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The end has been coming for a while. With the EPA’s new power plant emissions rules, though, it’s gotten a lot closer.

There’s no question that coal is on its way out in the U.S. In 2001, coal-fired power plants generated about 50% of U.S. electricity. Last year, they were down to about 15%.
On Thursday, however, the Biden administration arguably delivered a death blow. New carbon emission limits for coal plants establish a clear timeline by which America’s remaining coal generators must either invest in costly carbon capture equipment or close. With many of these plants already struggling to compete with cheaper renewables and natural gas, it’s not likely to be much of a choice. If the rule survives legal challenges, the nation’s coal fleet could be extinct by 2039.
Coal plant retirement presents a two-pronged problem: Utilities have to figure out how to replace lost power generation, and the surrounding community must reckon with the lost tax revenue and jobs from the power plants and the coal mines that supplied them.
From the beginning, Biden has promised to help revitalize the economies of the communities left in coal’s wake. “We’re never going to forget the men and women who dug the coal and built the nation,” he said when he laid out his energy transition plan just a week after entering office. “We’re going to do right by them.”
Economic revitalization doesn’t happen overnight, of course, or even in the span of a four-year term. But money is already rolling out in the form of targeted investments in new energy sources, businesses, and jobs in coal communities, and there’s more to come.
It’s the proactive planning aspect, however, that remains underresourced and scattershot.
Emily Grubert, a civil engineer and sociologist at the University of Notre Dame, told me there are few plants that are expected to make it past 2039 regardless, due to their age and the economics of operating them. The emissions rule’s real potential, then, is to bring about a more orderly — and potentially less painful — exit.
A Heatmap analysis of Energy Information Administration data found that of the nation’s roughly 230 remaining coal plants, 38 are scheduled to fully shut down by 2032. These plants won’t have to make any changes under the new rule. An additional five will shutter by 2039. These will be required to reduce their emissions in the interim, beginning in 2030, by replacing some of the coal they burn with natural gas. That leaves about 190 plants with either partial retirement plans or no plans at all that will be forced to make a decision between carbon capture and shutting down.
Grubert told me that many of these plants have, in fact, communicated informal plans to shut down that are not recorded in the federal data. That aside, she called it “amazing” how many have no retirement plans at all.
For surrounding communities, an impending coal transition can look really different in different places, depending on geography and how diverse the local economy is. Still, the first step should be the same everywhere. “What you need to do, really practically, is figure out what that plant is supporting,” Grubert told me. “What needs to be replaced, for whom, and by when?
It’s a lot more concrete than it seems: It’s some specific number of people, it’s some specific amount of tax revenue. It’s much easier to move forward once you actually know what those are.”
How much of that work has been done so far depends, in part, on the state. Some, like Colorado, New Mexico, and Illinois, have established new positions or entirely new offices dedicated to helping communities transition off fossil fuels. But other states, like Wyoming and Ohio, have advanced measures to keep coal plants open as long as possible.
Successful planning also depends on how clearly a retirement date is articulated and stuck to, Jeffrey Jacquet, an associate professor of rural sociology at Ohio State University who leads a multidisciplinary research project on coal communities there, told me. Some communities have been told one date and then been blindsided when a plant has been forced to shut down years earlier for economic reasons. He noted one success story in Shadyside, Ohio, where the local school board was able to negotiate a deal to slowly step down its tax collections over four years after learning the RE Burger coal plant was going to close. “Had they not weaned us off losing that tax revenue, we would have been in terrible shape,” a school board administrator told a student on Jacquet’s project. “Fiscally we’re pretty good on solid ground now, but at one point it was an extremely bleak time.”
The new power plant rule could help address some of these problems by putting the entire country on the same set timeline, forcing plant operators to put retirement dates in writing. There’s still a risk some will fail early, in unforeseen ways, but at least communities will have been put on notice.
Those who go looking for help will find ample resources. When I started looking into all of the programs that exist to bring investment into coal communities, or otherwise help them diversify their economies, I was surprised at how much investment in coal communities had already been set in motion:
This list is far from comprehensive. In fact, there are so many programs, it’s kind of a problem.
“So much of it comes down to the local capacity to take advantage of these opportunities,” Jacquet told me. “A lot of these communities are losing population, they’re facing out-migration. Community leaders are already overworked and overstressed.” (Possible case in point: I reached out to several local groups doing coal transition work in West Virginia and Kentucky for this story, and wasn’t able to get anyone on the phone.)
This isn’t a new problem, per se. The federal government had dozens of programs and pots of money set aside for rural economic development before the Biden administration came into the White House, but they were scattered across different agencies and departments within those agencies, making it difficult for any overworked, overstressed town manager to know where to start.
Jeremy Richardson, a manager of the carbon-free electricity program at the think tank RMI, told me he was involved in a group that pitched policies to the incoming president that would help ease the process. “It shouldn’t be on the community to navigate the entire federal bureaucracy to figure out what they qualify for,” he said.
Biden took the note. In his first climate executive order, he established the Interagency Working Group on Coal and Power Plant Communities and Economic Revitalization, which is building tools to help companies and local governments identify funding opportunities. Its “getting started guide,” which Richardson called a “fantastic piece of work,” walks communities and workers through 10 concrete steps, from identifying needs to developing a transition strategy to finding funding and implementing a project, with curated resources for each step. The group also established four “rapid response” teams to provide more targeted assistance to communities in areas with the highest loss of coal assets.
Jacquet summed up the group’s work as “hand holding,” stressing that it still required people at the local level that were willing and able to take advantage of these services. “I think we’re sort of seeing this phenomenon where the communities that are already best positioned to take advantage of these are going to be the ones that take advantage of it,” he said.
There are other limitations to the broader suite of federal assistance programs. For instance, even if a community is able to attract a big manufacturing project, there may be a several-years gap between the coal plant closing and the new job opportunities and local tax revenue manifesting.
That’s why the coordination efforts in states like Colorado, which was the first to establish an Office of Just Transition in 2019, are so promising. The office has a small staff of six, and a meager budget of $15 million, but is making progress by focusing on highly targeted assistance. In the town of Craig, two nearby coal-fired power plants are scheduled to retire over the next four years and four coal mines will shutter by 2030, taking with them 900 jobs and about 45% of the county’s tax revenue. A new “transition navigator” hired in January will help match the town’s needs with federal and state funding opportunities and serve as a central point of contact for coal workers and their families seeking connection to services.
“I think it’s been really helpful,” said Richardson. “They’ve had long conversations — several years of conversations — with those communities in northwest Colorado that are facing closures soon.” The office was controversial at first. Republicans called it “Orwellian” and unanimously opposed it. But in the years since, some of its staunchest critics have become its biggest champions. “To me that says that they’re doing some good work and they’re making some inroads.”
There’s progress on the energy side, too. RMI is pushing a model called “clean repowering,” enabled by a suite of IRA incentives that offer tax credits and loan guarantees for clean energy projects in fossil fuel communities. The idea is that renewable energy projects can get around the yearslong bottleneck of connecting to the grid by building in close proximity to existing fossil fuel plants. A lot of these plants have “spare” interconnection rights that a solar or wind farm could use to connect a lot sooner.
RMI found 250 gigawatts of spare rights available — which is more than the capacity of the entire existing coal fleet. “If you can build a renewable facility alongside where that fossil plant is, maybe you use the fossil plant a little less because it’s cheaper to generate from the renewables, but you know, you don’t have to close it immediately,” said Richardson.
As Daniel Raimi, a fellow at Resources for the Future, told me, even though the coal transition has been in motion for decades, it’s still early. There hasn’t been enough research. Much of the funding and programs are new. No one really knows yet what’s working, or what could work better.
The only thing that’s clear, he said, is that if these communities are going to develop alternative economic futures, they really need to begin that process now.
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A new Heatmap Pro poll shows a rapid shift in public opinion since last fall.
Americans have changed their minds about data centers. Decisively.
At least seven in 10 Americans would now oppose a data center being built near their home, according to a new Heatmap Pro poll, a record low that reveals a staggering shift in public opinion against the facilities powering the artificial intelligence boom.
The survey, conducted by Embold Research, finds that an outright majority of Americans are now strongly opposed to data center construction in their area. Young people, Democrats, and rural voters are more hostile to the projects, but they are broadly unpopular with Americans across geographic and political categories.
The new result reflects a rapid and profound shift in public opinion.
When Heatmap first asked Americans how they would feel about a nearby data center project last September, Americans were evenly split: 43% said they would support it, 42% were opposed, and 15% said they weren’t sure.
When asked the same question in February, Americans were more skeptical. Forty-eight percent said they would support a data center project or weren’t sure, while 51% opposed one in their area.
Now, 55% of Americans — an absolute majority — “strongly” oppose a data center project built near where they live, and an additional 16% are “somewhat” opposed. Only 21% of Americans would support a new nearby data center. The public has swung 49 points against data centers in just nine months, underscoring the heightened political salience of the facilities and the AI industry that they embody.
Other statistics suggest that the public’s skepticism of data centers is surging. At least 20 data center projects were canceled after facing significant public backlash in the first quarter of this year, according to Heatmap Pro data released last month. That is more than double the number that were canceled the previous quarter, the data shows.
The canceled projects from the first quarter wiped out more than $41 billion in planned investment and at least 3.5 gigawatts of electricity demand, according to the Heatmap Pro review.
Little wonder: The new polling shows that skepticism of data centers is widespread across all age groups, political parties, and regions of the country. Some 78% of Americans who said they voted for Kamala Harris in the 2024 election would oppose a local data center project; so would 63% of Americans who reported voting for Donald Trump. And no region of the U.S. saw less than 69% data center opposition.
For the past decade, many political issues have polarized along urban and rural lines, with city dwellers lining up on the liberal side of an issue and rural voters trending more conservative. But the new poll suggests data centers may be defying that trend: Data centers are slightly more unpopular among rural voters than among other voters.
Americans in smaller communities were 54 points opposed, on net, to a data center getting built near their home — in other words, 73% opposed a project, while 19% supported it. Suburbanites and urban voters were 48 and 47 points net opposed, respectively.
Young voters are also strongly against data centers. Eighty percent of Americans ages 18 to 34 said they would oppose a new data center near where they live.
Republicans, non-white Americans, and people who did not go to college are slightly more supportive of data centers in their communities than the median, but even that left the developments at least 30 points underwater.
Just 5% of Democrats, by contrast, said they would “strongly” support a data center getting built in their area, with another 10% describing partial support. Sixty-three percent of Democrats would strongly oppose the project and another 15% would somewhat oppose it.
Five percent of independents would strongly support a data center in their area, with 11% somewhat in support. Seventy-two percent of independents would be strongly or somewhat opposed to such a project.
The Heatmap Pro poll of 4,118 American registered voters was conducted by Embold Research via text-to-web responses from May 15 to 28, 2026. The survey included interviews with Americans in all 50 states and Washington, D.C. The margin of sampling error is plus or minus 1.6 percentage points.
Attorney General Letitia James leads a group of states suing the administration’s move to buy back two offshore wind leases.
A group of Northeast attorneys general led by New York’s Letitia James is suing the Trump administration for paying TotalEnergies nearly $1 billion to walk away from its two U.S. offshore wind leases.
The lawsuit, filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on Tuesday, alleges that the government’s settlement agreement with Total violates the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the statute governing offshore wind, as well as the Judgment Fund Act, which controls the pot of money the federal government uses to pay legal settlements. The other plaintiffs are New Jersey, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
“After repeatedly losing in court, this administration cooked up a sham deal to pay a foreign energy company hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars to abandon offshore wind and invest in oil and gas instead,” James said in a press release. “We are fighting back to stop this illegal agreement that threatens to erase over a thousand union jobs and cheat millions of New Yorkers out of clean, affordable energy.”
On March 23, the Interior Department announced it had reached an agreement with Total to cancel two offshore wind leases in the New York area and refund the $928 million cost back to the company; in exchange, the announcement said, Total would invest an equivalent amount in U.S. oil and gas projects. In a later release, the department said it would pay Total from the Judgment Fund, a permanently appropriated pot of money overseen by the Treasury Department used to settle ongoing or imminent litigation.
According to the signed settlement agreement, the Trump administration said that it would have suspended construction on the lease indefinitely due to national security concerns, after which Total would have claimed breach of contract, but instead, the two parties settled.
James’ lawsuit claims that this does not meet the Judgment Fund’s standard for imminent litigation. “A hypothetical lawsuit to challenge an agency action that had not even been threatened — here, the suspension or cancellation of the Lease — does not constitute actual or imminent litigation under the Judgment Fund Act,” it says.
The lawsuit also contends that there was no actual disagreement between the parties. Both Total and the Trump administration wanted to cancel the leases, it says, citing reporting from Axios in which Total’s CEO asserted that the agreement “came from us — we took the initiative.”
If the parties wanted to cancel the leases, they could have done so legally under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. But the government’s actions violate that statute as well, according to the lawsuit. Proper procedure would have required a hearing to investigate whether continued activity on the lease would cause serious harm to the environment or national security, and whether the advantages of cancelling outweigh those of continuing to honor the lease. The law also requires the administration to notify and coordinate with the governors of affected states, which the Interior Department did not do, the suit argues.
The states that brought the lawsuit allege the terminations will harm their economies, energy grids, and climate goals. New Jersey awarded a contract to one of Total’s offshore wind projects, called Attentive Energy Two, in 2024; the finished development would have provided the state 1.3 gigawatts of power, enough to power about 650,000 homes. On its own, the agreement would have gone a third of the way toward fulfilling a state law passed in 2018 that required New Jersey to procure 3.5 gigawatts of offshore wind energy. In addition to feeding the state’s tight electricity market, in which demand is now outpacing supply, the Attentive Energy Project would have delivered an estimated $3.1 billion in direct, indirect, and induced benefits into New Jersey’s economy.
New York did not have an active contract with any projects under development within the leased areas, but it was anticipating Total bidding into the state’s next round of offshore wind solicitations, according to the lawsuit. The state has many aging power plants nearing retirement, and its grid operator has warned that the New York City area faces a reliability risk without new generation coming online. Total’s project would have provided “critical energy diversity benefits” to the city, the suit says.
The Interior Department disputed the basis for the lawsuit, telling Heatmap that “the only thing blatantly unlawful here was the process by which these offshore wind leases were negotiated and imposed under the Biden administration.” A spokesperson reiterated that “there were serious national security risks that demanded immediate attention,” although did not elaborate on what those risks were. They also emphasized that the settlement agreements were voluntary and were approved by the Department of Justice.
“Attempts to rewrite history now cannot erase the reality of these projects and the damage they could cause,” they said.
Offshore wind advocates, however, applauded the suit. “We commend the Northeast Governors for standing up again against actions that threaten jobs, investment, and the nation's ability to meet growing electricity demand with an affordable and reliable energy source,” Liz Burdock, the president and CEO of the Oceantic Network, said.
A new scientific report on the state of the industry shows a growing gap between what we can do and what we need to do.
The gap between the world’s current capacity to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and the amount we’ll need to remove to materially address climate change is so large, it's hard to fathom crossing it. Now, a new report warns that the chasm is widening.
The third State of Carbon Dioxide Removal report, published on Tuesday, finds that while carbon removal research and deployment has advanced significantly in the past two years, it is still not growing quickly enough to reach the scale required to support the Paris Agreement temperature limits. Carbon emissions, meanwhile, have continued to rise globally, raising the amount of carbon removal required in turn.
“We’re seeing a lot of signs that there’s still growth happening,” Morgan Edwards, an assistant professor of public affairs at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, and one of the authors, told me. “But we need to see a step change in both early indicators like investment and also actual deployments” between now and 2030, in addition to serious emission reductions, she said.
The State of Carbon Dioxide Removal is a project between researchers at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, the University of Maryland, the University of Oxford, the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, and the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. The latest report collates a wide range of indicators to assemble a detailed portrait of progress in the sector, from the number of research papers and patents published, to project deployments, costs, and investment, to voluntary purchases and policies.
The world currently removes approximately 2.2 billion tons of carbon from the atmosphere each year through intentional human activity, the authors found, which is equivalent to about 5% of annual global carbon dioxide emissions. Nearly all of that carbon removal happens through what the authors deem “conventional” methods, which include planting trees, improved forest management, soil sequestration on farms and grasslands, and coastal wetland restoration.
Less than 1% of the 2.2 billion tons comes from “novel” methods such as direct air capture, bioenergy with carbon capture, enhanced weathering, and biochar, the most common method. Novel carbon removal increased from 1.4 million tons in 2023 to 2 million tons in 2025, with biochar responsible for most of that. In total, novel forms of carbon removal have to grow to 70 million by 2030 and 360 million by 2035 for the world to achieve net zero and begin to reverse warming back down to 1.5 degrees Celsius this century, the authors found. And that’s assuming the emissions curve starts to bend dramatically downward.
“The gap will continue to grow if we do not pursue immediate and ambitious emissions reductions today,” Edwards said. Though the Paris Agreement’s 1.5-degree goal looks to be receding further out of reach, she stressed that net-zero emissions implies significant carbon removal, regardless of what temperature target you’re aiming for.
No matter how you look at it, getting to 70 million tons by 2030 would require a major shift. Right now, the most optimistic expectation for how much the carbon removal industry will grow by that point, based on corporate announcements, is about 42 million tons per year by 2030, according to the report. The capacity in the pipeline from projects that are under construction, however, amounts to just 8.4 million by 2030. At the country level, only about a third of national climate strategies even mention novel carbon removal methods, and overall carbon removal ambition among countries would have to double to close the 2030 gap.
This isn’t impossible — other technologies have achieved comparable growth rates. The report’s authors estimate that carbon removal would have to scale at speeds similar to solar power and electric vehicles. Unlike those singular solutions, however, carbon removal consists of many different technologies that intersect with a range of industries — oil and gas drilling, farming, forestry, mining — and therefore may not scale as linearly. Also, unlike EVs and solar, carbon removal isn’t a useful product with an obvious market. It’s a public good, like waste management — and an expensive one, at that.
Carbon removal funding is also highly concentrated, the authors warn, making the industry vulnerable to sudden shifts in policy and investment appetite. For example, Microsoft alone has made more than 80% of carbon removal purchases to date; then in April it confirmed it was pausing procurements, leaving behind major uncertainty over who, if anyone, will fill its role in the market. Similarly, most government funding for pilot projects to date has concentrated in three countries — the U.S., Sweden, and Denmark — but more recently the U.S. has dismantled much of its support.
The industry is also concentrated in terms of deployment. Biochar and bioenergy with carbon capture account for almost all of the 2 million tons of novel removals the authors identified. Direct air capture facilities removed just 1,500 tons in 2025, according to the report. All of that came from Climeworks’ two facilities in Iceland — Orca and Mammoth — and it’s significantly less than the roughly 40,000 tons these facilities were designed to capture each year. (While there are a few other direct air capture plants operating, they have not yet had any removals certified by a third party, and so were not included in the estimate.)
There are some bright spots in the report. Research funding, scientific publications, demonstration projects, public policies, and private investment in carbon removal are all trending up. It’s just that the results of these efforts — in terms of patents, projects under construction, and the amount of carbon being removed — are uneven.
While the report is a valiant effort to assess how far carbon removal has come, the overall picture remains deeply uncertain. That word, “uncertain,” appears over and over, applying to such questions as:
The authors emphasize the need for more research, public policy, and funding to narrow these uncertainties — especially on the demand side of the equation.
“Both demand and supply side policies are important for innovation, but much of the policy we’ve seen for CDR today has been more supply-side focused,” said Edwards. “There’s a need for a strong signal to companies who are developing these technologies and implementing CDR on the ground that the demand will be there.”