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Robinson Meyer:
[1:26] Hi, I’m Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News. It is Wednesday, April 1. The electricity system is more important than ever, and the prices we pay for power are starting to reflect that. Last year, the increase in power prices outpaced overall inflation across the economy. The power grid was a huge issue in statewide elections, especially in New Jersey and Georgia. And in some parts of the country, especially the mid-Atlantic’s grid, PJM, we saw data centers begin to drive up overall electricity rates. We know the pressure in the system is building, although I think power prices are unlikely to exceed inflation again this year, thanks to the Iran war. Last year, utilities asked for more than $28 billion in rate hikes, and many of those hikes were approved by state regulators and are now essentially baked into the system and are going to be paid by customers this year or next year. But what’s funny about the power system, at least in the U.S., is that while I can kind of cite that statistic abstractly, it’s very hard to get a real-time look at the prices that people are actually paying for electricity. While we have retrospective studies in some states, it can be hard to know in real time why power costs are rising in some places and not others. Is it more competition for power? Basically, is there an electricity shortage? Is it that infrastructure costs are going up? Is it a big storm with extreme weather?
Robinson Meyer:
[2:42] That’s a problem for policymakers, and it’s provided an opening for Trump officials like Energy Secretary Chris Wright to claim that the simple presence of wind and solar on the grid drives up power rates. So I’m excited to announce in this very podcast that Heatmap has a new solution to this problem. With our partners at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, we released today the Electricity Price Hub. It’s a public-facing electricity data platform that provides monthly utility level estimates of residential electricity rates and bills across the United States. So for the first time ever, you can go in there right now. It’s very user friendly. It’s on heatmap.news. And of course, it’s in the show notes, like go do it right now. And you can see how your state, your zip code, or your utility service areas, average power prices and bills have changed over the past six years. And you can see what part of the power system drove those changes? Was it generation? Was it transmission? Was it distribution? I don’t think there’s any other tool like this on the internet right now.
Robinson Meyer:
[3:45] I’m so excited that we were able to publish it at Heatmap. And today on Shift Key, I’m excited to dive into it. So joining us today on this episode of Shift Key are our partners in producing the Electricity Price Hub. I’m joined by Brian Deese. He’s an Institute Innovation Fellow at the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research at MIT. He’s also, of course, the former director of the White House Economic Council under President Joe Biden.
Robinson Meyer:
[4:06] Also joining me is Lauren Sidner. She’s a senior advisor at the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy at MIT. She’s also a former senior advisor to U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate, John Kerry, also during the Biden administration. It’s all coming up on Shift Key. Brian and Lauren, welcome to Shift Key.
Brian Deese:
Excited to be here.
Lauren Sidner:
[4:29] Really good to be here. Thanks, Rob.
Robinson Meyer:
[4:31] As listeners will have heard, we announced a very exciting new tool on our website
Robinson Meyer:
[4:35] today, the Electricity Price Hub, and we’re going to talk about it in a second. But I want to start by talking about why this tool is important and what the state of the data was before this tool, what the state of our knowledge of the electricity system was before this tool. Because the electricity system, obviously, incredibly important to the U.S. economy, and yet it was something that it was very hard to understand in real time. So like prior to today, Brian, what was the state of our real time knowledge about the electricity grid and electricity prices? And how did that influence our ability to govern it?
Brian Deese:
[5:15] It may come as a surprise to people who have just seen all of the public reporting and news on this topic, that the state of our knowledge was really poor. It was a bit like the basketball player who was short, slow, and couldn’t shoot. So if you wanted to find data on electricity prices, one, almost all the data operated with a delay. You could find data three months, six months, 12 months delay. Two, the data is
Brian Deese:
[5:47] very aggregated at the state level or the national level, didn’t tell you much about what you were experiencing. And three, it was top level, what the electricity rate you’re paying, but it didn’t really tell you what you might actually be paying out of pocket. It didn’t tell you why, and it didn’t tell you what was driving those prices. So if you really wanted to ask the question of like, what am I paying in electricity today based on where I actually am and why am I paying that? It’s really hard to answer any of those things. And that was what motivated us. Was there a way to solve all of those problems together?
Robinson Meyer:
[6:25] And I remember as a reporter having these moments where we could say, okay, electricity inflation, according to CPI or according to PCE is running hot compared to overall economic inflation right now. But like, why was it so hard to get data on these topics? And what kind of delays are we talking about here? Is this like a month or two months? Because there’s already kind of this pass through time in the electricity grid, where like, if fuel costs go up today, it will take a long time for utilities to get those fuel costs approved by regulator and then pass them through to customers. Is that like the kind of delay we’re talking about? Or is this something more fundamental in the data.
Brian Deese:
[7:10] The principal reason why it’s tricky is a reflection of the electricity system we have in the U.S., which is we don’t have one system. We don’t even have a couple of systems. We have dozens and dozens of systems in the U.S. That are producing, transmitting, distributing, and utilizing power. And the structure of when that data is released, in what form it’s released, is a reflection of this patchwork of dozens and dozens and dozens of different jurisdictions around the U.S. And so to your point, there is data at the national level, CPI, CPI is inflation, within inflation data at the national level every month, how much is electricity price inflation going up compared to overall inflation? But that operates at the national level. If it’s disaggregated, you can find data that is operating with roughly a year delay. But even then, you have to be relatively committed to the proposition of going and looking at the data in each of these jurisdictions. And so you can get data for what’s happening in one utility jurisdiction in one state and one utility jurisdiction in another state. But you look and you say, well, but are those comparable? Because they’re presented in different ways. And it really is just a reflection of that patchwork electricity system we have in the United States.
Robinson Meyer:
[8:32] And that also, I would imagine, poses a big problem for policymakers because you can look at national level data, which I think is survey data, basically asking the same set of people who we survey kind of all the inflation data from, how much are you spending on electricity? And they’ll tell you. But then if you want to backtrack that to how much are...
Robinson Meyer:
[8:50] New Jerseyans spending on electricity? Or what do rising electricity costs in this state or this utility mean you should then do as a policy? Or why are they rising? Or what subcomponents are causing electricity prices to go up? Is this a data center thing? Is this a renewables thing? Like all of that, none of that is captured by data that before today was like close at hand or easy to access. Is that right?
Lauren Sidner:
[9:18] Yeah, that’s exactly right. It’s the kind of number of sources that Brian talked about. It’s the difference from one source to the next, just in terms of how the information is presented, whether it’s available in the first place. Oftentimes, you’ll have to pair information from one source with some estimates from federal reporting to be able to even interpret the information you get. The kind of main or kind of best-in-class federal data on this can give you a pretty good sense from one utility to the next, what the average rates look like, but it doesn’t tell you any of the kind of things that go into that rate. And so you can’t start to understand the kind of different drivers behind that. And then to your point earlier about what are New Jerseyans paying, there’s even within a state, there’s a huge range in terms of what’s happening. And so I guess it speaks to the real need for location, time, specific data. And that is just challenging given the number of places we’re talking about.
Robinson Meyer:
[10:14] What is the tool and how is this tool different?
Brian Deese:
[10:17] In basic terms, this tool will provide reliable, comparable data on a monthly basis on both electricity rates, what it costs for electricity and electricity bills, what people are paying at essentially the zip code level in states across the country. So for the first time, like we have with jobs or like we have with other sorts of data, every month, we will release data that is consistent, comparable, and reliable across those metrics. And it allows us to overcome those sort of the three problems of the basketball player, right? Which is, it’ll come out every month. It’ll come out at a level of granularity that allows you to say,
Brian Deese:
[10:59] Boy, I live in southern New Jersey, and it feels like I pay a lot more than my sister that lives in northern New Jersey. Is that the case? It’ll allow you to overcome that. And importantly, it’ll allow you to look into the rate data and say, what are the components of that rate. So if my rate is 100, how much of that is connected to generation? How much of that is transmission, distribution? It will break those things down. So our goal here is to provide that in a way that helps to make clearer what has been really hard to figure out.
Robinson Meyer:
[11:31] To kind of compare it to what used to exist, you would get these studies that would come out on a lag that would be able to disaggregate why rates had gone up in, say, California. And California, because it has the country’s most expensive electricity, or it’s consistently in the top five states, tends to get these very good research on the composition of its electricity rates. And you could look at California and be like, oh, they’re spending more on their distribution system. They’re spending more on this. That’s why rates are going up. I think this is the first time where you don’t have to wait for a study.
Robinson Meyer:
[12:05] You can look at states, you can look at zip codes, you can look at congressional districts, and you can say, oh, well, in the southeast, for instance, when rates are going up, or in even more specifically in this utility in Tampa, when rates have gone up, it’s because the distribution system is getting more expensive because of extreme weather. But when you look at parts of the mid-Atlantic, like central New Jersey or something, It’s because generation is getting more expensive because of data centers. This is like the first time we can actually, in a live way, compare why electricity prices are behaving the way they are across zip codes, utility service areas, states, like various kinds of jurisdictions across the country. It’s really cool.
Brian Deese:
[12:49] And I would say on that, Rob, that importantly, this tool is intended to empower all of the analysis that you just described. It is not actually a prescriptive tool that on its own, as of today, comes to all of those conclusions, but it provides the data in a consistent, repeatable way so that folks can do that type of analysis much more easily and across the country, not just in areas where there’s been enough focus or enough attention that people have really decided to research on its own.
Brian Deese:
[13:20] The other thing I should say about this is our goal is for this to be completely transparent, the methods and data architecture out there for people to explore, and completely open source in the sense that what’s one of the cool things about this partnership with you all and with Heatmap is that the goal is to put this data out into the open in a consistent, repeatable way so that we don’t have to operate with a lag for people to answer the question like that. So you can look and you can say, what are the components of transmission distribution? I want to be very clear. That doesn’t answer the policy question. It doesn’t. It doesn’t. What it does is it enables a more sort of intelligent exploration, research, debate dynamic around the policy question. That’s really the goal.
Robinson Meyer:
[14:01] So interesting, because in the current moment of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, we basically have up to the minute data on gasoline prices because of this company, GasBuddy, and because of AAA that does daily compilations, we know, like...
Robinson Meyer:
[14:17] If gas prices, you know, of course, we know the macro environment is that there’s basically no oil transiting out of the Strait of Hormuz. But even on a subnational level, we can say, okay, well, Michigan is in the middle of a price cycle, which means kind of prices are happened to be going up at the moment. And also it’s experiencing supply constraints this way. We know up to the hour, basically, within states and localities, what people are paying for gasoline. While if you wanted like comparable data for the electricity system was like, you could maybe find out what people were paying in a state or possibly a region of the country three to 24 months ago.
Brian Deese:
[15:00] Gas prices are the most transparent price in our entire economy. Almost everybody lives within earshot of that price being literally displayed, where they drive, where they walk. It is the most transparent price. Electricity prices are among the least transparent because they’re so hard to find for all the reasons we just described. And even if you find them, most people, their lived experience is not what is the electricity price that I’m paying? It’s what’s my bill. Which is another part of this tool that I think is important, which is we are doing consistent data both on the rate and also the average bill paid. The bill is obviously a function of the rate and then how much energy you are consuming. And that’s important too, I think, to start to get closer to being more transparent is that for people and what they experience, the experience of what’s driving both the rate and the bills. They both matter.
Robinson Meyer:
[15:57] So let’s talk about how it came together. Like maybe Lauren, can you describe for us like how was data collected for this? If we’ve never had a resource like this before, where did the data come from and how is it compiled to form the numbers that we’re reporting in the database today?
Lauren Sidner:
[16:14] Yeah. So for our own unique new data collection, we sourced information on utility rates from two key sources, both official reporting. The first category was data reported by state regulators or other state agencies on a regular basis. So we have a set of states where we collect rate data directly from those entities for all of the utilities that they regulate. For the remainder of states, we, for those kind of larger utilities in each state, we collect the rate data directly from utility rate books. And what we collect is any rates associated with standard residential rate plan, along with any other charges that apply to the typical residential customer. We then take that and pair it with information primarily from the EIA on the average usage by residential customers in a specific place in a specific month to calculate a single average rate and then a single average bill for each month. And obviously, as rates go up, bills go up, but that relationship isn’t always exactly what you would expect. We just out of curiosity and for a fun exercise mapped every utility in our data set onto a set of quadrants that it was sort of the national average rate, the national average bill. And there are a surprising number of utilities that fall above the national average rate and below the national average bill or below the national average rate and above the national average bill. So those things don’t always line up because a lot of what ends up influencing bill is not just the number you start with, but also, you know, typical household size, climate conditions, the kind of basic efficiency of the typical household in a place. So a lot goes into that number. And so that’s why we thought it was important to keep both numbers in mind in the dataset and to get a more complete picture.
Robinson Meyer:
[17:58] That’s so cool. You know, when we are able to say, okay, well, generation is X% of the bill or X number of dollars in the bill and transmission is X number of dollars in the bill or distribution. Is that coming out of the Public Utility Commission data and the state level data? Is that coming from what the utilities describe in their rate books? How are we able to get that level of granularity about the data?
Lauren Sidner:
[18:22] Yeah. So like I mentioned, we collect the rates for any charge that would apply to the typical customer. We then go through each of those charges and identify any kind of function-specific charges. And we base that on the kind of definitional language included in the utility tariff document. Oftentimes those documents will include a formula that explains how a charge is computed. And so use that language to understand how best to classify a given charge. And so we categorize those that can kind of neatly be sorted into one of our categories. It’s not always the case. There are going to be charges that cover multiple of the categories or straddle multiple of the category. So then for those, we go into the actual regulatory filings. The most frequent example of this is base rate charges. And there we pull the relevant utility regulatory filings that describe the kind of total revenue requirement, what they need to earn to cover all of their costs and the return on capital, and specifically look at what has been allocated to the residential customers and how those costs have been functionalized in those filings, the functional breakdown of the total amount in their filings.
Robinson Meyer:
[19:30] I’ve been a climate reporter for a long time, but kind of I had an interregnum during COVID where I helped run and put together and report on a volunteer project to collect COVID data from states. What I learned from that project is that every number in a database took incredible amounts of work to get, and actually a lot of discussions about where you should categorize something and where the cutoff is and what’s on the cusp. Like every number in a database has a.
Robinson Meyer:
[20:04] Often put together by human hands, not in a synthetic way, but there are so many decisions that go into making something that you can then cite as data that people don’t even realize when they think about it. Let me ask one more question, and then I want to get into the kind of what the stories here are. Sometimes we’re talking about electricity prices, and we’re talking about electricity bills. And I think what people will see when they play with a tool online is that there are some states that have very expensive electricity prices and then actually moderately sized bills. And there’s some states that have pretty good electricity prices, but then very expensive bills. And we can get into that story more and I want to, but if you were to take a look at your power bill, there’s a lot of charges on there that are not called your electricity rates, but nonetheless, are part of the price you pay for electricity. And I think you guys have dealt with this in a really interesting way. So can you just describe like, when you report an electricity price, is that just the electricity residential rate that’s been described by the utility? Or basically, what else goes into the number you describe as an electricity price?
Lauren Sidner:
[21:17] In every case, we are trying to capture the entirety of the typical residential customer’s bill. And so we capture what you just described as sort of the standard residential rate charges. And we add to that all the additional riders and adjustments that the average customer would also see. We don’t include any kind of voluntary charges or opt-in type of charges, but we do capture the kind of full extent of what would show up on a bill. And it’s worth noting too, that there’s a ton of variation in how that information is presented in the bill to the customer, how user-friendly that information presentation is in the end, and how readily customers are able to kind of understand the different pieces of the bill based on that.
Robinson Meyer:
[23:25] Let’s get into stories. One of the key distinctions that people will see the second they open the tool is that we distinguish between rates and bills. Why is it important to think about the rates and bills story separately? And what did you learn from looking at electricity rates and looking at electricity bills?
Brian Deese:
[23:46] The single most important thing is understanding when you have an issue where people are paying a lot for electricity, understanding what component of that is rate, what component of that is bill. In some ways it’s like the first question in answering the why, the like what’s going on, right? There’s an interesting story going on in Alabama, where if you look at Alabama and you look at rates are not particularly high and rates are not rising particularly fast. But Alabama, the typical residential customer in Alabama, uses a lot of electricity.
Brian Deese:
[24:24] Principally because you have to do a lot of cooling and because you’ve got less efficient buildings, houses in the state. And so as a result, the typical household in Alabama is paying in bill a lot compared to other parts of the country. And what’s interesting about that is in 2026 in Alabama, for the first time in at least a decade, if not more, there are now competitive Public Utility Commission elections going on. And in the context of that competitive election, there is now an active political debate around should Alabama Power in particular be required to change the way that it does its regulatory and rate setting?
Brian Deese:
[25:08] Fundamentally, that story is a story about the bills that people pay, right? And you could slow the growth in the electricity rate in Alabama and not actually get at the core thing that’s bugging people or that is an economic drag on people, which is that they’re paying high electricity bills just because of that. And the inverse of that is also true. There are parts of the country where the rates are increasing very quickly, but people’s bills are actually lower than others because they live in places where either you’re spending less on heating and cooling and/or where they live in more efficient homes or they work in more efficient buildings. So you really need to, I think, as we get going from the data to the why and what’s going on in any given place, understanding the rate and bill distinction is like, I think it’s like the first step. It’s the first step in most of these places is you want to ask what component of this is being driven by rates, what components are being driven by bills, and then you go to the next step of what’s behind either or both of those.
Robinson Meyer:
[26:09] In some ways, bill is what matters the most in terms of how people actually think through their electricity system. What’s an example of a place where rates might be increasing really quickly, but bills aren’t surging in the same way?
Lauren Sidner:
[26:23] Wisconsin, Michigan, Arizona all have rates that are above the national average, but bills that are below the national average.
Robinson Meyer:
[26:31] Huh. This stuck out to me looking at New York State too, honestly, is that if you look at Con Ed, which is the main utility for Manhattan and parts of Queens and parts of Brooklyn, you say, oh, the rates are really bad. But if you look at the bills, it’s like, oh, well, people have tiny apartments. They’re just not buying that much electricity every month.
Brian Deese:
[26:48] Bills matter in an absolute sense, but rates do matter in a relative sense, because people’s lived experience is also not just about it’s why inflation has the unsettling economic effect that it has, which is that as prices go up, even if they’re off a lower base — your point about Manhattan is a good one, which is it’s a good example of sort of high rates, low bills. But if the rate of increase of the bill is going up, then it also means that people are going to feel this more.
Robinson Meyer:
[27:17] And it’s complicated because from a utility revenue perspective, the bill is also what matters. And if you think about from a systems perspective, and the utility is trying to recoup the costs of running its system and then make a profit, the volumetric rate is a technical mechanism it uses to like allot the costs of running its system. But actually, the size of the revenue that it receives from each household matters far more in terms of its ability to turn a profit, to cover its cost, to invest further in the system. Like that is the number that matters in terms of actual upkeep for the system. Although I still find it requires a bit of a brain reformatting to remember that’s actually how the entire power grid works.
Brian Deese:
[27:57] It’s why it has been so difficult for us to figure out how to credit efficiency within our system. Because in an overly crude way, if the bill matters, then the utility actually wants to avoid incremental efficiency, which is not true in practice, but the mechanism to actually credit efficiency, whether that efficiency is actually at the household level or is efficiency of the system, efficiency of the grid, capacity and storage. All of those things run into this basic challenge, which is if you make the system more efficient, the utility often doesn’t get paid for it.
Robinson Meyer:
[28:36] This is one of the classic problems that I think we’re now struggling with in terms of governing utilities. I mean, when you looked at individual states or individual political jurisdictions, were there any that stood out where you were like, man, you can really see in this state the difficulty of utility governance or the difficulty of incentivizing utilities or customers to be more efficient in their energy use?
Lauren Sidner:
[28:59] A good number of states have adopted mechanisms that try to do away with the sort of internal disincentive to support efficiency. So very frequently, you’ll see charges that allow utilities to recover the costs of efficiency programs. But you will also, in maybe a more limited number of examples, see charges that allow utilities to recover the revenue that they lose because of those programs or because of distributed energy or other policy-related aims that may be in place. I believe Arizona has that kind of recovery mechanism, but it’s not uncommon. And then occasionally in states like California, you’ll see charges that will give a benefit to a customer for using less power. So it’ll be a tiered charge where if the customer kind of stays within the lower tier, they can actually get sort of a bill credit or something along those lines. So they sometimes even build it into the rate design in addition to just making sure the utility is made whole for supporting that kind of investment.
Robinson Meyer:
[29:58] You both now have come kind of up to the coalface of electricity pricing mechanics and seen at the data level, you know, how the generation system, the distribution system, the transmission system come together to form an electricity price, which then is assessed through bills. What did collecting this data, interacting with this data, change your mind about?
Brian Deese:
[30:23] For me, it increased the urgency around actually challenging and reforming these incentive models to try to get to the most efficient and best outcome for the rate payer. And in fact, the underlying complexity through rates and bills and the components thereof reinforces the challenge that oftentimes in this process, the end ratepayer, the end consumer, and their end experience gets kind of lost in that complicated process. And so for me, it reinforced that we’re not going to shift from a local and utility jurisdiction to a state to a regional to a federal, we’re not going to shift in, it’s neither feasible or advisable to have a single national electricity system, I don’t believe. But yet we need to be more aggressive and more creative about testing, challenging, and then scaling reforms to these systems to actually get to that outcome. I think that was the thing for me that was the most. And it goes back to when I was in government and we were thinking about the scope of national authority, which typically runs through FERC. FERC is the federal regulator charged with oversight. That there has been a real dispositional reticence to having FERC play a more assertive role because of this idea that states and individual utility jurisdictions are really where the action is at. This process challenged that thinking from my perspective. And I think that to really challenge and get that kind of constructive reform, you need to have a more full-throated national role, not to take over at a national level, but to exert that national authority, not just as a nudge, but as a hard nudge in the direction of a sort of more pro-consumer outcome to the grid.
Robinson Meyer:
[32:12] Lauren, what did just coming up against this data change your mind about?
Lauren Sidner:
[32:16] Yeah, going in, I kind of recognized the patchwork fragmented nature that Brian described earlier. But it was just really stark to me that there’s huge, huge variability in the kind of information environment from one state to the next, how easy it is to find kind of critical bits of information, how kind of user friendly regulatory filing systems are, how easy it is for people to understand just the basic makeup of their bills. I mean, there’s just a really wide, wide range across different states. And even in the absolute kind of best case of that, the utility still has this huge information advantage. And there’s a giant gap between that sort of best case and a lot of states. And so when you try and think about kind of identifying the right solutions that are specific to a given player or tailored to the challenges that exist in a given place, I think starting from fixing utility incentives to operate in a way that, like Brian said, is more consumer friendly is going to be really critical.
Robinson Meyer:
[33:14] What states stuck out to you as being the smartest or the most pro-consumer in how they represented and shared this information?
Lauren Sidner:
[33:20] I’m not sure I can name a single state. There were good practices that stood out from one state to the next. Finding basic information in regulatory filings was really surprisingly quite easy in South Carolina. So the South Carolina Commission provided helpful kind of summaries of the outcomes of different regulatory proceedings and what it would mean for consumers’ bills, for example. There were states that stood out because of the way they present the information in a bill. There were states that stood out because they compile and report in a standard way all of the kind of rates and bills for the utilities that they regulate. So I think there was no one best practice, but there were examples of things that were quite helpful from one state to the next.
Robinson Meyer:
[34:03] Looking at the results, what has been striking to me is, I mean, first of all, you look at the price data and you go, wow. Looking at the Continental 48, right? California sticks out. And I think the Northeast sticks out when you look at prices. And I think that’s a story that has become better understood over the past six or eight months. I would say that if you’re looking at inflation and electricity rates, where the price levels are the worst is New England, which has kind of its own islanded energy issues and has, as we’ve talked about in previous episodes, challenges with winter peaks and fuel availability, and California, which is kind of famously its own, has its own regulatory apparatus. But when you look at bills, the story becomes really different. And suddenly the Southeast and parts of the interior, which seem to have quite cheap power on a kilowatt hour basis, look like they’re really failing. And Tennessee, for instance, Alabama, that these places actually charge a lot of money on a monthly basis for power because of maybe an old building stock, because people have to buy a lot of power because of their cooling needs, because of maybe bills there are increasingly volatile. And like what stuck out to me is the success stories here. I have no other information to back up, but just like doing a facile reading of the data is like, it’s the Southwest.
Robinson Meyer:
[35:25] It’s Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico that both have pretty cheap power rates and also pretty cheap electricity bills, despite extremely high cooling needs. At this point, I’m not surprised by a lot with ERCOT, but I think the Southwest was really impressive in that regard.
Brian Deese:
[35:43] So, Rob, I was going to say, I think that this, for me, reinforced that we just have a lot to learn from Texas. And that’s not in any way a sort of whole scale or simplistic endorsement of ERCOT, right, with all its complexity. But you are getting lower prices, lower bills, and more cheaper and efficient sources of generation and distribution onto that grid. And those things are related. I guess on reflection with the data, it is not a total surprise that the system that enables the quickest and most efficient deployment of cheap and efficient power onto the grid is also the place that can navigate that dynamic of relatively lower prices and relatively lower bills. Nothing in this space is simple. So that doesn’t mean that we can just take that Texas model and stamp it out in every jurisdiction. But I also think it means we —
Robinson Meyer:
[36:35] For one thing, the Permian only exists in a couple of states, which really helps as does the huge wind alleys and solar alleys. But there’s so much more that we could be —
Brian Deese:
[36:45] Geography matters, temperature matters, density matters. But I think it causes me to say we need to challenge … There are so many settled, accepted views in this space that need to be challenged. The idea that we couldn’t do any of those things in PJM or in the Northeast because of those fundamental differences, I think needs to be challenged. It needs to be challenged more aggressively at the federal level, and needs to be challenged more aggressively at the state level. And I think we’re starting to see that happen.
Robinson Meyer:
[37:17] Let’s talk about PJM for a second and the Mid-Atlantic, because I think that has really dominated the electricity discourse recently. It does seem to be the part of the country where you can point most directly and say, power is getting more expensive in PJM. And that is at least in large part because of data centers. When you were able to look under the hood in PJM, what did you see? Like, what nuance are we missing by telling this data center PJM story? And are there some places in PJM that are maybe handling new demand or new capacity better than other places and able to keep bills from going up as much as maybe some large swaths of the grid are?
Brian Deese:
[37:57] Well, let me jump in first and then, Lauren, you should jump in on PJM too, because I think it is such an interesting story. For me, the PJM learning was the value of actually going under the hood and being able to solve the second problem of the, I guess, the basketball player who was slow, of actually being able to go down at the intra-regional level, right? Because PJM as a jurisdiction, you’re seeing exactly the price dynamics that you described. Within that, if you look at individual utilities, you see the largest skew, the largest distribution of outcomes, right? So you see the skew from literally a 30% increase in rates to a 5% decrease in rates. And then you look at how much of that is generation related, right? Charges associated with generation, and you see as high as a 40% increase and a 10% decrease, right? And so within those jurisdictions, within PJM as a whole, there is a lot to learn, again, about what’s going on in those particularly spiky jurisdictions and those that are managing that.
Robinson Meyer:
[39:03] Let’s get specific. So which jurisdictions are maybe handling this better?
Lauren Sidner:
[39:07] There are a variety of factors at play in the kind of range that Brian just described. And so it’s less that there’s specific parts of the region that are handling it better than others, because I think types of things that come into play are, there are some of the utilities that don’t participate in the capacity auction. And so they haven’t been as affected as others by the kind of very recent trends. There are some that own their own generation capacity and own their own generation assets, so maybe sort of buffered from some of those impacts. But then there are also kind of pockets or regions within the broader region that have very particular capacity constraints because there isn’t a lot of generation capacity with, you know, local generation capacity. Or there are kind of grid bottlenecks that are keeping cheaper sources of energy from flowing into those particular places. So it’s a kind of aggregation of all those things that are adding to this patchwork. And so we kind of have this settled wisdom of interconnection bottlenecks or slow interconnection timelines and grid constraints are driving this sort of region-wide trend. But in reality, the picture looks pretty different from one part of the region to another.
Robinson Meyer:
[40:16] Another story we’ve been telling about the power grid is that extreme weather is starting to make prices worse and starting to make bills go up. And that’s absolutely famously the story in California where the huge amount of adaptation to wildfires they’ve had to do, the huge amount of rebuilding after wildfires that they’ve had to do of the distribution grid and the transmission grid as well has really driven up rates, of course, as has the insurance costs. Is that just a California story or are there other places around the country where you look and say, wow, extreme weather, whether or not it represents climate change or not, is helping to drive up power prices in this maybe surprising place that people haven’t thought about yet?
Lauren Sidner:
[40:58] I think you’re right to point out California. It is definitely an extreme example here. We’ve seen the distribution part of the bill for parts of the state as much as or more than double in five years. And that’s in large part driven by the different types of costs that are coming because of wildfires, whether it’s repairs or preparing for wildfires or whether it’s liability resulting from those disasters. But it’s really not just California. And I think we’re going to, it’s that this trend is just going to continue. One of the biggest transmission and distribution utilities in Texas is just concluding a rate case. And by their own kind of description, they requested an increase in annual revenue of something like over $800 million. And they, by their own description, say that the largest kind of portion of that increase is attributable to storm damage over the last three years. And then across the country, but particularly in places like the Southeast and Florida, we’re seeing utilities have these additional charges that show up on people’s bills. And those charges have just kind of shot up over time. So Tampa Electric, for example, it has storm protection charge. It added a temporary storm-related surcharge to deal with some of the costs that have added up over the past few years. And the trend in those over the last five years has been really stark. It’s more than doubled over that period. And that is not unique to Tampa Electric either. And so I think throughout the country, this is going to be adding to distribution and other grid costs going forward.
Robinson Meyer:
[42:20] What other states linger in your thinking or other zip codes or utilities where you’re like, wow, you just encountered it and it really revealed something to you about the power grid?
Lauren Sidner:
[42:31] Maybe I’d point to Virginia, where we collected data on the two largest investor-owned utilities in the state. And a big part of the story there to me is that more and more of the bill is flowing through these other charges. And there’s just an enormous number of charges that go into residential customer bills in Virginia, which speaks to this question of utility incentives that we’ve touched on a couple times. But, you know, if utilities are able to just immediately pass costs through to customers, regardless of how they kind of line up with or relate to kind of projected or budgeted costs, there’s not a whole lot of built-in incentive for the utility to manage that. So that stood out, not just because it took forever to collect the data there, but …
Brian Deese:
[43:15] Another place that stood out to me was New Jersey, where obviously the politics of electricity prices have been front and center, including because of the gubernatorial election last year. And what’s interesting about New Jersey is not only a rising rate environment, but pockets of extraordinary volatility. So if you look at Atlantic City or Rockland Electric in that part of New Jersey, you see 200% plus swings in electricity prices intra-year, within the year, right? And that’s increasing significantly. This is just speculative, but I think that volatility, and this is for study, for other people to study based on the data, but I think that volatility is in part connected to the more extreme weather patterns that you’re seeing in this space. And I also think it connects to the lived experience in the politics of this issue, that it’s both about prices, but also volatility that leave people with the sense that something is different about the way that they are having to pay for the electricity that they tend to rely on than has been in the past.
Robinson Meyer:
[44:22] In some ways, the worst case scenario here is that electricity, which I think is already. Depending on where you live, the biggest or the second largest energy expense for most American households, becomes more like gasoline, but with even less price transparency than gasoline. Like gas can get really expensive. It has enormous volatility, but people tend to know what it costs. That’s one reason it’s so politically salient. If electricity becomes just as volatile and people fear the experience of opening their bills and not being able to predict their monthly expenses around electricity in the same way that they might struggle to predict it with gasoline or they might have to change other spending habits to accommodate higher gas prices, then that is bad for the economy. It’s bad for electrification. It’s really bad for decarbonization because if our whole goal here is to get people to shift from liquid fuels and oil and gas to heat pumps and especially electric vehicles. If they have the sense that electricity prices are as volatile as gas prices, that is really, really bad for the whole project.
Brian Deese:
[45:35] Yeah, like one of my goals and hopes in this whole project is that we can make electricity prices just more transparent and understandable. And it is complicated, but just because it is complicated doesn’t mean it has to be non-transparent. And so one of my hopes in this course here is to say, we’re now going to produce this data and make it more publicly available and try to bring a clearer sense that even if the underlying drivers as to why we are getting to the prices or the bills that people are paying are not straightforward, the prices and the bills that people should be paying should be, and they should be transparent. And there’s no reason why states, jurisdictions, utilities can’t get better at doing the things that would make it easier for us to hopefully, you know, ultimately, we can put the energy price hub out of business by just making all this data really freely available, I think, for some period of time until the system adapts to that. But look, that’s one of the goals is let’s just make this transparent. That alone is not going to bring electricity prices down, but it’s a step in the process.
Robinson Meyer:
[46:35] One of the things I’m most excited about is being able to continue to follow this data on a monthly basis and see emerging trends in the system and have you back on Shift Key to talk about them and to analyze them. And until then, we’ll have to leave it there. But thank you so much for joining us, Brian and Lauren. And people should check out. We’ll put it all over the show notes. It will be impossible to miss if you follow any heat map or shift key distribution channel. But the Electricity Price Hub, you should go check it out. You should go play around with it. Type in your zip code, type in your congressional district, type in your enemy’s zip code and congressional district, click around. There’s so much there to learn and see and explore. And I think we’re only just getting started in understanding all the data that you’ve made available through this tool.
Brian Deese:
[47:18] And give us feedback too, because this tool will get better the more that we publish it and the more that we have feedback as well. So thank you, Rob.
Robinson Meyer:
[47:24] Well, hey, thank you for joining us today on Shift Key. Thank you, Brian. Thank you, Lauren.
Lauren Sidner:
[47:27] Thanks, Rob.
Robinson Meyer:
[47:33] That will do it for today’s episode of Shift Key. I implore you, though, go play around with the Electricity Price Hub. You can find it on heatmap.news. You can find it in the show notes. I am sure the most interesting things to learn from this tool have not yet been learned. We haven’t found them yet at Heatmap or at MIT. So go look at your state. Go look at your zip code. Go look at the utility that you hate the most. Go look at the utility that you work for. Like, this is your moment. Go play around because it is such a rich data set and there’s so much information in it. I am just sure that one of our readers is going to find something so interesting that’s going to help all of us understand the electricity system better and better formulate policy. If you do find something let us know we’re at shiftkey@heatmap.news or editors@heatmap.news you can also find me of course on Twitter, BlueSky, or LinkedIn. Always feel free to reach out. Until next time, Shift Key is a production of Heatmap News. Our editors are Jillian Goodman and Nico Lauricella. Multimedia editing and audio engineering is by Jacob Lambert and Nick Woodbury. Our music is by Adam Kromelow. Thanks so much for listening. See you next week.
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Rob follows up on his scoop with Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh of Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy.
For the past few years, Microsoft has basically carried the carbon removal industry on its shoulders. The software company has purchased 72 million tons of carbon removal, more than 40 times what any other organization has financed, according to third-party sources.
Now it’s pulling back. As we reported last week, Microsoft has told suppliers and partners that it’s pausing new purchases. Though the company says that its program “has not ended,” even a temporary pullback will have significant implications for the nascent carbon removal industry. What happens next for these companies? And is a bloodbath on the way? On this week’s episode of Shift Key, Rob speaks to Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh from Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy about Microsoft’s singular importance and what could come next.
Shift Key is hosted by Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, or wherever you get your podcasts.
You can also add the show’s RSS feed to your podcast app to follow us directly.
Here is an excerpt from their conversation:
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh: To your original question about where to go forward from now, you could have another surplus of what you just described come up — climate commitments could kick back up again, and we would just do this whole thing over again. We would run it back, and we would be having this conversation, you know, five years from now, or whenever that is. And the way to hedge against that from happening — and to some extent stop it from happening — is to have federal governments across the globe pass durable policy that either compels the regulation or incentivizes the deployment of carbon dioxide removal. And that ... because carbon dioxide removal — outside of the co-benefits of some pathways, which are fantastic, just removing carbon from the atmosphere for pure carbon’s sake is the tragedy of the commons in a single climate technology entity. Like, this is something that will need federal support in the long run, to some extent, in a way that other climate technologies don’t. That’s true of most of the carbon management world, but it is uniquely true of CDR.
Robinson Meyer: But it’s a form of waste management. Trash and recycling also require ongoing government support. Now, at this point, it tends to come from the state and local level. But governments still pay to handle waste. That’s part of what we expect governments to do. It’s just that this waste happens to be in the atmosphere and requires a particularly high form of technology to dispel.
Cavanaugh: Yeah, it’s a very costly trash pickup service. And it also is contingent upon people caring about the trash. There is a relatively large constituency around the world that is unconvinced that the trash is an issue. And that is the big challenge.
You can find a full transcript of the episode here.
Mentioned:
Our initial Friday story: Microsoft Is Pausing Carbon Removal Purchases
Jack’s take: The Private Sector Built the Market, Time for Us to Scale It
Heatmap’s Emily Pontecorvo on Ctrl-S, the startup trying to save CDR intellectual property
This episode of Shift Key is sponsored by ...
Lunar Energy is building the technology to turn homes into active participants in the power system. Learn more about Lunar’s vision of the future at lunarenergy.com.
Music for Shift Key is by Adam Kromelow.
This transcript has been automatically generated.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, or wherever you get your podcasts.
You can also add the show’s RSS feed to your podcast app to follow us directly.
Robinson Meyer:
[0:59] Hello, it’s Wednesday, April 15, and there’s big news in the small but extremely important world of carbon removal. Last week, Microsoft informed some partners and suppliers that it’s pausing its carbon removal purchases. I first reported the news here at Heatmap on Friday. Bloomberg and Carbon Herald have confirmed the story as well. And it’s a huge deal for the carbon removal industry. That is, the set of companies trying to develop technologies that can reduce or eliminate heat-trapping carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Sometimes you’ll hear it get called CDR for carbon dioxide removal. And no matter what you call it, in recent years, Microsoft basically was the industry. Since 2020, it’s bought more than 70 million tons of carbon removal, which is 40 times more than any other organization or coalition has purchased. The CDR scientist Julio Friedmann told me that there are lots of tech companies out there whose whole business model was basically, we’re going to develop a CDR technology, and then we’ll sell to Microsoft. Well, now Microsoft won’t be buying any more, at least for the time being.
Robinson Meyer:
[1:59] I think it’s important to intervene here and say CDR is not a nice-to-have technology. The IPCC says we’ll need carbon removal to meet the Paris Agreement’s goals. And by one estimate, the world will need to be removing 7 billion to 9 billion tons of carbon a year by 2050 in order to maintain its Paris targets. Now, Microsoft, for its part, says its program isn’t totally over. Melanie Nakagawa, their chief sustainability officer, told me in a statement, quote, our carbon removal program has not ended. We continue to both build on and support our existing portfolio of nature-based and technology-based solutions. At times, we may adjust the pace or volume of our carbon removal procurement as we continue to refine our approach towards sustainability goals. Any adjustments we make are part of our disciplined approach and not a change in ambition, unquote. But even if just the pace and volume are changing, it’s still a big deal. We are going to need this technology, and we just lost its biggest buyer. So what comes next? Here to chat about it today is Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh. He’s the director of the Carbon Management Program at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University, and he’s the president of Carbon Middle Management Incorporated. He was previously policy manager for carbon management at Breakthrough Energy. Jack and I talk about the history of CDR, what Microsoft’s departure might mean, and what’s coming next for the industry. I’m Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatap News, and it’s all coming up on Shift Key. Jack Cavanaugh, welcome to Shift Key.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[3:26] Thanks for having me on, Rob. Good to see you.
Robinson Meyer:
[3:28] Good to see you. So let’s start here. Why was Microsoft such an important player in the carbon removal system?
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[3:35] Yeah, well, I think it’s important to do, you know, a little unearthing of the history of carbon removal, how we got to where we’re at today.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[3:43] There was, you know, a lot of seminal work done in the 1990s, the early 2000s about this crazy thing called direct air capture, where you could remove CO2 from the ambient air.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[3:54] And a lot of that was done by Klaus Lochner and David Keith, who have both founded different director capture companies, David Keith, carbon engineering, which was eventually sold to Occidental Petroleum. And then it was mostly R&D academic research. And then in 2019, Stripe, the payment processing company, announced $1 million for purchasing of carbon dioxide removal. And then in 2020, Microsoft announced their net negative by 2030 sustainability goal. And in 2022, that was followed up by the Frontier Fund, which was Stripe following on with a number of other partners, a $1 billion advanced market commitment. And so up until that point, what we think of today as carbon removal and the carbon removal market really didn’t exist. And so Microsoft was the first to get in and say, we are going to put relatively large capital outlays towards purchasing carbon removal alongside what Frontier did with the advanced market commitment and essentially kicked off a massive hype cycle for CDR that went across some government policy and certainly private investment.
Robinson Meyer:
[5:11] That history is super helpful. And also I feel like it is worth kind of hammering that at least when I started being a climate reporter, which was like 2016, 2017, 2015,
Robinson Meyer:
[5:23] carbon removal was seen as this purely science fictional technology. Like basically something we might need to develop down the line. There had been work on it done. It was a little taboo to talk about it because the sense was that talking about it would discourage the work of emissions reductions. And there was a sense that it would be really hard. And I mean, it is really hard, but there was a sense that it was like something to talk about in decades to come, but not something we were going to be talking about scaling in the next 10 years. And I do feel like the big milestone there, you know this, I’m just injecting it into the history, was the 1.5C report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which kind of said, hey, if the world wants to hit 1.5C or even 2C, first of all, it would be really bad for us to hit 1.5C. There’d be lots of near-term consequences. And of course, it’s pretty clear those are going to happen now. But there was a lot of energy around avoiding that. But also, if we want to not be at 1.5C by the end of the century, then the only way to do that is to know that we’re going to overshoot in the middle of the century and then draw down carbon at the end of the century. And that will require carbon removal. And so therefore, we need to start working on this technology now. And at least for me, that was the point as a reporter where it went from like, is this real? Should I be thinking about this? Like, does this matter? It seems like it would be a useful thing to have, but maybe there’s a reason nobody’s talking about it to like, oh, this is just like a tool that we are going to need to deal with climate change. And we need to start working on the tool now.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[6:52] Yeah, absolutely. And, you know, not to, there’s a much longer history than I laid out. I mean, to your point on the IPCC report, my colleague at Columbia, Noah Deich, founded Carbon180 around the time of that report coming out, which is the first CDR-specific NGO. And there were all sorts of folks that were talking about thinking about building a lot of the frameworks in the federal programs that we have today and building the bedrock of scientific understanding and R&D that have become companies today. And so a lot more happened, but you’re totally right that that report really kicked, like brought carbon removal from, you know, the sort of fringes of climate discussions into a more focal point that we are going to need this at a relatively large scale to reach any climate goals, 1.5 or above.
Robinson Meyer:
[7:43] Yeah. So without that context preloaded then, what was the importance of Microsoft to the carbon removal market? Because it seemed to play a pretty essential role.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[7:52] Yeah. So as you reported, I laid out in a piece that I published as well, Microsoft was somewhere around 80% of all voluntary carbon removal purchases in the market. And so just to be clear, voluntary means voluntary. This was done not because of any sort of compliance regulatory mechanism or some sort of incentive to be able to purchase. This was part of their sustainability plan. And being 80% of the market is a really interesting position to be in. And Microsoft, not just on the purchases that they made, the billions of dollars they have allocated towards carbon removal, they haven’t just done that, which in and of itself is an incredible thing to be able to get through all the intermachinations of a for-private business to be able to do this with discretionary spending. But they also then had the ability to sort of shape criteria, standardized contracts, all of these sorts of enabling pieces of financial and project infrastructure to be able to work, de-risk some aspects of the carbon removal market the voluntary market and so yeah they were quintessential in being able to buy build and then also bring in other buyers into the market to some extent now they tried very hard i’m sure they wished that more folks would have joined them but yeah if you’re 80% of the market you are the market essentially.
Robinson Meyer:
[9:20] It’s funny, I’ve been reporting out the consequences of this pullback from Microsoft or this pause or whatever we’re going to call it. And I think a number of folks in the industry have said, well, Microsoft did actually was amazing. I mean, they set this ambitious goal and they have met it and they’ve bought, I think, depending on how you count, 20 to 25 times more carbon removal than anyone else. It’s that that hasn’t been followed by other companies. The frontier companies are in second place, right? But it’s after that, no one has shown up to the same extent as Microsoft has. And that’s really significant. So I guess that naturally leads to the next question, which is how bad is it that Microsoft has gone? What does it mean for the carbon removal economy? And let’s bracket that like stuff should happen next. I mean, let’s bracket that, but let’s just kind of track fallout for now. How bad is it that Microsoft is now gone given that they were 80% of the market?
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[10:11] Yeah. So starting out, it’s obviously not good, right? There’s no way to sugarcoat losing potentially 80% of the market is good for an industry.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[10:22] However, you look at broad sweeping trends across the voluntary carbon market across public policy, which I know that we’ll get to. And we were already in the downturn of the large scale venture capital and some project finance level investment that went into CDR. And so what you have is hundreds of companies that are doing some form of carbon dioxide removal. Very few of those have a credible ability to claim that they are going to remove the amount of tons that Microsoft was buying. Microsoft was buying relatively large tonnage amounts, right? The hundreds of thousands, potentially millions of tons per purchase. And so not that many companies had the ability to scale, were at the appropriate time in their technology to scale that big. And so it’s actually, relative to the entire CDR industry, a fairly small subset of companies that could even have considered Microsoft as a potential buyer. Now, that leaves the 20% of the market that tends to buy in slightly smaller amounts. And so you have all of those folks, including the potential large-scale providers, now fighting over 20% of the market. And fundamentally, what it will mean is just an acceleration of something that was going to happen anyway, which is consolidation and bankruptcies or dissolutions. This was always going to happen at this moment because we don’t have supportive policy.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[11:49] And everyone in CDR knew it was in every conference, every conversation knew that this moment was going to happen. There was going to be a moment where Microsoft wasn’t going to buy the clip that they are anymore. And so you really could have had this story written for two years. And it was just like hit send when it occurred. And we’re just at that point right now.
Robinson Meyer:
[12:07] Something that’s come up in my reporting that I think is now kind of an interesting facet of the next step here is that because Microsoft was buying so much more than anyone else, there was no one else who was able to set prices with them. They were kind of setting the price and they were doing all the price exploration themselves as one firm, which is obviously suboptimal, let’s put it that way, and very tricky, I think, as a place to be in as a buyer. And I guess now there’ll be a lot more competition for buyers. And so maybe the price of carbon removal will fall. I don’t know. But one of the problems with no other buyer showing up is that Microsoft basically had to do all the price discovery itself. What are the next steps for carbon removal? It sounds like there is going to be a wave of bankruptcies to some degree. Maybe that’s a little inevitable. It’s a growing technology. But on the other hand, we’d like to retain the ability to continue to make advances in carbon removal technology. So like what should happen next across the market?
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[13:03] You’re absolutely right. There are going to be consolidations. There are going to be bankruptcies. The consolidations are going to increase the runway for the companies that will consolidate to try to hold on as long as they can. There’s an organization called Ctrl-S that Jason Hochman started up that is looking to retain some of the IP for some of these bankruptcies.
Robinson Meyer:
[13:22] My colleague, Emily Pontecorvo, wrote a story about it, which we’ll stick in the show notes.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[13:26] Yeah, yeah. Yeah, and I think it’s an interesting model because there is an incredibly diverse set of technologies. Within every CDR pathway, there’s a hundred different DAC companies or something like that, and they all do something slightly different. And you could imagine a world in which there is incentivizing policy for carbon removal. That IP could be valuable to folks to be able to learn faster, to build quicker.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[13:50] I also just want to take a brief note, just a moment to say, I’m like, what happens next is it is sort of incredible to me that there was a moment in time that there were folks at Microsoft, that got in with the C-suite, with the people that were allocating capital within the company and were able to carve out this program. That is amazing. This is voluntary discretionary spending at billions of dollars. And although the tech companies have free cash flow to be able to spend on this, having that same conversation today almost feels impossible, like going into, and Microsoft did have these conversations with a lot of other private companies about trying to spur folks into the market. And that’s sort of incredible. And so one pathway forward, I think that it’s been clear that sort of shut off is I don’t have a lot of confidence that there are going to be new private buyers at a meaningful amount. I just don’t think when you look at the broad fiscal reality of the world at the moment, that it just makes sense for any amount of discretionary spending to be spent on carbon removal, let alone many other climate technologies.
Robinson Meyer:
[14:57] And the key kind of elephant in the room here, right, is that a lot of the private spending on climate technologies, be it carbon removal or renewable construction and development or electric vehicle manufacturing, frankly, was coming from
Robinson Meyer:
[15:11] these big tech companies. I mean, Amazon is an investor in Rivian, right? And is it major source of offtake for Rivian to buy a lot of Rivian delivery vans? Apple and Google and Microsoft had these very aggressive renewable acquisition targets. And part of what’s happened over the past three years is that all the companies that were doing, basically directing some amount of free cash flow to climate investment, have become basically cash strapped light industrial companies that have to build as much physical infrastructure as they can and as much power generation infrastructure as they can. And every dollar matters much more than it did, say, two or three years ago. I think the exception would be Apple here. But for a while, we were able to kind of finance a lot of the climate ecosystem off the back of what was basically an employee perk because it was a very aggressive market for tech employees and they liked working at companies that had these big climate programs. And that is like fully over. The bull market for tech labor employment is over. The ability of these companies to finance climate tech is over. The willingness of them to finance climate tech as opposed to to dump another marginal dollar into data center development or AI model development is over. Like it’s all over.
Robinson Meyer:
[16:27] And that’s a major moment, not only for I mean, to some degree, carbon removal is like most illustrative version of it because it was the closest to like the gargoyle on the cathedral for Microsoft. The beautiful thing they could fund as a result of their incredible societal surplus, but like it’s over for a lot of different things.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[16:45] Yeah. And, and like you said, this is just one story amongst many other stories
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[16:50] that could be written in, in a similar vein. And to your original question about where to go forward from now, You could have another surplus of what you just described come up and you, climate commitments could kick back up again. And we would just do this whole thing over again. We would run it back and we would be having this conversation, you know, five years from now or whenever that is. And the way to hedge against that from happening and to some extent stop it from happening is to have federal governments across the globe pass durable policy that either compels the regulation or incentivizes the deployment of carbon dioxide removal and that because carbon dioxide removal outside of the co-benefits of some pathways, which are fantastic, just removing carbon from the atmosphere for pure carbon sake. Is the tragedy of the commons in a single climate technology entity. Like this is something that will need federal support in the long run to some extent in a way that other climate technologies don’t. That’s true of most of the carbon management world, but it is uniquely true of CDR.
Robinson Meyer:
[18:01] But it’s a form of waste management. Trash and recycling also require ongoing government support. Now, at this point, it tends to come from the state and local level. But governments still pay to handle waste. That’s part of what we expect governments to do. It’s just that this waste happens to be in the atmosphere and requires a particularly high form of technology to dispel.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[18:23] Yeah, it’s a very costly trash pickup service. And it also is contingent upon people caring about the trash. There is a relatively large constituency around the world that is unconvinced that the trash is an issue. And that is the big challenge.
Robinson Meyer:
[18:40] Yeah, agnostic on the trash. You know, historically, Congress has been quite supportive of carbon removal technology, but the current administration has not been as supportive. What has been funded in terms of federal policy that could potentially begin to pick up the pieces here? And then what should be funded with a more constructive Congress, a more constructive administration? What kind of policy should we eventually hope to see that could fight off some of this carbon removal wave of consolidation and bankruptcies?
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[19:11] Well, there was some appropriations money that was put into place for carbon removal R&D, and that is valuable and it’s good to be able to work on the research and development to help scale these technologies. But in terms of actual federal funds that have been spent, the DAC hubs program at the end of the Biden administration issued two $50 million grants to the large DAC hubs. That is the full extent to which is the monies that have been spent on the $3.5 billion DAC hubs program. The rest of that money is sitting at DOE, going through some internal review or whatever is happening at the moment with the DAC hubs program.
Robinson Meyer:
[19:53] It’s like the movie Brazil, presumably.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[19:55] Yes, exactly. The purchase prize is in a similar position, paused indefinitely, unclear of if or when that money will be spent. And the only existing policy that incentivizes carbon removal to any extent only incentivizes direct air capture and BECCS which is the 45Q tax credit you.
Robinson Meyer:
[20:14] Get 180 dollars a ton if you remove a ton of carbon from the atmosphere
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[20:17] Yeah with direct air capture one yeah and and with BECCS you would get 85 dollars a ton and that you know to count that as CDR there are some LCAs in terms of what biomass feedstocks you’re using into the process.
Robinson Meyer:
[20:32] But remind listeners what BECCS is.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[20:34] Oh, bioenergy with CCS. So you burn some sort of biomass feedstock and capture that CO2 at a point source. So you could imagine heat and power being used to create pulp and paper, and then you capture the CO2. And that receives $85 a ton because it’s point source capture. But even then, $85 a ton is not enough to reach final investment decision on the BEX facility. and $180 a ton isn’t enough to reach profitability for a DAC company. And so you still have to make up the delta to profitability and that is in the voluntary market, which as we discussed, has greatly retracted and the appetite for relatively expensive DAC credits is pretty low right now considering the fiscal situation of it all. And so.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[21:18] If I’m looking at it right now from the U.S. federal government, there’s basically very little to no current outlays for carbon removal. Going forward, there was a specific carbon removal tax credit that was introduced that had increased dollar amounts for various forms of CDR, basically functionally all forms of CDR. There has been discussions of in carbon border adjustment mechanism that Europe put in, Senator Cassidy as well as Senator Whitehouse each have a sort of trade policy as a sort of response to the carbon border adjustment mechanism. And that could include compliance pathways for carbon removal. I think it is important that, Because the cost of carbon removal is so high and because the political winds of the United States have been shifting very rapidly back and forth in terms of how political parties view climate and execute on climate policies or not execute on climate policies, that you have as many bites of the apple as you can. And CDR is embedded into as many policies as you can get it into, whether it’s trade policies, whether it’s tax credits, whether it’s direct procurement, or even farming smart programs for soil carbon sequestration. And there’s all sorts of different policy and regulatory opportunities. It’s just a matter of which ones the politics and the finances will allow.
Robinson Meyer:
[22:41] What’s happening around the world? Are other countries beginning to put money toward carbon removal that are not the U.S.?
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[22:47] Yeah, Canada has a $10 million procurement program, which is the first procurement program of its kind that’s ever been put into place. They’re soliciting proposals for that now. I mean, $10 million admittedly isn’t a lot, but it’s something. And you build on policies like this, and so it’s a good first start.
Robinson Meyer:
[23:04] $10 million Canadian.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[23:06] Yeah, that is true. $10 million Canadian. And then in Europe, Europe is integrating carbon removals into their emissions trading system. And that the final rules on that will happen in the next couple of years, which leaves a gap in terms of when that market will be accessible. Japan has compliance pathways in their domestic ETS for carbon removal. But in terms of pure policy market incentives that actually will get carbon dioxide removal projects built in the real world, incredibly limited in the next three to five years or whenever Europe integrates them, if not all else will equal nothing else goes forward, Europe will become the largest carbon removal market in the world. Until that happens, there is nothing in the near term that is moving forward.
Robinson Meyer:
[23:52] Is there anything happening in China? Because often the story of these climate tech investments is that the West starts them up, gets bored, allows all this IP to die on the vine. I think this is part of the idea of Ctrl-S. And then basically all the IP goes to China and China decides this is a frontier technology that it wants to invest in. And lo and behold, five years later is the best at it in the world. Like, is that happening right now with carbon removal, or is this not a field that China has indicated much interest in so far?
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[24:20] It’s tough to find data or information on carbon removal in China, although Tencent? Yeah. They announced some prizes structurally similar to sort of the Musk XPRIZE that $100 million for carbon removal. And there have been some reports of direct or capture R&D projects that have been built. But in my view, this is structurally different from China than any of the other things that they’ve done relative to the climate technologies that they’ve developed. Because again, you produce an EV, you produce a solar panel, you produce a battery, there’s a consumer that gains something valuable to them, whether it’s power from a solar panel or a battery, right? Power your car to help with the backup power on your house or an EV that is great and has cool features and is a, you know, a computer, but that’s not the same for carbon removal. And so like even totally China or like you look other places like the Gulf that Climeworks partnered with Saudi Arabia and obviously the Gulf countries are highly invested in a number of different technologies and have at least on balance sheet the money to be able to put towards this. But again, what is the value proposition for them to invest heavily in this industry when nowhere else around the world is?
Robinson Meyer:
[25:32] I mean, I think if also if you think about Chinese energy policy flows from a triangle of concern about conventional air pollution, you know, like PM2.5, energy security and wanting to stay at the frontier of technological development is really only that last point that would drive them
Robinson Meyer:
[25:48] to invest in carbon removal. At what point will the Chinese energy policy triangle become a diamond and we’ll see China make concerted investments focused not only on kind of playing up the climate benefits of its existing supply side investments, but affirmatively making supply side investments to advance international climate agenda. At that point, maybe we’ll see it invest in carbon removal. But until then, it doesn’t really fit into the existing Chinese paradigm.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[26:13] There are a number of CDR pathways that have really interesting co-benefits associated with them that have a clearer way to scale than something like direct air capture, unless you’re using for enhanced soil recovery, which is possible, even then still expensive. But you look at things like enhanced rock weathering and the potential to increase yields for crops, as well as decrease the need for fertilizer. You can imagine there are ocean health benefits associated with some forms of ocean CDR. And so in that way, I think that there is an opportunity, and you are currently seeing this amongst the CDR pathways, that they are finding ways, like all climate tech is at the moment, to highlight everything but the climate value associated with their technology. And this was a bit of a doomy and gloomy pod, but I think that that is a very near-term pathway that a market has a value associated with these things, and it’s not a voluntary one on carbon.
Robinson Meyer:
[27:14] Well, we’re going to have to leave it there, but you and I know that at some point you’re going to come back on Shift Key to talk about another favorite topic of ours, which is how to dress for 1.5C. And we’ll have to talk about many other developments as well. But Jack Havanaugh, thank you so much for joining us on Shift Key. It was great to have you.
Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh:
[27:32] Thanks for having me on, Rob.
Robinson Meyer:
[27:38] And that will do it for us on Shift Key today. We’ll be back soon with another episode of Shift Key. Until then, if you love this show, if you hated it, if you had lots of thoughts, you can find me on X, Bluesky, or LinkedIn at Robinson Meyer. Stick around after the credits. We have a great message from our sponsor for this week, Lunar Energy, that I’m very excited about. Until then, Shift Key is a production of Heatmap News. Our editors are Jillian Goodman and Nico Lauricella. Multimedia Editing and Audio Engineering is by Jacob Lambert and by Nick Woodbury. Our music is by Adam Kromelow. Thanks so much for listening. We’ll see you real soon.
Mike Munsell:
[28:16] Hi, my name is Mike Munsell, and I’m the Vice President of Partnerships with Heatmap. For the last two episodes, I chatted with Lunar Energy’s Sam Weavers about solar, batteries, and utility rate design. Today, we dive into virtual power plants and international markets.
Sam Wevers:
[28:30] My name is Sam Wevers, and I’m Director of Product at Lunar Energy.
Mike Munsell:
[28:35] I know we’ve been talking a lot about VPPs. It seems like every company or even a research firm has a different definition of a virtual power plant. How does Lunar define a VPP?
Sam Wevers:
[28:47] I’ve certainly come across this myself. You can get right into the weeds of defining what a VPP is. But, I mean, to me, it’s really just connecting distributed assets together with software and controlling them in smart ways so that those assets deliver value to the grid and homes get paid for that sort of service in return. A VPP turns thousands of disparate homes into something that can look like a power plant to the grid, except it’s a power plant that can be segmented and provide very locational and temporal services to the grid, or it can be grouped together at sort of the top level to provide bulk level power when measured at sort of that transmission or sort of ISO level. That’s probably my definition of a VPP.
Mike Munsell:
[29:31] Do other countries, other markets have VPPs or VPP-like structures?
Sam Wevers:
[29:36] Yeah, for sure. I mean, this is something that’s been emerging in Europe and in Australia in particular for a good 10 years or so. It’s also worth flagging that when I talk about VPPs, I’m in the main talking about VPPs for residential assets. VPPs have been providing demand response services with arc furnaces and large industrial loads for some time.
Sam Wevers:
[29:58] And we are now in a world where it’s not just big factories and manufacturing processes that can provide flexible demand to the grid, but also thousands and thousands of homes. Lots of the Nordic countries have residential assets providing grid frequency services. In the U.K., residential assets can be traded by independent aggregators in markets that are used to balance the grid after the wholesale market closes. And Australia has, you know, a really active and competitive market for residential VPP services.
Mike Munsell:
[30:29] And I know most Shift Key listeners are based in the U.S., but what can the U.S. learn from power markets of other countries?
Sam Wevers:
[30:37] One point is the same problem has been addressed in lots of different ways in different markets, whether that’s more on the rate design side or more on the VPP sort of program design side. One common trend that we talked about earlier is certainly this idea that as there is a shift away from feed-in tariffs in other markets for solar, which is akin to net metering, so really generous solar compensation, that ushered in a big deployment of batteries. There are over a million residential batteries installed in Japan, and they were installed to maximize the value of customers’ solar and also to provide outage protection. It’s a big reason why Lunar provides and has provided software services in Japan with our Gridshare platform for many years now, connecting to residential assets to optimize them daily against time of use rates.
Sam Wevers:
[31:28] I think the other key learnings probably go to exposure of price signals to customers like Octopus Agile in the U.K., all those time of use rates in Japan, and the automated load-shaping effects that these sort of rate shapes can have. The other one probably to flag is 10 years ago in the UK, it used to be that you couldn’t really play residential assets in these sort of wholesale level markets. The markets were very much designed around big minimum clip sizes and sort of performance standards that were very tailored to existing gas turbines and the like. But over time, National Grid over there in the UK and others has done a bunch of work to adjust those market rules to allow VPPs of residential assets to start to participate in new services. And they are participating in those services. They’re providing value to the grid and to customers and millions of pounds a year are getting paid out on a purely market basis. It’s not a subsidy-based thing. It’s just markets being designed to allow the value of these assets to be recognized. But I would also say that the scale of VPP programs in the USA is remarkable.
Sam Wevers:
[32:40] Last year in the DSGS program, I think the Brattle Group put out a report. There was over 500 megawatts dispatched in one dispatch last year and you know one needn’t start with the most complex market structure but the core goal should be the same right which is recognize the true sort of physical and economic value of these residential assets and by doing so costs of managing the grid can reduce customers can save money and make money and more renewables can reliably be brought online.
New documents add to doubt over President Trump’s deal to buy back the multinational energy company’s U.S. offshore wind leases.
Interior Secretary Doug Burgum's announcement last month that the administration was cancelling two offshore wind leases and reimbursing the lessee, TotalEnergies, nearly $1 billion, raised a host of questions. What authority was he using to do this? Where would the money come from? Was this legal? Could the Trump administration kill the offshore wind industry by paying it exorbitant sums to go away?
A newly unearthed copy of one of the agency’s official lease cancellation decisions begins to fill in the picture. It confirms what the Department of the Interior has thus far refused to acknowledge: The agency intends to pay TotalEnergies using the Judgment Fund, a cache of public money overseen by the Department of Justice intended for agency settlements.
Tony Irish, a former solicitor in the Department of the Interior, was digging around in a public Bureau of Ocean Energy Management database on Tuesday when he stumbled upon the document, which is dated April 9, 2026 — more than two weeks after Burgum’s lease cancellation announcement.
The document is a letter to Jen Banks, the permitting and development director for TotalEnergies’ Carolina Long Bay project, which is the smaller of the two leases that were cancelled. It says the agency reached a settlement agreement with Carolina Long Bay on March 23, in which the Interior Department “determined that cancelling Lease OCS-A 0545 is in the public interest,” and established that Carolina Long Bay “would have asserted claims in litigation against the United States related to the lease.”
It ends by saying that, pursuant to the settlement agreement, “DOI will, through the Department of Justice, request payment in the amount of $133,333,333 to Carolina Long Bay from the Judgment Fund Branch at the United States Department of Treasury.”
The letter does not include a copy of the settlement agreement or reference the stipulation that TotalEnergies reinvest the money into U.S. oil and gas development, as described in Burgum’s announcement.
While the Judgment Fund is essentially bottomless, there are strict rules about when it can be used. Agencies can draw on it to settle litigation that cannot be remedied by injunctive relief and requires monetary compensation. They can also request a payment from the Judgment Fund to settle “imminent litigation” — claims that have not yet been filed in court.
As there’s no record of claims filed in court, the TotalEnergies settlement likely falls into the latter category. But Irish, the former solicitor, told me it's hard to see how litigation could have been credibly imminent. TotalEnergies’ lease terms, which the Biden administration updated and the company agreed to in January 2025, explicitly state that the lease cannot be canceled “unless and until” the Interior Secretary has suspended operations for at least five years and extended the company’s lease for an equal amount of time. Given that TotalEnergies’ lease is less than five years old — it was purchased in 2022 — and there’s no evidence that it had been under suspension for any period of time, there appears to be little basis for any claim of imminent litigation.
It’s also unclear what claim TotalEnergies could have brought to warrant monetary payment. “It looks like the result of any viable claim TotalEnergies would have brought forth is not monetary damages, but enforcement of this lease provision that requires suspension and extension first,” Irish told me.
There is not yet any decision document in the database for TotalEnergies’ second lease, called Attentive Energy, for which the company stands to receive $795 million in reimbursements. Secretary Burgum will appear before the House Appropriations Committee on Monday morning, where Representative Chellie Pingree of Maine has vowed to question him on the deal. “The appropriations process for Fiscal Year 2027 will be getting underway soon with budget hearings, and I intend to press for answers,” she said in a statement shared with me by email in March. “Secretary Burgum should be prepared to provide them.”