind of in-person intervention. Finally, no command structure exists today through which a public official’s order to disconnect a data center would lead to a technician, either on-site or remotely, pulling the plug.
Existing laws are a poor fit for these problems, Colgan told me. During crisis situations today, the FBI can disconnect a building from the power grid in order to avoid immediate harm to life or property. But it can’t do anything about backup generation inside a property’s fence line.
Nor are today’s federal and state laws built for a situation in which a grid connection needs to be be severed because of what a third-party is computing inside a facility, the report finds. Instead, today’s laws “provide emergency authority over the electrical grid only to address a supply problem or a physical attack on the system itself,” the report says.
In fact, in virtually any scenario now imagined by the law, authorities would need to go to the courts to disconnect a data center from the power grid. That could potentially take “valuable time” because it could give a rogue agent time to distribute copies of itself to other servers, the report says. Existing laws would likely treat any urgent disconnection as the state’s prerogative — and not the federal government’s — because states wield most legal authority over the power grid.
Even if authorities could quickly sever a data center’s hookup, there’s also almost no way to do so without causing collateral damage to every other tenant inside a data center, Colgan said. That risk could further delay a utility shut-off or make leaders skittish about pulling the plug. And since some data center tenants keep backup power capacity in the same “cage” where they run their servers, a worker would likely need to go to the specific racks where an agent “resides” inside a facility to power it down.
The report doesn’t make policy recommendations, in part because frontier AI models are developing so rapidly — and the subject is so “deeply technical” — that it exceeds Colgan’s ability to advise legislative changes, he said. But he does recommend that AI experts and developers begin involving local grid authorities in their emergency scenario planning.
“You need someone from Anthropic to sit down with their utility, with someone from their [public utility commission], with someone from FERC,” he told me, referencing the federal agency that oversees the power grid. Those meetings should arguably happen in every state where an AI company is computing, and they should include discussion of how to locate an AI agent on a computing property and what to do if operators lose control.
Colgan offered another recommendation by phone on Wednesday. Given data centers’ deep unpopularity, many tech companies and data center developers are now willing to strike community benefits agreements with state or local governments in exchange for the right to build a new facility. Those contracts should recognize these AI alignment and electricity problems, he argued.
“There is this real political window to say, ‘If you want to build a data center, you must show that you could — if necessary — shut down specific server racks without doing massive collateral damage to everyone else,” he said. “This is the moment to do this, because there is some political leverage and because there is such demand for these data centers.”
‘When China wants to do something, boy, they move fast.’
The electrolyzer has come a long way in the nearly 250 years since a pair of Dutch scientists first used electricity to split water into hydrogen and oxygen. Over the decades, European and American scientists refined and commercialized this technology, yet it is China that now accounts for nearly 70% of global electrolyzer manufacturing capacity, churning out the machines that make clean hydrogen from water at a fraction of Western costs. Its factories are building far more equipment than its domestic hydrogen market can absorb, and exports are climbing. On paper, China looks poised to dominate the global electrolyzer and green hydrogen markets, much as it already has solar panels and batteries.
“It stands to reason that the Chinese would want to capture the market just like they did everything else,” Rinaldo Brutoco, a hydrogen investor and founder of the think tank World Business Academy, told me. Beijing’s latest Five-Year Plan certainly lends credence to that ambition, repeatedly calling for the development of green hydrogen, hydrogen-derived fuels, and electrolyzers, even as other nations lag behind their once-ambitious clean hydrogen targets.
But it’s not actually obvious that the technology will go the way of solar. For one, Western governments are increasingly wary of dependence on Chinese energy technologies and are trying to bolster domestic manufacturing and limit foreign competition through measures like tariffs, domestic-content bonuses, and subsidy eligibility restrictions. The West also specializes in its own electrolyzer tech, which relies on proton exchange membranes. Though more expensive than China’s typical alkaline electrolyzers, PEM systems pair better with intermittent renewable power.
China’s tech is improving, though, and its electrolyzer stacks — the pile of cells where water splits into hydrogen and oxygen — cost about 60% less than Western alternatives. But the stack only accounts for about 6% to 9% of the total levelised cost of clean hydrogen production; most of the expense comes from electrical and process equipment, labor, and, most importantly, clean electricity. That single-digit cost advantage may not be enough to sway foreign buyers, especially since some cheaper designs come with trade-offs in efficiency, lifecycle, and warranty coverage.
“When the project as a whole is considered, there’s a lot less deviation between the Chinese technology and the rest of the world’s,” Thomas Koller, regional hydrogen lead at the Norwegian energy and maritime consultancy DNV, told me. But China is working on that, he added. “They’re very competitive already on the stack. But now they know that they also want to be competitive on how that stack can integrate with the wider electrolyzer system.”
Cracking that system-level cost issue could bring China much closer to achieving global market dominance. DNV calculates that to meet the Paris Agreement’s targets, clean hydrogen would need to supply around 15% of global energy demand by 2050 — and the production equipment and resultant clean molecules would have to come from somewhere.
In the meantime, however, the analysts I spoke with agreed that China’s domestic green hydrogen market is positioned for a near-term boom, as the government pushes adoption across fertilizer, chemicals, oil refining, steel, and transportation. “Demand is really the key takeaway that I see from this new Five-Year Plan — shifting from production to thinking about demand,” Koller told me.
And while the plan was pretty much complete before the Iran war broke out, the ongoing disruption in the Strait of Hormuz has underscored the logic behind China’s hydrogen push, as the country previously relied on the Strait for up to half of its crude oil imports. “It’s placed them in a pretty good position — in respect of hydrogen at least — to try and strengthen one of these areas that can reduce dependence on imported oil,” Koller said of the Five-Year Plan.
China is already the world’s largest hydrogen producer and consumer by a wide margin, using the gas as a key industrial feedstock for its vast chemicals and heavy industry sectors. But today, the industry makes nearly all of that hydrogen with fossil fuels.
Beijing made clear in its latest Five-Year Plan, released in March, that it wants to change that. According to an unofficial translation, the state promised to “expand applications of hydrogen energy in transportation, electricity, industrial, and other domains,” while improving “renewable energy hydrogen production equipment” and advancing “the hydrogen energy industry chain toward green ammonia, methanol, and sustainable aviation fuels.” (China has not published an official English translation of the plan.)
The country certainly has the manufacturing capacity to support these ambitions. After hundreds of manufacturers poured into the electrolyzer industry earlier this decade, China now produces about 35 gigawatts worth of this equipment annually, compared with less than 2 gigawatts of domestic demand. The resulting glut has even led some producers to sell their equipment below cost, echoing the dynamics of the solar industry in the early 2010s. Now, Beijing is trying to build a green hydrogen market to soak up the surplus, elevating production of the fuel — and derivatives like ammonia, methanol, and SAF — to a national priority.
“They’re talking about nationwide pipelines for hydrogen. They’re talking about a regionalized cluster strategy; they have very hard targets for green hydrogen sales,” Brutoco told me.
China is targeting 2 million metric tons of renewable hydrogen production annually by 2030, an eightfold increase from roughly 0.25 million metric tons today. The government has also designated five city clusters as green hydrogen demonstration zones, each eligible for up to about $240 million over four years to scale up the fuel’s use across sectors including transportation, metallurgy, and green ammonia and methanol production — and to build the pipelines required to move it.
“Hydrogen has clearly moved up in political visibility,” Qi Qin, a China analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, told me back in March.
All of this stands in stark contrast to Western markets, where low-carbon hydrogen projects continue to be delayed or scrapped amid weak demand and waning political support. Clean hydrogen is still far more expensive than its fossil fuel-based counterpart; buyers remain reluctant to pay a green premium, and policy uncertainty over the past few years has clouded the industry outlook. In the U.S., the rollback of Inflation Reduction Act incentives has weakened the economic case for green hydrogen, while in Europe, delays to regulatory decisions and missed deadlines for implementing hydrogen mandates have added to the uncertainty.
“Many companies were really thinking that the hydrogen economy was going to take off, and in the end, this has not been the case,” Anne-Sophie Corbeau, a researcher at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, told me. “The cost of the whole electrolyzer system is actually much higher than what we thought at the beginning.” That, combined with advances in batteries and other electrification technologies like industrial heat pumps, has arguably narrowed the range of applications where green hydrogen makes sense.
But perhaps the problem is simply a failure of imagination. After all, no country has yet demonstrated what a scaled-up clean hydrogen industry could look like, either physically or economically. The next few years, however, could offer a decent preview.
“When China wants to do something, boy, they move fast,” Brutoco told me. And there’s no doubt Beijing wants to capitalize on its burgeoning hydrogen economy. “They need more export markets because their housing boom — which busted — ain’t coming back in the near future,” he argued, explaining that new export opportunities could help revive Beijing’s sluggish economy. He sees electrolyzers and hydrogen as “low-hanging fruit,” given the country’s existing domestic buildout.
As for the argument that cheap Chinese electrolyzer stacks do comparably little to reduce the overall installed cost of a clean hydrogen project, Brutoco doesn’t buy it. He doubts developers would forgo potential savings — and the additional revenue that could generate — simply to align themselves with their administration’s protectionist preferences. “Did you ever know a business person that would like to shave 5% to 10%?” he asked.
Then there’s the question of performance. China’s alkaline electrolyzers have historically been slower to ramp up and down in tandem with variable renewable power compared with PEM systems. But Brutoco argues that today’s improving alkaline tech is more than capable of serving utility-scale renewable projects in areas with relatively consistent sun or wind. Koller likewise sees Chinese alkaline manufacturers as credible contenders for a range of overseas projects.
“I would expect that all of the European projects that are electrolyzer-driven, they will be considering Chinese electrolyzers, among others,” he told me. The case could prove even stronger elsewhere in the APAC region, including India, Japan, South Korea, and Australia. “All of the projects that I can recall having seen for Asia Pacific [...] at least some Chinese technology has been considered.”
But since Amy Ouyang, a senior hydrogen associate at the Clean Air Task Force, has been tracking the industry, she told me that “the narrative has shifted.” Just three years ago, many analysts expected Chinese electrolyzers to follow the trajectory of solar panels, with rock-bottom prices eventually squeezing Western manufacturers out of the market. But today’s more protectionist trade environment has made her reconsider that assumption.
“Maybe in the 2010s, the European countries and the U.S. were not really prepared to say, ‘We’re going to turn away Chinese solar panels just because they’re made in China,’” she told me. But Washington in particular has soured on its earlier laissez-faire approach to trade, perhaps regretting that while the U.S. and allied nations pioneered technologies such as solar cells and lithium-ion batteries, China ultimately scaled them — capturing millions of manufacturing jobs in the process.
Energy shocks from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the Iran war have further pushed Western policymakers toward a focus on domestic manufacturing, energy security, and even food security, Corbeau, the Columbia researcher, told me, given that about a third of globally traded fertilizer passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Now, she said, more countries are likely thinking, “What if we use our hydro, geothermal, maybe cheap renewables, in order to produce hydrogen domestically and produce ammonia domestically and produce fertilizer domestically?”
It all adds up to an environment where Ouyang sees “a lot more willingness to protect their own domestic industries from the low price of the Chinese electrolyzers,” she said.
The problem is, there simply isn’t much of a Western clean hydrogen industry to actually protect right now. Spurring demand will require political will and economic incentives to persuade hydrogen end users to make deals and help the nascent industry move down the cost curve. But with wholesale electricity prices rising and the Trump administration dismantling renewable energy legislation, the U.S. in particular looks unlikely to invest in much manufacturing capacity anytime soon.
But if the West does decide to double down, it might be better off conceding the price war from the outset. “A Western electrolyzer stack would probably struggle to match China’s lowest bid on an electrolyzer stack,” Koller explained, advising against trying to replicate China’s commodity-scale manufacturing model. “I would see their stronger position being if they can demonstrate different performance, different integration, offer a different type of service, an improved lifecycle emissions statement.”
That is, the answer probably isn’t to beat China at its own game. The U.S. and Europe might never win on cost, but that doesn’t mean they can’t build and scale a superior technology before yet another industry slips out of their reach.
Only upgrades for pre-existing wind projects have been approved.
In September, the Trump administration told a reporter that the president directed the Pentagon to finally process wind projects through routine airspace approvals as required under a court order. By doing this, it created the appearance of real headway and good faith in talks with Democrats in Congress on energy permitting legislation before the November midterm elections.
But the White House’s assurances are not what they seem.
All of the projects the administration has reportedly advanced over the past week are repowerings, meaning they’re only upgrades of existing projects, and two of the “projects” they’ve advanced were just two individual turbines, the American Clean Power Association on Tuesday told members involved in litigation with the administration.
Over the course of his presidency, the president’s team has turned what was once a sleepy bureaucratic check for radar or flight interference into a weapon against wind energy in the United States. You need Federal Aviation Administration clearance for any structure above 200 feet in the air and that process includes a Pentagon review. By claiming wind projects suddenly needed new scrutiny for national security reasons, the Pentagon held up FAA airspace approvals for apparently hundreds of projects.
This has been a key part of bipartisan energy legislation talks back in D.C., as Democrats in Congress have demanded at least some semblance of regular order be returned to renewable energy in federal permitting. The permitting bill ostensibly has ways to strengthen wind companies’ hand in dealing with a hostile Trump administration but negotiators, including Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, have also previously called attacks on wind projects during negotiations harmful to a final deal becoming law.
In September, Politico reported Trump told his aides he would agree to direct the Defense Department to “start clearing its queue of long-delayed onshore wind projects to strike a deal” citing “two people familiar with the talks and granted anonymity.” Among the commitments Politico reported were made: to approve about 30 projects awaiting a countersignature from the Pentagon on a mitigation agreement related to airspace impacts.
In federal court, the renewable energy trade groups who brought the lawsuit clearly don’t think the Trump administration actually followed through with that promise.
On Oct. 20, after updates from the Justice Department showed little signs of progress (which I wrote about), the trade groups filed a motion to enforce the judge’s stay on their air clearance freeze, saying that very little had advanced since the ruling in early August, and that none of the 30 projects awaiting countersignature on their mitigation agreements actually had advanced from Pentagon review. In addition, they said the government was now asking project developers to sign onto a litany of new requirements in exchange for a sign-off on mitigation agreements. They submitted a joint declaration from subject matter experts, including from former military personnel, who described these requirements as a vast departure from precedent with little basis in security rationale that they said also had terms that could violate state or local laws, like a blanket prohibition on aircraft detection light systems. (You can read the declaration here.)
Two days later, on Oct. 22, it started to look like we were getting somewhere when news outlets reported the Trump administration was "advancing" two “wind projects” in South Dakota and Maine, citing statements from the White House and the Pentagon.
Bob Ditchey, a spokesperson for the Pentagon, told us in an email that the two “wind projects” were Crowned Ridge, which he said consisted of 87 turbines in “Grant, SD,” and “Blue Sky/Hill,” which he said was made up of 19 turbines in “Hancock, ME.” Ditchey described them both as “proposed” wind energy “developments.”
“Following rigorous evaluation of potential impacts on military readiness, radar installations, and airspace operations, the DoW has cleared both projects to proceed to the next phase of federal evaluation,” Ditchey said in an email. “The projects have been formally referred to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for final aeronautical study and determination.”
The South Dakota wind project Trump officials are referencing is likely NextEra’s Crowned Ridge wind farm, which has 87 turbines and has been operational since 2019. On Oct. 5 a NextEra project consultant submitted a litany of height clearance requests for a “repowering project” on behalf of Crowned Ridge Energy Center, LLC, according to the Federal Aviation Administration’s public database. The requests are for turbines in Grant County.
There is no Maine wind project with the name “Blue Sky/Hill,” as far as we can tell, but there is a project in Hancock County that was completed in 2012 called “Bull Hill” that consists of 19 turbines, and which also has pending applications for repowering in the FAA’s database.
Neither NextEra nor Bull Hill’s developer, TerraForm Power, responded to our requests for comment. The Pentagon also did not respond to questions about these projects or the additional ones it said it had advanced.
In addition, as of this story’s publication, all of the air clearance requests for these two projects are all listed as “pending” online.
If you’re wondering why operational wind farms might need air clearances for construction, all of the wind farms’ requests describe the projects as “repowering,” an industry term that applies to upgrading, modifying, altering or restarting pre-existing wind farms. A repowering can mean anything from fixing turbine blades to changing turbine height, or moving a turbine, or commissioning new turbines entirely. Crucially though it’s not really considered a “new wind farm” in the colloquial sense. As my colleague Matthew Zeitlin has explained, repowerings are seen by the energy sector as a simple pathway to the most juice for the squeeze from what has already been permitted and built.
On Tuesday, Punchbowl News reported that the White House was advancing three more wind projects in Illinois and Iowa. After this story ran, American Clean Power told members involved in the airspace litigation clarifying that all of the projects thus far are “repowerings” and that the two Illinois “projects” each were only individual wind turbines. None of the projects were new utility scale projects.
On Wednesday, just before this story went to press, Punchbowl News reported another two wind projects were advancing, calling it “more permitting goodwill from the White House.” We have not yet been able to confirm what these projects are or whether they are also repowering projects.
American Clean Power endorsed the bipartisan Senate permitting bill and called for its passage. The group provided a comment from Frank Macchiarola, their chief advocacy officer: “To date, the administration has moved forward only a handful of the total number of projects they agreed to approve. In order to pass BAAJA and bring down costs for Americans, the Administration needs to get serious about building clean power.”
The White House did not respond to a request for comment.