Carbon Removal
The Carbon Removal Buyer the World Has Been Waiting For
Proposed reforms to Europe’s Emissions Trading System could see the EU itself become a carbon credit customer.
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Proposed reforms to Europe’s Emissions Trading System could see the EU itself become a carbon credit customer.
What the heck is “surficial mineralization”?
Rob talks with Hannah Bebbington Valori, head of Frontier Climate, about the group’s new $915 million fund.
A new Searchlight Institute report joins a growing chorus arguing that corporate climate targets do more harm than good.
A new scientific report on the state of the industry shows a growing gap between what we can do and what we need to do.
The CEO of Climeworks argues that the buildout of technology to suck greenhouse gas from the air should be considered part of the cost of artificial intelligence.
Somewhere in Virginia, Texas, or Arizona, a data center is being commissioned this month that will draw more power than a small city. The server racks inside will train and run artificial intelligence models for years to come. And the electrons feeding it will, in all likelihood, come partly from natural gas — because that is what can be built fast enough to meet the demand.
AI is driving a major new wave of data center construction, and with it, a surge in demand for power and infrastructure. The International Energy Agency projects that the electricity consumption of global data centers could more than double to around 945 terawatt-hours by 2030, comparable to Japan’s entire electricity demand today.
That matters because much of the new electricity demand from data centers is still likely to be met by power sources where natural gas plays a central role. The backlog for new combined-cycle gas turbines — the more efficient type of gas plant, which generates electricity from both a gas turbine and the heat it produces — already stretches to five years. As a result, some data centers are turning instead to single-cycle gas turbines, which can be deployed more quickly but are even more carbon-intensive. In any case, that means fossil-fuel use for this generation of digital infrastructure is already largely locked in. Some of the emissions that follow can be reduced through efficiency and grid decarbonization, but a significant share will persist for years to come. I believe that closing this gap must be the job of carbon removal.
Carbon removal is the process of physically taking carbon dioxide back out of the atmosphere. At Climeworks, we have spent the past 17 years developing and deploying direct air capture technology that removes CO2 from the air and stores it in the ground for thousands of years. More recently, we launched our Climeworks Solutions business that works with third-party providers of other technology and nature-based carbon removal methods, such as reforestation, to help customers access a broader range of approaches and price points.
According to the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, carbon removal will be necessary if the world is to come close to meeting its climate goals, even alongside deep emissions cuts. For companies building and using digital infrastructure, the question this raises is simple: What do they do about the emissions they cannot yet eliminate?
The strongest near-term answer is to treat carbon removal as part of the cost of digital infrastructure — not as a substitute for clean energy, but as a complement to it. Trying to pair every data center directly with a direct air capture plant may sound attractive, especially because data centers have power, land and waste heat. But in practice, that kind of integration is still highly site-specific and not yet an easy model to repeat at scale. A more realistic solution is to treat carbon removal as part of the cost of cloud and AI products, where it can be built into existing pricing and contracts. In other words, carbon removal should be built into the cost of the digital product itself, rather than physically attached to every data center site.
The incentive is simple: As companies come under growing pressure to account for the emissions linked to the digital infrastructure they rely on, data center providers that offer a credible lower-emissions product will have an advantage.
One criticism of using carbon removal in this context is that it could prolong the use of fossil fuels. That concern deserves to be taken seriously, but it also needs a nuanced answer. There is an important difference between using carbon removal to justify new fossil infrastructure, and using it to address residual emissions that cannot yet be avoided. The latter is the role that serious climate frameworks assign to carbon removal.
Data center operators are not turning to natural gas because carbon removal exists. They are doing so because natural gas can provide the speed required by the current pace of compute growth. Carbon removal should therefore not be seen as a substitute for decarbonization, but as a way to manage a real constraint in an energy system that cannot decarbonize instantly.
The relevant comparison is not carbon removal versus renewables. It is unabated fossil-powered data center expansion versus expansion in which some of the resulting emissions are credibly and durably addressed. In that sense, the growth of AI infrastructure also creates an opportunity for carbon removal: It can bring larger volumes into the market, support scale-up, and help drive down costs over time.
The economics of integrating carbon removal into AI infrastructure are more feasible than one might assume. In December, Julio Friedmann, one of the best-known experts on carbon management and carbon removal, wrote in a Substack article that a gigawatt of advanced data center capacity can generate around $10 billion to $12 billion in annual revenues. Against that scale of value creation, the cost of addressing residual emissions through carbon removal becomes more manageable.
The emissions associated with that computing power depend heavily on how it is supplied. Based on our own calculations, assuming the current U.S. grid mix and utilization rates of around 85% to 100%, a gigawatt of data center capacity would emit approximately 3 million to 4 million tons of CO2 per year. Behind-the-meter natural gas generation would produce a similar level of emissions. Renewable power can reduce those emissions significantly, while nuclear power could reduce them further.
In practice, not every gigawatt of data center compute will be powered in the same way. But assuming roughly half is supplied by renewable or nuclear power, average residual emissions would still be around 2 million tons of CO2 per year for each gigawatt of compute. That is a substantial volume — and exactly the kind of residual emissions gap that carbon removal can help address.
A portfolio of carbon removal solutions, which can directly mitigate these emissions, only costs a few hundred dollars per ton. While that is a meaningful cost, it is manageable given the economics of AI products. It is affordable enough to make a start, especially for companies that want to offer a credible lower-emissions digital product.
So, who pays? In the near term, the most likely model is that cloud and AI service providers procure carbon removal and build the cost into their products, while customers create the commercial pressure and ultimately support that cost through procurement. Even if companies are speaking more cautiously about net zero than they were a few years ago, the underlying need for credible value-chain emissions data has not disappeared. Organizations still face growing pressure to account for scope 3 emissions through disclosure rules, investor-facing reporting frameworks and supplier requirements. As their use of cloud and AI grows, they will increasingly ask providers a simple question: What emissions come with this compute, and what are you doing about them? Once buyers start routinely asking that question, carbon removal moves from being a climate nice-to-have to a product feature.
Climeworks has reduced the cost of direct air capture significantly since our first plant came online, and that trajectory will continue as the market grows. But cost curves do not come down on their own. They come down when buyers decide that a cleaner product is worth paying for. The cost of solar electricity fell around 90% between 2010 and 2023, driven not just by technology but also by early procurement commitments from the likes of Google, Microsoft, and Amazon that gave manufacturers the confidence to invest at scale.
Carbon removal is approaching a similar inflection point. In April, Climeworks signed an agreement with NTT Data — one of the world’s largest digital and IT service providers — to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, as part of its commitment to net zero.
The business case, then, is simple. The AI boom is creating enormous economic value. But it is also creating residual carbon emissions that cannot be avoided only by clean power and increased efficiency. The solution is not to wait for a perfect zero-carbon grid, and it is not to force a bespoke carbon removal engineering solution onto every data center site. I believe the solution is to integrate carbon removal into the digital infrastructure offer now, and let customers choose it. That’s how lower-emissions compute becomes real and scalable. And that is why carbon removal needs to become an essential part of responsible AI growth.
Though the tech giant did not say its purchasing pause is permanent, the change will have lasting ripple effects.
What does an industry do when it’s lost 80% of its annual demand?
The carbon removal business is trying to figure that out.
For the past few years, Microsoft has been the buyer of first and last resort for any company that sought to pull carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. In order to achieve an aggressive internal climate goal, the software company purchased more than 70 million metric tons of carbon removal credits, 40 times more than anyone else.
Now, it’s pulling back. Microsoft has informed suppliers and partners that it is pausing carbon removal buying, Heatmap reported last week. Bloomberg and Carbon Herald soon followed. The news has rippled through the nascent industry, convincing executives and investors that lean years may be on the way after a period of rapid growth.
“For a lot of these companies, their business model was, ‘And then Microsoft buys,’” said Julio Friedmann, the chief scientist at Carbon Direct, a company that advises and consults with companies — including, yes, Microsoft — on their carbon management projects, in an interview. “It changes their business model significantly if Microsoft does not buy.”
Microsoft told me this week that it has not ended the purchasing program. It still aims to become carbon negative by 2030, meaning that it must remove more climate pollution from the atmosphere than it produces in that year, according to its website. Its ultimate goal is to eliminate all 45 years of its historic carbon emissions from electricity use by 2050.
“At times, we may adjust the pace or volume of our carbon removal procurement as we continue to refine our approach toward sustainability goals,” Melanie Nakagawa, Microsoft’s chief sustainability officer, said in a statement. “Any adjustments we make are part of our disciplined approach — not a change in ambition.”
Yet even a partial pullback will alter the industry. Over the past five years, carbon removal companies have raised more than $3.6 billion, according to the independent data tracker CDR.fyi. Startups have invested that money into research and equipment, expecting that voluntary corporate buyers — and, eventually, governments — will pay to clean up carbon dioxide in the air.
Although many companies have implicitly promised to buy carbon removal credits — they’re all but implied in any commitment to “net zero” — nobody bought more than Microsoft. The software company purchased 45 million tons of carbon removal last year alone, according to its own data.
The next biggest buyer of carbon removal credits — Frontier, a coalition of large companies led by the payments processing firm Stripe — has bought 1.8 million tons total since launching in 2022.
With such an outsize footprint, Microsoft’s carbon removal team became the de facto regulator for the early industry — setting prices, analyzing projects, and publishing in-house standards for public consumption.
It bought from virtually every kind of carbon removal company, purchasing from large-scale, factory-style facilities that use industrial equipment to suck carbon from the air, as well as smaller and more natural solutions that rely on photosynthesis. One of its largest deals was with the city-owned utility for Stockholm, Sweden, which is building a facility to capture the carbon released when plant matter is burned for energy.
That it would some day stop buying shouldn’t be seen as a surprise, Hannah Bebbington, the head of deployment at the carbon-removal purchasing coalition Frontier, told me. “It will be inevitable for any corporate buyer in the space,” she said. “Corporate budgets are finite.”
Frontier’s members include Google, McKinsey, and Shopify. The coalition remains “open for business,” she said. “We are always open to new buyers joining Frontier.”
But Frontier — and, certainly, Microsoft — understands that the real point of voluntary purchasing programs is to prime the pump for government policy. That’s both because governments play a central role in spurring along new technologies — and because, when you get down to it, governments already handle disposal for a number of different kinds of waste, and carbon dioxide in the air is just another kind of waste. (On a per ton basis, carbon removal may already be price-competitive with municipal trash pickup.)
“The end game here is government support in the long-term period,” Bebbington said. “We will need a robust set of policies around the world that provide permanent demand for high-quality, durable CDR funds.”
“The voluntary market plays a critical role right now, but it won’t scale, and we don’t expect it will scale to the size of the problem,” she added.
Only a handful of companies had the size and scale to sell carbon credits to Microsoft, which tended to place orders in the millions of tons, Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh, a researcher at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University, told me on a recent episode of Heatmap’s podcast, Shift Key. Those companies will now be competing with fledgling firms for a market that’s 80% smaller than it used to be.
“Fundamentally, what it will mean is just an acceleration of something that was going to happen anyway, which is consolidation and bankruptcies or dissolutions,” Cavanaugh told me. “This was always going to happen at this moment because we don’t have supportive policy.”
Friedmann agreed with the dour outlook. “We will see the best companies and the best projects make it. But a lot of companies will fail, and a lot of projects will fail,” he told me.
To some degree, Microsoft planned for that eventuality in its purchase scheme. The company signed long-term offtake contracts with companies to “pay on delivery,” meaning that it will only pay once tons are actually shown to be durably dealt with. That arrangement will protect Microsoft’s shareholders if companies or technologies fail, but means that it could conceivably keep paying out carbon removal firms for the next 10 years, Noah Deich, a former Biden administration energy official, told me.
The pause, in other words, spells an end to new dealmaking, but it does not stop the flow of revenue to carbon removal companies that have already signed contracts with Microsoft. “The big question now is not who will the next buyer be in 2026,”’ Deich said. “It is who is actually going to deliver credits and do so at scale, at cost, and on time.”
Deich, who ran the Energy Department’s carbon management programs, added that Microsoft has been as important to building the carbon removal industry as Germany was to creating the modern solar industry. That country’s feed-in tariff, which started in 2000, is credited with driving so much demand for solar panels that it spurred a worldwide wave of factory construction and manufacturing innovation.
“The idea that a software company could single-handedly make the market for a climate technology makes about as much sense as the country of Germany — with the same annual solar insolation as Alaska — making the market for solar photovoltaic panels,” Deich said, referencing the comparatively low amount of sunlight that it receives. “But they did it. Climate policy seems to defy Occam’s razor a lot, and this is a great example of that.”
History also shows what could happen if the government fails to step up. In the 1980s, the U.S. government — which had up to that point been the world’s No. 1 developer of solar panel technology — ended its advance purchase program. Many American solar firms sold their patents and intellectual property to Japanese companies.
Those sales led to something of a lost decade for solar research worldwide and ultimately paved the way for East Asian manufacturing companies — first in Japan, and then in China — to dominate the solar trade, Deich said. If the U.S. government doesn’t step up soon, then the same thing could happen to carbon removal.
The climate math still relied upon by global governments to guide their national emissions targets assumes that carbon removal technology will exist and be able to scale rapidly in the future. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change says that many outcomes where the world holds global temperatures to 1.5 or 2 degrees Celsius by the end of the century will involve some degree of “overshoot,” where carbon removal is used to remove excess carbon from the atmosphere.
By one estimate, the world will need to remove 7 billion to 9 billion tons of carbon from the atmosphere by the middle of the century in order to hold to Paris Agreement goals. You could argue that any scenario where the world meets “net zero” will require some amount of carbon removal because the word “net” implies humanity will be cleaning up residual emissions with technology. (Climate analysts sometimes distinguish “net zero” pathways from the even-more-difficult “real zero” pathway for this reason.)
Whether humanity has the technologies that it needs to eliminate emissions then will depend on what governments do now, Deich said. After all, the 2050s are closer to today than the 1980s are.
“It’s up to policymakers whether they want to make the relatively tiny investments in technology that make sure we can have net-zero 2050 and not net-zero 2080,” Deich said.
Congress has historically supported carbon removal more than other climate-critical technologies. The bipartisan infrastructure law of 2022 funded a new network of industrial hubs specializing in direct air capture technology, and previous budget bills created new first-of-a-kind purchasing programs for carbon removal credits. Even the Republican-authored One Big Beautiful Bill Act preserved tax incentives for some carbon removal technologies.
But the Trump administration has been far more equivocal about those programs. The Department of Energy initially declined to spend some funds authorized for carbon removal schemes, and in some cases redirected the funds — potentially illegally — to other purposes. (Carbon removal advocates got good news on Wednesday when the Energy Department reinstated $1.2 billion in grants to the direct air capture hubs.)
Those freezes and reallocations fit into the Trump administration’s broader war on federal climate policy. In part, Trump officials have seemed reluctant to signal that carbon might be a public problem — or something that needs to be “removed” or “managed” — in the first place.
Other countries have started preliminary carbon management programs — Norway, the United Kingdom, and Canada — have launched pilots in recent years. The European carbon market will also soon publish rules guiding how carbon removal credits can be used to offset pollution.
But in the absence of a large-scale federal program in the U.S., lean years are likely coming, observers said.
“I am optimistic that [carbon removal] will continue to scale, but not like it was,” Friedmann said. “Microsoft is a symptom of something that was coming.”
“The need for carbon removal has not changed,” he added.