You’re out of free articles.
Log in
To continue reading, log in to your account.
Create a Free Account
To unlock more free articles, please create a free account.
Sign In or Create an Account.
By continuing, you agree to the Terms of Service and acknowledge our Privacy Policy
Welcome to Heatmap
Thank you for registering with Heatmap. Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our lives, a force reshaping our economy, our politics, and our culture. We hope to be your trusted, friendly, and insightful guide to that transformation. Please enjoy your free articles. You can check your profile here .
subscribe to get Unlimited access
Offer for a Heatmap News Unlimited Access subscription; please note that your subscription will renew automatically unless you cancel prior to renewal. Cancellation takes effect at the end of your current billing period. We will let you know in advance of any price changes. Taxes may apply. Offer terms are subject to change.
Subscribe to get unlimited Access
Hey, you are out of free articles but you are only a few clicks away from full access. Subscribe below and take advantage of our introductory offer.
subscribe to get Unlimited access
Offer for a Heatmap News Unlimited Access subscription; please note that your subscription will renew automatically unless you cancel prior to renewal. Cancellation takes effect at the end of your current billing period. We will let you know in advance of any price changes. Taxes may apply. Offer terms are subject to change.
Create Your Account
Please Enter Your Password
Forgot your password?
Please enter the email address you use for your account so we can send you a link to reset your password:
Seventy-eight percent of Americans say they would pay more to buy a U.S.-made EV over a similar Chinese model. Here's why that's significant for Biden's climate law.
Consider for a moment that you are deciding between two electric cars for purchase.
The first is a name-brand American-made EV.
The second is almost identical — same range, same features, same reviews — but it is $5,000 cheaper than the first vehicle, and it is made in China.
Which would you choose?
When asked a nearly identical version of this question last month, nearly four out of every five Americans — some 78% of adults — said that they would buy the more expensive, U.S.-made car, new results from the Heatmap Climate Poll have found. Only 22% of adults said that they would choose the less expensive Chinese vehicle.
The results, which arrive as the Biden administration is finalizing rules that will govern new electric-car subsidies, suggest that many Americans are willing to support costly measures to boost a home-grown EV industry. And it offers some of the first evidence that Americans — who have long told pollsters that they want to buy U.S.-made products, but that they won’t pay extra for them — may be changing their views and buying habits in light of geopolitics.
The result “highlights the opportunity under the [Inflation Reduction Act] that not only Biden has, but the broader U.S. automotive sector has,” Corey Cantor, a senior associate for electric vehicles at BloombergNEF, a clean-energy analysis group, told me. The Inflation Reduction Act, which Congress passed last year, contains what analysts have estimated at hundreds of billions of dollars in tax breaks for companies that manufacture EVs or their batteries in the United States.
The poll adds ballast to one of the law’s central ideas: that Americans would support policy to boost U.S. domestic industry as much — or more — than they would back a more straightforward decarbonization measure. “It sounds like the IRA’s theory — or Joe Manchin’s theory, or Biden’s theory — is really well supported by the American public,” Cantor said, referencing the two Democrats most often credited with the bill’s design.
The EV question united Americans across party, gender, race, age, and ideological lines. Among people who voted for Trump in 2020, 83% said that they would choose the American car; 76% of Biden voters agreed. More than 80% of white, Black, and Asian Americans each picked the domestic model. So did similar majorities of older and younger Americans, men and women, Democrats and Republicans, and college graduates and those without a college degree.
Even among prospective EV buyers — presumably the most cost-sensitive cohort — 75% said that they would choose the pricier, U.S.-made car. The Heatmap Climate Poll, a scientific survey of 1,000 American adults in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, was conducted by the Benenson Strategy Group and Heatmap News during a five-day period last month.
An opinion poll is not a guarantee of consumer behavior. But in the past, Americans have generally said they would choose U.S.-made products only if they cost about as much as foreign-made goods. In 2016, an Associated Press-GFK poll found that while about 75% of Americans wanted to buy U.S.-made products, only about 30% were willing to pay more for them. According to a Boston Consulting Group analysis, Americans tend to be willing to pay about 5% more for a domestic-made product, The Washington Post has reported. With the average price of a new car approaching $50,000, Americans now seem to say that they will pay more than double that to avoid a Chinese-made electric vehicle.
For now, that preference probably has bigger political implications than consumer ones. Although China makes more EVs than any other country and dominates global market share, relatively few Chinese-made vehicles make their way to the United States. The American government has imposed high tariffs on Chinese-made EVs and EV parts — including key minerals used in electronics such as lithium, cobalt, and cadmium — since 2018.
Probably the highest-profile Chinese-made EV now sold in the United States is the Polestar 2, a well-reviewed, roughly $50,000 sedan that gets 300 miles of range. Although Polestar is headquartered in Sweden and associated with Volvo, it is controlled by Li Shufu, a Chinese billionaire and the founder of the Zhejiang Geely Holding Group, China’s seventh-largest carmaker. Geely also owns Volvo, so some of Volvo’s electric cars — such as the XC40 Recharge, a small SUV — use the same underlying “platform,” or shared set of design and engineering components, as Geely’s cars.
But aspects of this arrangement are changing. Polestar has said that its next car, the Polestar 3 — an $83,000 SUV due to go on sale later this year — will be made in Ridgeville, South Carolina.
Chinese-made EVs have been welcomed more warmly elsewhere in the world. The five most popular EVs in Australia are all made in China. BYD, a Chinese firm that is by some measures already the world’s largest EV maker, sells cars there and across northern Europe; it plans to expand to the U.K., Japan, and Mexico this year. So do Geely and Nio, another Chinese automaker. And some American firms are deepening their China ties: Tesla’s Shanghai plant is the company’s largest factory worldwide.
“European consumers have been fairly favorable” to Chinese EVs, Cantor said. “The response has been more like, This is a cool car, they’re a cool company. There’s a more complicated geopolitical relationship for any Chinese company to come into the American market.”
Dan Wang, a technology analyst at Gavekal Dragonomics, an economic-research firm based in Beijing, said that Americans may not be ready for how different these Made-in-China EVs will initially feel. “It’s not clear that the mindset [that Chinese automakers] bring from the Chinese market — featuring greater phone connectivity and a richer infotainment experience for the rider — meets the taste of Americans,” he told me.
That said, the poll question may be unrealistic about China’s ability to make cost-efficient EVs in the American market. In addition to the high tariffs, the federal government will soon provide subsidies of up to $7,500 to EVs that meet strict U.S.-made standards; it is due to announce that program’s details later this week.
Even beyond EVs, a large majority of Americans seemed to back the IRA’s broad, industry-forward approach when it was described to them in neutral terms, the poll found. Asked to choose from a list of pro-climate policies, just under half of Americans said that they would support a carbon tax. But 69% said that they wanted the government to invest “in technologies that greatly reduce greenhouse-gas emissions,” such as renewables or carbon removal. Essentially the same share said they supported requiring businesses to buy a certain share of their energy from renewable or zero-carbon sources.
Perhaps above all, the poll hints at Americans’ deepening skepticism of what was once one of the central bargains in its global trade agreements: that the U.S. should accept less domestic manufacturing in exchange for cheaper consumer prices. Americans — at least when asked hypothetically and about their own pocketbooks — don’t seem as willing to make that exchange anymore. Will they make the same decision at the dealership? The answer will matter to more than just the auto industry.
The Heatmap Climate Poll of 1,000 American adults was conducted via online panels by Benenson Strategy Group from Feb. 15 to 20, 2023. The survey included interviews with Americans in all 50 states and Washington, D.C. The margin of sampling error is plus or minus 3.02 percentage points. You can read more about the topline results here.
Log in
To continue reading, log in to your account.
Create a Free Account
To unlock more free articles, please create a free account.
And data centers might be collateral damage.
After derailing gigawatts of renewable power with a permitting freeze, the Trump administration is expanding its war on renewable energy, retaining one of country music’s biggest stars in a PR offensive against utility-scale projects on “prime farmland.”
The administration recently onboarded John Rich – one half of the stadium-packing American musical duo Big & Rich – to be Trump’s “special envoy for American landowners.” Rich entered activism around landowner rights last January when he backed opponents fighting a large Tennessee Valley Authority transmission project routed through his home county of Cheatham, Tennessee. This led to him joining the Trump team, where he’s fashioning himself as a go-to guy and cheerleader for anyone who wants Trump to help stop a solar or wind farm they don’t want built.
Rich’s first fight on behalf of the Trump team? Battling solar projects in upstate New York. Over the weekend, Agriculture Secretary Brooke Rollins, EPA Administrator Lee Zeldin, and the freshly-annointed Rich wrote New York Governor Kathy Hochul grilling her on the state’s definition of “prime farmland” and claiming “the absence of a clear plan” for disposing of solar panels after projects are decommissioned. The letter resulted from Rich’s conversations with a prominent anti-solar Substack author in upstate New York, Alexandra Fasulo, and it references a specific Repsol project under development in Glen, New York, that she is fighting in state court.
“Only 8 weeks ago, I decided to start posting my written content from Facebook and Substack to X. It didn’t take long before John Rich and I connected,” Fasulo wrote in a blog on Monday. “John and I spoke on the phone a few times. We texted and I began to share my research with him. Many meetings later… and the US Department of Agriculture, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and John Rich put their heads together.” In her post Fasulo signaled more is coming. “If you read the letter slowly, you’ll get the gist of what the feds are trying to do here. For legal purposes, I am not going to explain that in writing. Read between the lines,” she said. “This lays the foundation for battling destruction at the hands of solar and wind complexes, battery storage, and so much more. Have a little faith and patience. There is A LOT to come.”
Trump is pivoting to farmland fights because there are few battlegrounds left for the federal government to fire upon. He has totally undermined large-scale renewable energy development in the ocean – I mean, look at offshore wind. He’s wrecked progress in the desert, where large solar farms on federal lands remain trapped in bureaucratic permitting delays. Some facilities are now getting through, like Primergy Power’s Purple Sage Energy Center south of Pahrump, Nevada, which got its permits last month. Yet other large projects are petering out; permitting on at least three large solar proposals – Smith Blythe’s Desert Energy Charger Project and Intersect Power’s Perkins Renewable Energy Project in California and Balanced Rock Power’s Samantha Solar effort in Nevada – has been paused or canceled outright since the start of the year.
The president’s turn to fighting projects on farmland also makes sense from a political standpoint. He’s facing an enormous backlash to a buildout of hyperscale data centers he supported, many of which are sited on acreage suitable for agriculture. Republicans running statewide in must-watch midterms battlegrounds – Texas and Iowa, for example – will have to navigate this rocky terrain where something their president supported is deeply unpopular. By bringing Rich aboard and letting him wail on renewable energy in the public square, it’ll be a signal that the Big Man is still listening to rural MAGA voters wary of industrial development.
In media interviews, Rich has claimed Trump created this new, unpaid special envoy position after the country star turned down an offer to sit on the TVA. “I said [to Trump], ‘if I serve with the TVA I cannot disparage the TVA, and I fully intend on keeping my right to disparage them intact.’” He said, ‘You know what, I respect that. So what do you want to do?’ And I said, ‘Man, give me a position where I’ve got some authority and I can work with the highest agencies in the land to protect landowners. Can you create something like that for me?’”
That’s at least the public story for how the president created the “special envoy” role, which Rich has described in ways that are equal parts citizen-government liaison and culture warrior. It’s now clear from his many posts on X that he’ll be heavily involved in messaging against the construction of new renewable energy facilities, carbon pipelines and, potentially, hyperscale data centers.
“[I’ll] go out, find these egregious situations where landowners are being infringed upon and I can go in, work with USDA, EPA, Secretary of the Interior, HUD, the Energy Department, and then all the way of course [to] the Oval Office – to throw up a defense against American landowners,” Rich told Atkisson. He added that data centers will also be a focus of his in government, and there are “two or three” projects out there where he wanted to intervene.
“The president wants to see the data centers built, but he also wants the farm and ranchland to be preserved. We have to have food security for America. We have to.”
Rich and Fasulo then joined Rollins and other administration officials at a press conference Thursday in Washington, D.C. Fasulo spoke at length against New York solar and wind development. Pressed on how data centers square with farmland protection, Rollins spoke about the anxiety in rural America around hyperscalers.
“That debate is raging right now,” she said. “I think that the importance of private property rights, the importance of preserving American farmland, the importance of ensuring we’re going to have another 250 years of freedom is paramount. Does that mean it is completely incompatible with data centers? I don’t think so and I know President Trump doesn’t think so. But what it does mean is that we have to be extremely intentional. There should be plenty of land in this country where data centers can be built that will not be on prime, important farmland. That’s my take on that.”
When Rich joined the federal government is unclear. The Agriculture Department formally announced Rich joined the administration on June 10, but Rich first disclosed Trump “made an offer for a position” in a subscriber-only post made to X on July 24, 2025. He then provided updates in similarly paywalled statements, revealing the Trump appointment to his subscribers in April. Then in May, he told subscribers that he’d completed federal onboarding. “I’m really looking forward to pushing bad guys off of good guys’ land:) You’ll be seeing the official announcement soon, but I wanted you to know 1st!”
What’s clear, however, is that Rich has other targets too. As Rich was brought into federal service, he began routinely sharing a URL – “usda.gov/lawfare” – and directed aggrieved landowners to report potential misdeeds around land seizure. A review of his back-and-forth communications on social media indicate several potential fights he may wade into. Wind energy projects in Kansas. Solar development in rural Virginia. An aluminum smelter in Oklahoma. Carbon capture proposals in Louisiana.
Prior to formally joining the administration, Rich got involved in a conflict over eminent domain and transmission for data centers in Coweta County, Georgia, which had gone viral on right-wing social media. On May 12, Rich said he “just had a great phone call” with Rep. Brian Jack, the GOP congressman who represents the transmission battleground in question. “I will be speaking more on the matter soon,” he tweeted, declaring the power lines threatened “not only homes, but cattle farms and row crops.” Rich also says he facilitated federal engagement between the USDA and Casey Murph, a rancher in Navajo County, Arizona, who claims the state prematurely ended a land lease he held so Orsted can build a solar project.
It’s also apparent Rich will be the first major Trump administration official to publicly root for more counties to indefinitely ban solar and wind development. “The best way for farm and ranch land to be protected from wind/solar projects is for the county to pass a moratorium on those energy sources, disallowing them to ever be built in the county,” Rich told an X follower on May 16.
No one can predict how harmful it’ll be to have one of country music’s most famous artists turning into a spokesperson against renewable energy. But I doubt even paying Katie Miller to say nice things about solar will be able to overcome newly-empowered activism from a Nashville legend.
And more of the week’s top news around project fights.
1. Kansas City, Missouri – Data centers are so toxic that politicians are using them as boogeymen in totally unrelated policy discussions.
2. Ingham County, Michigan – We have our first major anti-data center candidate in a Democratic congressional primary.
3. Nueces County, Texas - The Longhorn State is on a bull run towards data center hostility.
4. Pulaski County, Arkansas - We have yet another municipal employee losing their job over helping a data center.
5. Marathon County, Wisconsin - Yet again rural residents are poised to lose against state permitting primacy laws benefiting renewable energy.
This week’s conversation is with Grant Gutierrez, head of community impacts at carbon management company Carbon Direct. This week Carbon Direct published a white paper Gutierrez authored on opposition around data centers he’s studied. His research reinforces much of what Heatmap Pro has uncovered, but I was particularly intrigued by a topline finding – that transparency is the most common thread in the 46 data center fights he looked into. Was he seeing what I’ve been seeing? So I asked him to hop onto a Zoom call and let me know his thoughts.
The following conversation was lightly edited for clarity.
If you were to explain the findings in your white paper to someone at a bar… how would you put it?
What I would say is that we were really interested in the kinds of concerns communities were articulating as they were opposing or resisting data center development in the U.S. To answer and explore those questions, we developed our own data center cancellation tracker where we looked for cases where we could find a strong correlation between cancelation or withdrawal status and opposition. Then we did high-level analyses of the demographics surrounding those data centers, using standard best practices from environmental justice methodologies and pulling sociodemographic and environmental burden characters from EPA’s EJScreen tool. We were mostly looking at public records. Press materials. City council meeting minutes. Things you wouldn’t have to dig too hard to find.
The kinds of communities we saw successfully resisting data centers tracked across the demographic middle of the United States – slightly more middle income, slightly more white than a majority of the American community, but mostly what you’d consider the average American community.
What is the intended audience of this paper and what are you hoping to communicate?
I think it’s important for data center developers and the capital behind them is that they need to move their engagement to early stage, responsible design. A second audience is regulators, city councils, and local zoning commissions about how to engage with developers and advocate for the right disclosure requirements from industry.
The key topline message is that developers who treat community engagement as a permitting formality instead of a critical early stage input are burdening communities, breaking trust. This is resulting in reputational risk for developers, stranded assets, losing capital – and the loss of future opportunities as developers want to build 21st century infrastructure.
Walk me through what you saw evaluating these projects. What’s the development pattern that leads to such opposition?
We saw five key themes. Some of them you might expect – concerns around natural resources, water impacts, electricity rates, land. The rural character came up quite consistently. And then there was a lack of transparency through the use of NDAs.
The NDA example I was surprised to see was the most consistent in all of our case studies. Communities are largely concerned with the process that unfolds as much as the impacts. That’s a very important signal that transcends political lines. Communities want to be heard, involved in the process. They want large infrastructural development with impacts to listen to their concerns. When those decisions are made behind NDAs or with no transparency or equitable engagement, communities quickly mobilize and organize at a hyperlocal level and are successful in opposing these data centers.
I know there are a number of companies out there – without naming names – that are putting responsible development principles forward. The ones we advocate for across our business, whether we’re working in carbon removal or other things. I see companies leading and saying, if we’re involved in this infrastructure, we are not going to sign an NDA. Those who are pushing forward renewable energy commitments, community benefit agreements, and local public-private partnerships are leading with transparency and equity in their engagements.
How any of this carries in the broader industry is yet to be seen.
In your report you point to various ways opposition can crop up to a project. One of those ways was due to the presence of co-located gas – you note that gas power at a data center engendered environmental opponents, which then strengthened those fighting a data center. Can you elaborate on whether you think a new gas power presence is making it harder to get a data center built?
The case you’re pointing to, that’s the Ballico case where on top of the data center there was a 3,500 megawatt co-located gas plant. That quickly led to major community concerns and a partnership with the Southern Environmental Law Center, which became the legal anchor for thinking through the opposition here and commissioned the technical evidence, and provided the legal [support] there.
You see a broad coalition coalesce around not only the data center concern but the climate concerns that arise. I wouldn’t be surprised if we saw a repeated concern around the expansion of fossil energy and combustion sources going hand in hand with community opposition and organizing on data centers. But that remains to be seen.
What in your research have you seen when you compare opposition to data centers and campaigns against, let’s say, fossil fuels? Or mining? Or renewables?
What I think about with data centers is they’re the highways of the 21st century. As we know through the highway projects in the U.S., there were major disproportionate impacts on communities of color. I think there’s potential for data centers if they follow that playbook to have that same impact.
When it comes to comparing these, that’s something I have not done yet. But I think there’s a few things happening. I think the scale and scope of the buildout is taking the American public by surprise. Articulation around impacts to natural resources and electricity prices in a heightened political climate and a difficult economy. It’s also the existential problem AI introduces, which is the role AI plays in society. This is unique compared to other kinds of extraction, which feed technologies already at play.
How do you feel about the fact that so many of us in energy, environment and climate are now talking about data centers all the time?
Never in my career, working in carbon removal and nature based solutions, I never thought data centers would be a major focus in my career as an environmental justice advocate and social scientist.
Data centers are probably emerging to be one of the biggest environmental justice problems of our time so while it’s not something I planned to work on, I am emboldened to see the response from the nonprofit community and others trying to wrap their heads around this. What is the right kind of information? What does the public need to know? How do we advocate for our communities and build the world we would like to build?
While data centers are moving fast, I’m encouraged to see communities organizing and advocating for their own needs as well. Over the next few years, the story will tell itself.
Last question – what was the last song you listened to?
DtMF by Bad Bunny.