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Plus how it’s different from carbon capture — and, while we’re at it, carbon offsets.

At the heart of the climate crisis lies a harsh physical reality: Once carbon dioxide enters the atmosphere, it can stay there for hundreds or even thousands of years. Although some carbon does cycle in and out of the air via plants, soils, and the ocean, we are emitting far more than these systems can handle, meaning that most of it is just piling up. Burning fossil fuels is like continuously stuffing feathers into a duvet blanketing the Earth.
But there may be ways to begin plucking them out. That’s the promise of carbon removal, a category of technologies and interventions that either pull carbon dioxide from the air and store it securely or enhance the systems that naturally absorb carbon today.
Carbon removal is not, inherently, a license to continue emitting — it is far cheaper and easier to reduce the flow of emissions into the atmosphere than it is to remove them after the fact. Climate action has been so slow, however, that removing carbon has become a pressing consideration.
There are many technical, political, and economic challenges to deploying carbon removal at a meaningful scale. This guide will introduce you to some of those challenges, along with the basics of what carbon removal is, the rationale for trying to do it, and the risks and trade-offs we’ll encounter along the way. Let’s dive in.
Variously called carbon removal, carbon dioxide removal, CDR, and negative emissions technologies, all of these terms refer to efforts to suck carbon from the atmosphere and store it in places where it will not warm the planet, such as oceans, soils, plants, and underground. The science behind carbon removal spans atmospheric studies, oceanography, biology, geology, chemistry, and engineering. The carbon removal “industry” overlaps with oil and gas drilling, farming, forestry, mining, and construction — sometimes several of these sectors at once.
Carbon removal encompasses an astonishingly wide range of activities, but the two best known examples are probably the simple practice of planting a tree and the complex engineering project of building a “direct air capture system.” The latter are typically big machines that use industrial-sized fans to blow air through a material that filters carbon dioxide, and then apply heat to extract the carbon from the filter.
But there are many other methods that fall somewhere in between. “Enhanced rock weathering” involves taking minerals that are known to slowly pull carbon from the air as they break down over millennia and trying to speed up those reactions by grinding them into a fine dust and spreading it on agricultural fields. In “ocean alkalinity enhancement,” minerals are deposited directly into the ocean, catalyzing chemical reactions that may enable surface waters to soak up more carbon from the atmosphere. Companies are also experimenting with ways to take carbon-rich organic waste, like sewage, corn stalks, and forest debris, and bury it permanently underground or transform it into more stable materials like biochar.

If you read the words “carbon capture” literally, then yes, carbon removal involves capturing carbon. It’s common to see news articles use the terms interchangeably. But “carbon capture” is also the name for a technology that addresses a very different problem, with different challenges and implications. For that reason, it’s useful to distinguish carbon removal as its own category.
By definition, carbon removal deals with carbon that was previously emitted into the atmosphere — the feathers piling up in the duvet. Carbon capture, by contrast, has historically referred to systems that collect carbon from the flue of an industrial site, like a power plant, before it can enter the atmosphere.
Some carbon removal methods, such as the aforementioned direct air capture machines, share equipment with carbon capture. Both might use materials called sorbents to separate carbon from flue gas or from the air, and both rely on pipelines and drilling to transport the carbon to underground storage wells. But carbon capture cleans up and extends the relevance of present-day industrial processes and fuels. Carbon removal can be deployed concurrent with or independent of today’s energy systems and addresses the legacy carbon still hanging around.
There are different opinions on this. Some consider “geoengineering” to mean any large-scale intervention to counteract climate change. Others reserve the term for interventions that deal only with the effects of climate change, rather than the root cause. For example, solar radiation management, an idea to release tiny particles into the atmosphere that reflect sunlight back into space, would cool the Earth but not change the concentration of carbon in the atmosphere. If we started to do it at scale and then stopped, global warming would rear right back, unless and until the carbon blanketing the atmosphere was removed.
Any global cooling achieved by carbon removal, by contrast, would likely be more durable. To be clear, scientists don’t propose trying to use carbon removal to bring global average temperatures back down to levels seen during the pre-industrial period. It would already take an almost unimaginably large-scale effort to cool the planet just a half a degree or so with carbon removal — more on that in a bit.
While scientists have been talking about carbon removal for decades, a sense of urgency to develop practicable solutions emerged in the years following the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement. The signatories to that United Nations agreement, which included almost every nation in the world, committed to limit warming to “well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels” and strive for no more than 1.5 degrees of warming.
When scientists with the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reviewed more than a thousand modeled scenarios mapping out how the world could achieve these goals, they found that it would be extraordinarily difficult without some degree of carbon removal. We had emitted so much by that point and made so little progress to change our energy systems that success required either cutting emissions at an unfathomably fast clip, cutting emissions more gradually and rapidly scaling up carbon removal to counteract the residuals, or “overshooting” the temperature targets altogether and using carbon removal to back into them.
If limiting warming to 1.5 degrees was a stretch back then, today it’s become even more implausible. “Recent warming trends and the lack of adequate mitigation measures make it clear that the 1.5°C goal will not be met,” reads a January 2025 report from the independent climate science research group Berkeley Earth. The authors expect the threshold to be crossed in the next five to 10 years. Another independent research group, Climate Action Tracker, estimates that current policies put the world on track to warm 2.7 degrees by the end of the century.
To many, carbon removal may seem Sisyphean. As long as we’re still flooding the atmosphere with carbon, trying to take it out bit by bit sounds futile.
But our relatively slow progress cleaning up our energy systems only strengthens the case to develop carbon removal. Just think of all the carbon that’s continuing to accumulate! If we reach a point in the future where energy is cleaner and emissions are significantly lower, carbon removal offers a chance to siphon out some of it and start to reverse the dangerous effects of climate change. If we don’t start building that capacity today, future generations will not have that option.
Scientists also make the case that carbon removal will be essential to halting climate change, never mind reversing it. That’s because there are some human activities that are so difficult or expensive to decarbonize — think commercial aviation, shipping, agriculture — that it may be easier, more economical, or even more environmentally friendly to remove the greenhouse gases they emit after the fact. Stopping the planet from warming does not necessarily require eliminating all emissions. The more likely path is to achieve “net zero,” a point where any remaining emissions are counterbalanced by an equal amount of carbon removal, including from human activities as well as natural carbon sinks.
It would certainly be easier, less expensive, and less resource-intensive to cut emissions today than it will be to remove them in the future. Some scientists have even argued we may be better off assuming carbon removal will not work at scale, as that might motivate more rapid emissions reductions. But the IPCC concluded pretty definitively in 2022 that carbon removal will be required if we want to stabilize global temperatures below 2 degrees this century.
The Paris Agreement temperature targets are not thresholds after which the world falls apart. But every tenth of a degree of warming will strain the Earth’s systems and test human survival more than the last. Abandoning carbon removal means accepting whatever dangerous and devastating effects we fail to avoid.
The latest edition of the “State of CDR” report, put together by a group of leading carbon removal researchers, found that all of the Paris Agreement-consistent scenarios modeled in the scientific literature require removing between 4 billion and 6 billion metric tons of carbon per year by 2035, and between 6 billion and 10 billion metric tons by 2050. For context, they estimate that the world currently removes about 2 billion metric tons of carbon per year over and above what the Earth would naturally absorb without human interference, 99% of which comes from planting trees and managing forests.
These estimates, however, are steeped in uncertainty, as the models make assumptions about the cost and speed of decarbonization and society’s willingness to make behavioral changes such as eating less meat and flying less. We could work toward other futures with less reliance on carbon removal. We could also passively drift toward one that calls for far more.
In short, the amount of carbon removal that may be desirable in the future depends largely on how quickly we reduce emissions and how successful we are in solving the hardest-to-decarbonize parts of the economy. It also depends on what kinds of trade-offs society is willing to make. Large-scale carbon removal would likely be resource-intensive, requiring a lot of land, energy, or both, and could impinge on other sustainability goals.
Afforestation and reforestation are responsible for most carbon removal that happens today, and planting more trees is essential to tackling climate change. But it would be a mistake to bank our carbon removal strategy on that approach alone. For one, depending on how much carbon removal is needed, there may not be enough land that can or should be forested without encroaching on food production or other uses. Large-scale tree planting efforts also often produce monoculture plantations, which are an inexpensive way to maximize carbon sequestration but can harm biodiversity.
The other argument for developing alternative solutions has to do with time. As I explained earlier, carbon dioxide emissions can stay in the atmosphere for millennia. Most tree species do not live longer than 1,000 years, and some are known to survive only for a few decades. The carbon stored in trees is vulnerable to fires, pests, disease, drought, and the simple fact of mortality. Climate change is already increasing these risks.
If we use carbon removal to neutralize residual fossil fuel emissions — which, again, could help us halt warming faster than we otherwise would be able to — the carbon will need to stay out of the atmosphere for as long as the emissions stay in. When we rely on trees to offset CO2 emissions, the climate scientist Zeke Hausfather wrote in a 2022 New York Times op-ed, we “risk merely hitting the climate ‘snooze’ button, kicking the can to future generations who will have to deal with those emissions.”
Every form of carbon removal has trade-offs. Direct air capture uses lots of energy; enhanced rock weathering relies on dirty mining processes and its effectiveness is difficult to measure. It’s still too early to know the extent to which these can be minimized, or to say what the ideal mix of solutions looks like.
There are hundreds of companies and research labs around the world working on various methods to remove carbon from the atmosphere, and the number of real-world projects is growing every year. But the field’s progress is limited by funding. There’s no natural market for carbon removal — it’s essentially a public service. Most of the money going into the field has come from tech companies like Microsoft and Stripe, which have voluntarily paid for carbon removals that haven’t happened yet to help startups access capital to deploy demonstration projects.
Experts across the industry say that in order for carbon removal to scale, governments will need to play a much bigger role. For one, they’ll likely need to pony up for research and development. The U.S. government has been spending about $1 billion per year to support carbon removal research, but according to one estimate, we’ll need to scale that to $100 billion per year by 2050 in order to make the technology set a viable solution. Many argue that compliance markets, in which governments require companies to lower their emissions and permit the purchase of carbon removal to meet targets, will be key to creating sustained demand. (These are not to be confused with carbon offsets, which have also been part of these markets, but have been more focused on projects that avoid emissions.) That’s already starting to happen abroad — this summer, the U.K. decided to incorporate removals into its emissions cap and trade program in 2029, and the E.U. proposed doing the same.
The few programs we do have in the U.S., on the other hand, are currently at risk. Congress appropriated $3.5 billion to the Department of Energy in 2021 to develop several direct air capture “hubs,” but Secretary of Energy Chris Wright may try to cancel the program. The agency also had a pilot program in which it planned to pre-pay for carbon removal, similar to what the tech companies have done, but it’s unclear whether that will move forward. But there’s more action in other countries.
Another central preoccupation in the field today is the development of robust standards that ensure we can accurately measure and report how much carbon is removed by each method. While this is relatively straightforward for a direct air capture system, which is a closed system, it’s much harder for enhanced rock weathering, for example, where there are a lot of outside variables that could affect the fate of the carbon.
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BAAJA would likely help speed up the U.S. transmission buildout, but there’s a chance we’re undercounting the benefits.
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As you may have seen, my colleague Emily Pontecorvo and I got the first look at the Rhodium Group’s analysis of what the bipartisan permitting bill will do to emissions.
You can read our story at Heatmap. The upshot is that the bill’s most significant provisions are likely neutral for climate change in a worst-case scenario — and could, in more optimistic scenarios, help reduce emissions. (Those scenarios aren’t about how the bill will be interpreted, to be clear, but about what might happen in the broader energy economy — with economic growth, for instance, or oil prices — that will feed back into the emissions math.)
I won’t give away much more about our story, but there is one irony I want to note about the Rhodium study and the broader morass of American electricity policy. One of the Rhodium study’s big findings is that BAAJA will help expand the transmission system. Power lines are essential for decarbonization because they move electricity from the country’s sunniest and windiest places to its cities, towns, and suburbs.
BAAJA will help transmission both because the law affirmatively expands the power grid and because the bill’s changes to environmental review law could help power lines. Today, for instance, it takes twice as long on average to conduct a federal environmental impact study for transmission lines as it does for pipelines, according to Rhodium data. All in all, the Rhodium analysis estimates BAAJA could increase the amount of new transmission capacity added per year by 167% to 262% nationwide, compared to the average rate over the past decade.
Which is very interesting. But it’s worth noting that the Rhodium analysis may — emphasis on may — undercount the bill’s transmission benefits. This is because the Rhodium authors did not have time to conduct a full network study of the U.S. transmission system, which would take into effect the grid’s physical footprint, power flows, and existing bottlenecks. Instead, they looked at power supply and demand within the context of the broader U.S. energy system.
That’s a reasonable decision; indeed, it was probably the only decision they could make. Because of how energy system models work, a more fulsome analysis might have taken weeks to complete, not to mention a very large amount of money and computational power. When the National Renewable Energy Lab studied how quickly Los Angeles could switch to 100% renewable energy earlier this decade, for instance, it ran such a study, modeling every transmission line and substation in LA. Its supercomputer wound up churning through more than 100 million simulations; the research effort took three years. If the Rhodium analysts had done even a fraction as much work to examine what BAAJA would mean for the country’s power grid, then they would have of course finished their analysis well after the window to vote on BAAJA would have closed.
One of the ironies here is that while the LA 100 study was particularly exhaustive, we actually require clean energy projects to conduct similar studies all the time. Right now, one of the primary reasons it takes so long to hook up a new power plant to the grid is that it has to undergo an interconnection study in many parts of the country. In those regions, a new solar farm or battery project can’t connect to the grid until operators study its effect on grid congestion everywhere else.
As it happens, BAAJA aims to fix this process, allowing power plants to join the grid in batches.
I want to note the irony that a process we mandate for the power sector is actually too slow to deliver speedy policy analysis to legislators. If Rhodium had tried to study BAAJA the way we make power plants study the grid, then it never would have delivered its verdict in time. If you think Congress is slow, in other words, you should meet the electricity sector.
Current conditions: The Pineapple Express, an atmospheric river originating in the Pacific near Hawaii, is arriving in the Southwest laden with heavy rain that’s set to flood the region • Indonesia has the worst air quality in the world as forest fires rage along Sumatra’s southern coast • A cross-country storm will soak much of the United States on Tuesday’s Election Day.
The Senate’s grand compromise to simplify federal permitting on energy projects would likely drop emissions slightly as the benefits to accelerating deployments of clean energy infrastructure outweigh the boost the legislation could give to fossil fuels. Even under the worst-case scenario, emissions remain on the same trajectory as today. That’s according to a hotly anticipated new analysis by the Rhodium Group, the consultancy whose U.S. emissions estimates are among the most widely cited in American politics. The report, shared first with my colleague Emily Pontecorvo, found that provisions in the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act largely counteract each other on climate. The bill makes building transmission lines much easier, a key step to patching more renewables onto the grid. But it also makes new gas pipelines simpler to permit, clearing the way for a buildout of the infrastructure for the fossil fuel already dominating U.S. electricity and heating systems. Still, under the best-case scenario, the legislation could cut U.S. economy-wide emissions by 5% below where they would otherwise go in 2040. The bill could also slash energy bills by $78 per year and support construction of more than 200 gigawatts of clean energy capacity, as compared to a world where it didn’t pass. The Rhodium report is at least the second analysis yet to find that the bill could modestly lower emissions. The first, as I reported last week, came from the think tank Resources for the Future, which saw a slight drop in power-sector emissions relative to a world without BAAJA.
If overhauling national permitting rules to make building green energy infrastructure easier doesn’t work to lower emissions, traditional negotiations in favor of regulations that can deliver cuts looks no more promising. Two weeks of United Nations-led talks in Armenia ended Saturday without a settled approach to meeting 2030 deadlines for preserving more nature. “We don’t need to spend more to close the biodiversity funding gap, we need to spend better,” Marina Von Weissenberg, a Finnish senior ministerial advisor, said in a statement. “Governments have a real opportunity here to reshape public spending with future generations in mind, but they can’t do it alone. International coordination is key to giving governments the confidence to lead change.”
Last week, my colleague Katie Brigham published a detailed feature highlighting China’s tightening grip over the global supply chain for electrolyzers, the technology that zaps water with electricity to separate the molecule’s hydrogen from its oxygen and harvest the former as fuel. Keen readers of this newsletter recognize the story. Even before the Iran War, China had beefed up its public support for green hydrogen and related technologies. After the conflict constricted the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz, the People’s Republic redoubled its efforts. Quite literally. New data from the National Energy Administration shows that investments into the hydrogen industry doubled in the first nine months of this year, according to Hydrogen Insight.
Fermi America went public in a gangbusters initial public offering last year as the company, with a board of directors including former Texas governor and U.S. Secretary of Energy Rick Perry, pledged to build the world’s largest data center and power the facility with gas and four large-scale Westinghouse AP1000 nuclear reactors. In April, the chief executive and chief financial officer quit. The board room drama continued into the next month. The company’s stock recovered somewhat over the summer as investors bet on a turnaround pegged to a series of deals with companies looking to lease space on its future servers. But fresh chaos enveloped the startup Friday when The Texas Tribune reported that Perry had failed to earn enough support from the board of directors to win reelection to his seat.
In a statement posted to X on Friday evening, Fermi said that neither Perry nor investor Jeffrey Stein had been removed from the company’s board. “In fact, both Governor Perry and Jeffrey Stein received a majority of the votes cast by shareholders,” the statement read. “Let’s be clear: Governor Perry and Mr. Stein remain members of Fermi’s Board of Directors and will continue serving until their successors are duly elected. Both remain eligible for reelection.”
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If you thought the fine particulate matter from last year’s catastrophic Los Angeles firestorm was bad, you weren’t thinking imaginatively enough about just how dangerous all that airborne material could be. A new study published in the journal Science Advances suggests that upward of 7 million people were exposed to high levels of airborne lead and other toxic metals released when homes and vehicles caught flame. The January 2025 Eaton inferno that destroyed more than 9,400 buildings and killed 19 people spewed 80 times the normal concentration of lead found in the atmosphere through a plume that settled over 70% of the Los Angeles metropolitan area. “I can envision that in the future we have these evacuation zones for smoke exposure as well,” Haroula Baliaka, the study’s lead author, who was a PhD candidate at Caltech last year, told Bloomberg. “Unfortunately, this is not a one-time event. It’s a new reality and we need to adapt to it and we need to do it sooner rather than later.”
The findings come a week after a study published in JAMA Pediatrics showed a link between wildfire smoke exposure during pregnancy and autism diagnoses in children. The research from Rutgers University examined 893,212 mother-child pairs enrolled in Medicaid, with children born between 2007 and 2014. Each increase of 0.75 micrograms per cubic meter in average concentrations of wildfire-related air pollution during pregnancy was associated with a 30% higher risk of a subsequent autism diagnosis. Exposure in the second and third trimesters had the highest risk. “Wildfire smoke can travel far beyond the communities where fires are burning, and exposure may occur even when smoke is not visible,” Stefania Papatheodorou, an epidemiologist at the Rutgers School of Public Health and lead author of the study, said in a press release. “Our findings highlight the importance of awareness of wildfire events and their potential effects on air quality during pregnancy.”
The United Kingdom is building out more than 10 gigawatts of offshore wind as London looks to shore up its electricity supplies amid the global energy shock. But Chancellor of the Exchequer John Healey said he would veto any offshore wind projects that don’t lower bills. While clean power is “how we break the grip of international gas prices on our bills,” he said the infrastructure “has to come at the right pace, in the right places, with the grid to carry it.” The statement fueled what The Guardian called “concerns that the government is moving away from the pro-renewables agenda.”
Meanwhile, the U.S. midterms aren’t the only election this week. In Sunday’s runoff election, Bulgaria’s pro-Russian acting President Iliana Iotova appeared to eke out a victory over the former prime minister Andrei Gyurov, a pro-Western banker. Her win unites the government with her close ally, Prime Minister Rumen Radev, ensuring stronger support for the leader’s two signature energy policies. One, a plan to build a pair of Westinghouse AP1000s at the Kozloduy nuclear plant, is scheduled to advance to the next planning stage next year. The other, the easing of sanctions on Russian uranium to ensure a supply of fuel for the plant’s existing reactors, looks likely to continue under Iotova’s friendly diplomacy with the Kremlin.
William Nordhaus, the pioneering Yale University economist who won the Nobel Prize in 2018 for integrating climate change into macroeconomic analysis, has died at 85 following a battle with an aggressive form of brain cancer. His nephew, Ted Nordhaus of the Breakthrough Institute, referred to his father, Robert Nordhaus, as “the original environmental lawyer and Bill as the original environmental economist,” he wrote in a blog post after his uncle’s passing. “It is safe to say that the Nordhaus brothers were doing environmental law and economics, respectively, long before either label existed. Not bad for two kids who grew up in the intellectual hotbed of Albuquerque, New Mexico, population 40,000, during and after the second world war.” Their legacies are something of the Nordhaus family brand: Pragmatism. May his memory be a blessing.
Even in the worst-case scenario, BAAJA wouldn’t increase emissions, an analysis by the Rhodium Group concludes.
The bipartisan permitting reform bill is likely to slightly cut greenhouse gas emissions and lower electricity bills by 2040 — or at worst leave emissions on the same trajectory that they are on today — as compared to the status quo, according to a new analysis of many of its provisions by the Rhodium Group, an independent research firm.
The analysis examines the policies in the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act, or BAAJA, that would have the most-clear cut effects on climate pollution and the energy system. It is the most comprehensive account of the bill’s effects on emissions so far, although it does not examine all of its provisions.
The bill is hard to analyze because — unlike recent partisan energy bills, such as the Inflation Reduction Act or President Trump’s tax and spending bill — its effects on the climate are more ambiguous and often seem to counteract each other. BAAJA will make it easier to build not only long-distance transmission lines, which are essential for clean energy, but also natural gas pipelines, which can expand fossil fuel production.
Yet the climate benefits likely outweigh or balance out the harms, at least among the studied policies, the report finds. In the best case scenario, the bill could cut U.S. economy-wide emissions by 4%, reduce energy bills by $78 per year, and drive more than 200 gigawatts of new clean energy capacity by 2040, compared to status quo policy. In a worst case scenario, greenhouse gas emissions would remain unchanged on their current trajectory.
The results should be viewed as more directionally instructive than a precise accounting of the legislation, Ben King, an energy and climate director at Rhodium, told me.
“We don’t see emissions increasing because of the bill,” King said. “This bill should drive some emission reductions, it should drive some more clean energy on the grid, and it should drive electricity bills down. And given the complexity of the bill, that’s what we can say at this point.”
The analysis does not look at the bill’s permitting certainty provisions, which Democrats initially sought to stop President Trump’s war on wind but have become one of its thorniest sections. Rhodium’s modeling is also a crude tool for assessing transmission policy, since the model can look only at economic inputs such as supply and demand, and not the physical reality of the U.S. grid, such as where transmission lines run or where the bottlenecks are.
It is the second analysis to find that the bill could modestly lower carbon pollution. A more limited report focusing only on the power grid, published last week by the think tank Resources for the Future, found the legislation could cut electricity emissions by 6% while reducing electricity system costs by $350 billion through 2050.
The effects of the bill may sound small, but BAAJA is not a climate bill. It’s not engineered to reduce reliance on fossil fuels or boost clean energy technologies. Its overarching purpose is to address various federal bottlenecks that bog down America’s ability to build stuff, whether that’s a pipeline or a highway or a power line or a solar farm. So it’s not entirely surprising that it’s not expected to have a dramatic effect on emissions.
The reason it’s a priority for Senate climate champions is that many of its provisions are important precursors to decarbonizing the U.S. economy more quickly. By enabling faster expansion of the power grid, the bill would put the country in a much better position to transition to clean energy. After Joe Biden’s big climate bill, the Inflation Reduction Act, passed in 2022, Princeton University researchers found that the country’s slow buildout of transmission lines would be a major obstacle to gleaning the law’s benefits. Unless the country more than doubled the rate of transmission expansion, they wrote, more than 80% of the IRA’s emission reduction potential by 2030 would be lost.
BAAJA could nearly triple the build rate of high-voltage transmission, the Rhodium Group found, from an average of about 0.7 terawatt-miles added per year over the past decade to an average annual pace of 1.9 to 2.6 terawatt-miles through 2040. Because Republicans and President Trump have repealed so many of the IRA’s provisions, this won’t drive as much clean energy as the Princeton researchers expected, but Rhodium estimates that by 2040, BAAJA would help between 17 and 249 gigawatts of clean resources get built compared to a world without it.
The growing grid is the main reason why the bill cuts energy costs, because it enables more lower-cost resources to connect to the grid. The bill’s requirement that data centers pay the full cost of connecting to the grid also puts downward pressure on electricity rates.
“If your goal is to do climate policy in the future, this is an important down payment to making progress there,” King said.
The authors studied the bill’s provisions under a range of economic assumptions, including a “best case” scenario in which clean energy gets cheaper and easily outcompetes natural gas, and a “worst case” scenario where natural gas prices collapse and the inexpensive fuel keeps dominating the U.S. energy system.

The authors limited their analysis to the bill’s provisions that speed up transmission line and natural gas pipeline permitting. They assumed that when you make it easier to approve transmission lines, the lines get cheaper to build and get built more quickly. The same goes for gas pipelines. Then they looked at how the energy system would respond. Would we build more power plants? Would there be more natural gas production? Where will that gas go?
The caveats, aside from omitting the bill’s “project certainty” provisions, are that they did not account for policies that support geothermal energy, virtual power plants, advanced transmission technologies, or the ways in which the bill would reduce congestion on the grid — all of which could result in fewer emissions. At the same time, the modeling assumes that all of the data centers that get built between now and 2040 connect to the grid, even though today, many data centers are planning to run on inefficient off-grid natural gas plants. That means this modeling likely underestimates emissions from data centers. (Although the authors did a separate exercise that went deeper into data centers, which I’ll explain shortly.)
The report also limited its analysis to the United States. While the modeling found that liquified natural gas exports would increase by 8% to 15% under BAAJA, the authors did not account for how those exports could affect the energy mix or emissions in the rest of the world.
They found that the bill’s changes to the Clean Water Act and the National Environmental Policy Act would enable more gas pipeline development, which, in isolation, would increase emissions relative to a world without BAAJA. More pipelines means more production of oil and natural gas, which means higher methane and CO2 emissions throughout the fossil supply chain. Under a worst case scenario, they estimate a 4% increase in the amount of new gas capacity, although gas-fired generation as a whole increases by less than 1% in 2040. Even then, emissions would simply be flat compared to current expectations.
“On net, the emissions increases that we see there are outweighed by the emissions benefits that come from the transmission provisions of the bill,” King said.
The report also studied how BAAJA might affect data center emissions. Its “base case” scenario — which includes all the analysis I’ve shared with you so far — assumes data centers will make up about 17% of electricity demand by 2040. That figure already supposes huge growth in data center energy consumption, because data centers only use about 5% of U.S. electricity today.
But what if data center demand grows even faster than that? The authors modeled two additional scenarios to see what would happen if data center electricity demand instead accounted for more than a quarter of U.S. electricity demand in 2040.
While BAAJA would make it easier for data centers to connect to the grid, it also includes ratepayer protection provisions that would make it more expensive to do so — roughly 10% more for a 1 gigawatt data center, Rhodium estimates. Determining whether that will drive developers on-grid or off-grid was beyond the scope of the analysis, so the modelers looked at the two extremes — a world where all additional data center demand hooks up to the grid and one where none of it does.
For the on-grid scenario, whether or not that additional demand is met with mostly gas plants or cleaner sources largely depends on the price of fossil versus clean generation. But even if most of the demand was met by natural gas plants on the grid, emissions would still be 30% lower than if it was met by natural gas plants off the grid, Rhodium found.
Editor’s note: This article originally misstated the scope and timing of electricity systems savings in the Resources for the Future study. It has been corrected in this version.