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Robinson Meyer:
[1:26] Hi, I’m Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News. It is Wednesday, April 1. The electricity system is more important than ever, and the prices we pay for power are starting to reflect that. Last year, the increase in power prices outpaced overall inflation across the economy. The power grid was a huge issue in statewide elections, especially in New Jersey and Georgia. And in some parts of the country, especially the mid-Atlantic’s grid, PJM, we saw data centers begin to drive up overall electricity rates. We know the pressure in the system is building, although I think power prices are unlikely to exceed inflation again this year, thanks to the Iran war. Last year, utilities asked for more than $28 billion in rate hikes, and many of those hikes were approved by state regulators and are now essentially baked into the system and are going to be paid by customers this year or next year. But what’s funny about the power system, at least in the U.S., is that while I can kind of cite that statistic abstractly, it’s very hard to get a real-time look at the prices that people are actually paying for electricity. While we have retrospective studies in some states, it can be hard to know in real time why power costs are rising in some places and not others. Is it more competition for power? Basically, is there an electricity shortage? Is it that infrastructure costs are going up? Is it a big storm with extreme weather?
Robinson Meyer:
[2:42] That’s a problem for policymakers, and it’s provided an opening for Trump officials like Energy Secretary Chris Wright to claim that the simple presence of wind and solar on the grid drives up power rates. So I’m excited to announce in this very podcast that Heatmap has a new solution to this problem. With our partners at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, we released today the Electricity Price Hub. It’s a public-facing electricity data platform that provides monthly utility level estimates of residential electricity rates and bills across the United States. So for the first time ever, you can go in there right now. It’s very user friendly. It’s on heatmap.news. And of course, it’s in the show notes, like go do it right now. And you can see how your state, your zip code, or your utility service areas, average power prices and bills have changed over the past six years. And you can see what part of the power system drove those changes? Was it generation? Was it transmission? Was it distribution? I don’t think there’s any other tool like this on the internet right now.
Robinson Meyer:
[3:45] I’m so excited that we were able to publish it at Heatmap. And today on Shift Key, I’m excited to dive into it. So joining us today on this episode of Shift Key are our partners in producing the Electricity Price Hub. I’m joined by Brian Deese. He’s an Institute Innovation Fellow at the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research at MIT. He’s also, of course, the former director of the White House Economic Council under President Joe Biden.
Robinson Meyer:
[4:06] Also joining me is Lauren Sidner. She’s a senior advisor at the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy at MIT. She’s also a former senior advisor to U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate, John Kerry, also during the Biden administration. It’s all coming up on Shift Key. Brian and Lauren, welcome to Shift Key.
Brian Deese:
Excited to be here.
Lauren Sidner:
[4:29] Really good to be here. Thanks, Rob.
Robinson Meyer:
[4:31] As listeners will have heard, we announced a very exciting new tool on our website
Robinson Meyer:
[4:35] today, the Electricity Price Hub, and we’re going to talk about it in a second. But I want to start by talking about why this tool is important and what the state of the data was before this tool, what the state of our knowledge of the electricity system was before this tool. Because the electricity system, obviously, incredibly important to the U.S. economy, and yet it was something that it was very hard to understand in real time. So like prior to today, Brian, what was the state of our real time knowledge about the electricity grid and electricity prices? And how did that influence our ability to govern it?
Brian Deese:
[5:15] It may come as a surprise to people who have just seen all of the public reporting and news on this topic, that the state of our knowledge was really poor. It was a bit like the basketball player who was short, slow, and couldn’t shoot. So if you wanted to find data on electricity prices, one, almost all the data operated with a delay. You could find data three months, six months, 12 months delay. Two, the data is
Brian Deese:
[5:47] very aggregated at the state level or the national level, didn’t tell you much about what you were experiencing. And three, it was top level, what the electricity rate you’re paying, but it didn’t really tell you what you might actually be paying out of pocket. It didn’t tell you why, and it didn’t tell you what was driving those prices. So if you really wanted to ask the question of like, what am I paying in electricity today based on where I actually am and why am I paying that? It’s really hard to answer any of those things. And that was what motivated us. Was there a way to solve all of those problems together?
Robinson Meyer:
[6:25] And I remember as a reporter having these moments where we could say, okay, electricity inflation, according to CPI or according to PCE is running hot compared to overall economic inflation right now. But like, why was it so hard to get data on these topics? And what kind of delays are we talking about here? Is this like a month or two months? Because there’s already kind of this pass through time in the electricity grid, where like, if fuel costs go up today, it will take a long time for utilities to get those fuel costs approved by regulator and then pass them through to customers. Is that like the kind of delay we’re talking about? Or is this something more fundamental in the data.
Brian Deese:
[7:10] The principal reason why it’s tricky is a reflection of the electricity system we have in the U.S., which is we don’t have one system. We don’t even have a couple of systems. We have dozens and dozens of systems in the U.S. That are producing, transmitting, distributing, and utilizing power. And the structure of when that data is released, in what form it’s released, is a reflection of this patchwork of dozens and dozens and dozens of different jurisdictions around the U.S. And so to your point, there is data at the national level, CPI, CPI is inflation, within inflation data at the national level every month, how much is electricity price inflation going up compared to overall inflation? But that operates at the national level. If it’s disaggregated, you can find data that is operating with roughly a year delay. But even then, you have to be relatively committed to the proposition of going and looking at the data in each of these jurisdictions. And so you can get data for what’s happening in one utility jurisdiction in one state and one utility jurisdiction in another state. But you look and you say, well, but are those comparable? Because they’re presented in different ways. And it really is just a reflection of that patchwork electricity system we have in the United States.
Robinson Meyer:
[8:32] And that also, I would imagine, poses a big problem for policymakers because you can look at national level data, which I think is survey data, basically asking the same set of people who we survey kind of all the inflation data from, how much are you spending on electricity? And they’ll tell you. But then if you want to backtrack that to how much are...
Robinson Meyer:
[8:50] New Jerseyans spending on electricity? Or what do rising electricity costs in this state or this utility mean you should then do as a policy? Or why are they rising? Or what subcomponents are causing electricity prices to go up? Is this a data center thing? Is this a renewables thing? Like all of that, none of that is captured by data that before today was like close at hand or easy to access. Is that right?
Lauren Sidner:
[9:18] Yeah, that’s exactly right. It’s the kind of number of sources that Brian talked about. It’s the difference from one source to the next, just in terms of how the information is presented, whether it’s available in the first place. Oftentimes, you’ll have to pair information from one source with some estimates from federal reporting to be able to even interpret the information you get. The kind of main or kind of best-in-class federal data on this can give you a pretty good sense from one utility to the next, what the average rates look like, but it doesn’t tell you any of the kind of things that go into that rate. And so you can’t start to understand the kind of different drivers behind that. And then to your point earlier about what are New Jerseyans paying, there’s even within a state, there’s a huge range in terms of what’s happening. And so I guess it speaks to the real need for location, time, specific data. And that is just challenging given the number of places we’re talking about.
Robinson Meyer:
[10:14] What is the tool and how is this tool different?
Brian Deese:
[10:17] In basic terms, this tool will provide reliable, comparable data on a monthly basis on both electricity rates, what it costs for electricity and electricity bills, what people are paying at essentially the zip code level in states across the country. So for the first time, like we have with jobs or like we have with other sorts of data, every month, we will release data that is consistent, comparable, and reliable across those metrics. And it allows us to overcome those sort of the three problems of the basketball player, right? Which is, it’ll come out every month. It’ll come out at a level of granularity that allows you to say,
Brian Deese:
[10:59] Boy, I live in southern New Jersey, and it feels like I pay a lot more than my sister that lives in northern New Jersey. Is that the case? It’ll allow you to overcome that. And importantly, it’ll allow you to look into the rate data and say, what are the components of that rate. So if my rate is 100, how much of that is connected to generation? How much of that is transmission, distribution? It will break those things down. So our goal here is to provide that in a way that helps to make clearer what has been really hard to figure out.
Robinson Meyer:
[11:31] To kind of compare it to what used to exist, you would get these studies that would come out on a lag that would be able to disaggregate why rates had gone up in, say, California. And California, because it has the country’s most expensive electricity, or it’s consistently in the top five states, tends to get these very good research on the composition of its electricity rates. And you could look at California and be like, oh, they’re spending more on their distribution system. They’re spending more on this. That’s why rates are going up. I think this is the first time where you don’t have to wait for a study.
Robinson Meyer:
[12:05] You can look at states, you can look at zip codes, you can look at congressional districts, and you can say, oh, well, in the southeast, for instance, when rates are going up, or in even more specifically in this utility in Tampa, when rates have gone up, it’s because the distribution system is getting more expensive because of extreme weather. But when you look at parts of the mid-Atlantic, like central New Jersey or something, It’s because generation is getting more expensive because of data centers. This is like the first time we can actually, in a live way, compare why electricity prices are behaving the way they are across zip codes, utility service areas, states, like various kinds of jurisdictions across the country. It’s really cool.
Brian Deese:
[12:49] And I would say on that, Rob, that importantly, this tool is intended to empower all of the analysis that you just described. It is not actually a prescriptive tool that on its own, as of today, comes to all of those conclusions, but it provides the data in a consistent, repeatable way so that folks can do that type of analysis much more easily and across the country, not just in areas where there’s been enough focus or enough attention that people have really decided to research on its own.
Brian Deese:
[13:20] The other thing I should say about this is our goal is for this to be completely transparent, the methods and data architecture out there for people to explore, and completely open source in the sense that what’s one of the cool things about this partnership with you all and with Heatmap is that the goal is to put this data out into the open in a consistent, repeatable way so that we don’t have to operate with a lag for people to answer the question like that. So you can look and you can say, what are the components of transmission distribution? I want to be very clear. That doesn’t answer the policy question. It doesn’t. It doesn’t. What it does is it enables a more sort of intelligent exploration, research, debate dynamic around the policy question. That’s really the goal.
Robinson Meyer:
[14:01] So interesting, because in the current moment of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, we basically have up to the minute data on gasoline prices because of this company, GasBuddy, and because of AAA that does daily compilations, we know, like...
Robinson Meyer:
[14:17] If gas prices, you know, of course, we know the macro environment is that there’s basically no oil transiting out of the Strait of Hormuz. But even on a subnational level, we can say, okay, well, Michigan is in the middle of a price cycle, which means kind of prices are happened to be going up at the moment. And also it’s experiencing supply constraints this way. We know up to the hour, basically, within states and localities, what people are paying for gasoline. While if you wanted like comparable data for the electricity system was like, you could maybe find out what people were paying in a state or possibly a region of the country three to 24 months ago.
Brian Deese:
[15:00] Gas prices are the most transparent price in our entire economy. Almost everybody lives within earshot of that price being literally displayed, where they drive, where they walk. It is the most transparent price. Electricity prices are among the least transparent because they’re so hard to find for all the reasons we just described. And even if you find them, most people, their lived experience is not what is the electricity price that I’m paying? It’s what’s my bill. Which is another part of this tool that I think is important, which is we are doing consistent data both on the rate and also the average bill paid. The bill is obviously a function of the rate and then how much energy you are consuming. And that’s important too, I think, to start to get closer to being more transparent is that for people and what they experience, the experience of what’s driving both the rate and the bills. They both matter.
Robinson Meyer:
[15:57] So let’s talk about how it came together. Like maybe Lauren, can you describe for us like how was data collected for this? If we’ve never had a resource like this before, where did the data come from and how is it compiled to form the numbers that we’re reporting in the database today?
Lauren Sidner:
[16:14] Yeah. So for our own unique new data collection, we sourced information on utility rates from two key sources, both official reporting. The first category was data reported by state regulators or other state agencies on a regular basis. So we have a set of states where we collect rate data directly from those entities for all of the utilities that they regulate. For the remainder of states, we, for those kind of larger utilities in each state, we collect the rate data directly from utility rate books. And what we collect is any rates associated with standard residential rate plan, along with any other charges that apply to the typical residential customer. We then take that and pair it with information primarily from the EIA on the average usage by residential customers in a specific place in a specific month to calculate a single average rate and then a single average bill for each month. And obviously, as rates go up, bills go up, but that relationship isn’t always exactly what you would expect. We just out of curiosity and for a fun exercise mapped every utility in our data set onto a set of quadrants that it was sort of the national average rate, the national average bill. And there are a surprising number of utilities that fall above the national average rate and below the national average bill or below the national average rate and above the national average bill. So those things don’t always line up because a lot of what ends up influencing bill is not just the number you start with, but also, you know, typical household size, climate conditions, the kind of basic efficiency of the typical household in a place. So a lot goes into that number. And so that’s why we thought it was important to keep both numbers in mind in the dataset and to get a more complete picture.
Robinson Meyer:
[17:58] That’s so cool. You know, when we are able to say, okay, well, generation is X% of the bill or X number of dollars in the bill and transmission is X number of dollars in the bill or distribution. Is that coming out of the Public Utility Commission data and the state level data? Is that coming from what the utilities describe in their rate books? How are we able to get that level of granularity about the data?
Lauren Sidner:
[18:22] Yeah. So like I mentioned, we collect the rates for any charge that would apply to the typical customer. We then go through each of those charges and identify any kind of function-specific charges. And we base that on the kind of definitional language included in the utility tariff document. Oftentimes those documents will include a formula that explains how a charge is computed. And so use that language to understand how best to classify a given charge. And so we categorize those that can kind of neatly be sorted into one of our categories. It’s not always the case. There are going to be charges that cover multiple of the categories or straddle multiple of the category. So then for those, we go into the actual regulatory filings. The most frequent example of this is base rate charges. And there we pull the relevant utility regulatory filings that describe the kind of total revenue requirement, what they need to earn to cover all of their costs and the return on capital, and specifically look at what has been allocated to the residential customers and how those costs have been functionalized in those filings, the functional breakdown of the total amount in their filings.
Robinson Meyer:
[19:30] I’ve been a climate reporter for a long time, but kind of I had an interregnum during COVID where I helped run and put together and report on a volunteer project to collect COVID data from states. What I learned from that project is that every number in a database took incredible amounts of work to get, and actually a lot of discussions about where you should categorize something and where the cutoff is and what’s on the cusp. Like every number in a database has a.
Robinson Meyer:
[20:04] Often put together by human hands, not in a synthetic way, but there are so many decisions that go into making something that you can then cite as data that people don’t even realize when they think about it. Let me ask one more question, and then I want to get into the kind of what the stories here are. Sometimes we’re talking about electricity prices, and we’re talking about electricity bills. And I think what people will see when they play with a tool online is that there are some states that have very expensive electricity prices and then actually moderately sized bills. And there’s some states that have pretty good electricity prices, but then very expensive bills. And we can get into that story more and I want to, but if you were to take a look at your power bill, there’s a lot of charges on there that are not called your electricity rates, but nonetheless, are part of the price you pay for electricity. And I think you guys have dealt with this in a really interesting way. So can you just describe like, when you report an electricity price, is that just the electricity residential rate that’s been described by the utility? Or basically, what else goes into the number you describe as an electricity price?
Lauren Sidner:
[21:17] In every case, we are trying to capture the entirety of the typical residential customer’s bill. And so we capture what you just described as sort of the standard residential rate charges. And we add to that all the additional riders and adjustments that the average customer would also see. We don’t include any kind of voluntary charges or opt-in type of charges, but we do capture the kind of full extent of what would show up on a bill. And it’s worth noting too, that there’s a ton of variation in how that information is presented in the bill to the customer, how user-friendly that information presentation is in the end, and how readily customers are able to kind of understand the different pieces of the bill based on that.
Robinson Meyer:
[23:25] Let’s get into stories. One of the key distinctions that people will see the second they open the tool is that we distinguish between rates and bills. Why is it important to think about the rates and bills story separately? And what did you learn from looking at electricity rates and looking at electricity bills?
Brian Deese:
[23:46] The single most important thing is understanding when you have an issue where people are paying a lot for electricity, understanding what component of that is rate, what component of that is bill. In some ways it’s like the first question in answering the why, the like what’s going on, right? There’s an interesting story going on in Alabama, where if you look at Alabama and you look at rates are not particularly high and rates are not rising particularly fast. But Alabama, the typical residential customer in Alabama, uses a lot of electricity.
Brian Deese:
[24:24] Principally because you have to do a lot of cooling and because you’ve got less efficient buildings, houses in the state. And so as a result, the typical household in Alabama is paying in bill a lot compared to other parts of the country. And what’s interesting about that is in 2026 in Alabama, for the first time in at least a decade, if not more, there are now competitive Public Utility Commission elections going on. And in the context of that competitive election, there is now an active political debate around should Alabama Power in particular be required to change the way that it does its regulatory and rate setting?
Brian Deese:
[25:08] Fundamentally, that story is a story about the bills that people pay, right? And you could slow the growth in the electricity rate in Alabama and not actually get at the core thing that’s bugging people or that is an economic drag on people, which is that they’re paying high electricity bills just because of that. And the inverse of that is also true. There are parts of the country where the rates are increasing very quickly, but people’s bills are actually lower than others because they live in places where either you’re spending less on heating and cooling and/or where they live in more efficient homes or they work in more efficient buildings. So you really need to, I think, as we get going from the data to the why and what’s going on in any given place, understanding the rate and bill distinction is like, I think it’s like the first step. It’s the first step in most of these places is you want to ask what component of this is being driven by rates, what components are being driven by bills, and then you go to the next step of what’s behind either or both of those.
Robinson Meyer:
[26:09] In some ways, bill is what matters the most in terms of how people actually think through their electricity system. What’s an example of a place where rates might be increasing really quickly, but bills aren’t surging in the same way?
Lauren Sidner:
[26:23] Wisconsin, Michigan, Arizona all have rates that are above the national average, but bills that are below the national average.
Robinson Meyer:
[26:31] Huh. This stuck out to me looking at New York State too, honestly, is that if you look at Con Ed, which is the main utility for Manhattan and parts of Queens and parts of Brooklyn, you say, oh, the rates are really bad. But if you look at the bills, it’s like, oh, well, people have tiny apartments. They’re just not buying that much electricity every month.
Brian Deese:
[26:48] Bills matter in an absolute sense, but rates do matter in a relative sense, because people’s lived experience is also not just about it’s why inflation has the unsettling economic effect that it has, which is that as prices go up, even if they’re off a lower base — your point about Manhattan is a good one, which is it’s a good example of sort of high rates, low bills. But if the rate of increase of the bill is going up, then it also means that people are going to feel this more.
Robinson Meyer:
[27:17] And it’s complicated because from a utility revenue perspective, the bill is also what matters. And if you think about from a systems perspective, and the utility is trying to recoup the costs of running its system and then make a profit, the volumetric rate is a technical mechanism it uses to like allot the costs of running its system. But actually, the size of the revenue that it receives from each household matters far more in terms of its ability to turn a profit, to cover its cost, to invest further in the system. Like that is the number that matters in terms of actual upkeep for the system. Although I still find it requires a bit of a brain reformatting to remember that’s actually how the entire power grid works.
Brian Deese:
[27:57] It’s why it has been so difficult for us to figure out how to credit efficiency within our system. Because in an overly crude way, if the bill matters, then the utility actually wants to avoid incremental efficiency, which is not true in practice, but the mechanism to actually credit efficiency, whether that efficiency is actually at the household level or is efficiency of the system, efficiency of the grid, capacity and storage. All of those things run into this basic challenge, which is if you make the system more efficient, the utility often doesn’t get paid for it.
Robinson Meyer:
[28:36] This is one of the classic problems that I think we’re now struggling with in terms of governing utilities. I mean, when you looked at individual states or individual political jurisdictions, were there any that stood out where you were like, man, you can really see in this state the difficulty of utility governance or the difficulty of incentivizing utilities or customers to be more efficient in their energy use?
Lauren Sidner:
[28:59] A good number of states have adopted mechanisms that try to do away with the sort of internal disincentive to support efficiency. So very frequently, you’ll see charges that allow utilities to recover the costs of efficiency programs. But you will also, in maybe a more limited number of examples, see charges that allow utilities to recover the revenue that they lose because of those programs or because of distributed energy or other policy-related aims that may be in place. I believe Arizona has that kind of recovery mechanism, but it’s not uncommon. And then occasionally in states like California, you’ll see charges that will give a benefit to a customer for using less power. So it’ll be a tiered charge where if the customer kind of stays within the lower tier, they can actually get sort of a bill credit or something along those lines. So they sometimes even build it into the rate design in addition to just making sure the utility is made whole for supporting that kind of investment.
Robinson Meyer:
[29:58] You both now have come kind of up to the coalface of electricity pricing mechanics and seen at the data level, you know, how the generation system, the distribution system, the transmission system come together to form an electricity price, which then is assessed through bills. What did collecting this data, interacting with this data, change your mind about?
Brian Deese:
[30:23] For me, it increased the urgency around actually challenging and reforming these incentive models to try to get to the most efficient and best outcome for the rate payer. And in fact, the underlying complexity through rates and bills and the components thereof reinforces the challenge that oftentimes in this process, the end ratepayer, the end consumer, and their end experience gets kind of lost in that complicated process. And so for me, it reinforced that we’re not going to shift from a local and utility jurisdiction to a state to a regional to a federal, we’re not going to shift in, it’s neither feasible or advisable to have a single national electricity system, I don’t believe. But yet we need to be more aggressive and more creative about testing, challenging, and then scaling reforms to these systems to actually get to that outcome. I think that was the thing for me that was the most. And it goes back to when I was in government and we were thinking about the scope of national authority, which typically runs through FERC. FERC is the federal regulator charged with oversight. That there has been a real dispositional reticence to having FERC play a more assertive role because of this idea that states and individual utility jurisdictions are really where the action is at. This process challenged that thinking from my perspective. And I think that to really challenge and get that kind of constructive reform, you need to have a more full-throated national role, not to take over at a national level, but to exert that national authority, not just as a nudge, but as a hard nudge in the direction of a sort of more pro-consumer outcome to the grid.
Robinson Meyer:
[32:12] Lauren, what did just coming up against this data change your mind about?
Lauren Sidner:
[32:16] Yeah, going in, I kind of recognized the patchwork fragmented nature that Brian described earlier. But it was just really stark to me that there’s huge, huge variability in the kind of information environment from one state to the next, how easy it is to find kind of critical bits of information, how kind of user friendly regulatory filing systems are, how easy it is for people to understand just the basic makeup of their bills. I mean, there’s just a really wide, wide range across different states. And even in the absolute kind of best case of that, the utility still has this huge information advantage. And there’s a giant gap between that sort of best case and a lot of states. And so when you try and think about kind of identifying the right solutions that are specific to a given player or tailored to the challenges that exist in a given place, I think starting from fixing utility incentives to operate in a way that, like Brian said, is more consumer friendly is going to be really critical.
Robinson Meyer:
[33:14] What states stuck out to you as being the smartest or the most pro-consumer in how they represented and shared this information?
Lauren Sidner:
[33:20] I’m not sure I can name a single state. There were good practices that stood out from one state to the next. Finding basic information in regulatory filings was really surprisingly quite easy in South Carolina. So the South Carolina Commission provided helpful kind of summaries of the outcomes of different regulatory proceedings and what it would mean for consumers’ bills, for example. There were states that stood out because of the way they present the information in a bill. There were states that stood out because they compile and report in a standard way all of the kind of rates and bills for the utilities that they regulate. So I think there was no one best practice, but there were examples of things that were quite helpful from one state to the next.
Robinson Meyer:
[34:03] Looking at the results, what has been striking to me is, I mean, first of all, you look at the price data and you go, wow. Looking at the Continental 48, right? California sticks out. And I think the Northeast sticks out when you look at prices. And I think that’s a story that has become better understood over the past six or eight months. I would say that if you’re looking at inflation and electricity rates, where the price levels are the worst is New England, which has kind of its own islanded energy issues and has, as we’ve talked about in previous episodes, challenges with winter peaks and fuel availability, and California, which is kind of famously its own, has its own regulatory apparatus. But when you look at bills, the story becomes really different. And suddenly the Southeast and parts of the interior, which seem to have quite cheap power on a kilowatt hour basis, look like they’re really failing. And Tennessee, for instance, Alabama, that these places actually charge a lot of money on a monthly basis for power because of maybe an old building stock, because people have to buy a lot of power because of their cooling needs, because of maybe bills there are increasingly volatile. And like what stuck out to me is the success stories here. I have no other information to back up, but just like doing a facile reading of the data is like, it’s the Southwest.
Robinson Meyer:
[35:25] It’s Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico that both have pretty cheap power rates and also pretty cheap electricity bills, despite extremely high cooling needs. At this point, I’m not surprised by a lot with ERCOT, but I think the Southwest was really impressive in that regard.
Brian Deese:
[35:43] So, Rob, I was going to say, I think that this, for me, reinforced that we just have a lot to learn from Texas. And that’s not in any way a sort of whole scale or simplistic endorsement of ERCOT, right, with all its complexity. But you are getting lower prices, lower bills, and more cheaper and efficient sources of generation and distribution onto that grid. And those things are related. I guess on reflection with the data, it is not a total surprise that the system that enables the quickest and most efficient deployment of cheap and efficient power onto the grid is also the place that can navigate that dynamic of relatively lower prices and relatively lower bills. Nothing in this space is simple. So that doesn’t mean that we can just take that Texas model and stamp it out in every jurisdiction. But I also think it means we —
Robinson Meyer:
[36:35] For one thing, the Permian only exists in a couple of states, which really helps as does the huge wind alleys and solar alleys. But there’s so much more that we could be —
Brian Deese:
[36:45] Geography matters, temperature matters, density matters. But I think it causes me to say we need to challenge … There are so many settled, accepted views in this space that need to be challenged. The idea that we couldn’t do any of those things in PJM or in the Northeast because of those fundamental differences, I think needs to be challenged. It needs to be challenged more aggressively at the federal level, and needs to be challenged more aggressively at the state level. And I think we’re starting to see that happen.
Robinson Meyer:
[37:17] Let’s talk about PJM for a second and the Mid-Atlantic, because I think that has really dominated the electricity discourse recently. It does seem to be the part of the country where you can point most directly and say, power is getting more expensive in PJM. And that is at least in large part because of data centers. When you were able to look under the hood in PJM, what did you see? Like, what nuance are we missing by telling this data center PJM story? And are there some places in PJM that are maybe handling new demand or new capacity better than other places and able to keep bills from going up as much as maybe some large swaths of the grid are?
Brian Deese:
[37:57] Well, let me jump in first and then, Lauren, you should jump in on PJM too, because I think it is such an interesting story. For me, the PJM learning was the value of actually going under the hood and being able to solve the second problem of the, I guess, the basketball player who was slow, of actually being able to go down at the intra-regional level, right? Because PJM as a jurisdiction, you’re seeing exactly the price dynamics that you described. Within that, if you look at individual utilities, you see the largest skew, the largest distribution of outcomes, right? So you see the skew from literally a 30% increase in rates to a 5% decrease in rates. And then you look at how much of that is generation related, right? Charges associated with generation, and you see as high as a 40% increase and a 10% decrease, right? And so within those jurisdictions, within PJM as a whole, there is a lot to learn, again, about what’s going on in those particularly spiky jurisdictions and those that are managing that.
Robinson Meyer:
[39:03] Let’s get specific. So which jurisdictions are maybe handling this better?
Lauren Sidner:
[39:07] There are a variety of factors at play in the kind of range that Brian just described. And so it’s less that there’s specific parts of the region that are handling it better than others, because I think types of things that come into play are, there are some of the utilities that don’t participate in the capacity auction. And so they haven’t been as affected as others by the kind of very recent trends. There are some that own their own generation capacity and own their own generation assets, so maybe sort of buffered from some of those impacts. But then there are also kind of pockets or regions within the broader region that have very particular capacity constraints because there isn’t a lot of generation capacity with, you know, local generation capacity. Or there are kind of grid bottlenecks that are keeping cheaper sources of energy from flowing into those particular places. So it’s a kind of aggregation of all those things that are adding to this patchwork. And so we kind of have this settled wisdom of interconnection bottlenecks or slow interconnection timelines and grid constraints are driving this sort of region-wide trend. But in reality, the picture looks pretty different from one part of the region to another.
Robinson Meyer:
[40:16] Another story we’ve been telling about the power grid is that extreme weather is starting to make prices worse and starting to make bills go up. And that’s absolutely famously the story in California where the huge amount of adaptation to wildfires they’ve had to do, the huge amount of rebuilding after wildfires that they’ve had to do of the distribution grid and the transmission grid as well has really driven up rates, of course, as has the insurance costs. Is that just a California story or are there other places around the country where you look and say, wow, extreme weather, whether or not it represents climate change or not, is helping to drive up power prices in this maybe surprising place that people haven’t thought about yet?
Lauren Sidner:
[40:58] I think you’re right to point out California. It is definitely an extreme example here. We’ve seen the distribution part of the bill for parts of the state as much as or more than double in five years. And that’s in large part driven by the different types of costs that are coming because of wildfires, whether it’s repairs or preparing for wildfires or whether it’s liability resulting from those disasters. But it’s really not just California. And I think we’re going to, it’s that this trend is just going to continue. One of the biggest transmission and distribution utilities in Texas is just concluding a rate case. And by their own kind of description, they requested an increase in annual revenue of something like over $800 million. And they, by their own description, say that the largest kind of portion of that increase is attributable to storm damage over the last three years. And then across the country, but particularly in places like the Southeast and Florida, we’re seeing utilities have these additional charges that show up on people’s bills. And those charges have just kind of shot up over time. So Tampa Electric, for example, it has storm protection charge. It added a temporary storm-related surcharge to deal with some of the costs that have added up over the past few years. And the trend in those over the last five years has been really stark. It’s more than doubled over that period. And that is not unique to Tampa Electric either. And so I think throughout the country, this is going to be adding to distribution and other grid costs going forward.
Robinson Meyer:
[42:20] What other states linger in your thinking or other zip codes or utilities where you’re like, wow, you just encountered it and it really revealed something to you about the power grid?
Lauren Sidner:
[42:31] Maybe I’d point to Virginia, where we collected data on the two largest investor-owned utilities in the state. And a big part of the story there to me is that more and more of the bill is flowing through these other charges. And there’s just an enormous number of charges that go into residential customer bills in Virginia, which speaks to this question of utility incentives that we’ve touched on a couple times. But, you know, if utilities are able to just immediately pass costs through to customers, regardless of how they kind of line up with or relate to kind of projected or budgeted costs, there’s not a whole lot of built-in incentive for the utility to manage that. So that stood out, not just because it took forever to collect the data there, but …
Brian Deese:
[43:15] Another place that stood out to me was New Jersey, where obviously the politics of electricity prices have been front and center, including because of the gubernatorial election last year. And what’s interesting about New Jersey is not only a rising rate environment, but pockets of extraordinary volatility. So if you look at Atlantic City or Rockland Electric in that part of New Jersey, you see 200% plus swings in electricity prices intra-year, within the year, right? And that’s increasing significantly. This is just speculative, but I think that volatility, and this is for study, for other people to study based on the data, but I think that volatility is in part connected to the more extreme weather patterns that you’re seeing in this space. And I also think it connects to the lived experience in the politics of this issue, that it’s both about prices, but also volatility that leave people with the sense that something is different about the way that they are having to pay for the electricity that they tend to rely on than has been in the past.
Robinson Meyer:
[44:22] In some ways, the worst case scenario here is that electricity, which I think is already. Depending on where you live, the biggest or the second largest energy expense for most American households, becomes more like gasoline, but with even less price transparency than gasoline. Like gas can get really expensive. It has enormous volatility, but people tend to know what it costs. That’s one reason it’s so politically salient. If electricity becomes just as volatile and people fear the experience of opening their bills and not being able to predict their monthly expenses around electricity in the same way that they might struggle to predict it with gasoline or they might have to change other spending habits to accommodate higher gas prices, then that is bad for the economy. It’s bad for electrification. It’s really bad for decarbonization because if our whole goal here is to get people to shift from liquid fuels and oil and gas to heat pumps and especially electric vehicles. If they have the sense that electricity prices are as volatile as gas prices, that is really, really bad for the whole project.
Brian Deese:
[45:35] Yeah, like one of my goals and hopes in this whole project is that we can make electricity prices just more transparent and understandable. And it is complicated, but just because it is complicated doesn’t mean it has to be non-transparent. And so one of my hopes in this course here is to say, we’re now going to produce this data and make it more publicly available and try to bring a clearer sense that even if the underlying drivers as to why we are getting to the prices or the bills that people are paying are not straightforward, the prices and the bills that people should be paying should be, and they should be transparent. And there’s no reason why states, jurisdictions, utilities can’t get better at doing the things that would make it easier for us to hopefully, you know, ultimately, we can put the energy price hub out of business by just making all this data really freely available, I think, for some period of time until the system adapts to that. But look, that’s one of the goals is let’s just make this transparent. That alone is not going to bring electricity prices down, but it’s a step in the process.
Robinson Meyer:
[46:35] One of the things I’m most excited about is being able to continue to follow this data on a monthly basis and see emerging trends in the system and have you back on Shift Key to talk about them and to analyze them. And until then, we’ll have to leave it there. But thank you so much for joining us, Brian and Lauren. And people should check out. We’ll put it all over the show notes. It will be impossible to miss if you follow any heat map or shift key distribution channel. But the Electricity Price Hub, you should go check it out. You should go play around with it. Type in your zip code, type in your congressional district, type in your enemy’s zip code and congressional district, click around. There’s so much there to learn and see and explore. And I think we’re only just getting started in understanding all the data that you’ve made available through this tool.
Brian Deese:
[47:18] And give us feedback too, because this tool will get better the more that we publish it and the more that we have feedback as well. So thank you, Rob.
Robinson Meyer:
[47:24] Well, hey, thank you for joining us today on Shift Key. Thank you, Brian. Thank you, Lauren.
Lauren Sidner:
[47:27] Thanks, Rob.
Robinson Meyer:
[47:33] That will do it for today’s episode of Shift Key. I implore you, though, go play around with the Electricity Price Hub. You can find it on heatmap.news. You can find it in the show notes. I am sure the most interesting things to learn from this tool have not yet been learned. We haven’t found them yet at Heatmap or at MIT. So go look at your state. Go look at your zip code. Go look at the utility that you hate the most. Go look at the utility that you work for. Like, this is your moment. Go play around because it is such a rich data set and there’s so much information in it. I am just sure that one of our readers is going to find something so interesting that’s going to help all of us understand the electricity system better and better formulate policy. If you do find something let us know we’re at shiftkey@heatmap.news or editors@heatmap.news you can also find me of course on Twitter, BlueSky, or LinkedIn. Always feel free to reach out. Until next time, Shift Key is a production of Heatmap News. Our editors are Jillian Goodman and Nico Lauricella. Multimedia editing and audio engineering is by Jacob Lambert and Nick Woodbury. Our music is by Adam Kromelow. Thanks so much for listening. See you next week.
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Rob checks in on this season’s supercharged ocean temperatures with climate researcher Zeke Hausfather.
Every few years, the Pacific Ocean’s surface waters become especially warm near the equator, a climatic phenomenon known as El Niño.
El Niño is a normal part of the climate system, but even in a normal year, it can trigger extreme weather around the world. Forecasters are worried that the current El Niño — which just began a few weeks ago — is going to be anything but normal. Models suggest that we could soon see the hottest El Niño ever measured, with unpredictable and catastrophic effects for ecosystems and societies around the world.
What does that mean? And why does this El Niño look so bad? On this episode of Shift Key, Rob is joined by Zeke Hausfather, a climate research lead at Stripe and a research scientist at Berkeley Earth. They discuss what forecast models are saying about this El Niño, why it gives us a glance at the future, and whether climate change itself is accelerating.
Shift Key is hosted by Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, or wherever you get your podcasts.
You can also add the show’s RSS feed to your podcast app to follow us directly.
Here is an excerpt from their conversation:
Robinson Meyer: How much, at this point, are we in an El Niño that is record-breaking? Like, how much do we see in observations, physical observations of the ocean or the atmosphere and the rest of the climate system, and how much do we think from the models that it is going to get even hotter?
Zeke Hausfather: So the way that we track the strength of an El Niño — there’s a few different ways to track it. But the most common one is from this particular region of the tropical Pacific called the Niño 3.4 region, which is sort of like about a third of the way into the Pacific off the coast of Chile, right around the equator. And that’s where this tongue of warm water forms during El Niño events. That’s sort of the characteristic signal of El Niños. And temperatures in that region, as of today, are at 2.8 degrees centigrade above normal, normal meaning the average of the last 30 years. So it’s sort of a sliding window that tries to remove some of the human-caused warming.
Robinson Meyer: Are we comparing temperatures from that region to another region? Or they’re just in that region two or more degrees above normal?
Zeke Hausfather: So it’s a good question. The traditional way that El Niño has been defined is to just compare that region to itself, but with a 30-year moving average applied to remove the effects of human-caused warming. There is another metric that was introduced by NOAA last year called the Relative El Niño Index, which is a variant where you sort of subtract out the average over the tropical ocean as a whole from that region, so you’re looking at the difference between that region and the rest of the tropics.
There’s pros and cons of that approach. Arguably, it removes the human warming signal a bit better, but it also can overly penalize really strong El Niño events that reach outside of that region because they start warming the whole tropics. So anyway, the details are technical, but the point on the observations is that we’re already seeing a very strong event occurring there today. You know, temperatures as of today, when we’re recording, August 10, are 2.8C above normal. To put that in perspective, the strongest ever anomalies we’ve recorded, at least daily in the satellite record since the 1980 or so, were in 2015, 2016, and those were about 3.1 degrees above normal. And so as of today, by itself, it would be the third strongest El Niño signal ever recorded in that region.
But what’s different is that El Niño almost always peaks near the end of the year. So if you look at all the El Niño events on record, there’s been one or two that have peaked in October, but the vast majority peak in November or December, and a couple as late as January. It’s a very persistent pattern of these events. And so the fact that it’s only the beginning of August now and we’re already at this extremely high level, we’re essentially running two to three months ahead of any other El Niño on record in terms of how quickly it’s developing, which is one of the reasons why we’re increasingly convinced that this is going to be a record-setting event. It’s going to blow any event we’ve seen previously out of the water. And if you look at the latest models that came out this morning, actually, it’s good timing. They’re predicting a peak of around 4C in the Niño 3.4 region, which will be, you know, more than a degree above the previous record and could end up being the strongest El Niño in 500 or 1,000 years. We don’t have great proxy estimates going back, but, it certainly is something well outside of anything we’ve seen since records began in 1850.
Robinson Meyer: The swimmer Katie Ledecky swims a race sometimes in the Olympics and she’ll be out swimming and then behind her there’s a computer-generated line which is the current world record, and she’s way out in front of the current world record, and you’re watching her and then she does she turns around in the pool and then the world record is behind her. That is the current El Niño. This is the Katie Ledecky-style El Niño.
You can find a full transcript of the episode here.
Mentioned:
NOAA’s El Niño page and the relative El Niño index
An Assessment of Earth's Climate Sensitivity Using Multiple Lines of Evidence, the 2020 paper where Zeke was a coauthor
Zeke’s blog post on AI emissions: The real energy use of agentic AI
John Bistline’s post on AI emissions at Watershed
Heatmap’s coverage of AI emissions: A New Guesstimate for Corporate AI Emissions
This episode of Shift Key is sponsored by ...
Discover the Yale Clean and Equitable Energy Development online certificate program at the Yale Center for Business and the Environment. In this fully online, 5-month program, you’ll learn from leading experts, develop practical skills, and grow a powerful network. Visit cbey.yale.edu to learn more and apply.
Music for Shift Key is by Adam Kromelow.
This transcript has been automatically generated.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, or wherever you get your podcasts.
You can also add the show’s RSS feed to your podcast app to follow us directly.
Robinson Meyer:
Hello, it’s Wednesday, August 12, and the Pacific Ocean is officially in El Niño. According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, sea surface temperatures in the key region of the Pacific are now above average, and the agency expects they’ll remain that way through early spring 2027. Now, even a normal El Niño can be a big deal. They can cause very wet winters in California, huge rainfall events in South America, and droughts or even famines in parts of Africa and Asia.
Robinson Meyer:
But if you’ve been paying attention, you know that this El Niño seems like it’s not going to be normal. It seems like it will be a super El Niño. Forecasters are now warning we could see the largest El Niño in years or decades, if not in a century or more. The last time we had a super El Niño event in 2015 and 2016, it caused almost $4 trillion in global economic damages. This one now seems like it could be even bigger. So I wanted to learn more about what might be coming down the pike, why we think this El Niño, even though it hasn’t happened yet, or has only just begun, could be so big and what it could all mean. And we have a great guest. Zeke Hausfather is a climate research lead at Stripe and a research scientist at Berkeley Earth. He’s also an IPCC author. He’s a climate scientist with a strong interest in observational temperature records, climate modeling, mitigation and emission scenarios, and carbon removal. He’s kind of working on all sides of the climate problem at the same time, which is why I always enjoy talking to him. And I can’t believe we’ve never had him on Shift Key before. On this show, we talk about why we think this El Niño will be so big, why it will be a kind of preview of sorts of the climate of the 2030s, and whether climate change now seems to be accelerating and getting worse. I’m Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News, and it’s all coming up on Shift Key. Zeke Hausfather, welcome to Shift Key.
Zeke Hausfather:
Thanks, Rob. Great to be on.
Robinson Meyer:
One reason I always enjoy talking to you is because you’re at this nexus of, let’s say, climate science and the physical systems and physical processes that happen in the world and mitigation and carbon removal and decarbonization and the various processes we need to master to tackle climate change. You’ve been tracking recently a particularly worrying set of developments around this year’s El Niño. And I think over the past few weeks, it’s gone from something watching you write and share what the models are saying, what we can know about the coming El Niño, has gone from making me think that it was, oh, that’s kind of interesting to, wow, this is a massive story that’s unfolding in front of us that’s going to shape this. Not only the next year of how we talk about weather and climate, but really the coming year of global events. So I want to just start by asking you, what do we know about this year’s coming Monster El Niño, as it has recently been described? And how has it developed over the past few weeks and months?
Zeke Hausfather:
Yeah, so it’s funny you call it a Monster El Niño. We’ve traditionally said super El Niño but this is going to be so far beyond a super El Niño if the models are right that we sort of need a new term for it i prefer monster to godzilla El Niño which is the other one thrown around but in terms of this year’s El Niño so we knew an El Niño was coming by late 2025 but we didn’t know how strong and so there’s a set of different dynamical models this year some of them are actual climate models some of them are you know more simple sort of adapted weather models But there’s about 14 or so different groups around the world that publish these sort of dynamical models of El Niño behavior. And so we knew that there was something in the pipeline. But at least initially, you know, circa January, February, it looked like it would be a pretty moderate event, you know, something maybe akin to... What we saw in 2010 may be enough by itself to drive a record warm year. And we’ll talk about the relationship later between El Niño and global temperatures, but not something that would be record setting by any stretch of the imagination. But by April or so of this year, we really started getting a big shift in the models. Back then, they showed something that could potentially tie 2015-2016 as the strongest El Niño event on record. Actually tie both 2015-2016 and the sort of storied El Niño of 1877-1878,
Zeke Hausfather:
Which is a particularly disastrous event in the early part of the record. But with every month that has come since, the models have been projecting higher and higher and higher estimates for this El Niño event. And the observations have been consistently overshooting what the models previously had projected. So, it’s not just the models that are going up, the observations are also skyrocketing and leaving the previous model projections in the dust. And there’s this thing in El Niño forecasting called the spring predictability barrier, which essentially is the fact that we’re just not very accurate at predicting El Niño during the spring. And so for a while there, everyone was kind of debating, like, is this another, you know, because there have been some historical cases where particularly individual models have gotten things really wrong in the spring. They’ve said the super strong El Niño event is coming, and it never came for one reason or another. The westerly wind bursts didn’t happen, or there’s changing patterns of circulation that led to the El Niño not developing. But now we’re well out of the spring predictability barrier, right? And we’ve seen observations already go into record territories. In fact, as of today, we are currently in the third strongest El Niño event ever recorded, maybe fourth if you go back to the 1800s.
Robinson Meyer:
Well, this actually gets to a key follow-up, which is how much at this point are we in an El Niño that is record-breaking? Like how much do we see in observations, physical observations of the ocean or the atmosphere and the rest of the climate system? And how much do we think from the models that it is going to get even hotter?
Zeke Hausfather:
So the way that we track the strength of an El Niño, there’s a few different ways to track it. But the most common one is from this particular region of the tropical Pacific called the Nino 3.4 region, which is sort of like about a third of the way into the Pacific off the coast of Chile, right around the equator. And that’s where this sort of tongue of warm water forms during El Niño events. That’s sort of the characteristic signal of El Niños. And temperatures in that region, as of today, are at 2.8 degrees centigrade above normal, normal meaning the average of the last 30 years. So it’s sort of a sliding window that tries to remove some of the human-caused warming.
Robinson Meyer:
Are we comparing temperatures from that region to another region, or they’re just in that region two or more degrees above normal?
Zeke Hausfather:
So it’s a good question. The traditional way that El Niño has been defined is to just compare that region to itself, but with a sort of 30-year moving average applied to remove the effects of human-caused warming. There is another metric that was introduced by NOAA last year called the relative El Niño index, which is a variant where you sort of subtract out the average over the tropical ocean as a whole from that region. So you’re sort of looking at the difference between that region and the rest of the tropics. There’s pros and cons of that approach. Arguably, it removes the human warming signal a bit better, but it also can overly penalize really strong El Niño events. That reach outside of that region because they start warming the whole tropics. So anyway, the details are technical, but the point on the observations is that we’re already seeing a very strong event occurring there today. You know, temperatures as of today, when we’re recording, August 10, are 2.8C above normal. To put that in perspective, the strongest ever anomalies we’ve recorded, at least daily in the satellite record since the 1980 or so, were in 2015, 2016 …
Zeke Hausfather:
And those were about 3.1 degrees above normal. And so as of today, by itself, it would be the third strongest El Niño signal ever recorded in that region. But what’s different is that El Niño almost always peaks near the end of the year. So if you look at all the El Niño events on record, you know, there’s been one or two that have peaked in October, but the vast majority peak in November or December and a couple as late as January. You know, it’s a very persistent pattern of these events. And so the fact that it’s only the beginning of August now and we’re already at this extremely high level, we’re essentially running two to three months ahead of any other El Niño on record in terms of how quickly it’s developing. Which is one of the reasons why we’re increasingly convinced that this is going to be a record setting event. It’s going to blow, you know, any event we’ve seen previously out of the water. And if you look at the latest models that came out this morning, actually, it’s good timing. They’re predicting a peak of around 4C in the Niño 3.4 region, which will be, you know, more than a degree above the previous record and could end up being the strongest El Niño in, you know, 500 or a thousand years. We don’t have great proxy estimates going back, but, you know, it certainly is something well outside of anything we’ve seen since records began in 1850.
Robinson Meyer:
The swimmer Katie Ledecky swims a race sometimes in the Olympics and she’ll be out swimming and then behind her there’s like a there’s a computer generated line which is the current world record and she’s way out in front of the current world record and you’re watching her and then she does she turns around in the pool and then the world record is behind her that is the current El Niño this is the Katie Ledecky style El Niño. This seems like as good a juncture as any to ask what physically is an El Niño? We talk about it as an event. We talk about it as a kind of phenomenon that can develop within the global climate system. I think people know that it has to do with the temperature of the Pacific, but what actually is physically happening on the planet when an El Niño occurs?
Zeke Hausfather:
So El Niño is a natural phenomenon. There is arguably some contribution of climate change to El Niño intensity and frequency, but it’s a topic that’s pretty heavily debated and we can talk about that in more detail later. But El Niño itself happens every three to seven years. It’s got a sister event called La Nina, which is essentially the inverse of it, which is unusually cold temperatures in the tropical Pacific instead of warm temperatures. And El Niño is driven by a combination of wind and currents. You have what we call westerly wind bursts that are changing the ocean mixing behavior in the Pacific. And so during an El Niño event, effectively the ocean takes up less heat, and so the atmosphere ends up being warmer, or the ocean even releases some heat. During La Niña, which is the inverse, the ocean, the deeper ocean, I should say, takes up more heat, And so the surface is cool. And so interestingly enough, during strong El Niño events, you tend to have a smaller increase or even in some extreme cases, a loss of ocean heat content, whereas the surface temperatures where we all live end up being much warmer. And so, you know, this isn’t necessarily something that is being caused by humans, but it’s happening on top of human driven warming. And a lot of the year to year variability in global temperatures, which many folks are familiar with looking at, are driven by the sort of El Niño-La Niña cycle.
Robinson Meyer:
What is driving this shift within the model? If the models believe that it’s going to be very warm, then it seems like there are probably signals within the physical system that are pushing them to believe the sea surface will get even hotter than it is right now. And so what are those signals that they seem to be responding to as we understand them?
Zeke Hausfather:
So there’s a couple factors going on here, right? One is, as I mentioned earlier, observations are persistently running above what previous model runs predicted. So observations themselves of the El Niño region sea surface temperatures are persistently running above. Driving projections for a strong event. But we are not just measuring sea surface temperatures. We are also measuring meteorological conditions that are favorable to the sort of westerly wind bursts that drive growing El Niño strength. And we’re modeling and observing what’s happening in the ocean below the surface. And so there we see this sort of pulse of warm water coming from the Western Pacific into the Eastern Pacific and moving up toward the surface. And that warm water is quite warm. You know, some regions are nine degrees centigrade above normal in sort of the deeper ocean temperatures. And that’ll emerge at the surface off the coast of Chile and then spread out across the El Niño tongue into the sort of eastern and central Pacific in the tropics. And so just seeing this warm water moving under the surface toward the El Niño region gives us a little sneak peek to, you know, what’s going to emerge in the next few weeks.
Robinson Meyer:
Because when you see the satellite imagery. That’s thermal coated of an El Niño, it looks like this big tongue of warm, I mean, you just called it the El Niño tongue, but it looks like this big, you know, stalactite of warm water is jutting out into the ocean, and then fading into the kind of baseline temperature mix. But it looks like this big warm tongue that I guess is aligned with the equator or just below the equator or?
Zeke Hausfather:
It’s right around the equator. Yeah. And I think tongue is generally the term that’s and used by folks. But under the surface, the sort of opposite is happening, right? So at the surface, it’s spreading out from the coast of Chile to the west. But under the surface, you have water moving eastward, like warm water in the deeper ocean. And then that’s coming up at the surface in Chile and then spreading westward. And so it’s almost a circulation you could think of it as.
Robinson Meyer:
Let’s bracket out what this El Niño might mean. But what does an El Niño generally mean for the rest of the world. I realize it has lots of these local effects, but one thing I’ve observed, and even reading about El Niño and covering El Niño, is it seems to be both understood as maybe the biggest annual variable in the climate system. And that means it’s both strongly described and also there’s a lack of specificity sometimes about what exactly it will do or what a large El Niño means as opposed to a small El Niño.
Zeke Hausfather:
So what we can most directly say is what’s happening in the tropical Pacific. You know, we’re measuring the sea surface temperatures. There’s that tongue that is very visible. It stands like a sore thumb in any global temperature map during an El Niño event. But when you shift temperatures in the ocean, in the tropical Pacific, it has a whole bunch of teleconnections to the rest of the planetary climate. It’s going to move the jet stream around, it’s going to lead to changing precipitation patterns. And again, some of these are more deterministic than others.
Zeke Hausfather:
It increases the odds of things. It doesn’t necessarily always cause things. But the things that we do tend to see most often associated with El Niño events are or in the El Niño tongue itself,
Zeke Hausfather:
And directly around it, things get a lot wetter. So coastal Peru and Ecuador see a huge amount of rainfall, the Horn of Africa. There’s a few other areas that tend to get quite a bit wetter. But, and in some ways more importantly, the area around that tongue to the north and the south of it and to the west of it get a lot drier. And this is probably the single biggest and most problematic impact of El Niño is its effects on rainfall in those regions. So places like Indonesia and Southeast Asia, India, Southern Africa, Northern Amazon, Eastern Australia, they all tend to get quite a bit drier during El Niño events. And if you look at some of the bigger El Niño related catastrophes in history, like the,
Zeke Hausfather:
You know, mass deaths following the 1877-1878 El Niño event, when depending on what study you look at, somewhere between, you know, three and 50 million people died, that was largely due to crop failure associated with drought in those regions. So that’s the one I’d be most worried about. But, you know, there are also a bunch of other effects. So the western U.S. famously gets wetter during El Niño years. We tend to have mudslides here in California. Route 1 is probably going to get washed away more than usual. You know, we tend to have a bit warmer temperatures in the northern parts of the U.S. and northwest Canada. You know, the oceans as a whole get warmer. One thing that we’ve started seeing during El Niño events starting in 1997, 1987-1988 is these sort of globally widespread coral bleaching events. So the first time this was observed was in 97-98 during that El Niño event. And it’s since then become sort of a common occurrence every time we have a strong El Niño and even some summers when we don’t because the oceans have
Senator Martin Heinrich:
Gotten so hot.
Zeke Hausfather:
And so certainly this year, that’s something that a lot of people are concerned about in the winter in the tropics. There’s also a bunch of different effects on storms associated with changes in wind shear and circulation patterns. A very strong El Niño event will suppress Atlantic hurricanes. It’s one of the reasons that our forecast for Atlantic hurricanes has been cut in half already and might be cut significantly further. But it does tend to lead to more cyclones in the eastern Pacific. So cyclones that might hit Japan or Hawaii or China are going to become more common this year. And then globally, it tends to warm the climate as a whole. So a strong El Niño event tends to be associated with a boost in global temperatures of up to 0.4C for four or five months, and for the year as a whole of around 0.2C. Though this event, because it’s so unprecedented, might push it much further than that. There’s also a bit of a lag in time between when El Niño peaks in the tropical Pacific and when the global temperature effects have felt of about three to five months. So that’s one of the reasons why, even though El Niño is going to peak this year, it’s next year, 2027, that’s likely to be the record shattering one in terms of global temperatures. And that’s a pattern that we persistently see in, you know, 1997 was warm and 1998 was record shattering. 2015 was warm and 2016 was record shattering. It’s the year after El Niño peaks that we really see this big boost in temperatures.
Robinson Meyer:
And that’s because basically we’ve added all this anthropogenic CO2 to the atmosphere. We already know the Earth is kind of out of temperature balance where there’s more heat captured in the atmospheric system than there would be in a kind of a thermostatic way. And normally how that’s dealt with is that heat gets dumped into the ocean and water goes down to the ocean, the ocean acts as a kind of planetary sink for heat from the atmosphere. Exactly. And if the ocean everywhere is unusually warm, but also if the world’s largest ocean is really, really warm at its warmest point, with heat radiating outward from there into the rest of the marine system, then it stops absorbing heat.
Zeke Hausfather:
If the ocean is absorbing less heat, which is sort of the major effect of El Niño, or even releasing heat in some extreme cases, that’s going to lead to a much hotter atmosphere. And so if we didn’t have El Niño and La Nina, almost every year would set a new record in a warming world. It would be monotonic, as we say. The line would just go up. But because we have El Niño and La Nina on top of that, some years are a bit cooler, some years are a bit warmer. And so you can even think of it as like a sine wave driven by El Niño and La Nina cycles on top of an upward line.
Robinson Meyer:
You referenced the 1877-1878 event. You referenced that this could be the biggest El Niño in 500 or 1,000 years. How do we know about El Niño events before the satellite record begins in let’s say around 1980 or even before I think modern 1877, 1878 is within the realm of modern temperature reconstructions where we take land records and put them together and some ocean records and put them together and then simulate the Earth’s climate and get a decent sense of what was happening in the climate system. But how do we know about these historical events?
Zeke Hausfather:
Yeah. So there’s, for a record like 1877, 1878, there’s sort of two ways we know about it. One is that we did have a decent amount of ocean measurements that far back. And so at least on trade routes, the sailing ships were throwing buckets over the side of the ship and pulling them up with a rope and sticking a thermometer in them. So we have some measurements in the El Niño region during that event. Not very many. So there still is a pretty big uncertainty there. But we also have a reasonable estimate of global temperatures. And so you can sort of back out to an extent the strength of an El Niño from its effect on global temperatures as well. And then when you go before 1850, we don’t really have any observations. I mean, there’s some land observations, but there’s not much in the way of ocean observations. And so there you’re relying on some individual proxy measurements like corals that can tell you something about temperature at a particular time. And you’re also looking at these overall global temperature reconstructions and trying to back out the strength of an El Niño event based on, you know, how spiky global temperature is. But certainly the further you go back, the lower the resolution those things are. So like 500 years, we can probably get at least a fuzzy picture.
Zeke Hausfather:
You know, a thousand years, you’re starting to push it just because it’s hard to pick up an event that’s only a year in duration in those proxy records that might have a resolution of 10 years or 15 years. And then obviously, if you push, well, before 1,000 years, you know, you’re starting to get into the realm of a single proxy observation is going to tell you something about 50 or 100 year average. And at that point, El Niño is just going to wash out. So it does limit the extent to which we can say something about the El Niño record.
Robinson Meyer:
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Robinson Meyer:
It’s interesting because to me the 2015-2016 event was right around the same time i started covering climate change and i think it actually marked a big moment in climate discourse if i’m allowed to historicize off the top of my head about these things december 2015 which is i really right as that El Niño event was peaking was the same month the paris agreement was signed obama had just issued and was about to fight in the courts for greenhouse gas regulations on power plants under the Clean Air Act. Then, of course, we had the 2016 election, of which a large amount of the content was about climate change. And I think an underrated amount of that election was about climate policy. And then we had the first Trump administration, during which climate became a more and more salient topic politically. And so 2015, 2016, that El Niño, the earth has had most of the warmest years on record have actually happened since that El Niño. That is still the decisive event to me. And I still remember, for instance, those mass coral bleaching events of the 2015-2016 period.
Robinson Meyer:
What do we know, if anything, about El Niño now that we didn’t know 10 years ago during that event? Or what do we know about El Niño’s relationship to climate change, if anything, that we didn’t know for the 2015-2016 event?
Zeke Hausfather:
Before I answer that, I’ll answer another related question, which I think is like why these sort of events have such salience in the public discourse. And I think, you know, part of that is that climate is a slow and gradual problem and our politics are not designed around slow and gradual problems. And so when we do have these acute events, which El Niño on top of global warming represents, you know, it’s a big spike upward. It gives us a sneak peek of, you know, what the new normal global temperature condition is going to be in a decade or so. You know, it tends to focus the attention. And so I think it is important for us to use that to the extent we can, because it is a little sneak peek of what’s coming soon. But in terms of the question you asked around what we know in addition about El Niño and climate, so there certainly have been a number of papers suggesting that climate change could be making strong El Niño events more common. There’s some physical mechanisms that have been proposed, but it isn’t something that shows up particularly robustly in our climate models today. And there are a number of scientists who also argue that there’s those physical reasons that have been proposed are not super strong. So I’d put this in the same category as the debates around like wavy jet stream from global warming and its effects on cold air outbreaks, for example.
Robinson Meyer:
And the way we jet stream, just for listeners, is the idea that climate change is making those extreme cold snaps that we have had recently in North American winters where it’s suddenly negative 10 for a day or two more common because the jet stream is less stable and it dips down, allowing the so-called polar vortex to dip down over more populous parts of North America than where it normally lives.
Zeke Hausfather:
I’d put both of those ideas in this category of very active scientific debate, like the jury is out. And so hopefully in another decade, we’ll have a stronger answer in both of them and more modeling and observations. But I don’t think we can say today that there’s particularly strong evidence that climate change is going to make El Niño’s stronger outside, of course, of, you know, the background warming, just making the impacts of everything worse.
Robinson Meyer:
Right. It’s so funny. I mean, it’s one of those classic climate science discussions where it would be great to know it would be an interesting answer that we’d learn about the Earth climate system. But it wouldn’t really, I don’t know that it would have policy relevance as maybe it would. I mean, maybe we’ll learn about key El Niño mechanisms that could come important later. But the key takeaway of climate science is and remains that we should, you know, reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions as fast as we possibly can while avoiding overall harms to humanity.
Zeke Hausfather:
And the climate impacts of human emissions are just so much bigger over time than the climate impacts of El Niño, right? You know, a strong El Niño event will add about 0.2 degrees centigrade to global temperatures for a year. You know, human emissions are adding that every eight years. So every eight years, we’re adding a permanent Super El Niño worth of heat to the climate system, which just helps put things in perspective. Or 1998, which at the time was a record-shattering year, would be an exceptionally cool year if it occurred this year.
Robinson Meyer:
Given the monotonic increases of human greenhouse gas emissions every year, at least so far, what does this El Niño event mean for global temperature rise? You’ve been involved in a debate with the, I would say, storied NASA, former NASA climate scientist Jim Hansen, about whether 2026 will be the hottest year ever. Maybe fill us in on that, but generally, what does this event mean for global temperature?
Zeke Hausfather:
Yeah. So El Niño provides a temporary boost in global temperatures. We know how it’s happened historically. It’s a little harder to predict this year because we’re so far out of sample. You know, if the models are right, we end up with a peak at 4C, which is more than a degree above anything we’ve ever seen before. We don’t have analogs to draw on. But if we assume the world is linear, which we get in trouble for sometimes, we would expect a boost in global temperatures in 2027 of, you know, 0.25, maybe even up to 0.3C. And so at least my latest estimate is that this year, 2026, will be pretty neck and neck with 2024. Probably still going to be the second warmest, but, you know, maybe a 40% chance it’s the warmest, 60% chance it’s the second warmest. So getting closer and closer to a coin toss. Next year, 2027, though, is going to shatter records. So the warmest year we’ve had to date was 2024, and that was about 1.5 degrees, 1.5, 2 or so above pre-industrial levels across the average of six different data sets that the scientists have put together. 2027 in those same data sets, given what the models expect El Niño to do, would end up around 1.7 degrees C.
Zeke Hausfather:
So even compared to the previous El Niño event, which was a big boost, you know, this event is going to shatter records. And so the air bars are still pretty big on that, in part because, you know, the models have a wide range of projections. If it ends up being an El Niño that only breaks a record by a small margin instead of shattering it, the global temperature response is going to be smaller. But under any of the El Niño forecasts, 2027 is going to be a record warm year. I think the last time I checked, there was about a 95% chance it sets a new record.
Robinson Meyer:
One of the multi-year running conversations in climate science, and I would say among climate analysts as well, is that this year, as you said, temperatures will be on average about 1.5C warmer than their pre-industrial average. I believe last year we were over 1.5C as well, or very close. And one way I’ve tried to be rigorous as this has happened in the climate system is to say, look, like just because you have one year, you know, of course, at this point, about eight or nine years ago, the IPCC came out with its 1.5C report, which basically said the effects of climate change at making the planet a degree and a half warmer than their pre-industrial average will be more severe than we thought will be bad. Well, it’s a thing that’s worth avoiding. One thing I’ve been carefully rigorous about is like a single year where the global average temperature is more than 1.5C above pre-industrial average doesn’t actually mean we’ve cleared this sort of conceptual 1.5C threshold. I mean, to be clear, we are definitely going to clear the 1.5C threshold, but the first year you do it is not when you actually clear that threshold. You need several years of data above 1.5C to bring the five or 10-year moving average above 1.5. It seems like with this big El Niño, though,
Robinson Meyer:
We are going to have warm temperatures. We’re going to really push that moving average a fair amount and at least could temporarily get the threshold to be pretty close. I realize it’s hard to predict more than beyond 2027. We don’t know what 2028. We could have a big La Nina in 2028 and it could push temperatures back down below 1.5C. But maybe to tie this into another conversation. I think for the past four years or five years at this point, really since the pandemic, global warming has appeared to accelerate. And there’s been this question about whether it was caused by reductions in particulate pollution or whether it’s some other process that’s being revealed as human emissions continue to drive it. I guess the other takeaway from this big El Niño event is like that acceleration is going to continue given that we’re going to be above 1.5C this year and we could be above 1.6 or 1.7 next year.
Zeke Hausfather:
Certainly, our estimates of when the world is going to cross 1.5C have been moving closer and closer to present. One of the challenges, I think there is broad agreement now that global warming is accelerating. In fact, I went out on a bit of a limb in 2023 and published a piece in the New York Times arguing that it was accelerating back when the evidence was much more mixed than it is right now. I think the debate is less today about is it accelerating and more about exactly how much and how quickly it is accelerating. And how much of that acceleration is being driven directly by human emissions, the combination of greenhouse gases that warm the planet and cutting emissions of aerosols, sulfur dioxide in particular, that have masked a portion of historical warming. And how much of it is being driven by feedbacks to the warming process, which in many ways are the more worrying factor, right? You know, is cloud changes that we’re observing, you know, all being driven by cutting air pollution and sulfur and shipping fuel and Chinese particulates from their coal plants? Or is that change in cloud behavior and clouds being less reflective a response to the warming itself? Because it turns out that the biggest driver of how sensitive climate models are to our emissions, this factor we call climate sensitivity, essentially how much warming you get if you double CO2.
Zeke Hausfather:
The biggest determinant of that in climate models is how clouds respond in a warming world. So if the cloud feedback is strong, if clouds become less reflective, if there’s less low-lying clouds, potentially more high clouds in a warming world, then you get a lot more warming for the same amount of CO2. And so we can’t say for sure today, what mix of factors we’re seeing. But I think a lot of us are really concerned that we might be seeing an emergence of a stronger cloud feedback, which would, all things being equal, tend to imply a higher climate sensitivity.
Zeke Hausfather:
But in terms of when we’re going to pass 1.5 degrees, unfortunately, the Paris Agreement didn’t actually define what they meant by 1.5 degrees, which has caused a lot of challenges after that. And then the IPCC decided to fill in the gap. And they said, OK, we’ll define 1.5 degrees as the midpoint of a 20-year period. So 20 years is long enough that El Niño and La Nina effects will cancel each other out, and you’ll just have the human warming, the long-term effects in there. The problem with that, of course, is that means you won’t know when you’ve passed 1.5 degrees until 10 years after the fact, which is not the most useful definition. So there’s a big paper in the works that myself and like 40 other people are co-authors of that hopefully is going to come out later this summer or fall that is trying to actually answer this question and say, how do we as a community figure out a way to define when we’ve crossed 1.5 degrees that doesn’t require waiting 10 years in the future to know? There’s still a bunch of different options you could choose and different methods and ways to combine observations and models or statistical smoothing or linear or exponential projections. Anyway, there’s a million different approaches one could take. The approach we took in this paper was essentially say, okay, which of these methods got previous periods right? Like when we passed one degree or when we passed 0.5 degrees, how resilient are they to like volcanic eruptions or weird El Niños or these other sort of things. But I do think the world is probably going to firmly pass 1.5 degrees by about 2028 or so, you know, it’s coming up pretty darn quickly.
Robinson Meyer:
I’ve always felt like we needed a number that was not just how much warmer is it than average. We need a kind of global warming index number, like a climate changey index that can spit out one number that says how much worse are things right now. The issue is that once you start thinking about what such an index would look like, you realize that you basically just want the global temperature average and also that it’s basically going to go up all the time. And so it doesn’t really have a useful function, except You know, when Europe is having a giant heat wave, you could be like, oh, it’s especially climate changey right now.
Zeke Hausfather:
We do have this human-induced warming estimate that we publish every year in the sort of climate change indicators report that Pierce Foster leads. And I think this year is about 1.4 degrees of pre-industrial levels was our
Zeke Hausfather:
best estimate for 2025, which is, you know, pretty darn close to 1.5.
Robinson Meyer:
We’re talking about this question of climate sensitivity, which is how responsive is the climate system when one doubles atmospheric CO2? CO2. And in many ways, it’s one of the core questions in climate science. And for a long time, we kind of had a distribution for it. We knew what the range of climate sensitivity might be, but we hadn’t made a lot of progress in cutting off the tails. You were a co-author on a 2020 paper that cut off the extreme low end and extreme high end estimates using a number of different lines of evidence. Given what we’ve seen since 2020, where there’s been this seeming acceleration in global warming, does that affect the conclusions of that work at all? Are you more worried that we’re on the high end or that there are more extreme high end possibilities within the climate system that maybe weren’t countenanced by how that paper was run? Or are we just landing, I believe that paper was found that climate sensitivity was somewhere between 2.6 and 3.9 Celsius, are we like pointing more toward the 3.9 side than the 2.6 side, given what we’ve seen over the past few years?
Zeke Hausfather:
So we rounded those numbers a bit in terms of what ended up in the IPCC sixth assessment report. But the IPCC report said that the likely range of climate sensitivity and likely in the IPCC’s parlance means there’s a roughly two-thirds chance it’s in that range was between 2.5 and 4C per doubling CO2. And the very likely range, the 90th percentile range, which I find more useful, to be honest, because a lot of things happen outside of a two thirds chance is somewhere between 2C and 5C if we double CO2. And that’s a pretty big range, right? A lot of stuff can happen between 2C and 5C, but...
Zeke Hausfather:
You know, we are doing an updated report, hopefully in time for the IPCC 7th assessment report that’s going to incorporate all of the evidence that’s come out since 2020, because, you know, it is a big question in climate science. And there’s been a lot of work that has come out in the last six years on this topic. And, you know, I don’t want to spill the beans early, so to speak, in terms of what we’re going to find. But I will say that there’s sort of two countervailing factors, one supporting higher sensitivity and one constraining it a bit. So the thing supporting higher climate sensitivity is what we’re seeing with earth energy imbalance. So this measurement we get from satellites of how much heat is being trapped in the climate system, which is something that’s a fairly new instrument. You know, we don’t have a super long record of it, but it is in some ways the most important measure because it is capturing the sum of the whole climate system. Now, it has shown values that are a bit on the high side of what most climate models expect. And so is an indication that climate sensitivity might be on the higher end, but it is also one satellite and a relatively short record. And so there’s reasons not to just use that as the only bit of information we have. The other thing that we have is the paleoclimate records. So the Earth’s more distant past, particularly the last ice age,
Zeke Hausfather:
The Pliocene, the Eocene, these sort of periods in the Earth’s more distant past that we have measurements of both carbon dioxide and greenhouse gas concentrations, but also of temperatures from proxy records. And those tend to suggest that climate sensitivity is not much above 5 degrees C. You know, if you have a really sensitive model, for example, it’s going to run away to snowball earth if it tries to simulate the last ice age. And there’s been a lot of work by that community to use things like pattern effects and sort of how the continents and ice sheets and everything were different in that period than they are today to try to infer what the relationship in that period means for climate sensitivity today. And I think that has not necessarily been pointing toward very high climate sensitivity. But that said, 5C warming for doubling CO2 is still very much in the range of possibilities. And so there’s been a bit of a heated debate between myself and Jim Hansen and a number of other folks in the community about this topic. And Hansen’s been arguing that climate sensitivity is probably close to 5C. And the rest of us have been saying that it could be. But across all the lines of evidence we have, we don’t necessarily think that it’s more likely to be 5C than 3C, right? I personally wouldn’t be surprised if at the end of the day, in the next IPCC report, we move the best estimate up to closer to 3.5 degrees C for doubling of CO2 from three. But it’s early days, and that’s not my chapter, so I don’t get to decide that.
Robinson Meyer:
Well, speaking of emissions, you recently published a blog post on the emissions intensity of using AI. And I appreciated it for a number of reasons, including the fact that you drew on this John Bistline paper, who’s a researcher at Watershed, trying to estimate the emissions intensity of AI, which was in turn covered by my colleague, Emily Panacorvo. So always great to see heat map in the mix. But your general takeaway from this paper and also from your own estimates was that AI, probably at this point, given how we use it, is much more emissions intensive than maybe early estimates or is somewhat more emissions intensive than early estimates and you were able to put some error bars around how we should think about electricity use associated with both chatbot ai and then also agentic and cloud code style ai and describe a little bit what you think the discourse is missing right now around those topics and why you think speaking of estimates coming in on the high end why some of the more popular estimates around the emissions intensity of AI may underestimate its emissions.
Zeke Hausfather:
So when you’re looking at AI energy use, there’s sort of top-down and bottom-up approaches you can take. I think the top-down numbers are broadly right, and those are the ones that give like, I don’t know, 15% of U.S. electricity use by 2030 going to AI data centers on the high end. I’m not arguing that estimates like those are too low. What this piece was more about is, what is the impact of me as an individual using AI tools? And there, the numbers that were published last year in 2025 by folks like Google or by OpenAI are not very realistic to the way people are actually using AI today. So these numbers that were published in 2025 were that AI per prompt, and by prompt, they mean typing something in a chat GPT text box and hitting enter and getting a response without a reasoning model, important distinction. So just one shot. But those take about 0.3 watts of energy, which really isn’t much, right? At 0.3 watts, you could do many, many, many thousands or tens of thousands of AI prompts and still have much lower impact than, you know. Running your air conditioner in the afternoon or, you know, driving to work.
Robinson Meyer:
That’s less than how a light bulb used to be. So if you didn’t feel bad about adding a single new lamp to your home, then you shouldn’t feel bad, so to speak, about using AI under that estimate. Yeah.
Zeke Hausfather:
But the problem, of course, is that some people are still using AI that way, but increasingly AI is being used in an agentic form. And that more means that you give AI a set of instructions or a goal to achieve. And then AI goes off and does many, many, many, things to try to achieve that goal. AI agents are, at least in the corporate world and the software engineering and scientific world, the vast majority of AI use today. And those agents make both much more complicated calls than the prompts would suggest and many, many more calls. And so when you look at the actual energy use of these AI agents, it’s something on the order of 600 times larger per prompt than the traditional, like, type something in a chat box and got to get an immediate response. And so that does end up adding up. I actually looked at two months of my own AI use because I had local logs of all of the numbers there.
Robinson Meyer:
When you say local AI use, these are calls you’re making locally to ChatGPT or Claude that you’ve retained a record for but the ai is still being run on an external device you don’t have a power meter hooked up to your desktop
Zeke Hausfather:
Yeah my desktop is using next to nothing this is some data center spinning up to process the call i made on my local cloud code but i found that on average i was using about three kilowatt hours a day for my agentic energy use which is the equivalent of running two refrigerators so that’s not nothing in big days when i was really doing some complicated like geospatial analysis or big data crunching exercise, I was using upwards of 10 kilowatt-hours per day. So maybe a third of the typical US household energy is just going to AI agents. And if you annualize that over the entire year, you end up with numbers that they’re not crazy. So for an entire year, my estimate is that my agentic AI energy use is about 1.1 megawatt-hours. If you convert that to CO2, again, using sort of a roughly average grid intensity, It’s about 370 kilograms of CO2. So that’s roughly half of a transcontinental flight. So again, it’s not enormous in terms of my overall emissions, but it’s also not trivial, like some of these initial estimates that came out last year would suggest.
Robinson Meyer:
Carbon emissions with average U.S. grid intensity or with the likely kind of it’s all coming from gas that...
Zeke Hausfather:
All coming from gas and average U.S. grid intensity are not that far apart at the moment.
Robinson Meyer:
Yes.
Zeke Hausfather:
Yeah. So this is using a bit of location-based analysis, but it’s pretty close to the all-gas assumption now. Where I’ve gotten some criticism there is people who said, well, if you account for the fact that these AI companies are buying RECs to cover their data center energy use by building clean energy elsewhere, even if it’s not directly powering the data center, then the number is probably lower. Which, you know, might be fair if they actually disclosed what those numbers would be, I would be happy to use them. But unfortunately, at the moment, AI companies are really not telling us much about the actual energy use of their products. And so we’re having to infer all this with very indirect methods. One of the main takeaways from this piece should be a plea for AI companies to be more transparent and actually tell us how much energy their systems are using.
Robinson Meyer:
I think this is very striking, particularly by Anthropic, which I think has published absolutely no estimates per token of its emissions intensity or energy use, even though it’s the quote unquote kind of good AI company. We just are kind of completely in the dark about what Claude uses. And in fact, we know that Anthropic is contracted with one of the Colossus data centers built by XAI, which is one of the worst offenders in terms of particularly emissions-intensive generation.
Robinson Meyer:
We’re going to have to leave it there. As El Niño continues to develop, maybe we’ll have you back to talk about just how bad it is. Zeke Hausfather, thank you so much for joining us on Shift Key.
Zeke Hausfather:
Thanks, Rob. It was a great conversation.
Robinson Meyer:
And that will do it for us this week, but we’ll be back next week with a new episode of ShiftKey. Until then, Shift Key is a production of Heatmap News. Our editors are Jillian Goodman and Nico Lauricella. Multimedia editing and audio engineering is by Jacob Lambert and by Nick Woodbury. Our music’s by Adam Kromelow. Thanks so much for listening. We’ll see you next week.
Boston-based startup Reservoir has raised an $8 million seed round to commercialize heat pump-powered water heaters.
There are plenty of ways to leverage everyday household appliances to shift electricity demand and free up capacity on the grid. But when energy nerds talk about these opportunities, they’re mostly focused on distributed energy resources like smart thermostats, residential batteries, and electric vehicle chargers. Water heaters — the vast majority of which are not internet connected — rarely enter the conversation.
Boston-based startup Reservoir wants to change that, raising a $8 million seed round to bring its sexier, techier heat pump water heaters to market. Asymmetric Capital Partners led the round, alongside Founder Collective and the climate-focused investor MCJ.
The startup has already installed its water heaters in nearly 100 homes around Boston. Each unit pairs an onboard computer with a heat pump, allowing it to learn a household’s hot water habits so it can begin preheating hours in advance of, say, your morning shower. That long lead time matters, as a heat pump can take five or six hours to warm up a standard 50-gallon tank. But if your schedule shifts and you need hot water at an atypical time, the unit comes equipped with backup resistance heating elements, allowing it to heat the tank quickly using the same technology many conventional water heaters do.
The company’s CEO, Luke Winston-Almanzar, was inspired to start the company when he realized that his water heater consumed more energy per year than it took to charge his electric car, but was dumber than his air fryer or watch.
“Most people don’t realize the water heater is the second biggest use of energy in the home. It’s almost 20%,” he told me, coming in behind space heating and cooling, which account for around half of a household’s total energy consumption. He saw an opportunity to help bring smart, energy efficient water heaters into the digital age, much the way Nest did for thermostats.
Simply switching to a heat pump water heater can already cut energy use by about 75% compared with standard electric models, which account for about half the nation’s fleet. And while most heat pump models now come equipped with internet connectivity and remote adjustment mechanisms, the startup’s predictive software is what truly sets it apart. While other units simply hold water at a consistent temperature, Reservoir squeezes out additional energy savings by only heating when it anticipates hot water will actually be needed, Winston-Almanzar told me. Ultimately, this adds up to an average $800 per year in customer savings compared to standard electric tanks, and around $150 for gas-powered tanks, according to the company’s estimates.
Scale that up to thousands of households, and water heaters become a grid resource that can participate in demand response programs and virtual power plants. “You get a smart water heater in homes — you can save people money, you can increase their comfort. But then you get 50,000 of them, and they’re connected, and you can actually offset Elon Musk’s data center,” Winston-Almanzar explained.
Because water heaters store thermal rather than electrical energy, they can’t send electricity back to the grid like residential battery storage systems can. But they can still shift when they consume electricity. For example, Reservoir can heat water in the early morning when demand on the grid is low and hold it until people start waking up and showering. Or for households that use more hot water in the evening, the system can heat up around midday when there’s lots of cheap, clean power on the grid. During times of peak demand, it can simply pause its heating cycle, drawing on the water it’s already stored.
While Reservoir hasn’t yet integrated its systems with a virtual power plant provider that could compensate customers for helping to alleviate strain on the grid, Winston-Almanzar sees this as a near-term opportunity. “What I’m sprinting towards is getting 1,000 units installed in Massachusetts because that gets us to the megawatt-hour-scale of thermal storage,” he told me, explaining that’s when VPP integration will start to make sense for a specific region.
Today, the startup’s base model retails for less than $4,000 fully installed, compared to $3,000 to $6,000 for a standard electric water heater, and includes all of Reservoir’s predictive capabilities. The company also offers a more feature-rich $5,450 model that has a “Party Mode,” which effectively stretches the capacity of a 50-gallon tank to deliver up to 150 gallons of hot water on high-demand days, such as when a household is hosting guests. This model can also proactively adjust the system when water pipes are at risk of freezing and offers “no-wait” showers, using a recirculation pump to deliver hot water instantaneously, without having to let the tap run first.
Those prices include the $1,050 rebate available for heat pump water heaters in Massachusetts, where Reservoir’s early installations are concentrated. While the Trump administration axed the Energy Efficient Home Improvement Credit, which covered 30% of the costs of eligible units up to $2,000, Winston-Almanzar says state-level incentives are helping fill the gap. The company has already expanded into Maine and New Hampshire, which offer their own rebates, and plans to enter additional major metro markets such as New York, Washington DC, Seattle, and San Francisco.
The company is also betting on its installation process as a competitive advantage. Rather than relying entirely on third-party contractors, Reservoir employs an in-house team of young, digitally native plumbers to install its systems — a team it expects will grow substantially as the company scales.
Ultimately, if Reservoir succeeds in becoming the Nest of water heaters, Winston-Almanzar predicts systems like his will eventually replace smart thermostats in VPP programs. “If you have a battery for where you need electrons moving, and you have a tank of water for when you need just heat moving, homeowners don’t even need to feel it,” he explained. While adjusting a customer’s thermostat can immediately impact their comfort, changing a water heater’s background operations will go largely unnoticed, he argued, making them a better option for VPP integration.
Turning one of a home’s largest energy loads into a giant grid battery that saves customers money certainly seems like a good bet. But it’s still early days. Reservoir will have to prove, through many thousands more installations, that the humble water heater truly has what it takes to become one of the grid’s most valuable distributed resources.