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Rob and Jesse talk with a former Meta energy executive, Near Horizon Group’s Peter Freed.

If you care about decarbonizing the power grid anytime soon, you have to care about data centers. The AI boom and the ongoing growth of the internet have driven a big new cycle of data center construction in the United States, with tech companies trying to buy electricity on the scale of large cities’ energy demands.
Peter Freed has seen this up close. As Meta’s former director of energy strategy, he worked on clean energy procurement and data center development from 2014 to 2024. He is now a founding partner at the Near Horizon Group, where he advises investors and companies on emerging topics in data centers and advanced clean energy.
On this week’s episode of Shift Key, Rob and Jesse talk with Peter about whether AI and new data centers are going to blow up the grid and break decarbonization. What are the real-world constraints on developing a data center in 2025? Are tech companies beginning to run out of natural gas to burn? What do their investments in clean energy mean? And could the rise of AI prompt an accidental return to coal? Shift Key is hosted by Jesse Jenkins, a professor of energy systems engineering at Princeton University, and Robinson Meyer, Heatmap’s executive editor.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, or wherever you get your podcasts.
You can also add the show’s RSS feed to your podcast app to follow us directly.
Here is an excerpt from our conversation:
Robinson Meyer: Even now, most of the data centers getting built are not AI data centers, right? The AI signal has yet to fully set in. Is that right?
Peter Freed: That’s right. What I would say is, if you look back at what happened, what got announced in 2024, most of the data centers that broke ground and were announced in 2024 were part of a demand plan that was done in 2023, when we did not have the AI demand ratchet, as I call it, on the system.
Now, what people then did is they probably just pulled stuff in. So you know, maybe you were going to do four data centers in 2024 and a few more in 2025. And instead they just, they yanked it forward. So it is also true that we’re definitely seeing the beginnings of this. But this year, 2025, will be a real bellwether year in terms of what the likely overall picture looks like. And one of the proxies that you can use for that is the capex forecast of the hyperscalers. So Meta’s capex forecast in 2024 was $38 billion; 2025, their capex forecast is $65 billion. So that’s a huge jump.
And by the way, Meta in particular doesn’t have a cloud business, so they’re not dependent on the signals coming in from other people. This is just for their own. So in some ways, it’s a clearer picture than we get from some of the other companies. Both Microsoft and Google are up at $80 billion. So to me this says, okay, 2025 is kind of going to show us where this trajectory is likely to go. And it’s pretty high.
I see the same reports that you all see. We’re probably somewhere between 30 [gigawatts] and 100 gigawatts of incremental data center-related load by 2030. I’d take the over at 50 gigawatts. It might be a little bit less, it might be more — 100 [gigawatts], I don’t know. So that’s a big signal.
Jesse Jenkins: For context, 50 gigawatts is half of the U.S. nuclear power fleet.
Freed: That’s correct. Yeah.
Jenkins: Maybe like 10% of U.S. electricity.
Freed: Yeah. Yeah. And so it lines up pretty well with what we were just talking about in terms of those forecasts. At the same time, if you look at all of the load growth projections that utilities with major data center demand have in their jurisdictions, you also get a number which is way larger than 50 gigawatts.
What is the reason for this gratuitous speculative behavior, the likes of which the industry has never seen? And we can talk as much or as little about that as you want, but it is simultaneously true that I think this is going to be a really large demand driver and that we have bubble-like characteristics in terms of the amount of stuff that people are trying to get done.
Music for Shift Key is by Adam Kromelow.
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Rob digs deep on critical minerals with Full Tilt Strategies’ Nathaniel Horadam.
President Trump announced on Monday that the U.S. would create a domestic stockpile of critical minerals for civilian use — essentially a Strategic Petroleum Reserve, but for lithium, copper, rare earths, and other rocks central to electronics and decarbonization.
It’s one of many experimental and unusual steps that the administration has taken to boost U.S. mineral production over the past 13 months. But are any of those plans working? What could improve — and what does any of this mean for clean energy?
On this week’s Shift Key, we talk to someone who saw these policies up close. From 2023 to 2025, Nathaniel Horadam worked on electric vehicle and mineral policy at the Department of Energy’s Loan Programs Office, eventually overseeing the office’s critical mineral portfolio last year. The office is the department’s in-house bank (it’s since been rechristened the Energy Dominance Financing Office) and it runs some of the federal government’s most ambitious industrial policy.
Horadam is now founder and president of Full Tilt Strategies, LLC, and he writes about mineral issues for his Tailings substack. He joins us to discuss what’s working, what’s not working, and what needs to improve. Shift Key is hosted by Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap, and Jesse Jenkins, a professor of energy systems engineering at Princeton University. Jesse is off this week.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, or wherever you get your podcasts.
You can also add the show’s RSS feed to your podcast app to follow us directly.
Here is an excerpt from our conversation:
Nathaniel Horadam: My like third cardinal rule here: Losing money is okay. At the end of the day, you’re providing an insurance policy —
Robinson Meyer: The government losing money is okay.
Horadam: Yeah. I mean, at the end of the day, one of my biggest observational complaints with the way the Trump administration’s approaching a lot of these deals right now is they’re being structured to not lose money.
Even if they’re taking risk, you’re taking equity stakes, and you’re looking to collateralize enough stuff. It’s a private equity mindset. It’s not necessarily setting up projects to succeed in the long term, and mechanisms to succeed in the long term. And the same thing — I mean, the Export-Import Bank, I applaud them for getting creative here and trying to find ways to extend its existing authorities as much as possible. But Ex-Im has a pretty strict loss cap that has traditionally constrained the amount of risk it can take. And between that and the fact that they were able to pull in outside investors to do this means it’s being structured to make a profit.
That may run against the goals of actually trying to provide the shock absorbers that you need for actual critical materials. I hope it doesn’t end up steering deal flow toward things that are more lucrative to try and keep this in the green and meet investor expectations. Certainly the encouraging bit that I saw in the Bloomberg story is that they are letting the industrial end users dictate what they stockpile. But at the end of the day, it’s still controlled by an administration that’s getting a lot of pressure to fix various markets for different materials, and it may be inclined to intervene in places that are a little bit outta scope. Let’s put it that way.
Mentioned:
Final 2025 List of Critical Minerals
Reuters: US moves away from critical mineral price floors
“What exactly are ‘Critical Minerals’?,” by Nathaniel Horadam
The Secure Minerals Act, by Senators Todd Young and Jeanne Shaheen
The Pentagon’s Rare Earths Deal Is Making Former Biden Officials Jealous
This episode of Shift Key is sponsored by ...
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Music for Shift Key is by Adam Kromelow.
The FREEDOM Act aims to protect energy developments from changing political winds.
A specter is haunting permitting reform talks — the specter of regulatory uncertainty. That seemingly anodyne two-word term has become Beltway shorthand for President Donald Trump’s unrelenting campaign to rescind federal permits for offshore wind projects. The repeated failure of the administration’s anti-wind policies to hold up in court aside, the precedent the president is setting has spooked oil and gas executives, who warn that a future Democratic government could try to yank back fossil fuel projects’ permits.
A new bipartisan bill set to be introduced in the House Tuesday morning seeks to curb the executive branch’s power to claw back previously-granted permits, protecting energy projects of all kinds from whiplash every time the political winds change.
Dubbed the FREEDOM Act, the legislation — a copy of which Heatmap obtained exclusively — is the latest attempt by Congress to speed up construction of major energy and mining projects as the United States’ electricity demand rapidly eclipses new supply and Chinese export controls send the price of key critical minerals skyrocketing.
Two California Democrats, Representatives Josh Harder and Adam Gray, joined three Republicans, Representatives Mike Lawler of New York, Don Bacon of Nebraska, and Chuck Edwards of North Carolina, to sponsor the bill.
While green groups have criticized past proposals to reform federal permitting as a way to further entrench fossil fuels by allowing oil and gas to qualify for the new shortcuts, Harder pitched the bill as relief to ratepayers who “are facing soaring energy prices because we’ve made it too hard to build new energy projects.”
“The FREEDOM Act delivers the smart, pro-growth certainty that critical energy projects desperately need by cutting delays, fast-tracking approvals, and holding federal agencies accountable,” he told me in a statement. “This is a common sense solution that will mean more energy projects being brought online in the short term and lower energy costs for our families for the long run.”
The most significant clause in the 77-page proposal lands on page 59. The legislation prohibits federal agencies and officials from issuing “any order or directive terminating the construction or operation of a fully permitted project, revoke any permit or authorization for a fully permitted project, or take any other action to halt, suspend, delay, or terminate an authorized activity carried out to support a fully permitted project.”
There are, of course, exceptions. Permits could still be pulled if a project poses “a clear, immediate, and substantiated harm for which the federal order, directive, or action is required to prevent, mitigate, or repair.” But there must be “no other viable alternative.”
Such a law on the books would not have prevented the Trump administration from de-designating millions of acres of federal waters to offshore wind development, to pick just one example. But the legislation would explicitly bar Trump’s various attempts to halt individual projects with stop work orders. Even the sweeping order the Department of the Interior issued in December that tried to stop work on all offshore wind turbines currently under construction on the grounds of national security would have needed to prove that the administration exhausted all other avenues first before taking such a step.
Had the administration attempted something similar anyway, the legislation has a mechanism to compensate companies for the costs racked up by delays. The so-called De-Risking Compensation Fund, which the bill would establish at the Treasury Department, would kick in if the government revoked a permit, canceled a project, failed to meet deadlines set out in the law for timely responses to applications, or ran out the clock on a project such that it’s rendered commercially unviable.
The maximum payout is equal to the company’s capital contribution, with a $5 million minimum threshold, according to a fact-sheet summarizing the bill for other lawmakers who might consider joining as co-sponsors. “Claims cannot be denied based on project permits or energy technology type,” the document reads. A company that would have benefited from a payout, for example, would be TC Energy, the developer behind the Keystone XL oil pipeline the Biden administration canceled shortly after taking office.
Like other permitting reform legislation, the FREEDOM Act sets new rules to keep applications moving through the federal bureaucracy. Specifically, it gives courts the right to decide whether agencies that miss deadlines should have to pay for companies to hire qualified contractors to complete review work.
The FREEDOM Act also learned an important lesson from the SPEED Act, another bipartisan bill to overhaul federal permitting that passed the House in December but has since become mired in the Senate. The SPEED Act lost Democratic support — ultimately passing the House with just 11 Democratic votes — after far-right Republicans and opponents of offshore wind leveraged a special carveout to continue allowing the administration to commence its attacks on seaborne turbine projects.
The amendment was a poison pill. In the Senate, a trio of key Democrats pushing for permitting reform, Senate Energy and Natural Resources ranking member Martin Heinrich, Environment and Public Works ranking member Sheldon Whitehouse, and Hawaii senator Brian Schatz, previously told Heatmap’s Jael Holzman that their support hinged on curbing Trump’s offshore wind blitz.
Those Senate Democrats “have made it clear that they expect protections against permitting abuses as part of this deal — the FREEDOM Act looks to provide that protection,” Thomas Hochman, the director of energy and infrastructure policy at the Foundation for American Innovation, told me. A go-to policy expert on clearing permitting blockages for energy projects, Hochman and his center-right think tank have been in talks with the lawmakers who drafted the bill.
A handful of clean-energy trade groups I contacted did not get back to me before publication time. But American Clean Power, one of the industry’s dominant associations, withdrew its support for the SPEED Act after Republicans won their carveout. The FREEDOM Act would solve for that objection.
The proponents of the FREEDOM Act aim for the bill to restart the debate and potentially merge with parts of the previous legislation.
“The FREEDOM Act has all the critical elements you’d hope to see in a permitting certainty bill,” Hochman said. “It’s tech-neutral, it covers both fully permitted projects and projects still in the pipeline, and it provides for monetary compensation to help cover losses for developers who have been subject to permitting abuses.”
Maybe utilities’ “natural monopoly” isn’t so natural after all.
Debates over electricity policy usually have a common starting point: the “natural monopoly” of the transmission system, wherein the poles and wires that connect power plants to homes and businesses have exclusive franchises in a certain territory and charge regulated rates to access them.
The thinking is that without a monopoly franchise, no one would make the necessary capital expenditures to build and maintain the power lines and grid infrastructure necessary to connect the whole system, especially if they thought someone would build a new transmission line nearby. So while a government body oversees investment and prices, the utility itself is not subject to market-based competition.
But what if someone really did want to build their own wires?
“There are at least two of us who do not think that electricity is a natural monopoly,” Glen Lyons, the founder of Advocates for Consumer Regulated Electricity, told me.
The other one is Travis Fisher, an energy scholar at the Cato Institute, who corrected his friend and colleague.
“Between me, and Joseph Schumpeter, and Wayne Crews, and Glen Lyons, there’s at least four of us. Only three of us are alive,” Fisher said, referencing the Austrian economist Schumpeter, who died in 1950, and the libertarian scholar Crews, who was a critic of the restructuring of the electricity market in the 1990s.
Fisher and Lyons, however, are the team behind a proposal put out on Tuesday by the libertarian Cato Institute calling for “consumer-regulated electricity.” Instead of a transmission system with a monopoly franchise that independent generators can connect to and sell power to utilities in a process regulated by a combination of a public utility commission and regional transmission organization or independent system operators, CRE systems would be physically islanded electricity systems that customers would privately and voluntarily sign up for.
Crucially, CRE would not be regulated under existing federal law, and would have no connection to the existing grid, allowing for novel price structures and even physical set-ups, like running on different frequencies or even direct current, Fisher said.
They would also, Fisher and Lyons argue, help solve the dilemma haunting electricity policymakers: how to bring new load on the grid quickly without saddling existing ratepayers with the cost of paying for utility upgrades.
“If enabled, CRE utilities would generate, transmit, and sell electricity directly to customers under voluntary contracts, without interconnecting to the existing regulated grid or seeking permission from economic regulators at the state or federal level,” the Cato proposal reads.
This idea has a natural audience among political conservatives, as it’s essentially a bet that more entrepreneurship and less regulation will solve some of our biggest energy system problems. On the other hand, utilities tend to be a powerful force in conservative politics at both the state and federal levels, which is one reason why these kinds of ideas are still marginal.
But less marginal than they have been.
Consumer-regulated electricity is more than just another think tank white paper. It has also won the approval of the influential American Legislative Exchange Council, better known as ALEC, a conservative group that writes model legislation for state legislatures to adopt. Fisher proposed version of the consumer-regulated utilities plan to the network in December of last year, and ALEC approved it in January.
A few days after the group finalized the model policy to allow CRE at the state level, Arkansas Senator Tom Cotton proposed his own version in the form of the DATA Act, which would “amend the Federal Power Act to exempt consumer-regulated electric utilities from Federal regulation.”
While the CRE proposal is a big conceptual departure from about a century of electricity regulation, the actual reform is modest. Fisher and Lyons propose a structure would apply solely to “sophisticated customers … who voluntarily contract for service and can manage their own risks,” i.e. big industrial users like data centers, not your home.
While this sounds like behind the meter generation, whereby large electricity users such as, say, xAI in Memphis, simply set up their own electricity plants, CRE goes further. The idea is to capture the self-regulation benefits of building your own power within a structure that still allows for the economies of scale of a grid. Or in the words of Cato’s proposal, CRE “would enable third-party utilities to serve many customers, resulting in lower costs, higher reliability, and a smaller environmental footprint compared to self-supply options.”
Fisher and Lyons argue that CRE would also have an advantage over so-called co-location, where data centers are built adjacent to generation and share interconnection with the grid, which still requires interacting with public utility commissions and utilities. The pair have also suggested that the Department of Energy and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission use its existing rulemaking process on data center interconnection to encourage states to pass the necessary laws to allow islanded utility systems.
While allowing totally private utility systems may be a radical — and certainly a libertarian — departure from the utility regulation system as it exists today, proposals are popping up on both the left and the right to try to reduce utility influence over the electricity system.
Tom Steyer, the hedge fund billionaire and climate investor who is running for governor of California, has said that he would “break up the utility monopolies to lower electric bills by 25%.” In a January press conference, Steyer clarified that he “wants to force utility companies to choose cheaper ways of wildfire-proofing their infrastructure and give customers other options for buying power, including making it easier to build neighborhood-level solar projects or allowing more communities to operate their own local grids,” according to CalMatters. California already has some degree of retail choice, although a more expansive version of a retail competition model infamously collapsed during the 2001 rolling blackouts.
To Fisher, while his and Lyons’ proposal is in some ways radical, it is also not a particularly big risk. If there’s truly no demand for private electricity networks, none will be built and nothing will change, even if there’s regulatory reform to allow for it.“I’m not surprised to see it get traction,” Fisher said of the plan, “just because there’s no downside, and the upside could be absolutely nothing — or it could be a breakthrough.”