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Robinson Meyer:
Good morning. It’s Thursday, June 11, and there are important state-level races coming up later this year in Georgia. I’m not talking about the governor’s race, nor am I talking about the Senate election, although both could shape the 2028 presidential field significantly. I’m talking, of course, about the Georgia Public Service Commission, which regulates the state’s utilities. Last year, you might recall if you’re a nerd, Democrats pulled off their biggest state-level win in 20 years in Georgia when voters elected Peter Hubbard and Alicia Johnson to Georgia’s Public Service Commission. It was the first time Democrats had won a state-level office in Georgia since 2006, and they did so by a massive margin with 63% of the vote, though it was an off-year race. That gave the Georgia Public Service Commission a 3-2 Republican split, but that could change this year. The commission’s crucial fifth seat is up for grabs in another election, and Peter Hubbard last year only won a one-year term. He has to win re-election this year. If he does. And if Democrats take that fifth seat, though, they could lead the Georgia Public Service Commission for the first time in decades. So on today’s show, I’m excited to welcome who else? Peter Hubbard. He is, as you know, a current member of the Georgia PSC. He’s a one-time renewables developer, and he’s the founder of the nonprofit Georgia Center for Energy Solutions. Now, I should say, I realize most shift key listeners don’t live in Georgia, although hello to those of you who do. But I think this is an interesting conversation just for anyone in the United States or for anyone who cares about the American energy system.
Robinson Meyer:
You know, every state has a public service commission. And although only 10 are directly elected by the voters, like in Georgia, these are crucial roles shaping how the energy system works in the United States. And with Peter, we had a really interesting conversation. We talked about what public service commissioners actually do, what their lives are like, and how they’re grappling with the challenges of load growth, the clean electricity build out, and the data center boom. So today, it’s Peter Hubbard, current utility regulator and utility regulator candidate in the great state of Georgia. I’m Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News, and it’s all coming up on Shift Key. Peter Hubbard, welcome to Shift Key.
Peter Hubbard:
Happy to be here, Rob.
Robinson Meyer:
So you have played a number of different roles in the energy system. I think you’ve been an advocate. You were an intervener in public service commission proceedings. You were a developer. You led an advocacy organization. And then, of course, crucially, you won this big statewide election last year as one of the first Democrats to win a statewide election in Georgia in quite some time. Can you just start by maybe giving us the story of how you got here? What did you do along the way to becoming a Georgia Public Service Commissioner?
Peter Hubbard:
Well, you could trace it all the way back to graduate school. I went to Johns Hopkins, took a class on oil and gas markets, and something clicked in me that said, this is what I would like to do. I’d really like to study energy. If I want to understand how to transition to clean energy, I … then I need to understand the system we have. So I jumped into a consulting firm, Siemens Energy Business Advisory, and worked there for close to a decade. Perfect experience in terms of just really getting into the weeds. I did a lot of capacity expansion production cost modeling. I ran a natural gas model and really got to understand electricity and gas markets from the ground up. And then with the three years of developing, what I did was try to capitalize on the IRA and follow Jigar Shah’s message of deploy, deploy, deploy, and get out and really understand how to make a project successful or understand why it fails in terms of solar and battery storage development, going through interconnection, going through, frankly, negotiating with landowners and trying to tell them about the benefits of solar and battery storage.
Robinson Meyer:
And where were most of your projects during that period? Were they in Georgia or were they all around and maybe more open markets?
Peter Hubbard:
I really focused on three markets, It’s the Mid-Continent ISO, the Southwestern Power Pool, and then ERCOT, so right in the center part of the country. You know, that experience was just hands-on and really taught me all of the nuances of, you know, the commercial side, the technical side, the political side of bringing projects successfully there. And then I tied it all together by having moved to Georgia a decade ago and looking at how we did integrated resource planning in the state. It just made me want to jump into the ring and try and provide comments through the expert witness path. So I really believe in building up that evidentiary record with good, solid analysis. And there’s just overwhelming amounts of analysis that suggest going in the direction of clean energy is the right direction. Not the least of which is that 90% plus of what’s going to be built this year in the United States and worldwide is solar, wind, and batteries. So it just makes sense from a lot of different perspectives, and I’m interested in trying to unlock how to move forward with more clean energy.
Robinson Meyer:
And now that you’re a public service commissioner, what is your day-to-day like? Because, of course, like we all think about public service commissioners all the time. It’s a very important part of how utilities are regulated. But what is the actual day of a commissioner like?
Peter Hubbard:
Well, my circumstance is unique. I only earned a one-year term, so I’m wearing two hats this year. I’m both a commissioner and a candidate. And each one of those is a full-time job, as well as being a full-time dad as well to two children. But the day-to-day, frankly, if you wanted to do the least amount of work possible. You could just show up every other Thursday to committee meetings and vote up or down and show up every other Tuesday to admin meetings and vote up or down. You really don’t have to engage all that much. But if you’re like me and really read everything that comes across your desk and want to get to the bottom of things, then it’s truly a full-time job. So a lot of it is meeting with stakeholders. A lot of it is understanding the dockets and really reading through the testimony that comes in, interacting with staff. There’s a lot that can be done and really just trying to understand you know what has come before me at the commission what’s coming up for example the 2028 integrated resource plan in Georgia and the rate case that follows and preparing for things like that so, you know i really try and keep myself busy wearing both of those hats this year.
Robinson Meyer:
What surprised you most about being commissioner so far
Peter Hubbard:
Well, probably what surprises me most is how dependent commissioners tend to be on staff to do the hard analysis and then present solutions. I’m the kind of person that can arrive at my own conclusions and come up with my own suggestions of where I think we should go. But really, commissioners tend to not be experts in their field. I’m a rare bird in that I’ve done this work, specifically working on integrated resource planning with other utilities. But we’re really dependent on staff. So that’s been surprising, as well as I would say just how entrenched interests are. This is a state that’s been under one party control for a long time. And while that’s changing, there’s just a certain way of doing business. And I hear frequently, this is the way we’ve always done things. And to me, that’s surprising as well, and not really an acceptable answer.
Robinson Meyer:
What’s an example?
Peter Hubbard:
Well, one is that the power company expects to collect full revenue requirements on really everything that they do, even on an individual basis. For example, storm cost recovery. So we had a docket a few weeks ago that concluded, about the $912 million request to cover storm damage costs. And I put forward a motion to try and reduce that request and not have full revenue requirements, including profit on top of storm cost recovery. But that motion failed because the suggestion was, well, we’ve always had full revenue requirements on money that we spend, including on storm cost recovery. But those costs are increasing with more frequent and powerful storms, and that was something I questioned, and I think deserves more scrutiny going forward.
Robinson Meyer:
In other words, basically, because there’s now going to be more storms, it’s kind of more opportunities to do storm cost recovery and therefore more opportunities for utility profit. Is that the link?
Peter Hubbard:
Yes, that’s right. That’s a vicious cycle going on, in my opinion.
Robinson Meyer:
So I want to talk about a few things here. Georgia is facing a number of different challenges, some unique to Georgia’s situation, some that I think a lot of different states are facing, some of which you campaigned on last year and are campaigning on now. So let’s talk about data centers. Last year, at the very end of the year, the Georgia Public Service Commission approved Georgia Power to buy almost 10 gigawatts of new capacity, basically about 3.6 gigawatts, of which is from entirely new natural gas generation, entirely to serve new data center demand. And so there’s a huge amount of new data center demand coming online in Georgia. How should the state handle this huge amount of data center demand coming online? And maybe like, what did you think was going to happen when you joined? What did you campaign on versus what has getting in the weeds actually kind of taught you about this bolus of demand coming online?
Peter Hubbard:
Yes, data centers are just the issue of the day, and they’re not going away anytime soon. And people are very concerned about it, really from all stripes of life. So you ask, what should the state be doing about it? And I advocate for a whole-of-government approach, because while the Public Service Commission really only has oversight over the power side of things, where that power comes from and how much data centers are paying on their tariff, there’s much larger issues in terms of water use, in terms of the tax incentives. The estimate is $3.5 billion in tax abatements this year in Georgia, uncollected revenue that data centers otherwise would be willing to pay.
Peter Hubbard:
And land use issues, and so on and so forth. So in my opinion, we really need a whole-of-government approach. And I would say, though, that data centers are also an opportunity in a sense. I’m someone who is pragmatic, and I also see that these are deep-pocketed in folks who can bring investment to the grid. And if we target those investments to generational improvements, things like transmission and building the right power sources, then I see that having a really beneficial effect short-term, long-term in Georgia. And so I’ve been interested very much in things like data center load flexibility and how can we bring some of these folks online and bring their revenues into the state more quickly and do it in a way to where we’re not necessarily building brand new gold-plated infrastructure but using more of the grid that we’ve already invested in and that’s that’s a critical piece that I would like to advance on and have, made strides in that way but you know we really need to bring the utility on board as well as the rest of the government.
Robinson Meyer:
When you talk about making data centers kind of pay their fair share or be fair participants in the power system, what does that mean to you?
Peter Hubbard:
Yeah, super complicated question, and I don’t have the full answer yet, but ...
Robinson Meyer:
It’s funny because it’s objectively, I think, what everyone wants, but it’s actually so complicated because to some degree, the grid is this machine that we all share and all use together, and that disentangling what it could mean is actually quite a technical and difficult thing.
Peter Hubbard:
It’s incredibly technical. You know, there’s a notice of proposed rulemaking that FERC, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, is, I believe, going to be issuing some guidance on what they see is that question of what should a data center pay on their tariff to make sure it’s their fair share. I’ll be monitoring that. I look, I’m a member of the National Association of Regulatory Commissioners, and all 50 states have commissions that are grappling with this question. So I’m looking at other states’ tariffs and what they’re doing well and not. But specifically, some things came out in the wash in Georgia in the fuel cost recovery docket that concluded last month in May of 2026. Specifically, things like data centers are really 100% on a real-time pricing tariff, and that real-time pricing tariff does not include firm transportation costs for pipelines. So, if we’re building 3.6 gigawatts of new gas-fired generation, those pipeline costs are not yet accounted for by data centers. And the company rebutted that saying, well, they’re paying on the other side of the equation in terms of demand, not energy, and we’ll show you those numbers in 2028 in the rate case that we never had last year because for political reasons it was paused.
Peter Hubbard:
Pipelines, the hedging program, energy from solar power purchase agreements, and income-qualified fuel discounts. These are all things that are not accounted for yet and being paid for by data centers, including the fact that we’re now demanding more natural gas for generation. And you can literally do the modeling of the counterfactual of what if we pulled out that demand and prices would be 5% to 11% lower.
Robinson Meyer:
So in other words, Georgians are paying either for higher bulk power prices from existing natural gas fleets, or if they take natural gas at their home via pipelines for their furnace or heater or whatever, then they’re also paying higher natural gas prices, basically because data centers are now competing with them in the system for gas.
Peter Hubbard:
I would at least go so far as to say that they’re competing in terms of a lot of our electricity comes from gas fire generation. And so they’re going to pay a higher price for that electricity.
Robinson Meyer:
You mentioned this pipeline issue that isn’t fully accounted in the rate case. Can you give a little more explanation of how that works exactly? Yeah.
Peter Hubbard:
Right. So for a combined cycle unit that’s going to be operating at, say, 60 or 70% capacity factor, you need to have firm transportation, so reserved pipeline capacity. And that’s expensive to put steel in the ground.
Robinson Meyer:
This is basically a guarantee that there’ll always be gas available at that turbine to run. Guaranteeing that there’ll always be gas available at the turbine to run means building new pipelines, basically.
Peter Hubbard:
Yes, although you can have operational flow orders and other reasons why that gas can’t be delivered. So then you have to build backup diesel for that or some kind of backup fuel. But those pipeline costs are actually being incurred even before those gas-fired generators can take that. So we’re going to be paying for capacity beginning in 2027 and just hope that we can find someone to market that capacity to for a few years until those gas-fired generators come online. It’s it’s worth hundreds of millions of dollars and it’s a cost that is not included in real-time pricing which is a tariff that data centers have access to, and basically provides a lower kind of cost because they’re using a large amount of energy so it’s just you know and we’ll get into the details in the next rate case in 2028, but we did not have a rate case in 2025. The last time we had one was in 2022. And there are certain studies that come out of those rate cases, like a cost allocation study and a cost of service study. And we didn’t get those last year. So who’s to say that they’re paying their fair share? We have to take the word from the utility right now.
Robinson Meyer:
So I want to talk about the big nuclear plant that was built in Georgia over the past few years. And I actually want to start with the national perspective because Vogtle Units 3 and 4 were recently completed in Georgia. They were enormously expensive to complete. And I will say, outside of Georgia, the way that these projects are discussed is...
Robinson Meyer:
As you know, thank goodness Georgia finished those two nuclear plants. Like, thank goodness they did it. Because the whole country learned a lot from watching Georgia have the experience to develop these two, what became enormously expensive nuclear plants, to the extent that the Trump administration is now trying to build 10 new nuclear plants across the country and believes it can do so in a cheaper way. It’s doing so entirely on the back of lessons learned from the Georgia process. Lessons that I should say seem entirely reasonable to me, including a lot of the delays in Georgia, came from the fact that equipment wasn’t ready or it was ready too early. And so it kind of sat around and therefore it incurred costs as it sat around or workers had to sit around while they waited for equipment to be delivered.
Robinson Meyer:
Anyway, all of this is to say here in the other 49 states, we go. So thank goodness Georgia finished these projects because it was a real gift to just our understanding of how to complete a large-scale nuclear project in the 2020s and 20-teens. And if we continue to build big new reactors, we’re going to learn a lot from that experience. I wonder, though, what your takeaway is about them or how you interpret them as a Georgia Public Service Commissioner because those projects got rate-based. And so Georgia utility customers are paying for them right now. And so I would imagine the response to them has been quite different in Georgia. And I almost wonder if you want to kind of give us what, now that you’re fully in-house at the PSC, just what your perspective is on that project.
Peter Hubbard:
Well, if you look at the context of how Vogtle Units 3 and 4 came about, they were proposed around 2008, 2009, around that time frame, or actually I believe they began construction around that time. But it was also around the time when the Georgia Consumer Utility Council, that independent body that intervenes in dockets to say, hey, this is what we, you know, we think this is in the interest of rate payers or no, this is going to be a very expensive power project. We didn’t have that independent voice. And so the commission approved moving forward with Vogtle Units 3 and 4, and it took, I believe, something like 15 years or so. And instead of $14 billion, $37 billion. And that was a tremendous risk, a known risk, especially to put on the backs of one state’s rate payers. And so that’s really where I’m coming from, especially in a sunny state like Georgia. Even if we had done nothing but solar, we would have gotten far more bang for our buck than the most expensive power plant in the country, where we also didn’t have the chance to examine those costs at the end of this construction period when they were put into rate base. There was kind of a perfunctory hearing, but no real examination of who should bear the cost of that. So I’m deeply skeptical of our ability to really get costs under control.
Peter Hubbard:
You have to get to around the fifth of a kind before you’re on that asymptote and where costs have come down enough to where they’re manageable. So maybe halfway through that build out of 10 new AP1000s, we’ll get there. But those costs can’t be borne by rate payers. It has to be federally backstopped if it’s going to happen. Yeah. And, you know, I do also want to just say that carbon-free energy is important to me when we’re in the midst of a climate crisis, in my opinion. And so I do appreciate the fact that when Vogtle Units 3 and 4 came online, it displaced a lot of coal and gas-fired generation. And that’s a good thing. I just wish the cost wasn’t so high and there are better alternatives that are cheaper to also provide carbon-free energy like solar.
Robinson Meyer:
One question I had, I think some of your Republican predecessors on the commission, one line I’ve heard from them is that there should be federal cost overrun insurance for these nuclear plants if a state undertakes a project of building them. Do you think that that’s an important policy as well?
Peter Hubbard:
It’s critical because we know that there’s going to be cost overruns. It’s guaranteed. And so if as a nation, federal government, we decide we want to pay 5x for our power, then we can do that. That’s a choice we can make. But, you know, we just can’t have rate payers bearing the risk of what happened in Georgia or even in South Carolina, where we’ve dug a $9 billion hole that’s still sitting there.
Robinson Meyer:
Yeah, the funny thing is, right, that Vogtle at least was finished. And then in South Carolina, you have this giant AP1000 project, which was not finished. And whether that counts as first of a kind or zeroth of a kind. I don’t know.
Robinson Meyer:
Now that you have this giant, all these giant costs that have to be rate-based in Georgia, I’ve heard the argument that Georgia should be going out and looking for giant customers because if you’re a giant customer, you pay regulated and you pay a regulated rate. You can absorb more of that, whether you’re a data center or maybe a new factory or just a big bulk customer, you can absorb more of those costs and in some ways kind of shield regular residential customers from that big bolus of costs. Does that seem like a good strategy to you or should we be managing those high costs that now have to be paid for in a different way?
Peter Hubbard:
Well, what we’re doing is locking ourselves into a future where we’re building resources that need to be paid off over decades. And the question in my mind is, if we lock ourselves into that future, and then these new large load customers don’t show up in the numbers advertised, or if we build these resources, they show up, but then they don’t stick around for the decades needed to pay off these investments, who’s left holding the bag? That’s a real concern of mine. That’s why I’m interested in solutions like data center load flexibility and the ability to use virtual power plants and other resources that capitalize on investments we’ve already made, yeah it’s great to have large load customers and they, are making investments in this state but there’s a risk to them as well I think your audience would be aware that there’s you know a lot of talk about over investment in the AI sector and perhaps a bubble some deflationary effects from that. So I need to be mindful of that. And I really don’t want to lock ourselves into poor decision making. There’s a path dependency to some of the decisions that have happened just before I joined this commission.
Robinson Meyer:
Georgia, I think famously, is a state where you still have regulated electricity monopolies. You have big vertically integrated electricity providers. They’re companies that manage the generation of electricity. They manage the transmission. They manage getting it to individuals’ doors. That’s very different from other parts of the country right now, and it makes your task as a public service commissioner quite different. Can you give us a sense of how does the fact that you have Georgia power, you have these big monopoly utilities within Georgia, make your role different than how it would be, say, in a Pennsylvania or a Texas or California, where you have something closer to an electricity market?
Peter Hubbard:
Great question. What I’ve noticed is that I do think that the model that we have here in the Southeast, where there are vertically integrated utilities and then regulators who are meant to make sure that costs are prudently spent, it can work when you have that watchdog regulatory commission doing its job and providing real oversight. But it tends to be asymmetric. I mentioned how dependent we are on staff. Commissioners tend to not be able to kind of go toe-to-toe with all of the analytical and legal might of these utilities. They’re very powerful. They really shower their largesse throughout the state and so that they can continue the pattern that they have of really dominating in the state. So from that perspective, it can work well, but you have to have regulators who are doing their job. I’ve also noticed that these utilities can move mountains when they want to. If they really want to move on something, they can make it happen almost by snapping their fingers. But in other circumstances, if it doesn’t align with their financial incentives, then they’re going to drag their feet. Countless pilot projects, more working group sessions, that sort of thing.
Peter Hubbard:
So it can be a tug and a pull. It’s kind of carrots and sticks. And that’s what I’m discovering is it’s a complicated mix. We also in the state are one of 10 states where we elect our commissioners instead of appoint them. Regardless, it’s going to have a political element, but it’s even more pronounced in Georgia. And it’s wild to people to see how regulation and electricity tariffs and things of that nature are now so prominent and political just in the zeitgeist.
Robinson Meyer:
Can I push back a little bit on something you said, which is that it can be done, that successful regulation of these monopoly utilities can be done? Because I want to believe that’s the case. I think what’s always striking to me when I talk to commissioners is the degree to which utilities control the information environment, right? They control the analysis you get. You can set deadlines, but they can miss them and maybe they’re punished for them. Maybe they’re not. They, of course, have enormous influence in politics. And meanwhile, you’re a team of public servants elected or appointed as the case may be, depending on the state. But you still are a bit at the mercy of the operators of this system and the operators of this system are the utility. I mean, is it actually possible to regulate these utilities in the way that the system envisions? Because I will say as a reporter on this, I’ve come over time to see the wisdom of like an ERCOT style approach, where at least, you know, a more open electricity market, or maybe a MISO approach or SPP approach, these deregulated electricity markets across the US that seem to achieve some of these cost reductions, at least in theory, by having independent power producers. Compete against each other. So you’ve been an independent power producer in those grids. I wonder, like,
Robinson Meyer:
Is there work that seemed to happen automatically via market mechanisms when you were a developer that now has to happen through oversight as a Georgia public service commissioner? Or actually sitting in the chair, do you feel more optimistic? Because at least now there’s one entity that controls the whole grid. And so if you want to build more solar, you just have to convince that one entity to build a lot more solar and it will happen.
Peter Hubbard:
Great question. And, you know, we’re in this, I guess we’re almost into the third decade of this experiment of regional transmission organizations, ERCOT being a great example of how you can connect and manage and really just kind of go gangbusters on things if the market economics align, versus PJM where they’re still trying to sort out their capacity auctions and that sort of thing. So those are your two extremes, I guess. And to your question, I think that the model we have in Georgia can work. It’s hard for it to work. There’s that asymmetric framework of information I was mentioning. I mean, it’s really difficult to go up against the analytical power of Georgia Power. And they do have, you know, they know their system well. And so they know what’s practical and they know where they can push back.
Peter Hubbard:
By contrast, as well, TVA is a place where you’ve got top-down control, and yet they’re still going into gas-fired generation. So who’s to say what the right model is? But I think that my experience in operating in those different markets and seeing what works well, I mentioned Texas, ERCOT, Connect and Manage, that’s great, but you also get just really large load customers that can provide, or that can destabilize a grid if not managed well. And you also kind of get this, I remember just reaching out to various county judges in Texas to say, what kind of permits do we need? And the judge would write back and say, nothing, go to town. There’s, you know, you can build whatever you want.
Peter Hubbard:
And I don’t know that that wide open methodology is a great way to do business either. There’s a happy medium. There’s always pros and cons to everything. What works in Georgia is that when we have a commission that’s aligned in the right direction, that’s understanding the benefits that clean energy and other resources can bring to a grid, we can compel the power company to adopt some of these measures. It needs to be done in a formalized rulemaking process. And I think that that’s where we’ll have a lot of success beginning next year is putting in place these rulemaking procedures so that we can bring the evidence. We can have interveners and advocates build that evidentiary record for why we should go in a certain direction. And I think that having top-down direction, but that’s thoughtful and deliberative and based on evidence, that can be powerful. So that’s the goal for Georgia, so long as I’m here on the commission.
Robinson Meyer:
How will Georgians have noticed your governance or your presence on the commission so far, or does it take longer than five months for folks to notice? Yeah. Kind of anything happening in the utility system?
Peter Hubbard:
It’s a commission of five commissioners. So the rule of three still governs. It’s a split commission in terms of political party. But the rule of two is still important on a commission. And what it allows us to do is put forward motions to improve deals that are there on the table and have them seconded and then have everyone vote on that to establish positions. Even if that motion fails, as it happened in these fuel cost and storm damage recovery dockets that I mentioned earlier. Even though those motions that I tried to put on the table to improve the deal failed, it’s a signal to voters, here is what we can have if we have a different commission. And it’s a way to hold folks accountable. I mentioned earlier, I tried to put forward a motion to reduce the recovery so that it wasn’t at the full revenue requirements, including profit, and that failed. And that’s something that I’ll campaign on and show the voters we could have a different commission if we just had different commissioners.
Robinson Meyer:
What kind of help do you need from the federal government? So you talked about an all-of-state effort to manage data centers, but of course, I think it’s very tricky for states to be the regulator of last resort for a lot of these utilities, because it is true that if you hack away at the utility too much, so to speak, they immediately feel it on Wall Street. And that ultimately then comes back and hits ratepayers and it’s the whole business climate of the state. And so what kind of help do you need from the federal government either to manage the kind of large loads that we’re seeing now with data centers or just generally as a state regulator of electricity companies and other public services, like what could the government be doing to make this an easier task?
Peter Hubbard:
Well, certainly the notice of proposed rulemaking on large load tariffs that FERC is working on. I think that’s crucial to have some kind of clarity from the overarching regulator, to help provide some guidance on directions. And I don’t know that they’re going to have the right answers or all of the answers when they issue their proposed rulemaking later this month. But it’s helpful to have at least someone who’s trying to provide thought leadership there. And there are other commissioners in other states who are trying to do that as well. I also just think that it can be really difficult to find the upfront capital for certain investments that we need. Anyone who does project finance knows that’s usually the hardest part, is … and one of the hardest parts, frankly, about clean energy is it’s an upfront capital investment where the benefit is realized over time with no fuel costs, no pipeline costs. So to the extent that the federal government can help to subsidize that, which they were doing with the investment and production tax credits, that can be very helpful. And we need more of that. We need to subsidize the good, disincentivize what isn’t so good. And that’s where the federal government steps in.
Robinson Meyer:
You’ve talked a few times now about getting data centers to be flexible to manage their reliance on the grid or maybe rolling out virtual power plants more. Have you seen the numbers that substantiate that the gigawatts are actually there? Because if Georgia added 9 gigawatts of capacity to deal with data centers, that’s a lot of electricity. Is there really 9 gigawatts of transmission space or of underutilized capacity in the grid that’s just sitting around and is waiting for these programs to use? Or is this going to be something that’s small, maybe helps on the margin, but ultimately we will need to find additional electrons somewhere?
Peter Hubbard:
Yeah, it’s not the silver bullet that will solve all our problems. And I think even the Nicholas Institute over at Duke University a couple years ago, or not that long ago, did a study on CERC Southeast, where Georgia Power is. And you might be able to squeeze an additional 6 gigawatts out of this balancing area in terms of that data center load flexibility. But we’re going to need to build new generation as well to meet load growth, as well as to retire some older assets that are uneconomic to dispatch. So we are still going to have to build. We need to be building smart resources, resources that aren’t going to paint us into a corner. But no, it’s not the whole enchilada data center load flexibility, but it’s a critical piece because it’s a very low-cost way and a very rapid way to bring revenues to the state from these data centers without necessarily, again, building brand new resources.
Robinson Meyer:
What does the future of the southeast energy landscape and electricity landscape look like to you? What direction should Georgia be moving and what direction should Georgia’s neighbors be moving to make sure you’re building in a direction that supports growth and hopefully decarbonization?
Peter Hubbard:
Man, there’s so many things there. I mean, the future is bright. We’re a very sunny state. There’s a lot of untapped solar resources. I’m a big fan of how batteries, battery energy storage systems are like the Swiss army knife of the electric grid, and they can do a lot for us to make more of the investments we’ve already made. I really think we need to continue to look at options to move towards an RTO in the Southeast. I know South Carolina, their legislature studied this. There’s lots of money left on the table by everyone building to their own peak plus reserve margin. So to the extent that we can really start to share resources geographically, let’s take the lessons learned from these last two or three decades of RTOs and take the best of what works and move forward with that. Yeah, there’s more work to be done than just at the public service commissions in the Southeast. We also need governors and legislatures to get on board with some changes as well. But there’s a lot of capacity to tap into and investments that could be made. I’ll just say as well, in Georgia, we have the largest solar manufacturing facility in the Western Hemisphere. We’re also manufacturing EVs and batteries, and we’ve got great workforce developments. So we should put the people and the manufacturers to work and the state building the clean energy future. So I’m pretty bullish on Georgia and the Southeast,
Peter Hubbard:
but we got to kind of get out of our own way and some of the institutional inertia that we have.
Robinson Meyer:
Any more detail you want to give us on what’s standing in the way of an RTO or the institutional inertia?
Peter Hubbard:
Well, the vested interests of monopoly electric utilities, I would say.
Robinson Meyer:
Okay, well, we will have to leave it there. Peter Hubbard, thank you so much for joining us.
Peter Hubbard:
Yeah, it’s great to be with you, Rob.
Robinson Meyer:
And that will do it for us today. Thanks so much for listening. We’ll be back next week with a new episode of Shift Key. I should say, by the way, before you go, I don’t know if you subscribe to Heatmap Daily, which is Heatmap’s newsletter that goes out every afternoon or evening Eastern time here in the U.S. But lately, we’ve been having some fun with it. And I want to encourage you to subscribe to it. I have been writing that newsletter every day. I share an observation, a piece of analysis or a piece of reporting I’ve been thinking about. It’s like an email from me to you every day about the news, about something that’s happened, about just what’s been on my mind, which is either going to sound fun or not fun. But if you made it this far into the podcast, I think you should sign up. It’s kind of like the peer to our morning newsletter, Heatmap AM, written by Alexander Kaufman. It’s a great time to sign up for any of Heatmap’s newsletters. We’re having a lot of fun with them. We’re experimenting. We’re figuring out how they can fit into your day. And if you’ve been receiving Heatmap Daily or any of Heatmap’s newsletters and you have thoughts, you can always let us know what you think about them at editors at heatmap.news. That’s editors at heatmap.news. And you can sign up for Heatmap’s newsletters. In fact, I encourage you to sign up for Heatmap’s newsletters. You should sign up for Heatmap’s newsletters at heatmap.news. That’s heatmap.news. Shift Key is a production, in fact, of Heatmap News. Our editors are Jillian Goodman and Nico Lauricella. Multimedia editing and audio engineering is by Jacob Lambert and by Nick Woodbury. Our music is by Adam Kromelow. Thanks so much for listening. We’ll see you next week.
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Current conditions: Tropical Storm Edouard is making landfall over Texas and Louisiana, bringing flooding as it moves inland • Already facing a southwest monsoon, or habagat, the Philippines is now staring down Tropical Storm Pilandok • Intensifying flooding in South Sudan’s Sudd, the largest wetlands in Africa, is displacing families by the droves.
Oil prices surged north of $90 per barrel Tuesday as the United States exchanged fire with Iran amid the ongoing fight to control the Strait of Hormuz. West Texas Intermediate, the U.S. benchmark, rose nearly 2% to $91.74 per barrel. Europe’s Brent crude measure closed less than 2% higher at just below $97. Murban crude, the yardstick for oil out of Abu Dhabi, soared nearly 8% to over $106 per barrel. In a post on Truth Social, President Donald Trump said he was “not trying to force Iran to the bargaining table.” Rather, “I couldn’t care less if they sign a worthless, to them, agreement,” he continued. “I like our position now much better, with almost total control of the Hormuz Strait, and their economy totally collapsing.” Referring to the U.S. military as the “American terrorists,” the Tasnim News Agency, a semi-official outlet associated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, reported that Tehran “had previously warned and promised” that “the Iranian armed forces will respond decisively and extensively to any aggression against our country’s territory and interests.”
Meanwhile, the Group of 20 — the club of 18 rich economies, plus the European Union and African Union — concluded its latest meeting with a joint statement that affirmed the necessity of central bank independence, called out energy affordability in the age of AI, and admonished “non-market economies” with “excessive and persistent external surpluses” that distort the global market. China didn't like that, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told CNBC, issuing a dissent.
If the sun were blasting onto all the solar panels in China all at once, the overall electricity output would top that of every one of the country’s coal plants firing at the same time. It’s a major milestone, Bloomberg reported, highlighting just how extensively Beijing has glazed its fields, foothills, and urban rooftops with photovoltaic panels in recent years. But the achievement comes with an asterisk. “No matter how you feel about solar or coal as an energy source, CAPACITY is not ENERGY,” energy analyst Nicholas Birkhead wrote in a post on X. “These solar capacity numbers way overstate the energy mix, which is what matters! I really wish we’d all just publish capacity numbers after they’re adjusted for capacity factor.” In other words: As significant as this seems, China is still burning a whole lot of coal more frequently than the midday sun is shining.
Last year, upward of $440 billion flowed into solar worldwide, while $540 billion went to upstream oil drilling. It’s a sign, according to a new report from McKinsey, that “markets are financing both fossil fuels and low-carbon energy simultaneously” and that “the system is not replacing one fuel type with another but rather building them in parallel.” Moving forward, the consultancy cautioned, policymakers and planners need to assess not just the cheapest available options for new generation but what best supports the performance of the entire energy system. Just look at what Ontario did when deciding to move forward with what’s expected to be North America’s first small modular reactors. Instead of looking at the upfront cost of the generating assets alone, the province-owned Ontario Power Generation considered the whole cost of transmission and backup generation that would have come in the fine print of choosing wind turbines over nuclear reactors. The example, as my colleague Matthew Zeitlin wrote, highlights the problems with levelized cost of energy, the widely used measure of the overnight costs of building new generation assets: “Everyone’s favorite energy metric is wrong.”
A long-awaited California bill covering state policy on wildfires, insurance, and utilities collapsed in the state legislature Tuesday. The proposal, called Senate Bill 492, had been the product of intense negotiations between legislative leaders and Governor Gavin Newsom. The deal was released on Saturday and included provisions to speed up payouts to victims of fires and nibbled around the edges of the vast payouts California utilities are forced to make to insurers when their equipment sparks a blaze. The legislators fractured because it failed to address the core issue of California’s strict rules around wildfire liability and insurance, where insurers can sue utilities to recover damages when, for example, a transformer or power line ignites dried brush. Instead, the deal would have tweaked the system, making it harder for insurers to sell claims to investors, pushing out payouts to victims faster, and limiting utility executive bonuses when their companies’ equipment causes a fire. These payouts can drag utilities into bankruptcy, as happened with Pacific Gas & Electric in 2019 following a series of wildfires, and end up elevating electricity rates. “The only solution is to return to fix the entire problem, not part of it,” Newsom said in a statement to Politico.
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Fervo Energy’s stock soared nearly 30% on Tuesday after the next-generation geothermal giant announced its biggest deal yet, to sell nearly 400 megawatts of electricity to Google. When Fervo starts up its Cape Station project in southwestern Utah sometime in 2028, the facility will become the world’s largest enhanced geothermal plant. In enhanced geothermal plants, the underground heat harnessed for power production comes from artificial wells drilled with fracking technology rather than naturally forming subterranean reservoirs of hot water. If Houston-based Fervo can bring down the cost of its drilling, the technology could enable construction of geothermal power stations in vastly more locations than the industry previously believed possible. “Even though right now we don’t have clarity yet on how this will serve a data center … we know that it will be a foundational building block of power generation for a data center presence in Utah,” Lucia Tian, Google’s director of advanced energy technologies, told The Wall Street Journal, which broke news of the deal.
Next-generation nuclear startups, meanwhile, are facing a looming challenge over plutonium. The material, which doesn’t occur naturally, was largely produced in the 20th century for weapons production. Now, however, developers of novel kinds of reactors are angling to use some of the world’s 571 metric tons of stockpiled plutonium for energy production. In a feature on the topic published this week, the Financial Times outlined the split between countries such as the U.S., which I told you in May was giving out plutonium to startups, and the United Kingdom, which opted to bury its material. “It’s like a car that runs on diamonds. Plutonium reserves are about the same size as diamonds around the world, which gives you an idea of how rare this precious element is,” a French official told the newspaper.

The Department of Energy is pumping $12 million into developing and manufacturing technology for solar panels that can be used in space. In keeping with the Trump administration’s skeptical position on the weather limits of wind and solar, the agency pointed out that, “unlike terrestrial solar energy systems, which are subject to regulate interruption by weather and the Earth’s rotation, space PV can deliver near-constant power.” The funding is aimed at projects that will enhance the durability and cost of solar cells for space and develop manufacturing methods that can provide “innovative, high-volume” processes for mass production. “The next frontier for solar PV power generation is in space,” Audrey Robertson, the assistant secretary of energy, said in a statement. “As demand for space-grade PV skyrockets, this investment will establish American leadership in next-generation, space-based PV, bolster our national security, and enhance our economic competitiveness.”
Investors are putting big G’s behind VPPs. Virtual power plants promise to ease stress on grids and direct power that might otherwise have been wasted toward all the new demand coming online. Amid the scramble to supply power to data centers, money is flowing into companies that can harness those distributed assets. On Tuesday, the VPP software maker Light announced a $46 million Series A. That same day, the British distributed energy giant Octopus Energy closed its deal to buy a majority stake in the VPP provider Uplight.
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Robinson Meyer:
Hello, it’s Wednesday, September 2. I cannot believe it is already September. Last month, it became clear we’re witnessing a new kind of natural gas build out in the United States. Just think of the announcements we got in a few days in the middle of August. First, around August 11, the market intelligence service Cleanview identified that Amazon was behind a 7.6-gigawatt natural gas plant in Texas called Gigawatt Ranch. So just for comparison, that is huge. That would be the country’s biggest natural gas power plant. In fact, it would be the country’s biggest power plant, period. It’s about half a gigawatt bigger than the Grand Coulee Dam in Washington State, the largest power plant in America for like half a century. Then, just a week later, we learned that OpenAI and Nvidia are working together on a 9.2-gigawatt gas plant in Ohio.
Robinson Meyer:
That plant would obviously dwarf the Grand Coulee Dam. It would be the biggest power plant in America by far. But it would also even rival the Jebel Ali Power and Desalination Facility in Dubai as the world’s largest natural gas power plant of any kind. It would be a truly gargantuan facility. My colleague Emily Pontecorvo recently tried to identify the scale of the ongoing gas buildout. And she found a number of power plants, of projects that I think weren’t on my radar, weren’t generally on people’s radar. It’s been interesting because we’ve been getting a sense of the scale of this buildout at the same time that it’s become clear that the data center buildout is enormously unpopular in itself. If you’ve been reading Heatmap News, you know that according to a Heatmap Pro and Embold research poll conducted also in early August, 75% of Americans are now opposed to a data center being built near where they live, including a majority of Democrats, Republicans, independents, rural voters, urban voters, suburban voters, basically any demographic you can think of. They don’t seem to want a data center near them right now.
Robinson Meyer:
I recently sat down with Emily, a Heatmap founding staff writer, to talk about her reporting on the gas buildout, how she identified the 10 largest gas power projects now under construction or being permitted or being proposed in the United States, and how to think about this messy period. Also, how to think about the fact that it’s tech companies, who often have some of the most ambitious climate policies in America, who are now behind, a natural gas buildout on the scale that could actually increase the country’s, greenhouse gas emissions from the power sector, or at least increase them compared to the baseline. How should we think about these net zero commitments from companies like Amazon, Microsoft, Google, when often it’s those same companies that are now building some of the biggest fossil fuel projects ever proposed in the United States? And what would a good net zero commitment or climate commitment look like from those companies? We get into all of it in this conversation. It was a really generative, really interesting conversation for me. I’m Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News, and it’s all coming up on this episode of Shift Key. Emily Pontecorvo is here. Welcome to Shift Key.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Thanks, Rob. Glad to be here.
Robinson Meyer:
So you recently wrote a piece for us about the scale of the natural gas buildout in the United States that’s happening to service data centers and to service AI. And I think it’s quite interesting because we will talk about this, but I don’t know if we understood just how large this buildout was going to be as recently as the beginning of this year.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah, I think that’s right.
Robinson Meyer:
What I think back to is, we did our poll, our annual poll of climate insiders, which are kind of sources and experts and former officials and chief sustainability officers. And we asked them at the end of last year, do you think the AI build out is going to significantly slow down decarbonization? And most people said no. And at the time, I don’t know how I would have answered, but ... I feel like we’re much closer to a place where the AI buildout is slowing down decarbonization now than we were even eight months ago. And so just to start off, can you put the scale of this gas buildout in context for us? So how many plants have been proposed? How many of these plants are going to happen? What do we understand about the scale of this next generation of gas that is being planned across the United States right now?
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah, so I will say to start that a lot of this information is very slippery because there’s been so many announcements. The announcements are constantly kind of changing. And so we have some numbers, but they’re definitely estimates. So last week, the Global Energy Monitor, which is this group that tracks oil and gas projects all over the world, they put out a report saying that they counted 189 gigawatts of natural gas plants in the U.S. that have either been announced, that are in a pre-construction phase, like they have some permits, or that are under construction. And that is nearly double the amount that they found at the end of last year, which was about 97 gigawatts.
Robinson Meyer:
And is that entirely behind the meter plants, or are those any kind of natural gas plant being planned across the United States, kind of for any purpose on the grid or off the grid?
Emily Pontecorvo:
So these numbers, 189 gigawatts up from 97 six months ago, those are projects that are specifically being motivated by data centers. So some of them are being built on the grid that utilities are building to kind of meet new demand room data centers. And a lot of them are off-grid projects that are being directly tied to data centers.
Robinson Meyer:
And I guess you’ve kind of alluded to this already, but like, So it’s almost 200 gigawatts of gas plants coming online. Do we know, like, how large is the existing U.S. gas fleet?
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah, so I, you know, had to look this up for this story. But as of last year, the existing natural gas generation capacity in the U.S. was 512 gigawatts.
Robinson Meyer:
Wow. It’s like 40% of the gas fleet we’re going to add to our existing fleet. Like, this is not a small change to the size of the gas fleet. This is like a major expansion of U.S. generation capacity.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah. And the thing is, the numbers I gave earlier, those are just projects that have some relationship to the data center build out. The report also gave an estimate of just total natural gas generation that’s being planned across the country. And that number is 378 gigawatts. So it’s almost, you know, nearly doubling what we have today. And what was really interesting was I went back and looked at when was a lot of the existing natural gas generation built? Was there a time in the past where we ... Natural gas plants this quickly. And there’s like a pretty clear kind of analogous time period in the early 2000s where we built, what was it, like nearly, it was like more than 150 gigawatts in just four years. I saw different estimates. It was like maybe closer to 200. But that was a very different build out where this time the plants are much, much bigger. And so many of them are being built off-grid.
Robinson Meyer:
It is actually crazy to me the scale of the build-out that is not being built to service AI, first of all, because I would have assumed that basically the number, that upfront number, was basically all the gas because all of it would be going to AI. So the fact that there’s another, what, 150, 140 gigawatts going to just general generation is pretty crazy.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah, I will say it is possible that some of that is duplicative. Like I was talking to Brendan Pierpont from Energy Innovation. He is on their electricity team, and he was pointing out that they’re seeing that in a lot of cases, the developers will go to the utilities first and ask for a certain amount of capacity. And then when they see how long that’s going to take, then they’ll kind of turn to an off-grid project. And so it’s possible that both of those are getting included in this data, but it’s so hard to really pinpoint what the numbers are.
Robinson Meyer:
So how should we think about these 189 gigawatts? Because as you said at the top of this episode, like there’s a haziness to all of this because sometimes the same gigawatt, so to speak, of demand gets requested in multiple different venues, either in different grids or at different locations, or they ask for it on grid and then they try to build it off grid. At the same time, One through line of this AI story since the beginning has been the difficulty of getting any kind of bead on demand and on the scale of demand. And it seems entirely possible to me that these 189 gigawatts are not going to all get built, but that we are going to add 189 gigawatts because maybe there’s another 100 gigawatts of demand that’s waiting to be requested. And, you know, if we build 70% of these requested gigawatts and 30% of those requested gigawatts, we’re still hitting 190 gigawatts, we’re still hitting 200 gigawatts. And so how do you think about the likelihood that this demand becomes like real capacity in the economy?
Emily Pontecorvo:
I think that the demand is real. I don’t know that 189 gigawatts of natural gas fired power plants, and especially the particular list that this report comes up with, I don’t know that those are real. But I think between data centers and a lot of other kinds of demand that we’re putting on the grid, air conditioning, electric vehicles, manufacturing, like absolutely 189 gigawatts is real. I think that the really big question is how real are these natural gas projects and how quickly will they get built? What kinds of equipment, what kinds of technology they’ll use? So
Emily Pontecorvo:
I basically went through this exercise of trying to identify the 10 biggest projects. And my initial list and my final list are not the same because as I was like researching each individual one, everything felt like sand slipping through my fingers. Like I would see one press release and then one, you know, news article with rumors about XYZ. And then the company’s website said one thing and the permit said another thing. And it was really hard to get a good grasp of, here’s a developer with a project that they say can meet five gigawatts of demand someday. And yet, in the near term, they’re actually just going to build 150 megawatts.
Emily Pontecorvo:
And so, like, should we think about that? Right, exactly.
Robinson Meyer:
This is the case for the OpenAI facility. I wrote about this for Heatmap Daily, our daily afternoon newsletter that everyone should hopefully be subscribed to. But there is this big OpenAI Department of Energy data center that is being planned in Ohio. It’s being built on a kind of ex-nuclear site that the DOE owns. And I think one of the interesting things, I mean, there’s a lot of interesting things about this project. But first of all, it’s massive. It’s nearly 10 gigawatts. It would rival the largest natural gas power plants in the world. I think it’s going to be right now.
Robinson Meyer:
Neck and neck. If the whole thing gets built, it would be right around the same size as the Jabal Ali power and desalination gas plant in Dubai. And it’s all going to go to an open AI data center. It’s backstopped by Nvidia. We learned that last month, it’s really going to increase the likelihood that this facility gets built out. But what’s interesting is that the natural gas plant is going to be built on federal land, on Department of Energy land. It’s going to be owned by the DOE and financed by Japan as part of this Trump-Japan trade deal. Now, I think there’s still a lot of questions about how much this gets built. But to your point, what’s difficult about thinking about this plant is that they want to eventually build more than nine gigawatts of power. They plan to initially build 800 megawatts of gas, which is a lot of gas, but not like a Grand Coulee Dam’s worth of gas. That is a very large gas plant, but it is not a unprecedentedly large gas plant. And how do you assess the scale of that demand, right? Do you think of it as an 800 megawatt gas plant that could literally grow 10x over the next few years? Or do you think of it as a nine and a half gigawatt gas plant, and therefore the largest power generation project in American history?
Emily Pontecorvo:
Right. I mean, so there’s like so many projects that are in this data, that are in that 189 gigawatts, like Fermi America, the big project in Texas.
Robinson Meyer:
The Rick Perry associated project, yes.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yes. And so they’re also aspiring to even bigger than the OpenAI project. I believe their stated total power generation for the site is like 17 gigawatts, 11 gigawatts of natural gas, plus a bunch of nuclear and some other stuff. Just completely pie in the sky numbers. they already have a permit for the 11 gigawatts of natural gas though or actually no i’m sorry they have a permit for the first six and submitted a permit for the next five but
Robinson Meyer:
Big plant that’s still a really big.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Plant it’s a really big plant and yeah there’s all these projects in the list that have these huge numbers but then what’s actually happening is they’re being built in phases and the first phase might just be a couple hundred megawatts or one gigawatt or between one and two is what I’ve mostly seen. And so whether that first phase is successfully built will determine whether the additional phases are built will determine how much of that 189 gigawatts.
Robinson Meyer:
Right. Well, and also like if the AI boom is still going strong in 2028 and 2029 and 2030, then they can keep building gas to service it. Who knows what the economy will be like by then? You and I will work for AI map or something.
Robinson Meyer:
Can we talk a little bit about like, why are companies building gas? Clean energy advocates talk a lot about how wind and solar, especially solar and batteries are the cheapest source of electricity. I would say when you talk to electricity traders, too, like when you talk to people in the market every day, they also talk about how cheap solar is. So why are companies building gas and not solar to service these facilities?
Emily Pontecorvo:
So there’s like, a lot of different reasons that are all kind of coming together. Maybe the biggest one of all are the bottlenecks to connecting to the grid, the transmission bottlenecks. And that’s really pushing a lot of these companies to look for off-grid solutions.
Robinson Meyer:
And specifically just to like play that out, because they cannot site enough acreage of solar on the site where they would put a data center to generate the power they need, which means they need a grid hookup. But if they need to generate their own power on their own acreage, then you need an extremely energy-dense form of generation, and that means you go to gas. Right, right.
Emily Pontecorvo:
And then I think that’s coming together with a bunch of political factors, like the Trump administration has a strong interest in pushing natural gas. They have gotten rid of the tax credits for clean energy. They’ve made renewable energy, wind and solar, really hard to build with all of these permitting freezes and permitting obstacles for renewables. I think another element is just like the extreme speed and kind of urgency that AI companies are expanding at and demanding power at, which I guess kind of circles back to the interconnection issue and just not wanting to wait to be connected to the grid. And then the last one that I think is important is this issue with affordability in data centers where people are really worried about the build out, increasing their energy bills. And a lot of data center developers are pushing this idea that by bringing their own generation, by building these gas power plants on site, not connecting to the grid, they’re kind of putting their project in a box and ensuring that it doesn’t have any impact on regular rate payers.
Robinson Meyer:
It’s interesting to me, the ratepayer protection pledge from Trump pledges that, data centers won’t make electricity rates go up. And the solution to this for a lot of these companies, as you were saying, when they look at the set of constraints that they’re working within that include acreage, cost, regulation, local grid interconnection capacity, speed to power, they solve this set of constraints by going with gas. And I mean, I think there’s a few interesting aspects about it. First of all, it’s not clear to me that it makes data centers any more popular. He recently did polling that made a lot of news that found that 75% of Americans at this point would oppose the data center being built near where they live. I’m not convinced that adding a fossil fuel power plant to a proposed data center project makes it any more popular because it’s taking a quasi-industrial site and turning it into a full-on industrial site. But that being said, one of the promises made by adding gas generation at the data center is that by generating your own electricity, you’re not increasing local demand for electricity and therefore not increasing anyone’s rates. Now...
Robinson Meyer:
There’s a whole separate conversation to have here about whether adding marginal large-scale loads to electricity grids outside of markets like the Mid-Atlantic, which are structured in a particular way where that jacks up everyone’s rates. There’s a whole separate question and discussion to have here about basically, if you add large customers to an electricity grid because of how electricity rates are designed, that may actually bring down everyone’s bills. But I don’t want to have that conversation now. But like, it’s not clear to me that they are actually like, companies build gas to protect everyone’s electricity rates from going up nearby. And whether or not that is a good idea, and whether or not that is true, what gets left out of that conversation is whether they’re protecting everyone else’s gas rates. And the natural gas system is also a fixed system. And unlike the electricity system where you’re moving electrons around, so to speak, and you can re-rate lines, you can up-rate existing transmission lines, like you are moving molecules around with natural gas. And one thing I have wondered is like, if we’re adding gigawatts and gigawatts of gas generation to an existing gas grid.
Robinson Meyer:
Are we about to see natural gas prices go up around the country, especially when you take into effect that LNG demand is also about to double over the next few years? And so there’s like we were already worried about LNG export driving up natural gas rates. Now we’re adding LNG and a nine gigawatt scale natural gas power plant is basically like a medium sized LNG plant’s worth of demand. You’re just exporting carbon dioxide into the sky and producing electricity right so like hyperscalers can protect electricity rates by building local gas generation it’s not clear to me they can protect gas rates.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah I, I mean we’ve talked about this. I, I think it’s a ... I did talk a little bit about this with folks when i was reporting on this gas build out, and I think the natural gas international natural gas market is complicated, and it’s not like there’s like a one-to-one, you know, increased demand here prices go up here…
Robinson Meyer:
It’s also like when you talk about natural gas pricing like what drives natural gas pricing in the united states is like number one weather and then like ... dot dot dot ... like a gap as big as the grand canyon and then number two like, local supply constraints and then number three is like local demand you know like there’s the number one thing driving natural gas rates remains weather but I don’t know whether these.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Things wonder yeah like if any of these mega projects get built to this the scale that they are trying to and like will they be fighting with lng exports for capacity it’s hard to it’s hard to imagine
Robinson Meyer:
Of these 10 projects, like what surprised you most? Or what project kind of wound up on the list that you did not expect to see on the list at the beginning?
Emily Pontecorvo:
So, you know, going back to a few things that we’ve talked about, like, why is this happening? Why are why gas plants? There were two projects on the list that I was surprised to learn about that were, I think, have been sort of overshadowed by the OpenAI project. But there are two additional natural gas mega projects that are coming out of this U.S.-Japan trade deal that are going to be financed by Japan and owned by the U.S.
Robinson Meyer:
I think they’re financed by Japan, owned by SoftBank’s new energy subsidiary.
Emily Pontecorvo:
In this case, SoftBank is not involved. So NextEra is building a big project in Pennsylvania. They haven’t said where yet. And a big project in Texas, neither is like has a data center attached to it. It’s a little bit unclear whether there will be a data center attached to it. The Pennsylvania one might connect to the grid. But nonetheless, these deals have been advertised as being sort of motivated by increased data center demand. And so just going back to what we were talking about before, like, I do think that a significant amount of this buildup is the Trump administration wanting to build gas plants. Like, that’s nearly 20 between these three projects, the OpenAI one and the two NextEra projects. That’s nearly 20 gigawatts of natural gas fired capacity that the Trump administration is behind through this trade deal.
Robinson Meyer:
That’s crazy. Do we know for the 180 gigawatts built-to-service AI, for the hundreds of gigawatts that we think might be coming online for these 20 gigawatts, do we know what ... Kind of power plant they’re going to build. Because as we’ve discussed on previous episodes of Shift Key, there’s several different kinds of gas plants that are being built. The most efficient tend to be these combined cycle plants, which use the exhaust from generating electricity to then generate more electricity. And then that can kind of scale up through a peaker plant all the way to just basically now people are running jet engines to generate electricity. That matters a lot to the emissions profile of these plants because it matters a lot to their energy efficiency in just a very kind of classical sense. Do we have any sense of how efficient this nearly 190 gigawatts could be?
Emily Pontecorvo:
No, we don’t. In the case of these three projects that came out of the U.S.-Japan trade deal, it’s a little bit fuzzy still what technologies they’ll be using. I think in the case of the OpenAI plant, they said that they have the initial generation equipment secured, which maybe that just leads me to think that it’s combined cycle turbines since those are in shorter supply.
Robinson Meyer:
The hardest to get. Or maybe it means that they absolutely don’t have combined cycle turbines. Maybe, maybe.
Emily Pontecorvo:
But in going through this list, what I learned is that like, yeah, a lot of these projects are the ones that are permitted where, you know, you get really specific information about exactly what technology they’re using. A lot of them are using these combustion engines, just putting like dozens of them on site and,
Robinson Meyer:
Let’s ask the question that I think is nearest and dearest to both of our hearts. Like, what does this mean for U.S. emissions? Do we have any ability to estimate what a gas build out of the scale, what does this mean for U.S. emissions?
Emily Pontecorvo:
I tried to answer that question for this story, and I think it’s one that I’m going to continue to look into. It’s really hard to say at this point because so much of it is speculative. We don’t know, you know, is a third of this real? Is half of it real? Will it all eventually be real? What technologies will they end up using? How much of it will be on-grid versus off-grid? Like all of those questions will impact what it means in the long run. I think the best kind of estimate that I found was to look at the Rhodium Group’s taking stock report. They just put out their latest version of this last month. And this report they put out annually, it basically looks at, you know, if we take current policy, energy, technology trends, and we project them out into the future, what happens to emissions. So they found power sector emissions could decline 24 to 48% by 2040.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Compared to today, yeah. So, you know, that maybe it’s hard to tell, like, is that good? Is that bad? That is a significantly worse outcome than what they found two years ago when they did the same exercise and the Inflation Reduction Act was kind of in full swing. At that point, their estimate was power sector emissions would decline by at least 42%, so near the high end of the current estimate, by 2035, so five years earlier. Both of those reports did take into account lots of data center demand growth, but they did not, neither of them took into account the potential for a lot of that demand growth to be met with off-grid natural gas combustion engines. And so, you know, those are much worse from a mission standpoint. And the other thing, when I spoke to Ben King, one of the authors, and he was saying, you know, not only are these less efficient systems, these combustion engines and simple cycle turbines, but putting them off-grid also, they’ll be running around the clock. Whereas like if they were on the grid, you have this amazingly efficient system that’s, they’re being called upon when they’re needed, but they’re not necessarily...
Robinson Meyer:
Right, you have price-based dispatch.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah, yeah.
Robinson Meyer:
What does this mean for corporate net zero goals? And to what extent is the AI high boom kind of turning corporate net zero goals into a dead letter?
Emily Pontecorvo:
So, you know, all of these companies, the biggest AI hyperscalers, Microsoft, Google, Meta, Amazon, those four specifically, they are still the biggest clean energy buyers in the world. Like Amazon has funded, you know, has more clean energy PPAs than any other company in the world. At the same time, Amazon is behind this natural gas power plant in Texas that’s going to be 7.65 gigawatts, depending on what else gets built, could be the biggest natural gas plant in the U.S. So it’s really hard.
Robinson Meyer:
For about a week, we thought it was the biggest natural gas plant in the U.S. And then this OpenAI project got announced.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Right, right. So yeah, it’s very hard to square these two sides of the coin where like these companies, on the one hand, seem to be totally throwing out their net zero goals and just trying to build as quickly as possible with whatever they can get. And on the other hand, they are still publicly stating their commitment to the net zero goal and still publicly signing power purchase agreements with clean energy. I don’t know that we have a good accounting yet of how much gas are they helping get built versus how much renewables. And I don’t know if that exercise is possible, but if you know, reach out to me. But there is something sort of absurd or like it just feels so implausible that these companies could still say we’re committed to go net zero and meanwhile be supporting these natural gas mega projects.
Robinson Meyer:
How many of these companies are still pledging to hit net zero by 2030?
Emily Pontecorvo:
Those four, the big, like Amazon, Microsoft, Meta, Google, the thing is
Robinson Meyer:
They all still have 2030 net zero goals.
Emily Pontecorvo:
They’re either 2030 or 2035. But I mean, on one hand, Google calls it a moonshot. And they have language like that, where they’re like, this is our guiding principle. This is our aspiration. But even that if this is your guiding principle how is it guiding you to support it
Robinson Meyer:
We did get to the moon, do you know what i mean a lot companies the government does this now too like public sector organizations they use moonshot to refer to something they want to do but are not probably going to do but in fact the whole thing about the moonshot was we did in fact get to the moon.
Emily Pontecorvo:
The thing is, like, is it still possible for a company like Microsoft or Google to hit net zero emissions by whatever date they choose on paper? Probably. That will maybe depend on the corporate standards that rise up in the next couple of years that determine what they are allowed to say on paper and how we account for certain things like carbon removal and clean energy purchases, those accounting rules can really change what these companies say they’ve accomplished. Will they have achieved net zero in the true spirit of trying to get the whole world to go net zero? I think that seems a lot less likely.
Robinson Meyer:
Well, this is, I mean, you’ve written about this too, but I guess what all this suggests to me is that corporate net zero goals and arguably even national net zero goals are not even the right thing to be training on because, and I’m not trying to make excuses for the tech companies here, because I completely agree with you that this gas build-out is not at all in line with their climate commitments. However if they were to basically give up on their climate commitments, and pull out their investments in all these other technologies that are crucial for global decarbonization and those technologies never got developed that would be a tragedy, like that would be really bad and to some degree if google, or microsoft with their investments that they’re making to meet their net zero goal, were to seed, a technology that is crucial to overall global decarbonization. To some degree, that is more important than whether Google is able to make a zero appear on its books in 2035 or 2040.
Robinson Meyer:
And I don’t mean to be too glib about this, but I do think we actually accept this logic in the case of other industries. I would argue, I think climate advocates would argue pretty forcefully that like the coal that was an input into the Chinese solar industry ultimately at this point has been overwhelmed by the emissions reductions from the Chinese solar industry, number one. But it was number two, it was like important because now we have the Chinese solar industry, which is able to produce solar panels at this unprecedented scale for global decarbonization. And setting aside the particular kind of security implications of that, it just seems to me that like, It is bad that these companies are doing this, but it would in some ways be worse for them to kind of stop.
Emily Pontecorvo:
I don’t know why one precludes the other.
Robinson Meyer:
I mean, well, just because I think that the charge here is not hypocrisy. I would rather they remain hypocritical, but doing something for net zero. I would like them to stop emitting. But if they are going to emit, I don’t mind that they’re hypocrites, I guess is maybe what I’m saying.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Sure. I mean, I do think that there is a potential problem with using net zero as the kind of defining goal.
Robinson Meyer:
Yes, yes. Right. In fact, the goal is a bad one.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah, I mean, I would love for these companies to come up with a new set of commitments that continue to motivate them to make the kind of transformative investments that they’re making, but that don’t lead people to believe that achieving this balance of inputs and outputs is not only feasible, but is like for one company by itself to do that is important.
Emily Pontecorvo:
And it’s much more important to look at the kind of global picture.
Robinson Meyer:
How do you think about this whole build out in context of climate? I mean, at this point, Heatmap has written extensively about the unpopularity of data centers. It’s clear that some people hate data centers because of their emissions impact, but it doesn’t seem to be driving that trend. Though in some ways that trend is so big, so generalized, and so amorphous in some ways that like everything is kind of driving it. How has your recent reporting made you think about the AI build out broadly?
Emily Pontecorvo:
I mean, I’d come back to the fact that we really don’t know the scale of it yet, because there are so many unknowns. So much of this development is speculative. How much natural gas will actually get built? We don’t know. I think there are some other kind of exciting unknowns, like will we be able to speed up the development of geothermal and some nuclear and some other cleaner sources that could maybe displace some of this gas? And then I also started to think about some other questions, which are like, in a future administration that wanted to do something about climate or a future Congress that had more capacity to do something about emissions, what kind of new constituencies does this build? Like, I wonder if, you know, in the past, companies like Microsoft and Google have been supporters of emissions regulation and clean energy policy. But if they suddenly have all this natural gas on their books, are they going to still support regulating emissions? Like, they might have a vested interest in fighting natural gas power plant controls.
Robinson Meyer:
It’s been so fascinating watching the political backlash to data centers. And I think especially because data centers threaten to be this massive emissions bomb, right? But also because that doesn’t really seem to be what the backlash is about. And I am filled with a little bit of a sense of foreboding watching this because I know the scale of infrastructure change that is going to have to happen to decarbonize. And it is smaller than the data center build out. Now, I think we have a lot more to offer people in some ways than AI does. But I don’t know that, for instance, the faces of that decarbonization infrastructure change will be any more trusted than the faces of this infrastructure build out. And so, you know, Tom Perriello, former congressman, actually was in climate philanthropy for a long time.
Robinson Meyer:
Was a fairly important figure in climate philanthropy, is now running for Congress again. His odds aren’t great, but he’s running in this Republican district near Charlottesville, Virginia. And he just came out with an ad that was against transmission lines. It was against a transmission line. And it was also kind of against data centers because there’s an unpopular transmission line in his district. And listen, he’s a politician, right? He’s going to do what he needs to do to win that election. But like, if Tom Perriello, of all people, is willing to nod along to the threats of transmission lines, which are non-existent and, in fact, essential to the energy transition. I can’t look at the data center backlash and be entirely like, yes, only good can happen, to paraphrase our president.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah. I mean, the one thing that I, when I think about comparing, if we didn’t have this crazy data center build out, and instead what we had was a huge surge of electric vehicles and heat pumps that created this energy crisis that, you know, where we needed to build a lot of power plants. I think the main difference in those two scenarios is the speed of it. Like, less the scale. I think the scale is somewhat equivalent, but it would at least have happened or it can still happen in the it might have been, people wouldn’t have been bombarded with a project in their backyard in every county in the country.
Robinson Meyer:
That’s not happening. And there’s an interesting angle here. We’ve talked about it on previous shows, but we always expected load growth to come back in the 2030s. In fact, we kind of need it to come back in the 2030s if we’re anywhere close to hitting climate goals. And if the economy not only decarbonizes, but modernizes in the way that we would like it to modernize, it will require load growth to go up. But I wonder if climate advocates are a little lucky that the people eating, the initial wave of load growth, the people who are kind of the clarions of load growth, as it were, are not decarbonization industries, but the big tech companies, which already had their own PR issues.
Emily Pontecorvo:
I don’t know. Well, a second ago, you were wondering if this doesn’t bode poorly for...
Robinson Meyer:
I think it ... I don’t know. I don’t know. I managed to feel bad about it either way. We’re going to have to leave it there. Emily Panacorvo, thanks so much for joining us on Shift Key.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Thanks, Rob.
Robinson Meyer:
And that will do it for us today. I hope you enjoy the dwindling days of your summer. Remember to stick around after the show for a conversation between Heatmap Labs and the sponsor of this episode, Verse. It should be really, really interesting. Until then, Shift Key is a production of Heatmap News. Our editors are Jillian Gibbon and Nico Loricello. Multimedia editing and audio production is by Jacob Lambert and by Nick Woodbury. Our music’s by Adam Cromelow. Thanks so much for listening. See you next time.
Mike Munsell:
My name is Mike Munsell, and I’m the Vice President of Partnerships with Heatmap News. In my last conversation with Seyed Madaeni, we talked about Versus’ business model helping data centers and large energy consumers connect to power. In today’s conversation, we chat about Versus’ recent Series B, and we go deep on speed to power. Let’s talk about speed to power. Why is everyone talking about this concept today, and how is Versus helping to accelerate that deployment? Very good question. And I think this is the billion dollar question, if not a trillion dollar question. So as we know, AI is compute, and compute needs power. So the first order of business, if you’re, I’m just going to use an example, if you’re developing 100-megawatt data center, the size of these data centers are measured in units of power. Let’s say for the sake of the argument when we talk about 100 megawatt data center if you apply for interconnection meaning that you want to power your facility so your chips start running and your AI models start training that takes a long time the reason that it takes a long time is utilities need to do planning studies they’re basically answering two questions one is there enough energy at the grid level to serve your consumption and your demand? Second, if there is, is there enough transmission and distribution wires to get the power to your location?
Seyed Madaeni:
Given this enormous amount of growth, the answer usually fails on both fronts. And as days go by and our grid becomes more and more saturated, the wait times are going to be even longer and longer because the world of power and energy doesn’t move at the speed of AI. It takes years to build transmission lines. It takes years to build power facilities. So how do we solve this problem? Is there a magic wand that we can use to accelerate the time for in a connection of these large loads the answer is yes in a nutshell is to bring your own generation to the mix and that is by deploying behind the meter assets behind the meter assets that are capable of
Seyed Madaeni:
Charging up energy giving it back to the grid like energy storage or solar or nimble gas plants. So really the solution is to pair your data center with these large physical assets such that when you are being studied by the local utility, you’re not no longer seen as a 100 megawatt fixed load that consumes electricity around the clock. You have the capability to shape and form your energy profile. But those physical assets, they’re not just going to drive themselves. They need software. Ironically, they need AI to solve the AI compute problem. And that’s where we come in. We control these assets on a second by second basis to, again, make sure the needs of the utilities are met, the needs of the data center is met. And then plus, we can give back to the grid and be grid grid citizens by participating electricity markets and really trying to offer that capacity to suppress electricity prices. That’s the solution that’s really being adopted. And we play a role in kind of controlling those assets on a 10, 15 year basis.
Mike Munsell:
And I saw you recently completed a Series B of which Nvidia and Google Ventures were big backers. Can you talk more about that and why Nvidia and Google are invested in versus success? And is it related to that speed to power equation?
Seyed Madaeni:
We just closed the Series B round. It was led by Bessemer Venture Partners. They’re an amazing group of folks, have more than a century of experience in investing. You’re absolutely right. Nvidia backed us. Also, Google Ventures, which led our Series A round. They also took part in our Series B round. Essentially, the value prop that we have in the investment thesis that these investors try to pursue is, can Verse be the entity to solve the grid problem so we can be good grid citizens and also simultaneously win the AI race? That was the fundamental investment thesis. and we managed to prove that we are the team, we are the platform. And as a result, they did participate. Now we’re working alongside Nvidia to integrate with their DSX platform and kind of be that part of the standard reference design, which we are working towards. Obviously, Google has a big need of data centers. Plus, we’re also serving a lot of hyperscalers and we have a deep backlog in the queue to kind of help contribute to bring these CapEx online.
Seyed Madaeni:
But we also have a very good angle that we can look back and not only we solve the problem, but we also help towards sustainability because believe it or not, solar and storage is the quickest and cheapest solution that you can deploy. We’re at the moment of time that CFOs like clean energy because it’s economic and clean, which gives us momentum to try to solve this problem.
Mike Munsell:
Let’s get into that. What is VERS deploying today? And what does the system look like when you integrate it with a data center?
Seyed Madaeni:
We as a company, we are AI software driven. So we are not really developing the physical projects. That requires financing, that requires a balance sheet, that requires expertise in EPC and construction. That’s why we have partners like Calibrand and And they’re top notch, not from the kind of physical development, but understanding how the systems work, holding the hands of these customers to understand what the value proposition is. Our work is mostly on the software side. Just think about it when you build an amazing car. That car needs a driver. And in this case, these assets need a driver, but it can’t be a human driver because you’re making decisions every millisecond, whether to fire up the battery, curtail the solar. Draw from the grid so we’re you need a autonomous self-driving car and this is like self-driving assets so ironically we’re using ai to train our models to control these assets but that’s the role that we play and in terms of the underlying assets that we’re seeing a lot of lithium-ion batteries systems from tesla influence and etc.
Seyed Madaeni:
A lot of solar and some nimble gas generators that can and be part of the mix and the solution. But we have integrations with a lot of these OEMs, SCADA systems, meters to be able to effectively control.
Mike Munsell:
And you mentioned Calibrand. Can you talk more about your partnership with them and how they’re helping you deploy today?
Seyed Madaeni:
Yeah. So basically, as we announced in our Series B, I would look at them, the OG of energy infrastructure development, and they’ve made significant progress in this field. So they’re deploying assets, they’re financing assets, they’re their owner and operator. And our partnership, our involvement is on the software side because this is not a software and AI problem. You can’t build amazing software like the one that we have and just use it up in the air. You need to deploy it on physical assets. And it takes a whole team to do that from people that understand hardware, understand financing, understanding project development, and people who understand AI models and software platforms, we fit in more of the latter camp.
Mike Munsell:
Can you talk more about your project pipeline right now and maybe how your Series B is helping to deploy technology faster, perhaps?
Seyed Madaeni:
Yeah, so basically our backlog is pretty deep. We are in the business of managing assets at the end of the day. So we have gigawatts on the management. We’ll soon come out with some press releases in terms of showcasing what those numbers are. And then our backlog, it’s on the kind of plain vanilla contract management, utility bill management, a lot of enterprises ranging from retail to hyperscalers to manufacturing, steel companies. But on the dispatch intelligence, which is part of ARIA, we have a deep backlog and commitment from a lot of blue chip hyperscalers that need speed to power tomorrow. So really, our mix of customer base is, I would say, enterprises that spend $100 million and above on electricity, which by frame of reference, some of them spend billions of dollars. So that’s really our target ICP. And so far, the traction has been amazing.
Mike Munsell:
That wraps up today’s conversation with Sayed Medini, CEO of Verse. Stay tuned after the next episode of Shift Key to learn more about Verse’s next five years and what Sayed believes is needed for U.S. energy policy.
Rob talks with Heatmap’s Emily Pontecorvo about how the data center boom is changing our emissions trajectory.
The United States is staring down a natural gas buildout of gigantic proportions.
Amazon wants to build what would be the country’s largest power plant in Texas — and run it entirely on natural gas. Not to be outdone, OpenAI is plotting an even larger power plant in Ohio that, if built, would become the world’s largest gas power facility. How should we think about this boom — and about the AI and technology companies behind it, who remain some of the world’s biggest buyers of clean energy?
On this episode of Shift Key, Rob is joined by Emily Pontecorvo, a Heatmap founding staff writer. They discuss what Emily learned identifying the country’s 10 biggest gas projects, what surprised her most, and what this means for the country’s climate trajectory — and Big Tech’s corporate net-zero goals.
Shift Key is hosted by Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, or wherever you get your podcasts.
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Here is an excerpt from their conversation:
Robinson Meyer: Can we talk a little bit about , why are companies building gas? Clean energy advocates talk a lot about how wind and solar — especially solar and batteries — are the cheapest source of electricity. I would say, when you talk to electricity traders, too, like when you talk to people in the market every day, they also talk about how cheap solar is. So why are companies building gas and not solar to service these facilities?
Emily Pontecorvo: So there’s a lot of different reasons that are all kind of coming together. Maybe the biggest one of all are the bottlenecks to connecting to the grid, the transmission bottlenecks. And that’s really pushing a lot of these companies to look for off-grid solutions.
Meyer: And specifically, just to play that out, because they cannot site enough acreage of solar on the site where they would put a data center to generate the power they need, which means they need a grid hookup. But if they need to generate their own power on their own acreage, then you need an extremely energy-dense form of generation, and that means you go to gas.
Pontecorvo: Right, right. And then I think that’s coming together with a bunch of political factors, like the Trump administration has a strong interest in pushing natural gas. They have gotten rid of the tax credits for clean energy. They’ve made renewable energy, wind and solar, really hard to build with all of these permitting freezes and permitting obstacles for renewables.
I think another element is just the extreme speed and urgency that AI companies are expanding at and demanding power at, which I guess kind of circles back to the interconnection issue and just not wanting to wait to be connected to the grid. And then the last one that I think is important is this issue with affordability in data centers, where people are really worried about the buildout increasing their energy bills. And a lot of data center developers are pushing this idea that by bringing their own generation, by building these gas power plants onsite, not connecting to the grid, they’re kind of putting their project in a box and ensuring that it doesn’t have any impact on regular ratepayers.
Meyer: It’s interesting to me — the Ratepayer Protection Pledge from Trump pledges that data centers won’t make electricity rates go up. And the solution to this for a lot of these companies, as you were saying, when they look at the set of constraints that they’re working within that include acreage, cost, regulation, local grid interconnection capacity, speed to power — they solve this set of constraints by going with gas. And I mean, I think there’s a few interesting aspects about it.
First of all, it’s not clear to me that it makes data centers any more popular. We recently did polling that made a lot of news that found that 75% of Americans, at this point, would oppose the data center being built near where they live. I’m not convinced that adding a fossil fuel power plant to a proposed data center project makes it any more popular because it’s taking a quasi-industrial site and turning it into a full-on industrial site. But that being said, one of the promises made by adding gas generation at the data center is that by generating your own electricity, you’re not increasing local demand for electricity and therefore not increasing anyone’s rates.
You can find a full transcript of the episode here.
Mentioned:
The U.S. Is Building Natural Gas Power Twice as Fast as China
Emily on Amazon’s Gigawatt Ranch
Rob on OpenAI and the PORTS-Pike Technology Campus
This episode of Shift Key is sponsored by ...
Verse's software platform Aria helps data centers connect to the grid faster and optimize power operations in real time. Learn more at verse.inc.
RE+ 26 is the largest clean energy event in North America, happening November 16th through 19th at the Las Vegas Convention Center. Register at re-plus.com and use code SHIFTKEY20 to save 20% off a Full Conference pass.
Music for Shift Key is by Adam Kromelow.