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A cynical optimist’s take on the Inflation Reduction Act.

The optimistic case for the Inflation Reduction Act — even under a Trump presidency, even with a Republican trifecta in Washington — rests on a “public investment first” view of climate policy. Public investment in the clean energy economy is not merely a second-best policy option to carbon pricing or other punitive regulations, the argument goes, but instead the first-best option in the marathon of politically durable decarbonization.
I am an outspoken proponent of this view. Public investment provides and encourages investment to drive down the cost of clean energy technologies, make them more market-competitive, and thereby reduces emissions by permanently shifting demand away from fossil fuel-dependent ones. Public investment in clean energy technologies can also create the conditions for new constituencies to gain political clout and defend their role in the economy, and for further policy ambition in the future.
The first major sign that public investment under the IRA might prove durable came in August, when a group of 18 House Republicans wrote to Speaker Mike Johnson in support of the clean energy tax credits that are the cornerstone of the legislation, emphasizing the job creation benefits of the policy. Even the American Petroleum Institute and U.S. Chamber of Commerce said back in May that they would support the IRA under a Trump presidency. Driving down costs? Check. New constituencies? Check.
It’s tempting to see this glimmer of change in favor of clean energy incentives as the consequence of groundswell political support, as voters see benefits arrive in their communities. Journalist Kate Aronoff calls this “pool party politics," named after the New Deal’s high-visibility spending on public pools which curried popular favor in the 1930s. The IRA’s benefits do tilt heavily toward red districts, so it would be nice to imagine that Republican elected officials are hearing bottom-up support and dutifully reflecting constituent interest — democracy in action.
Let’s call that the optimist’s view. My view, which one might call the “cynical optimist’s,” is that politicians — red or blue — are often more responsive to the concentrated interests and influence of lobbyists and donors than the electorate. The IRA may have gained popularity in Congress, including among Republicans, as financial and corporate interests — “capital” — started becoming IRA fans. Tim Sahay of the Net Zero Policy Lab at Johns Hopkins has called the IRA’s tax credits a “bottomless mimosa bar” for the financial market, and bankers are swanning up to get smashed on unlimited tax incentives for clean energy investment.
I favor the cynical optimist’s view because I believe it to be a more accurate picture of why the IRA is good politics. The “cynical” part recognizes that capital exerts disproportionate influence over the political process; the “optimist” part celebrates that the IRA is a powerful vehicle to appeal to their economic values. Bottomless mimosa bars aren’t just booze giveaways — they work by bringing in new customers who then stay and pay for their meals. Reformulating the interests of capital through public investment is a pragmatic and necessary antidote to the inertia of the incumbent fossil fuel industry.
A great example of the IRA gaining new types of fans is its program of expanded, transferable clean energy tax credits. Not only do these tax credits redirect tax revenue toward clean energy investment, making more projects economically justifiable, they may also develop their own market momentum. I advise Basis Climate, a platform for clean energy tax credit transfers, and when I asked co-founder Erik Underwood to tell me who is actually buying these tax credits, he told me it has mostly been savvy business people focused on minimizing their tax payments. Many of these buyers have never or only marginally participated in renewable energy deployment previously.
The tax credit transfer market has grown to $20 billion to 25 billion in a mere 20 months. By comparison, voluntary carbon markets have for decades attempted to enable green projects by creating a market for tradeable credits, yet the market is expected to reach just $2 billion globally in 2024.
In other words, the market for clean energy tax buyers has vastly expanded the base of corporates benefiting from and supporting clean energy projects, led by transactional people who want to avoid paying taxes. Now, there are tax-hating business types of all political colors, but one can already see that the politics of the IRA are shaping up differently than, say, a pollution tax that steadily gets harsher over time.
All that said, it is important not to overstate the case in favor of the IRA’s durability. Those 18 House Republicans are down to no more than 14 post-election, and the remainder may find that falling in line with the President politically safer were he to mount a full-scale attack on the IRA. They and corporate America may also love clean energy tax credits in the abstract but happily give them up to pay for a juicy tax cut for the wealthy.
Still, the most clearly durable part of the IRA are the $78 billion in public spending and whopping $493 billion in business and consumer energy investment that it has already catalyzed as of June 2024, an estimated 71% increase in private investment from the two years before the IRA. That investment won’t be undone with policy change, and it will radically change the economics of many clean energy technologies. It also lays the foundation for later policymaking, as distant as that possibility may now feel. By creating an expanded tent of clean economy interests, the “carrot” of public investment may also help future politicians and their constituencies find “stick” policies more feasible. Penalties on high-carbon products — from gas cars to steel — become much more palatable if they are merely driving substitution to other technologies that compete on price and quality, than if they’re just making the only serviceable option more expensive.
This more nuanced telling of the politics, though, means you don’t need a star-eyed, Mr. Smith Goes to Washington view of the American political process to see how the IRA is delivering political dividends. Whatever the fate of the IRA come January, the longer the benefits flow — to communities and to capitalists — the more difficult it will be to roll back the tide.
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The data center boom is everywhere you look in U.S. economic and emissions data.
This is an edition of Heatmap Daily, an evening review of the day’s news written by our executive editor. Sign up for it here.
It isn’t exactly a new thought, but I’ve been struck recently by how many trends in America’s economic and environmental data are fundamentally about the data center boom and the return of electricity demand:
First, the Energy Information Administration reported this week that U.S. emissions grew by more than 2% last year, driven by surging electricity demand and an increase in coal-fired generation. What caused that higher power demand? New factories and data centers — as well as record summertime cooling demand.
Second, many of the new factories driving that higher power demand are themselves producing goods that are … let’s say … data center-adjacent. There are the enormous new semiconductor fabs, of course. But Ford and General Motors have also set up new production lines (or repurposed old ones) to manufacture grid-scale batteries to meet power demand.
Third, take a look at the recent U.S. spending on private non-residential construction — in other words, everything American companies are building that is not houses, condos, or apartments.
The construction industry’s spent almost $60 billion on data centers over the past year, which is more than it spent on all other office buildings combined (and more than it spent building warehouses, too). Just a handful of categories — data centers, power plants, electricity infrastructure, and certain kinds of electronics manufacturing — now make up a third of all U.S. private non-residential construction investment. They’ve never made up such a large share of construction spending since data collection began in 2014.
As The New York Times recently noted, the American economy is unusually dependent on the American stock market right now — and the stock market is unusually dependent on artificial intelligence. This week, investors started to balk at the enormous spending hyperscalers are planning to keep building out the AI boom; Alphabet’s shares dropped 8% this week after it boosted its planned 2026 capital expenditure and signaled 2027 will be even bigger. If the data center boom started to slow down in earnest, then more than just that budget will change.
Speaking of which, my colleague Emily Pontecorvo wrote earlier this week about how many businesses are struggling to even estimate their carbon emissions from artificial intelligence. The carbon accounting startup Watershed recently unveiled a new formula to help companies get a sense of their AI-related emissions.
But even that formula is still limited by the amount of data hyperscalers publish — and they don’t publish that much. Google, for instance, is the only AI company that has (laudably) provided estimates of its emissions on a per-prompt basis. Yet no company has published its per-token emissions, or how emissions sync up with particular models or regions.
So Emily asked Google: Why aren’t you — or any other model provider — disclosing this kind of data yet?
The tech company didn’t get back to us until after we’d published Emily’s story. But its response was interesting enough that I wanted to quote some of it here.
The problem is “industry consensus,” Cooper Elsworth, a Google spokesperson, told us. “There is currently very little consensus on how to comprehensively and fairly measure the serving environmental impact of generative AI (such as text generation),” he wrote. “Without standardized, ‘apples-to-apples’ frameworks, it is difficult to compare different providers accurately.”
That’s partly because energy use — and emissions data — can vary from site to site and depend on “custom-built hardware, software compilers, and advanced inference techniques.” And he claimed Google doesn’t always have the measurement hardware in place to provide such specific estimates: “Providing precise, repeatable data requires highly advanced measurement infrastructure,” he said. “For example, software-based energy monitoring tools often suffer from sampling biases. For our study, we had to step away from top-down averages and directly measure actual energy at the physical power supply unit (PSU) level across our deployed fleet. Not all providers have the telemetry or data sets required to benchmark their operations at this level of granularity.”
Read Emily’s story to understand the other reasons why estimating — or even “guesstimating” — AI-related carbon emissions is so challenging.
A conversation with Emma Uridge of the Kansas Health Institute.
This week’s conversation is with Emma Uridge, analyst with the Kansas Health Institute. Uridge spent copious hours analyzing state and local laws on data center development to best understand how policymakers are responding to the potential environmental public health impacts of large AI infrastructure, including power and water. The report, which came out this week, also goes in depth into those health impacts. I reached out to her to discuss what she sees as must-watch territory for our readers on this emerging policy arena.
Our conversation was lightly edited for clarity.
What is actually being done on policy when it comes to data centers — beyond moratoria of course?
So first I’d like to just talk about the point of moratoria. It’s helpful to talk about how these policies emerge in the first place. One area where moratoria are helpful is when a data center is proposed but the county has no approach for how they’d like to potentially regulate them. That’s temporary, most of the time. It lets local governments conduct research on the various impacts and also negotiate community benefits, ones that can mitigate any potential negative impacts — like Lancaster Pennsylvania, which instituted a community benefit agreement that maximized the potential benefits of development while mitigating what large data centers can do. That agreement looked at capping municipal water use at 20,000 gallons per day and requiring 100% clean energy. It had financial penalties for non-compliance. The company also committed $20 million to their local economic development and clean energy fund. There are ways to negotiate with developers.
We also see amendments to existing zoning. Data center proposals are increasingly popping up in rural areas, many of which are unzoned, so there’s no way a county can negotiate unless there’s a moratorium in place.
Other policy solutions include different performance standards or requiring on-site renewable energy, like what Jefferson County, Missouri, looked at. Also setback requirements, mandatory noise buffers, ending by-right zoning.
Where are local governments getting ideas for regulating data centers?
A lot of the technical information comes from developers. That can in cases be seen as a biased source of information. I wouldn’t say there’s a dedicated group providing assistance to local governments when a project is proposed — which is a similar story to wind industry development, where we have only a handful of consultants who provide technical advice. It can be really helpful to get a multi-disciplinary approach to hearing information. It can be helpful to have the utility commission, public health folks, those in academia, as well as the developer.
As of right now, especially in rural areas, local governments have a hard task of balancing pushback while getting the most accurate, evidence-based, neutral information to make decisions. That balance can be contentious.
What is the federal government doing on data center policy? How is the Trump administration approaching it?
A few things there. In the early days, the drive was for AI expansion and to be competitive with foreign adversaries. Now due to the amount of public pushback in red and blue localities and a more cautious approach.
I’m not seeing a lot of actual policy movement at this time.
I know the EPA is looking at the chemicals used in cooling data centers because when that water is cycled through the system, some of it is discharged into the water system, so they’re looking at the Toxic Substances and Control Act for monitoring that.
How much of an impact does this minimal federal role have on industry behavior?
Y’know, this isn’t specific to data centers. This is true for all kinds of large-scale development: there’s a need to require some sort of federal monitoring and regulation.
That’s where I see an emerging role for public health. At the federal level, there could be policy movement towards requiring some sort of environmental monitoring at data centers to make sure they’re operating responsibility. Looking at specific water use relative to water availability and what happens when there’s a time of severe, persistent drought. With air quality too — we’ve seen areas where the grid isn’t as reliable so their diesel generators are kicking on more and affecting air quality for residents.
We’re just not seeing all of that right now. We need corporate disclosure.
What do you see as the most important public health impacts from data center development?
It varies by localities. The most discussed obviously is water usage. One thing I’d note about my conversations with folks enthusiastic around emerging tech is, there are still questions that need to be asked about the capacity of localities to support a data center. Like a small town in Kansas may only be using 40% of their water for their utility needs. If a data center came online, how much of that water goes to the data center?
One area underexplored within the public health discipline is energy poverty and energy security. The ability of a household to meet the needs of everything energy provides in our lives. It’s known we have an aging electric grid but we’re not talking enough about large-scale blackouts when the grid is not sufficient to support some of these new data centers.
Plus more of the week’s big development fights.
1. Laramie County, Wyoming — Meta is fighting the fine it received in the Cheyenne data center water pollution controversy, and the conflict between the tech giant and the city’s small board of public utilities is continuing to spill out into the public.
2. Niagara County, New York — This county just rejected a solar project’s highway work permits in a show of retaliation against the state’s Office of Renewable Energy Siting.
3. Barron County, Wisconsin — The anti-solar protest is the new campaign stop in deep red Wisconsin.
4. Chesapeake, Virginia — A large battery storage project on the Virginia coastline is on the rocks amidst rampant local opposition.
5. Lewis County, West Virginia — West Virginia is now a key battleground in the fight over transmission, as a line spanning all of West Virginia and Maryland — and cutting through Data Center Alley in Virginia — causes compounding consternation.