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Corpus Christi is on the verge of running out of water. Stopping it would take a disaster.

Even in its frontier days, when it was a camp for General Zachary Taylor’s forces defending the border of newly annexed Texas, there was barely enough water in Corpus Christi to go around. The Tejanos, Americanos, and old Spanish ranchers crazy (or unlucky) enough to settle on the edge of this growing empire survived by drinking from arroyos, cisterns, and foul, sulphuric wells. The native Karankawa people lived nomadically to avoid straining the region’s streams, springs, and shallow groundwater resources.
You can follow Corpus’ subsequent history through the twists and turns of what historian Alan Lessoff calls the “endless search for a larger and more adequate water supply” in his book Where Texas Meets the Sea: Corpus Christi and Its History — the damming of local rivers, the failure of those dams, massive Depression-era reservoir projects, groundwater running dry, the consolidation of regional water districts, an expensive project to pipe in fresh water from 100 miles away, an even more expensive project to produce it on the spot. Take your pick of cities west of the 98th meridian: Phoenix, Las Vegas, Los Angeles. They’ve all followed similar beats.
But Corpus — never a superlative city, a chip on its shoulder that goes back to Taylor’s time — is now close to the inglorious distinction of becoming the first American metropolis to run out of water. Though it’s located on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico, its fresh water reservoirs sit at less than 10% of their total capacity; Day Zero will arrive in November unless there’s 20 to 30 inches of rainfall before then. Those are hurricane numbers, an unsettling thing upon which to hang one’s hope.
But that’s what desperation does. You hope for the second-worst thing because it’s better than the alternative.
The first sign that something had gone very wrong in Corpus Christi came in 2016. Over the course of 10 months — in July 2015, September 2015, and May 2016 — the city issued 22 days’ worth of water-boil notices for possible E. coli contamination, low chlorine levels, and the presence of indicator bacteria suggesting low disinfectant levels. The water quality problems appeared to stem from restrictions Corpus officials had ordered during a recent drought, when low flow through old pipes can create “dead zones” for bacteria to grow between the treatment plants and home taps.
Then came December 14, 2016. Late in the evening, the city issued the strictest water advisory yet for its 317,000 residents — a “do not use” order stemming from a corrosive chemical that had leaked into the town’s water supply due to backflow from a local asphalt plant. The notice, which pertained to everything from drinking water to tooth-brushing and showering, lasted for four days.
“Our group connected at an emergency meeting and committed to start learning as much as we could about the city’s water policies and problems,” Isabel Araiza, the co-founder of For the Greater Good, a grassroots organization focused on protecting Corpus Christi’s water supply, told me. “I really had not been paying attention prior to that.”
It turned out the chemical leak was only the tip of the iceberg. City officials in the 1920s and 1930s had recognized Corpus Christi as a strategic shipping location, the closest American port to the Panama Canal, and had dredged a channel into its shallow inner bay that allowed large ships to come and go — at the time, mostly shuttling the region’s cotton exports. Following the discovery of oil to the west of the city a few years later, though, the channel enabled Corpus to begin exporting petroleum products. Industry pounced.
“Why are there so many cement factories and inorganic chemical plants and metal manufacturers [in Corpus Christi]?” Lessoff, the historian, asked me. “It’s because of all the energy they need. And those things also need a lot of water.”
Though the city was competing with the humid, semitropical petroleum hubs in Houston and Louisiana, where water is less of a concern, Corpus Christi pressed forward, even as its residential population quadrupled. By the end of the 1950s, industry-related uses accounted for almost 40% of water demand in Nueces County, of which Corpus represents as much as 90% of the population. “If you’re a city official, you’re looking at this growth, and you’re telling yourself, ‘Well, we’ll figure it out,’” Lessoff said of the ballooning problem.
The situation took a turn in late 2015, when Congress repealed the 1975 export ban on crude oil. Corpus was perfectly positioned to capitalize on the opportunity, given its proximity to the extraction operations in Eagle Ford and the Permian Basin, its deep shipping channel, and its industrial base. Billions of dollars in investment in new plants soon poured into a city waiting with open arms.
Corpus officials at the time assured ExxonMobil, among other chemical companies, that its $10 billion plastics facility, which opened in 2018, would have sufficient water available to it for the “foreseeable future” despite the plant using 25 million gallons per day during its peak production — enough to meet the needs of a family of four for 170 years. To Steel Dynamics, a year later, the city promised an additional 6 million gallons of water per day. “We have enough now to attract development and keep our lawns and parks green,” then-mayor Joe McComb boasted in 2018 when revoking drought restrictions that he claimed “gave a false sense that we were always running out of water.”
Beginning in 2018, the largest industrial water users in Corpus were also offered the option to pay a voluntary, year-round “drought surcharge exemption” rather than face larger financial penalties when a drought emergency is declared. The exemption charge of just 31 cents per 1,000 gallons is effectively a rounding error for companies like Exxon or Valero, and about 10 companies in the area take advantage of the program.
The city’s blasé attitude stemmed in part from its bet that desalination plants would come to its rescue. When they approved the new influx of manufacturing in 2018, Corpus leaders acknowledged that a new city-owned desalination facility needed to be up and running by “early 2023” to fill anticipated gaps in its natural water supply. Preliminary plans weren’t even presented to the city council, though, until 2019.
By 2022, a year before the city’s estimated deadline for needing the water, there were plans for five desalination plants around Corpus Christi Bay, including two that would have been city-owned. (City officials said the astronomical cost of building a plant — around $1 billion — would be offset by the drought surcharge exemption fund, which only brings in around $6 million per year.) Groups like For the Greater Good and the Sierra Club fought hard against the city’s plan for a desalination plant in the shallow Inner Harbor, arguing that the freshwater it produced would prop up industry, allowing it to continue its insatiable consumption, much as critics of carbon capture have argued that the technology would allow fossil fuel companies to continue emitting and running their businesses as usual.
“We as residents are not using the majority of this water, so there is no reason why we should have to subsidize any kind of infrastructure that’s primarily beneficial to private corporations,” Chloe Torres, the Coastal Bend regional coordinator for Texas Campaign for the Environment, which opposed the desalination plant, told me. “Even by the rules of capitalism, that’s a tough sell.”
Coastal desalination relies on reverse osmosis, a process that filters salt out of seawater and would discharge the hypersaline brine back into the shallow bay. “When I was living there in the 1990s, desalination was like, Who would want to do something like that?” Lessoff, the historian, told me. “It’s outrageous because of the energy involved, the environmental factors, and the effect on these estuaries.”
It was also in 2022 that national environmental groups helped elect two candidates to the city council, Jim Klein, the former president of the Coastal Bend Sierra Club, and Sylvia Campos, who said they’d focus on holding industry accountable for its water usage. By some estimates, industry was guzzling as much as 80% of Corpus’ available water supply, with residents using just a fraction. The 2022 election was critical because “desalination is not done through voter approval,” Campos told me. “It is done through the city council purposely so the citizens really don’t have a say.” For the several-hundred-thousand people who live in the metropolitan area surrounding Corpus, who can’t vote in the city elections but are subject to its decisions as wholesale purchasers of its water, the situation is even less democratic.
Heading into 2024, national climate and environmental groups such as Lead Locally and the Sierra Club again endorsed a slate of candidates who opposed desalination. But industry had wised up since 2022, and spent big on the race. Environmental candidates got clobbered — Klein lost his election for an at-large council seat; Araiza, the co-founder of For the Greater Good, lost her mayoral bid by 36 points; and four other city council hopefuls also failed in their bids.
Voters returned only Campos to the city council, but it wasn’t because of their environmental concerns. “When I was knocking on their doors, they weren’t talking to me about water,” she told me.
In purple Corpus Christi, Campos, a self-described socialist, told me she convinced other city council members to turn against the desalination plans by arguing that a billion-dollar investment in a plant producing only 30 million gallons of freshwater per day didn’t make financial sense. In September 2025, in a 6-3 vote, the city council killed the Inner Harbor desalination proposal — a move that prompted Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch to either downgrade or review the city’s credit rating given the “unexpected acceleration of water depletion risk.” William Chriss, a third-generation Corpus Christian and local political analyst, told me, “I don’t think [the city council] necessarily changed their minds about the need for a desal plant. I think they changed their minds about the cost of this particular desal plant.”
Indeed, the need for water hadn’t gone away. Corpus’ water department has said that about 70% of residents already use less than a proposed restriction of 5,250 gallons per month. First-time violators who exceed that amount could face a $500 fee; a proposed penalty for second-time violators would see their water shut off.
Under a proposal floated this week, residential customers could use up to 6,000 gallons per month, while industrial customers would be forced to adhere to a 25% cut in their average water use between 2022 and 2024 — and face water shutoffs if they don’t comply.
The big industrial consumers like Exxon, Valero, and Flint Hills Resources have so far refused to disclose how they would adjust their operations in order to meet such reductions on the grounds that it’s proprietary information, as Dylan Baddour has reported in his ongoing coverage of the crisis for Inside Climate News. (Exxon and Valero failed to return our request for comment. A spokesperson for Flint Hills, which runs two crude oil refineries in Corpus, told me in a statement that the company is “optimistic we will be able to manage the potential curtailment scenarios without significantly disrupting our operations,” and pointed me toward its plans to use up to 2 million gallons per day of treated city wastewater for its operations.)
Texas Governor Greg Abbott has warned Corpus Christi’s leadership that there is “only … a little time more before the state of Texas has to take over” managing the water crisis, and blasted the city for “squandering” a $750 million loan commitments from the Texas Water Development Board, most of which had been designated exclusively for the construction of the Inner Harbor desalination plant. President Trump has also visited the Port of Corpus Christi and floated funding a revived Inner Harbor desalination project. “This is called a serious money ask, and I’m going to get that thing approved for you guys,” he told the local media. Last week, the Corpus Christi City Council voted 6-2 to begin talks with AXE H2O, a private company seeking to build a desalination plant with the city’s guarantee of a 30-year water purchase agreement.
Campos was one of the “no” votes, expressing skepticism about the “too good to be true” proposal, which would dump its high-saline discharge into the deeper gulf rather than the isolated bay, theoretically lessening the environmental impact. But its energy-intensive process would also run on natural gas, likely via on-site turbines, which its chairman said would keep its water costs lower than regional competitors as prices on the Texas grid tend to vary wildly. (Corpus Christi Polymers, which is constructing its own desalination plant, has also solicited the city for a purchasing agreement.) There is also the inherent irony of using fossil fuels to fix a problem created by fossil fuels.
A new desalination plant also does little to solve the immediate crisis, leaving Corpus in the most desperate position of its long history. A worst-case scenario would involve shutting off the tap for industry and facing its lawyers in court; limiting or rotating residential water availability; or trucking in water to manually refill the cisterns, as Baddour has reported. “The lead time that it takes to fix some of these problems just does not allow for a head-in-the-sand approach,” Amy Hardberger, the director of the Center for Water Law and Policy at Texas Tech in Lubbock, told me, having watched the situation unfold from afar. “But I don’t want to vilify Corpus,” she added. “I just think they’re getting to this point a little ahead of other cities.”
Some optimists have entertained the idea that a major rainfall could potentially break the region’s drought and buy Corpus a little more time to find a way out of its current water crisis. “The only alternatives that exist for Corpus Christi between now and three years from now at the earliest” — when a desalination plant could be up and running — “are a series of hurricanes or tropical storms that will miraculously fill our reservoir,” Chriss, the political analyst, said.
But Lessoff, the historian, gasped when I suggested a hurricane might relieve some of the pressure on Corpus. “If you want to have the biggest environmental disaster in American history, go ahead,” he said in disbelief.
The city is a catastrophe waiting to happen, Lessoff went on. Because of its low-lying chemical plants and petroleum refineries, if or when a climate change-strengthened hurricane makes landfall on the Coastal Bend, “it’ll make the BP disaster in the Gulf look like nothing,” he said. In other words, if there were ever a way to make Corpus Christians nostalgic for a mere 22 days of boil-water notices, then a direct hit by a hurricane would be it.
But that also means, perversely, that the best outcome might be for Corpus to have to sit with the consequences of over 100 years of bad water policy, deference to industry, and electing officials more interested in economic boosterism than protecting the limited resources for its residents. If any good comes out of the situation, it might be that other cities in the urban southwest learn from Corpus’ mistakes.
“It doesn’t help me to say ‘I told you so’ when there’s no water coming out of my tap,” Hardberger, the water policy expert, said. “It’s like, ‘Please don’t put me in that position. I want to live here, too. This is my home. Please work with me.’”
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If Democrats plan to restore the solar and wind tax credits, then passing BAAJA now suddenly looks like the savvy move.
This is Heatmap Daily, a weekday digest written by our executive editor. Subscribe here.
So here we are. The bipartisan permitting reform bill has cleared its first and most important procedural hurdle in the Senate. On Monday evening, 73 senators voted to end debate on the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act, or BAAJA, which would broadly make it faster and easier to build federal infrastructure projects of all sorts, especially power lines.
The bill will still undergo what its backers call a “healthy amendment process,” and it will face procedural and substantive votes for the next week or two. But its path to passage, at least in the Senate, is getting clearer.
That’s more than a little surprising. Going into the midterm elections, the conventional wisdom in Washington was that the bigger the Democratic wave, the harder it would be to pass BAAJA. Supporters feared that Democrats, newly flush with confidence, would drop the compromise and choose to restart negotiations anew in the next Congress. That’s certainly what Representative Jared Huffman, the likely incoming chair of the House Natural Resources Committee, has pushed for on X over the past week. And soon after the scale of the electoral deluge for Republicans became clear, Heatmap reported that the bill’s odds of passage had gotten a little steeper.
And yet the bill has actually gotten closer to becoming law, not further, since last Tuesday. And as I pondered the situation over the weekend, I realized the original conventional wisdom was misguided. The midterm elections have strengthened the politics of permitting reform. Tuesday’s results can help explain why the Democratic Senate caucus is now speeding toward passage.
The first dynamic is obvious: This is an affordability bill — it’s right there in the name — and Democrats just won an affordability election. The bill’s projected energy affordability benefits are small but real, and proponents argue (plausibly) that the bill’s most important changes are impossible to quantify in an energy model. The bill will make federally funded public transit much faster to build, for instance, which will have big affordability and emissions implications but is essentially impossible to model.
What’s more, much of the incoming Democratic Senate class ran on a policy platform that looks a lot like BAAJA. James Talarico of Texas, Adam Hamilton of Kansas, Annie Andrews of South Carolina, and — if they win — Scott Colom of Mississippoi and Mary Peltola of Alaska all promised an all-of-the-above energy policy that would expand the supply of fossil fuels and clean energy. That is what BAAJA does, according to its supporters and detractors.
South Carolina’s Andrews even went one step further and explicitly committed to finding a permitting reform compromise with Republicans. “Nobody has the political will to get to work and pass this bipartisan plan. It’s embarrassing,” she wrote. “In the Senate, I'll work to bring members of both parties together to finally get this done.” Now Democrats can get it done before she even gets to the Hill.
BAAJA mirrors Democratic policy commitments in more specific ways, too. Seven of the incoming 11 Democratic senators campaigned on forcing data centers to pay the full cost of their electricity use; it was even one of Abdul El-Sayed’s mandatory “terms of engagement” for the facilities. The rest of the winning Senate class made more vague pledges that data centers should not make Americans’ power bills go up.
The permitting bill would accomplish this goal, too. BAAJA would force data centers and crypto miners to pay the full costs of their connection to the grid, and it would let states go even further in transferring additional system costs from other ratepayers onto data centers.
Last week’s elections could help ease specific data center worries around the bill, as well. Some of BAAJA’s critics have feared that the bill could accelerate the nationwide data center buildout. And in a world where data centers are growing fastest in Republican states, activists might be loath to surrender any federal tool — no matter how feckless — that would be useful to fighting them. But many of the states where data centers and behind-the-meter gas plants are growing most quickly — such as Texas, Ohio, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania — will now have new Democratic governors or outright trifectas next year. The most effective tool for slowing the data center buildout remains state, county, and municipal land use laws. BAAJA would not touch those ordinances. And its data center electricity provisions would actually expand the ways that incoming Democratic governors could make data centers pay for the rest of the grid or even build new infrastructure.
Likewise, BAAJA’s new utility oversight tools look far more powerful in a world where state politicians have promised to fight utilities. Democrats likely also find it easier to write those powers into law in a world where public utility commissions are trending Democratic.
And there is one more reason Democrats might feel more comfortable passing this bill now: Tuesday has made their odds of gaining even more power in the future look better, and this bill will improve as Democrats pass other clean energy or climate policies to augment it.
If Congress soon restores the wind and solar tax credits, for instance — as most every incoming congressional Democrats have vowed to do — then BAAJA’s transmission provisions will go from being merely somewhat good for the climate to being very good. When the Inflation Reduction Act fell short, it was because the United States could not build new power lines fast enough to hook new solar and wind farms to electricity demand. But marrying the IRA’s clean energy tax credits to BAAJA’s transmission mandates would supercharge them both. And if a future Democratic Congress chooses to fund and build a national macrogrid, then passing BAAJA now would make it much easier, because some of the hardest political aspects of such a task — such as creating a federal backstop siting mechanism for new power lines — will already be done. There’s a reasonable political argument that Democrats should eagerly welcome Republican co-ownership of BAAJA’s transmission provisions, so that the party does not have to own the political consequences of such a buildout alone in the future.
Likewise, BAAJA will disproportionately benefit the party that wins the next presidential election, because the bill’s greatest affordability benefits will start accruing to the president who follows Donald Trump. Like all big energy bills, BAAJA will take time to work its way through the energy system. Americans won’t immediately experience cheaper bills or faster projects; after BAAJA’s passage, independent agencies such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission will need to write rules governing the law’s new programs and communicate them to states, utilities, and grid managers.
Many of those effects will start to be felt right around the time the next president takes office in January 2029 — or even in the early 2030s. If Democrats feel better about their chances of taking the White House today than they did a week ago, then they may very well feel better about passing this bill now, too.
BAAJA survived its first test, but Trump says the bill “hasn’t been fully negotiated.”
The Senate on Monday night moved to open debate on the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act — just after the president bizarrely threw cold water on the deal he struck for the bill.
Senators agreed to invoke cloture on a motion to proceed to the bill by a vote of 73–25, a forceful bipartisan tally that could bolster momentum behind the bill. Up next comes what Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, the Democrat from Rhode Island and one of the key sponsors of the bill, called a “healthy amendment process” at a press conference Monday morning. This will constitute the last remaining opening for senators and outside constituencies to try and change provisions they disagree with. How many amendments will make it to a vote, however, is not publicly known. Nor is how fast debate on the bill will move along, so best be patient.
I’m aware of pushes for at least two amendments to be considered — one ostensibly to remove the bill’s changes to the National Historic Preservation Act and another related to future administrations potentially revoking Trump-era permits. Some of the lawmakers who voted to proceed on the bill may become “nays” depending on how the amendment process goes.
In a normal world, this would be the clarifying moment for BAAJA, when the clouds would part and a pathway to passage and enactment would appear obvious. There are certainly rays of hope for the pro-BAAJA squad because a large bipartisan vote would help the legislation move briskly in the House.
But we still live in the Trump era, so instead, just as senators were preparing to vote, and after the White House released a formal statement endorsing the bill, the president told the world that actually, the deal wasn’t done.
Politico reported in September that the president told his aides he would direct the Pentagon to clear its queue of onshore wind projects to strike a deal on permitting. The White House has for weeks been telling reporters it’s been advancing wind projects through the Pentagon airspace clearance process in good faith. As we reported in late October, these claims have not always lined up with what the administration and renewable energy trade groups have been stating in federal court, where a judge months ago required the government to resume these once-routine height approvals.
For some reason, asked about this at a White House media briefing Monday evening, Trump told reporters from the press room podium that actually he won’t approve wind turbines even if the bill becomes law. Then he said, “The bill hasn’t been fully negotiated.” You can watch the full clip of the comments here.
It’s unclear whether these comments affected the bill’s odds at final passage, but they did lead to a very long all-caps post on X from Representative Jared Huffman, who’s in line to lead the House Committee on Natural Resources in the coming Congress. The White House has tried to clarify the president’s remarks, and Senator Whitehouse blamed the comments on Trump’s age. So just because we’re seeing legislative progress doesn’t mean the future will make sense.
Researchers, advocates, and funders gathered to discuss intervening in the global climate on purpose.
For decades, deliberately intervening in the Earth’s climate system was something most scientists and policymakers didn’t dare talk about. But last month, more than 250 people from six continents gathered in Reykjavik, Iceland for a three-day summit devoted entirely to willfully tinkering with the climate to make it more resilient.
The gathering served as a purposeful, if hesitant, coming out party for a field so controversial that just a few years ago, hundreds of researchers signed the Solar Geoengineering Non-Use Agreement, which called for an end to public funding for scientific research into the field. But this summit revealed that the sector — while still deeply divided over questions of money, governance, and deployment — is beginning to emerge from the shadows.
Why now? The consensus among climate scientists about our ability to mitigate warming is growing more dire by the day. The United Nations now acknowledges that limiting temperature to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels is out of reach, putting more drastic adaptation solutions in play.
“It is increasingly clear to anyone who’s paying any attention that we are screwed, right? That we have blown past every possible reasonable threshold at which our existing theory of change can possibly lead to a safe and equitable climate future,” Joshua Elliott, chief scientist at Renaissance Philanthropy, told me. He directs the two-year-old nonprofit’s Advanced Research for Climate Emergencies initiative, which organized the event. “I feel like the second election of Trump was such a nail in the coffin.”
The three-day Global Risk and Stabilization Summit brought together scientists, engineers, funders, insurers, and at least one venture-backed startup to talk about everything from thickening Arctic sea ice to shielding Antarctic glaciers with underwater curtains to spraying reflective particles into the stratosphere to bounce a portion of incoming sunlight back into space. That last approach, a method of solar geoengineering known as stratospheric aerosol injection, tends to dominate geoengineering discussions, as it could theoretically cool the planet quickly and relatively cheaply.
That doesn’t mean it’s generally accepted, however. Far from it. The sessions at the ARC summit ran under Chatham House Rules, i.e. no reporting who said what — or even whether they were there at all — without explicit permission. ARC plans to release a synthesis report on the state of field next year, but in the meantime the conference website made clear: “Attending the summit does not imply that you endorse the report, any particular intervention, or the stabilization framing. Attending means you are taking part in the conversation and nothing more.”
This type of careful distancing is par for the course in geoengineering circles. Just as many mainstream climate advocates once viewed adaptation — and later carbon removal — as distractions from the need to cut emissions, geoengineering has suffered under the same criticisms. Its oftentimes sci-fi sounding interventions are already ripe conspiracy fodder. Add to that its underresearched environmental impacts and side effects, and some of these strategies could prove truly disastrous in the wrong hands.
But at least people are finally talking about it. In the weeks since the summit, attendees have published dozens of Substack and Linkedin posts about what they saw, heard, and took away from the conference. I talked to many of them about this first attempt to intentionally gather and grow the sector.
Naturally, they don’t all agree on the best path forward. Seemingly everyone acknowledges that conducting more research and designing better Earth monitoring systems is a no-lose situation. But big questions remain unresolved: what role private capital should play; how openly to discuss the possibility of near-term deployment; the somewhat uncomfortable overlap between climate engineering, defense, and national security; and how to educate policymakers and the general public about interventions that sound to some like nefarious overlords trying to control the weather.
The field doesn’t even yet agree on what to call itself. The conference organizers prefer “Earth systems stabilization” to “geoengineering,” arguing that a sector like this should be defined by its goal rather than how it gets there. The terminology remains unsettled, however, with one critic, University of Waterloo economist and former geoengineering researcher Juan Moreno-Cruz telling me in an email that the renaming “feels like a campaign” with the “objective of moving more towards action.”
At this nascent stage, any one individual can have an outsized voice. Based on the published speaker list, as well as various recaps posted during and after the event, the guest list featured some of the field’s biggest names. That included David Keith, founder of the direct air capture company Carbon Engineering and a pioneer of solar geoengineering, which involves releasing aerosols like sulfates into the atmosphere to reflect a small portion of sunlight back into space. Also in attendance were Columbia University climate economist Gernot Wagner, Paris Agreement architect Sue Biniaz, and J.P. Morgan climate advisor Sarah Kapnick, alongside delegates from some of the big environmental NGOs, including the Environmental Defense Fund and Natural Resources Defense Council.
More potentially polarizing attendees included Yanai Yedvab, the CEO of solar geoengineering startup Stardust Solutions — one of the first for-profit entities to enter the space — and Lowercarbon Capital, the climate tech venture firm that led its Series A round.
The function that private sector funding and venture-style startups could or should play in this field remains one of the biggest points of tension. Many strongly believe that the only appropriate customer for a globally consequential intervention like stratospheric aerosol injection is a coalition of national governments. But there seems to be a preemptive acknowledgement among those I spoke with that getting the United Nations itself to align on research and potential terms of deployment is unlikely.
Paul Gambill, an ARC fellow and co-founder of Nori, an early carbon removal marketplace, told me that one session at the summit was titled “The Future is Minilateral,” a nod to the growing interest in a small bloc of countries — “maybe six or so” — working together on the issue. Several people I spoke with described a model in which governments would buy technology from a company like Stardust, but retain control over if, when, and how to deploy it.
But even within the ARC set, that framing seems to have skeptics. Noah Deich, another ARC fellow and carbon removal veteran who co-founded the nonprofit Carbon180, sees the profit motive as inherently dangerous. There’s no guarantee that the science will ever advance to the point where governments are comfortable becoming customers, but investors always want to see returns. That disconnect, he argues, creates the incentive to commercialize the technology before either the research or the public is ready.
“That to me is very, very concerning, and shows a lack of judgment at a first order for the people who have invested in this, and for the people who have accepted that private sector money,” Deich told me. “That makes me very, very wary about what they’re going to do when faced with the choice of, hey no government wants to do this. Or these governments have said it is illegal, and this one says it’s fine. Like, will they actually respect the ones that say it’s illegal?”
Others see private capital as all but inevitable. Susan Su, a climate tech investor and analyst, thinks the sector would do best to engage with the private sector strategically rather than fearfully. “Money in general comes with ideas, and in my view, that’s okay,” she told me. If a venture backer has their own notions about how and where to deploy stratospheric aerosol injection, for instance, that need not dictate the agenda. “It’s the entrepreneur’s or the initiative’s job to push back against those ideas and to shape them.”
Su also thinks the field ought to be more open to discussing deployment as a possible outcome from both the research and conditions on the ground, rather than treating it as the third rail. “There’s a sentiment of caution that I think is rooted in a previous era, where it’s been a long road to reach whatever limited consensus there is today that we should even research this,” she explained to me in an email. “With that much caveating, it’s hard to imagine why a funder would get excited to back something that everyone’s saying shouldn't exist.”
Still, it’s not hard to imagine a near-term future in which climate change presents an increasingly urgent national security concern, and the instant governments start treating geoengineering as a defense priority, the money could be practically limitless. Private geoengineering companies could function essentially as defense contractors, with militaries as their primary customers.
The comparison makes some understandably uneasy, as it risks framing climate interventions as weapons to be wielded by states with the resources to develop and deploy them. But however you look at it, “people are starting to realize, there’s no scenario where this stuff doesn’t become geopolitical very very fast,” Gambill told me. And that makes an already controversial field considerably messier.
One way to sidestep some of the thorniest questions around global governance could be to start with a focus on more localized interventions. In the Arctic, for example, companies such as Real Ice and Arctic Reflections are testing ways to thicken sea-ice by pumping seawater onto its surface during the winter. In Antarctica, researchers are studying the feasibility of underwater “seafloor curtains” in front of the Florida-sized Thwaites Glacier to keep warm ocean water from melting it from below. If that glacier were to fully collapse, it could raise global sea levels by up to two feet. There are also some truly low-tech options on the table, too: One calls for reintroducing bison to the Alaskan tundra, where their heavy footsteps would compact the snow and help keep the underlying permafrost frozen.
There’s even a more localized version of solar geoengineering. Called marine cloud brightening, it involves spraying a fine mist of seawater into low-lying clouds over the ocean. The salt particles encourage the formation of smaller cloud droplets, making the clouds brighter and more reflective, cooling the ocean and surface below. Unlike stratospheric aerosol injection, the impacts of which could persist for a year or more, a single deployment of marine cloud brightening lasts mere days, making it readily reversible and easier to test. Australian researchers have piloted this tech over the Great Barrier Reef.
"It feels like people read Kim Stanley Robinson’s novels and are trying to actually figure out if any of that stuff makes sense,” Deich told me. In Robinson’s acclaimed 2020 novel The Ministry for the Future, he imagines efforts at stratospheric aerosol injection, glacier stabilization, and large-scale rewilding in response to a fictional — but readily imaginable — catastrophic heat wave.
Deich worries, however, that he didn’t hear enough emphasis at the summit on the ongoing role carbon removal — not just emissions cuts — would have to play in a world even temporarily reliant on an intervention like stratospheric aerosol injection. That’s because of the risk of “termination shock”: If scientists suddenly halted solar geoengineering, the warming it had been masking would likely return within just a few years unless carbon removal efforts could draw down significant CO2 in the interim.
“The [carbon dioxide removal] community from the very early days tried very hard to say, first priority is obviously stopping emissions, but we also need to do removal, and we can’t wait for one to do the other,” Deich told me. “And I don’t see that same type of drumbeat being articulated by the SRM crowd.”
He and others are well aware of the moral hazard argument that has long dogged carbon removal: that this tech will give fossil fuel companies cover to keep emitting, and politicians an excuse to avoid the harder work of decarbonization. With carbon removal, however, that concern is generally simple to rebut. All recent IPCC reports have concluded that removals will be necessary to keep warming anywhere near safe levels. And in many cases, cutting emissions is still far cheaper than removing carbon after the fact.
But it’s a different calculus for an intervention like stratospheric aerosol injection, which is cheap by comparison and could lower global temperatures without doing anything to address the underlying emissions buildup. It’s easy to see how policymakers and the public could say, “Let’s let future generations deal with this building up of greenhouse gasses. We don’t really have to care about that now, we can just keep the temperatures a bit lower and buy ourselves time,” Robert Höglund, a carbon removal advisor and co-founder of the market tracker CDR.fyi, told me. “I think that’s fair. It’s a real risk.”
For its part, ARC plans to publish a report early next year bringing together the work of roughly 40 authors to lay out the state of the field’s science, governance, and social legitimacy. This will come alongside an open map of the interventions being studied and tested as well as funding and research gaps that remain. Rather than immediately holding another global summit, the organization plans to convene regional meetings next year primarily in low- and middle-income countries to explore possibilities for local research efforts in climate vulnerable nations. The next global gathering might then be scheduled for 2028.
In the meantime, many hope ARC and others will help shepherd along myriad research and communications efforts. Because if any message dominated the inaugural summit, it was: Geoengineering isn’t yet ready for prime time. There’s much more research to do, and significant stakeholder groundwork to lay, especially as the field considers how to best invite policymakers into the conversation.
“You cannot create a field. Nobody can declare it into existence,” ARC director Joshua Elliott told me of the effort to bring together the disparate experts working on climate stabilization. What organizations like ARC can do is build the infrastructure for it to emerge. That looks like convening researchers, advocates, and even skeptics; synthesizing siloed knowledge; opening the arguments to debate; establishing academic journals; and creating funding streams within governments and other institutions. But from there, the big decisions belong to others.
“That’s where our theory of change stops,” Elliott told me. ARC won’t decide whether the aerosols are injected into the atmosphere or Arctic ice is thickened. “It is the governments and the multilateral institutions that we have charged with making these decisions, despite however functional you think those institutions might be.”