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Seventy-eight percent of Americans say they would pay more to buy a U.S.-made EV over a similar Chinese model. Here's why that's significant for Biden's climate law.
Consider for a moment that you are deciding between two electric cars for purchase.
The first is a name-brand American-made EV.
The second is almost identical — same range, same features, same reviews — but it is $5,000 cheaper than the first vehicle, and it is made in China.
Which would you choose?
When asked a nearly identical version of this question last month, nearly four out of every five Americans — some 78% of adults — said that they would buy the more expensive, U.S.-made car, new results from the Heatmap Climate Poll have found. Only 22% of adults said that they would choose the less expensive Chinese vehicle.
The results, which arrive as the Biden administration is finalizing rules that will govern new electric-car subsidies, suggest that many Americans are willing to support costly measures to boost a home-grown EV industry. And it offers some of the first evidence that Americans — who have long told pollsters that they want to buy U.S.-made products, but that they won’t pay extra for them — may be changing their views and buying habits in light of geopolitics.
The result “highlights the opportunity under the [Inflation Reduction Act] that not only Biden has, but the broader U.S. automotive sector has,” Corey Cantor, a senior associate for electric vehicles at BloombergNEF, a clean-energy analysis group, told me. The Inflation Reduction Act, which Congress passed last year, contains what analysts have estimated at hundreds of billions of dollars in tax breaks for companies that manufacture EVs or their batteries in the United States.
The poll adds ballast to one of the law’s central ideas: that Americans would support policy to boost U.S. domestic industry as much — or more — than they would back a more straightforward decarbonization measure. “It sounds like the IRA’s theory — or Joe Manchin’s theory, or Biden’s theory — is really well supported by the American public,” Cantor said, referencing the two Democrats most often credited with the bill’s design.
The EV question united Americans across party, gender, race, age, and ideological lines. Among people who voted for Trump in 2020, 83% said that they would choose the American car; 76% of Biden voters agreed. More than 80% of white, Black, and Asian Americans each picked the domestic model. So did similar majorities of older and younger Americans, men and women, Democrats and Republicans, and college graduates and those without a college degree.
Even among prospective EV buyers — presumably the most cost-sensitive cohort — 75% said that they would choose the pricier, U.S.-made car. The Heatmap Climate Poll, a scientific survey of 1,000 American adults in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, was conducted by the Benenson Strategy Group and Heatmap News during a five-day period last month.
An opinion poll is not a guarantee of consumer behavior. But in the past, Americans have generally said they would choose U.S.-made products only if they cost about as much as foreign-made goods. In 2016, an Associated Press-GFK poll found that while about 75% of Americans wanted to buy U.S.-made products, only about 30% were willing to pay more for them. According to a Boston Consulting Group analysis, Americans tend to be willing to pay about 5% more for a domestic-made product, The Washington Post has reported. With the average price of a new car approaching $50,000, Americans now seem to say that they will pay more than double that to avoid a Chinese-made electric vehicle.
For now, that preference probably has bigger political implications than consumer ones. Although China makes more EVs than any other country and dominates global market share, relatively few Chinese-made vehicles make their way to the United States. The American government has imposed high tariffs on Chinese-made EVs and EV parts — including key minerals used in electronics such as lithium, cobalt, and cadmium — since 2018.
Probably the highest-profile Chinese-made EV now sold in the United States is the Polestar 2, a well-reviewed, roughly $50,000 sedan that gets 300 miles of range. Although Polestar is headquartered in Sweden and associated with Volvo, it is controlled by Li Shufu, a Chinese billionaire and the founder of the Zhejiang Geely Holding Group, China’s seventh-largest carmaker. Geely also owns Volvo, so some of Volvo’s electric cars — such as the XC40 Recharge, a small SUV — use the same underlying “platform,” or shared set of design and engineering components, as Geely’s cars.
But aspects of this arrangement are changing. Polestar has said that its next car, the Polestar 3 — an $83,000 SUV due to go on sale later this year — will be made in Ridgeville, South Carolina.
Chinese-made EVs have been welcomed more warmly elsewhere in the world. The five most popular EVs in Australia are all made in China. BYD, a Chinese firm that is by some measures already the world’s largest EV maker, sells cars there and across northern Europe; it plans to expand to the U.K., Japan, and Mexico this year. So do Geely and Nio, another Chinese automaker. And some American firms are deepening their China ties: Tesla’s Shanghai plant is the company’s largest factory worldwide.
“European consumers have been fairly favorable” to Chinese EVs, Cantor said. “The response has been more like, This is a cool car, they’re a cool company. There’s a more complicated geopolitical relationship for any Chinese company to come into the American market.”
Dan Wang, a technology analyst at Gavekal Dragonomics, an economic-research firm based in Beijing, said that Americans may not be ready for how different these Made-in-China EVs will initially feel. “It’s not clear that the mindset [that Chinese automakers] bring from the Chinese market — featuring greater phone connectivity and a richer infotainment experience for the rider — meets the taste of Americans,” he told me.
That said, the poll question may be unrealistic about China’s ability to make cost-efficient EVs in the American market. In addition to the high tariffs, the federal government will soon provide subsidies of up to $7,500 to EVs that meet strict U.S.-made standards; it is due to announce that program’s details later this week.
Even beyond EVs, a large majority of Americans seemed to back the IRA’s broad, industry-forward approach when it was described to them in neutral terms, the poll found. Asked to choose from a list of pro-climate policies, just under half of Americans said that they would support a carbon tax. But 69% said that they wanted the government to invest “in technologies that greatly reduce greenhouse-gas emissions,” such as renewables or carbon removal. Essentially the same share said they supported requiring businesses to buy a certain share of their energy from renewable or zero-carbon sources.
Perhaps above all, the poll hints at Americans’ deepening skepticism of what was once one of the central bargains in its global trade agreements: that the U.S. should accept less domestic manufacturing in exchange for cheaper consumer prices. Americans — at least when asked hypothetically and about their own pocketbooks — don’t seem as willing to make that exchange anymore. Will they make the same decision at the dealership? The answer will matter to more than just the auto industry.
The Heatmap Climate Poll of 1,000 American adults was conducted via online panels by Benenson Strategy Group from Feb. 15 to 20, 2023. The survey included interviews with Americans in all 50 states and Washington, D.C. The margin of sampling error is plus or minus 3.02 percentage points. You can read more about the topline results here.
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Current conditions: Hurricane Genevieve formed into the first major storm of the season, strengthening to Category 4 off Mexico’s Pacific Coast on Sunday but steering clear of any land for now • Hurricane Fausto, meanwhile, is weakening as it heads toward Hawaii • China evacuated hundreds of thousands of people as Typhoon Noul made landfall.

Wildfires in France and Spain forced roughly 300,000 people to evacuate their homes in what the French Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez called an “unprecedented” blaze. In Spain, the central western province of Avila suffered what the broadcaster France24 described as its “worst blaze in recent history” as Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez directly linked the disaster to climate change. By Sunday evening, in France, flames had come within nine miles of the southwestern city of Bordeaux in the heart of the nation's storied winelands as President Emmanuel Macron vowed to “rebuild.” Others saw the disaster as a sign of overdue lifestyle and infrastructure changes in the face of a warming planet. In Le Monde, the newspaper of record, the philosopher Cynthia Fleury and the Socialist mayor of the town of Saint-Médard-en-Jalles, Stéphane Delpeyrat-Vincen, argued: “What is burning is not just forests, but a way of inhabiting the land that is no longer possible.” The fires come weeks after a series of historic heat waves in Europe, including the hottest June on record, which made tinderboxes of parched woodlands.
President Donald Trump last week announced a landmark deal with Saudi Arabia to help build the kingdom’s first nuclear power station, besting the Russians and the Chinese in a race to tap into one of the world’s most coveted new export markets for atomic power technology. While the White House has yet to release all the details on the geopolitically meteoric agreement with Riyadh, sources with knowledge of the deal have confirmed to me what’s been reported elsewhere — that the deal will almost certainly include new large-scale Westinghouse AP1000s. Over the weekend, The New York Times identified another element to the partnership: Trump’s family and personal friends may benefit. The newspaper pointed to ties between a firm owned by Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick’s sons and Westinghouse; links between Eric Trump and Donald Trump Jr.’s investments into quantum computing and former Texas Governor Rick Perry’s Fermi America project to build AP1000s in Texas; and suggested that TAE Technologies, the fusion company merging with the corporate parent of Trump’s Truth Social platform, could see potential benefits from the Saudi deal. “There is no evidence at this point that Mr. Trump’s friends or family helped orchestrate the Saudi nuclear deal,” reporters Eric Lipton and Kate Kelly wrote. “Yet a number of the president’s allies and relatives, including members of his cabinet, stand to benefit if his big bet on nuclear power pays off. Certain investors with ties to these deals are positioned to profit, even if the delivery of large new loads of nuclear-powered electricity remains years away.”
The Trump administration is, in fact, making a real attempt at building new AP1000s at home. As my colleague Robinson Meyer wrote last month, a major Department of Energy deal would help utilities buy the parts needed to build more Westinghouse reactors.
Chip giant Nvidia is considering providing a $250 billion backstop to fund OpenAI’s data center project in southern Ohio, The Wall Street Journal reported on Sunday. The deal would guarantee up to half of the capital needed to lease SoftBank’s 10-gigawatt data center to supply computing power to the ChatGPT maker.
GE Vernova’s backlog of orders for gas turbines, meanwhile, now stretches to 2031 and accounts for a cumulative 116 gigawatts of power-producing capacity. In its latest earnings call, covered in Utility Dive at the end of last week, the company posted double-digit revenue and order growth in the division that supplies equipment for gas, hydro, nuclear, and grid facilities.
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Back in February, I told you that Japan was stepping up its efforts to extract rare earths from seabed minerals. On Friday, Tokyo confirmed it had discovered that medium and heavy rare earth elements accounted for about 54% of the rare earths mined from mud recovered from a remote Pacific island, Mining.com reported. The finds come after the government-backed vessel Chikyu sucked nearly 50 metric tons of mud from Minamitori Island, an uninhabited atoll located closer to Wake Island than Tokyo. Heavy rare earths, such as dysprosium, terbium, and yttrium — and medium rare earths such as samarium, europium, and gadolinium — are trickier to process. China controls the market for both categories by a wider margin than for light rare earths. That makes Japan’s discovery so exciting. Separating metals out of the mud could be an easier process than from other ores, potentially supplying the democratic world with a new source of non-Chinese minerals.
When the Biden administration tried putting rules in place for producing clean hydrogen, as my colleague Emily Pontecorvo explained nicely at the time, the regulations posed a problem for efforts to make fuel through nuclear-powered electrolysis. That’s because the incentives to ensure developers built new solar and wind rather than cannibalizing existing grid resources for hydrogen production made it impossible for nuclear reactors to qualify. Companies such as Constellation Energy, which had the nation’s leading experiment in nuclear-powered hydrogen production, protested. It all turned out to be for nought, since Trump ultimately wiped out the tax credits. As with so much nuclear technology that faces political tumult in America, South Korea is moving in to try its hand at hydrogen fuel production. Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power, the country’s state-owned nuclear giant, said it will launch a pilot program to produce hydrogen using heat and electricity from reactors, Hydrogen Insight reported last week.
India, meanwhile, is beefing up its plans for small modular reactors. Earlier this month, I reminded you about New Delhi’s plans to open its nuclear sector to foreign investments after years of icing out all but Russia’s state nuclear vendor. That isn’t to say India isn’t looking to continue building its own indigenously-designed units. On Friday, NucNet reported that the country plans to develop and operate at least five of its own SMR designs by 2033.
Last week, Heatmap editorial fellow Ameya Hadap broke news that Koloma, a startup seeking to spur natural production of hydrogen, had inked a deal to look for gas deposits across 817 square miles of the Philippines’ largest island, Luzon. It’s not the only subsurface search for clean energy. Last week, the country’s Economy and Development Council approved the Philippines’ first financing package to de-risk geothermal investments, Think Geo Energy reported.
The data center boom is everywhere you look in U.S. economic and emissions data.
This is an edition of Heatmap Daily, an evening review of the day’s news written by our executive editor. Sign up for it here.
It isn’t exactly a new thought, but I’ve been struck recently by how many trends in America’s economic and environmental data are fundamentally about the data center boom and the return of electricity demand:
First, the Energy Information Administration reported this week that U.S. emissions grew by more than 2% last year, driven by surging electricity demand and an increase in coal-fired generation. What caused that higher power demand? New factories and data centers — as well as record summertime cooling demand.
Second, many of the new factories driving that higher power demand are themselves producing goods that are … let’s say … data center-adjacent. There are the enormous new semiconductor fabs, of course. But Ford and General Motors have also set up new production lines (or repurposed old ones) to manufacture grid-scale batteries to meet power demand.
Third, take a look at the recent U.S. spending on private non-residential construction — in other words, everything American companies are building that is not houses, condos, or apartments.
The construction industry’s spent almost $60 billion on data centers over the past year, which is more than it spent on all other office buildings combined (and more than it spent building warehouses, too). Just a handful of categories — data centers, power plants, electricity infrastructure, and certain kinds of electronics manufacturing — now make up a third of all U.S. private non-residential construction investment. They’ve never made up such a large share of construction spending since data collection began in 2014.
As The New York Times recently noted, the American economy is unusually dependent on the American stock market right now — and the stock market is unusually dependent on artificial intelligence. This week, investors started to balk at the enormous spending hyperscalers are planning to keep building out the AI boom; Alphabet’s shares dropped 8% this week after it boosted its planned 2026 capital expenditure and signaled 2027 will be even bigger. If the data center boom started to slow down in earnest, then more than just that budget will change.
Speaking of which, my colleague Emily Pontecorvo wrote earlier this week about how many businesses are struggling to even estimate their carbon emissions from artificial intelligence. The carbon accounting startup Watershed recently unveiled a new formula to help companies get a sense of their AI-related emissions.
But even that formula is still limited by the amount of data hyperscalers publish — and they don’t publish that much. Google, for instance, is the only AI company that has (laudably) provided estimates of its emissions on a per-prompt basis. Yet no company has published its per-token emissions, or how emissions sync up with particular models or regions.
So Emily asked Google: Why aren’t you — or any other model provider — disclosing this kind of data yet?
The tech company didn’t get back to us until after we’d published Emily’s story. But its response was interesting enough that I wanted to quote some of it here.
The problem is “industry consensus,” Cooper Elsworth, a Google spokesperson, told us. “There is currently very little consensus on how to comprehensively and fairly measure the serving environmental impact of generative AI (such as text generation),” he wrote. “Without standardized, ‘apples-to-apples’ frameworks, it is difficult to compare different providers accurately.”
That’s partly because energy use — and emissions data — can vary from site to site and depend on “custom-built hardware, software compilers, and advanced inference techniques.” And he claimed Google doesn’t always have the measurement hardware in place to provide such specific estimates: “Providing precise, repeatable data requires highly advanced measurement infrastructure,” he said. “For example, software-based energy monitoring tools often suffer from sampling biases. For our study, we had to step away from top-down averages and directly measure actual energy at the physical power supply unit (PSU) level across our deployed fleet. Not all providers have the telemetry or data sets required to benchmark their operations at this level of granularity.”
Read Emily’s story to understand the other reasons why estimating — or even “guesstimating” — AI-related carbon emissions is so challenging.
A conversation with Emma Uridge of the Kansas Health Institute.
This week’s conversation is with Emma Uridge, analyst with the Kansas Health Institute. Uridge spent copious hours analyzing state and local laws on data center development to best understand how policymakers are responding to the potential environmental public health impacts of large AI infrastructure, including power and water. The report, which came out this week, also goes in depth into those health impacts. I reached out to her to discuss what she sees as must-watch territory for our readers on this emerging policy arena.
Our conversation was lightly edited for clarity.
What is actually being done on policy when it comes to data centers — beyond moratoria of course?
So first I’d like to just talk about the point of moratoria. It’s helpful to talk about how these policies emerge in the first place. One area where moratoria are helpful is when a data center is proposed but the county has no approach for how they’d like to potentially regulate them. That’s temporary, most of the time. It lets local governments conduct research on the various impacts and also negotiate community benefits, ones that can mitigate any potential negative impacts — like Lancaster Pennsylvania, which instituted a community benefit agreement that maximized the potential benefits of development while mitigating what large data centers can do. That agreement looked at capping municipal water use at 20,000 gallons per day and requiring 100% clean energy. It had financial penalties for non-compliance. The company also committed $20 million to their local economic development and clean energy fund. There are ways to negotiate with developers.
We also see amendments to existing zoning. Data center proposals are increasingly popping up in rural areas, many of which are unzoned, so there’s no way a county can negotiate unless there’s a moratorium in place.
Other policy solutions include different performance standards or requiring on-site renewable energy, like what Jefferson County, Missouri, looked at. Also setback requirements, mandatory noise buffers, ending by-right zoning.
Where are local governments getting ideas for regulating data centers?
A lot of the technical information comes from developers. That can in cases be seen as a biased source of information. I wouldn’t say there’s a dedicated group providing assistance to local governments when a project is proposed — which is a similar story to wind industry development, where we have only a handful of consultants who provide technical advice. It can be really helpful to get a multi-disciplinary approach to hearing information. It can be helpful to have the utility commission, public health folks, those in academia, as well as the developer.
As of right now, especially in rural areas, local governments have a hard task of balancing pushback while getting the most accurate, evidence-based, neutral information to make decisions. That balance can be contentious.
What is the federal government doing on data center policy? How is the Trump administration approaching it?
A few things there. In the early days, the drive was for AI expansion and to be competitive with foreign adversaries. Now due to the amount of public pushback in red and blue localities and a more cautious approach.
I’m not seeing a lot of actual policy movement at this time.
I know the EPA is looking at the chemicals used in cooling data centers because when that water is cycled through the system, some of it is discharged into the water system, so they’re looking at the Toxic Substances and Control Act for monitoring that.
How much of an impact does this minimal federal role have on industry behavior?
Y’know, this isn’t specific to data centers. This is true for all kinds of large-scale development: there’s a need to require some sort of federal monitoring and regulation.
That’s where I see an emerging role for public health. At the federal level, there could be policy movement towards requiring some sort of environmental monitoring at data centers to make sure they’re operating responsibility. Looking at specific water use relative to water availability and what happens when there’s a time of severe, persistent drought. With air quality too — we’ve seen areas where the grid isn’t as reliable so their diesel generators are kicking on more and affecting air quality for residents.
We’re just not seeing all of that right now. We need corporate disclosure.
What do you see as the most important public health impacts from data center development?
It varies by localities. The most discussed obviously is water usage. One thing I’d note about my conversations with folks enthusiastic around emerging tech is, there are still questions that need to be asked about the capacity of localities to support a data center. Like a small town in Kansas may only be using 40% of their water for their utility needs. If a data center came online, how much of that water goes to the data center?
One area underexplored within the public health discipline is energy poverty and energy security. The ability of a household to meet the needs of everything energy provides in our lives. It’s known we have an aging electric grid but we’re not talking enough about large-scale blackouts when the grid is not sufficient to support some of these new data centers.